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7 November 2007

Cover Graphic: http://img.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2007/07_02/poppiesMS2107_468x313.jpg

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3 Executive Summary: What viable poppy elimination and replacement programs are likely to succeed in Afghanistan? Any successful opium poppy replacement program will likely include several integrated programs in the areas of, agriculture, mineral and fuel deposit exploitation, jobs in the construction of infrastructure and industrial manufacturing. It is highly likely that an interconnected set of programs will benefit both the local and national economies. The potential for success of any coordinated program is in direct proportion to the level of interdiction, border security, and prosecution of drug lords and corrupt officials. It is highly unlikely that eradication, the physical destruction of poppy crops, is sufficient for successful elimination of opium and sustainable replacement. One single replacement program, industry or crop is highly unlikely capable of replacing poppy, for the complexities of the situation, geography and culture require a multifaceted and interconnected solution.

Key Findings: Eradication What is the current state of opium production in Afghanistan, and has that production increased or decreased over last year? From 2006 to August 2007, Afghanistan produced 8,200 tons of opium, a 34 percent increase. Afghanistan has eradicated opium poppy from 13 of the 34 provinces to date. Approximately ten percent of the total cultivation area was eradicated or replaced, over last year‘s cultivation area. However, favorable weather and rainfall amounts during the 2007 growing season resulted in the overall increase in production. The majority of the cultivation of opium poppy exists in the southern provinces along the Pakistan border.

How did Governor Atta succeed in eliminating poppy cultivation in the Balkh Province? Governor Atta provided options to the farmers in the Balkh region. Rather than forcibly eradicating the poppy crop by destroying it physically, farmers received assistance with farming alternative crops. Governor Atta engaged the mullahs in Balkh to encourage the region‘s farmers to be receptive to alternative crops. He arrested and prosecuted corrupt officials in the province who had been profiting from the opium economy. Governor Atta did not have a monumental task in this process, as Balkh is not a traditional poppy region, and the quantities being grown there were small.

Has the US Government objected to any of the eradication or elimination methods utilized by provincial authorities? The US government has not objected to any of the methods used by provincial leaders. However, there is mounting pressure to use chemical eradication by some US officials.

4 What method of eradication has the US Government encouraged? Chemical eradication of poppy crops has been heavily encouraged by some sectors of the US Government, as it is seen as an effective method of killing large coca crops in the drug war being waged against the cocaine cartels of South America. However, it is highly likely that chemical spraying in Afghanistan would result in a significant rise in negative propaganda by the Taliban and al Qaeda elements in the country. It is highly likely that all crop failures, births of malformed children or livestock, or mysterious deaths would be presented as results of intentional poisoning by the US and Karzai Governments.

Security What actions by the Afghan and Coalition governments are likely to improve the security in Afghanistan? It is highly likely that increased military prosecution of drug lords, traffickers and Taliban elements engaged in opium trafficking and refining will reduce the pressure on farmers to grow poppies. This activity will likely positively affect the development of agriculture, mining and industry by significantly increasing physical security, and improving confidence in the alternative programs to be introduced.

What is the role the of the US military in the counter-narcotics strategy? US military Rules Of Engagement allow for intelligence sharing, logistical as well as lift support, and the deployment of a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to assist eradicators, should hostile forces attack them. With opium traffickers exploiting areas of insecurity in Afghanistan, it is likely that continued application of force is necessary to remove those who encourage its cultivation and benefit from the infrastructural improvements being proposed.

What limitations apply to NATO forces in the counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan? There are approximately 35,000 NATO led forces conducting stability and security operations in Afghanistan. However, those forces are not being utilized to full capacity. Many of the representative countries imposed operational restrictions upon there forces leaving a few select countries with the burden of actively engaging the enemy.

Agriculture What agricultural crops are likely to be successfully cultivated in Afghanistan? The Northern Plateau of Afghanistan covers about 40,000 square miles of extremely fertile foothills and plains. Orchards of walnuts, apricots, prunes, almonds, pomegranates, mulberries, apples and pistachios all thrive in this region. Grape vineyards, cotton, wheat and melons historically have done well here. Cashmere goats and sheep are easily supported, and provide a renewable fiber crop. The Southern

5 Plateau region covers about 50,000 square miles, and consists of high plateaus and sandy deserts. The soil here is infertile, except along the rivers in the southwest, which feed traditional irrigation systems. The dry, yet mild climate in the irrigated areas of the Southern Plateau supports the cultivation of wheat, grapes, orchards of tree crops, and livestock. Flax is grown as an oil seed crop, however its potential for linen production is likely to create secondary and tertiary sources of economic gain from the same crop, if exploited.

Which crops are likely to be successful cash crops, and provide sufficient monetary incentive sustainable to replace poppy cultivation? With the development of export to international markets, saffron, pomegranates, grapes (as raisins and juice), wool, cotton, cashmere, walnuts, almonds and flax are likely to provide the farmer between 1200 and 3500 USD per crop, per hectare, per year. Saffron crocuses are currently cultivated in limited quantity in Afghanistan, and as the single most expensive spice currently in existence has enormous potential for cultivation and export. It is grown from June to October, and it is likely to be an excellent rotational crop with other crops that are grown on the same ground during the alternate seasons. As cropping intensity and climate allow for 2-3 crops per year on the same ground, the potential exists for efficiency and profit for the Afghan farmer. The production of export products from these crops is likely to provide off-farm employment as well, doubling the economic gain potential for several of the crops.

Which crops are likely to provide for Afghanistan’s food needs? Historically, cereal grains, predominantly wheat and to a lesser degree barley, maize and rice, are the major staple crops in Afghanistan. An increase in animal husbandry, specifically sheep and goats for wool and cashmere, proportionally will increase meat for domestic consumption as well.

Mining Natural Resources What mineral or fuel resources are known to exist in Afghanistan and which are likely to be commercially desirable commodities? Iron, copper, coal, gas and oil resources exist in large deposits in Afghanistan. Though smaller in size, exploitable deposits of bauxite, tin, gypsum, tungsten, zinc and lead have been identified by the United States Geological Survey.

Do any of the mineral or fuel resources coincide in location with poppy cultivating areas of Afghanistan? The United States Geological Survey identified deposits of copper, mercury, tungsten, limestone, gold, fluorite, tin, calcite and possibly uranium in Afghanistan‘s main poppy growing region which includes the provinces of Farah, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Urzugan and Zabul. The largest mineral and fuel deposits, including the Aynak copper

6 deposit and the Hajigak iron ore deposit, are located in northern Afghanistan and are distinctly separate from major poppy cultivating regions.

Which mineral or fuel deposits are likely to provide sufficient monetary incentive to replace poppy cultivation if commercially exploited? The Aynak copper deposit is estimated to be worth between USD 100-300 million annually if a mine is fully developed. It is likely that commercial mining operations would employ large numbers of Afghans, including a projected 60,000 in jobs indirectly created by a mine at Aynak.

Industry What is the cultural inclination of the Afghan population toward agriculture, mining and industry, and is there any cultural resistance to change? Former Minister of the Interior Ali Jalali confirmed that Afghans are not culturally opposed to any type of work. The large farming population is due to 80 percent of the Afghan population living in rural areas. It is highly likely that if presented with local manufacturing or industrial jobs, located in rural areas for proximity to raw materials supplies, Afghans would accept them. According to Minister Jalali, Afghans are willing to engage in any enterprise which will provide for their families‘ livelihoods and security.

What infrastructure (roads, bridges, structures) are necessary in order to implement mineral/fuel exploitation, industrial and agricultural expansion? Establishment of public works projects for the purpose of facilitating and linking the various components of any poppy replacement strategy is vital. Such projects should include: renovation of dams, repair or replacement of damaged bridges on vital transportation routes, complete restoration of Afghanistan‘s entire irrigation system, drainage system repair in flood-prone areas, and the construction of farm-to-market and access roads in agricultural and mining regions.

What manufactured goods within the industrial sector are likely to succeed? Agriculture is a fundamental means of livelihood in Afghanistan, supporting 85% of its people. The majority of private sector entrepreneurs in Afghanistan are farmers, the bulk of industrial sector processing is geared to providing services to farmers, and farm related business. Domestic production of machinery related to the agro-business and agro-processing industries is a lucrative opportunity for investors given rehabilitation efforts in rural Afghanistan. Agricultural and processing equipment in Afghanistan is currently imported from abroad, or remains from the Soviet era. Demand for new machinery, such as grain cleaning and sieving equipment for flour, and tractor trolleys and plows, will continue to grow and be vital to the production of agricultural goods. Textiles production supplied by indigenous agricultural fiber is likely to increase as the agricultural sector improves.

7 Key Indicators The probability of success for Afghanistan‘s opium elimination and replacement goals will likely increase as the following prerequisite conditions improve:

 Increased security and interdiction in the southern provinces of Afghanistan in order to remove the Taliban, which operates in the region.

 Proactive engagement by the government of Pakistan in following through on all agreements to secure the common border, in order to effectively prevent drug trafficking, arms smuggling and access to refuge for the Taliban and al Qaeda elements.

 Decreased corruption within the government and private sector in order to restore public trust.

 Reduction of emphasis on physical eradication of poppy crops to reduce possibility of propaganda favoring the Taliban.

 More flexible Rules of Engagement for North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Coalition forces, specifying the targeting of opium traffickers and Taliban personnel.

 Substantial improvement of irrigation and potable water supply infrastructure over current levels.

 Substantial improvement on road infrastructure to increase transportation nationwide.

