Japan's Polar Engagement and the Role of Scientific Whaling

Tonami Paper

Japan’s Achilles heel? Japan’s Polar engagement and the role of scientific whaling

Aki Tonami NIAS – Nordic Institute of Asian Studies University of Copenhagen [email protected]

Paper prepared for the panel ‘Asia at the poles’, ISA Asia-Pacific, Hong Kong, 26 June 2016

First draft - Not for citation

Introduction

With global temperature rising and subsequent climatic changes in the Polar regions, the issue of how human-beings should and can ‘govern’ the pristine, fragile natural environment of the Polar regions has gained much attention. Particularly discussed has been whether existing frameworks of governance of the Polar regions, such as the Arctic Council (AC) and the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), are able to cope with the rapidly changing environment of the Polar regions. Moreover, a question of how to ‘harness’ the ‘emerging’ actors who (were perceived to) have a great interest in the regions has been on the agenda as well. These ‘emerging’ actors included East Asian states, in particular China, an emerging economic and military power. Rather unfortunate for her, China entered Arctic politics “at time when the region has become both more crowded and more diplomatically unpredictable” (Lanteigne, 2014, p. 11), as a result receiving much media attention and criticisms from the scholarly community of the Arctic coastal states. This phenomenon appears to be present in Antarctic politics. Subsequently, Japan’s Polar engagement caught attention as it was one of the five Asian states whose (permanent) Observer status at the Arctic Council (AC) was accepted1 at the Kiruna Meeting in May 2013, along with China.

1 In 2013, Arctic Council abandoned the flexible mechanism of granting “ad-hoc Observer” status and implemented a more static list of criteria that controls access to Council meetings (Knecht, 2015). Therefore, the colloquial use of the term ‘permanent Observer’ as opposed the ‘ad-hoc Observer’ will no longer be valid.

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Being accepted to the Arctic Council as Observer and with the release of official Arctic policy in 2015, Japan became a full-fledged stakeholder in the Arctic. Similarly, Japan has been one of the most active states in the Antarctic, sending nationally-funded Antarctic expeditions on a regular basis. In line with Japan’s environmental and science diplomacy in recent years, Japan’s Polar diplomacy is generally speaking liberal, based on Japan’s ideal of promoting multilateral solutions to global problems. However, there is one aspect of Japan’s Polar engagement that stands out like a sore thumb: its controversial research whaling policy in the Antarctic. For the Western audience, which is generally anti-whaling, the Japanese government’s seemingly unnecessary adherence to whaling, so much so it lost a case at the International Court of Justice, appear nothing but puzzling (see, for example, Wingfield- Hayes (2016)). Against this background, my questions for this paper are: Why does Japan continue scientific whaling? What does it mean to its Polar engagement? In the rest of the paper, firstly, I will introduce Japan’s Polar policy, Arctic policy and Antarctic policy. I will incorporate a bipolar perspective because while both Poles have some similarities (and many states including Japan juxtapose both Polar regions against each other), there are distinct differences that are deemed to prevent a similar governance system like the ATS for the Arctic. For instance, Young (2012) dismisses the possibility of creating an ‘Arctic Treaty’ because: Arctic lands and coastal waters are subject to undisputed jurisdiction on the part of the Arctic states; the Arctic has a sizable population of permanent or long-term residents, including indigenous peoples who have rights recognized in international law as well as in the laws of individual states; the Arctic is a locus of large-scale industrial activities, including world-class lead, zinc, nickel and diamond mining along with oil and gas extraction; and the Arctic has long been and continues to be a militarized region (p.392). It is also useful to pay attention to both Arctic and Antarctic policies for the sake of comparative analysis. Secondly, I will follow with an introduction of theories I will use for the analysis: the luxury theory by Hans Mouritzen (Mouritzen, 2009; Mouritzen & Wivel, 2012) and a theory of foreign policy change by David W. Welch (2005). In conducting foreign policy analysis, Robert Putnam (1988)’s concept of a ‘two-level game’ appears to be one of the most commonly used analytical frameworks. Putnam famously argued that in negotiations, national leaders are engaged in a ‘two-level game’, aligned with both their position in relation to their negotiating partner(s) and their position in domestic politics. I too take a

