Analysis of the Jihadi Infighting in the Sahel Region

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FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES

Diploma Thesis

BC. DOMINIK NOVOSAD

Supervisor: Monika Gabriela Bartoszewicz, MA, MLitt, PhD

Department of Political Science Security and Strategic Studies

Brno 2021

ANALYSIS OF THE JIHADI INFIGHTING IN THE SAHEL REGION

Bibliografický záznam

Autor: Bc. Dominik Novosad Fakulta sociálních studií Masarykova univerzita Katedra politologie Název práce: Analysis of the Jihadi Infighting in the Sahel Region Studijní program: Magisterský studijní program Studijní obor: Security and Strategic Studies Vedoucí práce: Monika Gabriela Bartoszewicz, MA, MLitt, PhD Rok: 2021 Počet stran: 170 Klíčová slova: JNIM, ISGS, Sahel, Process Tracing, Sahelská anomálie, povstalecká fragmentace, džihádismus

2 ANALYSIS OF THE JIHADI INFIGHTING IN THE SAHEL REGION

Bibliographic record

Author: Bc. Dominik Novosad Faculty of Social Studies Masaryk University Department of Political Science Title of Thesis: Analysis of the Jihadi Infighting in the Sahel Region Degree Programme: Master’s degree programme Field of Study: Security and Strategic Studies Supervisor: Monika Gabriela Bartoszewicz, MA, MLitt, PhD Year: 2021 Number of Pages: 170 Keywords: JNIM, ISGS, Sahel, Process Tracing, Sahelian anomaly, rebel fragmentation, jihadism

3 ANALYSIS OF THE JIHADI INFIGHTING IN THE SAHEL REGION

Abstrakt

Diplomová práce se zabývá soubojem džihádistických povstaleckých skupin v Sahelu. První část práce se zaměřuje na vysvětlení propuknutí konfliktu mezi džihádistickými skupinami a koncem tzv. “Sahelské anomálie”. V druhé části práce je pak analyzován momentální stav džihádistického soupeření. K naplnění prvního stanoveného cíle práce autor využívá metodu process tracing vedenou Pischeddovou (2015) teorií oken příležitostí a slabin. K napl- nění druhého cíle je komparováno a analyzováno pět indikátorů stanovených na základě práce výzkumníků Cunningham, Gleditsch a Salehyan (2009).

4 ANALYSIS OF THE JIHADI INFIGHTING IN THE SAHEL REGION

Abstract

This diploma thesis deals with the infighting of jihadist insurgent groups in the Sahel region. The first part of the thesis focuses on explaining the onset of violent contestation between the jihadist groups and the end of the so-called “Sahelian anomaly”. In the second part of this thesis, the current state of the jihadi contestation is analysed. To fulfil our first stated goal, the author uses the process tracing method led by Pischedda’s (2015) Theory of Windows of Opportunity and Vulnerability. To fulfil the second goal, we analyse and compare five indicators based on the work of Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009).

ANALYSIS OF THE JIHADI INFIGHTING IN THE SAHEL REGION

Declaration of Authorship

I hereby declare that I have written the following master’s thesis on the topic of Analysis of the Jihadi Infighting in the Sahel Region only by myself. All sources used in this thesis have been cited in the text and are listed in the list of used sources and literature.

Brno, May 29, 2021 ...... Bc. Dominik Novosad

ANALYSIS OF THE JIHADI INFIGHTING IN THE SAHEL REGION

Acknowledgement

I would like to express my thanks and gratitude to Dr. Monika Gabriela Bar- toszewicz for the extensive guidance, patience, and advice she provided to me while working on this thesis. Secondly, I would like to thank my family and friends for the continuous support throughout my studies.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents

List of Figures 13

List of Abbreviations 14

1 Introduction 17

2 Methodology and Conceptual Framework 20 2.1 Process Tracing ...... 21 2.2 Indicators ...... 25

3 Theoretical Background 28 3.1 Rebel Fragmentation and Infighting ...... 28 3.2 Theory of Windows of Opportunity and Windows of Vulnerability ...... 30 3.2.1 Co-ethnicity ...... 33 3.2.2 Operationalisation of the Theory...... 34

4 Co-identity and Historical Background 37 4.1 Salafi Roots ...... 37 4.2 Factions of Salafism ...... 39 4.3 Conflict inside the Jihadi Sphere ...... 42 4.3.1 Far Enemy Debate ...... 42 4.3.2 Emergence of the al-Qaeda in Iraq ...... 44 4.3.3 The Split of the Salafi-jihadi Sphere ...... 46 4.4 Transnational Competition ...... 49

5 Analytical part 52 5.1 Process tracing ...... 52 5.1.1 Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims) ...... 53 5.1.2 Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) ...... 56 5.1.3 Relationship and Power Imbalance ...... 58

11 TABLE OF CONTENTS

5.1.4 The Formative Years of ISGS (2015-2017) ...... 59 5.1.5 Emergence of JNIM and its Capabilities (2017) ...... 64 5.1.6 Theoretical Explanation for the Lack of Infighting ...... 67 5.1.7 Foreign Intervention and Government Forces ...... 70 5.1.8 The Relationship Until the Beginning of Infighting ...... 74 5.1.9 Rise of ISGS and Shifting Distribution of Power ...... 78 5.1.10 The Infighting ...... 81 5.1.11 Analysis of Findings and Discussion ...... 90 5.2 Indicators ...... 97 5.2.1 Clear Central Command ...... 97 5.2.2 Fighting Capacity ...... 102 5.2.3 Ability to Procure Arms ...... 106 5.2.4 Mobilization Capacity ...... 109 5.2.5 Territory Control ...... 113 5.2.6 Analysis of Findings and Discussion ...... 119

6 Conclusion 124

Sources 127

Number of characters: 198 409

12 LIST OF FIGURES

List of Figures

Figure 1 (p. 24): Sufficient/Necessary Conditions for Affirming Casual In- ference. Source: Collier 2011

Figure 2 (p. 33): Benefits/Costs of Inter-rebel War. Source: Pischedda 2015, 46

Figure 3 (p. 52): Map of the Sahel Region. Source: Zyzou, 2020

Figure 4 (p. 63): Number of Terrorist Attacks by ISGS 2016-2020. Created by the author on the basis of ACLED data.

Figure 5 (p. 67): Number of Terrorist Attacks by JNIM 2017-2020. Created by the author on the basis of ACLED data.

Figure 6 (p. 72): Regional Security Responses in the Sahel. Source: AFD, 2020

Figure 7 (p. 82): Battles Between JNIM and ISGS (1 January 2020 – 31 De- cember 2020). Source: Nsaibia 2021

Figure 8 (p. 115): Map of Operational Territories of JNIM and ISGS. Source: Sollazo and Nowak 2020, 6

Figure 9 (p. 120): Table of Indicators. Created by the author.

13 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

List of Abbreviations

ACLED – The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project AQ – al-Qaeda AQIM – al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb EUCAP Mali – European Union Capacity Building Mission in Mali EUCAP Niger – European Union Capacity Building Mission in Niger EUTM Mali – European Union Training Mission Mali G5 Sahel – The Group of Five for the Sahel GATIA – The Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies GSPC – Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat H1 – Hypothesis 1 H2 – Hypothesis 2 IED – Improvised Explosive Device IS – The Islamic State ISGS – The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara ISIS – The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant ISWAP – The Islamic State West Africa Province JNIM – Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin MINURSO – United Nations Mission for the Referendum in West- ern Sahara MNLA – The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad MSA – Movement for the Salvation of Azawad MUJAO – Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa NGO – Non-governmental Organisation RPG – Rocket-propelled Grenade SALW – Small Arms, Light Weaponry

14 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

SVBIED – Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device US – The United States UN MINUSMA – United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabili- zation Mission in Mali

INTRODUCTION

1 Introduction

The African continent, due to the deteriorating security situation in the Sahel region, the Horn of Africa, Mozambique, and most recently central Africa, is quickly becoming one of the most significant regions for jihadist activity. When it comes to the intensity of fighting, it is dwarfed only by the Syrian and Iraqi theatres of jihad. Above this, the jihadi movement has been under- going an internal split since the rise of the Islamic State in 2014. The movement fragmented into two competing blocks represented by al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. The transnational competition between the groups turned violent and recently moved its centre of competition to Africa. Due to these developments, this thesis looks at the problem of the jihadi infighting in the Sahel region which recently became the latest and the most intense point of the contestation. In the first part of this work, the particular case we analyse is the so- called “Sahelian anomaly” (often also referred to as an exception). “Sahelian anomaly” refers to a special relationship between the Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS) and al-Qaeda (AQ) affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal- Muslimin (JNIM). The term anomaly pertains to a lack of fighting, or as some analysts claim, even uneasy cooperation between two groups, which is unu- sual as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State affiliates immediately clashed any- where else they came into proximity with each other. However, this exception started to erode in late 2019 and grew into a full-blown inter-rebel war in 2020 when the groups started fighting each other also in the Sahel region. The dynamics of the onset of inter-rebel fighting are essential for multiple reasons. First, understanding the dynamics of inter-rebel fighting is crucial for effective policymaking and policy execution. Literature shows that fragmented rebel movements are less effective in their insurgencies and more

17 INTRODUCTION vulnerable to counter-insurgency campaigns (Bakke, Cunningham, and Sey- mour 2015). Thus, the deteriorating security situation in the Sahel region and the rest of Africa calls us to understand the dynamics of rebel infighting in order to capitalize on them in counter-insurgency efforts. Secondly, the case provides an exciting research topic from a theoretical standpoint. Understand- ing why and under what conditions the conflict started when it started could prove beneficial for the broader theoretical understanding of inter-rebel violence in general and the infighting in the jihadist movement in particular. Based on these observations, the first research question driving this research can be formulated as: “Why did the ‘Sahelian anomaly’ end?” We use process tracing led by Pischedda’s (2015) Theory of Windows of Oppor- tunity and Windows of Vulnerability to answer this question. The theory itself, our reasoning for using it, and its conceptualization in the context of jihadist infighting is discussed at length in the theoretical section of this thesis. The second goal of this thesis is to analyse the current state of the inter rebel contestation in the western part of the Sahel region. To this end, the second research question is formulated as: “Who is winning the inter-jihadi conflict in the Sahel region?” Five indicators based on the work of Cunning- ham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009; 2013) were chosen to answer this question. These indicators will be analysed and compared in the second part of the analytical section of this thesis. Analysing these indicators will not only help us investigate the current state of the inter-rebel war but will also allow us to assess the current counter-insurgency strategy in the Sahel region. Lastly, it is essential to clarify what we mean by the Sahel region. The Sahel is a belt-like region of Africa stretching from the east coast to the continent’s west coast. The region goes through multiple countries ranging from Senegal to Eritrea. In the context of this thesis, we talk about the regional security complex of three Sahelian states Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.

18 INTRODUCTION

These states face similar problems and threats as it is their territory on which the jihadi insurgence, and thus the inter-rebel contestation, is taking place. The jihadi groups often cross borders and fight in each of the states. These states also cooperate in the G5 Sahel forum and cooperate with international actors and structures in their counter-insurgency efforts (Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs 2020). Therefore, they fulfil the definition of regional security complex as defined in Buzan, Wilde, and Wæver (1998, 12): “A security complex is defined as a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another.” The states are therefore grouped and analysed together as one regional security complex rather than individual countries.

19 METHODOLOGY AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2 Methodology and Conceptual Framework

Grounded in the nature of our researched phenomena, the first part of the thesis constitutes a disciplined interpretative case study. A case study is a detailed analysis of a specific phenomenon or case. The goal of a case study is to closely examine a particular aspect of a historical episode or a case in great detail (George and Bennett 2005). A disciplined interpretative case study seeks to describe, explain, or interpret an event by applying a previously not used theory in this particular case. The theory is used to identify the main processes and variables in the researched case, not to achieve theoretical gen- eralization (Odell 2001). This kind of case study can also contribute to theory testing. It can uncover cases where the established theory does not fit even though it should and thus highlights a need for new theory in neglected areas (George and Bennett 2005). Accordingly, in the first part of this thesis, the author uses Pischedda’s (2015) theory of Windows of Opportunity/Vulnerability as a theoretical background and framework for the analysis. As our focal point is the end of the “Sahelian anomaly,” we mainly look at the timeframe from 2015 when the ISGS group split from the al-Qaeda affiliated structures of JNIM until the year 2019 when the clashes officially began. Thematically, we look at the rebel infighting, specifically at the onset of the violent clashes between ISGS and JNIM. To analyse this historical case and understand its causal mechanisms, we use process tracing to map processes leading to the onset of violent clashes. The second part of the thesis is a comparative analysis of the groups. The thesis looks at the current state of the infighting and analyses who is winning the inter-jihadi conflict. Based on the work of Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009; 2013), five indicators to determine who is winning were

20 METHODOLOGY AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK chosen: 1) clear central command, 2) mobilization capacity, 3) ability to procure arms, 4) fighting capacity, 5) territory control. These factors were chosen because they measure relevant but different phenomena (to be sure we are not analysing the same concept under a different name and to ensure maximal internal variance) but also because in periods of fighting, these factors are much more important than other factors more characteristic for distribution of power in peaceful times (such as the ability to get the supporters to the voting polls, which is not applicable in this case of course). The comparative analysis of these indicators will allow us to objectively determine who is winning the conflict.

2.1 Process Tracing

Process tracing is a method where the researcher examines within-case evidence to support or refute a hypothesis (or to generate one). General characteristics of the process tracing in a positivist perspective include an emphasis on causal mechanisms and causality between the independent and dependent variables (Vennesson 2008). In this thesis, we use the work of Bennett and Checkel (2014, 6), who define process tracing as: “The use of histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hy- pothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case,” and “the process-tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.” Often utilized analogy while explaining process tracing is the detective solving crime by creating a complex and durable explanation by putting together clues and evidence accompanied by motivation, opportunity, and

21 METHODOLOGY AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK means that possible suspect had to have to commit the crime. An analogy of a doctor diagnosing an illness based on a patient’s medical history, symptoms, and medical tests is also mentioned (Bennett 2010). Further, Beach and Pedersen (2013) define three distinct types of process tracing: theory-testing, theory-building, and explaining-outcome. As a disciplined interpretative case study (or theory-led case study), this paper is not particularly interested in broader theory-building. It also uses Pischedda’s (2015) theory of Windows of Opportunity and Vulnerability as an analytical framework and theoretical background to lead our analysis of the end of the “Sahelian anomaly”. It, therefore, takes procedures from the theory-testing process tracing. The reasoning for choosing Pischedda’s theory is elaborated on and explained in the following chapter. In theory-testing process tracing, we are aware of what our X and Y are, and we are also, to a certain degree, aware of possible casual mechanisms or can deduce them from the theory. Conceptualization of the casual mechanisms depends on the formulation of existing theories, whether they are formulated in complete casual mechanisms (in this case, the work is much eas- ier) or in simple correlations (here we must logically formulate causal mechanisms and expected context in which they will operate) (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 56). As many theory’s hypotheses as possible should be tested. If only certain hypotheses are tested, we end up with a partially tested theory. To test the theory, we must test all the available hypotheses. We should also make predictions based on these hypotheses as hypotheses usually make testable predictions. However, these inferred predictions must be explained and de- fended, so no confusion about whether the prediction is rooted in the theory arises (Van Evera 1997). Our operationalisation of the theoretical concepts based on Pischedda’s theory is discussed in the following chapter.

22 METHODOLOGY AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

For successful process tracing that would provide us a causal inference, a detailed description is paramount. As we are trying to unravel causal inference, we focus on specific events and situations and their unfolding throughout time. To achieve this, we must understand these events at one point in time in detail and be able to describe them. Through deep description, we can analyse key steps and thus put together the analysis of changes and sequence of the process. Also, for effective identifying of diagnostic evidence, a certain degree of prior knowledge is needed (Collier 2011). To test the evidence for our hypothesis Bennett (2008), building on Van Evera’s work (1997), puts forward four tests. These tests are classified according to whether they are sufficient or necessary for a hypothesis to stand and their implications for rival hypotheses (Collier 2011). These tests include hoop test, smoking gun test, doubly decisive test, and straw in the wind test (Bennett 2008). Hoop tests are necessary to pass. Failure of the hoop test disqualifies the hypothesis, but confidence in our hypothesis is not greatly increased when the test is passed. Therefore, this test is often used to reject a hypothesis. An example of the test in the context of the mentioned detective analogy would be whether the accused was in the state on the day of the murder (Bennett 2008). Smoking gun tests are strong support for the hypothesis if passed. However, their failure does not strongly undermine it. If we look at the analogy again, a smoking gun in the suspect’s hand strongly indicates he committed the crime (although not undeniably). However, the lack of this gun does not exonerate the suspect (Bennett 2008). Doubly decisive tests strongly confirm our hypothesis while eliminat- ing the rival hypotheses. This test would be analogous to catching a robber’s face on a bank camera (Bennett 2008). In social science, evidence that would

23 METHODOLOGY AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK pass this kind of test is rare; however, a similar outcome can be achieved by combining multiple other tests (Collier 2011). Straw-in-the-wind tests can help with accepting or rejecting a hypothesis, but only in a minor way and are not decisive by themselves. These are the weakest tests and might serve as an initial assessment of the hypothesis. This can be demonstrated on a famous clue from detective fiction, where a dog guarding a stable did nothing throughout the night when someone ab- ducted a horse. This would indicate that someone known to the dog committed the crime, but it does not confirm any hypothesis, only gives a partial clue (Collier 2011).

Figure 1: Sufficient/Necessary Conditions for Affirming Casual Inference. Source: Col- lier 2011

The benefit of the process tracing methodology lies in the causal inference, which is the reason for its use in this thesis. Careful analysis of a sequence of the events in researched case helps us determine whether the X caused Y, or Y caused X, e. Process tracing also helps with the problem of

24 METHODOLOGY AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK potential spuriousness. When we construct a causal chain between the independent and dependent variable, process tracing helps us uncover evidence of a possible third variable that could potentially influence both variables (Ben- nett 2010). Process tracing also has certain limits. One of the problems is data gathering. Lyall (2015) argues that for effective process tracing, extended fieldwork is necessary. This is often very complicated in conflict areas and is unrealistic in the scope of this thesis. Another drawback is a limited general- ization of specific processes or neglecting structural factors that might play a role in which mechanisms occur and influence the magnitude of their effects (Lyall 2015).

2.2 Indicators

The indicators, which will be scrutinised in this research, were chosen due to the nature of the inter-jihadi conflict in the Sahel region. The contemporary conflict in the Sahel region is categorized as an insurgency by contemporary analysts and is often called a “jihadist insurgency” (Hansen 2019, 34; Byman 2013; Burchill 2016; Pellerin 2019). The author of this thesis builds on the work of Moghadam, Berger, and Beliakova (2014, 9) claiming that the concept of insurgency understood as “an organised, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control” is best suited for the analysis of the Sahelian jihadi groups. As Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009) developed the indicators to analyse insurgent groups, they provide us useful tool for analysing factors crucial in the context of our research. The success and power of insurgent groups are often connected to their ability to interact with the local population

25 METHODOLOGY AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK and control territory rather than to a simple battlefield performance. Thus, these indicators help us to conduct more complex and telling analysis. Clear Central Command looks at the scope of control the group has over its forces. Strong central command is a prerequisite for effective execution of rebel strategy against its enemies as a clear organisational structure is needed to coordinate its fighters. The rebel group that has more consolidated control over its forces should be able to lead a more effective military campaign than the organisation with a lower level of central command. Consoli- dated control over the group also increases its cohesion and gives a clear negotiating authority to its enemies (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009). This indicator will have two variables. The first will be a dichotomous “yes” or “no” which will look at the existence of central command. If the group has a central command, another variable will look at the control over the group by the leadership measured as low, medium, and high (Cunning- ham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2013). Mobilization Capacity refers to the ability to mobilize or draft soldiers. The group with higher mobilization potential should be more able to engage in direct attacks and to signal a clear threat to its rival. Authors highlight that this variable looks at the ability to mobilize support rather than ac- tual mobilized supporters as groups often keep troops in reserve (Cunning- ham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009). As an example, the authors show the case of many anti-colonial movements which, although out-matched militarily, could replenish the lost soldiers from a broad supporter base (Cunning- ham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2013). This indicator will be measured as low, moderate, and high. Ability to Procure Arms indicates the rebels’ ability to gather weapons. The higher the ability to procure arms, the higher the capacity to effec-

26 METHODOLOGY AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK tively lead a military campaign should be (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Sale- hyan 2009). Many groups are significantly weakened by their lack of weaponry as can be seen in the case of Afghan Mujahedin, who became much more effective after receiving arms supplies from the United States and Paki- stan (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2013). This indicator will be measured as low, moderate, and high. Fighting Capacity describes the rebels’ ability to effectively fight their enemies and defeat them. The group that is able to mount significant pressure and conduct and win sophisticated battles poses a more credible challenge (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan, 2009). For example, groups that were underestimated initially but proved capable on the battlefield should be more likely to see concessions and negotiations. Groups with lower fighting capability would usually avoid large-scale confrontation and focus on guerrilla warfare. This indicator will be measured as low, moderate, and high (Cun- ningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2013). Territory Control provides a safe haven to organise and regroup outside of the enemies’ reach. The ability to control territory is not necessarily linked to a group’s military strength as the group may base their control of the territory on a friendly ethnic group or control rural areas outside of the rival group or governments’ reach (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009). This indicator consists of three variables. The first variable is a dichotomous “yes” or “no” depending on whether the group controls any territory at all. If the group controls a territory, the second variable identifies the controlled territory (such as the name of a specific province or a general area such as “parts of central Mali”). The third variable looks at the extent of control and is coded as low, medium, or high (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2013).