Source Reliability: 7.5 Analytic Confidence: 7

______Victoria Allen Luke K. Handley

______Ryan R. Stranahan Jacob Wells

8 Poppy Elimination and Replacement in Afghanistan Table of Contents

Executive Summary 4

Key Findings 4

Key Indicators 8

Table of Contents 9

Current Status 10

Security 14

Eradication 18

Agriculture 22

Natural Resources 34

Manufacturing And Industry 42

Annex 1: Governor Mohammad Atta, Balk Province 48

Annex 2: Afghan Eradication Force 49

Annex 3: Mineral Occurrences In Afghanistan’s Main Poppy 50 Growing Provinces

Annex 4: Land Use In Afghanistan 51

Annex 5: Potential Long-Term Soil Replenishment Programs 52

Annex 6: Presentation Slides 55

Annex 7: Source Reliability and Analytic Confidence 62

Annex 8: Acknowledgements 63

Annex 9: Contact Information 64

Annex 10: Endnotes 65

9

Current Status

Recent Trends Indicate Afghanistan Highly Likely To Continue To Produce Majority Of World’s Opium Poppy

Executive Summary: It is highly likely that Afghanistan will continue to produce the majority of the world‘s opium poppy supply for the next several years, due to trends from 2001 to 2007. The success of eradication will depend upon the success of the Afghanistan government and its allies to win the war on terrorism and provide economic alternatives for the people of Afghanistan.

Discussion: The poppy is a hardy plant, which will grow in varying climates, except the extreme cold. The ideal conditions for poppy growth are snow in winter, rain in the spring and dry weather while the plant is mature. The alternation of rainy and dry seasons determines the opium yield.1 The opium poppy planting season begins in October and can last through December, while the harvest season begins in April. From 2006 to August 2007, Afghanistan cultivated 193,000 hectares of opium poppies, which is a 17% increase over 2006. As a result of favorable weather conditions, Afghanistan produced 8,200 tons of opium, which was 34% more than in 2006. It is important to note that the southern provinces experienced increased rainfall from November 2006 to April 2007.2 The increased rainfall allowed for a significant increase in Afghanistan‘s poppy production. Currently, Afghanistan is nearly the exclusive supplier of opium, amounting to 93% of the world‘s market.3 More land is dedicated to drug production than in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan in 2007. Source: http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/ combined and no country has AFG07_ExSum_web.pdf produced as many drugs since China in the 19th century.

10 The United States and its allies have tried various methods to cut production since removing the Taliban from power in 2001, from poppy eradication to inducements for farmers to plant other crops, but the financial incentive to grow poppies is too great.4 Although opium production is extremely high, the Afghanistan government is making strong efforts on the continued eradication process. In 2007, 13 of the 34 provinces eradicated opium poppy growth. Afghanistan has implemented strategic plans for successful eradication and is following similar practices of many countries in South America and the Golden Triangle. Similar eradication efforts include, alternative livelihood programs, manual and mechanical eradication and some testing of aerial spray. With this progress, the Afghanistan government believes it can make at least half of the Afghanistan provinces opium-free in 2008.

However, as the eradication process is gradually successful, the country is strongly divided. Throughout the north-central provinces, the number of opium-free provinces more than doubled, from 6 last year to 13 in 2007. A leading example is the province of Balkh, where opium cultivation collapsed from 7,200 hectares last year to zero today. These efforts are possible because the Balkh province and other northern provinces are not traditional poppy regions and quantities being grown are relatively small compared to amounts grown in the southern provinces. In south-west Afghanistan, despite relatively higher levels of income, opium cultivation has exploded to unprecedented levels. This year approximately 70% of the country‘s poppies were grown in five provinces along the border with Pakistan. An overwhelming 50% of the whole Afghan opium crop comes from one single province: Helmand. With just 2.5 million inhabitants, this This map indicates the location of various international armed relatively rich southern forces in Afghanistan. province has become the Source: news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6903403.stm world‘s biggest source of illicit drugs.5 The Taliban now control major areas of land in Hilmand, Kandahar and other provinces along the Pakistani border. The Taliban are using the opium trade and drug economy resources to fund arms, logistics and militia pay. This will allow the Taliban to further build its resources and enable them to resist eradication efforts, making it difficult for the Afghanistan government to reach its 2008 goal.

11 Comment: The eradication process must continue and even intensify its current efforts. The efforts must be lead by the Afghanistan government and supported by the U.S and other foreign agencies. As the eradication, process is continuing its efforts there are currently no replacement programs being implemented nation-wide. This is counterproductive when the poppy farmer‘s crops are being destroyed and the farmers are not provided with a replacement. When the next planting season arrives, the farmers are returning to the poppy in which is the only crop they can rely on for income. Security threats remain a major detour for the eradication process and will continue until the Taliban is removed. Figure 1 illustrates the large amount of opium poppy produced in the southern provinces along the Pakistan border. Figure 2 illustrates the location of the lead forces within Afghanistan. The lack of armed forces in the Southern provinces is allowing the resurgence of the Taliban and the increased production of poppy in that region. If security is not increased within this region, eradication efforts will be stalled and Afghanistan will not overcome the problem.

Source Reliability: 8 Analytic Confidence: 8

Ryan R. Stranahan

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13

Security

Security Risk To NATO Forces As Well As The Afghan Eradication Force Is Likely To Increase Due To Forced Eradication

Executive Summary: Forced eradication is likely to worsen the security situation for NATO-led forces and continues to present hazards to the Afghan Eradication Force (AEF). NATO and AEF forces have experienced reprisal attacks for the frequent destruction of poppy fields. The destruction of crops without compensation angers the Afghan farmers who worry about supporting their families.

Discussion: In the early morning, teams of American contractors from DynCorp and Afghan National Police who make up the Afghan Eradication Force (AEF) depart in their Ford pickups and All Terrain Vehicles (ATVs) for targeted poppy fields. While destroying poppy crops with ATVs dragging metal bars while other members of the AEF swing DynCorp provides air support for poppy eradication conducted shovel handles at the by the Afghanistan Eradication Force. poppies, eradication teams Source: http://www.viewimages.com/Search.aspx?mid=5723 expose themselves to many 9892&epmid=1&partner=Google dangers.6

Not only must they concern themselves with the Taliban and narco-traffickers, but angry farmers as well.

Tribal farmers are beginning to retaliate as witnessed by Lee Anderson. Anderson, a journalist embedded with the AEF experienced a horrific gun battle when the organization continuously targeted the Alkozai tribe while leaving the Populzai tribe‘s

14 (President Karzai‘s tribe) fields relatively untouched. After the gun battle, a suicide bomber attacked an Australian convoy near Tarin Kowt wounding a number of civilians and soldiers.7

According to Senlis president Norine Macdonald, the United States‘ insistence upon forced eradication is destabilizing the security situation. Macdonald also agreed that DynCorp‘s operations in Oruzgan had increased the security risk for Australian soldiers adding, that it is a failed counter-narcotics policy and undermines the military presence.8

Comment: None.

Source Reliability: 8 Analytic Confidence: 6

Jacob Wells

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DEA And NIU Likely To Reduce The Flow Of Narcotics In Increasing Amounts In Afghanistan

Executive Summary: Involvement of United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) as well as increased numbers of National Interdiction Unit (NIU) members will likely reduce the flow of narcotics in increasing amounts. After opening their office in Kabul, the DEA began conducting interdiction operations as well as training Afghan drug agents, giving them the ability to enhance their own counter-narcotics efforts.

Discussion: The DEA is directly involved in overseeing and advising US Government and Afghan officials in counter narcotics programs and drug policy issues in Afghanistan. The DEA has joined with coalition partners, the State Department, and the Department of Defense (DOD) in the U.S. Embassy Kabul Counternarcotics Implementation Plan (The Five Pillar Plan).9

The DEA‘s primary role in this plan falls under the ―Interdiction Pillar,‖ where they will assist with the destruction of clandestine labs and seizing precursor chemicals, opium, and opiate stockpiles. To achieve that goal, the DEA is expanding its presence in Afghanistan US Drug Enforcement Administration agents training Afghan by permanently police in counternarcotics operations. Source: http://www.ny stationing additional times.com/2007/05/16/world/asia/16drugs.html Special Agents and Intelligence Analysts to enhance that Afghanistan‘s counternarcotics capacity.10 Not only has the DEA reopened its office in Kabul but also a base camp for the DEA‘s Foreign -deployed Advisory Support Team and National Interdiction Unit (NIU).11

The DEA also will continue lending its expertise by providing drug enforcement training to the Counternarcotics Police-Afghanistan (CNP-A). The DEA established

16 the NIU, which is comprised of Counter-narcotics Police-Afghanistan (CNP-A) officers selected to work in narcotic enforcement operations in Kabul.12 According to US Department of Justice audit reports dated February 2007, NIU numbers will reach 215.13

Comment: The NIU will be working with the DEA‘s newly initiated Foreign-deployed Advisory Support Team Agents. The FAST program directly improves the DEA‘s work force and capabilities in Afghanistan by enhancing connectivity with its Afghan counterparts to identify, target, investigate, disrupt or dismantle transnational drug trafficking operations in the region.14 Compared to the past 18 months when the FAST teams were deployed in 2005 there have been significant percent increases in drug seizures. A 61 percent increase in opium, 129 percent increase in heroin, and a 640 percent increase in morphine base seizures. There was a 48 percent increase in the seizure of precursor chemicals as well as a 919 percent increase in the discovery of clandestine labs. Lastly, there was a 54 percent increase in arrests/detainments of persons involve in drug production.15

Source Reliability: 8 Analytic Confidence: 6

Jacob Wells

17

Eradication

Afghan Farmers Are Unlikely To Cooperate With Eradicators Because Of Their Primary Need To Support Family

Executive Summary: Failed food crops coupled with forced poppy eradication is unlikely to improve the cooperation between the Afghan farmer and counter-narcotics officials. Farmers are more concerned about the survival of their families than the Afghan government desires to eradicate the poppy crop.

