The interplay of governance modes in architectural
decision making
Master’s Thesis 30 credits Programme: Master’s Programme in Business and Management Specialisation: Organisation
Department of Business Studies Uppsala University Spring Semester of 2021
Date of Submission: 2021-06-02
Daniel Nordenström Adam Svender
Supervisor: Josef Pallas
Nordenström & Svender, 1
Abstract
The suggested deficiencies in bureaucratic and management governance highlighted by scholars in new public management as well as organizational studies has led to an increased academic interest in alternate forms of governance. One of those forms being collegiality, a governance form often associated with traditional professions such as hospital workers, lawyers, academics and architects. This case study sets out to examine how the interplay between the governance modes of bureaucracy, management and collegiality is manifested in organizations. To do this, governance interplay in the decision making of architectural production was chosen as the subject of the study, as it has been suggested by prior literature to feature elements of collegiality as well as bureaucracy. A framework derived from the literature on governance modes was formulated to enable the study of governance interplay, and the findings suggest that governance modes are applied in a manner similar to a bricolage or hybrid organization as is recognized within the literature on institutional logics.
Keywords: Governance modes, interplay, ideal types, bureaucracy, management, collegiality. Nordenström & Svender, 2
Acknowledgements
We would like to extend our gratitude and appreciation to the architecture firm that made this study possible. From the start, we were met with enthusiasm, openness and curiosity, for which we are immensely grateful. Furthermore, we would like to recognize our peers in the seminar group, and a special thanks to Lowe and Jakob for their valuable feedback during this final semester. It should be noted that this paper has been written as part of a larger research project on collegiality, conducted at Uppsala university. This research project is, in part, led by our supervisor for this paper Josef Pallas and we would like to show our appreciation and gratitude for the opportunity to be a part of it, as well as for Pallas’ supervision during this study. Pallas’ insights and guidance have been beyond valuable. To Pallas, the architectural firm and our peers: Thank you.
Uppsala, 2021-06-02.
Daniel Nordenström Adam Svender Nordenström & Svender, 3
Table of contents
Abstract 1 Acknowledgements 2 Table of contents 3 1. Introduction 4 1.1 Problematization 5 1.2 Purpose and research question 7 1.3 Disposition 7 2. Theory 9 2.1 Governance in organizations 9 2.2 Ideal modes of governance 9 2.3 Research on the interplay of governance modes 14 2.4 Institutional logics as an analogy 15 2.5 The theoretical interplay of the ideal governance modes in decision making 16 2.6 Theoretical framework 21 3. Method 24 3.1 Scientific approach and design 24 3.2 Case selection 25 3.3 Research setting & context 26 3.4 Data collection and operationalization 27 3.5 Method of analysis 30 3.6 Ethical considerations 31 4. Findings 32 4.1 Decisions regarding project management 32 4.2 Decisions on architectural design 35 4.3 Predetermined decisions 38 5. Analysis 40 5.1 The empirical interplay of governance modes 40 5.2 Emerging themes and patterns of the interplay 46 6. Conclusion 49 7. Discussion 51 8. Limitations and future research 53 9. References 55 10. Appendixes 68 Nordenström & Svender, 4
1. Introduction
In their article on power relations in architecture firms, Brown, Kornberger, Clegg and Carter (2010) state what many architects probably know already: there has always existed tension between the creative ethos of architects and the necessity of winning commissions to reach the goals of the organization. Similar tensions, however, can be found in other professional realms as professionals and collegial organizations in general have been losing power (Freidson 1983) due to the increase of bureaucratization (Freidson 1983; Waters 1989) and managerialism (Hood 1991). Most of the literature on the increase of bureaucratic and managerial governance have focused on the public sector. Possibly due to the suggestion that, as Hood (1991; 1995) and Noordegraf (2007) and have demonstrated, the public sector has undergone large changes and implementation of management ideas that have changed the institutional environment within the public sector to a larger degree than the private sector, which by and large were already managerial (Hood 1991).
The constraints put on architectural firms by different governance modes is a topic that has been subjected to increased attention over the past few years in Sweden (see for example: Sehlin 2021; Lunneborg 2020; Söderlind 2019; Nordangård 2018a; Nordberg 2016). Mostly as a part of a larger debate on the architectural design of contemporary buildings, what beauty is and who decides what should be built. One of the main opinion makers within this discussion is a lobby organization called Arkitektupproret (“Architectural riot”), which opposes modern architectural design and celebrates traditional architecture. Arkitektupproret accuses architects of elitism and for possessing a “taste monopoly” that only appeals to other architects with the exclusion of ordinary people (Arkitektupproret 2019), as well as for being hypocritical for producing contemporary architecture while personally prefer to reside in traditionally designed buildings (Arkitektupproret 2018a).
As a response to Arkitektupproret’s critique, leading architects have defended contemporary architectural design (Expressen TV 2018) by labeling the opinions as regressive (Nordangård 2018b); others are essentially blaming some aspects of how architectural firms are organized by claiming that time and financial constraints hinders their ability to produce the work they want to produce (Belin 2019; Stjernberg 2019), suggesting an impairment of the profession by management and market forces. Architects argue that construction developers downgrade projects by using cheaper materials and cheaper designs in an effort to cut costs, which Nordenström & Svender, 5 ultimately turns a beautiful building into an ugly one during the actual production of a building (Belin 2019). In turn, the construction developers accuses the complexity of the bureaucratic regulations, purportedly forcing the construction companies to lower costs at every stage of production in order to be able to meet market requirements and offer competitive prices (Belin 2019; Kronqvist 2019; Landén 2019; Hanna, Fosnes & Selberg 2017). Underlying the arguments within the infected debate on contemporary architectural design lies an indication that there are governance modes that to a certain extent are competing with each other. For example, when Stjernberg (2019) argues that financial constraints and market forces are hurting architectural work and creativity, it could serve as a cause for further research about how the managerial goals of the organization are colliding with the professional and creative ethos of the architects, to use Browns et al. (2010) terminology.
The potential clash between these modes of governance in the architectural design process poses a great opportunity to study how governance forms interact, conflict and coincide with each other in architectural production. Since architectural firms has been recognized as professional bureaucracies, meaning they are bureaucratic organisations dominated by the expertise of the professionals (Mintzberg 1992, referenced in Lunenburg 2012), this setup poses a great opportunity to examine the interplay of governance modes and to contribute to the academic debate and research of governance interplay within organizations.
1.1 Problematization
As described above, this study aims to capture how governance modes are manifested in architectural production and, in particular, in architectural decision making. In order to examine the governance interplay, ideal types of bureaucracy, collegiality, and management will be employed in this paper. Furthermore, an emphasis will be made on how the ideal forms describe the decision maker and the decision-making process. Because of this paper’s application of ideal forms as theoretical constructs, it is necessary to address the common criticism that the usage of the ideal form gets, in that ideal types are far removed from real life (see for example: Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist 2016; Thornton & Ocasio 2008; Bartels 2009), inadequate to capture the complex social reality. To illustrate, while Weber acknowledged the role of collegiality (Waters 1989), he nonetheless excluded it when formulating the ideal form of bureaucracy and hence described an organization that is Nordenström & Svender, 6 functioning according to its bureaucratic routines, blueprints and formal structures (Weber 1947, referenced in Pugh 2007). While acknowledging critique of ideal types, studies that have employed the ideal form in their research are rarely using it to describe the world in a literal sense. Rather, they are have used ideal forms as tools for comparisons in their analysis (see: Kligyte & Barrie 2014; Blomgren & Waks 2016; Thornton 2002; Pallas, Fredriksson, & Wedlin 2016; Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist 2016, Samuelsson 2019; Heckscher 1994; Waters 1989). These studies mirrors Thornton and Ocasio’s (2008) notion that ideal types are highly useful for comparisons:
“While often derived from empirical observation, ideal types are not for describing an organizational field, but instead are theoretical models for comparing the effects of various meanings in a location with a definable boundary [...] Ideal types assign a hypothetical meaning that can be used as a yardstick to compare and contrast hypothesized and actual meaning and behaviour” (Thornton & Ocasio 2008, p. 110).
Research on emerging and contradicting governance modes has to a large degree focused on the public sector and, more specifically, the introduction of New Public Management (NPM) (Diefenbach 2009; Blomgren & Waks 2015; Haque 1999; Hoggett 1996; Hood 1995; 1991). While the term according to Hood (1991) might be ill-defined, as it is just an overarching name of a set of doctrines. The doctrines themselves incorporate features that express the practices of NPM. An emphasis on output controls and competition are illustrative examples of such features. Diefenbach (2009) claims that the increase of managerialism has been detrimental to public organizations, as NPM’s emphasis on effectiveness might achieve the opposite when all costs and benefits are considered (Butterfield, Edwards & Woodall 2004; Pollitt 2000; Haque 1999;). Moreover, as Sahlin and Eriksson-Zetterquist (2016) points out, increased managerialism through supervision, goals, and reward structures have had a negative impact on the collegial aspects within the university world.
One could assume that the same development, referring to increased managerialism and bureaucratization, would have similar effects for professionals within private enterprises. However, the assumption that it would have a negative impact for organizations at large could be questioned by arguing that there are key features that differentiate publicly and privately owned enterprises. Ownership, the demand to make profit, and different dominating Nordenström & Svender, 7 institutional logics (Blomgren & Waks 2016; Noordegraaf 2007), to name a few. Hence, in order to get a better theoretical and empirical understanding of the interplay between governance modes, this paper argues that more research is needed in professional settings within both the private and public sector.
1.2 Purpose and research question
Following the problematization regarding ideal forms above, this study set out to examine the interplay of governance modes in architectural production. That is, how governance modes are practised interdependently, in concurrence or in contradiction with each other. Hence, the following research question was formulated:
How is the interplay of governance modes manifested in the decision making within architectural production?
1.3 Disposition
This paper opens by describing the ideal types of bureaucracy, management and collegiality. It is these ideal types that the study uses as comparative tools of analysis of the interplay on governance modes. The theory chapter continues by reviewing earlier research of the interplay between both governance modes, as well as institutional logics, whose literature on interplay this study draws inspiration from. While recognizing that institutional logics and governance modes are not one and the same, institutional logics is included as an analogy to how the interplay between governance modes might manifest itself. Finally, the chapter closes by formulating a theoretical framework of analysis, drawn from theoretical assumptions on the ideal types that are derived from prior literature on ideal modes of governance. The paper continues by accounting for the choices made pertaining to the methodology of the study in order to adequately address the problem statement and answer the research questions. Decisions regarding the qualitative nature of the study and the methodology of a case study are accounted for. Moreover, in the method section, the paper will account for the choices of conducting both interviews and observations, as well as the ethical considerations that have been taken into consideration throughout the study. Nordenström & Svender, 8
In the findings chapter, the empirical findings are accounted for along five decision areas that were identified during the study’s initial investigation into architectural decision making. The findings section is followed by an analysis of the data according to the theoretical framework. Where the framework is applied as well as acting as a departure for deeper analysis of the interplay within architectural production. Finally, the paper concludes the findings and analysis and ends with a discussion of the findings as well as the limitations of the study, and closes by making suggestions for future research. Nordenström & Svender, 9
2. Theory
2.1 Governance in organizations
The origins, meaning and significance of the term governance is disputed by scholars to this day. Scholars within the social sciences, and particularly business administration, might associate governance with bureaucracy and management; in the judicial literature, it could refer to the rule of law; and in policies studies it could refer to governmental coordination and organization (Zumbansen 2012). Zumbasen (ibid) suggests that the term from an interdisciplinary perspective encompasses the “engaging with competing models and theoretizations of order”. That is, the conceptualization of what organized order looks like and how it is created. In organizational studies, governance of organizations is often recognized as either bureaucratic or managerial (Zumbasen 2012; Bartels 2009; Diefenbach 2009; Höpfl 2006; Selznick 1948). While scholars within the field of organizational studies have suggested that both bureaucracy and managerial governance contributes to efficiency (Bartels 2009; Freiberg 2005; Hoggett 1996; Wilenski 1988), they have also been suggested to bring with them increased administrative workload and complexity (Brandtner, Horvath & Powell 2016; Staw & Epstein 2000; Pollitt 2000; Carson, Lanier, Carson & Birkenmeier 1999), as well as the challenging of core values and operations (Haque 1999; Hood 1991). These recognized drawbacks have led researchers to examine alternative forms of coordination and control (Tracey, Phillips & Jarvis 2011). One such alternative form being collegiality (Wald 1983; Waters 1989; Bogh-Andersen 2009), a hitherto overlooked governance mode often associated with traditional professions such as lawyers, teachers, architects, and hospital workers (Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist 2016).
2.2 Ideal modes of governance
2.2.1 Bureaucracy
Prior to the conceptualization of the bureaucracy, a seignorial leadership persisted. A leadership which some scholars have labeled as a reminiscence of feudal society (Selznick 1948), which viewed people as belonging to certain positions based on person, family and status. Weber’s (1922) rational bureaucracy was a clear break from that order. Instead, the bureaucracy was characterized by efficiency through the division of labour, hierarchy, rules, impersonal relationships and meritocracy (Weber 1922; Selznick 1943; Selznick 1948; Waters 1989; Höpfl 2006; Weber referenced in Pugh 2007; Bartels 2009). Nordenström & Svender, 10
In his article on post-bureaucracy, Höpfl (2006) lists eleven attributes of what he categorizes as the core attributes of the rational bureaucracy based on analysis of several of Weber’s writings. First, bureaucracies secures routine day-to-day execution through administrators. Secondly, the bureaucratic organization is strictly hierarchical, consisting of delimited jurisdictions that enables the division of labour. Third, the hierarchy is monocratic, advocating that authority is to be exercised by one person without interference from others rather than democratically in a collective. Fourth, bureaucracy assumes impersonality towards its staff, requiring officials to treat their subordinates impersonally and with no regard to their person or status. This impersonality is suggested to derive from rules, which is also determinant for recruitment and advancement. Fifth, qualifications and expertise is determinant for the position within the hierarchy. Sixth, the selection of officials is made by superiors. Seventh, promotions are based on rules and order, rather than on merit, and salaires relate to the status within the hierarchy rather than individual performance. Eighth, the keeping of records. Ninth, fixed salaries for positions. Tenth, secret and secretiveness based on authority level in the hierarchy; and finally, eleventh, the bureaucracy is characterized by its large size.