27 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

3 Theoretical Background

3.1 Rebel Fragmentation and Infighting

Why do some rebel groups fight each other? The examples of rebel groups fighting other rebel groups rather than the common enemy represented by the state are plenty throughout history. As the state is typically the strongest actor in the conflict, the rebel groups should be logically pushed to cooperate to balance out the power discrepancy. Also, different groups of the rebel movement often share certain attributes that should increase this cohesion, such as ideology, ethnicity, or victimization from the incumbent regime. Instead, the groups often fight amongst each other and become more vulnerable to counter-insurgency operations by the state (Joo and Mukherjee 2020; Fjelde and Nilsson 2012). Joo and Mukherjee (2020) report that two-fifths of their global sample of rebel groups from 1980 until 2014 split into more competing groups. Since the early research on civil wars, which often described rebels as a unitary group, literature on rebel fragmentation and alliance building has grown in volume significantly. Many hypotheses on the causes of fragmentation have been put forward. Subpar military performance, loss of territory, relationship with an external sponsor who disagrees with the group’s leader, and the level of central- ization all have been mentioned as a factor increasing the possibility of fragmentation (Doctor 2020). Fragmented movements differ significantly in the number of competing factions, distribution of power, or institutional structure (Bakke, Cunning- ham, and Seymour 2015). More importantly, the level of fragmentation influences many important parts and processes of the conflict. The success of a peace process, course of negotiations and possible compromises with state,

28 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND insurgency’s political and military effectiveness, an escalation from non-violence to violence and fratricide have all been shown to be negatively influenced by the increased fragmentation of the rebel movement (Seymour, Bakke, and Cunningham 2016; Warren and Troy 2015; Rudloff and Findley 2016). In the case of the “Sahelian anomaly”, the splintered groups did not fight each other from the beginning and, according to some analysts, even cooperated against the state. As noted above, literature on rebel fragmentation shows an increased possibility of violent infighting or fratricide in fragmented rebel movements. However, the explanations of why some groups fight and not others have received less attention (Fjelde and Nilsson 2018). Existing explanations have focused on multiple factors that would explain rebel infighting. Fjelde and Nilsson (2012) conducted a large-N study of rebel infighting and found that power imbalance, presence of loot able goods, weak government authority, and territorial control all increased the propensity of rebel infighting. However, as Pischedda (2015) points out, these are rather correlations and authors do not expand on causal mechanisms that would explain how these factors increase the possibility of violent infighting. Hafez (2017) argues that the level of ideological extremity is central to rebel infighting. The degree of centrism or extremism makes even ideologically similar groups in a rebel movement distant. This proximity-distance paradox makes the groups threatening to each other as a successful bid for power from an ideologically proximate group would marginalize the rival group in the broader movement. When a centrist group is faced with this situation, a preferred strategy to manage the rivalry is balancing, outbidding, or defecting. On the other hand, extremist groups are likely to respond with violence (Hafez 2017).

29 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Other authors also looked at battlefield shocks and their influence on factional struggles of rebel movements. Gains in territorial control and operational reach have been argued to decrease rebel groups’ willingness to cooperate. Also, repressive actions of the state, such as targeted killings of rebel leaders, can unleash struggles over leadership positions and cause rebel infighting (Mosinger 2019). Pischedda (2015) builds on previous works (such as the work of Fjelde and Nilsson mentioned above) and comes with his own theory of inter-rebel war. Pischedda claims that in a rebel environment without an overarching structure (as the state is not present to remove the anarchy), groups’ calculations and threat perceptions are motivated by power-driven strategic logic. Inter-rebel war is thus likely to appear when groups face what he calls “windows of opportunity” or “windows of vulnerability”. As Pischedda focuses on inter-rebel war onset, rather than on singular skirmishes among rebel groups, his theory perfectly fits the research design and therefore is used as the background and analytical framework in which the end of “Sahelian anomaly” is analysed in this work. In his theory, Pischedda also highlights the role of co-ethnicity (or co-identity), which is in line with the goal of this work (as the conflict is taking place among the Is- lamic State in Greater Sahara and al-Qaeda affiliated JNIM who share significant ideological underpinnings). Thus, in the next section, his theory is introduced in detail.

3.2 Theory of Windows of Opportunity and Windows of Vulnerability

The logic of balance of power should push rebel organisations to cooperate in the face of a stronger enemy in the regime and thus avoid complete anni- hilation. As noted above, the question of why inter-rebel wars and infighting

30 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND occur when the rebels usually face a stronger enemy in the incumbent regime serves as a springboard for finding the theoretical answers. Pischedda’s answer is based on two observations. Ideological and strategical differences, different priorities, and overlapping ambitions often cause a conflict of interests between the groups. This conflict of interest could potentially make the groups damage or even existentially threaten each other. Even if the groups share strategic goals, organisational goals will often differ in the setting of fragmented rebel insurgency. The second observation lies in the fact that even though the incumbent regime is usually much stronger than the rebel groups, this does not mean that the regime is able or willing to launch an effective counter-insurgency campaign that would deal a decisive blow to the fighting factions of rebels (Pischedda 2015, 19). The onset of the rebel war is based on rational calculations. An effective military campaign against a rival group can remove the threat, or perceived threat, posed by the rival group. Victory would also allow taking control of the resource base, population, and territory of the rival rebel group as the co-ethnicity factor would ensure smooth expansion into the group’s domain. Pischedda (2018, 150) posits three jointly present conditions for inter- rebel war to be a low-cost solution: “(1) there is an imbalance of power between rebel organisations, (2) the government does not represent a serious and immediate military threat, but (3) it is not so weak as to suggest major opportunity costs. In the face of these low costs, the powerful group may be tempted to wipe out its rival(s) to become the rebel hegemon.” The cost side of the equation includes a weakened state of the rebel groups and thus increased vulnerability to the counter-insurgency campaign. Based on battlefield trends and troop deployment, the rebels calculate whether an effective offensive is likely. In the case of a possible governmental offensive, an inter-rebel war is less likely. However, the costs are minimized in the calculations when one of the groups is significantly stronger than the

31 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND other. This again leads to a lesser probability of inter-rebel war in a situation where the groups are comparably strong. Suppose the potential conflict looks like an easy fight and the government is not willing or able to effectively use the period of infighting to achieve victory. In that case, the probability of the conflict is higher. Another cost is of a missed opportunity. This refers to a situation where the onset of inter-rebel war would hinder an ongoing maxi- mum pressure policy or expansion campaign against the government. When a situation with high benefits and low costs of the inter-rebel war arises, the window of opportunity appears. This window refers to the situation where a stronger group uses its dominant position to launch a hegemonic bid for power. The goal is to destroy a weaker co-ethnic rival to ensure its dominant position in the rebel movement when effective government cap- italization on the infighting is unlikely. The alternative situation is created by the window of vulnerability. This scenario is characterized by high benefits but also high costs. The stronger group launches an offensive in the face of deteriorating relative power to the weaker co-ethnic rival to forestall its downfall. The reduction of the threat of the rising rival group, or a gamble for resurrection, is preferred even in a situation without favourable distribution of power in the rebel movement and favourable government threat environment. The onset of the war should be preceded by other initiatives as the groups would usually prefer to solve the situation in a different way (Pischedda 2015). Both situations follow the better-now-than-later logic, which is the most observable when the logic of both situations’ blends. In a situation where the dominant rebel group expects a significant deterioration of its relative power to the co-ethnic rival (which is not yet taking place) and sees it as a relatively easy fight, the group would accept higher risks and costs in the hegemonic bid even when the window of vulnerability did not materialize yet.

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Figure 2: Benefits/Costs of Inter-rebel War. Source: Pischedda 2015, 46

3.2.1 Co-ethnicity As Pischedda’s theory applies largely to a co-ethnic rebel war, it is important to clarify the logic of the theory and our use of the concept in the context of the Sahel infighting, where clear co-ethnicity (two rebel groups from one ethnicity) is not the case. Co-ethnicity is the driving factor of the infighting as it significantly changes the cost-benefit calculations. Rebel groups are competing over the same ethnic community and are thus in direct competition. Not only can co- ethnic organisation complicate the fight with the government through stealing potential recruits, decreasing clarity and credibility of threats and demands, or spoiling negotiations. It can also more easily absorb a rival group’s population, and resources were it to defeat it militarily as it would take the position of hegemony in the ethnic community. This is not the case when a “foreign power” takes control over the territory. Further, not attacking a co-ethnic rival in a favourable situation leaves possible resources and personnel on the table that could otherwise be used in the fight against the government. It also leaves the group exposed to the possibility of a future advance by the rival group. In

33 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND an anarchic environment of insurgent warfare without overarching authority that would enforce deals, this threat is permanent. In principle, our case study of the “Sahelian anomaly” does not con- stitute an inter-rebel war between two co-ethnic groups. However, I argue that the ideology constitutes another type of shared identity for which the presented dynamics still hold. Pischedda shortly addresses this and agrees that ideology might play a similar role (Pischedda 2015, 37). The dynamics of the co-ethnicity factor in the context of the “Sahelian anomaly” are described in the following section.

3.2.2 Operationalisation of the Theory From the broader theory, Pischedda (2015, 47) derives two testable hypotheses which will serve us as our variables:

H1. Hegemonic bid. Inter-rebel war should occur when all of the following conditions hold: - A rebel group enjoys a marked military advantage over its co-ethnic rival(s) (but not all of them are below the threshold of extreme weakness). - The government does not represent a serious and immediate threat. - The rebels are not poised to make major territorial gains or just about to achieve outright victory against the government.

This hypothesis is characterized by an imbalance in power distribution among the groups and a lack of threat from the government and opportunity against it. If possible, the imbalance should be looked at from the perspective of rebel leaders. Thus, their statements relating to the power distribution would be the strongest evidence; however, if this evidence is not available,

34 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Pischedda (2015) recommends third-party reports and looking at the groups’ troop numbers, weapons, organisational structure, and battlefield experience. Similar logic about the evidence of government threat or opportunity against it is used. The reports of leaders’ perceptions would be the best evidence; however, if the government forces are undertaking major offensive, significant troop movements are taking place, or a hard-line executive is being established, we can code the existence of a serious threat. The lack of threat is characterized by the initiation of clashes by the rebels (mainly in guerrilla conflict context) or by static battle lines which the rebels can defend (mainly in the context of conventional warfare). If the rebels are making major strives on the battlefield, the infighting is less likely to occur as the cost of losing the edge against the government would be too high (Pischedda 2015).

H2. Gamble for resurrection. Inter-rebel war should occur when all the following conditions hold (Pischedda 2015, 47): - A group faces a major deterioration of its relative power or a mounting threat posed by a co-ethnic rival. - The inter-rebel balance of power is not favourable to the group and/or the government poses a serious and immediate threat. - The group’s attempts at overcoming its predicament with peaceful measures have failed or alternative plans appear unworkable.

The deterioration and risks of the group should be seen in decreasing military capability, problems with retaining fighters due to material shortages (such as weapons or supplies), or problems with keeping up with the growing rival group. The threat assessment is also influenced by possible governmental offensive as a more aggressive rival could launch a simultaneous offensive

35 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND with the government and thus exposing the group to a two-frontal war (Pischedda 2015). Pischedda (2018) sees the strongest possible evidence to prove his theory in explicit statements made by rebel leaders claiming they followed a similar or same logic as presented in his theory. The second strongest evidence are the accounts of individuals close to the rebel leaders who are famil- iar with their decision-making process. Gathering this kind of evidence is unrealistic under present conditions and thus beyond the scope of this thesis. Therefore, if similar evidence is not be available, the author will rely on weaker evidence such as open-source reports of third-party observers (such as journalists, scholars, analysts, diplomats, and international workers) and data from open source serves such as The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED).

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4 Co-identity and Historical Background

To understand the co-identity argument, it is important to clarify the claim concerning shared ideology and to describe the background of the internal conflict in the global jihadi sphere.

4.1 Salafi Roots

Both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State belong to the broader Salafi-jihadist movement and thus share significant ideological underpinnings rooted in Salafism. Salafism is a reformist branch of Sunni Islam that sees the first three generations of Muslims as pure and righteous forefathers (salaf) whose practice of Islam was unadulterated and exemplary. According to Maher (2016, 7), this belief is based on a hadith in which the Prophet Muhammad described the characteristics of the best Muslims: “Of the generation to which I belong, then of the second generation (generation adjacent to my generation), then of the third generation (generation adjacent to the second generation).” Adherents of Salafism strive to emulate the practices of the first three generations and reject anything they see as innovations (bid’ah), thus embrac- ing a puritanical interpretation of the religion and rejecting many mainstream religious practices, local customs, and philosophical contemplations that emerged during the next fourteen centuries. Accordingly, Byman (2015) claims that Salafism accepts only the Quran, sunnah, and hadith as a legitimate source of practice and belief. The message of the movement is a progression through regression. In order to progress and achieve perfect life, Muslims have to strive to reform and achieve the purity of the early generations. The doctrine is, therefore, concerned with concepts of tawhid (God’s unity and supremacy) and aqida (doctrinal purity, creed). By being the closest to the salaf, Salafists believe

37 CO-IDENTITY AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND that they are the “saved sect”. This concept is again based on a hadith that claims Islam will eventually disintegrate into various heretical sects with only one faction practicing Islam correctly (Maher 2016). Historically the movement builds on the Hanbali School of jurispru- dence and the 13th-century Islamic jurist Ibn Taymiyya who took great inspi- ration from Ibn Hanbal (after whom the Hanbali school is named). Taymiyya lived during the Mongol conquest of the Muslim world and became worried about the foreign influence on the religion. He and his students used strict literal reading and individual religious reasoning (ijtihad) to use religious texts in modern context instead of relying on prior interpretations without deeply understanding them (taqlid)1, thus trying to purge any illegitimate influence on the religion accumulated throughout time. Ibn Taymiyya’s writings on concepts such as tawhid and aqida continue to influence Salafis to this day and can be seen, for example, on the strictness of the al-wala wal-bara doctrine. This doctrine refers to complete loyalty (wala) and love towards everything Islamic (God, religion, community) and complete disavowal, refusal, or hatred (bara) towards anything un- Islamic (Mohie-Eldin 2015). This doctrine, combined with Salafist reasoning, led, for example, to denunciation of Shia and Sufi creeds as infidels. Tay- miyya also influenced contemporary Salafists with his fatwa against the Mon- gol rulers who converted to Islam, but according to Taymiyya, did not implement Sharia to the full extent and kept some of their tribal laws. This legiti- mization of jihad against “apostate” Mongolian Muslim rulers is often used in today’s context as justification of armed resistance against contemporary

11 The debate about taqlid and ijtihad is still ongoing, as a complete rejection of taqlid would mean rejection of Hanbali school. Therefore, taqlid is not completely shunned but should be used in the context of ijtihad. It is also important to point out that ijtihad does not mean rational reasoning in the context of Salafism, which is prohibited, but rather a religious one based on a literal and strict reading of fundamental religious texts (Mohie-Eldin 2015).

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“apostate” Muslim rulers by contemporary Salafi-jihadi groups (Springer 2009). Even though Salafism has deep historical roots, it is broadly seen as a religious and political movement that emerged between the 18th century and continued to evolve until the end of the 20th century in the context of Western dominance of the Islamic world. The movement was a part of a broader Is- lamist response to secularization and the spread of Western values throughout declining Islamic societies. Within the broader framework of emerging Is- lamist thought, Salafism started to take on ideological and doctrinal structure. As the movement emerged in different contexts such as the modernist thought led by Egyptian al-Azhar scholar Jamal al-Din al-Afghani in the late 19th century or the more militant branch of Saudi Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in the 18th century, it eventually transformed into a multidimensional phenomenon with different approaches and religious thought (Mohie-Eldin 2015). The result of this evolution can be seen in today’s fragmentation of the movement.

4.2 Factions of Salafism

Quintan Wiktorowicz (2005) came with the broadly accepted classification of the three different factions inside the Salafi movement. Although the basis of the movement, such as views on tawhid and legitimate sources of doctrine, remains the same across the Salafi spectrum, significant differences in topics such as jihad, apostasy, or the movement’s priorities fragmented the bloc. This can be seen on the ground as Salafism is a source of stability in some countries such as Saudi Arabia, where the Mufti himself is a Salafist. On the other hand, in Syria, Salafism is a source of instability and violence (Maher 2016).

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Wiktorowicz classifies factions inside the Salafi movement as purists, politicos, and jihadis. In the context of this thesis, we focus on the jihadi subgroup as defined by Wiktorowicz; however, it is helpful also to introduce the remaining two sub-groups as it demonstrates common ideological underpin- ning of the movement and thus of the different jihadi groups. The purists aim to maintain the purity of Islam and believe that before the religion is purified, any political action will lead to corruption and injustice due to the poor understanding of faith. The proper way to spread the Salafi creed is preaching (da’wa), education and purification. The purists build upon the Meccan period of Muhammad’s life. At that time, Muhammad and his followers were a minority and thus vulnerable to violence by the rul- ing elite, therefore their preferred action was to advice the leaders rather than to rebel, even under repression. This part of the Salafi spectrum rejects being a political movement and is concerned strictly about protecting tawhid and Islam from foreign influences. Characteristic for this part of the Salafi movement is hostility towards anything Western, Christian, or Jewish. Jews and Christians are seen as eternal enemies who are trying to pollute the religion with their concepts and ideas. This tendency to reject anything Western leads to isolationism as foreigners have nothing to offer (Wiktorowicz 2005). The purists reject the method of politicos and jihadis as un-Islamic. The Prophet never launched demonstrations or revolutions. These are more typical for French and American history and are thus seen as another corrupt- ing Western influence. Politicos and jihadis are rationalists driven by human desire whose belief is correct, but their way of action is misguided in the eyes of purists. The purist class is the most influential in Saudi Arabia and is mainly comprised of the older generation of religious scholars (Wiktorowicz 2005). On the other hand, the politicos are composed of the younger generation influenced by the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood, which started to

40 CO-IDENTITY AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND spread during the 1960s. This younger politicized generation saw themselves as more equipped to apply the Salafi creed in the contemporary political and international situation and started to slowly challenge the purists’ institutional hold during the 1980s and the 1990s. This changed drastically after the fatwa accepting the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia. The criticism of the old purist establishment became vocal as many of the younger political Salafists saw the American presence as occupation and colonization. The purists have become seen as old and disconnected from reality; thus, the younger, more politically savvy generation, even though less religiously experienced, should take the leadership of the movement (Wiktorowicz 2005). The politicos operate as activists directly engaged with the political process. They call for reform and change according to their Islamic beliefs (implementation of Sharia) but reject revolutions or violence (Maher 2016). The last group is jihadis. The main characteristic of this group is its support for violent revolution in order to establish Islamic states governed by Sharia. The faction emerged during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; thus, its ideology was formed not in universities as was the case in the political branch mentioned above but instead on the battlefield. Jihadis agree with the criticism levelled against purists by politicos but go even further, calling the purist scholars of the Saudi establishment corrupt and unwilling to act upon Salafi beliefs. The politicos are then criticized for their acceptance of democ- racy and rejection of jihad as the only path towards the Islamic political order (Wiktorowicz 2005). The term Salafi jihadism is broad, and there is ongoing scholarly debate on the precise conceptualization of the term as even this faction of the broader Salafi movement is fragmented. The organisations or individuals inside the Salafi-jihadi sphere differ in their approach towards the extent and legitimacy of the use of violence, priorities, and strategy. However, despite

41 CO-IDENTITY AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND these differences, the broader base of the ideology remains constant across the groups (Hegghammer 2014). Groups researched in this thesis, Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, are no different, and even though they are both included under a broader umbrella of Salafi-jihadism, they differ in many aspects. However, their ideological underpinnings remain very similar as they share a common goal of establishing a global caliphate built on Islamic principles of governance and build on the same scholars such as Ibn Taymiyya, Sayyid Qutb, or Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (Glenn 2015). Precisely this reality renders the co-identity dynamics described in Pischedda’s work possible to take place in Sahel but rather along the ideological instead of the ethnic lines. The fighters and supporters of both groups belong to the same Salafi-jihadi community and can, therefore, be effectively absorbed into the ranks of the hegemonic group.