Discussion: According to former Interior Minister Ali Jalali, a recent survey claimed 83 percent of Afghans believe poppy cultivation is wrong; however, poppy is still being cultivated in Afghanistan to the amount of 93% of the world’s total. One reason for this number appears to be from the failure of the Afghan government to incorporate a proper alternative livelihood while simultaneously forcefully eradicating poppy crops. Ghulam Sakhi, from the Nahr-i-Farhad in Herat Province, said poppy is his only source of livelihood and they (the government) should first kill him and his 12 family members before they destroy the farm.16 This is only one of many complaints of forced eradication without alternative livelihood programs.

The Afghan government failed to compensate farmers for the destruction of vast tracts of poppy crops. Almas Bawar, spokesperson for Senlis in Kabul, told Pajhwok Afghan News that their team had seen checks issued by the government for poppy elimination that had bounced.17

Soona Niloofar, a member of parliament from Uruzgan, An Afghan farmer curses Afghanistan Eradication complained, ―Before the Dutch Force in response to poppy destruction. arrived, I told them, ‗You must Source: http://www.viewimages.com do reconstruction and help the farmers.‘ And the Ministry of Agriculture also spoke about helping them with

18 alternative livelihoods. But nothing happened,‖ Niloofar continued, ―They have done little reconstruction. There is a big gap between them and the people.‖18

Comment: Chris Alexander a Canadian who is one of the top United Nations officials in Afghanistan said, ―In Helmand and Uruzgan, eradication has been subject to political manipulation and corruption. It has also proven virtually impossible to conduct in districts where the Taliban are relatively strong, thereby inevitably penalizing farmers in pro-government districts.‖ When the farmers view themselves as being penalized they will cooperate less with coalition forces and the Afghan government.

Source Reliability: 8 Analytic Confidence: 6

Jacob Wells

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Opposition To Chemical Eradication Likely To Continue

Executive Summary: The Afghan government and several European governments, as well as some United States government officials, will likely continue to oppose the use of chemical eradication methods. Health and environmental issues are of concern but more importantly the potential for the Taliban to exploit a perception of chemical warfare against the Afghan farmer in propaganda campaigns. The Taliban will use any child born with a birth defect or stillborn, any dead livestock or failed crops as propaganda. This is likely to prove detrimental to the counterinsurgency effort.

Discussion: In January 2006, Dr. Faizullah Kakar, Afghanistan's Deputy Minister of Public Health disrupted plans for the ground spraying of poppy fields. The deputy minister sited health and environmental concerns with the use of chemical sprays. Officials in Afghanistan do not protect and regulate water supplies as strictly as in the US. Chemicals can run into ditches and into rivers utilized by the whole population.19 US Officials, including officials at the White House, State Department, and the Drug Enforcement Administration are pressing the Afghan government to allow the use of chemical eradication in the poppy fields.20

The push for providing farmers with alternative livelihood rather than forced eradication is not only favored not only by the Afghan government but also by European, US military and US intelligence officials.21 Their concerns are not health or environmental issues but the potential for political fallout. General Mohammed Daud, Head of the Anti-Narcotics Department at Afghanistan‘s Ministry of Interior stated that spraying ―could be seen as an attack on the people not just the poppy crop.‖22 Former Interior Minister Ali Jalali shared similar feelings. Jalali believes the potential for the Taliban to exploit the use of chemical spray will Spraying poppy crops with herbicide be detrimental to the counterinsurgency effort. will likely provide an opportunity for Farmers experienced the destruction of food the Taliban to gain further influence crops along-side their poppy crops as well as in the region. Source: www.fri.sfasu.edu

20 encountered difficult growing seasons. Events such as these have the potential to push the farmer into the arms of the Taliban.23

Comment: Glyphosate, the proposed chemical for eradication is reported to pose no risk to humans due to its low toxicity rate.24

Source Reliability: 8 Analytic Confidence: 6

Jacob Wells

21

Agriculture

Continued Technological Development Of Afghan Agriculture, With Greater Focus On Export Commodities, Likely To Contribute Significantly To The Economy

Executive Summary: It is likely that continued technological development of Afghan agriculture, with greater focus on production for export, will contribute significantly to the economic stability of Afghanistan‘s rural population. The current state of agricultural diversity and geographic crop distribution indicates that Afghanistan is highly likely capable of supporting more efficient crop production while maintaining historic crop diversity. Further, it is highly likely that production of greater quantities of agricultural export commodities, coupled with the development of agriculture-supplied light industry, will augment Afghanistan‘s regional and international trade, thereby bolstering its internal security with a stronger economy through broad-based economic gain.

Discussion: Contrary to the media-provided impression of agricultural sterility, Afghanistan is fully capable of sustaining regionally specialized agriculture. Afghans have a long history of making effective use of its limited water resources for growing a wide variety of food crops. These include tree crops such as pomegranates, figs, mulberries, walnuts, pistachios,

almonds and apricots; field crops The harvest bounty of Afghanistan, being marketed such as cotton, peanuts, kidney internationally by a Kandahar-based farmer cooperative beans, chickpeas, melons, herbs group. Source: http://www.afghangrown.org/images/ and grapes25; and cereal grains photo-nuts-fruits.jpg such as wheat, barley, millet, rice and maize.26

Assistance and education, provided by a large variety of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), is increasing productivity per hectare under cultivation, and

22 harvest volumes are increasing yearly, despite concurrent increases in opium production in 2007, as all crops benefited from increased rainfall for the year.27

Geographical analysis of farming systems in Afghanistan, which looks at populations of farms with broadly similar resource bases, enterprise patterns and constraints, and household livelihoods, identifies regions for similar development strategies and interventions. Such NGOs as USAID, Roots of Peace, and the U.N.‘s Food and Agriculture Organization are engaged in assisting the rural Afghan population, in targeted areas of horticultural viability, to develop their crops. The NGOs also are providing education, assistance and micro-loans in the establishment of crop and animal husbandry businesses in the farming communities, in the areas of productivity and marketing.28

Comments: None.

Source Reliability: 8 Analytic Confidence: 7

Victoria J. Allen

23 Accelerated Irrigation Redevelopment And Technology Transfer Highly Likely To Result In A Proportional Increase In Agricultural Productivity

Executive Summary: It is highly likely that Afghanistan‘s horticultural productivity will continue to increase as irrigation systems are rejuvenated and brought on line. As efficient water usage is created, and crop development and technology transfer programs gain momentum, higher production per hectare is highly likely to result.

Discussion: For millennia, Afghans have made relatively effective use of their limited water resources with gravity-fed irrigation systems for growing a wide variety of food crops and orchards. Based upon ancient Persian technology, Afghan irrigation consists of two basic types: underground systems – karezes (networks of spring-fed underground channels and distribution pipes), shallow wells and springs; and surface systems – open canals which feed ditch systems. The underground systems account for 30 percent of the current water utilization in agriculture, while canals account for 70 percent. Springs irrigate about 190,000 hectares (ha) of land; karezes irrigate 167,000ha, and shallow wells 12,000ha. Canals are by far the most important irrigation systems in the country. They irrigate 75 percent of the irrigated land area. Most of the canal-irrigated land is located in the North, West, and Southwest of the country.29

An NGO-provided well supplies The total potential of the water resources in Afghan farmers with much Afghanistan per year is approximately 75 billion cubic needed water. meters (m cu.), of which 55 billion m cu. is surface Source: water and 20 billion m cu. is ground water. As of 2005, http://instapundit.com/images/ usage of surface water was 20 billion m cu., and 3 billion m cu. of ground water.30 The substantial under-utilization of water resources is the result of bombing during the Soviet, land abandonment, and a quarter-century of war. A USAID study in 2006 showed that water use efficiency was only about 25 to 30 percent, for both ground water and surface water irrigation schemes. Additionally, up to 25 percent of the water from karezes was wasted, due to unregulated flow.31

24 Farmers are aware of the intensity of irrigation (i.e. the number of times each crop should be irrigated), but generally are not knowledgeable of the timing and extent of irrigation requirements for given crops. Timing is crucial, since water supply must be matched to crop requirements, which vary through the growing season. NGOs in Afghanistan are currently helping to repair and expand existing canals and irrigation systems that stem from the five main riverine water sources in the country, the Amu Darya, Kabul, Helmand, Farahrud and Harirud rivers. However, an estimated 65 percent of the pre-Soviet-era irrigation systems remain in a The five major river systems in Afghanistan are state of disrepair and disuse.32 delineated here. Clockwise from the North: the

Amu Darya River Basin in yellow, the Kabul River Basin in green, the Helmand River Basin in blue, As irrigation is improved, the the Farahrud River Basin in pink, and the Harirud traditional agricultural corridors River Basin in rose. along the river systems are Source: http://www.cawater-info.net rejuvenated and expanded. /afghanistan/data/i/afg_basins.gi Thirty-three large systems in eight provinces were rehabilitated by USAID‘s Rebuilding Agricultural Markets Program (RAMP), one of the large U.S. sponsored programs, between 2002 and 2006. The primary goal of the program was increased productivity and marketed output of agriculture crops, fruit and vegetables. RAMP had also a secondary objective: improving food security for Afghans. Using 2005 price, the total net benefit estimated for six years is USD 1.2 billion, with a return on investment of 60 dollars realized per dollar invested. An estimated 330,000 households (about 2.6 million people) are the direct beneficiaries of this particular program. Rehabilitated irrigation systems in Parwan, Balkh, Kunduz and Baghlan produced surplus cereal grains this year.33

Comment: None.