These attributes of the rational bureaucracy are what Höpfl (2006) conceptualizes as the foundation of bureaucracy and what Weber thought was the most efficient way to organize. The concept is not without its critiques, however. Scholars have argued that Weber did not account for new power relationships of the bureaucracy (Selznick 1943; 1948), social relations (Merton 1940; 1952), nor the decrease in efficiency due to over-administration that has been observed empirically (Suddaby, Ganzin & Minkus 2017; Brandtner et al. 2016; Hood 1991; 1995). Other scholars argue that the bureaucracy is an outdated type of organization in the current complex, dynamic, and globalized society of today (Bennis 1965; Child & McGrath 2001). According to Van Braam (1980, referenced in Bartels 2009), critiques of the bureaucratic ideal type are characterized by two fallacies: misappropriation of the ideal type, and a partial understanding of the bureaucracy’s rationality. Mayntz (1971 referenced in Bartels 2009) argues that scholars' disapproval of bureaucracy is often motivated by their assumptions and goals rather than empirical evidence. In his article on bureaucracy, Bartels (2009) highlights that Weber acknowledges that the ideal type can not possibly exist and therefore can not be found. This acknowledgement, Bartels argues, invalidates the critiques of the ideal type not corresponding to the complex social reality. As Nordenström & Svender, 11
Weber did not intend to describe reality accurately from the beginning. Despite the critique however, bureaucracy has been claimed to still characterize much of contemporary organizational life to this day (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist 2016).
2.2.2 Management
One of the wider societal trends over the last 40 years has been the one of increased managerialism among organizations. Most notably within the public sector, purportedly as a response to bureaucratic inefficiencies (Hood 1991; Brunsson & Sahlin-Andersson 2000; Reiter & Klenk 2019). Managerialism as a theoretical concept is not part of a cohesive structure, but rather consists of separate ideas connected by a market, stakeholder and customer logic (Diefenbach 2009; Blomgren & Waks 2015; Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist 2016). Due to this theoretical incohesiveness, the choice has been made to focus on the literature of NPM, which have been concerned with the definition of management. Diefenbach (2009) identified in his examination of the NPM literature five core elements of managerialism: 1) business environment and strategic objectives, 2) organizational structures and processes, 3) performance management and measurement systems, 4) management and managers, and 5) employees and corporate culture.
First, management assumes ever-changing external pressures from the business environment (Steger 2005; Meyer & Bromley 2013; Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist 2016), which creates the need for organizations to formulate strategies and change in order to survive (Hood 1991; Karp 2005). The inherent market orientation makes managed organizations competitive towards its external business environment. Secondly, in terms of organizational structures, managerialism assumes a hierarchical structure, much like the bureaucratic ideal type (Diefenbach 2009). However, in managerialism there is less focus on the hierarchy and an increased focus on flexibility and decentralization. This is due to the idea of letting “managers manage” (Nielsen 2013; Laegreid, Roness & Verhoest 2011). Some scholars argue, however, that the managerial hierarchy is not necessarily less hierarchical, arguing that the hierarchy is simply different than that of the bureaucracy, emphasizing a structure of strategy formulation (Diefenbach 2009; Hellawell & Hancock 2001; Sanderson 2001; Courpasson 2000; Pollitt 1990; Considine 1990). Similar to bureaucracy, management favors processes. But ideally, managerial processes focus more on faster decision making, Nordenström & Svender, 12 collaboration and putting things into action (Diefenbach 2009). Standardized strategic and operational tools are employed though, through the use of management models.
Third, managerialism assumes a systematic, regular and comprehensive use of performance indicators (Hoggett 1996; McCormack, Propper & Smith 2013). These performance indicators are used in the assessment of the organization’s goal fulfillment. The managerial assumption of applying such indicators is that it leads to an increase in efficiency, productivity and quality (Diefenbach 2009). Fourth, management is viewed to be a separate organizational function, populated by “managers” with the skill to “manage” (Kärreman & Alvesson 2004). Focusing on the skills of analysing the environment, strategizing, and measuring performance, rather than skills of the professionals that the manager manages, enabling transferability of managers between industries and professions (Hoggett 1996). Fifth, the managed organization expects its staff to develop “business-like” attitudes and mindsets and emphasizes leadership and corporate culture as crucial to the organization’s success (Karp 2005).
Management has come to be scrutinized by scholars of different disciplines. Scholars have brought forth critique of managerialism eroding qualitative values such as the public service ethos and its commitment to impartiality, welfare, and social equality and justice due to their non-quantifiable nature (Haque 1999; Hoggett 1996). Diefenbach (2009) states in his critique that the devaluation of ethical principles of public governance and ethical values at today's scale is measured at historical proportions. Furthermore, while there is evidence of management improving the efficiency of public organizations (Wilenski 1988; Hoggett 1996; Freiberg 2005), the efficiency gains are suggested to be achieved at the cost of less desirable results (Pollitt 2000; Diefenbach 2009), such as the loss of values. Others argue that the overall performance of organizations does not increase at all, but that it in fact decreases (Carson, Lanier, Carson & Birkenmeier 1999; Staw & Epstein 2000; Butterfield, Edwards & Woodall 2004).
2.2.3 Collegiality
While writings on collegiality appeared as early as in Webers’ texts some hundred years ago (Waters 1989), ideas about collegiality have been somewhat forgotten in contemporary business literature (Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist 2016). Collegial governance sets itself apart from management and bureaucracy by not pertaining to any one organization, but Nordenström & Svender, 13 cross-organizationally, throughout professional groups and practitioners (Waters 1989; Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist 2016). It is characterized by shared expertise, values, norms, as well as egalitarianism and autonomy of the practitioners (Freidson 1984; Waters 1989; Edwards 2003; Bogh-Andersen 2009). While some view the ideal types of collegiality as an inherent aspect of professionalism (Waters 1989), others view it as a working process that are not exclusive to professionals (Denis, Veronesi, Regis & Germain 2019; Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist 2016). This demonstrates a perceived ambiguity regarding what the concept of collegiality really entails and how it is defined.
In Waters (1989) analysis of Weber's early work on collegiality, he identifies six characteristics that later research echo and agree upon as fundamental aspects of collegiality. The first aspect is the theoretical knowledge and disciplinary expertise that members of a profession possess. Becoming a member of a certain discipline is only achievable if the member has acquired a necessary amount of knowledge within the field (Freidson 1984), because of the complex and technical nature of the knowledge domain (Wald 1983). The second aspect of collegiality is the idea of a professional career. Members of a collegial profession serve a higher norm or purpose rather than blunt self-interest. The claim is that regardless of what sector or how the incentive structures are shaped, professionals within an occupation should follow a certain code of conduct (Bogh-Andersen 2009). These codes can be found within the judicial profession (Edwards 2003), health care (Hadjistavropoulos, Malloy, Sharpe & Fuchs-Lacelle 2003), and universities (Freidson 1984).
The third aspect of collegiality is the idea of formalized egalitarianism (Waters 1989). Leadership is carried out according to the principle of primus inter pares, or the first among equals (Sahlin & Eriksson Zetterqvist 2016). This principle differs from bureaucratic and management structures as it lacks formal leaders and a top-down hierarchy. In general, one professor, physician or lawyer is equal to another. The lack of formalized and authoritarian leadership brings us to the fourth aspect of collegiality which is formalized autonomy (Waters 1989). Professionals within a collegiate are ideally self regulating and are subjected to informal control through self regulating processes. Professionals are essentially free to do research and communicate as they wish, but in case of violations of ethical norms, the matter is handled by the peers, rather than through bureaucratic processes (Waters 1989; Freidson 1984; Wald 1983; Blomgren & Waks 2015; Denis et al. 2019). The fifth aspect is scrutiny of product, best illustrated by the seminar in the university context (Sahlin & Nordenström & Svender, 14
Eriksson-Zetterquist 2016) or by second opinions within health-care and legal professions (Waters 1989). The sixth, and final aspect of the ideal type is collective decision-making. In the ideal form, the collegiate makes decisions collectively through a decision-making body, or what Kligyte and Barrie (2014) calls decision-making structures. Collegiate bodies are either general committees consisting of all peers in an organization, specialist committees composed of peers within a certain discipline or delegate committees which act on behalf of a superior body (Waters 1989).
2.3 Research on the interplay of governance modes
Sahlin and Eriksson-Zetterquist (2016) argue that it is a practical impossibility for any ideal mode of governance to remain the same if other governance modes come into play. Contemporary research on interplay of governance modes has largely focused on how professionals react to new forms of governance. Research from Denis and his colleagues (2019) shows that the introduction of new governance modes is often met with resistance, or co-production (for empirical examples, see Exworthy, Wilkinson, McColl, Moore, Roderick, Smith & Gabbay 2003; Adler & Kwon 2013). Both Sahlin and Eriksson-Zetterquist (2016), and Denis et al. (2019) papers’ echoes earlier texts on the interplay between collegiality and bureaucracy in the sense that they highlight the incompatibility between the collegiality and bureaucracy. Weber (1978, referenced in Waters 1989) viewed collegiality as having a largely negative effect on the modern society’s organizing capacity, and thus predicted a retreat of collegiality in favor of increased bureaucracy. Moreover, Durkheim (1933, referenced in Waters 1989) viewed collegiality as having a mitigating effect on arbitrary use of power and forced division of labor in professional bureaucracies, indicating that there is a fundamental collision between the two. According to Sahlin and Eriksson-Zetterquist (2016), however, current views on professions argue that collegiality cannot be practiced in isolation, but rather is practiced in combination with bureaucratic and management forms of governance. According to Sahlin and Eriksson-Zetterquist (ibid) the interplay of governance modes should be viewed as more of a balancing act rather than pure competition of governance modes, implying that governance modes on a theoretical level can be applied strategically.
For the purpose of understanding the relationship between governance modes, there is good reason to borrow ideas and concepts from the neighboring stream of literature on institutional logics and institutional pluralism. Especially as institutional logics is viewed to have the Nordenström & Svender, 15 possibility to be used strategically (Blomgren & Waks 2016; Johansen & Waldorff 2015; Ansari, Wijen & Gray 2013; McPherson & Sauder 2013). It is necessary to highlight that institutional logics should not be regarded as equated to governance modes. To elaborate, an organization can be managerial to a high degree without pertaining to a market logic, considering the fact that nonprofit organizations also can be highly managerial (Kaplan 2001). Rather, research on the interplay between institutional logics allows this paper to use logics as an analogy to how the interplay between collegial, managerial and bureaucratic modes of governance might manifest itself.
2.4 Institutional logics as an analogy
Institutional logics refers to taken for granted orders, values, and assumptions (Powell & Dimaggio 1991; Thornton 2008) and extensive research has been conducted on organizations that experience multiple contradicting logics at the same time (see for example Blomgren & Waks 2016; Noordegraaf 2007) making the interplay of logics possible to use as a metaphor for the interplay of governance modes. Organizations that exist in a pluralism of institutional logics has been suggested to either become hybrid organizations, where logics coincide to create a new, singular logic (Mair, Mayer & Lutz 2015; Battilana & Dorado 2010) or bricolage organizations where individuals are able to choose between logics dependent on the role, position or situation he or she is currently in (Ansari, Wijen & Gray 2013; McPherson & Sauder 2013; Johansen & Waldorff 2015).
2.4.1 Hybrid organizations
The concept of hybrid organizations tries to describe organizations that merge two or more logics that were previously thought of as separated fields of work into something new (Johansen & Waldorff 2015; Aurini 2006). Studies on hybrid organizations focus largely on the organizational level rather than the individual level, and through the application of case studies, researchers have been able to identify how organizations use logics strategically when reacting to institutional pressures (Johansen & Waldorff 2015). For instance, Battilana and Dorado (2010) studied microfinance organizations and found that the studied organizations hire new employees that are carriers of the logics that the organization attempts to combine. Another illustrative paper by Dacin, Dacin and Tracey (2011) studied how social entrepreneurial enterprises are a result of combining both for-profit and nonprofit institutional logics. Furthermore, Dacin et al. (2011) discusses how these contradicting logics creates Nordenström & Svender, 16 unique challenges for social entrepreneurial organizations, since they have to address stakeholders within both realms in order to be legitimate. Dacin et al. (2011) then conclude by highlighting the important question of how individual actors within the organizations are making trade-offs between logics, which brings us to the concept of bricolage organizations.
2.4.2 Bricolage organizations
Similarly to hybrid organizations, bricolage organizations are also said to exist in institutional pluralism. There are, however, differences in the level of perspective. While hybrid organizations focus on the organizational level, studies on bricolages focus on the micro-level as it puts emphasis on the individual actor within the organization (Johansen & Waldorff 2015). In a bricolage organization, the individual actor can pick and choose between institutional logics depending on the role or position he or she is currently in (Ansari, Wijen & Gray 2013; McPherson & Sauder 2013; Johansen & Waldorff 2015). This differs from what Noordegraaf (2007) and Blomgren and Waks (2016) call hybrid-professionals, referring to professionals that embody multiple logics. The concept of bricolage organizations implies, as Johansen and Waldorff (2015), Glynn (2000), and Glynn and Lounsbury (2005) suggests, that the actors within the organization have a high degree of influence to form their own work by molding and resisting logics within their day-to-day practices. To illustrate, McPherson and Sauders (2013) ethnographic case study on institutional complexity in a drug court found that individual actors use logics as a toolbox to justify and influence decisions according to their own views on a case. This bears resemblance to Denis et al. (2019) notion that governance modes might lead to either resistance or co-production from the individual actors within the organization. Similarly to Denis et al. (2019) conclusions on combining governance modes, failing to succeed with complementary strategic use of different logics has been associated with internal conflict that could be harmful to organizations (Battilana & Dorado 2010; D'Aunno, Sutton & Price 1991; Pache & Santos 2010; Zilber 2002), and uncompatible logics forces actors to compromise between logics (Oliver 1991; Battilana & Dorado 2010).
2.5 The theoretical interplay of the ideal governance modes in decision making
To examine how the interplay of governance modes is manifested in architectural production, this paper will focus on the decision making aspects of the ideal types. For this cause, decision making has been divided into two practical elements and two legitimizing elements. Nordenström & Svender, 17
The practical elements of governance decision making are: the decision maker, and the decision-making process. The legimitzing elements of decision making associated with each practical element is dubbed the rationale. That is, the rationale of the decision maker and the rationale of the decision-making process. Although all three ideal types do not explicitly describe the decision-making mechanism in detail, they do mention how decision making ought to be carried out as well as the rationale of the governance mode. This section will continue by describing each ideal decision maker, decision-making process, and their accompanying rationale. Mapping the possible theoretical compatibilities between practical elements, as well as the theoretical compatibilities between the legitimizing elements and their associated practical element.
2.5.1 The decision maker
The bureaucratic decision maker is a monocratic official with a certain mandate pertaining to that particular office, which sets formalized rules and procedures that workers are to follow (Selznick 1943; 1948; Waters 1989; Höpfl 2006). The authority of a decision maker is not necessarily one that allows the official to make decisions outside of predetermined processes and procedures (Bartels 2009). Rather, the official is to reinforce the rules of established processes and procedures to make sure that they are followed by the personnel (Höpfl 2006; Van Braam 1980, referenced in Bartels 2009; Selznick 1948). The ideal managerial decision maker is, much like the bureaucratic ideal, monocratic (Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist 2016; Kärreman & Alvesson 2004), but is more oriented towards performance, rather than formalized rules (Diefenbach 2009). Collegiality sets itself apart from both management and bureaucracy by promoting collective bodies as decision makers (Kligyte & Barrie 2014). If authority is given to individuals, it is given to those that are considered primus inter pares based on their expertise and through recognition of their peers (Waters 1989).