4.3 Conflict inside the Jihadi Sphere

The contemporary conflict inside the jihadi sphere is not based on large ideological differences between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, but rather in their differences in strategical outlooks on how to achieve their stated goal of the Islamic caliphate. The author does not claim that the ideologies are iden- tical but rather that they are similar enough to allow dynamics of co-identity competition to take place.

4.3.1 Far Enemy Debate It was in the context of the Afghani jihad where the roots of today’s infighting between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State took place. Although the conflict had a significant international dimension as the jihad was waged against invading Soviet forces by Afghani mujahideen supported by Afghan Arabs, it was still localist thinking that led many of the foreign fighters to join the efforts in

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Afghanistan. Many of the individuals came to Afghanistan to escape regime repressions and to secure a safe haven that would provide them with battlefield experience, training, and connections. The goal was to defeat the local Kabul regime and later export the jihadi endeavour to their home countries. This sentiment is observed in the thinking of Ayman al-Zawahiri, who came to the Afghani theatre of jihad to secure a base from which a jihad against the Egyptian regime could be waged (Raphaeli 2002). As reported by Mahnken (2014), prior to the attacks of 9/11, Zawahiri wrote: “A jihadist movement needs an arena that would act like an incubator where its seeds would grow and where it can acquire practical experience in combat, politics, and organisational matters.” This sentiment was shared almost universally amongst the jihadi scene that started to emerge during the 1970s. These jihadis were religious nation- alists who strived to implement revolutionary change in their respective societies through the confrontation of the near enemy (“apostate” secular Muslim rulers). This endeavour took priority over fighting the far enemy (the West, Zionist regime) as, according to Zawahiri and others, the road towards Jeru- salem led through Cairo. Thus, the goal was to overthrow the secular regimes and Islamise the societies from the top down (Turner 2014). By the end of the 1990s, a dramatic shift within the focus of the jihadi activities took place. Several major historical events occurred and altered the context of the jihadi evolution. The Soviet army withdrew from Afghanistan, and the Union subsequently collapsed. The 1991 Gulf war took place and led to the permanent presence of the American forces in Saudi Arabia. This was even more important for Osama bin Ladin as he volunteered his mujahideen to Saudi Arabia to fight in Iraq, but his offer was rejected; instead, Americans were asked for help from the threat of Iraqi expansion. Also, the returning jihadis of the Afghan jihad were largely crushed in their local context. A par- adigmatic shift occurred among a minority segment of jihadis from localism

43 CO-IDENTITY AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND to globalism. This minority led by al-Qaeda gave birth to transnational jihad and managed to steer the whole movement (Gerges 2005). The logic of the pivot towards the far enemy was articulated mainly by Osama bin Ladin, Abdullah Azzam, and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Osama bin Laden in his 1996 “Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places,” called on the Muslim community to fight against the “Zionist-Crusader” alliance. As long as the West has influence and power inside the Muslim lands, no real Islamic polity can be established as it would be crushed immediately (Gerges 2005). The success of 1998 US embassies bombings and subsequent 9/11 attacks catapulted al-Qaeda into the forefront of the jihadi scene. Although many prominent jihadis such as Abu Musab al-Suri criticized the attacks as strategically and tactically wrong due to the American response which over- threw the Afghani Taliban, thus destroying jihadi safe haven, the attacks are broadly considered “heroic and glorious” (Cruickshank and Ali 2007). The shift towards the far enemy is crucial to understanding the contemporary conflict between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State as it bred grounds for the conflict between the father of the Islamic State Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and broader al-Qaeda leadership.

4.3.2 Emergence of the al-Qaeda in Iraq In 1989 Zarqawi joined the jihadi movement in Afghanistan. Although he missed the bulk of the fighting, his stay here cemented his ideology and provided him with important contacts to the jihadi scene. Zarqawi returned to Jordan in 1993 and soon became embedded in revolutionary Islamist circles. Here he focused his activities against the Jordanian regime as he wanted to change the Arab societies before making jihad against Israel and the West. He soon ended up in prison for establishing an illegal jihadi cell (Weaver 2006). It was his stay in prison that cemented his radicalism. Gerges (2016)

44 CO-IDENTITY AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND reports that according to Zarqawi’s inmates, the brutal psychological and physical torture left a mark on Zarqawi. He changed from a devout follower to a feared leader and substantially radicalized in his views. In 1999 Zarqawi was released in the context of the general amnesty declared by the new king and again left for Afghanistan, where he again established an independent jihadi cell. Even though he differed with the al-Qaeda leadership on some ideological grounds, he shared the Salafi-jihadi worldview and thus received support from al-Qaeda. After the US invasion of Afghanistan, Zarqawi and his group left the country for Iran and eventually ended up in Northern Iraq. Here Zarqawi managed to blend into society well and started building his jihadi base. Report- edly, Zarqawi started with just 30 fighters at the beginning of the US-led invasion but quickly amassed at least 5,000 fighters (Gerges 2016, 67). During this time, al-Qaeda suffered significant setbacks in Afghani- stan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia. The invasion of Iraq resurrected the dying jihadi cause and put this theatre of jihad, where Zarqawi obtained a significant influence, into the forefront of jihadi activities (Gerges 2016). Zar- qawi and his views towards the Shia population were considered extremist even by the AQ leadership, but his potential in Iraq and the Levant for the future jihadi endeavour was too great to pass on. On the other hand, his allegiance to al-Qaeda gave him prestige, material, logistical support and increased his legitimacy. In 2004 this relationship turned official when Zar- qawi’s group Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’l Jihad became al-Qaeda Iraqi branch (al-Qaeda in Iraq) (Fishman 2016). Even though officially Zarqawi was supposed to abide by the rulings of al-Qaeda leadership, it soon became apparent that the leaders were unable to control him or curb his extreme sectarian tendencies. The Islamic State used extreme sectarianism and violence as a form of provocation. In a letter intercepted in 2004, Zarqawi identifies four main groups of enemies: 1)

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Americans, 2) Kurds, 3) Soldiers, police, and agents, 4) Shiites (Zarqawi 2004). The Shia population was supposed to be a main target of the terrorist operations. Zarqawi justified the campaign against the Shia population by claiming they are cooperating with Americans against the Sunni population. Strategically, the goal of this terrorist campaign was to produce a violent response from the Shia militias to wake up Sunni masses and harness their en- ergy in order to overthrow the local regime (George 2007). As Zarqawi puts it: “The Shiites: In our view they are the key element of change. I mean that in making them our targets and striking at the heart of their religious, political, and military structures we will trigger their rage against the Sun- nis…forcing them to bare their fangs and reveal the sly rancour that drives them from deep within. If we manage to draw them onto the terrain of partisan war, it will be possible to tear the Sunnis away from their heedlessness, for they will feel the weight of the imminence of danger and the devastating threat of death wielded by these Sabeans” (Zarqawi 2004, 246).

4.3.3 The Split of the Salafi-jihadi Sphere Over the years, mounting criticism from leading jihadi ideologues such as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (previously a close mentor of Zarqawi) and Zawahiri and a lack of response or moderation from Zarqawi turned the relationship sour. The reasons AQ had for being cautious about attacking Shia were multifold. In an intercepted letter, Zawahiri expressed disdain for the terrorist attacks against Iraqi civilians and the Shia population. Although Zawahiri denounced the Shia denomination as false, he saw the violent acts towards common Shia as counterproductive and contrary to al-Qaeda’s strategic goals (George 2007). The AQ leadership has also been in contact with the Iranian regime since at least the early 2000s; thus, logistical and tactical pragmatism might have played a role in the AQ’s decision to avoid targeting the Shia community (Bergen 2013; Roggio 2014).

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The internal dispute culminated in 2006 when Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda in Iraq merged with several other jihadi groups to form Mujahideen Shura Coun- cil. In October, the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq was announced, here still officially loyal to the AQ; however, these steps started the process of leaving the al-Qaeda structure (Hamming 2019). After the death of Zarqawi in the same year, the situation became stale as the group enjoyed mixed successes and setbacks while still being backed by al-Qaeda. The chain of violence unleashed by the Zarqawi’s suicide bombing missions culminated in the bombing of a sacred Shia shrine in February 2005, which catapulted the cycle of violence out of control into the civil war of 2006 and 2007. The extreme violence used towards the Shia community and other Muslims considered enemies proved effective in stirring the civil conflict and driving recruitment in the local context (George 2007; Hassan 2016). However, the use of indiscriminate violence towards civilian populations prompted some members of AQ to recommend severing ties with the Iraqi branch. Another major disagreement between the organisations is the way of establishing the Islamic polity. AQ preaches gradual progress towards the territories and masses it controls and rejects an early establishment of the Islamic state so long as the far enemy is powerful enough to overthrow them (Hafez 2020). This led to the adoption of the attrition strategy to weaken the far enemy before the eventual establishment of the caliphate. Bin Laden did not believe the US would sustain a long conflict in the Middle East. In 2004, bin Laden talked about this approach and noted that the mujahedin: “Bled Russia for 10 years, until it went bankrupt,” and are currently: “…bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy” (Byman 2015, 52). On the other side, ISIS is building more on the ideas of al-Maqdisi and Abu Bakr Naji. Both underscored the importance of controlling physical territory (Arosoaie 2015). These ideas influenced Zarqawi and his followers,

47 CO-IDENTITY AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND culminating in the 2010 reorganisation of the Islamic State under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and successive drive to establish a physical caliphate (Arosoaie 2015). AQ does not essentially disagree with this position ideologically but rather tactically as a real Islamic state would give the international community a clear target. This gradual process and pragmatism became one of the points of criticism from the Islamic State. In 2020, Islamic State’s Yemeni branch released a video summarizing its critique towards AQ and other Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood. The video mainly focused on the senior leadership of AQ and its failure in implementing Sharia, cooperation with “apostates” and overall pragmatism (such as contacts with Iran or gradual implementation of Sharia) (Joscelyn 2020). AQ’s gradual pragmatism is sharply contrasted by IS’s puritanical and immediate approach summed up by one member of the Islamic State: “If you think people will accept the Islamic project voluntarily, you’re wrong. They have to be forced at first. The other groups think that they can convince people and win them over, but they are wrong. You have a ready project, you should place it on society like a tooth crown and make sure to maintain it” (Hassan 2016). The relationship completely collapsed and turned violent following the expansion into Syria in 2014 under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Bagh- dadi. The refusal of the Islamic State to subordinate to the al-Qaeda rulings and challenging the status of another al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria led to the public disavowal from Zawahiri and marked the beginning of the violent confrontation of the two branches competing over hegemony over the Salafi-jihadi movement (Byman and Williams 2015).

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4.4 Transnational Competition

Theory on internal fragmentation or “fratricide” in violent non-state actors shows that the heightened competition between the groups leads to increased violence as the groups try to “outbid” each other to either mark their emergence, to distinguish themselves and their strategies and aims from the insti- tutionalized consensus or to attack rivals representing the same group (Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour 2012). Kydd and Walter (2006) also mention outbidding as a strategy often utilized in conflicts where two key conditions occur: two or more domestic parties compete for leadership of the movement, and the population is not sure which one represents their interests. The increase in violence serves as a costly signal that shows the capability of the group. Kydd and Walter, and outbidding theory in general, has been focused mainly on a single-state observation and thus ignoring competition of groups with an international dimension. This framework limits the view of the entire market in which the groups compete (Farrell 2020). Farrell (2020) claims that groups can compete and outbid each other transnationally because of shared ideology. Farrell demonstrates this on the Salafi-jihadi movement, which is based on a global ideology without ethnic and national lines. Salafi-jihadi groups also compete over global resources such as foreign fighters or finances. Therefore, Farrell posits a hypothesis based on the transnational outbidding logic: increased competition in the Salafi-jihadi sphere will lead to more violence and to more spectacular attacks. Hamming (2020) agrees that according to the social movement studies and terrorism literature, we should expect an escalation in violence. However, he claims that this escalation did not take place in the case of the al-Qaeda/Is- lamic State rivalry, or at least it was very one-sided. The Islamic State used

49 CO-IDENTITY AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND extreme violence and its professional media apparatus to set itself apart from the rest of the jihadi groups, al-Qaeda included. Although the strategy of the Islamic State proved to be very successful in conquering territory and attracting new recruits, al-Qaeda and other jihadi organisations did not escalate their violent behaviour over previous levels. The reason, according to Hamming, is the influence of the senior ideologues such as Abu Qatada and al-Maqdisi, who generally oppose actively fighting the Islamic State and different pragmatic approach followed by al-Qaeda as discussed above. Where the competition showed to be significant was the call for the bay’a (allegiance). Few weeks before al-Baghdadi appeared in Mosul mosque, IS spokesperson Abu Muhammad al-Adnani called on all Muslims to pledge allegiance to the new caliph. Following this declaration, more than 40 groups pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. Although the Islamic State put forward certain conditions for the organisations, the acceptance of these pledges showed some patterns of competition with al-Qaeda (Eleftheriadou 2020). The Islamic State accepted pledges from organisations that clearly did not meet the conditions (such as the unification of the jihadi forces, the nom- ination of a leader, and a plan for military conquest) but were in strategically important places in their competition with al-Qaeda, such as Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region (Khorasan province). Majority of the groups that pledged allegiance were splinter groups from already established organisations often affiliated with al-Qaeda. The motivation for these group to join the Islamic State are based on strategical (establishment of the caliphate) and resource (expected recruitment boost, financial support or access to the IS media apparatus) related factors. Another major influence shared by most of the groups was their local relevance. Alt- hough largely unrelated to the competition of the two groups, the internal

50 CO-IDENTITY AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND splits were based on pre-existing conflicts such as disputed leadership and regional differences (Eleftheriadou 2020). In 2015 the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara followed the described pattern of international fragmentation of the Salafi-jihadi sphere when it formed as a splinter group from al-Qaeda affiliated al-Murabitoon group and set the stage for eventual violent competition (Mapping Militant Organisa- tions 2018). Even though the two described blocks differ in some respects, they are largely built on and originate in the same underlying ideological thoughts and goals. As demonstrated above, the split is rooted rather in tactical and strategical differences and subsequently fuelled by transnational competition dynamics. Further, the groups pledging allegiance to IS were often previously affiliated with AQ, which strengthens our co-identity argument and demonstrates the fluidity of fighters between the competing Salafi-jihadi blocks. Therefore, the co-identity factor is clearly visible in the shared ideology and will be further demonstrated in the analytical part.

51 ANALYTICAL PART

5 Analytical part

5.1 Process tracing

The western Sahel region throughout its modern history contained multiple armed groups and different insurgency movements. As this thesis aims to analyse intra-jihadi conflict, the history and origins of the main actors will be traced. The common origin of both groups is significant for the analysis of the relationship between them as it influenced the dynamic of the conflict outbreak. The current organisational state and capabilities of these groups will be analysed in the second part of the analytical section.

Figure 3: Map of the Sahel Region. Source: Zyzou, 2020

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5.1.1 Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims) Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) was formed in March of 2017 by the merge of several al-Qaeda affiliated groups. The establishment of the united front was announced in a 7-minute-long video headed by the leader of the new nebula group Malian Tuareg Iyad Ag Ghaly. The new umbrella organisation consists of Ansar Dine, Katiba Macina, al-Murabitoon, and al- Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) Sahara branch (Gaffey 2017a). Ghaly himself has a long history of involvement in mainly Malian conflict. As a member of the influential Tuareg Ifogha tribe from the Kidal region in northern Mali, he took part in anti-government rebellions since the 1990s, where he played a leading role inside the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad2. In the early 1990s, Ghaly was considered a moderate Tuareg leader. He was even rewarded with a diplomatic position in Saudi Arabia by the Malian government in 2007 for his role in negotiating the release of hostages with GSPC3. However, his ties to the orthodox Tabliqi4 sect made him persona non grata to Saudi Arabia in 2010. It was during this time when Ghaly made increasing contacts with religious groups and activists. Af- ter his return from Saudi Arabia, Ghaly failed to become the MNLA5 leader in 2011, reportedly due to his demand that the group will strive for implementation of Sharia. He later established his own group and took part in the 2012 rebellion that swept northern Mali, at this time still as an ally of MNLA. As the head of his newly established Islamist group Ansar Dine, he was one

2 Azawad is the name used by the Tuareg people for the northern Mali region as well as for the formerly unrecognized state declared in 2012 (Hansen 2019). 3 The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat was an Algerian terrorist group active in the early 2000s (Hansen 2019). 4 Transnational orthodox missionary movement considered radical by countries such as Saudi Arabia (Gaffey 2016). 5 The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad is a secular political and military group that took part in the 2012 uprisings (Hansen 2019).

53 ANALYTICAL PART of the main characters who managed to co-opt the rebellion into an Islamist- led insurgency. His ties to the Tuareg rebellion, which was secular in principle, collapsed after he refused to denounce association with al-Qaeda and pushed for the implementation of Sharia in northern Mali (Metcalf 2012; Gaffey 2016; Hansen 2019). In the video of 2017, Ghaly announces JNIM to be a part of international al-Qaeda structure and pledges allegiance to the al-Qaeda central leadership: “On this blessed occasion, we renew our pledge of allegiance to our honorable emirs and sheiks: Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud (more commonly known as Abdelmalek Droukdel, the emir of AQIM6), our beloved and wise sheikh Ayman al Zawahiri and…the emir of the Islamic Emirate in Afghani- stan Mullah Haibatullah, may Allah protect them and support them” (Josce- lyn 2017). He further praised al-Qaeda for pragmatism in enforcing Sharia law and restraint in proclaiming other Muslims as infidels. The reason for the unification was, according to Ghaly, the ability to resist foreign intervention forces (Joscelyn 2017). The individual groups come from a variety of backgrounds; however, historically they are somewhat connected and there have been reports of various levels of cooperation for a long time. AQIM was formed in January of 2007 in a rebranding move. Previously known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), the move was widely seen as an effort to remain relevant after the unsuccessful Algerian jihad. Even after the rebranding move from local jihadi group to a part of international al-Qaeda structure, the group’s goals remained largely local (Aronson 2014). It was a split inside the AQIM that gave birth to other organisations. Personal animosity and rivalry between AQIM emir Abdelmalek Droukdel and senior leader Moktar

6 Abdelmalek Droukdel was killed in 2020 by French forces and was replaced by Algerian Abu Obaida Yusuf al-Annabi (France24 2020b; Al Jazeera 2020a).

