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Mass and Elite Views on Nuclear Security US National Security Surveys 1993–1999

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UNM Institute for Public Policy Mass and Elite Views on Nuclear Security US National Security Surveys 1993–1999 Volume II: Policy Elites UNM Institute for Public Policy The University of New Mexico Albuquerque, New Mexico August 2000 This research was conducted with funding provided by Sandia National Laboratories. Mass and Elite Views on Nuclear Security US National Security Surveys 1993–1999 Volume II: Policy Elites Kerry G. Herron, Ph.D. Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Ph.D. Scott D. Hughes, Ph.D. Dennis M. Gormley Thomas G. Mahnken, Ph.D. UNM Institute for Public Policy The University of New Mexico Albuquerque, New Mexico August 2000 Acknowledgments The authors wish to express appreciation to the following individuals whose support made this project possible. Sandia National Laboratories Roger Hagengruber, Senior Vice President Clyde Layne, Manager National Security and Arms Control National Security Leadership Programs UNM Institute for Public Policy Contributing Staff Transcription Carol Silva Marylou Smith Amy Fromer Carol Brown C. J. Ondek Lisa Page Policy Elites Interviewed 1 David Albright William C. Martel Andrew L. Ross Sidney Bearman James J. Martin Henry Rowen Richard K. Betts Jeffrey S. McKitrick James R. Schlesinger Davis B. Bobrow Jack Mendelsohn Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft General George Lee Butler Charles E. Miller Leon V. Sigal Stephen A. Cambone Marvin Miller Steven Simon William W. Carter Steven E. Miller Leon Sloss Tom Zamora Collina Janne E. Nolan Ambassador David Smith Ambassador Jonathan Dean Robert S. Norris Henry Sokolski Sidney Drell Robert Nurick John D. Steinbruner Michele Flournoy David Ochmanek Jessica Stern Alton Frye Keith B. Payne Frank J. Thomas Frank W. Gaffney, Jr. Vice Adm. John Poindexter Stephen W. Van Evera John Isaacs Barry Posen General Larry D. Welch Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr. George W. Rathjens Cindy Williams Daryl G. Kimball Victor H. Reis Philip Williams Ronald Lehman Stephen P. Rosen 1 Brief notations about the professional associations and qualifications of each participant are provided in Chapter One. ii Abstract As the first decade of the post-Cold War era comes to a close, policy makers and citizens can take stock of the lessons learned and continuing uncertainties that characterize this new international security environment. In this volume we provide a resource for “taking stock” through analyzing the results of in- depth interviews with fifty members of the US security policy community con- ducted between June 3, 1999 and March 1, 2000. Participants were chosen for their expertise in nuclear security policy and to illuminate a wide range of rele- vant policy perspectives. This is Volume II of the fourth report in an ongoing series of studies begun in 1993 to examine how mass and elite perspectives about nuclear security are evolving in the post-Cold War era. Areas of investigation in this volume include elite perceptions of the follow- ing: (a) key attributes and implications of the contemporary international secu- rity environment; (b) the evolving nature and requirements of nuclear security; (c) nuclear arms control; (d) US nuclear force structure, posture, and infra- structure; (d) missile defenses; (e) integrated beliefs about nuclear security; and (f) the role of the US general public in security policy processes. Qualitative cross-sectional analysis of verbatim transcripts of the fifty inter- views provides comparisons of the views of these policy elites in their own words. We employ cluster analysis to identify four groups of respondents ex- hibiting similar within group views about nuclear security and large differ- ences in policy perspectives between groups. We compare these patterns to the results of cluster analysis of a national sample of the US general public. In Volume I we present findings from a nationwide telephone survey of ran- domly selected members of the US general public conducted from September 13 to October 14, 1999. To analyze trends, we compare results to findings from previous surveys in this series conducted in 1993, 1995, and 1997. iii Intentionally Blank iv Contents: Volume II Front Matter Acknowledgments ii Abstract iii Contents v Executive Guide for the Reader ix Chapter One: Introduction and Overview 1 Section 1.1: Project Goal 1 Section 1.2: Conceptual Approach 2 Section 1.3: Analytic Model 3 Section 1.4: Research Design 5 Section 1.5: Data Collection 6 Section 1.6: Data Analysis 12 Section 1.7: Organization of Volume II 17 Chapter Two: International Security Environment 19 Section 2.1: Characterizing Today’s Security Environment 20 Section 2.2: Implications for Managing Security 23 Section 2.3: Assessing Russia 29 Section 2.4: Assessing China 34 Section 2.5: Nuclear Proliferation 39 Section 2.6: Mass Casualty Terrorism 46 Section 2.7: Characterizing Group Views 53 Chapter Three: Evolving Nature of Nuclear Security 59 Section 3.1: Risks and Benefits of Nuclear