Source Reliability: 8 Analytic Confidence: 8

Victoria J. Allen

25 Horticultural Productivity In Afghanistan Highly Likely To Increase As Technology And Water Utilization Improves

Executive Summary: Afghanistan‘s horticultural productivity is highly likely to improve as crop development and the gradual repair and expansion of regional irrigation systems continues. Production and export of horticultural products, between 2002 and 2006, increased six- fold over the projected estimates in 2002. It is highly likely that greenhouse cultivation introduced over the last several years is creating strategic advantages in areas where winter months are nonproductive.

Discussion: When quantifying the contribution to the Afghan economy by the agricultural sector, the non-poppy net product is just over one-third of Afghanistan‘s GDP. However, an estimated 2 million Afghans are involved in poppy cultivation and with this element factored in Afghanistan‘s agriculture sector contributed 53% of the GDP in 2005/2006.34

Non-poppy harvest volumes are increasing, despite the current upswing in opium An Afghan farmer tends his maturing wheat crop. production, due to the assistance and Source: http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/ education provided by a large variety of media/images/40883000/jpg/_40883171_afg non-governmental organizations (NGOs). han_ap_index.jpg Following a low production level during the drought of 2004, the 2007 total cereal crop is an estimated five million tons, more than doubling the 2001 level of just over two million tons.35

While classified as an arid to semi-arid region, Afghanistan‘s climate, soil and irrigation systems do allow for the cultivation of a wide variety of food crops and orchards. There is potential for substantial improvement in production per hectare, as irrigation systems are rejuvenated and brought online. Approximately 65 percent of the country‘s irrigation network remains in a state of decay and disuse at the present time, though approximately five years of international assistance has been gradually rejuvenating the horticultural regions.36

26 The Northern Plateau of Afghanistan covers about 40,000 square miles of extremely fertile foothills and plains. Orchards of walnuts, apricots, prunes, almonds, pomegranates, mulberries, apples and pistachios all thrive in this region. Grape vineyards, wheat and melons historically have done well here. The Southern Plateau region covers about 50,000 square miles, and consists of high plateaus and sandy deserts. The soil in the region predominantly is infertile, except along the rivers in the southwest, which feed traditional irrigation systems. The dry, yet mild climate in the irrigated areas of the Southern Plateau supports the cultivation of cotton, wheat, grapes, and orchards of tree crops.37

National soil mapping has been done on a very small scale: detailed work was limited to alluvial valleys. Little is known of upland soils, including the rain-fed wheat-lands of the north. Much of the hilly land and some of the deserts are rock and gravel. The Central Highlands have desert steppe or meadow-steppe soils. The Northern Plains have extremely rich, fertile loess soils. The southwestern Plateau has infertile desert soils except in places along rivers where alluvium has accumulated. Arable soils are generally of high pH. Nitrogen is the main limiting nutrient in crop production; phosphorus is often lacking; response to potassium is rare.38 In Herat Province, farmer Mola Shah Gool Beginning in 2004, USAID and the earned $660 from his greenhouse in winter, NGO Catholic Relief Services jointly during a season when he previously had no introduced a greenhouse technology income. experimental project in three districts Source: http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/ of Herat Province, which historically Article.68.aspx are not cultivated during the winter months. In the first two years, 81 greenhouses were constructed, and lead farmers tested the greenhouses and trained other farmers.

The greenhouses provide income to farmers during the winter months when they normally cannot grow crops and therefore have no income at all. Low start-up costs allow small and medium-scale farmers to adopt the technology, and high rates of return ensure sustainability. As of October, 2006, the success of the greenhouses, and enthusiastic endorsement by participants, led over 100 farmers to seek micro-loans to finance their own greenhouse construction. Greenhouse cultivation in Afghanistan has demonstrated four distinct strategic advantages: off-season income, import substitution, low start-up costs, and sustainability 39

27

Comment: Soil rejuvenation and nutrient supplementation should be explored. Recognizing that long term benefit, minimal cost, net environmental benefit and low technological requirement are key components to any solutions to be examined, the recommendations made are based upon the analyst‘s personal knowledge. Highly successful soil rejuvenation programs are identified in Annex 5.

Source Reliability: 8 Analytical Confidence: 7

Victoria J. Allen

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Increased Animal Husbandry Highly Likely To Improve Rural Economic Security And Supply Industrial And Export Commodities

Executive Summary: Increased animal husbandry will highly likely improve rural economic security and supply industrial and export commodities. It is highly likely that focused production increases of cashmere goats and karakul sheep will realize greater economic security through export of raw fiber and textiles. It is likely that utilization of underdeveloped or untapped livestock-based resources hold potential for increased rural cottage industry and urban job market expansion. The increased production of raw and finished cashmere goods is unlikely to substantially reduce prices on the world markets.

Discussion: Afghanistan‘s total land mass is 647,500 square kilometers (km sq.).40 The total pasture grazing land available, exclusive of arable farmland, is approximately 45%, or 291,375 km sq. With the assistance of numerous non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Afghans are gaining education and financial assistance in the establishment of animal husbandry businesses.41 Afghans are also receiving training by NGO AfghanAid, to be veterinary workers, with the emphasis on the reduction of livestock disease and improved propagation of livestock herds This 1982 land use map of Afghanistan indicates such as sheep and goats, cattle, viable dryland crop and pasture grazing areas in light and chickens.42 green, and irrigated regions in dark green. Source: http://images.nationmaster.com/images/ Goats and sheep provide milk motw/middle_east_and_asia/afghanistan_econ_1982.jpg and meat for domestic

consumption by rural Afghans. There is significant potential for economic growth by increasing the populations of cashmere goats and karakul sheep. Historically successful in Afghanistan, sheep are the main species of small ruminants, but in some areas goats make up the majority in the flocks.43 Goats better utilize alternative feed sources, and are reputed to be willing to eat almost anything. The digestive systems of a goat allow nearly any organic substance to be broken down and used as nutrients.

30 Their plant diet is extremely varied and includes some plant species which are toxic or detrimental to other livestock.44

With a higher fat content in the meat, sheep are preferred to goats for slaughter. Sheep are shorn either once or twice a year; goats are shorn only once. The annual greasy wool production of traditional sheep is 0.5-3.0 kg, which is partly traded and partly used for domestic purposes. Cashmere goats produce milk, hair and wool, and hides. If the goats are shorn, the shearing normally is done in late spring and the hair is used for making ropes or the black tents of the nomadic Kuchi tribesmen. Some farmers never shear their goats, but rather collect the wisps of fiber from the vegetation which snags it as the goats browse.45

Afghanistan is the third largest producer of this high value, renewable commodity, behind China and Mongolia.46 The importance of the cashmere industry to the Mongolian economy is clear: it provides income and employment for over a third of the population and raw cashmere and cashmere products are Mongolia‘s third largest export. A vibrant cashmere industry has the potential to contribute to the growth of the Hardy cashmere goats, being efficient browsers and economy, of the manufacturing tolerant of weather extremes, are easily sustained on sector, of employment at both Afghanistan‘s vast pasturelands. Source: http://skylinesfarm.com the herder and the manufacturing levels, and of exports. It is important here to note that in Mongolia the herding sector and processing sectors are in deep trouble. In 2005, the herding sector surpassed the total herd size that can be sustained by Mongolia‘s pasturelands, and it is likely that overgrazing began to cause desertification. Many firms in the processing sector ceased to operate or downsized their operations over the past 10 years, yet processors still operate on average at less than 50% capacity.47

This is to Afghanistan‘s advantage. Despite being ranked third in cashmere production, Afghanistan‘s share of the cashmere market is approximately 5%. As horticultural crop productivity increases, and irrigation systems are renovated, Afghanistan‘s capability to sustain larger numbers of goats and sheep will increase. There is a slowly growing market to be tapped by Afghan farmers who produce cashmere, as Mongolian production drops.

31 Domestic development of rural cottage industry and urban textile industry will directly benefit from an increase in animal fiber production. Cashmere goats produce a downy undercoat of fiber that is separated by hand from the hair after shearing, either by the flock owners or by workers employed by the wool dealers. The cashmere fiber is mainly collected in the western and northwestern areas of the country, though there likely is room for expansion. Currently all cashmere wool for sale is marketed through Herat by only a few dealers. Payment is made according to the proportion of hair fiber in the wool and the price per kilogram is determined by the world market for that fiber. The per goat production of high quality underdown is an average 150 grams per year.48

The Karakul sheep is one of the oldest breeds Karakul pelts are prized throughout Central known, indigenous to the Central Asian Asia for their warmth, and are commonly region, and highly tolerant of Afghanistan‘s used for hats and outerwear. Many adult climate and pastoral conditions. sheep have a double coat: a fine down Source: www.rarebreedscanada.ca/ undercoat, covered by a coat of guard hair. The Karakul produces a lightweight, high-volume, strong-fibered fleece that, at its best, is long and lustrous with little crimp. Considered long-stapled (average 6" to 12" per year), the fleece has a very low lanolin content, making it easily spun with little preparation. It produces a superior carpet yarn, and is often used for rugs and saddle blankets and outer garments.

Comments: Efficient processing of cashmere and wool by mechanical means would increase production, enabling increased domestic production of quality yarns and textiles for export. There are companies which manufacture wool/cashmere ―mini-mill‖ fiber separator machines which are small enough for rural/cottage industry, having 24-40 ft2 footprints.49 Mini-mill separator machines would enable farmer co-ops to process their fiber crops locally, efficiently, and with reliably high quality results, maximizing their income potential per year.

Source Reliability: 8 Analytic Confidence: 8 Victoria J. Allen

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33

Natural Resources

Replacement Program Highly Likely To Include Mine Established At Aynak’s World-Class Copper Deposit

Executive Summary: Afghanistan‘s poppy replacement programs will highly likely include the establishment of a mine at the Aynak copper deposit. Located 19 miles south of Kabul in eastern Afghanistan, Aynak is a world-class deposit with 240 million tons of copper worth up to USD 30 billion. The Afghan government accepted bids from nine international companies to begin to develop a mine at Aynak with China Metallurgical Group and Hunter Dickinson Inc. of Canada considered the favorites.