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Belmoktar led to a split when Belmoktar was dismissed from the ranks of AQIM in 2012 (Cruickshank 2013). Belmoktar set up his own group al-Mulathamin and in 2013 merged with another splinter group of AQIM Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) to form al-Murabitoon. Although Belmoktar left the AQIM and thus al-Qaeda structures, it was reported that rather than leaving al-Qaeda altogether, Belmoktar tried to report directly to al-Qaeda central, thus side- stepping Droukdel. In 2015 after a senior leader of al-Murabitoon Adnan Abu Walid Sahrawi pledged the group’s allegiance to the Islamic State, Belmoktar rejected this move and renewed his bay’a to al-Qaeda. On December 3, 2015, Droukdel formally announced that al-Murabitoon rejoined the AQIM structures (Joscelyn 2015; Reuters 2015). Iyad Al Ghaly’s own organisation Ansar Dine was established in 2011 and became well known due to its role in the 2012 Tuareg uprisings. Together with other militant organisations, Ansar Dine was ousted in 2013 French military intervention called Operation Serval and remained largely dormant until 2015 where its activities were resumed (ECFR 2021a; Sandner 2014). The last group that took part in the merger of 2017, Katiba Macina, also known as Macina Liberation Front, led by Amadou Koufa, is an affiliate of Ansar Dine with the centre of operation in central and southern Mali. The official Ansar Dine had limited access and influence in this region as Ghaly remains mainly in southern Algeria, where according to French intelligence agencies, he enjoys protection from the Algerian state (Ahmed, Roger, Boisbouvier, and Alilat 2018). The region of southern Mali and Burkina Faso is a base of operation for another Islamist group Ansaroul Islam. The group is not officially a part of the JNIM group or broader al-Qaeda structure but reportedly has significant ties with the Katiba Macina group (Zimmerer 2019). Ansaroul was formed in 2016 by Burkinabe Ibrahim Dicko, who was previously a member

55 ANALYTICAL PART of Katiba Macina and according to a defector, maintains close ideological, operational, and logistical links to the group and thus to the JNIM structure (Weiss 2018b). The groups share al-Qaeda anti-western and anti-government ideology which in this context means mainly against the French involvement in the region (through the Operations Serval and Barhkane), the UN MINUSMA and government forces (Zimmerer 2019).

5.1.2 Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) In the context of the rise of the Islamic State during 2014 and 2015, a split emerged in the al-Murabitoon group between pro-IS and pro-AQ elements. In May 2015, Sahrawi unilaterally pledged the group’s allegiance to the Is- lamic State. The move was immediately condemned by Belmoktar as an individual pledge that did not represent the group and reaffirmed his allegiance to the al-Qaeda core (Warner 2017). Shortly after this internal conflict, Sahrawi defected the group together with other pro-IS elements, formed the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara and called for local jihadists to follow his example (Heras 2015). Sahrawi himself has a long history in the Malian conflict. Sahrawi was born in 1973 in the disputed region of Western Sahara. In 1992 he joined the refugee camp in Tindouf, Algeria, where he received a scholarship from Poli- sario Front7 and graduated in social sciences. He later worked for the Sahrawi8 Youth Union. In 2004 Sahrawi turned to religion when he became close with Sahrawi religious students who adhered to the Wahhabi form of Islam. Some reports suggest this was caused by health issues and depression

7 Polisario Front fought for the independence of Western Sahara from Morocco. Sahrawi joined its military wing (Sahrawi People’s Liberation Army) and was trained in Shahid al-Ouali training camp in Muqataa (Hansen 2019). 8 The name Sahrawi denotes people living in the western Sahara Desert.

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(Roger 2020); others cite his disillusionment with the lack of progress of the Polisario Front (Hansen 2019). He left Tindouf in 2010 for northern Mali, where he joined al-Qaeda linked Katiba Tarik Ibn Zyad and subsequently co-founded MUJAO in 2011. As a spokesperson and one of the top leaders of MUJAO, he also took part in the jihadi co-opted uprisings of 2012 and 2013. In this context, Sahrawi was seen as one of the more radical leaders and was described as hard and uncom- promising by Mahmoud Dicko9 (Roger 2020). In August 2013, after the re- versal of the situation on the battlefield by French intervention under Opera- tion Serval, Sahrawi’s MUJAO merged with Belmoktar’s group to form al- Murabitoon, as mentioned earlier. The internal conflict of 2015 simmered for several months. It is not clear what was the basis of the conflict as some sources report the reason being the allocation of resources obtained from hostage-taking; other sources highlight doctrinal differences (Roger 2020). The conflict might have also been rooted in personal animosity between Sahrawi and Belmoktar. During the merger of 2013, parts of the MUJAO organisation were sceptical towards new leadership, Sahrawi amongst them, and joined the al-Murabitoon organisation only after a compromise candidate Abu Bakr al-Masri was chosen to lead the group. The problems again flared up in April 2014 when French forces killed al-Masri and a veteran fighter of MUJAO Ahmed al-Tilemsi was chosen to lead the group. Tilemsi was reportedly chosen because of personal agreement between Belmoktar and Sahrawi that Belmoktar will not lead the organisation. French forces killed Tilemsi in December 2014, which again led to increased tension about the leadership role. Hansen (2019, 93) reports that Sahrawi called a Shura council and was elected as the new leader of the group.

9 Malian Salafi imam and important Islamist politician.

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Belmoktar, who at this time was not in Mali, contested the whole process and refused to pledge allegiance to Sahrawi. Sahrawi took his first independent actions in 2014 when he started to organise individuals from Fulani ethnic group in the north Tillabery region in Niger to join him in the fight against the Niger state. The group that would later create the pro-IS elements in al-Murabitoon reportedly conducted its first attack against Nigerien security forces in October 2014. These attacks were unclaimed but later attributed to Sahrawi’s group, which subsequently defected to the Islamic State (Raineri 2020). The precise dynamic of the Sahrawi’s defection is not clear. Bel- moktar reacted by calling his own Shura council meeting, which elected him as the leader of al-Murabitoon. Local media and anonymous US officials suggest that the internal conflict did escalate into a physical confrontation. Ac- cording to some reports, Sahrawi’s faction was dealt a significant defeat in which Sahrawi was severely wounded (MAX-Security 2016; Joscelyn and Weiss 2016a; Hansen 2019). It is important to highlight that these reports are difficult to verify and are somewhat contradicted by the reported cooperation of the groups in the following years, which will be analysed in the following section; however, what they imply would partly explain the inactivity of the ISGS in 2015 and early 2016.

5.1.3 Relationship and Power Imbalance To answer our first research question, it is important to look closely at the relationship of the two groups prior to the beginning of violent contestation. As this thesis is led by Pischedda’s theory, which is based on power imbal- ances and changes in the relative power of the groups, we should expect to see either “a marked military advantage over its co-ethnic rival(s) (but not all of them are below the threshold of extreme weakness)” or “a major dete-

58 ANALYTICAL PART rioration of its relative power or a mounting threat posed by a co-ethnic rival” as previously argued. If no such dynamic is observed, the theory would fail to pass the hoop test and would be considered false. A rival explanation would then be used to explain the infighting. To map the changes in the relative power of the groups’ we will start by describing the formative years of the ISGS even though the JNIM was not formed yet. Although JNIM was not formed in these years, the ISGS must have come to contact with subgroups who later formed JNIM, mainly Katiba Macina, due to geographic proximity. Also, it is essential to investigate this part to demonstrate ISGS’s rising capability throughout the years and anchor the significant changes in the power distribution amongst the jihadi groups throughout time.

5.1.4 The Formative Years of ISGS (2015-2017) After the split in al-Murabitoon the new Islamic State splinter group went silent. The exact reasons for this are not known; however, it is possible that the reported injury debilitated Sahrawi’s actions. Another generally accepted theory is that the organisation was too weak to conduct any operations, and thus Sahrawi focused on building up its base (Raineri 2020; Hansen 2019). This theory is corroborated by reports that Sahrawi and some of his men settled between Niger and Mali and married into the local Fulani tribe, probably to create local connections and regroup (Diblo 2017). This would also explain why the Islamic State central did not immediately recognize Sahrawi’s pledge. Although Sahrawi declared allegiance to the IS central in 2015, the pledge was officially recognized in October 2016 after 17 months wait. Even after the recognition the group was not promoted to “province” but simply acknowledged. As mentioned earlier, the IS central usually did not hesitate to recognize pledged groups no matter how weak they

59 ANALYTICAL PART were (as was the case in Algeria or Saudi Arabia) if they were in a strategically important region where competition with al-Qaeda was high. However, it seems that IS central changed its strategy after the lack of success of its provinces which could have negatively affected the Islamic State brand. Thus, it is possible that the recognition was postponed due to Sahrawi’s inability to prove the group’s capability. Only after ISGS became more visible and conducted few operations in 2016 was the pledge suddenly accepted. This pattern is further supported by different case of Boko Haram (rebranded as the Is- lamic State West Africa Province) in Nigeria and the swiftness with which its pledge was accepted. This group’s pledge was immediately accepted in May 2015, demonstrating that strong organisation10 in the region of West Africa is strategically important to the IS central (MAX-Security 2016; Joscelyn and Weiss 2016b; Zenn and Cisse 2017). It is therefore clear that Sahrawi and his organisation, which had an estimated 40 fighters in 2015 (Zenn and Cisse 2017), was extremely weak at the beginning of its existence. It was in late 2016 when the group became visible and conducted its first operations. In May 2016, Sahrawi announced his comeback on the scene with an audio recording calling for attacks against UN mission in Western Sahara (MINURSO), Moroccan security forces, foreign companies in Morocco, and Western tourists in Morocco (Al Jazeera 2016). The first attack claimed by the group soon followed. The attack took place on September 2, 2016, in the border region of Burkina Faso and Niger, targeting security post in Markoye, Oudalan province. Border agent and one civilian were killed in the raid claimed through Mauritanian news agency Al Akhbar by Sahrawi and his men (Weiss 2016). The attack was reportedly

10 Boko Haram’s numbers prior the pledge of allegiance to IS were estimated between “hundreds to a few thousand”. The group also did not have any local rivals and conducted successful operations (Warner and Hulme 2018).

60 ANALYTICAL PART conducted by two to four individuals using small arms11 (Roger 2016). This attack was followed on October 12 when a military outpost in Intagom, Ou- dalan, was targeted. Four soldiers and a civilian were killed in the attack. Five days later, on October 17, the Koutoukale high-security prison that holds many militants and important jihadi figures captured in Niger was attacked. The attack was repelled by the security forces and one attacker wearing a suicide vest was killed in action (Menastream 2018b; Al Akhbar 2016). The year 2017 followed the pattern of increasing activity and operational complexity. On February 22, 2017, a Nigerien army convoy was ambushed near Tirzawane, not far from the Malian border. 16 Nigerien soldiers were killed and 18 injured. ISGS operatives also stole seven vehicles and destroyed four others. The number of attackers is not known, but according to Nigerien, Malian, and French military sources, the numbers are “several dozen”. The sophistication of the attack was also significantly higher as the militants used pickups and motorcycles and had to avoid military posts in Ménaka, Mali during their travel to Niger (RFI 2017; Menastream 2018b). Another significant attack that brought international attention to ISGS was conducted on October 4, 2017. A military convoy of Nigerien and US soldiers was ambushed outside of the Nigerien village of Tongo Tongo in the Tillabery region. Four US and two Nigerien soldiers were killed, and multiple individuals were injured. Reportedly 21 assailants were killed in the combat (Menastream 2018b). Again, we can see a significant improvement in the operational capability of the ISGS fighters. The ambush was launched against the rear of the convoy and the vehicles were allowed to move through the kill zone before being halted. Then a large group of militants on 12 mounted vehicles and around 20 motorcycles started to outflank the convoy (Trevithick

11 Small arms are man-portable weapons including handguns, long guns, light machine guns and their components.

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2018). The attack caused the highest casualty count to the US forces in Africa since the 1993 Mogadishu battle and received intense media and governmental coverage (Leithead 2018). The ambush was probably conducted by approximately 50 men, although some reports mention up to 100 men, which seems exaggerated based on estimates of ISGS’s militants (Starr and Cohen 2017; Gaffey 2017b). One possibility would be that fighters who were not members of ISGS at the time took part in the ambush, which is not uncommon as individuals are sometimes recruited for one-time actions. This was defi- nitely the case in the years 2019 and 2020 as described on the following pages, therefore, it is possible that a similar tactic on a smaller scale was already used in 2017. These two attacks aside, ISGS did claim multiple significant attacks throughout 2017, such as October 19 attack on a school in Burkina Faso’s Soum Province or December 22 attack on GATIA12 position in the Ahina region and arguably conducted even more operations as only a fractional part of the attacks is claimed (Menastream 2018b). In its formative years, ISGS had very rudimentary ability to produce own media material, if any, and attacks were claimed mainly through the local media. Also, even though in 2016 the IS central accepted the pledge of the ISGS, ISGS did not have any access to the media apparatus of IS central and IS central did not claim the attacks conducted by ISGS as their own (Menas- tream 2018a). Therefore, we can claim that there was very little to no communication and cooperation between ISGS and IS central, and thus the increasing capability of ISGS was not caused by a foreign actor directly helping the group or having control over its activities.

12 The Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies is a pro-government armed group in northern Mali.

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Figure 4: Number of Terrorist Attacks by ISGS 2016-2020. Created by the author on the basis of ACLED data.

As figure 4 shows, between 2015-2017 ISGS slowly increased its activity along with the tactical complexity of its attacks (as demonstrated on the Tongo Tongo attack). The group went from 0 conducted attacks in 2015 to at least 5 in 2017. Also, the territory on which the attacks were conducted expanded to all three countries, although the group seemed to be locked in the tri-border area between Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, known as the Liptako- Gourma region (ACLED 2021a). As far as the membership of ISGS is concerned, the estimates vary and are somewhat speculative. The membership of ISGS is estimated at around 40 men in 2015 based on the Sahrawi’s video pledging the allegiance to IS central where Sahrawi is surrounded by approximately 40 men (Zenn and Cisse 2017). In October 2017, at the time of the Tongo Tongo attack, a senior US official estimated the membership rose somewhat to around 40-60 men (Gaffey 2017b). In this time period, the attacks started with mainly small arms attacks but continued to evolve into more complex attacks using motorbikes, hand-

63 ANALYTICAL PART propelled grenades and mounted vehicles, as can be seen in the difference between the Markoye and the Tongo Tongo attacks. The Tongo Tongo attack was also tactically more complex with more casualties, as demonstrated above. As far as the command structure is concerned, no detailed information is available; however, it is reasonable to speculate that given the low number of ISGS fighters Sahrawi enjoyed tightly centralized leadership at this time period. These are the indicators proposed by Pischedda and congruent with operationalisation proposed in this thesis to assess the rising power of the organisation. The above analysis enables us to clearly see that the group’s power followed a pattern of increasing capability. Although JNIM was not formed yet, the groups that merged in 2017 did exist and enjoyed a significant lead in these areas. This fact will be demonstrated in the following sub-chapter.

5.1.5 Emergence of JNIM and its Capabilities (2017) As described above, JNIM came into existence in March of 2017 by the merge of four distinct groups. This poses us a challenge in how to view the organisation. Is JNIM a singular organisation with clear leadership or a conglomer- ate of different independent groups using a common name to conceal each individual group’s activities, motivations, and vulnerabilities? For example, Eizenga and Williams (2020) underscore the importance of analysing each group independently as the different subgroups still enjoy significant autonomy, and some subgroups are more active and capable than others. For example, 75% of violent events attributed to JNIM are taking place in central Mali and northern Burkina Faso and are likely conducted by the elements of Katiba Macina (Eizenga and Williams 2020). It is important to mention that Eizenga and Williams are focusing on factors concerning counter-insurgency

64 ANALYTICAL PART in which the focus on certain networks in specific regions might have more utility than viewing JNIM as a singular entity spread across the Sahel region. However, as the goal of the thesis is first to answer why JNIM and ISGS began fighting each other, JNIM will be considered here as a homoge- nous organisation. All four groups pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda together with Iyad Ag Ghaly given clear authority to speak for the groups, as can be seen in the video from March 2017. Also, all attacks conducted after the merge of 2017 are claimed in the name of JNIM and not in the name of individual subgroups. So far, no information suggesting a split inside the JNIM regarding their general strategy or cohesion was uncovered by the author. The infighting is also framed in a united front as the conflict is being led by the entire JNIM structure, not just by its subgroups. The complex command structure of JNIM might play a role in the conflict and thus will be closely analysed in the second chapter of the analytical part as the clear central command is one of the indicators of the group’s power. The jihadi infighting, however, will be framed as between two coherent blocks represented by ISGS and JNIM. The most active Katiba Macina is a subgroup of Ghaly’s Ansar Dine and thus, so far, the JNIM’s core seems to be stable. The leaders of the subgroups also have a long personal relationship stretching back into 1990s Al- gerian jihad (Thurston 2020a; Hansen 2019). Although the leaders sometimes did have personal disagreements, no major conflict and competition between groups took place so far and groups have been known to cooperate for years (Thurston 2020b). As put by a western analyst: “… in any case there was no competition among these groups in the sense that their ideological conver- gence was obvious. Their quasi-union already existed implicitly. The real issue was who was to be their supreme leader. The choice of Iyad Ag Ghaly was the most appropriate one, he is a major local figure.” The analyst continued: “…we may say in a way that Ag Ghaly translated the fight of Al-Qaeda

65 ANALYTICAL PART into Tamashek in the sense that Al-Qaeda struggle become a local one, not just a sort of international crusade without any link to the local realities of the populations” (Lounnas 2017:4). This ability to go local was another factor that made JNIM a clearly dominant organisation in 2017. The group was embedded in the local context for decades while the operational territory of the groups stretched from northern to central Mali and even into Burkina Faso with Ansaroul Islam connections. ISGS was, on the other hand, bound to the tri-border area and Ménaka region. In 2017 JNIM elements continued to progress towards southern regions of Mali as compared to the previous activity being focused mainly on the northern regions, thus, central Mali became the most volatile region (Weiss 2018a). The operational ability of JNIM in 2017 was also vastly superior to the ISGS, as can be seen in the number of attacks conducted by the individual groups prior to the merge in 2015-2016 and after the formation of JNIM in 2017. The effectiveness of the attacks was also highly superior, as can be seen on the suicide attack of January 18, 2017. The attack, although technically conducted prior to the merge, was conducted by al-Murabitoon militants and claimed 79 victims, with another 108 individuals wounded, vastly supersed- ing the number of casualties caused by ISGS attacks at this time (Sandor 2017, 16). According to ACLED (see Figure 5), by the end of 2017, JNIM had at least 92 attacks in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to its name. The attacks throughout the year targeted gendarmerie posts, vehicles, soldiers, UN forces and foreign companies using improvised explosive devices (IEDs), landmines and small arms (Weiss 2017). Around 20% of the attacks were results of IEDs, but the attacks with 10+ casualties were mainly conducted as armed assaults and shootings conducted with small arms (Zimmerer 2019).

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Figure 5: Number of Terrorist Attacks by JNIM 2017-2020. Created by the author on the basis of ACLED data.

As far as numbers of militants in JNIM is concerned, the estimates vary. One estimate from 2018 put the number of fighters at 800 (Browne 2018). Center for Strategic and International Studies put the number of JNIM fighters in September 2018 between 1,000 and 2,000 fighters (CSIS 2018). Although the exact number of fighters is not certain, even if we go by the lower estimates, JNIM still outranks ISGS in numbers of militants at least tenfold.