2 Tonami Paper position that there is a ‘two-level game’ as Putnam describes in foreign policy making. While at the same time, I do acknowledge that focusing too heavily on intrastate features pose a danger of getting caught in a “logic/politics dichotomy” and prevent the analysis to be only capturing part of a given foreign policy outcome (Freedman, 1976). With this in mind, the luxury theory provides a compelling argument that the role of internal considerations in the state’s external action space, which is going to be relevant for the subject of this paper. In addition, Welch’s theory of foreign policy change, particularly the segment in which he analysed the Japan’s (lack of) foreign policy change with regards to a territorial dispute with Russia, provides a good reference point for this paper as I will discuss the puzzling adherence of Japan to whaling.

Japan’s Polar policy

Japan’s Polar policy centres on scientific research. Indeed, Japan has been one of few non- Western states to conduct polar research, doing so since 1957, but mainly focusing on Antarctica (Tonami & Watters, 2012). This is not unrelated to the fact that the first Japanese Antarctic expedition during 1911-1912, in which Nobu Shirase landed on Antarctica on 16 January 19122, is commemorated as the burgeoning of Japan’s Polar engagement. Although Japan’s polar research has consistently been conducted both in the Arctic and the Antarctic, the Arctic research community had been smaller by comparison and researchers had been dispersed among various institutions, consequently allowing the Antarctic voice to be stronger and more influential than that of the Arctic in the Polar policy-making.3 In 2009, however, the Arctic issue finally began to attract significant public attention in Japan. In April, the Japanese Vice Foreign Minister released an official statement on the 50th anniversary of the Antarctic Treaty and announced Japan’s intention to apply for Observer status at the Arctic Council (Hashimoto, 2009). In July, the Japanese government officially submitted an application to the AC. This formal self-recognition of Japan’s desire to be acknowledged in an intergovernmental body of Arctic governance sped up the policy- making processes with regards to the Arctic within the government. For the time-being, therefore, there is no unified Polar policy that encompasses both Polar regions.

2 This was approximately a month after the Norwegian Roald Amundsen reached the South Pole. 3 Author’s interview with a Japanese Polar researcher, November 2012.

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Arctic policy Although comparatively smaller in scale than that of the Antarctic, Japan has a history of Arctic engagement that dates back to WWII (Naganobu, 2012). In accordance with the general trend of Japan’s environmental diplomacy, Japan takes a liberal position in the Arctic and tries to promote multilateral solutions (Hook, Gibson, Hughes, & Dobson, 2012, p. 320). One of the first evident signs of this liberal position is Japan’s joining the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) as a non-Arctic state in 1992. Japan was the first Asian state to do so, and it was only two years after the Committee was established.4 This is backed by Japan’s formal recognition of the role of science and technology in its economic development and diplomacy during that period. A symbolic example is the Science and Technology Basic Law that was enacted in November 1995. The law claimed that its objective was “to achieve a higher standard of science and technology, to contribute to the development of the economy and society of Japan...” (Cabinet Office of Japan, 2015). In other words, the Law gave clarity on the shared understanding of the Japanese decision- makers that, in order to shake off the long recession and the end of the era of Japan as a ‘catching-up nation’ to the Western developed economies, it was indispensable to create new industries by developing creative and high-tech scientific technologies (Akashi, 2011). While it is debatable when and how Japan began to recognize science and technology as an important tool to facilitate its economic growth and its national wealth, it is imperative to understand the Japanese interpretation of the role of science and technology in linking its domestic industrial policy and foreign policy. In the beginning of 2000s, the Japanese government became aware of the need of supporting polar research. In December 2004, the Council for Science and Technology Policy, which is under the Cabinet Office, agreed on the Promotion Strategy of Earth Observation. This Strategy included Japan’s aim to realize a long-term, continuous observation of the Polar regions and cryosphere (MEXT 2010). From 2009, Japan’s Arctic policy began to set forth. As previously mentioned, in July 2009 Japan submitted its

4 IASC was founded in 1990 by representatives of national scientific organizations of the eight Arctic countries: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the USA (International Arctic Research Center, 2015).