According to the bureaucratic ideal type, the decision maker rises through the ranks by following the rules and by possessing the right merits for the role, since bureaucracy is meritocratic in its ideal form (Bartels 2009; Höpfl 2006). Thus, the decision maker is viewed as being the most suitable for the position and therefore ought to be the optimal decision maker. Similarly to the bureaucratic decision maker, the managerial decision maker is also chosen based on merits (Diefenbach 2009). In contrast to bureaucracy however, which does not specify which merits is ideally favoured for a decision maker, managerialism views knowledge in strategy and management as crucial for the managerial decision maker as these Nordenström & Svender, 18 are competences that are viewed to lead to success for the organization (Kärreman & Alvesson 2004). In contrast to the bureaucratic and managerial ideal, the legitimacy of the decision maker’s authority is drawn from the decision makers’ merits within the profession and recognition from colleagues based on their knowledge, rather than their position within the hierarchy, promoting equality between members of the profession (Bogh-Andersen 2009; Waters 1989; Freidson 1984). While knowledge of the business is viewed as important, it is first and foremost the profession-specific knowledge that is valued (Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist 2016; Wald 1983). Furthermore, collegial rationale promotes knowledge development and to reach the “truth”.
Because bureaucracy does not specify the knowledge valued by the ideal type and by that logic incorporates managerial rationale, this paper assumes that bureaucratic rationale can be used to legitimize managerial decision makers. The opposite is assumed to be theoretically incompatible due to management’s emphasis on the individual and her judgement as opposed to the assumed rule-abiding and impartial rationality of bureaucracy (Bartels 2009; Diefenbach 2009). In the sense that the primus inter pares of the collegial ideal are given authority based on their expertise within a field (Freidson 1984; Wald 1983), and the manager is viewed to possess superior merits and skills within the field of strategy and management (Kärreman & Alvesson 2004), managerial rationale could be used to legitimize collegial decision makers, while the opposite is not true because of collegiality’s authority being derived by the recognition of peer in a sense of equality rather than from a position within the hierarchy (Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist 2016). At large, collegiality differentiates itself from the managerial governance mode in the way it rationalizes the decision maker’s authority.
The aforementioned characteristics of the governance modes’ decision maker and its rationale can be viewed in appendix A. In sum, two assumptions of theoretical compatibility between governance modes across the decision maker and its accompanying rationale can be made from the characteristics derived from the literature:
Theoretic assumption 1a: Managerial decision makers can be legitimized by bureaucratic rationale. Nordenström & Svender, 19
Theoretic assumption 1b: Collegial decision makers can be legitimized by managerial rationale.
2.5.2 The decision-making processes and their rationales
According to the bureaucratic ideal, decisions are to be carried out by weighing pros and cons of a decision, and by abiding to set procedures, rather than by adhering to the decision maker’s subjective judgement and preference (Bartels 2009). Osborne and Plastrik (1997, referenced in Bartels 2009) recognized the task of “thinking” as essential to the bureaucratic decision maker’s role. Although encouraged to refrain from subjective judgement, some form of individual assessment is thus assumed to be inherent in the bureaucratic decision-making process. Management on the other hand, commonly employs tools such as various management models and key performance indicators in order to facilitate decision making (McCormack, Propper & Smith 2013; Hoggett 1996). The decision making itself is viewed to rest on the manager’s ability to assess different courses of action and picking the one that will benefit the organization the most. The collegial ideal type employs tools that are meant to share expertise, favouring collective decision making (Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist 2016; Kligyte & Barrie 2014; Waters 198). Such decision making is carried out through seminars and open discussions where participants are given the opportunity to argue and exchange ideas, put forth different perspectives and to explore, in order to reach consensus, or at least a majority consensus in order to make a decision (Kligyte & Barrie 2014).
The decision-making process of bureaucracy is motivated by impartiality, requiring decision makers to set personal values aside, and promoting rational practices which will yield the optimal outcome. The meritocracy aids this effort, as it puts the right person in authority (Höpfl 2006). Rules and processes are employed to support decision making. As processes act as a reassurance that the most rational course of action is taken. Managerial decision-making processes do employ processes as well, similarly to bureaucratic practices, but these are employed more flexibly (Nielsen 2013; Laegreid, Roness & Verhoest 2011). Instead, the process is motivated by the understanding of the organization and its external environment, through performance indicators and a myriad of management models (Hood 1991; Propper & Smith 2013). These processes and models act as input to the individual decision maker’s assessment of the best course of action. Collegiality, again, emphasizes professional knowledge and knowledge development and assumes impartiality in reaching that development (Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist 2016; Waters 1989; Freidson, 1984). Why Nordenström & Svender, 20 discussions are favoured, where experts are allowed to impartially debate a subject in order to reach the optimal outcome based on the collective knowledge.
Due to the differences in management’s favour of the decision maker’s assumed superior judgement and bureaucracy’s ideal of detachment of individual judgement, bureaucracy and management are incompatible, despite them sharing certain elements in the decision-making process. By the same logic, the managerial rationale is incompatible with collegial decision-making processes as well. In setting personal values aside and promoting impartially, collegiality and bureaucracy share similarities (Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist 2016). They differ, however, in how that impartiality is reached. Theoretically, a bureaucratic rationale could legitimize collegial decision-making processes as it promotes meritocracy and impersonality. Collegial rationality is not, however, compatible with managerial decision-making processes in the sense that collegiality assumes impartiality and a distancing from personal values, as managerialism in its entirety does not (Diefenbach 2009).
The aforementioned characteristics of the governance modes’ decision-making processes and their rationale can be viewed in appendix B. In sum, one assumption of theoretical compatibility between governance modes across the decision-making process and its accompanying rationale can be made from the characteristics derived from the literature:
Theoretic assumption 2a: Collegial decision-making processes can be legitimized by bureaucratic rationale.
2.5.3 The theoretical interplay of decision makers and decision-making processes
Having separated the decision maker from the decision-making process, the literature on ideal types suggests a bureaucratic decision maker can apply managerial and collegial decision-making processes independently. Being a monocratic decision maker chosen on meritocratic grounds does not exclude the application of management models, measurements, seminars or discussions in the process. The same is true of the managerial decision maker, and the bureaucratic and collegial decision-making processes. Finally, the collective decision-making bodies of collegiality can theoretically employ both predetermined processes, measurements, and management models independently in their decision making. The processes can thus be assumed to, theoretically, be independent of the decision makers. Nordenström & Svender, 21
Theoretic assumption 3a: All governance modes are compatible across practical elements of decision making. Making it possible to mix governance modes across decision-making processes and decision makers.
Although not embodying the term interplay, the literature on governance modes assumes same-governance mode compatibility across all elements of decision making in their ideal forms. Therefore, in accordance with prior literature, this paper assumes that any ideal type is compatible with itself across all decision-making elements.
Theoretic assumption 4a: Any governance mode is compatible with itself throughout all decision-making elements. Creating an “ideal” combination.
The characteristics of the decision-making elements of the ideal decision maker and its rationale are depicted in appendix A, the characteristics of the decision-making processes and their rationale are depicted in appendix B, and the interplay derived from the theoretical assumptions are depicted in appendix C.
2.6 Theoretical framework
As this study sets out to examine decision making in architectural production, a framework that enables such an examination is required. The elements of decision making have been divided in the previous section into practices, e.g. the decision maker and the decision-making process, and a rationale associated with each practice. From these elements, a matrix of the ideal governance modes’ practices and rationales have been formulated. The matrix is depicted in Table 1 below and will act as a framework of analysis in this study, together with the framework of interplay based on the theoretical assumptions depicted in illustration 1, which can be viewed in its entirety in appendix C. This will allow the study to examine, structure and categorize the data in order to empirically identify different combinations of interplay in architectural production. It should be mentioned however, that the assumptions made are our own, derived from our interpretation of the theoretic compatibility between the ideal types, and that the categorization of the empirical data and thus the findings of the study have a direct correlation with the assumptions made. Nordenström & Svender, 22
Ideal decision maker Ideal decision-making process
Governance Which ideal type does the decision Which ideal type does the practice maker correspond with? decision-making process correspond with?
Governance Which ideal decision-maker rationale Which ideal decision-making process rationale does the data correspond with? rationale does the data correspond with?
Table 1: The framework of decision-making elements in governance modes created for the purpose of this study.
Illustration 1: The framework of governance interplay derived from the theoretical assumptions, created for the purpose of this study. The assumptions can be viewed separately in the framework in appendix C.
Furthermore, we recognize the complexity of the research field this paper wishes to contribute to. A complexity that we assume to be inherent in research of governance interplay, as it examines interrelations between several governance modes across multiple elements. The complex nature of the subject is determinant of the complexity of the framework of governance interplay. To compensate for this complexity, appendices have been frequently applied in order to create transparency in the framework of analysis, and the findings derived from it. This enables the study’s analysis to be traced back to the theoretical assumptions of interplay derived from the literature on governance modes. Also, the decision was made to refrain from dividing the theoretical assumptions into sub-assumptions, in order to decrease complexity. Theoretic assumption 3a could, for instance, be divided into six sub assumptions. One for each “line” in the depicted interplay framework. Although that level of detail in the assumptions would increase the level of detail in the analysis, it would also increase the space needed in the paper to address them in the analysis, as well as in the theory section. Therefore, they have been omitted for pedagogical reasons as well as in regard to the Nordenström & Svender, 23 limits in time and scope of this paper. Any sub-assumptions that could be derived from the framework is thus not addressed separately in this paper. Rather they will be addressed collectively within the formulated theoretical assumption to which they happen to belong, without being labeled and addressed separately. Last, only positive assumptions have been articulated. That is, assumptions which assume compatibility. Negative assumptions, assumptions articulating contradictions between the governance ideals, have been omitted since they can be identified by their absence in the framework. Nordenström & Svender, 24
3. Method
3.1 Scientific approach and design
This paper acknowledges that ideal types of governance modes are social constructs (see: Berger & Luckmann 1966), an assembly of ideas that together form a concept of how organizations ideally ought to be organized. We recognize the fallacy of ideal types brought forward by Van Braam (1980, referenced in Bartels 2009), be it bureaucracy or other, and agree with Weber’s (1922) view that while ideal types do not exist, they can be used as tools to simplify and make sense of a complex reality, as well as with Thornton and Ocasio’s (2008) notion that ideal types can be applied for the purpose of comparison. We emphasize, however, that while ideal governance types do not exist, and therefore is impossible to find empirically, there are substantial evidence for the existence of elements of all three governance modes in organizations (Hood 1991; 1995; Exworthy et al. 2002; McCormack et al. 2013; Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist 2016), and that researchers within organizational studies seems to agree on the existence of these elements of governance (DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Waters 1989; Diefenbach 2009; Pache & Santos 2010; Kligyte & Barrie 2014; Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist 2016; Denis et al. 2019), although not in their ideal form. Therefore, this study postulates that modes of governance are to be found that correspond to the theoretical assumptions of the ideal governance interplay identified in the paper’s theory section.
In order to examine the complex interplay between governance modes in architectural production, we chose to conduct a case study at one of the leading architectural firms in Sweden, hereon referred to as the “Firm”. The study is qualitative in nature, applying case study methodology, which is widely used in business research (Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007), and as Stake (1995) suggests, a suitable method when the research aims to capture the complexity and particular nature of the case in question in-depth (Yin 2011; Given 2008; Yin 2003). As we seek to examine the interplay of governance modes, our study is descriptive. We do not attempt to explore new governance modes or means of coordination, but rather to describe the interplay of governance mode in organizational everyday life, while simultaneously challenging the ideal concepts’ ability to capture empirical governance practices. Moreover, the choice of conducting a case study was derived from prior literature, such as suggested by Johansen and Waldorff (2015), who states that researchers typically use Nordenström & Svender, 25 case studies when studying hybrid organizations, as it is the most fruitful method to capture how the organization applies logics strategically. Hence, in order to capture the interplay between governance modes we again take inspiration from studies on institutional logics (see Blomgren & Waks 2016; Pallas, Fredriksson & Wedlin 2016; Exworthy et al. 2002; McPherson & Sauder 2013). Furthermore, the case study design allows us to triangulate the data collection, combining observations and interviews, which is suggested to increase the quality of the findings (Webb, Campbell, Schwartz & Sechrest 1966). Making the case study methodology relevant for this study (Yin 2003; Darke, Shanks & Broadbent 1998). The collected data was categorized in accordance with the study’s theoretical framework of governance decision making described in section 2.6 to deduce empirical combinations of governance interplay. Thus employing a deductive approach to the study (Fejes & Thornberg 2015).
3.2 Case selection
The architectural firm that was studied was one subsidiary of one of the top architectural firms in Sweden. The Firm has contributed and continues to contribute with several large and well-known architectural projects across Sweden. What we aim to achieve by applying a case methodology to this study is to describe the interplay within an organization that acts as an example of similar organizations. As the Firm currently employs over hundreds of architects, it occupies a large portion of the industry’s expertise, experience and best practices, and the case could therefore be qualified as a representative case according to Yin’s (2003) classification of cases. Being limited to one case, however, we acknowledge that the sample size is small which limits the generalizability of the findings. To use Blomkvist, Hallin and Lindell’s (2018) terminology, we make no claims to be able to make statistical generalizations in the sense that our findings can describe the interplay of governance modes in all architecture firms. We assume that there are bound to be differences in how architectural firms are governed, and considering the study’s limitations in time and scope, as well as the fact that our study is limited to a sole subsidiary of the Firm, we argue that statistical generalizations are beyond the scope of this study.
Instead of statistical generalizations, however, what we aim for in this paper is what Blomkvist, Hallin and Lindell (2018) labels analytical generalization, meaning that if all things being equal, the concepts and ideas can be transferred to other cases. Furthermore, Nordenström & Svender, 26
Mitchell (1983) argues that, for qualitative research, “cogency of the theoretical reasoning” is what determines generalizability of the findings. Hence, the question in this regard is not if the findings can be generalized to a wider population, but rather how well the researcher generalizes back to theory (Mitchell 1983; Spicer 1992; Lukka & Kaasanen 1995), why we have chosen to thoroughly employ appendices to increase transparency of the framework and the analysis.
3.2.1 Initial investigation of architectural organizations and production
During our initial conversations with the office manager, it was mentioned that the Firm is organized in a hierarchy, shared across the industry (see Sveriges arkitekter 2021). Ranging from the bottom of the hierarchy to the top, the roles are: participant architect (PA), administrative architect (AA), architectural project manager (APM). Additionally, the Firm had instituted two management roles: studio managers (SM) and office managers (OM). The roles are listed and associated with their Swedish name and abbreviation in appendix D. It was also communicated that all the architectural projects in the Firm adheres to a process that is designed in accordance with the requirements of a quality management system (QMS). From the QMS, we could identify four decision areas by which we frame and delimit architectural production: Budgeting, time planning, resource allocation, and architectural design. However, we also chose to include the decision area of the work process in the architectural production. Adding up to a total of five decision areas in architectural production.
