Regret, Determination, and Honour
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Title Page Regret, Determination, and Honour The Impact of the Single Ship Losses in North American Waters on the British Royal Navy, 1812-1813 by Nicholas James Kaizer Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts at Dalhousie University Halifax, Nova Scotia June 2018 © Copyright by Nicholas James Kaizer, 2018 Table of Contents Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... iv Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................... v Chapter One: Introduction .......................................................................................................... 1 The Royal Navy in the Napoleonic Era ................................................................................... 2 Historiography of the Royal Navy in the Napoleonic Period .............................................. 10 Historiography of the War of 1812........................................................................................ 23 Thesis and Sources .................................................................................................................. 29 Chapter Two: “It is with the deepest regret:” Reporting and reconciling loss in a navy accustomed to victory, 1812 ....................................................................................................... 36 Rodgers and Broke on the Hunt ............................................................................................ 38 Essex-Alert Action, 13th August 1812 .................................................................................... 46 Constitution-Guerriere Action, 19th August 1812 .................................................................. 51 Wasp-Frolic Action, 18th October 1812 ................................................................................. 59 United States-Macedonian Action, 25th October 1812 .......................................................... 62 Constitution-Java Action, 29th December 1812 ..................................................................... 70 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 76 Chapter Three: Broken “Spell of Invincibility:” Impact of 1812 losses on the Naval Chronicle and Halifax Press, 1812-1813.................................................................................... 79 British Honour and the Spell of Invincibility ....................................................................... 81 “They are Frigates in Name Only”........................................................................................ 86 Outrage at the Admiralty ....................................................................................................... 95 Halifax’s Popular Press ........................................................................................................ 100 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 105 Chapter Four: “Great hopes yet of an honourable encounter:” Capel, Broke, and the Blockade of Boston, 1813 .......................................................................................................... 108 Changing Naval Policy ......................................................................................................... 111 Reactions of the Captains of the North American Squadron ........................................... 117 The Blockade of Boston ........................................................................................................ 125 Shannon-Chesapeake Action, 1st June 1813 ........................................................................ 137 Chapter Five: Conclusion......................................................................................................... 148 Bibliography .............................................................................................................................. 158 Primary Sources .................................................................................................................... 158 ii Secondary Sources ................................................................................................................ 161 Appendix A: Dispositions of Warships in North American Waters, July 1813 .................. 167 Appendix B: Social Backgrounds of Royal Navy Officers, 1793-1815 ................................. 169 Appendix C: Careers of the Captains, Commanders, and Lieutenants of the actions of the War of 1812 ............................................................................................................................... 170 Appendix D: Comparison of Force in the Single Ship Actions ............................................. 172 iii Abstract The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars was a time of unprecedented naval success for the United Kingdom. By 1812, after nineteen years of warfare, the Royal Navy had won every major battle and maintained a choking blockade over the ports of France and her allies. When war broke out with the United States in 1812 many hoped that the new conflict meant a fresh period of prizes, glory, and honour. By the end of the year, however, five British ships had been defeated in action by their American counterparts. For the British, it was as shocking as it was depressing. British naval historiography tends to focus on victory, and in this period, there were plenty of victories to study. But these losses and the reactions to them provide an interesting case study to examine the post-Nelsonic Royal Navy culture and fighting spirit. This thesis examines how the navy reacted to the losses culturally through an examination of the defenses made by the defeated officers of 1812 and their receptions in Courts Martial held after the loss of a ship. These naval officers understood their losses not as the result of vastly superior enemy firepower but instead as contests which they could have won if not for a lack of fortune. The naval-interested public did not agree, and instead justified their own insecurities regarding their beloved naval heroes by clinging to the impressive broadsides of America’s heavy frigates like USS Constitution. The Admiralty responded to the defeats and resulting public uproar with cautious policies in the North American Squadron. The captains of the North American Squadron, however, were not sympathetic to the cautious policies. Their desire to avenge British honour resulted in the issuing of challenges which weakened Britain’s efforts to blockade the United States and, except for the successful Shannon-Chesapeake action, were in vain. iv Acknowledgements For all of the hard work and worry that inevitably comes with the academic process, it has been a joy to have developed this project. Throughout the last three years I have always treated this project as an escape from other responsibilities. As with any project extending of this length or magnitude, reaching the finish line was by no means a solitary effort. Throughout the project I was continuously encouraged by my family and friends, historians or otherwise, and I cannot thank them enough. Of course, my closest companion these last three years has been my dutiful feline, who never failed to choose my lap or my thesis draft as a place to settle for a nap. This thesis evolved out of my honours work at Acadia University, and as such I would like to thank my honours supervisor Dr. Paul Doerr, and the amazing faculty of Acadia’s Department of History and Classics for their support. While at Dalhousie I was encouraged and spurred on at every stage by Valerie Peck, whose support has been a blessing. I would also like to thank Dr. Roger Marsters and Dr. Justin Roberts, who generously agreed to serve as readers on my defense committee. I cannot express my gratitude to them both, as Justin went beyond the normal duties as a third reader and provided much needed comments and edits that helped to polish this thesis, and as Roger has twice given his time to act as my second reader. I would especially like to thank Dr. Jerry Bannister for agreeing to serve as my supervisor. Without his advice and guidance this project would not have been possible. Jerry’s expertise and experience helped me to mould my interests in naval culture into a workable project, and without his understanding and hard work this would not have been possible. I am indebted to Jerry for his guidance and support through it all. v Chapter One: Introduction In the early afternoon of the 19th of August 1812, lookouts of HMS Guerriere, a sixteen- year-old Royal Navy frigate captured from the French in 1806, spotted another frigate on the horizon. Not long after, one of her lieutenants made her out to be the American frigate USS Constitution, which had escaped from Guerriere and her companions earlier in the war. Without hesitation Captain James Dacres reduced Guerriere’s sail so that Constitution could catch up. He was determined to bring her to action, and the maneuvers of the Americans indicated that her commander was equally determined to fight. When the guns fell silent that evening, Dacres’ ship was battered to pieces and had struck to the enemy. It was the first time in over a year that a British ship had surrendered, and as news of the event spread