4 Tonami Paper application for Observer status at the AC. In part to impress the Arctic coastal states who had a say in Japan’s application to the AC, and in other part to prepare the ground for when/if Japan became Observer at the AC, the government followed up the application with several domestic initiatives. They included the establishment an Arctic Task Force at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MoFA), a special public-private joint committee on the Northern Sea Route (NSR)5 organized by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT), the addition of the word ‘Arctic’ 18 times to the renewed Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, setting up of an inter-ministerial committee on the Arctic (Liaison Committee among Ministries and Agencies on Various Issues Related to the Arctic), or the appointment of Japan’s own Arctic Ambassador. Nonetheless, the flagship of Japan’s Arctic engagement has been considered as, at least by the Japanese stakeholders, its scientific research. Therefore, these government initiatives became ‘complete’ when they were complemented by nation-wide, large-scale, government-funded scientific research projects that aimed at protecting and understanding the Arctic environment. In terms of ministerial bodies related to the Arctic, at present there is no cross- ministerial, unified organization to deal with Arctic issues except for the aforementioned inter-ministerial committee on the Arctic. Amongst various ministries, business sectors and research institutes, the most relevant are: • Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) and the National Institute of Polar Research (NIPR) under MEXT • Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) • Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) • The Headquarters for Ocean Policy under the Cabinet Office • The Ocean Policy Research Institute (OPRI) under the Sasakawa Peace Foundation • Shipping Sector • Ports & infrastructure industry • Energy Sector

5 The Northern Sea Route (NSR), is a sea route that runs from the Kara Gate to the Bering Strait, connecting Europe and Asia across the High North. During the summer months, when the ice level is at its lowest, the NSR can cut the shipping distance between Asia and Europe by as much as 30% compared to conventional routes such as via the Suez Canal.

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Two years after Japan was accepted to be Observer at the AC and became a full- fledged non-Arctic-Arctic stakeholder, Japan announced its first official Arctic policy. At the Arctic Circle Assembly held in Reykjavik, Iceland in October 2015, the Japanese Arctic Ambassador Kazuko Shiraishi excitedly introduced the policy prefacing:

[Today is] the most important day ever for Japan’s Arctic policy. Just 6 hours ago, Prime Minister [Shinzo] Abe adopted a comprehensive Arctic policy for the first time in history…Economic opportunities and environmental challenges…the entire global environment. This recognition is the basis of our action.”

The official Arctic policy lists global environment, indigenous peoples, science and technology, the rule of law and international cooperation, sea routes, natural resources, and national security as areas of priority, and research and development, international cooperation and sustainable use (of natural resources) as specific initiatives. This rather all- embracing Arctic policy is due to a policy-making process of an iron triangle comprised of bureaucracy, politicians and business groups, each of which hold varying interests (Tonami, forthcoming). Seen from this perspective, Japan regards the Arctic as a region too difficult to generate any financial benefits in the short-term, but sufficiently important to continue planting flags to be used in the future; in doing so, science and technology, including scientific research, is considered as a useful tool.

Antarctic policy Despite Japan’s long history of Antarctic engagement, there is only a small volume of published studies describing the role of Japan and the governance of Antarctica. However, they do not necessarily reflect the latest state of Japan's Antarctic policy and its character. For instance, Joyner (1989) described the history of the Antarctic Treaty System and Japan's national interests in the Antarctic. They were regarded as: more cooperation with the Antarctic Treaty Consultive Party (ATCP), economic interests and preservation of access for Japanese nationals to exploit living marine resources and minerals, scientific interests and preservation of the resources of the Antarctic for future exploitation. Japan's economic interests in the Antarctic and subsequent reluctance to ratify the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty was criticized before Japan finally ratified in 1997 (Blay, 1992). Others explored the politics and legal implications around Japan's renunciation of