Discussion: Afghanistan is rich in natural resources, including world-class copper and iron ore deposits.50 Other resources include coal, natural gas and oil.51 Afghan Minister of Mines, Mohamad Ibrahim Adel says 90% of the country‘s natural wealth remains untapped. The government expects private investment in these sectors rather than government investment.52

The Aynak copper deposit, located 19 miles south of Kabul, is a world-class deposit.53 Estimates of the amount of copper vary greatly from 12 million tons54 to 280 million tons.55 The most common estimate originates from a study conducted by the Afghanistan Geological Survey and the British Geological Survey of 240 million tons with a grade of 2.3%,56 which is confirmed by the Asian Development Bank.57

Given the high price of copper the total The Aynak copper deposit is located just value of the Aynak deposit could be outside Kabul, Afghanistan’s capital city. USD 30 billion. There are various Source: http://www.bgs.ac.uk/ estimates of the annual value of a mine afghanminerals/docs/Aynak_A4.pdf at Aynak, including a USD 100 million

34 claim by Afghanistan Investment Support Agency (AISA)58, a USD 200 million claim by Minister Adel59 and others as high as USD 300 million.60

The Afghan government accepted bids from nine companies to mine Aynak,61 including Bahar Consortium of Australia, Hindalco Industries Ltd. of India, Hunter Dickinson Inc. of Canada, Kazakhyms Corporation LLC of Kazakhstan, MCC China Metallurgical Group Corporation and Zijin Mining Group Company Ltd both of China, Phelphs Dodge Corporation of the USA and two Russian companies, Strikeforce Ltd and Tyazhpromexport.62 Afghan officials narrowed the field to Hunter Dickinson, Kazakhyms, China Metallurgical Group, Phelphs Dodge and Strikeforce. Sources say China Metallurgical Group and Hunter Dickinson are the favorites so far.63

Securing electricity to run a mine at Aynak is likely a major problem as nearby villages only have generators as energy sources.64 The mine would require 50 megawatts of powers while Kabul has just a single 19-megawatt generator.65 John SanFilipo, a research geologist at the United States Geological Survey (USGS), says that mining companies can exploit coal resources quickly and that coal will likely fuel many of the minerals processing plants that develop around the copper.66

The interest of many internationals companies to establish mines at Aynak is likely an indicator of what Afghanistan can expect with other natural resources, including coal and petroleum.67 The Export Promotion Agency of Afghanistan believes development at Aynak will dramatically boost the mining industry and encourage further exploration for copper in the region.68

Comment: None

Analytic Confidence: 7 Source Reliability: 7

Luke K. Handley

35

Increase In Coal Production Likely Needed To Power Mine At Aynak Copper Deposit; Coal Export Opportunities Likely Include China As A Customer

Executive Summary: An increase in domestic coal production will likely be needed to power the mine at the Aynak copper deposit that the Afghan government is currently selecting a private company to build. With extracting coal as a poppy replacement program, opportunities to export the resource will likely include neighboring China which increased coal imports nearly 50% between 2006 and 2007.

Discussion: Afghanistan is rich in natural resources including coal deposits. The Asian Development Bank69 and Afghanistan Investment Support Agency (AISA) report an estimated 70 million tons of coal reserves in the country primarily located in the north between Herat and Badakhshan.70 The United States Geological Survey (USGS) identifies a number of mines in Baghlan province.71 The Afghan government is currently in the process of choosing a company to mine the Aynak copper deposit.72 Unnamed sources indicated that China This USGS map indicates potential areas for coal Metallurgical Group and Hunter discovery and current coal mines in Afghanistan. Dickinson Inc. of Canada are the Source: http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2005/3073/2005- 3073.pdf favorites so far to win the contract73 to 74 mine the deposit worth as much as USD 300 million annually.

A mine at Aynak would require at least 50 megawatts of power, while Kabul has just a single 19-megawatt generator75 and small generators power nearby villages.76 The need for coal to power Aynak is likely a motivating factor for Afghanistan to increase its coal production to better ensure successful operation of the pending copper mine.

Another opportunity that would likely be available if Afghanistan increased coal production is exporting the resource internationally. Despite being the world‘s largest

36 coal producer, China imported over 38 million tons from January through September 2007, an increase of nearly 50% over the same time span in 2006.77 A 1999 report conducted by the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics predicts that China could import 50 million tons of coal by 2010 from Australian exporters.78 Although the majority of this time span is over, it likely that China will continue to import large amounts of coal. This likely presents an opportunity for Afghanistan to increase coal production and export it to China.

Domestic prices for coal have increased. The price in Kabul has increased significantly from USD 12 per ton to between USD 60-80 per ton mainly due to the demand for fired bricks used in construction projects.79 The World Bank reports Afghanistan produced 140,000 tons of coal in 2004 worth USD 10 million.80 The current annual value of coal production could easily increase with adequate government regulation, the restoration of existing coal mines including machinery replacement and an influx of private investment, according to AISA.81 An increase in coal production in could power a mine at the Aynak copper deposit near Former Minister of the Interior Ali Kabul. Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ Jalali highlighted the fact that shared/spl/hi/picture_gallery/05/south_asia_af Afghans had previously traveled to ghanistan0s_mines/html/1.stm 82 India to mine coal. This likely indicates that Afghans have an inclination work in the mining industry, especially if the mines were located in Afghanistan.

A threat to the ability to extract increased amounts of iron ore and coal is likely the country‘s the remote and rugged terrain and an inadequate transportation network which have previously made mining difficult.83 Also, obsolete and broken equipment hinders current production84 which relies on manual operations.85

Comment: None.

Analytic Confidence: 7 Source Reliability: 7

Luke K. Handley

37

Mining Afghanistan’s Extensive Iron Ore Resources Likely Provides Short-Term Exporting Opportunity With Long-Term Steel Manufacturing Possibilities

Executive Summary: Mining Afghanistan‘s extensive iron ore resources likely provides a short-term exporting opportunity confirmed by the Export Promotion Agency of Afghanistan (EPAA) and the Afghanistan Investment Support Agency. Interested countries will likely include China, which will import 410 million tons of iron ore in 2008. The EPAA and World Bank identify the possibility of creating an integrated metals industry in Afghanistan due to the presence of iron ore and coal reserves.

Discussion: Afghanistan is rich in natural resources including iron ore. A survey conducted by the British Geological Survey located iron ore deposits in the provinces of Kabul, Bamyam, Badakhshan and Baghlan86 with the Hajigak deposit containing an estimate 1.8 billion tons.87 AISA and the Asian Development Bank88 recognize Hajigak as the largest iron ore reserve in the Middle East, including 110 million tons of high-grade iron.89

According to AISA, the Hajigak deposit provides an opportunity for Afghanistan to export iron ore to China and Southeast Asia where there is a growing demand for the resources in heavy industry.90

Luo Bingsheng, the Vice Chairman of the China Iron and Steel Association, said that China will import 410 million tons of iron ore in 2008, an increase of 11.8% from 2007.91 The Hajigak iron ore deposit is located near the China will likely be looking for more Hajigak Pass in the Hindu Kush about 100 kilometers west of Kabul in Bamyan. sources to import iron ore from and Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/ Afghanistan has an opportunity to thumb/6/60/Hajigak.jpg/300px-Hajigak.jpg export iron ore from Hajigak.

The Export Promotion Agency of Afghanistan (EPAA) reports that exporting iron ore would be difficult; however, the presence of good quality coal north of Hajigak

38 provides the opportunity for an integrated iron and steel plant supplying markets in Afghanistan and internationally.92 The World Bank claims that it is possible to conceive of an integrated ferrous metals industry, direct reduction of iron to produce steel products and/or export iron ore to markets in the Middle East.93

The Hajigak iron deposit is located 100 kilometers (km) west of Kabul in Bamyan Province.94 It extends for 32 km along the strike, is up to 380 meters (m) wide and is as deep as 550 m.95 Below 100 m the deposit averages 61.3% iron.96

A threat to the ability to extract increased amounts of iron ore is likely the country‘s the remote and rugged terrain and an inadequate transportation network which have previously made mining difficult.97

Comment: None.

Analytic Confidence: 6.5 Source Reliability: 7

Luke K. Handley

39

Exploiting Natural Gas And Crude Oil Reserves Likely A Long- Term Goal In Afghanistan But Unlikely To Become Poppy Replacement Program

Executive Summary: With the completion of United States Geological Survey’s assessment of Afghanistan’s petroleum resources in 2006, exploiting these extensive resources is likely a long-term goal of the country; however, it is unlikely that exploiting resources will be part of any poppy replacement program in the near future.

Discussion: Afghanistan likely lacks much of the infrastructure necessary to even begin efficiently exploiting natural gas and oil reserves in the northern provinces. Transportation infrastructure, refining plants, an educated workforce and security from Taliban insurgents are all issues that likely need to be addressed before the country can make significant use of the natural gas and oil reserves which, therefore, makes exploiting these resources a highly unlikely poppy replacement program.