3.3 Research setting & context
The subsidiary office examined in this study had recently gone through a merger with another local architectural firm, reportedly bringing with it structural and cultural clashes between the two offices during the post-merger phase, according to the OM. Cultural clashes are commonplace and widely documented in the research field of mergers and acquisitions (see: Whittington, Regnér, Angwin, Johnson, Scholes & Johnson 2009). However, we estimate that the post-merger culture and structural clash between the two firms have a limited impact on the study since we estimate that the decisions that needs to be made throughout a project in architectural production will remain nearly identical, as the process is similar throughout the industry (see: Sveriges arkitekter 2021), as is typical of professions (Blomgren & Waks 2015; Noordegraf 2007; Freidson 1984). Furthermore, we also estimate the remote work practice Nordenström & Svender, 27 that has come to persist throughout large parts of white-collar industries due to Covid-19 pandemic (Gordan 2020) to have a limited impact on the study. Although decisions might be taken through different channels. The process, type of decision and rationale is expected to remain the same as prior to the communicative changes made because of the Covid-19 pandemic. During our initial meetings with the office manager, at no time was changes within structure, hierarchy or degree of autonomy, nor the work process mentioned. As has been reported by the OM, no other changes had been made to the organization other than the possibility for employees to conduct their tasks remotely. Making the Firm a suitable subject in which to study the interplay of governance modes in architectural production.
3.4 Data collection and operationalization
By combining the data collection methods of interviews and observations, we applied a triangulation strategy to the data collection, which is suggested to result in greater confidence in findings (Webb et al. 1966). Triangulations has traditionally been applied in quantitative research (Bryman & Bell 2011), äbut have been increasingly popular in qualitative research as the method allows researchers to cross-check findings (Fenton, Bryman & Deacon 1998), allowing ethnographers to cross-reference between interviews and observations to determine that they have understood what emerged in interviews. Kanter (1977) for instance, who applied triangulation in her research, suggested that the combining of methods is the most valid and reliable way to study complex social entities such as the organization.
There are several reasons as to why we chose the methods of observations and interviews. First, there is a common challenge in research when making the distinction between what people say, and what they actually do (Bryman & Bell 2011). Here lies the strength of the structured observation, as it transcends the limitations of the interview format. Limitations such as the difficulty to verbalize certain practices and rituals (Stausberg & Engler 2011), for example. Secondly, respondents might not be able to recollect the information sought after, forget to report some vital information, or even remember it incorrectly, skewing the collected data (Bryman & Bell 2011).
Purposive sampling was applied when choosing respondents, with the goal of choosing respondents that were representative of the entire hierarchy at the Firm. This was done for several reasons: The first reason being that we could not expect any one person to have the Nordenström & Svender, 28 full picture of the entire company. The second reason being that it has been suggested to ensure trustworthiness (Lincoln & Guba 1985), since we are able to confirm some information with other respondents. The third and last reason was that by picking respondents from every level at the hierarchy, we ensured a variety of perspectives of the understanding of the interplay (Bryman & Bell 2011). Interviewees were also chosen based on a knowledge criterion, as suggested by Etikan, Abubakar Musa, Sunusi and Alkassim (2016). This criterion states that the interviewees are required to possess a certain amount of working life experience and industry knowledge. A broad and deep knowledge within the field of architecture enables the interviewee to provide a richer picture and understanding of the commonly employed governance practices. Therefore, we made sure that the chosen respondents have been working at the Firm for at least two or more years in order to get answers from proficient and well-informed individuals. Thus, we combined the purposive sampling with what Etikan et al. (2016) and Trotter (2012) calls nominated expert sampling. Although we made efforts to represent the entire hierarchy, we acknowledge that purposive sampling does not allow for generalizations to a population (Bryman & Bell 2011). An overview of the respondents and their work experience can be seen in appendix E.
As mentioned above, we contacted the OM at the beginning of the project and asked if we could use the Firm as a subject for our case study. The first action we took was drafting an email that the OM forwarded to all the employees, informing them that we were to conduct a case study at the Firm with some information attached about the research topic. In this email, we asked the employees if it was possible to participate in meetings and conduct interviews. There was, however, scarcity in the information we provided about the study’s topic since we did not want respondents to prepare their answers beforehand. The data was collected during a period of three weeks. Due to the time restraints, we did not anticipate to reach saturation, as is often the goal when conducting interviews (Trotter 2012; Braun & Clarke 2021). Saturation occurs when all relevant themes or concepts have been thoroughly explored, and no new relevant themes emerge (Schensul & LeCompte 2010; Trotter 2012, Braun & Clarke 2021). However, we started to experience saturation after the eighth interview as no new information emerged.
3.4.1 Interviews
A total of eleven semi-structured interviews were conducted, spanning between 34 and 75 minutes, depending on how much time the respondent was able to set aside. Semi-structured Nordenström & Svender, 29 interviews were chosen due to their flexibility, as well as their ability to generate deep insights (Yin 2014; Bryman & Bell 2011). A total of four interviews were held face-to-face and the rest was conducted through video calls. Considering the current pandemic, video calls were a necessity for most respondents as they work from home. At the beginning of the interviews, we made it clear to the respondents that they would be anonymous, which is in line with good research practice (Swedish Research Council 2017). The anonymization was done partly to preserve the integrity of the respondents, but also to ensure that the respondents felt that they were able to answer honestly with no risk of repercussion (Bryman & Bell 2011), which is suggested to increase the overall quality of the collected data. Moreover, the interviews were recorded in order to increase the accuracy of data analysis on the governance interplay within the Firm. While recordings might make respondents self-aware, possibly affecting the data (ibid), it was important to increase the level of detail in the data collected as interviews are reported to be one of the most important data collection sources when conducting case studies (Yin 2014).
3.4.2 Structured observations
To adequately capture decision making and its rationales, seven participatory and structured observations complemented the information collected in the interviews. The observed meetings were about design issues, setting project budgets, resource allocation and time planning, and prerequisites for a new project (for an overview, see appendix F). All of the observations were carried out in early or mid stages in the architectural project except for one, as the resource allocation meeting did not pertain to one specific project but rather was about allocation of personnel across all projects. At the end of every meeting, a short interview was held in order to set discrepancies and contingencies straight by asking control questions. Here lies the advantages in participatory, ethnographic observation, as through the interviews we were able to penetrate the heart of the meeting by giving nuance to the structured data in the observation (Perlow 1997; O’Byrne 2007).
The observations were structured, meaning we observed the behavior of the participants through a fixed set of categories in an observation schedule (Stausberg & Engler 2011). These categories are retrieved from our theoretical framework and hence the decision, the decision maker, the decision-making process and the rationale behind the decision was noted. As work during the pandemic is mainly performed remotely, most of the observations were conducted during teamwork sessions and group meetings through video calls. The Nordenström & Svender, 30 observations would have ideally been covert, as it would ensure that the participants would not change their behavior because of our presence (Bryman & Bell 2011), but as three of the meetings had clients involved, their consent was required. In order to lessen our presence in the meetings the camera was shut off and the mics were muted. During the observations, we recorded the decisions taken by the subjects in digital notes. These observation notes were later analyzed, together with the transcripts of the interviews.
3.5 Method of analysis
Employing a grounded theory-inspired approach to the study, the data was during the course of the data collection continually coded in accordance with the theoretical framework (Strauss & Corbin 1998). In doing so, we assessed the data, analyzing what implications it had, what category the data belonged to, and which practical element or which rationale each data represented. In line with Lofland and Lofland’s (1995) suggestions on coding, we coded the data as soon as possible after collection, as is suggested in grounded theory as it is suggested to sharpen our understanding of the data (Bryman & Bell 2011). Once coded, the data and the coding was reiterated multiple times to ensure that the data was interpreted the same way. This was done in order to increase the dependability of the coding (Guba & Lincoln 1985) and led to one revision which improved the quality of the coding. The data was coded at several levels, as suggested by Coffey, Holbrookand and Atkinson (1996). In the first level of coding, the data was coded based on which decision-making element it belonged to. Either the decision maker or the decision-making process. The second level of coding determined whether the data described the practice or the rationale. Once established, the third level of coding categorized to which ideal governance mode the data adhered. Resulting in the data being categorized into decision-making elements with their corresponding ideal governance mode. In doing so, we paid careful attention to the context in which something was said or observed, in order to increase the accuracy of the coding. Once the data was coded in accordance with the theoretical framework within each decision area that was identified prior to the study, we analyzed the different interplay combinations that appeared, comparing them to the theoretical assumptions of interplay, and analyzed themes of the interplay combinations, in accordance with Blomkvist, Hallin and Lindell’s (2018) notion of thematic analysis. During this thematic analysis it was noted when and how the governance modes were applied in the architectural production, resulting in themes of common application of governance modes. Nordenström & Svender, 31
3.6 Ethical considerations
In the Swedish Research Council’s (2017) report “Good research practice’’ it states that the researcher should not conduct interviews without consent and properly informing the respondent. While Bryman and Bell (2011) recognize that the issue of informed consent is perhaps most crucial in covert observations, it is nonetheless an issue in the interview situation as well. When asking for consent to conduct the interviews, we made it clear to the respondents that the information was confidential, and at any time they were free to withdraw from the study, considering the sensitive nature of the data collected of the operations of one of Sweden’s leading architectural firms. Hence, the respondents name will not be displayed in any way throughout this paper. Furthermore, at the beginning of each interview the purpose of the study was described in more detail to the respondents, compared to the scarce information we had sent out with the initial email. Furthermore, it is necessary to address the dilemma of the included titles and roles of the respondents. During the course of the study, we only interviewed one OM and therefore an employee at the Firm would easily recognize who that respondent is. We are still explicit with the titles due to two reasons: 1) hiding the titles would to a large degree decrease the overall quality of the paper, as it decreases the transparency of the data collected, and 2) the OM is in a position of power and therefore, we argue that anonymization is more crucial to employees further down the hierarchy, which are richer in numbers and thus the titles cannot be linked to any one individual.
We also recognize that there is an imbalance between genders among the authors in the reference list. We acknowledge that there is a qualitative aspect to this issue as well as ethical. To grasp the complexity of organizational governance, and make a good contribution to society at large, it requires not only a diversity in authors, but diversity in perspectives on management and governance. This is a sentiment we draw from Chapman (2012), who made this argument regarding research in accounting. In order to be transparent regarding this issue, we have included the first names of researchers in our reference list at the end of the paper. Last, as the study took place during the Covid-19 pandemic we purposely limited the time we physically spent at the Firm’s office out of consideration to the health of the employees, even if we had full approval to be there throughout the whole semester. Nordenström & Svender, 32
4. Findings
The data generated through observations and interviews are in this chapter presented along the five decision areas that were identified throughout architectural production prior to the study. To reiterate, the decision areas are: budgeting, resource allocation, time planning, architectural design, and work processes. Furthermore, within each decision area, the data describes the practical elements of decision making, the decision maker and the decision-making process, and their accompanying rationale.
4.1 Decisions regarding project management
4.1.1 Budgeting
The data gathered from interviews suggests that the task of managing the budget falls upon the APM, who has the formal responsibility for the project. Up to a certain amount at least. R7 and R2 report that the mandate to decide on the budget is limited to the size of the budget and the position within the hierarchy. For budgets below half a million SEK, it is within the APM’s mandate to decide on the budget. The OM is authorized to decide on budgets up to five million SEK. For higher amounts, the mandate lies with the CEO, and above 50 million with the chairman of the board. Although respondents have recounted that budgeting rarely amounts to sizes that need to be permitted by roles above the APM. Despite the authorization arrangement, the APM’s budget mandate is reported by respondents to derive from the APM’s experience of prior projects while no such train of thoughts was reported regarding the other roles’ mandate. A common perception among the respondents was that every project has a degree of uniqueness to it and therefore relies on architects’ prior project experience to successfully estimate new projects. In one interview, R5 stated that “... you have to set budgets and like, it is based on knowledge within the field. But it is not based on you being an economist or having [financial] skills.”
R1, R2 and R5 all report that project budgeting often is done in collaboration with other APMs. Here, again, the value of experience was emphasized by the respondents. According to R1, R2, and R5, collaboration increases the accuracy of estimations of the work effort required. Commonly, they reported, APMs consult other architects who have experience from similar projects and tasks in order to gain access to relevant experience needed for the estimation. The increased estimated accuracy was reported to increase the financial viability of the project. R2 elaborates: “... those doing the budgets and prices, often have a pretty good Nordenström & Svender, 33 understanding. But you want like, [...] to get it verified.”. In the same interview, R2 mentioned:
“The APM sets the budget. But preferably in collaboration with another APM. So that you have checked and… it is the same, like. How tall is tall? The same… two different APMs can reach two completely different prices on the same project, technically.” (R2)
R2 claimed that, because of the experience’s importance, it is practically impossible for a novice to estimate a proper budget for a large-scale architectural project, as even experienced architects rely on input and second opinions from other colleagues. R3, who wanted to take on APM responsibilities, gave an example of this collaboration when the respondent reported receiving advice from a senior APM when setting the budget. R2 elaborated on the dynamic:
“You can also check with others: ‘Hi, I’m going to leave a tender on a preschool of 1000 square meters. Have you… done a similar project? What did it cost?’ and then you can like… out of experience, see if it's reasonable. So it's about, like, gathering… knowledge.’’ (R2)
4.1.2 Time planning
Time planning has been reported to be intimately associated with the budgeting process. To the degree that they are at times hard to separate from one another in the data. They are distinct from each other, however, in the sense that the budgeting focuses on the financial viability of a project, while time planning focuses on the time spent by architects on tasks. Therefore it is said that the time plan suggests frames and limits for the budget. One respondent reports that time plans are quite fixed, as the respondent claims that customers often already have a set time frame in mind when initiating a project, which limits the architects’ influence on the time plan. But architects do report estimating the work to make sure that the requested time frame is viable and that the time spent on tasks does not result in costs’ exceeding the budget. R11 recalls:
“... when I work with my [...] [APM]. They can say: ‘Yes, but [the customer] wants this’, like ‘What do you think it takes for you to deliver this?’, and then I say, like ‘Yes, but like, this much time, perhaps’. And then she [...] adds it to the Nordenström & Svender, 34
budget. And then she may look at what I have said and just: ‘No, but that is probably a slight miscalculation. You might need a little more [time] there’” (R11)
Again, we can see in the data from the interviews with R1 and R11 that the decisions and the formal mandate of the time plan lies with the APM. The PA has been reported to participate in this work, however, by estimating the time it takes for them to finish a certain task, which will be added to the budget in form of costs. The APM is here reported to have the role of ensuring that estimates are reasonable and as accurate as possible. Therefore acting as a quality assurance mechanism for less experienced architects. As with budgets, experience is highlighted by R11 to be determinant to the architect's ability to make accurate assessments. Similarly to the budgeting process, the APM is reported to commonly collaborate with other architects to reach estimations. Most commonly the architects responsible for carrying out the task in question, but at times other architects can be involved because of the experience they possess in the particular task to be estimated. R11 recalls in one interview:
“... it is often the one with more experience. [...] yes, not necessarily role hierarchical. That it is always [the APM] or AA [who makes the decision]. But it can be, since [they] often have more experience.” (R11)
Furthermore, second opinions are not reported to be employed by anyone other than the APM. R1 states that the reason the APM has the final say on time-planning is because of the time plan’s dependency on other actors’ work. Such as consultants and contractors, which the APM is responsible for taking into account when creating the project’s time plan.