6 Tonami Paper territorial rights in Antarctica in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 after the defeat of WWII (Hara, 1999, 2006; Scott, 1999). Recent studies of Japan and the Antarctic revolve around the controversial research whaling that Japan conducts in the Antarctic (Anton, 2009) and so-called ‘eco-terrorism’ committed by an anti-whaling NGO at Japanese research whaling vessels (Roeschke, 2009). The Antarctic Treaty is the centrepiece of the legal regime and governance of the Antarctic. The Treaty was signed in Washington on 1 December 1959 by the twelve countries whose scientists had been active in and around Antarctica during the International Geophysical Year (IGY) of 1957-58 (Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, 2014). It entered into force in 1961 and currently the total number of Parties to the Treaty is 50. The Antarctic Treaty and related agreements are called the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) and within the ATS international relations with regards to Antarctica are regulated.6 Japan was one of the twelve original contracting states of the Antarctic Treaty and one of the twelve governments that had participated in the Washington Conference Treaty negotiations and ratified it, which brought the Treaty into force on 23 June 1961 (Joyner, 1989). Japan does not claim territorial rights in Antarctica and does not recognize other nations' claim either, similar to Belgium and South Africa. This is because Japan was forced to renounce its claim to Antarctica, together with a number of territories in the Asia-Pacific, in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 after the defeat of WWII (Hara, 2006). In order to understand Japan’s position on the Antarctic, it is noteworthy to mention the five important provisions of The Antarctic Treaty, which are (Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty, 2014): 1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only (Art. I); 2. Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and cooperation toward that end … shall continue (Art. II); 3. Scientific observations and results from Antarctica shall be exchanged and made freely available (Art. III); 4. Among the signatories of the Treaty were seven countries - Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom - with territorial claims,

6 For the treaty system, Antarctica is defined as all of the land and ice shelves south of 60°S latitude.

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sometimes overlapping. Other countries do not recognize any claims. The US and Russia maintain a “basis of claim”. All positions are explicitly protected in Article IV, which preserves the status quo; 5. To promote the objectives and ensure the observance of the provisions of the Treaty, "All areas of Antarctica, including all stations, installations and equipment within those areas … shall be open at all times to inspection " (Art. VII). Japan's position is that: a) the basic goal is to place the Antarctica under international management, b) Japan recognizes the importance of continuing the system to the future based on the Antarctic Treaty, c) it is important to actively support the planning and the implementation of measures to promote the aims and principles of the Antarctic Treaty (National Institute of Polar Research (NIPR), 2003). Japan is one of 27 members of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting with other nations that have been active in scientific research in Antarctica. Japan has sent regular scientific research expedition every year since 1956 (the Japanese Antarctic Research Expedition (JARE)). The first expedition reached East Ongul Island in Queen Maud Land in January 1957, and opened the Syowa Station, which is now the mother station of the JARE (National Institute of Polar Research (NIPR), 2014). The expedition is sent every year since, the latest one being the 57th (http://www.nipr.ac.jp/jare/jare57/index.html). Japan is one of the nations that do not support any mining activities in Antarctica based on the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty that Japan ratified in 1997 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2013a). For the time-being, it appears a major part of Japanese Antarctic policy is related to the Antarctic Research Expedition. In contrast with Arctic affairs, there is a cross-ministerial, unified organization, called "Integration Promotion Headquarter of the Antarctic Region Observation (nankyoku chiiki kansoku tōgō suisin honbu)" headed by MEXT. The Headquarter consists of 10 ministries and a panel of academic experts, but the most relevant ministerial bodies are (MEXT, 2013): • MEXT and NIPR under MEXT • Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications • MLIT (Geospatial Information Authority of Japan, Japan Meteorological Agency, Japan Coast Guard)