In 2006, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) completed an assessment of Afghanistan‘s petroleum resources.98 The study increased oil reserves by 18 times and natural gas more than three times over previous estimates. 99 Undiscovered petroleum resources range from 3.5 to 36 trillion cubic feet of 100 Natural gas and oil exploitation is likely a long-term goal of natural gas. USGS Afghanistan. Source: http://www.edmunds.com/media/ estimates of oil range from ownership/driving/how.much.oil/oil.pump.500.jpg 0.4 to 3.5 billion barrels. 101 These resources are located in northern Afghanistan in two geological basins, crude 102 oil in the Amu Darya Basin and natural gas the Afghan-Tajik Basin. The USGS conducted the study with its standard methodology and protocol and assessed an area of approximately 86,000 sq km in northern Afghanistan. 103

40 In September 1999, the Afghan government signed a deal with Consolidated Construction Company of Greece to explore for oil and gas in Herat in southwestern Afghanistan near the Iranian border.104 This area is believed to be potentially rich in hydrocarbons, including oil and coal.105

Afghanistan's natural gas production decreased drastically from 275 million cubic feet per day (mcf/d) in the mid-1970s to just 22 mcf/d in 1998, all of which was used domestically.106

Comment: None.

Analytical Confidence: 6.5 Source Reliability: 7.5

Luke K. Handley

41 Manufacturing And Industry

Non-Agricultural Industries Likely To Lead The Way For Future Domestic Production Of Agricultural Machinery

Executive Summary: It is likely that industrial growth will continue to develop in Afghanistan. More foreign investors are entering non-agricultural industries; as industrial sectors develop, it is likely agricultural manufacturers will use prior industrial success as a model for development. However, foreign investment will likely progress slowly as the lack of security will deter some investors.

Discussion: Afghanistan‘s industrial sector was still in the early stages of development at the time of the Soviet Union‘s invasion in 1979. The nine-year conflict disrupted the emerging industrial structure and many of the industries. Afghan industry was primarily concerned with processing local agricultural raw materials and mining local mineral resources. Aside from the security situation, low-income levels, poor investment infrastructure and its geographic location impeded Afghanistan‘s industrial growth.107 Afghanistan‘s industry currently amounts for 26% of the GDP. It produces small-scale production for domestic use of textiles, soap, furniture, shoes, fertilizer, cement, hand-woven carpets, natural gas, and precious and semi-precious gemstones.108 The Afghan carpet Over one million Afghans are employed in the industry employs more than 1 carpet industry in Afghanistan. million people.109 However, Source: http://www.unhcr.ca/withyou/2005_01/ industrial development is images/news/afghanistan.jpg rudimentary and is mostly limited to the processing of agricultural products. The labor force is 15 million people, with 10% in the industry sector.110 The majority of all factories are located in Afghanistan‘s capital, Kabul, and rely heavily on foreign donors and money to operate.

Afghanistan needs to rebuild an economy, particularly in agriculture, energy, housing, education, and export-related industries as part of its efforts to feed the population,

42 create jobs, attract foreign investment and earn desperately needed hard currency.111 The GDP is estimated at USD 21.5 billion and the GDP per capita is about USD 800 per year. Afghanistan‘s economy is primarily made up of agriculture, amounting to 38% of the GDP, industry with 24% and services with 38%. Unemployment is a major issue as rates are 40% in Kabul and higher in provinces further away from the capital. The literacy rate is 28.1% and will likely affect development in any new industries, as employees will have to be trained in specific areas.112

In order to make Afghanistan a suitable country for investment, President Karzai initiated a policy decision called Afghanistan Investment Support Agency (AISA). AISA is charged with the responsibility to facilitate registration, licensing and promotion of all investments in Afghanistan. It concentrates on pro-active measures to attract industrial investment from both within and outside Afghanistan, thus generating employment and economic growth. The principles of a free market economy are incorporated in the new Constitution, just as the growth of the private sector is a cornerstone of the National Development Strategy.113 Afghanistan has a market with substantial opportunities for businesses, especially in agricultural consulting services (chemicals, machinery, irrigation technology, food process) and provides investors with the opportunity to take advantage of low cost production of the regional market.114 For example, the Afghanistan government secured a business success when the Coca-Cola Company opened a $25 million state-of-the-art bottling plant in Kabul in September 2006, with President Karzai himself inaugurating the plant.115

Given the fact that countries like China and India, who have been for decades at the forefront of low-end manufacturing are now moving a step forward into more sophisticated industries which bring rising labor and manufacturing costs, international production industries must be on the continued look-out for low-cost countries to relocate their industries to. Industries suitable for investment are likely to be those, which can first supply the local market and later become an export product. That way these industries can help significantly with offsetting Afghanistan‘s trade imbalance.116

Comment: Several investors are making million dollar investment deals for industries in Afghanistan. In order for further investment and economic growth, Afghanistan must continue to rebuild its infrastructure, eradicate poppy, and win the war on terrorism.

Source Reliability: 8 Analytic Confidence: 7

Ryan R. Stranahan

43

Manufacturing Highly Likely To Serve As Alternative Livelihood To Replace Opium Poppy Production

Executive Summary: It is highly likely Afghanistan farmers will accept alternative livelihoods as a replacement to growing opium poppy. Afghanistan is highly capable of developing alternative programs as long as it continues its proactive approach and increases its eradication efforts in order to battle the increased production of opium poppy.

Discussion: The alternative livelihoods supported by current US strategy are too often short-term ―cash for work‖ projects that do not provide a lasting incentive for farmers to give up opium cultivation. The United States should focus on long-term solutions to the opium problem that emphasizes true alternative livelihoods for the 2.9 million Afghans who currently rely on the opium industry for income. William Byrd of the World Bank says, ―Expectations about what can be accomplished in the short run must be kept reasonable. Overly inflated expectations inevitably lead to disappointments which, given the political sensitivity of narcotics, in turn can lead to overreaction and policy mistakes.‖117

In a survey conducted from 2,996 poppy farmers in 1,500 villages across Afghanistan, farmers reported other on job preferences to replace opium poppy cultivation. The majority of the farmers (98%) reported that they would be ready to stop opium poppy A study conducted by the United Nations‘ Office on Drugs and Crime identified preferred alternative livelihoods in cultivation should access to Afghanistan. Source: http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/ alternative livelihoods be AFG07_ExSum_web.pdf provided. When asked about alternatives to opium poppy cultivation, 28% of farmers preferred the provision of off-farm employment, 23% preferred to farm other crops with the same income, 12% preferred provision of credits, 10% asked for marketing facilities and 9% preferred agricultural subsidies. 8% of farmers preferred other crops with at least half of the income from opium.118

44 The government of Afghanistan is working on making the alternative livelihood programs a possibility for the near future. Afghanistan has been proactive in entering trade agreements and gaining preferential access to key markets around the world. As a result, Afghanistan is a prime area for businesses to set up production and manufacturing facilities so they may take advantage of this privileged access to lucrative markets around the world.

Agriculture is a fundamental means of livelihood in Afghanistan, generating 38% of the country‘s GDP and supporting 85% of its people. The majority of private sector entrepreneurs in Afghanistan are farmers, the bulk of industrial sector processing is geared to providing services to farmers, and farm related business. Because this sector contributes the most to national income and personal livelihoods, increased investment in the agro-business and agriculture areas will have a direct positive impact on the lives of thousands of Afghans.119

Domestic production of machinery related to the agro-business and agro-processing industries is a lucrative opportunity for investors given rehabilitation efforts in rural Afghanistan. Agricultural and processing equipment in Afghanistan is currently imported from abroad, or from the Soviet era. Demand for new machinery, such as grain cleaning and sieving equipment for flour, and tractor trolleys and plows, will continue to grow and be vital to the production of agricultural goods. In the long term, the manufacturing of local machinery will be profitable to the agricultural industry and the establishment of repair centers for technical support will be crucial.120 The manufacturing of machinery will first allow farmers within Afghanistan to upgrade equipment and allow them to yield greater crop production. Secondly, domestic production will provide off-farm employment for individuals who will work in the factories and repair centers. Lastly, as the domestic manufacturing industry increases, the equipment can be used as an export commodity to neighboring countries. Currently, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Pakistan are largely agricultural economies similar to Afghanistan and currently import agricultural machinery.

Comment: As domestic production of machinery is a long-term replacement option and a practical solution, there are several challenges that will need to be addressed. First, an individual, most likely a foreign investor, must be willing to invest in developing a manufacturing site in Afghanistan. This involves building an infrastructure and providing all necessary tools for beginning a new industry. Secondly, most farmers are illiterate, and farm level education systems, including extension services, are key to the adoption of new production systems and technologies.121 Factories producing the agricultural equipment will also have to train the employees on how to produce the

45 products. Next, access to credit is essential for the rural economy for the purchase of inputs and consumption. Many farmers are highly indebted and are caught in a cycle of short-term loans not repaid because of harvest failure. This reduces their access to further credit and leaves earned income to repay outstanding loans more difficult. If machinery is produced domestically, many farmers will not have the money or resources to purchase the new equipment.122 Lastly, the lack of security in the country will continue to deter foreign investors from developing such and industry and prolong the current poppy growth.

Source Reliability: 8 Analytic Confidence: 7

Ryan R. Stranahan

46

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47

Annex 1: Governor Mohammad Atta, Balk Province Governor Mohammad Atta, born in Afghanistan‘s Balkh Province, is considered one of Afghanistan‘s most educated governors.123 Serving as a military commander for Burhanuddin Rabbani's Jamiat-i Islami, Atta fought against the Soviet ally Abdul Rashid Dostum during the 1980s. However, both Atta and Dostum were allied together against the Taliban when Atta commanded the 7th Corps of Northern Afghanistan.124 Under Governor Atta‘s leadership, the Balk Province is one of the most stable provinces in Afghanistan.

According to former Interior Minister Ali Jalali, the Balkh Province is economically better off than much of Afghanistan and water is less of a concern to the population of that area as well. Jalali also explained that, in order to prevent the cultivation of poppy, Governor Atta worked with the farmers from the very beginning. Wheat and honeydew melon were the traditional crops in the Balkh region, not poppy. Governor Atta also cracked down of official corruption. David Monter reported to the Christian Science Monitor that, in February 2006, Atta fired the district government head, chief of police, chief of security, chief of staff, and the prosecutor for alleged involvement in the drug trade.