5.1.6 Theoretical Explanation for the Lack of Infighting Looking at the state of the groups in 2017, we can clearly see a power imbalance in favour of JNIM. When we look at the militants’ numbers, numbers of attacks, their complexity and the operational reach of the groups, we can clearly see one dominant actor (JNIM) and a much weaker rival group (ISGS). Both groups also recruit from very similar demographics. As argued in previous chapters, the Salafi-jihadi spectrum creates a shared identity and

67 ANALYTICAL PART thus a common recruiting pool. However, on top of this fact, both groups also heavily target the Fulani ethnic group in their recruitment efforts. The Fulani community plays an important role in the dynamics of the Sahelian jihadi infighting as this group increases the co-identity/co-ethnicity factor due to its proclivity to joining the jihadi groups. Although in the past jihadists focused mainly on the Tuareg and Arab ethnic groups, recently, the focus has shifted towards the Fulanis (Cissé 2020). The Fulani ethnic group is spread throughout the Sahel and West Af- rica. The total population of the group is estimated to be between 25 to 40 million, with around 99 % being Muslims. The share of the population in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso is 16.2 % (3 million), 7.6 % (1,6 million), and 6.3% (1,2 million). As the ethnic group comprises a significant portion of the population, it offers a deep recruitment pool for the jihadists (Cline 2021). The reasons for the “jihadification” of the Fulani vary. The tradition- ally nomadic group comprised of herders had its traditional pasture territory recently shrunk. Due to environmental pressures, competition for resources, but also due to the spread of the agro-pastoralism, many of the historical routes used for grazing were blocked. The reduction of the pastures pushed Fulani further south towards the farmlands where herds of Fulani cattle are often accused of destroying crops. On the other hand, Fulanis complain of cattle theft, lack of access to water, and obstacles to their movement. This led to a confrontation between Fulani herders and other ethnic groups such as Tuaregs or the Bambara. The conflict evolved into a spiral of violence and retaliations. As the state forces were unable to protect Fulanis and often even took part in the violence, the group turned to jihadists for security and the possibility of revenge (McGregor 2017; Sangare 2019; Ammour 2020). Above this, the jihadists often offer high payments and elevated social status to individuals who struggle with unemployment and erosion of their way of life. According to local Nigerien Fulani leader: “Having weapons

68 ANALYTICAL PART gives you a kind of prestige—young people from the villages are very influenced by the young armed bandits who drive around on motorbikes, well dressed and well fed. Young herders are very envious of them, they admire their appearance,” (Le Roux 2019b). In the context of dire economic situation, the jihadi ideology and preaching of social justice might be very tempting. This was exactly the way in which Amadou Koufa managed to build Katiba Macina. Above his anti- elitist and social justice rhetoric, he also built on the historical narratives connected to the Fulani Macina Empire, which is reflected in the name of his group (Thurston 2020a). During the 18th century, the Fulani successfully launched multiple imamates based on Sharia law and established them through jihad. This era is generally considered a golden age which was ended by European colonization (Sangare 2019; Cissé 2020). Although the importance of this narrative should not be overstated, it provides a useful historical narrative for the idea of recreating a jihadist rule in the region and bringing back the golden age. The Katiba Macina subgroup was created by a radical Fulani preacher Amadou Koufa from the Mopti region. Koufa also has a long history in Is- lamist uprisings in Mali and is connected to the other leaders of JNIM. In its first official video in 2016, Koufa’s Katiba Macina introduced itself as an affiliated “Fulani branch” of Ghaly’s Ansar Dine (Le Roux 2019a). The rest of the groups united under JNIM also contains some Fulani fighters, although to a lesser extent (Cissé 2020). ISGS, similarly to Koufa, uses grievances of the marginalized Fulani community (and other marginalized groups) to recruit fighters into its ranks, often young Fulani men who represent majority of ISGS fighters (Le Roux 2019b). Based on the presented evidence, we can argue that many of the conditions for hegemonic bid and inter-rebel war as put by Pischedda hold. One

69 ANALYTICAL PART group enjoys a marked military advantage against a group that is much weaker but does not belong below the threshold of extreme weakness. Fur- thermore, the JNIM coalition was not in the position to make a significant territorial gain or to outright defeat the government due to the presence of the international forces. These factors were underscored by the co-ethnicity factor and thus should increase the possibility of fighting between the groups. However, the last hypothesis put forward by Pischedda regarding the role of the threat from government forces seems to be the factor that kept the groups from fighting each other.

5.1.7 Foreign Intervention and Government Forces The insurgency of 2012 in northern Mali brought significant international attention to the Sahel region and with it a growing number of security forces. The main international actor invested in the Sahel region is France. France, with a long colonial history in Mali and the rest of the western Sahel, reacted to the spreading Islamist insurgency with Operation Serval in 2013. Operation Serval was launched after the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2085 and an official request by the government of Mali for military assistance. The French troops were deployed on January 11 and within a short period of time managed to halt the Islamist encroachment on the southern regions of Mali. In matters of days, the important northern cities were taken back from the Islamist control and the militants were forced out into the mountainous borderlands of northern Mali (Boeke and Schuurman 2015). Over the period of just four months, around 700 jihadists (out of the estimated 2,000) were killed and another 430 were taken prisoners. The rest of the militants dispersed into the population or fled to the neighbouring countries (Halifa-Legrand and Jauvert 2013).

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After the short-term military success of Operation Serval, the activity was replaced by Operation Barkhane in August 2014. The stated goal of Bar- khane is to follow up the military success of Serval with long-term counter- insurgency and territory control efforts to prevent the region from becoming a haven for jihadist groups (Tull 2021). The operation encompasses Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, Mauritania, and Chad. As the operation is conducted over a large swath of territory (as large as entire Europe), it is characterized by low-intensity, long-term operations with short, localised episodes of intense combat. The French contingent consists of roughly 5,000 troops (Tertrais 2016). Another important force in the region is the G5 Sahel13 Joint Force. This military force of the G5 organisation was established in July 2017 and is dedicated to combatting terrorist groups and organised crime in the region. Although the personnel deployed counts around 5,000 individuals, its effectiveness remains questionable. As the countries of the G5 group lack military and financial resources, they require international assistance to function and deal with the limited operational effectiveness. As the Sahel theatre brought significant attention from the international community, the group enjoys international capacity-building support, mainly from the US and France, but also from the United Nations and the European Union (ICG 2017a; Dieng 2019). Another significant presence in the Sahel is the UN MINUSMA peace operation, the European EUTM Mali, EUCAP Sahel Mali, and EUCAP Sahel Niger Missions. The mandate of the MINUSMA mission is to stabilize and support the restoration and extension of state authority in the country. The

13 G5 Sahel was created in 2014 to improve international cooperation in areas of security and development. The regional organisation includes Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad (G5 Sahel 2020).

71 ANALYTICAL PART mandate encompassed threat reduction, prevention of returning of armed elements, assistance with the rebuilding of security forces, and implementing political process including the Algiers Agreement14 (Lijn 2019). European missions in the Sahel are focused on training security forces and advising them. The goals of the missions are generally restoration of constitutional and democratic order, restoring the governmental control over the territory, and neutralizing organised crime and terrorist groups (AFD 2020).

Figure 6: Regional Security Responses in the Sahel. Source: AFD, 2020

14 A peace agreement between the Malian government and non-jihadist armed groups from northern Mali signed in 2015 (RW 2020).

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The significant presence of international forces stationed in the Islam- ist strongholds (as can be seen on the map above, mainly in central Mali, which became the main region of jihadi activity as demonstrated earlier) and the military success of the French operations played an important role in JNIM creation and thus also on subsequent decision making. Additionally, the G5 forum was established in 2017. Another deployment of 5,000 soldiers from the G5 countries was announced in the same year, further increasing pressure on the jihadi elements in the Sahel, mainly in Mali, and thus increased the need for cohesion. The importance of foreign intervention in the region and its effect on the jihadi camp, at this time mainly on the JNIM and its subgroups prior to the merge, is evidenced by the statements and exchanged correspondence. The leaders of different subgroups started to call for the reunification of the jihadi forces. With this logic, in an audio recording from 2015, Droukdel urges other jihadists in the region to regroup and join the banner of al-Qaeda. There also was a correspondence exchanged between Belmoktar and Drouk- del about the importance of cooperation in the face of foreign intervention (Mémier 2017). On December 4, Droukdel announced al-Murabitoon’s return to the fold of AQIM and urged jihadists to unite to fight against France and its allies in the region (Mémier 2017). Abu Dujana al-Qasmi, al-Murabitoon spokesman, verified the announcement: “The goal of joining our brothers and loved ones in the Al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb is to stand together against the occupying Crusader enemy” (Al Jazeera 2015). Further, Djamel Okacha15 in his interview with Alakhbar news outlet in 2016 stated that al-Qaeda’s work in the field of preaching and jihad is done

15 One of the top leaders of AQIM, reportedly killed in 2019 by French forces in the Timbuktu region (The National 2019).

73 ANALYTICAL PART globally and in cooperation with other jihadi groups. He asserted that differences between AQIM, Katiba Macina, and Ansar Dine relating to the local focus of their jihad do not prevent cooperation and coordination in all matters related to the war in Mali. He also welcomed Belmoktar back into the AQIM structure. Okacha also attested that normal contacts had been maintained with Abu Walid al-Sahrawi’s group (ISGS) even though he pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, although in the interview, he called on him to come to his senses and join the ranks of al-Qaeda (Zerrouky and Guibert 2016). The formation of JNIM itself was also framed in this way. In the March 2nd announcement, Ghaly confirmed the significance of the foreign intervention by stating that Ansar Dine, al-Murabitoon, and AQIM’s Sahara branch had merged into a singular organisation operating under “one emir” to “stand united against the occupier Crusader enemy” (Joscelyn 2017). We can explain the lack of infighting between JNIM and ISGS in the years 2017-2019 by the significant presence of the external security forces. As the ISGS yet did not pose a significant threat to the JNIM hegemonic position, the group did not want to allocate resources to fight a much weaker rival in a situation where an intensive counter-insurgency campaign was being conducted and a new contingent of 5,000 soldiers from the G5 Sahel was announced. The situation stayed this way for a while, which enabled ISGS to maintain its growth and eventually become a viable challenger to the JNIM hegemonic position.

5.1.8 The Relationship Until the Beginning of Infighting The relationship between ISGS and JNIM prior to the eruption of infighting is often described as the “Sahelian anomaly” due to the lack of infighting typical for other regions where affiliates of AQ and IS came to close geographic proximity. The nature of the relationship between ISGS and JNIM is disputed, and therefore it is crucial to analyse the connections between the

74 ANALYTICAL PART groups in 2017-2019 to understand what led to the inter-rebel war and whether the unravelling of the events corresponds to the dynamic stipulated by Pischedda or whether a different dynamic took place. Not only did the groups refrain from fighting each other, but according to some analysts even cooperated and conducted military operations together. Thurston (2020a, 211) reports that the global competition between AQ and IS became muted on the local level in the Sahel, and already in 2017, reports about a formal liaison emerged. Other reports alleged that Ghaly met with Sahrawi in December 2017 and continued their communication through regional commanders in the following months (Jeune Afrique 2018). The AQIM strategy of incorporating smaller organisations might have played a role in the possible vision of reintegration of Sahrawi’s group into the broader AQIM structure. This possibility was also mentioned by Okacha in the 2016 interview when he called on Sahrawi to rejoin AQIM (Zerrouky and Guibert 2016). The cooperation for ISGS, which at this time did not yet have a deeper connection to IS central, meant more resources against key enemies and avoiding the fight with JNIM (Thurston 2020a). In 2017 the first alleged coordinated attack occurred when JNIM attacked a joint MINUSMA and Malian military patrol in the In-Delimane area between Ansongo and Ménaka. JNIM claimed the attack, but according to an interview with a local expert from the Tuareg community, an ISGS lieutenant provided fighters for the assault (Nsaibia and Weiss 2020). The cooperation was further reported by French Major General Bruno Guibert in April 2018 and described as an “alliance of circumstance”. As ISGS still lacked the material and logistical capabilities to conduct large-scale attacks alone, it sought external support from JNIM. According to Major Gen- eral, what united JNIM and ISGS was the common desire to empty northern Mali of international and state forces. However, complex and coordinated planning or merge of the groups was not likely due to different approaches to

75 ANALYTICAL PART local populations (Hugeux 2018). Statements of Major General Guibert were also confirmed by Brigadier General Dagvin Anderson, U.S. Africa Com- mand, who stated that the two groups were cooperating in the region and even conducting attacks together. General Anderson stated that although the groups did not have a unified command, the common goal of propagating their ideology and eventually establishing an Islamic polity overshadowed concerns about local control. The reasons why the groups were able to avoid conflict and cooperate were rooted in historical ties between the groups and their members, who often share ties through their clan and tribal identities (Warner 2020). Some analysts, notably Colin Clarke and Julie Coleman, disagree with the assessment that two groups were cooperating but rather claim they were “working in parallel”. If we accept this logic, it can be argued that the groups were trying to deconflict and avoid fighting each other but it would simultaneously imply that the word “cooperation” is too strong and loosely used as there were no concrete cases of tactical cooperation. Clarke and Coleman demonstrate their claim on the fact that both groups claim attacks in different (although geographically close) parts of the Sahel with minimal overlap, and thus, cooperation is unlikely (EER 2020). A regional expert Wassim Nasr (2020) also claimed that no evidence of organisational cooperation existed and what took place was rather a degree of tolerance based on family and tribal ties. This analysis is, however, countered by Pellerin (2019). Although he agrees that the groups had clearly divided territory in time of their cooperation, based on multiple interviews with local sources, he assesses that logistical and tactical cooperation took place. The relationship between the groups was strengthened in 2017 through multiple meetings in the Ménaka region between the leaders of both organisations regarding the cooperation against

76 ANALYTICAL PART the G5 Sahel Joint Force. Pellerin (2019, 16) demonstrates the logistical cooperation on the event of 2017 when ISGS arrested an important JNIM leader accused of spying and handed him back to JNIM. Pellerin’s view is further confirmed by Nsaibia and Weiss (2020), who demonstrate at least five instances of attacks and kidnappings where ISGS and JNIM seemed to cooperate. A notable case includes the hostage-taking of two French tourists in northern Benin in May 2019. The pair was trans- ported through Burkina Faso to northern Mali. While JNIM was blamed for the action, Le Monde reported that Burkinabe security services claimed the kidnapping being the work of ISGS linked militants who transferred the tourists to Katiba Macina elements of JNIM (Nsaibia and Weiss 2020). Groups also reportedly cooperated through information sharing on building explo- sives, collecting taxes, and allowed one another safely to travel through controlled territory (Paquette 2020). A report by a US counterterrorism official also indicated that groups cooperated in the 2019 campaign to isolate the cap- ital of Burkina Faso, Ouagadougou by periodically blocking roads to the city (Paquette and Warrick 2020). In 2020 UN Security Council’s (2020a) report also claimed that the two groups were cooperating to increase their capabilities in military operations. Whether the nature of the relationship between ISGS and JNIM prior to the infighting was cooperation or rather plain avoidance of conflict is not self-evident from the evidence gathered; what is certain is that groups re- frained from violently clashing with each other. The first reports of inter-rebel skirmishes inside the jihadi camp were reported in late 2019, but the conflict grew into a full-blown confrontation in the first half of 2020. The conflict coincides with a significant shift in the distribution of power amongst the groups as ISGS managed to rapidly expand and grow in its capabilities between the years 2017-2019. The dynamic of deterioration of the relative

77 ANALYTICAL PART power of the stronger side to its weaker rival is the basis of Pischedda’s theory. This dynamic in the context of the JNIM/ISGS relationship will be demonstrated on the following pages.

5.1.9 Rise of ISGS and Shifting Distribution of Power ISGS managed to grow rapidly from its state in the year 2017. This fact can be demonstrated on multiple factors. For example, the number of its core fighters increased significantly from its 40-60 fighters in the 2015-2017 period. The current estimates of the ISGS core militants rose to hundreds (Paquette and Warrick 2020). US officials came with a more precise estimate in 2018, claiming the group counts around 300 core fighters (Browne 2018). Other experts from the field also estimated the number of militants between 200 and 300 (France24 2020a), with some going as high as 400 (Warner and Hulme 2018). Additionally, ISGS also started to hire and utilize individuals who do not belong to the organisation’s core for its military operations. According to Mahamadou Savadogo, a Burkinabe regional expert, the numbers of these “ad hoc” fighters, who are often connected to criminal networks, trafficking, and poaching, often outmatches real numbers of core fighters by two or three hired fighters per one core ISGS militant (RFI 2020). Other organisations in the Sahel also deploy this tactic; however, ISGS manages to beef up its ranks from local communities by up to 70% of its force being hired just for the operation and paid in cash, weapons, or ammunition (Burke 2020). Moreover, the territory of its activities also rose in scope significantly. We can observe this closely in Burkina Faso. The country managed to avoid regional instability in the period of 2011-2016. However, since 2016 we can see a pattern of increasing jihadi activity. In 2017 jihadi elements started to actively penetrate the northern regions of the country and managed to continue their encroachment on the eastern regions in 2018. In 2019 the centre-

78 ANALYTICAL PART north regions became the preferred targets of jihadist activities. While the rise is not solely due to ISGS, the group seems to be dominant in the north-east of the country, while the western parts are JNIM and Ansaroul domains (Sava- dogo 2019; US Department of State 2019). Based on data from ACLED, 2018 marked a huge territorial expansion of ISGS’s activities. The group became more active in its home region of Ménaka but also continued expanding into western Niger and alongside the Burkinabe eastern borders southwards towards Benin and Togo (Africa Cen- ter for Strategic Studies 2019). Although the group expanded its activities, it was mainly into regions that historically were not under the influence of JNIM. In 2019 a further encroachment of ISGS into the “W National Park”, which encompasses Burkina Faso, Niger, and even Benin, was reported by the UN (UN Security Council 2019, 4). Thus, we can observe large swathes of territory previously being spared of violent activities of jihadi groups becoming new operational regions. Another factor that significantly demonstrates the growing capabilities of the group is the number of attacks and its sophistication and effectiveness. ISGS conducted around five attacks in 2017, while JNIM conducted around 90. In 2019 the difference already shrunk significantly with ISGS conducting 177 attacks and JNIM 378. In 2020 ISGS is blamed for 336 incidents while JNIM for 434 (ACLED 2021a). While JNIM was still dominant, ISGS managed to almost catch up and put its activity levels on par with JNIM. Not only did the number of attacks increased, but the lethality of the operations also increased significantly. This was undeniably also due to ISGS’s activities as deaths rose from 770 reported deaths in 2016 to more than 4,000 in 2019. Just in Burkina Faso, the number rose from 80 in 2016 to at least 1,800 in 2019 (MD 2020).

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The effectiveness of ISGS’s attacks is another factor that points to the growing capabilities. ISGS stepped up its attacks on non-jihadist armed militias such as GATIA and launched a string of assassinations targeting local figures suspected of collaboration and cooperation with the state and the Bar- khane forces (ICG 2020). However, the most progress can be seen in its attacks against local governmental forces. For example, in May 2019, ISGS claimed the attack against Nigerien soldiers killing 28 individuals. The attack was conducted after the Nigerien military began chasing militants who tried to attack a high-security prison. One of the military vehicles triggered a land mine which served as a signal for the counterattack. The incident also happened in the same location in which the 2017 Tongo Tongo attack took place (BBC 2019). In July 2019, the Nigerien army camp in Inates was stormed by jihadists from ISGS. The attack started by detonating a vehicle bomb which opened the way for the militants who killed 18 soldiers (Dakaractu 2021). Further, in August 2019, ISGS claimed the Koutougou attack in northern Burkina Faso. The attack, so far the deadliest insurgency attack in the country’s history, killed 24 soldiers and was conducted by several dozens of militants using motorbikes and pickup trucks. Above this, during the attack, militants used heavier weapons including rockets (Kelly 2019). In November 2019, ISGS attacked a military post in Indelimane, Ménaka region of Mali, killing 53 soldiers and one civilian (Burke 2019). Finally, in December 2019, 71 Nigerien soldiers were killed in the attack on In-Atés camp (UN Security Council 2020a, 10). Thus, we can clearly observe a pattern of increasing tactical and operational capabilities from the formative years of ISGS. Although JNIM still remained the dominant Islamist group in the region, the distribution of power was shifting and JNIM’s relative power began eroding since 2018. We can observe this on multiple factors mentioned above. The JNIM numbers, although still superior to ISGS, did not grow between

80 ANALYTICAL PART the years 2015-2020 similarly to ISGS. The current estimates of JNIM’s force are constant and move around 2,000 at the highest (CSIS 2018; Connolly 2020). When it comes to the number of attacks, JNIM was still the most active actor; however, discrepancies in the number of attacks and their complexity began to decrease between the groups, as seen on the data from ACLED (see Figures 4 and 5). As far as territorial expansion is concerned, JNIM largely stayed in its historical regions of northern and central Mali and eastern Burkina Faso (DIS 2020). Based on the presented evidence, we can clearly state that the dynamic of ISGS’s growth prior to the beginning of infighting corresponded with the dynamic predicted by Pischedda in his Bid for Resurrection hypothesis. Therefore, we can consider the crucial hoop test passed. However, passing this test is not sufficient to answer the research question as the corresponding dynamic might simply be a correlation, and other factors might have directly caused the infighting. To prove that the deteriorating position of JNIM caused the infighting, we must closely trace the immediate events predating the eruption of the inter-rebel war of 2020. The best evidence for this would be a direct statement from JNIM’s leadership that the reason for infighting was the growing capability of ISGS; however, this kind of evidence is scarce, thus we will mainly have to look to other sources and circumstantial evidence that would prove or disprove the theory. Finally, the JNIM group should be the one who launched the attack against ISGS and not the other way around. The role of government in the time period prior to infighting will also be analysed as the pressure put forward by governmental and international forces plays a crucial role.