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• Ministry of Defense (MoD) • MoFA • Ministry of Environment (MoE) Under the auspices of MEXT, NIPR conducts Antarctic research and observation as the central agency of the Antarctic observation program. Geospatial Information Authority of Japan is responsible for the observation of the ionosphere and auroras. Japan Meteorological Agency administers the surveying and mapping of Antarctica and Japan Meteorological Agency observes the ozone layer and the upper-air. Japan Coast Guard oversees affairs related to marine physics, marine chemistry and tidal fluctuation. In terms of capacity to conduct maritime activities in the Polar regions, three icebreakers owned by Japan; the Shirase, Soya and Teshio. The Shirase is under the auspices of the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (SDF). For this reason, there are legal restrictions on the scope of usage for the Shirase, based on the SDF Act.7 At present, the Shirase may only be used as a supply vessel for the Japanese Antarctic Research Expedition (JARE) under NIPR.8 The Soya and Teshio are owned by the Japan Coast Guard and only used as patrol boats, operating from Hokkaido in northern Japan. MoD engages in the transportation of the members of the Expedition and necessary supplies by sea and air. MoFA represents the Japanese government in the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings. MoE is responsible for the Act on Protection of the Environment in Antarctica, which is a domestic legislation that corresponds to the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, and administers procedures required for the Antarctic tourism and visits.

Scientific Whaling The most crucial aspect of Japan’s Antarctic policy for this paper is that Japan conducts research whaling in the Antarctic. Japan joined the International Whaling Commission (IWC) in 1951 and under the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW), Japan implemented a commercial whaling moratorium in 1986. Meanwhile, in 1987, Japan started its first research whaling program in the Antarctica called JAPRA (The Institute of Cetacean

7 Refer to Self-Defense Forces Act (Act No. 165 of 1954), 4th clause of Article 100, the Enforcement Order of the Self-Defense Forces Act (Cabinet Order No. 179 of 1954). 8 There is there is no significant discussion to change the relevant law.

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Research, 2013b). The program ended in 2004 but was immediately succeeded by JARPA II. Japan's continuation of whaling has received much criticism, especially from abroad, examples being direct anti-whaling actions against Japan's Antarctic whaling expedition by the anti-whaling NGO Sea Shepard since 2007 (Sea Shepherd, 2008), or a case by Australia against Japan (New Zealand intervening) regarding whaling in the Antarctic at the International Court of Justice, which Japan lost (International Court of Justice, 2014). The Institute of Cetacean Research (ICR) is an independent research institute that specializes in the biological and social sciences related to whales and the main body to conduct research whaling in the Antarctica with the permission of the Japanese government. According to the ICR, Japan’s objective with regards to whaling is to "resume commercial whaling for abundant species on a sustainable basis under international control" (The Institute of Cetacean Research, 2013a). The Japanese government's official position regarding research whaling at least until the ICJ’s ruling was that: "as with any other marine life, whales are a natural resource and can be utilized as such, so long as this is done in a manner that is supported by the best scientific evidence available to be sustainable" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2013b). Three entities are relevant to Japan's whaling policy in the Antarctic: The Japan Fisheries Agency (JFA) under the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), the ICR, MoFA. In November 2014, the Japan government announced a new scientific whaling program called 'New Scientific Whale Research Program in the Antarctic Ocean (NEWREP- A)'. On 6 October 2015, Japan made a new declaration related to the ICJ. Japan declared “considering that, as Japan is a State Party to the UNCLOS and continues to observe its obligations, it is more appropriate, as long as there is no special agreement, to apply dispute settlement procedure under the UNCLOS that establishes provisions regarding living resources of the sea as well as the involvement of experts from the scientific or technical perspective when an international dispute arises with respect to research on, or conservation, management or exploitation of, living resources of the sea,” in relation to the ICJ judgement on Japan’s scientific whaling (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2015). There is a reasonable amount of existing research that tries to explain why Japan continues its scientific whaling while economic and political benefits of doing so are so marginal (if not negative). Under the current climate, it is a lost cause, and it is simply “puzzling” that whaling policy is rather at odds with Japan’s overall approach to