Jacob Wells

48 Annex 2: Afghan Eradication Force

Executive Summary: The Afghan Eradication Force (AEF) is a specialized police organization consisting of members of the Afghan National Police. Douglas Wankel, the chief of counternarcotics at the United States Embassy Kabul assisted with the creation of the AEF, which falls under the authority of the Ministry of Interior.

Discussion: Recognizing the interrelated threat of insurgent activity and opium cultivation, the US Embassy Kabul organized a task force consisting of representatives of the Government of Afghanistan (including the Afghan National Army and National Police), the United Kingdom, United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNDOC), the US State Department and the US military to coordinate security and eradication assistance. The Afghan government deploys the AEF to supplement Governor-led Eradication (GLE) efforts.125

The AEF is a specialized police organization consisting of mobile units of eradicators and security personnel, each supported by air assets. The Ministry of Interior deploys AEF where the provincial efforts fail or where provincial governors request such assistance.126

Douglas Wankel, a former US Drug Several members of the AEF Enforcement Administration official helped to operating in a poppy field. Source: www.newyorker.com/.../09/0707 create the AEF and is the leading US official 09fa_fact_anderson overseeing the poppy-eradication effort in Afghanistan. Wankel utililizes a two-hundred-and-fifty-man AEF contingent, including approximately forty contractors supplied by DynCorp, a Virginia-based private military company.127

Comment: Ultimately, the AEF eradicated 2,374 hectares in Helmand (1,918 ha.), Badakhshan (422 ha.) and Baghlan (34 ha). The UNODC estimates that GLE was responsible for destroying another 13,339 hectares in 19 provinces, including 3,166 hectares in Helmand, 457 hectares in Badakhshan and 23 hectares in Baghlan. UNODC estimates this year‘s verified eradication approached perhaps 10 percent of Afghanistan‘s total poppy crop, as opposed to four percent last year.128 Jacob Wells

49 Annex 3: Mineral Deposits In Afghanistan’s Main Poppy Growing Provinces

There are not many substantial mineral deposits in the main poppy growing provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Farah, Nimroz, Zabul and Uruzgan. The United States Geological Survey‘s ―Geological and Mineral Resource Map of Afghanistan‖ from 2006 identifies many deposits in these provinces: Farah  Unclassified copper along Iran border  Lacustrine halite in central Farah 20 miles from Iran border  Unclassified mercury in northeastern Farah  Skarn tungsten 25 miles southeast of capital city Farah Helmand:  Limestone occurrences within 50 miles of Pakistan border  Carbonatite rock possibly including uranium located in central Helmand 70 miles north of Pakistan border Kandahar:  Unclassified copper along southeastern border and in north-central Kandahar  Unclassified and vein gold in north-central Kandahar  Lacustrine halite located in central Kandahar Nimroz:  Lacustrine halite located 20 miles north of Zaranj in western Nimroz Urzugan:  Unclassified fluorite along southern border with Kandahar  Unclassified and skarn copper along eastern border with Zabul and in north- central Urzugan  Unclassified and vein tungsten in north-central Urzugan  Unclassified mercury in north-central Urzugan  Unclassified tin in central Urzugan  Calcite (Iceland spar) in central Urzugan Zabul:  Unclassified, vein and skarn gold from northwestern to northeastern Zabul which continues into Ghazni province  Unclassified, vein, skarn and greisen tin tungsten in north-central Zabul  Vein polymetallic throughout northern Zabul

Luke K. Handley

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Annex 4: Land Use In Afghanistan Afghanistan is essentially semi-arid to desert and most crop production is limited to pockets of irrigable land, with some rain-fed areas in the north and at high-altitudes. Crops cover less than 10% of the total land area; most of the rest is extensive grazing, desert or high mountain and permanent ice. By far the greatest part of the land surface of Afghanistan is extensive grazing land - desert; semi-desert or high or steep mountain; only about 40% is said to be suitable for winter grazing. From satellite imagery it has been estimated that more than 70% is rough grazing. (Table 1). Table 1: AFGHANISTAN - LAND USE (1993) * Area (hectares) Percentage

Irrigated Agricultural Land 3,302,007 5.1

Orchards 94,217 0.1 Intensively irrigated 1,559,654 2.4

Intermittently cropped 1,648,136 2.6

Rain-fed Agricultural Land 4,517,714 7.0 Forest Land 1,337,582 2.1 Rangeland 29,176,732 45.2 Barren Land 24,067,016 37.3 Marsh Land 417,563 0.6 Water Bodies 248,187 0.4 Snow-covered Area 1.463.101 2.3 Urban Area 29.494 0.05 TOTAL LAND AREA 64,559,396 100 Source: http://www.fao.org/ag/agp/agpc/doc/counprof/afgan/afgan.htm

51 Annex 5: Potential Long-Term Soil Replenishment Programs

Replenishment and nutrient supplementation of the soil in Afghanistan‘s arable regions should be explored. Recognizing the imperative for long term benefit, minimal cost, net environmental benefit and low technological requirements for any solutions to be examined, the following recommendations are made based upon the analyst‘s personal knowledge.

In the Central Valley of California, there are vast areas dedicated to cotton. The cultivation of cotton, however, depletes the nitrogen in the soil at a substantial rate. Continued yearly planting of cotton steadily reduces productivity due to the paucity of nutrients vital for healthy plants. The cotton industry in the region (and possibly across the cotton-growning states) solved the problem with crop rotation. Specifically, alternating every other year of cotton cultivation with a year of sugar beets was determined to be highly beneficial. As the sugar beets are being harvested, the beet tops are removed and left in the fields. They are then plowed back into the soil. The tops contain a high level of nitrogen, which rejuvenates the soil sufficiently over the winter that the cotton crop produces consistent yields over time.

In the horticultural farming areas of Afghanistan where irrigated fields are nitrogen poor, it is highly likely that a similar program of crop rotation with essentially in-ground composting in alternate years will gradually elevate the nutrient levels of the soil.

The second potential soil rejuvenation program truly is a perpetual, maintenance-free, labor-free solution—if implemented effectively in the first several years. Simply put, this program is vermiculture: cultivation of earthworms for colonization of arable land. The positive effects of earthworms are aeration and promotion of macronutrient availability. When worms excrete egesta in the form of casts, a balanced selection of minerals and plant nutrients is made into a form accessible for root uptake. US research shows that earthworm casts are five times richer in available nitrogen, seven times richer in available phosphates and eleven times richer in available potash than the surrounding upper 150mm of soil. The weight of casts produced may be greater than 4.5 kg per worm per year.129

Earthworm activity aerates and mixes the soil, and is constructive to mineralization and nutrient uptake by vegetation. Certain species of earthworm come to the surface and graze on the higher concentrations of organic matter present there, mixing it with the mineral soil. Because a high level of organic matter mixing is associated with soil fertility, an abundance of earthworms is beneficial to the farmer.130

52 Several beneficial varieties of earthworm are indigenous to Central and South Asia, including Afghanistan, making such a plan viable with little risk of failure. For initial establishment of a small worm bed of six cubic feet, approximately one pound of worms (roughly 1,000 worms) is needed.131 Healthy worm populations tend to double in two to 12 months, depending upon the worm species.132 It is a realistic expectation that minimal initial investments in local worm farms are likely to produce significant results within two years.

The following anecdote illustrates a successful program in India, similar to the author‘s vermiculture proposal. The project involved retaining the worms in beds or containers, and harvesting the compost produced by them. The author proposes a combined program of vermicomposting, and transplantation of large worm colonies directly into arable land in Afghanistan to perpetually rejuvenate the soil.

In 1985, the Indian concern Maharashtra Agricultural Bioteks formed a company and set up a small plant to manufacture vermicompost from agricultural waste. Those involved believed that moving people towards sustainable agriculture might be best achieved by successfully operating a commercial venture based on regenerative principles.

Over ten years, the organization produced 5,000 tons of vermicompost annually. Its real achievement, however, was raising awareness among farmers, research workers and policy makers in India about regenerative food production methods. The group was directly responsible for 2,000 farmers and horticulturalists adopting vermicomposting during the same ten-year period. These "converted" farmers and horticulturalists then started secondary dissemination of vermicompost principles to their neighbors.

In 1991-92 Maharashtra Bioteks, working with the India Department of Science and Technology, promoted the adoption of vermicompost technology throughout 13 states in India. The group also established a vermicompost unit with Chitrakoot Gramodaya University at Chitrakoot, Madhya Pradesh which produced five tons of compost per month.

The research agenda included a program for the reduction of chemical fertilizer use on grapes, pomegranates and bananas. Nearly 1,000 farmers used vermicompost as a soil amendment in their orchards, reducing the use of chemical fertilizers by 90%.

The organization devised methods to convert some biodegradable industrial waste (pulp waste from paper mills, filter cake and liquid effluent from sugar factories, fruit and vegetable processing units, cafeteria waste and assorted city waste) into vermicompost.

53 These wastes are commonly regarded as pollutants. Over the course of the ten-year project, three facilities produced thirty tons of vermicompost each month.

The organization also created a program which trained housewives and home gardeners to produce their own vermicompost from household and garden waste. The principle aim of this work was to increase awareness about regenerative practices.133

Victoria Allen

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Annex 7: Source Reliability and Analytic Confidence

Source reliability is a measure that an analyst utilizes to quantify the assessed dependability of facts, websites, human contacts, et cetera. It is measured on a scale of one through 10, with one indicating extremely low source reliability and 10 illustrating that information from a particular source is highly reliable.