4.1.3 Resource allocation
Several of the respondents stated that the responsibility of resource allocation lies with the SM, since they have an overview of many projects at the Firm and formally have staff liability. Their decisions, however, rely on the input and insights from the APMs and it was reported that although the actual mandate and authority rests with the SM role, discussions on resource allocation rarely reached such a point where that mandate needed to be exercised. This was confirmed in the observation of the resource allocation meeting during the study. Where the APMs and the SMs participated in open discussions in a collaborative fashion. During discussions, the current status of the projects was reported and decisions were taken unanimously by the APMs that were involved in the particular discussion. Such as the Nordenström & Svender, 35 discussion on reallocation of an architect from one APM’s project to another one’s, or the redistribution of workload in a project. R7 elaborated on this in one interview:
“You do it together. Because we… as SM you don’t have all the input on how the projects have changed, and as SM, in the end it is my responsibility to make sure everyone is allocated on projects. Correctly allocated. Enough and not too much. And we do that together with the APM[s]’’ (R7)
R2 also reports in one interview that the purpose of the collaborative discussions is to coordinate resources in a large organization. “Otherwise it will be like [...] six individuals running their own company if you do not, like, coordinate…”, R2 stated. R3 also reported that the benefit of having APMs coordinate is that the APMs have the insight in the architects’ knowledge and experiences, which would enable them to make better resource allocation decisions than upper management, which would be too foreign with the knowledge at the subsidiary office. R3 believed that it was of utmost importance that the right person be allocated to the right project at the right time, and that the best evaluator of that would be architects within the architectural production.
4.2 Decisions on architectural design
All respondents have stated that the ultimate authority on design resides with the APM. This authority includes the mandate to delegate tasks and override other team members’ architectural decisions. The mandate to decide on architectural matters was confirmed during the internal design meeting (26th of April 2021) where the APM made 9 out of 12 decisions. The other three decisions were taken in consensus. When the APM was asked why this authority was exercised, the APM said that the others were new to the project and hence he was the one who had all the knowledge about what the client wanted and the professional knowledge about the particular project. In one interview, R7 reported that architectural decision making pertains to the APM role and never reaches higher management. According to R1 and R7, management roles such as SM and OM, whose roles reside above the APM in the organization’s hierarchy have no influence over the architectural design. R7 states in one interview: Nordenström & Svender, 36
“... because [...] the design resides with the one who has the responsibility for the [project]. If you have given someone the responsibility to be [an] APM, you have also given them the responsibility to draw...” (R7)
Three main reasons were reported as to how the APM’s authority on architectural design is motivated. First, according to all of the respondents, the APMs are generally highly experienced professionals, more so than the average PA or AA. Data from the interviews suggest that the reason why an APM might be more or less keen to make decisions in some situations lie in the level of knowledge and experience among the project members. Key reasons are highlighted by R5, who emphasises that the amount of decisions needed to be taken by the APM is dependent on the team members and their experience. Moreover, R5 and R3 said that even if decisions on design normally are taken when the project members reach some form of consensus, the one with the most experience usually has more mandate and authority within the project group. Another point is raised by R8, who mentioned that if there are differences in opinions on design, the best argument generally wins. Secondly, according to R1 and R3, the APM is the one who normally is in touch with the client and hence has the foremost knowledge about the clients needs and wants. Third, the APM has a judicial mandate and responsibility for the result of the project. This was highlighted by R1:
“There is a judicial… what is it called, reason also that I am [responsible for the project] towards the customer. I am the one who vouches for the contract and so on. But it would be to make an own goal not to… not to let the one having the client contact also have the last word on what we deliver.” (R1)
Situational differences in how the APM employs his or her authority was also found within data from the observations. During the internal design meeting (26th of April 2021) the APM was observably willing to make decisions and delegate specific tasks. This was shown in the balance between the amount of decisions made by the APM (9) and decisions made by other participants in the meeting (0) or by consensus (3), which was motivated by the imbalance of knowledge between the APM and the other architects in the aforementioned observation. During the sketch meeting on 28th of April, fewer actual decisions were made as the APM made 4 decisions on design, the AA made none, and 2 was made through consensus. The nature of the meeting was more collaborative than the internal design meeting on 26th of April, as second opinions and discussions were more apparent. R1, the APM during the Nordenström & Svender, 37 meeting, mentioned that the purpose of the meeting was to reach some form of consensus on design, but if there were to become a conflict the APM would settle the matter.
The data from the observations and interviews showed that the APM in the end has the authority and mandate to make decisions on architectural design. However, data also showed that decisions regarding design are taken as a result of a collaborative process with the end goal of reaching consensus. The collaborative aspect was apparent in several meetings but most apparent in the sketch meeting (28th of April 2021), as it bore some resemblance to a workshop. Furthermore, respondents state that more often than not, suggestions made by administrative and participating architects are ultimately accepted by APMs. The design process is reported to be hierarchically flat in the sense that the project members are able to utilize their professional creativity, knowledge and openly discuss their opinions. This is a view that is to a large extent shared between individuals at different levels of the organizational hierarchy. R3, which is an AA, said that the APM and the AA are equal when it comes to soft parameters, such as choice of materials or colors. Furthermore, several respondents claimed that ideas on design are accepted by the quality of the idea rather than who puts it forth. The rationale being that the use of group discussions and second opinions are important to secure quality in the final product, according to R4 and R5. In one interview, when being asked about the nature of the group discussions, R2 exclaimed: “Yes… god… it is a mess like no other [...] and you discuss like, all the time”. Moreover, R9 reflected on the matter:
“Because you can’t sit and pretend that you know, that won’t get you anywhere. We have, at least I think, a culture at the office where you can ask all the time when you don’t feel comfortable or know how to do something. Then you can make common decisions that way. [...] [T]he stuff you have asked about before, then you know how to think about it. Then you can make those decisions.” (R9)
R5 had a similar view:
“It is very important. But it has to be a… great deal of dialog beforehand. You can’t come and sit all by yourself for three months and then deliver a review document without having had discussions like… between APM and AA. That won’t work” (R5) Nordenström & Svender, 38
Respondents still claim that authority on design decisions pertains to the APM role and thus whoever occupies that role is given that responsibility. Other respondents elaborate on why this is. According to several respondents, the “mandate to draw”, as quoted by R7 priorly, derives from the judicial authority, as the one vouching for the project, as well as the responsibility of answering to and handling the customer. Furthermore, architects traverse the hierarchy based on experience, years in the field and knowledge. The rationale is that the promotion to APM requires a certain degree of knowledge and experience. R3 states:
“Right, [APM] have had more projects, have seen more problems and have solved more problems. So it is better to learn from that person instead of saying that it should be my way” (R3)
4.3 Predetermined decisions
4.3.1 Work process
In the data, it is reported that the Firm’s upper management has made the decision to adopt a standardized work process to be applied in all architectural projects throughout the Firm. According to R11, R6 and R7, the work process is designed to meet the requirements of ISO 9001 and ISO 14001 which has granted the Firm two certifications by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). The ISO 9001 specifies requirements for a QMS certification (International Organization for Standardization 2021a) and the ISO 14001 specific requirements for certification within environmental management (International Organization for Standardization 2021b). To the Firm, this means that decisions regarding certain meetings, budgeting procedures, meeting protocols, and quality assurance among other things, are predetermined by the requirements of the certification R2, R3, and R5 reports. R2 reported:
“Internally we have our quality management system, of course, [...] there you have certain rules of which to adapt. Like you have to set a budget [...] project confirmation to the customer [...] a time plan [...] start meeting protocol… and [...] a conclusion meeting” (R2) Nordenström & Svender, 39
Although the decision to implement the QMS was made by the Firm’s management, the responsibility to ensure that the procedure is followed and adopted throughout projects falls on the APM. The APM does not make decisions regarding the work process per sé, he or she merely enforces the decisions already taken regarding the process. As R3 reported, there is not much choice in the application of the standardized process: “Yeah, no, even if we think that it is stupid. It is just to accept and abide. We will not be able to influence [the work process]…“. The process is reported to entail activities such as quality assurance, by going through checklists to ensure that nothing is mistakenly omitted; communication procedures with customers to ensure common understanding; clarifications of goals; a common workspace and file structure; and documentation. The IT-environment within the Firm mirrors the QMS and documents, and tools and file systems are structured in accordance with the standards set by the ISO 9001 and the ISO 140001 specifications, as noted by R9. R5 clarifies the role of the QMS by categorizing customer demands as describing what is to be delivered, and the work process as specifying how it is to be delivered throughout the architectural production. R2 reported that it has the benefit of increasing transferability between projects, as architects know their way around the project structure regardless of the project or subsidiary office. Decreasing the time it takes for architects to get up to speed when being transferred into a new project. R2 elaborated on this view:
‘’Yes, but it is probably [good] that we have a consensus on how to drive projects forward. So there is a… similarity. And if you are a large organization… so I work on a project in Kalmar right now. When I work with them, I recognize myself. ’This is the way we work’. You know all the documents, nothing is new’’ (R2)
However, although several respondents reported perceived benefits with the QMS, many of the architects admitted to it having its downside as well. Some of those downsides are the increased administrative burden. R2 articulated the thought that many architects probably experience “over administration” due to the QMS and that there may be many documents that are perceived as “benchwarmers” - existing for the sake of existing. In the words of R3: “... if one is to plan a project, you are supposed to put it into three different programs. It is not only double [the workload], but triple [the workload] to have it.”. However, although many articulated the challenges of increased administrative burden, a majority of the respondents emphasised the benefits of the QMS over the downsides. Nordenström & Svender, 40
5. Analysis
5.1 The empirical interplay of governance modes
5.1.1 Budgeting
As suggested by the data, the decision maker, the APM, was found to be monocratic and merited within both the architectural field as well as within management, suggesting that the decision maker is both bureaucratic and managerial simultaneously as it mirrors both bureaucratic (Bartels 2009; Höpfl 2006) and managerial ideals (Diefenbach 2009). The decision maker’s authority on budgeting matters is, according to the data, determined by the attestation order, a set of regulations that echoes the rationality of bureaucracy (Bartels 2009; Selznick 1948; Weber 1947). The authority is reported to pertain to roles within the hierarchy based on the value of the budget, and the attestation order ensures that the optimal decision is made by the right official. It was also reported that the APM’s authority is legitimized by their financial knowledge and skills within budgeting, which is in line with managerial ideals (Diefenbach 2009; Karp 2005; Kärreman & Alvesson 2004; Hood 1991). Thus, the APM’s role as a manager and bureaucratic official is legitimized by both bureaucratic and managerial rationale. Elaborating on the findings of the interplay between the decision maker and its rationale, two novel interplay combinations emerged in the data that was assumed to be theoretically incompatible based on the assumptions derived from the reviewed literature on the ideal types of governance. The combinations are characterized by a bureaucratic or managerial decision maker whose authority is rationalized through their merits in the profession and the recognition of their peers, as is consistent with collegial ideals (Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist 2016; Waters 1989; Freidson 1984). In several of the interviews, the APM’s knowledge within the craft was listed as one of the main rationales behind the legitimization of the APM’s authority, as knowledge in architecture is viewed as crucial in the estimations of budgets.
According to the data, the APM applies two processes in their decision making. The first is the application of management tools such as the budget and other financial tools in order to ensure financial viability of the budget, echoing the governance ideals of management (Hellawell & Hancock 2001; Sanderson 2001; Courpasson 2000). The second process is the collaboration with peers who possess similar managerial competencies, as well as expertise Nordenström & Svender, 41 within the craft. Discussions and second opinions, or knowledge gathering, as R2 framed it, is reported by respondents to increase the accuracy of the budget estimates. This splits the decision-making process into two different processes. The first being the application of tools. In this case budgets, a management idea (Diefenbach 2009); and the second being the employed process. In this case collaborative discussions, which is a recognized collegial process (Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist 2016; Kligyte & Barrie 2014). The interplay between governance modes across all decision-making elements within budgeting are depicted in illustration 2 below.
Illustration 2: The empirical governance interplay in the budgeting decision area. The dotted lines emphasize the identified novel interplays.
5.1.2 Time planning
The data suggests that time estimates are made by the architect that is to carry out the particular task or by an architect that is considered to have a high degree of expertise within the specific task and area to be estimated. In making estimations, it is reported that the architect's expertise, rather than her position within the hierarchy, determines her authority, something that mirrors collegial ideals (Waters 1989; Freidson 1984). However, it is reported that the APM has the final say in the estimates, due to the authority being inherent in the APM’s role, echoing the bureaucratic ideal type of decision makers and its legitimacy of authority (Bartels 2009; Höpfl 2006; Weber 1947, referenced in Pugh 2007). According to the data, the bureaucratic decision maker, the APM, could simultaneously be the collegial decision maker, as the APM are among the most experienced architects in the Firm. However, they need not be the same person, since the decision maker varies, and at times coincides with the APM’s role. Nordenström & Svender, 42
Similarly to the budgeting process, the decision-making process is suggested to be twofold. First, the timeplan and its estimations are employed to measure and ensure feasibility of time, which adds cost frames to the budget, ensuring financial viability. The result orientation, and the measurement practice of the timeplan echoes the processes and rationale of managerial governance (McCormack, Propper & Smith 2013; Diefenbach 2009; Hoggett 1996). Second, collegial processes of discussions and collaboration are employed (Kligyte & Barrie 2014; Waters 1989). This is reported to be due to the importance of knowledge in time estimations as it increases accuracy in the estimates. In a similar fashion as the budgeting process, a distinction can be made between the tools applied in the process, which are managerial, and the process in which the decision is taken, which are collegial. The interplay between governance modes across all decision-making elements within time planning are depicted in illustration 3 below.
Illustration 3: The empirical governance interplay in the time planning decision area.