10 Tonami Paper environmental diplomacy, let alone foreign policy in general (Strausz, 2014). Catalinac and Chan (2005) asserted that Japan’s persistence in its right to whale is because the Japanese government regards the whaling dispute as “a threat to resource security and also a danger to inter-state respect for differences in custom and cuisine”. Yet Japan’s desire to be perceived as a responsible member of international society creates a dilemma, thus leading to the current form of scientific whaling policy as a compromise. Ishii and Okubo (2007), on the other hand, argued that the domestic incentives of “the whaling camp” most represented by JFA are what drives the Japanese stance. The Agency is incentivized to continue scientific whaling in order to avoid the accountability question and to increase and maintain its whale-related budget. Moreover, it does not help that Japanese policymakers regard non-issues like whaling as one of the few issues where they can relieve “diplomatic stress” caused by the perception that Japan always has a weaker hand against Western powers such as the United States (p.85). Morikawa (2009, p. 1) criticised the Japanese government that it allowed the whaling issue to "take on a magnitude and significance far beyond its actual importance" and "has made the continuation of whaling a national goal and a matter of national pride" (Morikawa, 2009, p. 19). Indeed, some argue Japan even bought votes at IWC by providing ODA to small IWC member states (Miller & Dolšak, 2007; Strand & Tuman, 2012). Blok (2008, 2011) investigated further the issue of identity-based politics of whaling. According to Blok (2008), what whaling conflicts are “really” about is “an essentially contested normative question” (p.41) and “national sentiments of pride and humiliation are clearly at stake for pro-whaling elites” of Japan (p.61). Among these elites, the image of “Super-Whale” that is a majestic, intelligent, socially complex, caring, and singing friend of humanity, words such as abundant, Japanese, and depiction of whales as fish-predating are associated together to form pro-whaling commitments (Blok, 2011, p. 74). Strausz (2014) endeavored to go back to the original point by asking a question: Why did Japan begin scientific whaling, a policy that benefits few domestically and alienates many around the world? His answer from the foreign policy analysis point of view was that Japan's scientific whaling regime was formed as a result of a 'two-level game' between US President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. When Japan’s scientific whaling regime was created, although Reagan himself was not particularly concerned about whaling, he was faced with a unified, anti-whaling Congress. Nakasone was neither much

11 Tonami Paper concerned about whaling but had to face a Diet divided on how to deal with whaling, as stopping it was considered to cause economic costs to a fisheries industry, a major Japanese industry. Strausz argued these were the circumstances that brought Japan to develop the scientific whaling regime that persists to this day; therefore, it is highly unlikely that mere international pressure (even the ICJ ruling) convinces Japan to end its whaling program unless otherwise credible threats to a fisheries industry exist. I disagree with Strausz on this point as it has been long since fisheries was a major industry in Japan. For instance, the number of workers in fisheries boasted more than 700,000 in 1960 but decreased dramatically to 180,000 in 2013, and more than half of these workers are reported to be older than 60-years-old (The Mainichi Shimbun, 2015). Revenues from fisheries consist less than 1% of Japan’s GDP. The fisheries industry in Japan may still be important, but it is more precise to say it is on the verge of extinction. Based on existing research, however, it appears it is agreeable that whaling is actually neither a major economic issue nor a matter of vital national importance for Japan. It is domestic politics that gave birth to its current whaling policy and it will continue to be used as a diplomatic tool that is used in the international fora but serves as a tool to achieve political goals in domestic politics.

Theories of Foreign Policy Change

The questions remain, then, why does Japan continue scientific whaling when it clearly brings very little economic and political benefits? What implications does Japan’s continuation of scientific whaling bring to its Polar engagement? To answer questions, the luxury theory for the interplay of decision-makers’ external and internal considerations developed by Hans Mouritzen and a theory of foreign policy change by David A. Welch would be useful.

The Luxury Theory Based on neoclassical realism, Mouritzen recognise the occasional need to pay attention to intrastate factors to explain a given foreign policy outcome (Mauritzen & Wivel, 2012, p. 41). The luxury theory postulates that the role of decision-makers’ internal considerations will vary with the state’s external action space, which is defined as the state’s ability to remain unaffected by other states’ power and influence. The size of external action space

12 Tonami Paper permits or prohibits “intrastate peculiarities” to play any role in foreign policy; in other words, it is a luxury for intrastate peculiarities (for example, domestic politics) to play any significant role in foreign policy making. When the external action space decreases, for example because of emerging external danger, the role of intrastate peculiarities decreases; states become less able to afford “democratic or other ideological luxury” (Mauritzen & Wivel, 2012, p. 41). On the contrary, the more favourable external action space increases, the more role of intrastate peculiarities in foreign policy making increases; Luxury can be afforded. In addition, the theory gives four possible roles to intrastate peculiarities in foreign policy. They are considered as (Mauritzen & Wivel, 2012, p. 42): • Category I: With strong external pressure and no peculiarities; an easy ‘win’ for the environment • Category II: Intrastate factors restrain the external ones as inertia • Category III: Intrastate factors reinforce the external ones • Category IV: External pressures may be too weak to generate foreign policy outcomes. Intrastate peculiarities function as efficient causes for foreign policies. “Lessons” learned by key decision-makers from past wars and geopolitics are allowed to play a decisive role.