5.1.10 The Infighting The first clashes between the groups were reported at the end of 2019 in the central and northern Mali regions. From late 2019 until the end of 2020, the

81 ANALYTICAL PART groups clashed at least 125 times. The infighting reportedly caused 731 fatal- ities coming from both sides (Nsaibia 2021). The scope of hostilities suggests the basis of conflict is rooted in significant competition as minor differences between the groups or individuals in leadership would be prohibited due to the costs inflicted upon both groups.

Figure 7: Battles Between JNIM and ISGS (1 January 2020 – 31 December 2020). Source: Nsaibia 2021

In the case of the Bid for Resurrection hypothesis, we should see an initiative for peaceful solutions prior to the infighting. Indeed, there were some attempts to reconcile the groups before the conflict erupted. For example, in February 2019, a few months before the beginning of the infighting, the two groups met to discuss deconfliction zones. The meeting was facili- tated by al-Qaeda leader Sedane Ag Hitta and took place in the Kidal region (Nsaibia and Weiss 2020). Later in November 2019, the French Promédiation NGO reported a crisis meeting between the groups (Berger 2020). The meeting between Jaffar

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Dicko, the head of Ansaroul Islam, and Abu Walid al-Sahrawi was supposed to demarcate regional borders, red lines, and operational territory for each group which would ease the tensions. However, the groups did not come to an agreement, and the meeting led to a further increase in tensions as four ISGS members were later detained and imprisoned by JNIM (Baloi 2020; Mednick 2020). The meeting was also reported by the UN Security Council (2020b, 18). Another attempt to ease the tensions was undertaken by JNIM by re- leasing two pamphlets in late 2019 and early 2020. The first pamphlet, “Re- sponding to suspicions that you do not apply Sharia,” was targeted at the JNIM militants who were not satisfied with the gradual16 implementation of Sharia and some even left the group for ISGS (which will be further elaborated). The second pamphlet, “Year of the Group,” calls on jihadists in the Sahel to come together and deescalate the situation: “…so let us witness a year of a new and unified group between differing Muslim sects, with all their descriptions, doctrines, and orientations,” the document stated hinting at the increasing tensions between the groups (Weiss 2020a). The final attempt at reconciliation was taken by the open letter of Jan- uary 11 or 12, 2020, written by Abu Walid al-Sahrawi and obtained by the Promédiation NGO. Sahrawi demanded reimbursement for the killing of two combatants and the unconditional release of captured ISGS fighters. If his conditions were met, he offered a meeting and discussion about a non-aggression pact between ISGS and JNIM (Mondafrique 2020). However, none of these initiatives were successful and all ultimately failed. The last attempt made by ISGS was reportedly firmly rejected by

16 JNIM follows Droukdel’s model of Sharia implementation. The population is educated on religious affairs and certain parts of the code are implemented (such as the separation of sexes). The strict hudud punishments such as beheadings are to be implemented later when the population is educated and are not immediately enforced.

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JNIM, although the statement was made through an unofficial jihadist account (Al Lami 2020). As the tensions were rising, one of the most important factors that led to the current state of infighting was the continuous defection of JNIM’s militants to ISGS ranks. ISGS proved capable of attracting other regional jihadist elements despite its position as the weaker actor in the region. In 2017, Katiba Salaheddine led by Sultan Ould Badi, pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and joined ISGS (Menastream 2018c). Alt- hough the group was previously loosely connected to AQIM and later JNIM, no violent reaction to this development came from the JNIM side (Mapping Militant Organisations 2018). In the same year, another group of Toleebe Fu- lani left Katiba Macina for ISGS (Nsaibia 2018). It is important to note that the groups operated in ISGS home region near Ménaka and no large intrusion into the historical territory of JNIM took place so far; however, Amadou Koufa reacted to these developments in 2018 video, where he called on regional jihadists to unite (Zelin 2018). The defections continued throughout 2019 and 2020 when some factions of JNIM-linked Ansaroul Islam also defected to ISGS in the central parts of northern Burkina Faso, Seno Province, and other areas near the Malian border (Nsaibia and Weiss 2020). An important defection took place in Sep- tember 2019 when Malian Abou Mahmoud and a significant number of his men left JNIM for ISGS. The event took place after the failed crisis meeting mentioned above and was a significant loss for JNIM as these individuals had strong ties in Nampala and Serma regions, historically JNIM’s domains (Bal- daro and Diall 2020). In January 2020, another group of dozens of militants from the Malian Nampala region pledged allegiance to ISGS (Weiss 2020b). Further, in Janu- ary 2020, another group of Katiba Macina fighters also defected to ISGS. The group, led by Mamadou Mobbo, a Fulani scholar who helped Amadou Koufa establish Katiba Macina in central Mali, left JNIM due to disagreements

84 ANALYTICAL PART about the management of local relations around natural resources and pastures but also about the implementation of Sharia. The decision to join ISGS caused clashes during which two individuals from Mobbo’s camp were killed (Agence Ecofin 2020). With the defecting fighters joining ISGS, the group also gradually en- croached further into the historical territory of JNIM. The group tried to expand further into the northern Inner Niger Delta and the Liptako-Gourma region of Mali and even to northern Mali’s borders with Algeria (Nasr 2020; Nsaibia 2020). Most of the infighting took place precisely in these regions; however, after some initial military successes of JNIM, neither side managed to penetrate the rival’s historical strongholds (Nsaibia 2021). The importance of the defections from JNIM to ISGS in starting the violent confrontation was also commented on by Koufa in a WhatsApp audio message: “Some among us rose up against us. These are the same people we trained. They received weapons thanks to us. We showed them how to fight a war. We showed them how to fight against the unfaithful. They learned the tactics of war with us: how to fight against France, how to fight against the American army, how to fight against the Malian army. With us, they understood how to fight against the diassoussou [state informants]. They were among us. We let them settle where we are settled. We gave them the same name we use, the mujahidin […]. And they defected to join another group. Why did they defect?” (Baldaro and Diall 2020). In another audio recording, Koufa is heard explaining to a group of Fulani recruits and fighters the reasons behind the conflict between the groups. The statements from the recording, according to Nasr (2020), suggest the fear of defections to ISGS “was real and justified a fight”. In the weekly newsletter, Al-Naba, Sahrawi also claimed that JNIM could no longer tolerate “hundreds” of its fighters leaving and declaring their allegiance to the caliph

85 ANALYTICAL PART and subsequently joining ISGS. Other reasons are mentioned as well, for example, JNIM’s possible negotiations with the Malian government and slow implementation of Sharia (al-Naba 260). Sahrawi specifically mentions that ISGS focused on fighting international forces and government but continued to attract a lot of JNIM’s fighters from northern Burkina Faso, Mopti, and Nampala who were not physically in these regions at the time of the pledge and were later blocked from returning to their home regions by JNIM (Thurston 2020c). The reasons for the defections are rooted in criticism of Koufa for his management of the regions under his control, but also in ISGS’s willingness to let the fighters keep their loot as contrasted by Koufa’s centralized system where the resources obtained from looting are pooled together. Another reason often mentioned is ISGS’s willingness to let its militants and friendly ethnic groups enact revenge against rival ethnic groups, which is often for- bidden by JNIM (Baldaro and Diall 2020). Lastly, the more radical elements of JNIM are critical of slow and gradual implementation of Sharia, negotiating with the government and with other non-jihadi armed groups. This problem has been central to jihadi cohesion in the region since 2012 when Drouk- del called on his militants to not enforce strict Sharia punishments as the population should first be educated on the Islamic law, however more radical elements began immediately enacting the code and alienating the population in the process (Guidére 2014). On the other side, ISGS opts for immediate implementation of Sharia and enforces it with brutality and threats of violence, thus attracting the more radical elements from the jihadi ranks (Med- nick 2020; Baché 2021; Serge 2020). Based on these facts author of this thesis argues that the continuing defection of JNIM’s fighters towards ISGS was one of the main reasons for the infighting. This claim corresponds with Pischedda’s theory as the inability

86 ANALYTICAL PART to retain fighters is one of the main signs of growing risks for the group; thus, the opening of the window of weakness is visible in the case of JNIM. It is equally important for our analysis to find out who started the infighting. Specific, concrete and unbiased third-party evidence on who initiated the conflict (who conducted the first complex military operation) is not available. However, there are some hints that the JNIM was the first side conducting military operations. According to the al-Naba newsletter published on May 7, 2020, JNIM started the first military operations. The newsletter stated that al-Qaeda has “started a war” against ISGS and that al-Qaeda “never misses the chance for treachery”. The editorial also accuses JNIM of cooperating with the government, guarding the borders of Algeria and Mauritania on behalf of the nation- states, and cooperating with other non-jihadi militias in the fight against ISGS. According to al-Naba and later Sahrawi, who mentions this fact in his interview mentioned above, the attack was highly organised and conducted by a substantial military force. JNIM also reportedly blocked ISGS’s fuel supply routes and arrested local sympathizers of the group (Joscelyn and Weiss 2020; NDT 2020). Although al-Naba is the IS’s propaganda outlet and thus the information it puts out must be viewed with this fact in mind, other factors also point to the JNIM being the initiator. For example, the last attempt at reconciliation was initiated by Sahrawi and reportedly rejected or at least ignored by JNIM. Further, the first skirmishes took place in regions where the defections from JNIM to ISGS took place, such as Mopti and Nampala, pointing to an initiative of JNIM to impose control over its traditional territory (Serge 2020). Another important fact is that in early 2020 on the G5 Sahel and France summit, French President Emmanuel Macron declared ISGS as the new main enemy in the region: “The priority is the Islamic State in the

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Greater Sahara.” The President of Burkina Faso, Roch Marc Christian Kabore, also confirmed the statement: “The Islamic State in the Greater Sa- hara has emerged as our main enemy, against whom we should focus our struggle” (RFI 2020). Until 2020, JNIM was the target of the bulk of counter- insurgency operations; however, the growing capability and surge of ISGS attacks in the second half of 2019 even led France to announce additional 600 troops to combat ISGS in 2020 (The Soufan Center 2020). This development makes it unlikely that ISGS would open another front against JNIM in a situation of increased counter-insurgency targeting the group. On the other hand, it creates a favourable environment for attack from the JNIM side as the resources of government forces were refocused on ISGS and thus putting ISGS under pressure by two-frontal war. At this time, JNIM was even considering negotiations with the Malian government and thus could expect lower hostility levels. This fact was also mentioned in al-Naba when ISGS accused JNIM of conducting its offensive simultaneously with the French forces (Thurston 2020c). Above this, no evidence points to ISGS being the direct instigator of the infighting. This leads us to the overall governmental threat in late 2019 and 2020 as the possibility of governmental counter-insurgency is one of the factors in Pischedda’s theory. In the Bid for Resurrection hypothesis, Pischedda expects an increased possibility of the government offensive, which puts pressure on the hegemonic group to quickly consolidate its resources by destroying its rival and absorbing his resources. This predicted scenario did not take place in the Sahel as multiple factors point to decreasing ability of governmental and international forces to conduct effective counter-insurgency. This can be demonstrated by the civilian support for the presence of international forces, but also for the governmental forces. The support for French intervention has been declining steadily since 2013. After the Islamist uprisings, the intervention force was welcomed and seen as liberation from

88 ANALYTICAL PART the harsh rule of the Islamist militias. Nonetheless, during the following years, the support for the mission was declining steadily and culminating in the 2019 protests, which called for a complete withdrawal leading some analysts to expect partial French drawback. President Macron stated that if these anti-French sentiments are not addressed, he will not leave French soldiers stationed in the Sahel region (Mules 2019; Shurkin 2020). At the same time, in 2019 US signalled a possible withdrawal of its special forces out of the region in a global pivot of military resources towards China, leaving behind only operational bases for drones (Allinson and Mellouk 2020). As far as the local militaries are concerned, the relationship with civilians is deteriorating even more. Mounting allegations of abuses by the state security forces seem to accelerate jihadi recruitment and mobilization (Rain- eri 2020). According to Human Rights Watch report, between 2017 and 2020, the Malian security forces reportedly killed 535 civilians and conducted multiple mass executions. These numbers are on par with civilian casualties caused by the jihadists (Le Cam 2021). Local reporters even suggest that civilians are more willing to inform the armed groups than the local armies (Le Point 2019). Mali was also prepared for elections in 2020. The elections, which were originally supposed to take place in 2018, were marred by violence as multiple important local figures, election officials, and observers were kid- napped, including the leader of the opposition Soumaila Cissé (Al Jazeera 2020b). The elections failed to stabilize the country when in the aftermath of the election, opposition parties organised multiple protests against President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (Salaha and Kleinfeld 2020). Finally, in August 2020, the parliament was dissolved by a coup organised by the representatives of the Malian military (BBC 2020). Although it is difficult to analyse the impact of the elections on the jihadists, it is reasonable to suspect that the organisation of the elections and its impact on the country’s political environment

89 ANALYTICAL PART could have taken some pressure off the jihadist groups. This is seconded by the fact that a similar dynamic could be seen in 2012 when jihadi insurgents took control of northern Mali after a military coup took place (Thurston 2020a). Finally, the low capacity to effectively lead the counter-insurgency campaign can be demonstrated by the increasing number of attacks and casualties caused by the jihadists between the years 2015-2019. Although an intense campaign was being waged, the groups remained resilient, and their operational momentum grew steadily. The regions of central Mali were in- creasingly dangerous for security forces to the point that the Barkhane operation largely avoided conducting patrols in the region (Hugeux 2018). The Sahelian forces also largely withdrew from the Timbuktu, Gao and Ménaka regions under the pressure of the jihadists creating a security vacuum that allowed jihadists to recruit, train and collect taxes freely (UN Security Coun- cil 2020b, 19). According to Pischedda (2015, 70), the ability to choose the place and time of the attack by insurgent groups points to decreased ability of the government to effectively threaten the groups. Additionally, the French announced its pivot towards ISGS, further decreasing pressure on JNIM. Based on these facts, the author claims that the governmental threat to jihadists, especially to JNIM, seemed to be relatively decreased rather than increased as predicted by Pischedda’s theory. The implications of this fact are analysed in the following section.

5.1.11 Analysis of Findings and Discussion The understanding what leads to the infighting between rebel groups has not only theoretical implications but also provides important pragmatic insights to policymakers. To effectively intervene in civil war or quell an insurgency, the knowledge of dynamics leading rebel groups’ decision-making processes provides significant advantages to governmental actors. Understanding how

90 ANALYTICAL PART to disrupt cohesion inside the rebel movement or increase it can significantly weaken the insurgency as inter-rebel war can inflict serious material and human costs on the groups. Suppose our conclusion about the impact of international forces’ pivot towards the weaker group on the eruption of infighting is correct. In that case, similar dynamics and timing could be potentially used in other counter-insurgency strategies. One observation Pischedda makes is that the co-ethnicity factor increases rather than decreases the possibility of infighting as the winning group has lower obstacles in absorbing resources obtained by defeating a rival organisation. In the conceptual part of the thesis, the author argued that Salafi ideology creates a co-identity factor similar to the co-ethnicity. Although eth- nically common groups might provide more incentives to territorial control as the civilian population also shares ethnic roots and are thus more likely to support the militias, the Salafi co-identity factor seems to hold up in the Sahel conflict. The fluctuation and defections of fighters from one camp to the other were a significant factor for the breakout of the conflict but also showed the willingness of the militants to switch sides, further strengthening our argument. Moreover, groups also competed over marginalized ethnic groups closer to the jihadi camps, mainly the Fulani ethnic group. Elimination of the competing group would thus enable the winner of the confrontation to not only absorb the bulk of the jihadi fighters left but also possible recruits from the Fulani (and potentially other marginalized groups) ethnic group, which was the case before the emergence of the ISGS. Until the creation of ISGS, the entire ethnic group was a recruitment source for Amadou Koufa’s Fulani Katiba Macina. Thus, we can see that the co-identity factor is existent and pertinent in the Sahelian context. To answer our first research question and test Pischedda’s theory, we first had to pass the hoop test regarding the power distribution amongst the groups. A clear discrepancy between the groups was visible immediately in

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2017 after the emergence of JNIM. Although the power imbalance between the groups and shared recruitment sources would create an environment prone to infighting, JNIM’s focus on, and threat assessment of the governmental and international forces influenced risk/benefit calculations and thus fore- stalled the confrontation. This observation is based on several pieces of evidence gathered in the empirical part. First, the whole creation of JNIM was framed in a “resistance against the Crusader enemy” way. The groups still had a clear memory of the 2013 intervention and focused mainly on resisting French counter-insurgency operations. Second, a prominent AQ representa- tive called on Sahrawi to return to the AQ fold and unite against the “Crusad- ers”. Again, this points to the focus on withstanding international operations against the jihadi front. Third, groups that merged into JNIM had several personal disputes before the merge (mainly Belmoktar and Droukdel), which were put aside due to pressure put forward by France, as mentioned in their captured personal correspondence. Fifth, in the year 2017, another surge of 5,000 security forces was announced with the creation of the G5 Sahel Joint Force. Cooperation against the G5 forces was also reported as the reason for multiple meetings between ISGS and JNIM representatives in 2017. These were not direct statements that ISGS will not be attacked due to the presence of international forces and thus cannot be considered smoking gun evidence but rather multiple straw in the wind pieces of evidence. As only one hypothesis put forward in the Hegemonic Bid holds true, the groups yet did not have enough incentive in their risk/benefit calculations to wage inter-rebel war. The relationship between the groups between 2017 and the first half of 2019 was void of conflict with some evidence even pointing to cooperation. However, the power distribution began to shift significantly. From JNIM being a clear hegemon in the region, ISGS managed to grow rapidly and largely catch up. Based on the number of attacks, membership, tactical complexity of operations, and territorial expansion of its operations, it is clear to

92 ANALYTICAL PART see that ISGS outpaced JNIM in growth. Although JNIM still remained the dominant actor, the scale began to tip to JNIM’s disadvantage. This change in the distribution of power prior to the infighting corresponds with the dynamics described in the Bid for Resurrection hypothesis and, therefore, the hoop test is passed. The change in the dynamics began to be visible in 2018; however, the infighting started in late 2019. This can be explained by several factors. The capacities of ISGS rose significantly, making the possibility for the Hege- monic Bid from JNIM not viable due to high costs that would be inflicted on the organisation in the case of inter-rebel war. Concurrently, as both organisations were somewhat cooperating or working parallelly, JNIM did not yet have an incentive to ignore these high costs since both organisations largely functioned in their own territories. Further, although the threat from governmental and international forces began eroding17, which can be seen on the increasing number and complexity of attacks waged by both groups against security forces, the situation was much more stable than in the following year. In 2019 multiple factors changed, which could influence the risk/benefit calculations of JNIM. The political environment in 2019 shifted significantly and brought multiple factors which led to the intense infighting of 2020. The relative decline of JNIM to ISGS continued. ISGS’s activities were almost on par with JNIM. The operational capabilities were also on par with JNIM, as can be seen on a string of deadly attacks against government forces in late 2019, which were operationally difficult and, in the case of the Burkina Faso attack, the deadliest in the country’s history. Two significant factors strained the relationship of the groups and influenced risk/benefit calculations of possible

17 The ability to launch attacks on security forces rather than to simply resist the counter- insurgency operations is a factor used by Pischedda to evaluate the decreasing threat from security forces (Pischedda 2015, 70).