5.1.3 Resource allocation
According to the data, the decision maker within resource allocation can be separated into two different categories: the formal decision maker and the actual decision maker. The formal decision maker is the SM, a manager that has the responsibility and authority of managing and coordinating personnel, which is in line with managerial ideals (Diefenbach 2009; Kärreman & Alvesson 2004). However, as reported by several respondents and noted in the observations, decisions regarding resource allocation were always taken in consensus between the SMs and the APMs, echoing the decision-making ideals of collegiality (Kligyte & Barrie 2014). The rationale behind this is that, as R7 reports, the SM lacks the knowledge and insight that the APMs have of the status within projects, which aids the effort of resource allocation. The employed discussions and collaboration, and the reported strength of Nordenström & Svender, 43 combining the knowledge of the status within projects in order to reach the best decision, echoes the ideals of collegiality (Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist 2016). Since architects have had the need for staffing projects prior to the proliferation of management models and NPM ideals, the resource allocation is not interpreted as a management practice. The process and its rationale is thus categorized as ideally collegial. The interplay between governance modes across all decision-making elements within resource allocation are depicted in illustration 4 below.
Illustration 4: The empirical governance interplay in the resource allocation area.
5.1.4 Design
The APM, the decision maker of architectural design, has been identified to be monocratic. The APM’s authority deviates from hierarchical structures in that the APM’s superiors do not have any authority over the APM in regards to design, as stated by R7. Roles further down the hierarchy, the PAs and AAs, are reported to be able to freely make suggestions. However, it is ultimately the APM who decides which suggestions to accept and which to reject. Thus, the APM enjoys the legal-rational authority that is inherent in bureaucratic structures (Weber 1947, referenced in Pugh 2007; Höpfl 2006). The APM’s authority is legitimized through all three governance ideals, of which the legitimization by managerial and collegial rationales resulted in novel interplay combinations assumed to be theoretically incompatible. First, the authority is enforced through rational-legal rationale, pertaining to the judicial commitment of the result, echoing bureaucratic ideals (Bartels 2009). Secondly, it is legitimized by customer-oriented rationale which is inherent in management (Diefenbach 2009). Claiming that the APM has the best understanding of the customer’s needs and wants. Third, the APM’s authority is legitimized by his or her merits within the profession. Since architects are promoted to APM by the recognition of other professionals, it bears resemblance to the collegial ideal type (Denis et al. 2019; Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist 2016; Freidson 1984). Nordenström & Svender, 44
The decision-making process and its rationale, in turn, was suggested to always promote discussions and the collective knowledge, echoing the collegial ideal in both process and rationale (Kligyte & Barrie 2014; Waters 1989). The data from the interviews suggests that decisions are taken collectively in collaboration. Or rather, suggestions are made in group discussions and ultimately being rejected or accepted by the APM. Though it was mentioned that this authority is exercised to different extents by different APMs. This was confirmed in the observations that showed one APM being more authoritative than other APMs observed. However, the data suggests that the APMs who do not exercise this authority, simply choose to be more open and accepting towards suggestions. Therefore, the process is suggested to be collegial, and the decision maker bureaucratic. The strength of applying collegial decision-making processes, such as the gathering of knowledge, second opinions and discussions, has been reported to enable architects to view problems from multiple angles and to take advantage of others’ expertise of which they themselves do not possess. The interplay between governance modes across all decision-making elements within design are depicted in illustration 5 below.
Illustration 5: The empirical governance interplay in the design decision area. The dotted lines emphasize the identified novel interplays.
5.1.5 Work processes
Adapting to a work process that has been decided on in advance by management, the decision maker and the rationale echoes bureaucratic ideals (Höpfl 2006; Selznick 1948). It is reported by R3, together with several respondents, that the work process cannot be deviated from, which further highlights the bureaucratic ideal of abiding to rules (Bartels 2009). The rationale of the implementation of the work process was reported to be standardization across the Firm. Which respondents claimed to be needed when the Firm employs so many architects. The rationale of the process, however, is twofold. First, the process follows the Nordenström & Svender, 45 bureaucratic rationale of being standardized in order to heighten the overall quality of the output. Second, the process adheres to managerial rationale in that the underlying process is a management idea that has been standardized and certified (see Staw & Epstein 2000, on QMS). Thus, the decisions are ideally bureaucratic, with some interplay of management rationale in the decision-making process. The interplay between governance modes across all decision-making elements within the work process are depicted in illustration 6 below.
Illustration 6: The empirical governance interplay in the work process area. The dotted line emphasizes the identified novel interplay.
5.1.6 Summary
In summary, cross-governance interplay between the decision maker and the decision-making process was recorded eight times across all decision areas. Compatibility between all governance modes was recorded in this interplay, confirming the whole of theoretical assumption 4a that assumed independence and compatibility between all governance modes, across the decision maker and the applied decision-making process. No cross-governance interplay in line with assumption 1a, 1b or 2a was recorded, which assumed that bureaucratic rationale could legitimize managerial decision makers, that managerial rationale could legitimize collegial decision makers, and that bureaucratic rationale could legitimize collegial decision-making processes. Instead, novel interplay between governance modes across practical elements and their rationale that was assumed to be theoretically incompatible emerged in the data. These interplays consisted of a collegial rationale legitimizing bureaucratic, as well as managerial, decision makers within the decision areas of budgeting and design. Within architectural design, managerial rationale was also recorded to legitimize a bureaucratic decision maker. Finally, managerial rationale was shown to legitimize bureaucratic decision-making processes in one instance, in decisions regarding the work process. Nordenström & Svender, 46
Assumption 4a, that assumed compatibility within the same governance mode across decision-making elements was recorded a total of 19 times. Eight times across the decision maker and its accompanying rationale throughout all decision areas, four times across the decision-maker and the decision-making process throughout all decision areas except design, and seven times across the decision-making process and its accompanying rationale throughout all decision areas. In line with this assumption, all three governance modes were found in ideal combinations, of which collegiality was found to be the most common. Appearing in two decision areas: resource allocation and time planning. Although ideal combinations were found, they were always accompanied by interplay with other governance modes, in part or in whole.
Furthermore, comparing the degree of interplay between decision-making elements, the analysis shows that a higher degree of cross-governance interplay was recorded between practical elements of decision making (eight times) than ideal interplay combinations (four times). Instead, a high degree of ideal combinations between practical elements and rationales were recorded. Eight times between the decision maker and its rationale, and seven times between the decision-making process and its rationale. The number of recorded interplays within the different decision areas can be viewed in its entirety in appendix G.
5.2 Emerging themes and patterns of the interplay
Analyzing the data of the empirical interplay combinations, two themes of interplay stood out. These were that 1) coinciding rationales suggests a strengthening of the APM’s authority, and 2) different governance modes are utilized for different decisions.
5.2.1 Coinciding rationales suggests a strengthening of the APM’s authority
The data suggests that the architects are promoted to APM based on their merits and expertise within the profession, pertaining to a collegial ideal (Waters 1989; Freidson 1984), as well as strategic and managerial skills, pertaining to the management ideal (Diefenbach 2009; Hood 1991). These skills are important to the responsibilities identified to pertain to the APM role. When an architect is appointed to APM, it provides one of the most experienced and knowledgeable architects with bureaucratic rational-legal authority (Weber 1947, referenced in Pugh 2007) to make creative decisions within a project. As suggested by R5, the professional expertise is also necessary for the APM’s ability to set budgets that are Nordenström & Svender, 47 financially viable. The formal authority in combination with professional knowledge, and the management skills, has been suggested to enable the APM to ensure that customer needs are met while acting as a quality assurance mechanism in the production of architectural design. Together, these three rationales strengthen and legitimize the role of the APM as a decision maker on design, budgets, and time planning, and provides the APM with the possibility to act as a mitigator of the tension between the creative process and the clients needs as highlighted by Brown et al. (2010). The way the APM’s role is strengthened by the rationale of collegiality, management and bureaucracy is similar to how hybrid-professionals embodies a pluralism of institutional logics (Blomgren & Waks 2016; Tracey et al. 2011; Noordegraaf 2007; Aurini 2006).
5.2.2 Different governance modes are utilized for different decisions
According to the analysis, it is suggested that collegiality is commonly employed within the architectural production as a decision-making process. Discussions, arguments, experience and different perspectives are put forth regardless of the decision area. This is in line with Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquists (2016) notion that collegiality should be seen as a working process consisting of planning, decision making and follow-up procedures with the ultimate goal of output based on professional expertise. For example, discussions and second opinions are used when making decisions on budgeting in a manner that resembles second opinions that scholars have found within the legal profession (Freidson & Rhea 1963), health care (Noordegraaf 2007; Blomgren & Waks 2016) and universities (Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist 2016). The reported purpose being to improve the output of both managerial as well as architectural decisions. This reflects two aspects of the collegial ideal type: scrutiny of product in the sense that peer evaluation is commonly used (Waters 1989) and formal autonomy, in the sense that architects are free to draw, self-police, delegate, instruct others and communicate findings without being subjected to policing from superiors (ibid), with the caveat that it is within the boundaries of the predetermined work processes.
Furthermore, as the APMs make decisions on resource allocation together they have, deliberately or unintendedly, formed a group that resembles the prototypical collegial body of the committee (Waters 1989; Freidson 1984). The rationale being that group discussion enhances managerial decision making. Taking advantage of the collective, rather than the individual, to improve decision making which is supported by the finding of positive effects in collegial decision-making within the judicial profession (Edwards 2003). On the other Nordenström & Svender, 48 hand, managerial governance within decision-making processes seems to be manifested and applied as management ideas and tools, as observed in prior research (Pallas, Fredrikson & Wedlin 2016). In the instances of budgeting, time planning, and resource allocation, management models act as tools that are applied in collegial work processes. Such as budgeting, time plans, and the QMS.
To conclude, although the there were no theoretical compatibility of collegial working processes and management processes articulated in the framework (Diefenbach 2009; Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist 2016), the analysis shows that the Firm applies both processes in a complementary and bricolage-like manner (Johansen & Waldorff 2015), limiting their application to different areas in the decision making. Thus, the Firm applies the governance modes for different purposes and tasks, as complements. Moreover, the boundaries created within the architectural production by the QMS are in line with Water’s (1989; see also Scott 1965) categorization of organizations as an intermediate collegiate organization, which refers to professional bureaucracies in which the professionals are subordinate to the administrative framework, therefore limiting their autonomy (see also Freidson 1984), which was suggested to be the case with the adoption of the QMS. Nordenström & Svender, 49
6. Conclusion
From the literature on governance modes (Waters 1989; Weber 1947, referenced in Pugh 2007; Freidson 1984; Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist, 2016; Diefenbach 2009; Höpfl 2006; Bartels 2009), this paper derived five theoretical assumptions of compatibility between governance modes across four decision-making elements. Two practical elements: the decision-maker and the decision-making process, and two legimizing elements: the practical element’s respective rationale. The assumptions derived from the literature was: 1a, which postulates legitimization of managerial decision makers by bureaucratic rationale; 1b, which assumes legitimization of collegial decision makers by managerial rationale; 2a, which posit legitimization of collegial decision-making processes by bureaucratic rationale; 3a, which assumes compatibility and independence across the practical elements between governance modes; and 4a, which assumes compatibility within each governance mode across all decision-making elements. The assumptions, which can be viewed in their entirety in appendix C, were tested against data collected on decision making within five decision areas in the architectural production in one of Sweden’s top architectural firms.
The study found support for assumption 3a, and 4a, and identified four novel interplay combinations. The first and second novel interplay combinations showed that collegial rationale legitimized bureaucratic and managerial decision makers, the third combination showed that managerial rationale legitimized bureaucratic decision makers, and the fourth combination showed that managerial rationale legitimized a bureaucratic decision-making process. When analyzing the interplay combinations, the data revealed that the most common interplay combination was that of same-governance interplay across decision-making practices and their respective rationale. Across practical decision-making elements however, cross-governance interplay was the most common combination. Twice as common as that of same-governance interplay, according to the analysis. Implying a higher degree of cross-governance interplay across the decision-maker and the decision-making process than across practices and their rationale. The study did not find support for assumption 1a, 1b or 2a.
From the analysis of the identified interplay combinations derived from the data, two themes emerged. First, the coinciding rationales of the managerial, bureaucratic and collegial governance mode legitimizes the role and authority of the APM. The study showed that in Nordenström & Svender, 50 order to be appointed to an APM and obtain the authority pertaining to the role, the architect is required to possess a high degree of expertise as well as managerial skills, pertaining to both collegial (Waters 1989) and managerial ideals (Diefenbach 2007). Furthermore, inherent in the APM role is the rational-legal authority to sign contracts with clients and the responsibility of quality of the architectural design. A parallel can be drawn to that of hybrid-professionals, as the APM’s role has amalgamated the different governing modes into one, in order to handle different demands from different stakeholders, which requires different competencies and skills. Therefore, the APM has the necessary competencies to navigate between the collegial creative working processes within architectural production and the clients’ demands. Secondly, the analysis shows that governance modes are employed for different decisions, that is: for different purposes and tasks, in a similar manner like institutional bricolages (Johansen & Waldorff 2015). For example, while the decision-making processes in architectural production are collegial, management tools are frequently used within the same processes. Allowing the APM to make use of both processes within the production. Nordenström & Svender, 51
7. Discussion
The analogy of governance interplay derived from the literature on institutional logics has shown promise as a descriptive framework of governance interplay. The analogy allowed us to describe and label the interplay identified in the analysis as both having features of an amalgamation, as in the concept of hybrid organizations (Johansen & Waldorff 2015; Aurini 2006), as well as governance modes being applied at different times for different purposes, as is typical of bricolage organizations (Ansari, Wijen & Gray 2013; McPherson & Sauder 2013; Johansen & Waldorff 2015). The mirroring of the hybrid organization concept indicates that the APM is a role where governance modes overlap, allowing the APM to make decisions to address different demands from different stakeholders. Something that has been shown in prior research on institutional logics, for instance with the management roles in health care (Noordegraaf 2007). Furthermore, the bricolage concept proved useful when analysing the APM’s application of her rational-legal authority. Where the APM applied collegial processes of discussion, trying to reach consensus between architects in different architectural design decisions, while also having the option to, and sometimes exercising the rational-legal authority, to override other architects’ decisions.