A Theory of Foreign Policy Change In his book “Painful Choices: A theory of foreign policy change” (2005), David A. Welch proposed an alternative framework to explain states’ behaviour than the Realist paradigm, which, according to him, characterises the central motivation of states as abstract concepts thereby making a predictive theory of state behaviour unworkable. He offered a decision- based of theory by providing explanations of “why states deviate from their prior behaviour” (p.28). In test-driving his theory, he devoted one of the chapters to understand and compare “useless islands disputes”: the territorial dispute over the Falkland/Malvinas between Argentina and Britain and the Northern Territories issue between Japan and Russia. Welch highlighted a stark difference between the two cases; Argentina resorted to arms to try to resolve its long-standing dispute, while Japan stuck with diplomacy to recover

13 Tonami Paper the Northern Territories. Compared to Argentina, from 1950s to the present, “Japan has patiently and steadily pursued a purely diplomatic solution" (p.72). In his analysis, Welch found that “[t]he real value of the islands to Japan is symbolic. Japan's national identity is invested in the Northern Territories much the same way Argentina's is invested in the Malvinas. Without acknowledged sovereignty over the Northern Territories, the Japanese feel that Japan is simply not complete” (p.98). Moreover, the recovery of the islands is a “moral imperative of sufficient power and cogency to justify the remarkable priority the issue has enjoyed in Japanese foreign policy” (p.98). What is more, Japan was willing to pay a considerable price of its stubbornness by persisting on the issue, such as straining Russo-Japanese relations or undermined credibility of Japanese diplomacy (p.102). Indeed, the process of Northern Territorial issue, which in actual terms offers no significant economic or political benefits to Japan, being morphed into a moral, symbolic imperative very much resonates with the whaling issue I have described earlier. At the end of the chapter, after a careful analysis of the two territorial disputes, Welch asserted that there are crucial differences between the two: the existence/ absence of a deadline, perceptions of the feasibility of alternative options, and international-society concerns. For instance, Japanese leaders have thus far never fixed a deadline for a resolution of the Northern Territories issue. In addition, they were aware that they had been dealt a weak hand, hence they did not have any difficulty in understanding that perseverance, although an admittedly unproductive approach, served the best chance of success (p.114). This was helped by a nuanced and realistic appreciation of various international concerns and perspectives on the problem that the Japanese foreign policy establishment held (p.115). Lastly, the fact that Japan was a security client of the US, a member of the G-7, and a prominent player in many parts of postwar global governance, as well as Japan’s self-awareness of its assertiveness and unilateralism in the past as a defeated power, prevented Japan from taking any other action than diplomacy (p.115). Welch concludes that “dramatic foreign policy change is less likely among states that operate in a more profoundly social and more deeply multilateral context” (p.115).

