The interplay of governance modes in architectural decision making Master’s Thesis 30 credits Programme: Master’s Programme in Business and Management Specialisation: Organisation Department of Business Studies Uppsala University Spring Semester of 2021 Date of Submission: 2021-06-02 Daniel Nordenström Adam Svender Supervisor: Josef Pallas Nordenström & Svender, 1 Abstract The suggested deficiencies in bureaucratic and management governance highlighted by scholars in new public management as well as organizational studies has led to an increased academic interest in alternate forms of governance. One of those forms being collegiality, a governance form often associated with traditional professions such as hospital workers, lawyers, academics and architects. This case study sets out to examine how the interplay between the governance modes of bureaucracy, management and collegiality is manifested in organizations. To do this, governance interplay in the decision making of architectural production was chosen as the subject of the study, as it has been suggested by prior literature to feature elements of collegiality as well as bureaucracy. A framework derived from the literature on governance modes was formulated to enable the study of governance interplay, and the findings suggest that governance modes are applied in a manner similar to a bricolage or hybrid organization as is recognized within the literature on institutional logics. Keywords: Governance modes, interplay, ideal types, bureaucracy, management, collegiality. Nordenström & Svender, 2 Acknowledgements We would like to extend our gratitude and appreciation to the architecture firm that made this study possible. From the start, we were met with enthusiasm, openness and curiosity, for which we are immensely grateful. Furthermore, we would like to recognize our peers in the seminar group, and a special thanks to Lowe and Jakob for their valuable feedback during this final semester. It should be noted that this paper has been written as part of a larger research project on collegiality, conducted at Uppsala university. This research project is, in part, led by our supervisor for this paper Josef Pallas and we would like to show our appreciation and gratitude for the opportunity to be a part of it, as well as for Pallas’ supervision during this study. Pallas’ insights and guidance have been beyond valuable. To Pallas, the architectural firm and our peers: Thank you. Uppsala, 2021-06-02. Daniel Nordenström Adam Svender Nordenström & Svender, 3 Table of contents Abstract 1 Acknowledgements 2 Table of contents 3 1. Introduction 4 1.1 Problematization 5 1.2 Purpose and research question 7 1.3 Disposition 7 2. Theory 9 2.1 Governance in organizations 9 2.2 Ideal modes of governance 9 2.3 Research on the interplay of governance modes 14 2.4 Institutional logics as an analogy 15 2.5 The theoretical interplay of the ideal governance modes in decision making 16 2.6 Theoretical framework 21 3. Method 24 3.1 Scientific approach and design 24 3.2 Case selection 25 3.3 Research setting & context 26 3.4 Data collection and operationalization 27 3.5 Method of analysis 30 3.6 Ethical considerations 31 4. Findings 32 4.1 Decisions regarding project management 32 4.2 Decisions on architectural design 35 4.3 Predetermined decisions 38 5. Analysis 40 5.1 The empirical interplay of governance modes 40 5.2 Emerging themes and patterns of the interplay 46 6. Conclusion 49 7. Discussion 51 8. Limitations and future research 53 9. References 55 10. Appendixes 68 Nordenström & Svender, 4 1. Introduction In their article on power relations in architecture firms, Brown, Kornberger, Clegg and Carter (2010) state what many architects probably know already: there has always existed tension between the creative ethos of architects and the necessity of winning commissions to reach the goals of the organization. Similar tensions, however, can be found in other professional realms as professionals and collegial organizations in general have been losing power (Freidson 1983) due to the increase of bureaucratization (Freidson 1983; Waters 1989) and managerialism (Hood 1991). Most of the literature on the increase of bureaucratic and managerial governance have focused on the public sector. Possibly due to the suggestion that, as Hood (1991; 1995) and Noordegraf (2007) and have demonstrated, the public sector has undergone large changes and implementation of management ideas that have changed the institutional environment within the public sector to a larger degree than the private sector, which by and large were already managerial (Hood 1991). The constraints put on architectural firms by different governance modes is a topic that has been subjected to increased attention over the past few years in Sweden (see for example: Sehlin 2021; Lunneborg 2020; Söderlind 2019; Nordangård 2018a; Nordberg 2016). Mostly as a part of a larger debate on the architectural design of contemporary buildings, what beauty is and who decides what should be built. One of the main opinion makers within this discussion is a lobby organization called Arkitektupproret (“Architectural riot”), which opposes modern architectural design and celebrates traditional architecture. Arkitektupproret accuses architects of elitism and for possessing a “taste monopoly” that only appeals to other architects with the exclusion of ordinary people (Arkitektupproret 2019), as well as for being hypocritical for producing contemporary architecture while personally prefer to reside in traditionally designed buildings (Arkitektupproret 2018a). As a response to Arkitektupproret’s critique, leading architects have defended contemporary architectural design (Expressen TV 2018) by labeling the opinions as regressive (Nordangård 2018b); others are essentially blaming some aspects of how architectural firms are organized by claiming that time and financial constraints hinders their ability to produce the work they want to produce (Belin 2019; Stjernberg 2019), suggesting an impairment of the profession by management and market forces. Architects argue that construction developers downgrade projects by using cheaper materials and cheaper designs in an effort to cut costs, which Nordenström & Svender, 5 ultimately turns a beautiful building into an ugly one during the actual production of a building (Belin 2019). In turn, the construction developers accuses the complexity of the bureaucratic regulations, purportedly forcing the construction companies to lower costs at every stage of production in order to be able to meet market requirements and offer competitive prices (Belin 2019; Kronqvist 2019; Landén 2019; Hanna, Fosnes & Selberg 2017). Underlying the arguments within the infected debate on contemporary architectural design lies an indication that there are governance modes that to a certain extent are competing with each other. For example, when Stjernberg (2019) argues that financial constraints and market forces are hurting architectural work and creativity, it could serve as a cause for further research about how the managerial goals of the organization are colliding with the professional and creative ethos of the architects, to use Browns et al. (2010) terminology. The potential clash between these modes of governance in the architectural design process poses a great opportunity to study how governance forms interact, conflict and coincide with each other in architectural production. Since architectural firms has been recognized as professional bureaucracies, meaning they are bureaucratic organisations dominated by the expertise of the professionals (Mintzberg 1992, referenced in Lunenburg 2012), this setup poses a great opportunity to examine the interplay of governance modes and to contribute to the academic debate and research of governance interplay within organizations. 1.1 Problematization As described above, this study aims to capture how governance modes are manifested in architectural production and, in particular, in architectural decision making. In order to examine the governance interplay, ideal types of bureaucracy, collegiality, and management will be employed in this paper. Furthermore, an emphasis will be made on how the ideal forms describe the decision maker and the decision-making process. Because of this paper’s application of ideal forms as theoretical constructs, it is necessary to address the common criticism that the usage of the ideal form gets, in that ideal types are far removed from real life (see for example: Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist 2016; Thornton & Ocasio 2008; Bartels 2009), inadequate to capture the complex social reality. To illustrate, while Weber acknowledged the role of collegiality (Waters 1989), he nonetheless excluded it when formulating the ideal form of bureaucracy and hence described an organization that is Nordenström & Svender, 6 functioning according to its bureaucratic routines, blueprints and formal structures (Weber 1947, referenced in Pugh 2007). While acknowledging critique of ideal types, studies that have employed the ideal form in their research are rarely using it to describe the world in a literal sense. Rather, they are have used ideal forms as tools for comparisons in their analysis (see: Kligyte & Barrie 2014; Blomgren & Waks 2016; Thornton 2002; Pallas, Fredriksson, & Wedlin 2016; Sahlin & Eriksson-Zetterquist 2016, Samuelsson 2019; Heckscher 1994; Waters 1989). These studies mirrors Thornton and Ocasio’s (2008) notion that ideal types are highly useful for comparisons: “While often