The description of the role of the APM as multifaceted, incorporating multiple governance modes, plays into Freidson's (1984; 1983) argument that traditionally “free” professions, such as architects, lawyers and medical workers, have been losing power to bureaucratization and managerialism. However, the question can be raised regarding whether this development has negative implications for professions. For instance, the argument can be made that the amalgamation of governing modes, as is suggested by the study’s analysis, can strengthen the skills of professionals. The role of the APM enables the organization to either apply different modes as tools and processes in a bricolage-like manner to address different challenges in decision-making. Perhaps it is not a question of expansion of one governance mode at the cost of another, where one will be dominating and the other will be outmaneuvered. Rather, the question might be how these different governance modes can complement and strengthen each other to make use of the best of both worlds. Not unlike the coinciding rationales, strengthening the legitimacy of the APM’s authority as the most experienced architect in the project. To reiterate the idea of handling governing modes in a balancing act made by Sahlin and Eriksson-Zetterquist (2016), we posit that the negative impact of NPM in the public sector (Diefenbach 2009; Butterfield, Edwards & Woodall 2004; Pollitt 2000; Staw & Nordenström & Svender, 52
Epstein 2000; Haque 1999; Carson, Lanier, Carson & Birkenmeier 1999; Hoggett 1996) might be an indication of an imbalance between governance modes. Suggesting that it is a natural development in the exploration of new combinations of governance modes to test the limits in order to identify where the balance is located. Thus, we articulate the idea that in the long run, it is first once the suggested loss of values of the public sector and within professions is realized and reflected upon, that it is possible to revert back to a healthy balance where strengths of multiple governance modes can be utilized. Nordenström & Svender, 53
8. Limitations and future research
This paper’s choice of conducting a case study has yielded a depth into the interplay of governance modes, as is a suggested advantage of the case study methodology by scholars (Yin 2011; Given 2008; Yin 2003). However, as case studies have been suggested to limit the generalizability of studies’ findings, we make no claims of enabling statistical generalizations (Blomkvist, Hallin & Lindell 2018) from the findings. However, we do argue that the findings can be analytically generalized, as the framework of analysis and combinations of concepts within this study can be reused in other studies, as well as the use of institutional logics as an analogy for the interplay between governance modes. Furthermore, as swedish architectural firms share the same role structure in architectural production across organizations (see appendix D), one can expect similarities between firms, as collegiality differentiates itself from management and bureaucracy by pertaining cross-organizationally, rather than isolated within organizations (Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist 2016). However, there might be differences in how these cross-organizational roles interplay with other governance modes in other organizations. Therefore, we encourage future research to delve into the interplay of governance modes within other architectural firms, as well as within other professional bureaucracies such as law firms (Edwards 2003), healthcare organizations (Hadjistavropoulos, Malloy, Sharpe & Fuchs-Lacelle 2003), and universities (Freidson 1984).
Furthermore, by limiting ourselves to decision making, we have omitted characteristics of the different governance modes. Such as the role of shared values, norms and the field specific knowledge (Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist, 2016; Waters 1989; Freidson 1984) that are shared across organizations within collegiality. Collegiality incorporates more than collective decision makers and decision-making processes, and the same is true of the governance modes of bureaucracy and management. By delimiting ourselves to certain aspects of the governance modes we consequently delimit the understanding of the governance interplay. Therefore, more research is needed to examine more aspects of the governance modes and their interplay. Another area of research we want to call attention to is why the interplay of governance modes is manifested in certain interplay combinations. In the data, there are suggestions that collegial decision-making processes are applied to increase accuracy and quality, and one possible future strain of research could investigate the usefulness of different governance modes for different tasks and purposes. One example of such research is Edwards (2003) who argued that collegial decision-making processes increased the quality of judicial Nordenström & Svender, 54 decisions in courts. An increased understanding of governance modes as a whole, and alternative governance modes in particular, might shed light on how different governance modes can be applied in a bricolage or hybrid manner, in order to increase efficiency and quality output for contemporary organizations, as was shown in the research on social entrepreneurship by Tracey et al. (2011). Continuing to explore collegiality and other alternate forms of governance could thus inspire new ideas of how to organize.
Finally, the findings of the novel interplay combinations suggest that the ideal theoretical assumptions about the interplay of governance modes might prove inadequate as a framework to accurately describe empiric interplay, and that there might be a need for further theorizing to formulate new frameworks for analysis on governance interplay. One possible expansion of the framework suggested by the data in this study could be to separate decision-making processes into processes and tools, in order to increase the understanding of the interplay. As highlighted in the theory section however, the assumptions derived from prior literature on governance modes are our own, and the interpretations made and the consecutive assumed theoretic interplay derived from those interpretations might play into the applicability of the framework. Therefore, we call for possible frameworks to be thoroughly investigated, formulated, and tested in future research, in order to enable further research on governance interplay. Nordenström & Svender, 55
9. References
Adler, Paul S & Kwon, Seok-Woo. (2013). The Mutation of Professionalism as a Contested Diffusion Process: Clinical Guidelines as Carriers of Institutional Change in Medicine. Journal of Management Studies 50(5).
Ansari, Shahzad; Wijen, Frank & Gray, Barbara. (2013). Constructing a Climate Change Logic: An Institutional Perspective on the “Tragedy of the Commons”. Organization Science Vol. 24, No. 4, 1014–1040
Aurini, Janice. (2006). Crafting legitimation projects: An institutional analysis of private education businesses. Sociological Forum, 21(1), 83-111.
Arkitektupproret. (2018). Hur bor arkitekterna? – Lådmodernisternas dubbelmoral. Published: 2018-03-04.
Arkitektupproret. (2019). Så upprätthålls smakmonopolet. Published: 2019-03-26.
Bartels, Koen P.R.; (2009) The Disregard for Weber’s Herrschaft - The Relevance of Weber's Ideal Type of Bureaucracy for the Modern Study of Public Administration. Administrative Theory & Praxis, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 447–478
Battilana, Julie & Dorado, Silvia. (2010). Building Sustainable Hybrid Organizations: The Case of Commercial Microfinance Organizations. The Academy of Management Journal, December 2010, Vol. 53, No. 6. Special Research Forum: Organizations and Their Institutional Environments - Bringing Meaning, Values, and Culture Back In. December 2010, 1419-40
Belin, Mårten. (2019). Vi bygger mer kortsiktigt än någonsin. Arkitekten. 2019-04-19.
Bennis, Warren. (1965). Beyond Bureaucracy - Will Organization Men Fit the New Organizations? Trans-Action, 2, 31–35
Berger, Peter L. & Luckmann, Thomas. (1966). The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. Penguin Books Ltd.
Bévort, Franz & Suddaby, Roy. (2016). Scripting professional identities: how individuals make sense of contradictory institutional logics. Journal of Professions and Organization, Volume 3, Issue 1, March 2016, Pages 17–38.
Blomgren, Maria & Waks, Caroline. (2015). Coping With Contradictions: Hybrid Professionals Managing Institutional Complexity. Journal of Professions and Organization, 2015, 2, 78-102.
Blomkvist, Pär., Hallin, Anette., & Lindell, Eva. (2018). Metod för företagsekonomer. Uppsats enligt 4-stegsmodellen. 1st edition. Polen: Interak.
Bogh-Andersen, Lotte. (2009). What determines the behaviour and performance of health professionals? Public service motivation, professional norms and/or economic incentives. International Review of Administrative Sciences. SAGE Publications, Vol 75 (1): 79-97.
Brandtner, Christof , Horvath, Aaron, & Powell, Walter W. (2016). How the iron cage evolves: From accounting to accountability as the content of rationalization. American Sociological Review. June 24-26, 2016.
Braun, Virginia & Clarke, Victoria. (2021). To saturate or not to saturate? Questioning data saturation as a useful concept for thematic analysis and sample-size rationales. Qualitative Research in Sport, Exercise and Health, 13(2), 201-216
Brown, Andrew D.; Kornberger, Martin; Clegg, Stewart R.; Carter, Chris. (2010). ‘Invisible walls’ and ‘silent hierarchies’: A case study of power relations in an architecture firm. Human Relations 63(4) 525-549. Nordenström & Svender, 57
Brunsson, Nils & Sahlin-Andersson, Kerstin. (2000). Constructing Organizations - The Example of Public Sector Reform. Organization Studies 2000, 21/4, 721-46.
Bryman, Alan & Bell, Emma. (2011). Business Research Methods. 3rd edt. Oxford University Press Inc, New York.
Butterfield, Reginald., Edwards, Christine., & Woodall, Jean. (2004). The new public management and the UK Police Service. Public Management Review, 6, 3, 395–415
Carson, Paula Philips., Lanier, Patricia A., Carson, Kerry David & Birkenmeier, Betty J. (1999). A historical perspective on fad adoption and abandonment. Journal of Management History, Vol. 5 No. 6, 320-333
Chapman, Christopher S. (2012). Framing the Issue of Research Quality in a Context of Research Diversity. Accounting Horizons Vol. 26, No. 4, 821–831
Child, John & McGrath, Rita Gunther. (2001). Organizations Unfettered: Organizational Form in an Information-Intensive Economy. The Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 44, No. 6, pp. 1135-1148
Coffey, Amanda., Holbrook, Beverly & Atkinson, Paul. (1996). Qualitative Data Analysis: Technologies and Representations. Sociological Research Online, Vol. 2.
Considine, Mark. (1990). Managerialism Strikes Out. Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 49, Issue 2, 166-178.
Courpasson, David. (2000). Managerial Strategies of Domination. Power in Soft Bureaucracies. Organization Studies, 141-161.
D'Aunno, Thomas., Sutton, Robert., I. & Price, Richard H. (1991). Isomorphism and external support in conflicting institutional environments: A study of drug abuse treatment units. Academy of Management Journal, 34: 636-661. Nordenström & Svender, 58
Dacin, Tina., Dacin, Peter A & Tracey, Paul. (2011). Social Entrepreneurship: A Critique and Future Directions. Organizational Science, Vol. 22(5), 1203-1213
Darke, Peta., Shanks, Graeme & Broadbent, Marianne. (1998). Successfully completing case study research: combining rigour, relevance and pragmatism. Information Systems Journal, 8(4), 273-289
Denis, Jean-Louis; Veronesi, Gianluca; Régis, Catherine & Germain, Sabrina. (2019). Collegiality as Political Work: Professions in Today’s World of Organizations. Journal of Professions and Organization, 2019, 6, 323-41. Oxford University Press.
Diefenbach, Thomas. (2009). New Public Management in Public Sector Organizations: The Dark Sides of Managerialistic ‘Enlightenment’. Public Administration Vol. 87, No. 4. 892–909.
Dimaggio, Paul J. & Powell, Walter W. (1983). The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality In Organizational Fields. American Sociological Review, 1983, Vol 48. 147-160.
Edwards, Harry T. (2003). The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making. University of Pennsylvania Law Review , May, 2003, Vol. 151, No. 5 pp. 1639-1690
Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. & Graebner, Melissa E. (2007). Theory Building from Cases: Opportunities and Challenges. Academy of Management Journal, 50(1): 25–32.
Etikan, Ilker., Abubakar Musa, Sulaiman., Sunusi Alkassim, Rukayya. (2016). Comparison of Convenience Sampling and Purposive Sampling. American Journal of Theoretical and Applied Statistics, Vol. 5 No. 1, 1-4.
Expressen TV. (2018). Frelin om arkitekturupproret. By: DI TV. 2018-02-22 [https://www.expressen.se/tv/ditv/frelin-om-arkitekturupproret/]. Viewed: 2021-02-27
Exworthy, Mark; Wilkinson, Emma K.; McColl, Alastair; Moore, Michael; Roderick, Paul; Smith, Helen; Gabbay, John. (2003). The role of performance indicators in changing the Nordenström & Svender, 59 autonomy of the general practice profession in the UK. Social Science & Medicine, Volume 56, Issue 7, Pages 1493-1504
Fejes, Andreas. & Thornberg, Robert. (2015). Handbok i kvalitativ analys. 2nd edition. Egypt: Sahara Printing.
Fenton, Natalie., Bryman, Alan., and Deacon, David. (1998). Mediating Social Science. London: Sage.
Freiberg, Arie. (2005). Managerialism in Australian Criminal Justice: RIP for KPIs? Monash University Law Review, 31, 1, 12–36
Freidson, Eliot & Rhea, Buford. (1963). Processes of Control in a Company of Equals. Social Problems, Vol. 11, No. 2, 119-131
Freidson, Eliot. (1983). The reorganization of the professions by regulation. Law and Human Behavior 7, 279-290.
Freidson, Eliot. (1984). The Changing Nature of Professional Control. Annual Review of Sociology, 1984, Vol.10 (1984) pp. 1-20.
Given, Lisa M. (2008). The Sage Encyclopedia of qualitative research methods (Vol. 1-0). London: Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications.
Glynn, Mary Ann. (2000). When cymbals become symbols: Conflict over organizational identity within a symphony orchestra. Organization Science, 11ē. 285-298.
Glynn, Mary Ann.; & Lounsbury, Michael. (2005). From the critic's corner: Logic blending, discursive change and authenticity in a cultural production system. Journal of Management Studies, 42: 1031-1055.
Goodrick, Elizabeth & Reay, Trish. (2011). Constellations of Institutional Logics Changes in the Professional Work of Pharmacists. Work and Occupations, 38/3, 372–416 Nordenström & Svender, 60
Gordan, Rebecka. (2020). Så påverkas arkitekternas arbetsplatser av coronaviruset. Arkitekten. 2020-03-19.
Guba, Yvonna S. & Lincoln, Egon G. (1985) Naturalistic Inquiry. 1st edt. Sage Publications Inc.
Hadjistavropoulos, Thomas; Malloy, David C.; Sharpe, Donald; Fuchs-Lacelle, Shannon. (2003). The Ethical Ideologies of Psychologists and Physicians: A Preliminary Comparison. Ethics & Behavior, 13:1, 97-104
Hanna, Stefan; Fosnes, Christina & Selberg, Gunnar. (2017). Bygg bostäder som folk har råd med. Svenska Dagbladet. 2017-07-22.
Haque, Shamsul M. (1999). Ethical Tension in Public Governance: Critical Impacts on Theory Building. Administrative Theory & Praxis, Vol. 21, Issue 4, 468-473.
Hellawell, David & Hancock, Nick. (2001). A case study of the changing role of the academic middle manager in higher education: between hierarchical control and collegiality? Research Papers in Education, Vol. 16:2, 183-197
Hoggett, Paul. (1996). New Modes of Control in the Public Service. Public Administration, Vol. 74, Issue 1, 9-32.
Hood, Christoffer. (1991). A Public Management for All Seasons? Public Administration Vol. 69, 3-19
Hood, Christoffer. (1995). Contemporary public management:a new global paradigm? Public Policy and Administration, Vol. 10, No. 2.
Höpfl, Harro. (2006). Organization in the Age of Post-Bureaucracy. Journal of Organizational Change Management, Vol 19(1). Nordenström & Svender, 61
International Organization for Standardization. (2021a). ISO 9000 Family - Quality Management.
International Organization for Standardization. (2021b). ISO 14000 Family - Environmental Management.
Johansen, Christina & Boch Waldorff. (2015). What are Institutional Logics - and Where is the Perspective Taking Us? Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 2015, No. 1.
Kanter, Rosabeth Moss. (1977). Men and Women of the Corporation. New York: Basic Books.
Kaplan, Robert S. (2001). Strategic Performance Measurement and Management in Nonprofit Organizations. Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 11(3).
Karp, Tom. (2005). Unpacking the mysteries of change: mental modelling. Journal of Change Management, 51, 87-96.
Kligyte, Giedre & Barrie, Simon. 2014. Collegiality: leading us into fantasy – the paradoxical resilience of collegiality in academic leadership. Higher Education Research & Development, 33:1, 157-169
Kronqvist, Patrik. (2019). Därför är bostäder så dyra att bygga. Expressen. Published: 2019-10-03.