Analytic confidence is the quantification of an analyst's judgment of his or her own estimates. This factor is also measured on a scale of one through 10, one indicating that the analyst believes an estimate is unlikely to come to fruition, and 10 signifying that an estimate is all but certain. Team members placed overall scores at the end of each estimate.

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Annex 8: Acknowledgements

The team members thank Professor James Breckenridge for his insight and instruction throughout the term. His guidance was invaluable in the completion of this project. The members of the team thank all of the faculty and staff at the Mercyhurst College Institute for Intelligence Studies, who have made the past four years a rewarding academic experience.

The team spoke with former Interior Minister of Afghanistan Ali Jalali, and would like to thank him for the time he donated. The information he provided was instrumental in making this project successful.

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Annex 9: Contact Information

Please contact the authors with any comments or questions.

Victoria Allen [email protected] Luke Handley [email protected] Ryan Stranahan [email protected] Jacob Wells [email protected]

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Annex 10: Endnotes

1 http://www.shaps.hawaii.edu/drugs/dea20026/dea20026.html 2 http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/EVOD-77SGAL?OpenDocument 3 United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime: http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/AFG07_ExSum_web.pdf 4 http://in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-29224520070829?pageNumber=2 5 United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime: http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/AFG07_ExSum_web.pdf 6 http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/07/09/070709fa_fact_anderson?currentPage=8 7 http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/07/09/070709fa_fact_anderson?currentPage=8 8 http://oruzgan.web-log.nl/uruzgan_weblog/tarin_kowttirin_kot_tk/index.html 9 http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct031705.html 10 http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct031705.html 11 http://www.usdoj.gov/dea//pubs/cngrtest/ct062806.html 12 http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct031705.html 13 http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/DEA/a0719/app6.htm 14 http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct031705.html 15 http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/DEA/a0719/app6.htm 16 http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=33004 17 http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=33004 18 http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/07/09/070709fa_fact_anderson?currentPage=1 19http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/22/world/asia/22spray.html?ref=worldspecial 20http://www.blueridgenow.com/article/20071008/ZNYT03/710080348/1170/NEWS/ZNYT03/U_S_Ren ews_Bid_to_Destroy_Opium_Poppies_in_Afghanistan 21http://www.blueridgenow.com/article/20071008/ZNYT03/710080348/1170/NEWS/ZNYT03/U_S_Ren ews_Bid_to_Destroy_Opium_Poppies_in_Afghanistan 22 http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0125/p07s01-wosc.html 23 http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=33004 24http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&dopt=AbstractPlus&list_uids=1 0854122 25 http://www.afghangrown.org/products.html 26 http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/2007/1000645/index.html 27 http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/EVOD-77SGAL?OpenDocument 28 http://www.cmi.no/afghanistan/themes/ngos.cfm 29 http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADH196.pdf 30 http://www.adb.org/Water/narbo/2005/Training-Program/pres-AFG-grp1-NARBO-training.pdf 31 http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADH196.pdf 32 http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADH196.pdf 33 http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADH196.pdf 34 http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADJ073.pdf 35 http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/2007/1000645/index.html 36 http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADH196.pdf 37 http://www.eafghans.com/afghanistan/article.php?id=62 38 http://www.fao.org/ag/agp/agpc/doc/counprof/afgan/afgan.htm 39 http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/Article.68.aspx 40 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html 41 http://www.cmi.no/afghanistan/themes/ngos.cfm 42 http://www.afghanaid.org.uk/about_afghanaid/current_projects.phtml 43 http://www.fao.org/ag/agp/agpc/doc/counprof/afgan/afgan.htm 44 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goat

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45 http://www.fao.org/ag/agp/agpc/doc/counprof/afgan/afgan.htm 46 http://topics.developmentgateway.org/afghanistan/rc/ItemDetail.do~1106006?itemId=1106006 47 http://www.gateway.mn/downloads/industry/Cashmere2005-eng.pdf 48 http://www.fao.org/ag/agp/agpc/doc/counprof/afgan/afgan.htm 49 http://www.isn.net/~minimill/html/large_fiber_separator.html 50 John SanFilipo, Research Geologist, US Geological Survey, personal communication 51 http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8319454 52 http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/09.07.2007investgems.html 53 http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/12.01investnews.html 54 http://english.people.com.cn/200611/15/eng20061115_321768.html 55 http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/special/terror/front/1183615.html 56http://www.firebasesoftware.com/PR%20News%20Releases/Business/Advertising%20And%20Marketi ng/Progress%20in%20Afghanistan%20Aynak%20Copper%20Tender%20Commences 57 http://www.adb.org/Documents/Events/2006/CAREC-BDF/mining-sector-en.pdf (page 6) 58 http://www.aisa.org.af/Downloads/reports/Mining1.pdf (page 5) 59 http://english.people.com.cn/200611/15/eng20061115_321768.html 60 http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/03/070319180014.htm 61 http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2006/myb3-2006-af.pdf 62 http://www.bgs.ac.uk/afghanminerals/docs/tenders/Aynak/EOISelectionPR19-11-06.pdf 63 http://www.nature.com/news/2007/071022/full/449968a.html 64 http://www.nature.com/news/2007/071022/full/449968a.html 65 http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/12.01investnews.html 66 John SanFilipo, Research Geologist, US Geological Survey, personal communication 67 http://www.nature.com/news/2007/071022/full/449968a.html 68 http://www.epaa.org.af/mainpages/marblemineral.sxw.html 69 http://www.adb.org/Documents/Events/2006/CAREC-BDF/mining-sector-en.pdf (page 6) 70 http://www.aisa.org.af/Downloads/reports/Mining1.pdf (page 9) 71 http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2005/3073/2005-3073.pdf 72 http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2006/myb3-2006-af.pdf 73 http://www.nature.com/news/2007/071022/full/449968a.html 74 http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/03/070319180014.htm 75 http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8319454 76 http://www.nature.com/news/2007/071022/full/449968a.html 77 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/18/content_6901616.htm 78 http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0BJT/is_23_7/ai_58358890 79 http://www.aisa.org.af/Downloads/reports/Mining1.pdf (page 9) 80 http://www.adb.org/Documents/Events/2006/CAREC-BDF/mining-sector-en.pdf (page 7) 81 http://www.aisa.org.af/Downloads/reports/Mining1.pdf (page 9) 82 Ali Jalali, former Interior Minister, Afghanistan government, personal communication 83 http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Asia-and-Oceania/Afghanistan-MINING.html 84 http://www.epaa.org.af/mainpages/marblemineral.sxw.html 85 http://www.adb.org/Documents/Events/2006/CAREC-BDF/mining-sector-en.pdf (page 6) 86 http://www.aisa.org.af/Downloads/reports/Mining1.pdf (page 6) 87 http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/06.27.2007investnewsmining.html 88 http://www.adb.org/Documents/Events/2006/CAREC-BDF/mining-sector-en.pdf (page 6) 89 http://www.aisa.org.af/Downloads/reports/Mining1.pdf (page 6) 90 http://www.aisa.org.af/Downloads/reports/Mining1.pdf (page 6) 91 http://www.resourceinvestor.com/pebble.asp?relid=37252 92 http://www.epaa.org.af/mainpages/marblemineral.sxw.html 93 http://www- wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/03/26/000160016_20040326111059/Ren dered/PDF/282310AF.pdf (page 23) 94 http://www.epaa.org.af/mainpages/marblemineral.sxw.html 95 http://www.epaa.org.af/mainpages/marblemineral.sxw.html

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96 http://www.epaa.org.af/mainpages/marblemineral.sxw.html 97 http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Asia-and-Oceania/Afghanistan-MINING.html 98 http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2006/03/060314231913.htm 99 http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2006/03/060314231913.htm 100 http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2006/03/060314231913.htm 101 http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2006/03/060314231913.htm 102 http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2006/03/060314231913.htm 103 http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2006/03/060314231913.htm 104 http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Asia-and-the-Pacific/Afghanistan.html 105 http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Asia-and-the-Pacific/Afghanistan.html 106 http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Asia-and-the-Pacific/Afghanistan.html 107 http://www.gl.iit.edu/govdocs/afghanistan/Industry.html 108 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm

109 http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile- english&x=20071001152413liameruoy0.1086542&m=October 110 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html 111 http://www.ecosecretariat.org/ECOTradeNet/Trade_Countries/Afghanistan/Afghanistan 112 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html#Econ 113 http://www.aisa.org.af/ 114 http://www.ecosecretariat.org/ECOTradeNet/Trade_Countries/Afghanistan/Afghanistan 115 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/11/mil-061116-voa05.htm 116 http://www.aisa.org.af/pri-sectors.html#low 117 http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/ 118 United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime: http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/AFG07_ExSum_web.pdf 119 http://www.aisa.org.af/Downloads/reports/Agro1.pdf 120 http://www.aisa.org.af/Downloads/reports/Agro1.pdf 121 http://www.icarda.org/afghanistan/workshop/guid33.htm 122 http://agriculture.gov.af/fills/MAKING%20AGRICULTURE%20AND%20PRODUCTIVE.pdf 123 http://www.portlandonline.com/mayor/index.cfm?a=bgjeei&c=difaa 124 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/ustad.htm 125 http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rm/72241.htm 126 http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rm/72241.htm 127 http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/07/09/070709fa_fact_anderson?currentPage=1 128 http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rm/72241.htm 129 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soil_conservation#Soil_pH 130 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Earthworms#Economic_impact 131 http://www.seasonsindia.com/lifestyle/grdnVermicompost_sea.htm 132 http://fadr.msu.ru/rodale/agsieve/txt/vol7/art5.html 133 http://www.ibiblio.org/london/agriculture/vermiculture/1/msg00000.html

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