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Analysis

Arctic & Antarctic policies If simply compared, the most noticeable difference between Japan's Arctic and Antarctic policies is that policies related to the Arctic are still in their nascent, changeable stage of formation compared to those of the Antarctic. This reflects the fact that Antarctica has a much longer history of being governed through the international, multilateral institutions and Japan has been a member of the decision making process from their very early age. Of both Polar regions, Japan has historically placed a much higher priority on the Antarctic than on the Arctic. As previously mentioned, the government's overall position on the Antarctic has been to 1) to become a member of the most relevant governance system of the Region, 2) increase Japan's presence and influence indirectly through achievements of scientific research, and 3) prepare the domestic environment (policy and governmental/non- governmental institutions) to support achieving these goals. With the recent announcement of its official Arctic policy, it appears Japan very much attempts to incorporate this approach into the Arctic as well. While at the same time, there is a distinct difference between Japan's Arctic and Antarctic policies in their contents. Under the circumstances, the key provisions of the Antarctic Treaty and the Environmental Protocol regarding issues such as the freezing of jurisdictional claims, the demilitarization and denuclearization of the entire continent and the prohibition on mining activities do not meet the needs of the Arctic states (Young, 2008), hence it is highly unlikely the Arctic states will conclude similar agreements in the near future. On the contrary, non-Arctic states are encouraged to invest in the Arctic Region to fund expensive mining projects and boost somewhat stagnating regional economies. The example being the establishment of the Arctic Economic Council, whose first meeting was held in September 2014 (Arctic Economic Council, 2014). In this regard, as the nation that pursues a great deal of state-led development, the Japanese government plays an important role in guiding relevant domestic industries to increase their involvement in the Arctic region. Moreover, the government and the researchers recognize that the Japanese Arctic research deserves more assistance from the Japanese government and public in light of current climatic changes and the support the Antarctic research has received over the years. For instance, there is an on-going discussion of building a new icebreaker dedicated

15 Tonami Paper to the Arctic research. This aspect of economic opportunities (or lack thereof) in the region in question is mirrored in the related institutions; it is noteworthy that even though the protection of the natural environment is an important element of both Arctic and Antarctic policies, only the Antarctic policies are dealt by MoE.

Why does Japan continue scientific whaling and what does it mean to its Polar engagement? From the above discussion, it was evident that there is a strong influence of domestic politics to Japan’s scientific whaling policy. In reality, whaling is neither a major economic issue nor a matter of vital importance for Japan. Domestic politics was what brought the current whaling policy and scientific whaling has been and remains to be used as a diplomatic tool that is used in the international stage but mainly to be served as a tool to achieve political goals in domestic politics. With this in mind, applying the luxury theory by Mouritzen, Japan’s whaling policy belongs to the Category IV, where external pressures are too weak to generate foreign policy outcomes and intrastate peculiarities function as efficient causes for foreign policies. For long, the IWC as well as bilateral relations with anti- whaling states such as the US, Australia and New Zealand have been too week external pressures and allowed Japan to enjoy the luxury of internal peculiarities playing an independent role in foreign policy making. This makes a striking contrast to Japan’s Arctic and Antarctic policies (with an exception of the scientific whaling policy), which basically sought multilateral solutions therefore belonging to the Category I, where an easy ‘win’ was achieved by the environment. The environment, in this case, is the existing governance regimes centered on the AC or the ATS, and the ‘win’ is largely due to their ability to exert strong (and prevailing) external pressure and little to no internal peculiarities within Japan. Perhaps, however, the scientific whaling issue will become a permanent fixture of Japan’s diplomatic landscape as the Northern Territories issues have become for Japanese officials and the Japanese people. They are “a constant irritant, but one the Japanese have managed to live with” (Welch, 2005, p. 112). However, there is also a possibility that Japan’s scientific whaling could become its Achilles heel, where other states or interested stakeholders can use against Japan in order to close its already small external space of actions of its Polar engagement. Indeed, Ishii and Sanada pointed out in their latest book that the ruling of the ICJ began to exert influence in other forums related to whaling, in

16 Tonami Paper particular IWC, to block Japan’s attempt to legally continue scientific whaling (Ishii & Sanada, 2015). Perhaps, as seen in the case of Northern Territories, Japan could be willing to take up the challenge and adhere to its ‘national pride’ over the whaling issue, which could, once again as the case of the Northern Territories showed, be costly for Japan. The possible impact of the fact that MoE, which is considered as one of the least powerful ministries of the Japanese administration, is mainly in charge of the Antarctic affairs should also be investigated. Further research is needed as to how relevant anti- whaling states such as Australia, New Zealand and the US, which are also active and influential members of the ATS (in the case of the US, also a Member state of the AC) incorporate into or separate Japan’s scientific whaling issue from overall bilateral relations or Polar relations.

[Conclusions to be added]

17 Tonami Paper

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