Kärreman, Dan & Alvesson, Mats. (2004). ‘Cages in Tandem: Management Control, Social Identity, and Identification in a Knowledge-intensive Firm’, Organization, 11, 1, 149–75.
Landén, Nisse. (2019). Systemfel ger Sverige Europas dyraste byggen. Published: 2019-02-08. < https://www.svd.se/systemfel-ger-sverige-europas-dyraste-byggen> Viewed: 2021-02-22 Nordenström & Svender, 62
Laegreid, Per., Roness, Paul G. & Verhoest, Koen. (2011). Explaining the Innovative Culture and Activities of State Agencies. Organization Studies 32(10) 1321–1347
Lofland, John & Lofland, Lynn. (1995). Analyzing Social Settings: A Guide to Qualitative Observation and Analysis. 3rd Edt. Belmont, CA. Wadsworth.
Lukka, Kari & Kaasanen, Eero. (1995). The problem of generalizability: anecdotes and evidence in accounting research. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Vol. 8 No. 5, 1995, pp. 71-90.
Lunneborg, Rolf. (2020). Arkitektur: Sundsvall hyllas – och sågas av kritiker. Published: 2020-08-29.
Lunenburg, Fred C. (2012). Organizational Structure: Mintzberg’s Framework. International Journal of Scholarly, Academic, Intellectual Diversity, Vol. 14, No. 1.
Mair, Johanna; Mayer, Judith; and Lutz, Eva. (2015). Navigating Institutional Plurality: Organizational Governance in Hybrid Organizations, Organization studies, vol. 36:6.
McCormack, John; Propper, Carol & Smith, Sarah. (2013). Herding Cats? Management and University Performance. The Economic Journal vol. 124, Issue 578. August 2014.
McPherson, Michael Chad & Sauder, Michael. (2013). Logics in Action: Managing Institutional Complexity in a Drug Court. Administrative Science Quarterly 58 (2)165–196
Merton, Robert K. (1940). Bureaucratic structure and personality. Social forces, 560-568.
Meyer, John W. & Bromley, Patricia. (2013). The Worldwide Expansion of “Organization”. Sociological Theory 31(4) 366–389
Mitchell, Clyde J. (1983). Case and Situation Analysis. Sociological Review, 31: 186-211. Nordenström & Svender, 63
Noordegraf, Mirko. (2007). From “Pure” to “Hybrid” Professionalism Present-Day Professionalism in Ambiguous Public Domains. Administration & Society, Vol. 39, No. 6 761-785. Sage Publications.
Nordangård, Inger. (2018a). Paneldebatt: ‘’Är modern arkitektur ful?’’. Arkitektupproret. 2018-11-13.
Nordangård, Inger. (2018b). Stjärnarkitekten: “Svensk arkitektur har aldrig varit bättre” . Arkitektupproret. 2018-09-22.
Nordberg, Stefan. (2016). Arkitekter kritiserar nya bostäder som monotona och likriktade. Sveriges Radio. 2016-12-29.
O’Byrne, Patrick. (2007). The Advantages and Disadvantages of Mixing Methods: An Analysis of Combining Traditional and Autoethnographic Approaches. Qualitative Health Research, Volume 17 Number 10 December 2007 1381-1391
Oliver, C. (1991). Strategic responses to institutional processes. Academy of Management Review, 16: 145-179.
Pache, Anne-Claire & Santos, Felipe. (2010). When Worlds Collide: The Internal Dynamics of Organizational Responses to Conflicting Institutional Demands. The Academy of Management Review , July 2010, Vol. 35, No. 3 (July 2010), pp. 455-476
Pache, Anne-Claire & Santos, Felipe. (2013). Inside the Hybrid Organization: Selective Coupling as a Response to Competing Institutional Logics. The Academy of Management Journal, August 2013, Vol. 56, No. 4 (August 2013), pp. 972-1001 Nordenström & Svender, 64
Pallas, Josef., Fredriksson, Magnus & Wedlin, Linda. (2016). Translating Institutional Logics: When the Media Logic Meets Professions. Organization Studies, Vol 37(11), 1661-1684.
Perlow, Leslie. (1997). Finding Time - How corporations, individuals, and families can benefit from new work practices. Cornell University Press.
Pollit, Christopher. (1990). Doing Business in the Temple? Managers and Quality Assurance in the Public Services. Public Administration, Vol. 68, 435-452
Reiter, Renate & Klenk, Tanja. (2019). The manifold meanings of ‘post-New Public Management’ – a systematic literature review. International Review of Administrative Sciences 2019, Vol. 85(1) 11–27.
Sahlin, Kerstin & Eriksson-Zetterquist, Ulla. (2016). Collegiality in Modern Universities - The Composition of Governance Ideals and Practices. Nordic Journal of Studies in Educational Policy, 2016:2-3
Samuelsson, Katarina. (2019). Teachers’ Work in Times of Restructuring. Gothenburg Studies in Educational Sciences, 431.
Sanderson, Ian. (2001). Performance Management, Evaluation and Learning in ‘Modern’ Local Government. Public Administration, Vol. 79, Issue 2, 297-313.
Schensul, Jean & LeCompte, Margaret D. Designing and Conducting Ethnographic Research: An Introduction. 1st Edt. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.
Scott, Richard W. (1965). Reactions to Supervision in a Heteronomous Professional Organization. Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 1, 65-81
Sehlin, Ann. (2021). Arkitekturupproret: Landets fulaste byggnad finns i Stockholm. Sveriges Television. 2021-01-01. [https://www.svt.se/nyheter/lokalt/stockholm/landets-fulaste-byggnad-finns-i-stockholm] Viewed: 2021-02-22. Nordenström & Svender, 65
Selznick, Philip. (1943). An Approach to a Theory of Bureaucracy. American Sociological Review, Vol. 8, No. 1, 47-54.
Selznick, Philip. (1948). Foundation of the Theory of Organization. American Sociological Review, Vol. 13, No. 1, 25-35.
Spicer, Barry H. (1992). The resurgence of cost and management accounting: a review of some recent developments in practice, theories and case research methods. Management Accounting Research, Vol. 3 No. 1, pp. 1-37.
Stake, Robert E. (1995). The Art of Case Study Research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc.
Stausberg, Michael & Engler, Steven. (2011). Handbook of Research Methods in the Study of Religion. First published in 2011 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon,
Staw, Barry M. & Epstein, Lisa D. (2000) What Bandwagons Bring: Effects of Popular Management Techniques on Corporate Performance, Reputation, and CEO Pay. Administrative Science Quarterly, 45(3), 523-556
Stjernberg, Max Sohl. (2019). Han är professorn som ska förena arkitektur och ekonomi. Arkitekten. 2019-08-30.
Strauss, Anselm & Corbin, Juliet. (1990). Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Suddaby, Roy; Ganzin, Max & Minkus, Alison. (2017). Craft, Magic and the Re-Enchantment of the World. European Management Journal xxx, 1-12. Nordenström & Svender, 66
Sveriges arkitekter. (2021). SACO lönesök - ditt bästa löneverktyg.
Swedish Research Council, Vetenskapsrådet (2017). Good Research Practice. VR1710 ISBN 978-91-7307-354-7.
Swidler, Ann. (1986). Culture in action: Symbols and strategies. American Sociological Review, 51: 273-286.
Söderlind, Jerker. (2019) Arkitekterna behöver tänka om. Inte de skönhetstörstande medborgarna. Sydsvenskan. 2019-04-01.
Thornton, Patricia H. (2002). The Rise of the Corporation in a Craft Industry: Conflict and Conformity in Institutional Logics. The Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 45, No. 1, 81-101
Thornton, Patricia H. & Ocasio, William. (2008). Institutional Logics. In: Greenwood, Royston; Oliver, Christine; Sahlin, Kerstin; Suddaby, Roy. The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism. 2nd edt. Sage Publications Ltd.
Tracey, Paul; Phillips, Nelson., & Jarvis, Owen. (2011). Bridging institutional entrepreneurship and the creation of new organizational forms: A multilevel model. Organization Science, 22(1), 60-80
Trotter, Robert T. (2012). Qualitative research sample design and sample size: Resolving and unresolved issues and inferential imperatives. Preventive Medicine, 55, 398-400.
Wald, Patricia M. (1983). The Problem with the Courts: Black-robed Bureaucracy, or Collegiality under Challenge? 42 Maryland Law Review, 766 (1983) Nordenström & Svender, 67
Waters, Malcolm. (1989). Collegiality, Bureaucratization and Professionalization: A Weberian Analysis. American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 94, No. 5, 945-72.
Webb, Eugene J., Campbell, Donald T., Schwartz, Richard D., & Sechrest, Lee. (1966). Unobtrusive measures: Nonreactive research in the social sciences. Rand Mcnally.
Weber, Max. (1947). Legitimacy, Authority and Bureaucracy-The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Referenced in Pugh, Derek S. 2007. Organization Theory: Selected Classic Readings. Penguin Books Ltd.
Weber, Max (1922). Economy and Society - A New Translation. Harvard University Press.
Weber, Max. (1978). Economy and Society. Edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Berkley: University of California Press.
Whittington, Richard; Regnér, Patrick; Angwin, Duncan; Scholes, Kevan; Johnson, Gerry. (2009). Exploring Strategy, Text and Cases. 3rd Edt. Pearson Education Limited.
Yin, Robert K. (2003). Case Study Research: Design and Methods. 3rd Edt. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Yin, Robert K. (2011). Application of Case Study Research. London: SAGE Publications.
Yin, Robert K. (2014). Case Study Research. Design and Methods. 5th edition. London: Sage Publications.
Zilber, Tammar B. (2002). Institutionalization as an interplay between actions, meaning and actors: The case of a rape crisis center in Israel. Academy of Management Journal, 45: 234-254.
Zumbansen, Peer. (2012). Governance: An Interdisciplinary Perspective. In: The Oxford Handbook of Governance. Edited by: Levi-Faur, David. Oxford University Press. Nordenström & Svender, 68
10. Appendixes
Appendix A: Theoretical mapping of the ideal decision maker and its rationale
Bureaucracy Managerialism Collegiality
Decision Authority Monocratic Monocratic Collective maker Goal in Unbiased, Performance Knowledge / decision Impersonality Truth making
Legitimizer Qualities Knowledge - Knowledge in Knowledge of the unspecified management profession
Rationale Merits - Merits as a Knowledge & unspecified strategizer knowledge Rule abiding development, Recognition by peers
Appendix B: Theoretical mapping of the ideal decision process and its rationale
Bureaucracy Management Collegiality
Decision Process Predetermined Measurements Seminar -making processes Management Discussion process "Thinking" models Peer review Strategizing
Legitimizer Rationale Rule abiding Impartial Impartial / truth Merited "thinker" Correct Consensus Impartial information about the environment Nordenström & Svender, 69
Appendix C: Theoretical assumptions
Theoretic assumption 1a
Theoretic assumption 1b
Theoretic assumption 2a Nordenström & Svender, 70
Theoretic assumption 3a
Theoretic assumption 4a Nordenström & Svender, 71
Appendix D: The hierarchical roles in the Firm
Role in english Eng. Role in swedish Swe. Abbr. Abbr.
Participating architect PA Medverkande arkitekt MV
Administrative architect AA Handläggande arkitekt HL
Architectural project manager APM Ansvarig arkitekt/ UA Uppdragsansvarig
Studio managers SM Studiochefer SC (with internal staff liability)
Office manager OM Kontorschef KC (one at each subsidiary) Nordenström & Svender, 72
Appendix E: An overview of the respondents and their work experience.
Participant Role Work experience Interview Time format
Been working as an architect Face-to-Face 55 minutes for 30 years. Two years at this Respondent 1 SM/APM company.
Has been working as an Video call 64 minutes architect for 30 years, and at Respondent 2 SM/APM the Firm for 12 years.
Has been working at the Face-to-Face 61 minutes company for two years and as Respondent 3 PA an architect for ten years.
Has been working as an Face-to-Face 34 minutes architect for four years and at Respondent 4 AA the Firm for two years.
Been working at the company Video call 48 minutes for ten years, and 20 years as Respondent 5 APM an architect.
APM/Business Has been working as an Video call 47 minutes Respondent 6 Manager architect for 20 years
Been working at the company Face-to-Face 75 minutes for two years and as an Respondent 7 OM architect for 35 years.
Been working as an architect Video call 47 minutes for three years and at the Firm Respondent 8 AA for two years.
Has been working as an Video call 47 minutes architect and at the Firm for Respondent 9 AA four years.
Has been working as an Video call 37 minutes Respondent architect and the Firm for four 10 PA years.
Respondent Been working as an architect Video call 43 minutes 11 PA and the Firm for three years Nordenström & Svender, 73
Appendix F: An overview of the observation and it’s content.
Date Type of Present Description Meeting format meeting
APM, client, Mid-stage project Microsoft Teams property meeting 2021-04-21 Client Meeting owners
APM, AA, Mid-stage eeting Microsoft Teams PA, PA regarding design and 2021-04-26 Internal meeting layout
APM, Early-stage project Microsoft Teams property meeting. owners, other 2021-04-27 Planning consultants
APM, AA Mid-stage meeting Microsoft Teams Design/sketch brainstorming 2021-04-28 meeting meeting.
AA, Client Early-stage meeting Face-to-face designed as a 2021-04-29 Client meeting workshop.
APM, APM Meeting about setting Microsoft Teams the budget for a 2021-05-04 Budget meeting specific project.
Resource Five APM:s Office meeting Microsoft Teams allocation unrelated to a specific 2021-05-05 meeting project. Nordenström & Svender, 74
Appendix G: An overview of number confirmed assumptions.
Decision area Theoretic # of interplay # of interplay # of interplay assumption between decision between decision between maker and its maker and decision-making rationale decision-making process and its process rationale
Budgeting 1a
1b
2a
3a 3 times (BM, BC, MC)
4a 2 times 1 time 2 times (BB & MM) (MM) (MM, CC)
Novel: C->B - 1 time C->M - 1 time
Time planning 1a
1b
2a
3a 3 times (BM, BC, CM)
4a 2 times 1 time 2 times (BB, CC) (CC) (MM, CC)
Novel
Resource 1a allocation 1b
2a
3a 1 time (MC)
4a 2 times 1 time (CC) 1 time (CC) (MM, CC)
Novel
Design 1a
1b
2a Nordenström & Svender, 75
3a 1 time (BC)
4a 1 time (BB) 1 time (CC)
Novel M->B - 1 time C->B - 1 time
Work process 1a
1b
2a
3a
4a 1 time 1 time 1 time (BB) (BB) (BB)
Novel B <- M - 1 time
Summary 1a
1b
2a
3a 8 times
4a 8 times 4 times 7 times
Novel 4 times B <- M - 1 time
C->B - 2 times C->M - 1 time M->B - 1 time