Weapons 59 Section 3.2: Nuclear Deterrence and the Cold War 63 Section 3.3: Nuclear Deterrence Today 67 Section 3.4: The Future Efficacy of Nuclear Deterrence 73 Section 3.5: Extended Nuclear Deterrence 76 Section 3.6: Existential Nuclear Deterrence 80 Section 3.7: Deterring Biological and Chemical Attacks 84 v Section 3.8: The Role of Precision Guided Munitions 96 Section 3.9: Characterizing Group Views 104 Chapter Four: Nuclear Arms Control 109 Section 4.1: Viability of Strategic Arms Control 109 Section 4.2: Views About Unilateral Nuclear Initiatives 116 Section 4.3: Shape of START III 119 Section 4.4: Transparency and Verification 122 Section 4.5: Future Arms Control Directions 124 Section 4.6: Views About the CTBT 127 Section 4.7: Characterizing Group Views 138 Chapter Five: Nuclear Forces and Infrastructure 143 Section 5.1: US Nuclear Force Structure 143 Section 5.2: US Nuclear Force Posture 157 Section 5.3: US Nuclear Infrastructure 172 Section 5.4: Characterizing Group Views 184 Chapter Six: Missile Defenses 189 Section 6.1: Perspectives on the Ballistic Missile Threat 189 Section 6.2: Perspectives on Theater Missile Defenses 192 Section 6.3: National Missile Defenses and Nuclear Deterrence 194 Section 6.4: Relationship Between Offensive and Defensive Forces 196 Section 6.5: Effectiveness of National Missile Defenses 199 Section 6.6: Implications for the ABM Treaty 201 Section 6.7: Responses to Deploying National Missile Defenses 203 Section 6.8: Characterizing Group Views 205 Chapter Seven: Beliefs About Nuclear Security 209 Section 7.1: Conceptualizing Nuclear Abolition 209 Section 7.2: Reconciling Nuclear Weapons and US Values 225 vi Section 7.3: Justifying the Employment of Nuclear Weapons 230 Section 7.4: Characterizing Group Views 235 Chapter Eight: Elite Views of the Public and Nuclear Security 239 Section 8.1: Traditional Role of the Public in Nuclear Security Policy 240 Section 8.2: Public Capacity to Understand and Participate 252 Section 8.3: Elite Preferences About the Role of the General Public 256 Section 8.4: Characterizing Group Views 261 Chapter Nine: Comparing Mass and Elite Perspectives 265 Section 9.1: Comparing Expectations About Publics 265 Section 9.2: Characterizing Mass and Elite Views 267 Section 9.3: Relating Patterns Among Mass and Elite Publics 272 Section 9.4: Implications for Security Policy Processes 278 Section 9.5: Bottom Lines 282 Appendix 1: Research Methodology 285 Section A1.1: Sampling 285 Section A1.2: Respondent Protections 287 Section A1.3: Initial Contact and Scheduling 287 Section A1.4: Data Collection 288 Section A1.5: Data Coding and Analysis 297 Annex A: Consent Form 305 Annex B: Topical Outline 306 Annex C: Interviewer’s Guide 307 Appendix 2: Elite Focus Group 311 Section A2.1: Participants 312 vii Section A2.2: Security Environment and Threats to US Security 313 Section A2.3: Relevance of Nuclear Weapons 319 Section A2.4: US Nuclear Force Structure and Posture 324 Section A2.5: Security Policy Processes and the Public 331 Glossary 335 References 337 viii Volume II: Executive Guide for the Reader This is the second volume of a two-volume report summarizing findings from an ongoing research project to study mass and elite views about nuclear security in the post-Cold War environment. This Executive Guide provides an overview of topics by chapter and a quick reference to key points of interest for the reader. In Volume I of the report, we analyze results from a nationwide survey of the general public conducted between September 13 and October 14, 1999. We compare findings with those from three previous surveys of the general public conducted in 1993, 1995, and 1997. In Volume II we comparatively analyze views about nuclear security expressed during in-depth interviews with fifty members of the US security policy community between June 3, 1999 and March 1, 2000. The following table outlines our ongoing study series. PHASE I PHASE II PHASE III PHASE IV Survey: September– June 1993– September– June– October 1999 COLLECTION PERIODS March 1994 November 1995 November 1997 Interviews: June1999– March 2000 • General Public: • General Public: • General Public: • General Public: N = 1,301 N = 2,490 N = 1,639 N = 1,483 RESPONDENT • Union of Con- • American Men & • Policy Elites: GROUPS cerned Scientists: Women of Science: N = 50 N = 1,155 N = 1,212 • US National Labs: • State Legislators: N = 1,226 N = 603 • General Public: • General Public: • General Public: • General Public: Telephone Telephone Telephone Telephone COLLECTION • Union of Con- • American Men & • Policy Elites: METHODS cerned Scientists: Women of Science: Face-to-face Mail Mail interviews • US National Labs: • State Legislators: Mail Mail • Nuclear security • Nuclear security • Nuclear security • Nuclear security • Philosophical • US/Russian nu- • US/Russian nu- • Precision guided KEY LINES OF approaches to clear cooperation clear cooperation munitions INVESTIGATION science and • Personal security • Critical infrastruc- • Response options research tures • National missile • Science policy defenses ix Chapter One: Introduction and Overview Project Goal (p.
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