93 ANALYTICAL PART infighting. First, ISGS managed to lure a significant amount of JNIM’s soldiers to its ranks. Second, with these fighters defecting, ISGS started to penetrate territory which was historically JNIM’s domain and thus directly threatening JNIM position. Therefore, we can consider the first hypothesis: “A group faces a major deterioration of its relative power or a mounting threat posed by a co-ethnic rival,” (Pischedda 2015, 47) of the Bid for Resur- rection proven. The second hypothesis: “The group’s attempts at overcoming its predicament with peaceful measures have failed or alternative plans appear unworkable,” (Pischedda 2015, 47) was also proved as multiple meetings between the groups took place and statements tried to calm the situation to no avail. The last attempt to solve the rising tensions was initiated by ISGS in 2020, immediately prior to the outbreak of intense inter-rebel war. In the Bid for Resurrection scenario, Pischedda also predicts an increase in governmental pressure on the hegemonic group: “The inter-rebel balance of power is not favourable to the group and/or the government poses a serious and immediate threat,” (Pischedda 2015, 47). The first part of the hypothesis holds as demonstrated above; however, the dynamic regarding the governmental threat towards the group does not hold up to the evidence. Not only were the counter-insurgency operations unable to stop the growth of the groups, but also the upcoming elections destabilized the political environment of Mali. Further, the civilian population grew hostile to the international forces to the degree that even French President Emanuel Macron commented on them. There were also signs of a possible drawback of international forces. Contrary to Pischedda’s expectations, we can see a decreasing pressure from the government side. Rather, we can see a combination of window of opportunity and window of weakness logic pushing JNIM to launch an offensive.

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In the relative decline characteristic for the window of weakness, the window of opportunity was opened for JNIM when the international forces announced shifting their focus towards ISGS. The fact that the fighting began when the international coalition announced their offensive against ISGS was also commented on by IS in their newsletter al-Naba. Other factors pointing to this conclusion were that ISGS tried to deescalate the situation and was ignored by JNIM even though JNIM tried to deescalate the situation prior to the international forces announced their focus on ISGS. Evidence also suggests that it was JNIM who launched the offensive. The author found no evidence to suggest otherwise. Based on these findings, we can answer our first research question: “Why did the ‘Sahelian anomaly’ end?” In an environment of the declining relative power of hegemonic JNIM characteristic for the Bid for Resurrection hypothesis, a window of opportunity appeared when international forces switched their focus against ISGS. This dynamic influenced the risk/benefit calculations of possible inter-rebel war with “better now than later” logic. This conclusion is based on the plethora of evidence presented in the empirical part, which mainly passes the straw in the wind test and the hoop test. However, the author of the thesis considers statements from Amadou Koufa, mainly the reported recordings of his speech, as a possible smoking gun evidence.18 Amadou Koufa reportedly mentions the defections of JNIM’s fighters to ISGS as the reason for the infighting, which corresponds with the dynamic described in this thesis. Another evidence, which would be considered a smoking gun and in combination with Koufa’s statements could even pose as doubly decisive evidence, would be a statement from AQ leadership con-

18 Although this evidence could not be obtained by the author to independently confirm it, and even if it were, there would be other problems such as translation of the recording.

95 ANALYTICAL PART cerning the timing of the offensive and its deliberate launch during the international counter-insurgency forces switching its focus on ISGS. The author did not manage to uncover this kind of evidence at the time of writing. Pischedda’s theory was chosen as the framework for the analysis due to its focus on the onset of inter-rebel war and the causal chain it provides to explain the infighting. Rival theories often focus on conditions that increase the likelihood of infighting but offer no casual chain which would map in detail dynamics leading to the eruption of the conflict. Other theories are often too narrow in their view, such as the focus on ideological factor, which is important, but rarely can explain the whole case of inter-rebel wars. In con- trast, Pischedda’s theory encompasses these factors in the change of power distribution and co-identity/co-ethnicity concepts. As can be seen in the empirical part, many dynamics predicted by Pischedda took place in the Sahelian context, and thus the author of this thesis considers Pischedda’s theory a useful tool in the analysis of the onset of inter-rebel war. One downside of the theory is the role of government forces in the inter-rebel war. Although much attention is paid to the dynamics, the view is often too singular. For example, although Pischedda briefly discusses the possibility of the mixture of the two dynamics regarding the pressure of governmental forces, the possibility of the government increasing the pressure on one group of the rebel landscape and its implication to the rival groups are only briefly mentioned and not discussed at all. Therefore, it would be fruitful to conduct more qualitative research and analyse this phenomenon in greater detail.

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5.2 Indicators

Before we proceed with the analysis of the chosen indicators, it is essential to mention that since the conflict is still ongoing, it is difficult to obtain concrete and detailed information about the situation on the ground. Due to this limi- tation, we will focus instead on more pronounced differences and clearly observable general patterns.

5.2.1 Clear Central Command JNIM was created by groups and individuals who took part in the 2012 uprisings, knew each other personally, and often lived in the jihadi sphere since at least the 1990s. As the groups which took part in the 2012 uprisings under the banner of AQIM reorganised in 2017 under the JNIM name, it is useful to look at the organisational structure of AQIM around the 2012 period. Both groups were and continue to be led by the same individuals, and thus we can expect some continuity in the organisational structure. Although the group claims allegiance to AQ, the direct influence of AQ central on the decision making of its Sahelian affiliate is not clear, either historically or even now. After the intense war on terror in the aftermath of 9/11, AQ reorganisation into AQ 2.0 as discussed in the theoretical chapter, was visible in the Sahel. According to the Abbottabad letters, the documents captured during the Bin Laden raid in 2011, AQIM was not a priority of AQ central. AQIM was supposed to follow the advice of the AQ central leadership, above this, AQIM seemed to have a significant degree of autonomy. This was corroborated by Droukdel in 2013 when the Timbuktu letters were found. Droukdel mentions to his commanders that even though he asks for the guidance of AQ central, he does not receive any answers (Boeke 2016; Chelin 2018). Based on this information, we can state that AQIM was largely

97 ANALYTICAL PART independent as far as the operationalisation of the AQ ideology was concerned, and its relationship to AQ central was rather symbolic and very indi- rect. This is further corroborated by the fact that Zawahiri called for the implementation of Sharia in 2012. Still, Droukdel, who wanted to have a transi- tional period of educating the population about the Islamic law before applying strict punishments, chose to go against the guidelines (Joscelyn 2012; Doyle 2013). This seems to be the case today with JNIM. Although the group pledged allegiance to AQ central leadership and adopted the general ideological guidelines of AQ, such as toppling regional governments, pushing the Western influence out of the Islamic lands, and addressing social and economic issues (Zimmerer 2019), the group is autonomous on the local level. This can be seen in multiple instances where AQIM and JNIM went against the general principles of AQ central. For example, JNIM recently announced it would not conduct terrorist attacks on Western territory (Al Zallaqa 2021). This autonomy was also confirmed by the new AQIM emir Abu Ubaydah Yusuf al-Annabi, who took the place of deceased Droukdel in late 2020: “JNIM is a non-dissociable part of AQIM, which in its turn is a non- dissociable part of al-Qaeda central. …Regarding the geographical reality and the military pressure on its leaders and commanders, al Qaeda had to adapt with flexible command and control, therefore giving general and strategic guidelines, and then tactically it is up to each branch to reach toward achieving those guidelines depending on their realities. … AQIM follows the same process of leadership regarding its activity in different African countries” (Nasr 2021). During the 2012 uprisings, AQIM adopted the organisational structure used in the Algerian uprisings during the time of GSPC. The central leadership was organised into Shura council with around 14 members and headed

98 ANALYTICAL PART by Droukdel as the emir. The rest of the Shura consisted of regional commanders, political, military, judicial, and media deputies. Thus, we can see that central command was present for AQIM. However, direct control over the fighters was problematic, to say the least, as the model was highly decen- tralized (local leaders had significant autonomy), and problems with the chain of command emerged (Chelin 2018; Boeke 2016). Droukdel sent clear in- structions advising against a war with MNLA but also against the immediate strict implementation of Sharia and destruction of non-Islamic shrines. He also warned against provoking international intervention and advised to hide the expansionary, jihadi, or al-Qaeda related ambitions. All these warnings were ignored and disobeyed by his local commanders when Ansar Dine and MUJAO launched an offensive against southern Mali and immediately started implementing strict religious punishments eliciting Operation Serval. The situation led to the previously described dispute between Droukdel and Bel- moktar, but also with Ansar Dine (Thurston 2020a; Hansen 2019; Boeke 2016; Doyle 2013). We can see a similar pattern in the case of JNIM today. Although the group is headed by Ghaly, who speaks for the entire JNIM, the organisation was formed by four different entities, which still maintain a significant autonomy and operational territory. Despite this autonomy, the groups consistently reaffirmed their membership to JNIM (ECFR 2021b). From these four groups, al-Murabitoon and AQIM Sahara branch seem largely degraded by the French operations and killings of local leaders such as Belmoktar and Djamel Okacha (Eizenga and Willaims 2020). Most of the operations are, therefore, conducted by the Katiba Macina and Ansar Dine elements. Both subgroups have differing tactics, territories, and objectives. Ansar Dine elements led by Ghaly operate mainly in northern Mali, where Ghaly enjoys a strong connection to local elites, including secular leaders inside the Tuareg community (Thurston 2020a). Ghaly also seems

99 ANALYTICAL PART to be a more pragmatic politician who supports a gradual implementation of Sharia and tries to avoid alienating local civilians. Religious education and legal services are being offered to local populations (Forbes 2018). On the other hand, while still subordinate to Ghaly, Koufa’s Katiba Macina operates in central Mali with its connections stretching to western Burkina Faso. Recent data points to increased attacks against civilians as Katiba Macina has been recently responsible for more than half of Islamist attacks against civilians (Boukhars 2020). Koufa is also less pragmatic than Ghaly as he relies on extreme religious rhetoric and anti-elite sentiments to drive the recruitment of the lower classes of the Fulani ethnic group (Thurston 2020a; Boukhars 2020). Since 2017 the group began to collect zakat (religious tax), imposed strict implementation of Sharia, and banned several local customs. The mixing of sexes, playing music or sports were also banned and a strict dressing code was implemented. The code was enforced through whip- ping, abductions, and even executions and alienated a significant portion of the population (ICG 2019). Although differences between these two dominant blocks of JNIM can be seen, so far, cohesion has remained largely stable on the organisational level. However, the group seems to be having some problems with controlling its soldiers. In recent years multiple subgroups of mainly Fulani fighters defected to ISGS, as described above (Nsaibia and Weiss 2020). Above this, the conflicts around the allocation of resources, management of the Katiba Mac- ina, and possible negotiations with the government caused conflicts amongst the more radical elements of the group. Koufa is also criticized for his sub- servience to Ghaly by some of his Fulani fighters (The Africa Report 2020). According to Roger (2018), Koufa’s soldiers are largely autonomous groups of around 30-50 individuals with a loose hierarchical structure. We can, therefore, see that central command represented by Ghaly as the head of the organisation and by Koufa as the number two in the JNIM

100 ANALYTICAL PART exists. However, some problems arise with the control of the leadership over the sub-groups and their foot soldiers since these are largely autonomous units. Historically, these jihadist groups also dealt with internal disputes between the autonomous subgroups now forming JNIM. In light of the above, we code the control over the organisation as medium. Similar to JNIM’s relationship with AQ core, ISGS is also connected to IS central, but the centre of gravity as far as the central command is concerned lies on the local level. Up until 2019, ISGS connections to IS central appeared to be minimal with IS central accepting the pledge of ISGS in 2016, but above that, not much attention was paid to the group. The situation changed in 2019 when IS central began publishing attacks conducted by ISGS and ran an interview with Sahrawi in 2020. ISGS was also formally placed under the structure of the Islamic State in the West Africa Province (ISWAP) located in Nigeria. Even though there is increased communication between the ISGS and IS central, as evident by al-Naba publication of ISGS attacks, no evidence directly points to material and personal support for the Sahelian group. Rather, the restructuring seems to be mainly a branding move (Post- ings 2019). As far as the structure of the group is concerned, information is very scant. The ISGS militants seem to be divided into two organisational subgroups (Katibas) with one being predominantly composed of the Fulani community and the other being predominantly Tuareg (Bensimon 2019). Accord- ing to the reports and available information, Sahrawi still maintains and controls a unified command structure and remains an undisputed emir in the Sa- hel region (Roger 2020; ICG 2020, 19). UN report from February 2021 states that the group still maintains effective command-and-control capacity in the aftermath of the French operations (UN Security Council 2021, 9). Although a certain level of autonomy is highly probable due to the geographical scope and the size of ISGS, no evidence of internal disputes or

101 ANALYTICAL PART different approaches that would significantly decrease the group’s cohesion were uncovered by the author. Sahrawi also seems to enjoy tight central command and remains undisputed head of the group; therefore, we code the control over the group as high.

5.2.2 Fighting Capacity As far as fighting capacity is concerned, we can look at two dimensions of the groups’ abilities. The first dimension constitutes the ability to attack governmental forces. As demonstrated in the empirical part, ISGS conducted multiple sophisticated and successful attacks against governmental forces, for example, the Tongo Tongo attack of May 2019, the Inates attack of July 2019, the Koutougou attack of August 2019, or the In-Atés attack of December 2019 (BBC 2019; Dakaractu 2021; Kelly 2019; UN Security Council 2020a). The activity of the group even prompted French President Emmanuel Macron to label ISGS as enemy number one when the group killed 400 Malian, Burk- inabe, and Nigerien soldiers in just one year (France24 2020a; Nsaibia 2021). Similarly, JNIM also conducted multiple sophisticated and high casualty attacks against government forces such as the March 2020 attack on Malian army base, April 2020 attack in Sollé, Burkina Faso, or the 2021 attack in Boni, Mali (Al Jazeera 2020c; Al Zallaqa 2020; Urteaga 2021). Since late 2020, JNIM also increased its targeting of the French forces. In December 2020, three French soldiers were killed in an IED attack by JNIM (Reuters 2020). In January 2021, another two French soldiers were killed in an IED attack claimed by JNIM (|The Defense Post 2021). These cases present only a fractional part of the overall attacks (see Figures 4 and 5) as both groups conducted a multitude of similar attacks in the last two years, particularly in 2019 and 2020. Rather, these attacks serve as a demonstration of the ability to effectively target institutional security forces. Therefore, we can see that both groups possess a significant ability to

102 ANALYTICAL PART attack governmental forces. The second dimension of fighting capacity can be seen in their ability to fight each other. It is very difficult to analyse individual battles as information that would indicate which organisation won the confrontation are extremely hard to obtain. Both groups use their media apparatus to publicize their victories, but these information campaigns are part of a broader propaganda battle between the groups and are thus unreliable. Therefore, we will focus more on general patterns of success of the individual groups. The first major clashes took place in Katiba Macina’s operational area pointing to JNIM’s effort to push ISGS out of its historical territory. ISGS reportedly managed to launch and win multiple confrontations and repulse JNIM on multiple occasions, such as the fight in Boulikessi, Mali, where more than 35 JNIM fighters reportedly died (Joscelynn and Weiss 2020). In April 2020, ISGS also attacked a JNIM position in Tin Tabakat. Although JNIM reportedly repulsed the attack, high casualty counts were inflicted on both sides (Nordsud Journal 2020a). In the same month, ISGS fighters also killed around 40 JNIM militants in two attacks in Arbinda and Nassoumbou (Bamada 2020). Although the infighting cost both groups significant material and human resources, JNIM managed to get the upper hand in the conflict and in the first quarter of 2020 succeeded to largely push ISGS out of its historical territories (Nsaibia 2021; Berger 2020). On April 18, 2020, one of the largest battles of the confrontation took place. A convoy of JNIM fighters consisting of around 40 motorcycles and four vehicles overrun two smaller bases of ISGS, seizing weapons and ammunition. The group then continued and took a large base in Tintasadalt, capturing ISGS lieutenant and approximately ten soldiers and infiltrating the ISGS communication system. On April 19, JNIM used the communication system when its soldiers attacked another base of ISGS and set up several ambushes against incoming reinforcements. The

103 ANALYTICAL PART number of casualties is not known; however, the operation dealt a significant blow to ISGS and increased JNIM’s presence in the Gourma region. JNIM reportedly sent around 40 vehicles and 300 motorcycles from Macina and the Timbuktu regions to establish its presence in the area (Bamaka 2020). In mid-April, ISGS launched a counteroffensive with a series of attacks against JNIM installations in the Gourma region and Burkina Faso, killing around 60 JNIM militants and taking another 40 prisoners (DonKlericuzio 2020; Berger 2020). Since May 2020, the number of clashes dropped significantly and peaked again in October 2020 (see Figure 7). In the first quarter of 2021, the number of clashes between ISGS and JNIM remains relatively low with 12 clashes reported in Burkina Faso, 2 in Mali, and 3 in Niger (ACLED 2021a). The second half of 2020 again shifted the momentum in favour of JNIM. For example, in July, JNIM killed 14 ISGS fighters and captured four commanders pushing ISGS further away from the Gao region (Nordsud Jour- nal 2020b). In September, JNIM allegedly pushed ISGS out of multiple towns and villages in the Gao region (Menastream 2020). ISGS was under pressure from JNIM but also from Barkhane forces. This significantly decreased its ability to conduct sophisticated operations. Commander of Barkhane forces General Marc Conruyt stated that Operation Eclipse and Operation Bour- rasque19 dealt heavy blows to ISGS and decreased its capacities significantly (AKMoumouni 2021). This information is further confirmed by the French forces shifting their primary targeting from ISGS back to JNIM. “ISGS has lost its grip and suffered many losses,” stated the French President, adding that JNIM will be the next target of French operations (Baouaga 2021). JNIM also conducted multiple sophisticated operations in the first quarter of 2021

19 Offensives conducted by the Barkhane and G5 forces in September and October 2020 against ISGS in the tri-border area (AKMoumouni 2021).

104 ANALYTICAL PART while ISGS remained largely dormant. At least 9 Malian soldiers died in the JNIM attack on the base in Boni on February 3 (Serge 2021). In January MI- NUSMA base was also attacked with a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) and shelled by JNIM (AFP 2021a). Simultaneous attacks on three gendarmerie posts in Bandiagara in February were conducted (AFP 2021b). Although the attackers were not identified, the attack took place in Katiba Macina’s operational territory. Finally, in April, a detachment of Malian soldiers was attacked in central Mali. Three soldiers were killed and 17 injured (Chaded 2021). Historically both groups possess a significant fighting capacity; however, due to recent developments and significant counter-insurgency efforts focused on ISGS, the group’s ability seems to be decreased, although not completely destroyed at the time of writing. Due to these developments, we code the fighting capacity of ISGS as moderate and the fighting capacity of JNIM as high. The situation remains fluid. The newest data points to a possible ISGS resurgence since the operational shift of Barkhane forces toward JNIM. ISGS conducted multiple attacks against civilians, which are, however, not indica- tive of fighting capacities as these are rather massacres of the civilian population. Few operations against state and non-state forces have also been conducted in recent months, such as the attack on a military convoy in Tessit on March 15, killing 33 Malian soldiers (ActuNiger 2021; Menastream 2021; ACLED 2021b; Weiss 2021). On May 14, a group of roughly a hundred ISGS militants was seen crossing the Niger River and continuing to the Ansongo region, reportedly to strengthen the ISGS ranks (aBamako 2021b).

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5.2.3 Ability to Procure Arms The ability to procure arms in West Africa has been recently fuelled by the proliferation of jihadist groups and their demand for weaponry. Current estimates of weapons held legally or illegally by civilians in the region are moving around 11 million with the Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso subregion account roughly for 5 million weapons. Thus, we can see that the region is filled with weapons (Demuynck, Mehra, and Bergema 2020, 5). The region was already saturated with illicit arms flowing from sur- rounding conflict areas before the eruption of infighting. Previous conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leona, Côte d’Ivoire, and Libya have enabled significant arms circulation (Jouve 2020). Historically Libya served as a major supplier of weapons to northern Mali. After the 2011 fall of Muammar Qaddafi, a significant power vacuum created in the country enabled military stockpiles to be raided and vast amounts of small arms, light weaponry (SALW), and ex- plosives to be sold to the neighbouring countries (Global 2013). Although some of the Libyan arms were trafficked to other countries, such as the Cen- tral African Republic, the majority stayed in Mali (Jouve 2020). Since 2015, we can observe a pattern of decreasing exports from Libya to Mali, mainly due to an increased demand for weapons in Libya, but also due to increased border surveillance and deployment of international forces (Florquin, Lipott, and Wairagu 2019). Consequently, trafficking is in- creasingly taking place in the tri-border area with large amounts of weapons generally heading to the Tillaberi region of Niger (CAR 2016). JNIM benefited from the historical reality of Libyan weaponry influx as the bulk of the equipment was used in the northern uprisings of 2012 and was partly obtained by the AQ affiliated groups (Global 2013). Another factor in favour of JNIM is the leadership’s role in smuggling. Ghaly, Koufa, and before his death also

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Belmoktar, are historically considered the most prominent smugglers in the region (Sollazo and Nowak 2020). However, recent developments somehow levelled the playing field for both groups as far as the ability to procure new arms is concerned. The influx of arms from Libya, which were mostly smuggled to the Tuareg-dominated north, decreased significantly (Florquin, Lipott, and Wairagu 2019). Further, northern smuggling routes controlled by JNIM elements are used mainly for drugs, human trafficking, and other illicit goods with the decreasing importance of weapons (Sollazo and Nowak 2020). Increased focus on the tri- border area also somewhat benefited ISGS as the group operates mainly in this area and takes part in smuggling with Illiassou Djibo, an ISGS lieutenant and prominent smuggler proving the point (Assanvo et al. 2019). Although smuggling still plays an important role in the ability to procure arms, recent analyses indicate that the main contemporary source of weaponry for JNIM and ISGS is the looting of national armouries, military bases, and police stations (Sollazo and Nowak 2020; Constellis 2018; Demuynck, Mehra, and Bergema 2020; Koné 2020). Both groups proved capable of overrunning local military bases. Third party reports are also confirmed by the footage published by the groups themselves. After the attacks on military camps in Inates, Niger, Indelimane, Mali, and Koutougou in Burkina Faso, both groups displayed the weapons and ammunition seized in their propaganda videos (Koné 2020). In December 2019, ISGS conducted an attack on a Nigerien army base, killing 89 soldiers and obtaining a significant amount of equipment (Al Arabiya 2020a; 2020b). In the Tongo Tongo attack of 2019, ISGS captured Chinese heavy machine gun W85 HMG with large quantities of ammunition, Night Vision goggles, two high-precision rifles, multiple Chinese Type 56-2 AKs, grenade launcher with ammunition and a large amount of small arms ammunition (Calibre Obscura 2020). In February 2020, a police station was

107 ANALYTICAL PART attacked in Burkina Faso near the town of Sebba. Ten police officers were killed and “heavy material damage” was dealt as the attackers managed to loot the weaponry (Vanguard 2020). Similarly, JNIM’s attack on the Malian army base in the Gao region also captured equipment including DShK heavy machine guns, RPGs, SPG- 9 rocket launcher and multiple vehicles (Weiss 2020c). In April 2020, JNIM also claimed it had seized 3 DShK, 5 PKs, 8 RPGs, 20 AK-47s, five cars and ammunition in Sollé, Burkina Faso (Al Zallaqa 2020). Recent months also indicate that JNIM possesses a greater ability to successfully raid military bases, probably due to pressure put on ISGS by the Barkhane forces and the cost inflicted by fighting with JNIM. This is probably most highlighted in the first quarter of 2021. As described in the previous chapter, JNIM conducted multiple attacks on police stations and military bases, which enabled it to continue seizing equipment and weaponry. For example, in the Boni attack mentioned above, the militants seized multiple vehicles, weapons and boxes of ammunition (Ocisse691 2021). In the Bandiagara attack, three vehicles and several pieces of military equipment were also captured (Housseyne 2021). As far as the type of weaponry is concerned, the use remains largely comparable. As noted by the ICCT report from March 2021, no major difference between the types of arms possessed by terrorist groups was observed. The groups largely use industrial types of SALW, mainly AK-patterns which represent 95% of all automatic assault rifles in the region, small to medium- caliber machine guns and RPGs (Mehra et al. 2021, 10). Both groups also use similar tactics. A targeted base or unit is usually attacked with a SVBIED and shelled with mortars and RPGs to clear the way for motorbike-borne fighters to overrun the enemy. Although some heavier weaponry was also seized, so far, the groups did not systematically use it, probably due to the difficulty operating it and obtaining ammunition (Koné 2020; Calibre Obscura 2020).

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ISGS also started employing improvised explosive devices (IED) since 2019, a tactic previously used primarily by JNIM (ACLED 2019). Therefore, we can see that both groups historically enjoyed significant ability to procure arms and use similar types of weaponry. However, as the ability to procure arms in the Sahelian context is directly connected to ability to raid and loot security forces installations and thus is also connected to the fighting capacity of both groups the recent development points to JNIM having the upper hand. Therefore, we code the ability to procure arms of JNIM as high and ISGS as moderate. Similarly to the fighting capacity, the situation is very fluid and with the Barkhane forces focusing on JNIM in recent months, the momentum can again shift in the following months.

5.2.4 Mobilization Capacity As can be seen in the resurgence of JNIM from the state of 2013 military defeat of AQ affiliated groups by Operation Serval, the group poses a high ability to recruit and mobilize soldiers. Even though the French intervention killed around 700 (out of 2,000) jihadists and captured another 430 (Halifa- Legrand and Jauvert 2013), destroying over 50% of the jihadist militants, the groups managed to reorganise under the JNIM banner and launch intense insurgency throughout the Sahel. Additionally, JNIM managed to survive the continuous counter-insurgency campaign and even expand, as can be seen on the number of attacks conducted in recent years (see Figure 5) and the increasing geographic scope of the attacks (ACLED 2021a). In recent months, JNIM was the main target of French counter-insurgency operations, however, the group seems to be resilient and able to fill the ranks despite the continuous counter-insurgency. This can be observed on a video from March 4, 2021. A huge convoy of JNIM militants counting several hundred individuals was filmed in Sollé, Burkina Faso proving the organisation’s ability to fill the depleted ranks (Sandor 2021; Nasr 2021).

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We can observe a similar pattern with ISGS. The group rose from its abysmal state of 2015 to basically rivalling JNIM in 2019, thus proving its high capability to recruit soldiers. Although the two-frontal war depleted ISGS in late 2020, recent months point to a resurgence of ISGS with a string of multiple brutal assaults on villages claiming up to 300 civilian lives (Weiss 2021). Reports of new attacks against the government forces and government- allied militias are also emerging, further confirming the capability to renew the depleted ranks (aBamako 2021a; ACLED 2021b). Although one of the recruitment drivers for Sahelian jihadist groups stems from the ideology, the jihad in the Sahelian context is often called “glocal”. The adjective “glocal” refers to the tendency of jihadists to adapt to the local context and alter their agenda. Thus, the global goals of jihadi movements are redefined to fit the local context (Marret 2008; Pellerin 2019). Cases of pure ideological radicalization in the Sahelian context are recorded: “I was praying in the mosque when the Mujaheedin entered Gao. As I heard them shouting ‘Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar,’ my body started shaking. I could feel it in my bones that the time has come for Islam to rule. The next day I went to MUJAO’s headquarter and registered for military training” (Ibrahim 2017, 13). However, the existing literature maintains that religious issues are secondary to socio-political and economic reasons (Pellerin 2017; Raineri 2018). Therefore, even though ISGS managed to lure the more radical elements of JNIM into its ranks as demonstrated via process tracing, this constitutes rather a secondary mobilization driver and thus does not provide a significant overall edge for ISGS’s ability to mobilize militants. Local Fulani sources often state that the individuals who joined Is- lamist groups have no prior experience with religion (Raineri 2020). In the Sahelian context, it is the real or perceived injustice that often leads to jihadism. Jihadists are able to extend their influence into rural regions

110 ANALYTICAL PART where the state enjoys a limited reach and where local grievances exist. Con- flicts over land had been increasing in intensity due to the growing population and dry climate, leading rival communities to violence. The state is unable or unwilling to solve these problems as certain communities have limited access to state institutions (mainly pastoral communities such as Fulani). Even if the community approaches the state institutions, they often have to deal with corruption and unwillingness of the officials to solve the issues at hand. Thus, jihadists are able to arm existing local cleavages, previously expressed in a non-violent way and label them as jihad. In this context, the jihadi groups which build on an egalitarian ideology of punishing crimes regardless of community membership or social status are able to offer quicker and more legitimate social order (Raineri 2018; Pellerin 2019; Thurston 2020a). Another crucial service that the state is not able to provide is security. This case is again most visible in the case of the Fulani community, which was historically often attacked and pillaged by Imghad Tuaregs and Daous- sahak tribes and ignored by the state. The situation radicalized in 2012 when the northern rebellion completely pushed out the state from the Ménaka region. Tuarged combatants pillaged and racketed the Fulani community often using arbitrary violence without consequences. In the security vacuum, MU- JAO appeared as the only viable option which could provide security to the Fulani community. After the French intervention, the governments again sided with Tuaregs and even allied with the non-state militias GATIA and MSA20 further alienating the Fulani community. Since 2017, local observers report increasing communal violence and abuses by MSA, GATIA, Malian and Burkinabe forces. Extrajudicial killings, abductions and targeting of civilians based on group identity rather than on real ideological alignment are

20 Movement for the Salvation of Azawad is armed political group in northern Mali.

111 ANALYTICAL PART driving recruitment for ISGS and JNIM. It was exactly this situation that reportedly allowed ISGS to grow so rapidly since 2017. In addition to protection, revenge is another factor that pushes marginalized communities to the jihadi groups. This leads to communities being locked in a circle of stigmati- zation of entire groups and violent reprisals by state and non-state forces (Raineri 2020; Thurston 2020a; Cline 2021). Lastly, jihadi groups recruit due to economic but also social status- related reasons. Individuals such as poachers, bandits, traffickers, but also unemployed persons or struggling herders often join groups as mercenaries who gradually accept the jihadi ideology and join the groups full-time. This is corroborated by the fact that up to 70% of ISGS militants and unspecified number of JNIM militants are hired only for specific operations and are not part of the core jihadi groups (Burke 2020; Pellerin 2019). The importance of social status was also noted by the local community leader: “Having weapons gives you a kind of prestige—young people from the villages are very influenced by the young armed bandits who drive around on motorbikes, well dressed and well fed. Young herders are very envious of them, they admire their appearance” (Le Roux 2019b). Both groups continued to regroup after significant counter-insurgency efforts throughout the years. In recent months this pattern can be seen again taking place in the case of ISGS. The UN reports that ISGS appears to be regenerating its base of fighters despite the intense counter-insurgency campaign of 2020. Similarly, Katiba Macina has the ability to mount sophisticated operations even though the latest French operations killed more than 100 operatives, thus further demonstrating the ability to refill the ranks (UN Security Council 2021, 10). French security officials stated that even though Barkhane forces neutralize dozens of terrorists, the situation keeps getting worse (Le Point 2019).

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Ultimately, the drivers of recruitment have been largely unaddressed by state and the international forces, which focus mainly on the military side of the counter-insurgency. The violent abuses by security forces and dimin- ished state presence in conflict areas remain significant underlining problems further allowing jihadist groups to recruit (ICG 2018; Le Cam 2021). There- fore, we code both groups’ mobilization capacities as high.

5.2.5 Territory Control The question of territory control in the Sahelian context is a complex one. Although neither JNIM or ISGS control territory in the sense of uncontested governance and institution building as was the case for example in Afghani- stan with the Taliban or in Iraq and Syria with the Islamic State, both groups clearly do have territorial strongholds and areas of operations, therefore cod- ing the indicator for territory control as a “no” would be detrimental to our analysis. Therefore, we employ the typology of territorial control proposed by Hansen (2019) in his comparative study of African jihadi groups. In his book, Hansen defines a Semi-territorial Presence of the jihadi groups in certain parts of Africa. This presence resembles a traditional insurgency where the state forces are able to achieve large-scale military victories, but the territory is more or less left to the jihadists. The situation is also characterized by the institutional forces being stationed in fortified camps but not being able to provide protection for more remote areas such as rural villages. This is the outcome of the lack of resources or willingness on the side of governmental or international forces to secure the area after their military victories (Hansen 2019). This is precisely the case in the Sahel region. Although the international and governmental forces are able to achieve military victories over the groups, the territory remains out of the reach for the state to enforce its rule.

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This enables the groups to regroup, recruit and conduct new military operations as shown on earlier pages of this thesis. This is further confirmed by Hansen as he classifies both JNIM and ISGS as semi-territorial groups (Han- sen 2019, 35). Therefore, we code the territorial control of both groups as existing, however acknowledging that this control is semi territorial in nature. ISGS operates mainly in the tri-border area of Liptako-Gourma region. This area is sparsely populated and allows ISGS to stretch the battlefield on large swaths of territory. The activities of the group stretch some 800 km along the Mali-Niger border and around 600 km down alongside the Burkina Faso-Niger border. Around 90% of the attacks conducted by the group took place within 100 km of these borders (Le Roux 2019b). Before being pushed back in 2020, ISGS expanded its operational territory deeper into central Mali, a historical domain of Katiba Macina and continued its expansion alongside Burkina Faso-Niger border towards Benin. These regions are engaged in artisanal gold mining and serve as transit routes for smuggling. The expansion thus might have been fuelled by revenue-generating ambitions (Af- rica Center for Strategic Studies 2020). JNIM’s area of operations stretches from northern Mali, central Mali and north of eastern Burkina Faso to Niger borderlands. The group recently became active alongside the southwestern Burkinabe borderlands, probably due to new artisanal gold mining in the area. The group also continues to control significant trafficking routes throughout its territories, namely in northern and central Mali (Eizenga and Williams 2020; Thurston 2020a).

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Figure 8: Map of Operational Territories of JNIM and ISGS.21 Source: Sollazo and Nowak 2020, 6

Although both groups are semi-territorial with distinct operational territories, ISGS and JNIM differ significantly in their approach to the local populations. In its forming years, ISGS entrenched itself in the local conflicts and presented itself as the defender of the Fulani people (Hansen 2019). The pattern of exploiting local grievances seems to continue in recent years. How- ever, the group is still focused mainly on the protection of certain Fulani subgroups. Above this, the group does not have any significant connections to local communities as no broader “hearts and minds” strategy seems to be implemented (Doboš and Riegl 2021).

21 This map is a mere approximation based on activity reported, therefore it serves mainly as a general demonstration of presence.

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In his pledge to the Islamic State in 2015, Sahrawi announced the goal of establishing an Islamic state. However, very little effort to do so was ex- erted. Adam Sandor, an expert on Sahel jihadist groups stated that “Unlike those groups in the Middle East this group is extremely predatory and doesn’t really provide any type of governance function to the population of the Sahel” (BBC 2021). Rather, ISGS is in a perpetual conflict with local militias and non-state groups semi-aligned with the government such as GATIA or MSA. Thus, the local support for the groups remains very limited (Hansen 2019; Le Roux 2019b; Doboš and Riegl 2021). Due to the lack of acceptance of ISGS by the local communities, the group uses violence to extort from the civilian communities and deter them from cooperating with the government. The situation is reflected in the number of casualties, as 45% of its attacks target civilians. In Niger, where ISGS is the dominant Islamist group, roughly two out of every three attacks target civilians pointing to a lack of support from locals (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2020). A recent string of massacres of civilians attributed to ISGS also highlights this reality. In December 2020, two ISGS members collecting taxes were refused and later killed by villagers. In a probable retaliatory attack, ISGS killed 105 civilians in January 2021 (Lyammouri 2021). In March, ISGS killed another eight civilians when villagers resisted cattle rustling in Dinara, Tillabery (Menastream 2021). ISGS has to use violence to extort its influence over territory, it is in perpetual warfare with local militias and is resisted by local populations. Consequently, it does not conduct any governing related initiatives hence we code its territorial control as low. JNIM, on the other hand, has a more pragmatic approach towards local populations. The group has learned from the experience of the 2012 uprisings and adopted different initiatives to win the local population to its side through religious education, outreach from JNIM religious representatives and even through providing legal services (Forbes 2018). JNIM also partly

116 ANALYTICAL PART implemented a parallel welfare system further proving its governance capability (Pollichieni 2021). Significant attention is paid to the local context. JNIM leaders listen to local concerns and try to solve local issues, often more effectively and quickly than governmental institutions. This has led JNIM to be able to receive information and sometimes even shelter and provisions by locals in certain regions such as Kidal (Zimmerer 2019). JNIM also uses grievances of certain communities against the state or the contemporary social order to drive sympathies for the group. This is the case for the Katiba Macina elements of JNIM, but also for the JNIM-linked Ansaroul Islam. These elements build on radical rhetoric by Fulani preachers Amadou Koufa and Malam Ibrahim Dicko. In their speeches, equality between classes and questioning the dominance of traditional individuals and families played a significant role. Although the preachers lost most of their followers when they began conducting violent operations, the audience remains receptive to these ideas (ICG 2017b; Ursu 2018). Additionally, the governing system implemented by Katiba Macina was perceived by the population as fairer when compared to the system of justice implemented by the central government (Baldaro and Diall 2020). JNIM also seems to be more multi-ethnic than ISGS. Although ISGS has some elements of Daoussahak and Djarma ethnic groups in its ranks, it remains largely Fulani. JNIM also has a significant presence of Fulani, mainly due to the Katiba Macina subgroup, but aside from that, members of communities such as Songhai, Bambara, Tuarges and Arabs are also present (Thurston 2020a; Ahmed, Roger, Boisbouvier and Alilat 2018). The different approach of JNIM towards the local populations is also reflected in civilian casualties caused by the group. The group targets primarily law enforcement and security forces. For example, according to ACLED data, attacks conducted by JNIM in 2018 targeted civilians in 29% of incidents, although recently this number has been rising (Pollichieni 2021).

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Still, a significant difference between the groups when it comes to targeting civilians can be observed. When JNIM gained control of the Tongo- mayel commune in northern Burkina Faso in April 2020, a territory previously controlled by ISGS, many civilians who previously fled the area returned. The group reportedly reopened blocked transport routes and allowed for the import of aid. JNIM even apologized to the people attacked by ISGS (Mednick 2020). Similarly, JNIM also promised revenge against ISGS for the massacres of around 200 civilians conducted in Tillabery by ISGS this year, simultaneously denying responsibility and denouncing the targeting of civilians (DonKlericuzio 2021; Bayrakdar, Kocan, and Estelle 2021). The effectiveness of JNIM’s approach can be observed indirectly by the reactions of civilians under its control. One local man reported that JNIM is referred to as “the kind ones” and is preferred by the local populations over the ISGS (Mednick 2020). Forbes (2018) also noted that the civilian population seems to be habituating to the jihadist rule as the implementation of Sha- ria, even public stoning, receives much less resistance now than it did in 2013. JNIM is also willing to negotiate with local populations and is able to convince them to implement some elements of Sharia such as a strict clothing code (Baché 2021). Some observers also noted that civilians seem to be more willing to inform armed groups than the governmental forces (Le Point 2019). Although JNIM seems to be more able to connect with the local population than ISGS, it is important to note that the group does not enjoy wide popular support. Recently the number of civilian casualties in central Mali and northern Burkina Faso has been rising suggesting a mounting popular resistance (Eizenga and Williams 2020). Moreover, JNIM still fights with local militias and non-state armed groups throughout the region (Pollichieni 2021). Further, in regions where JNIM’s local outreach does not work, the group still uses violence and intimidation to stop locals from communicating

118 ANALYTICAL PART with governmental forces leading to significant displacement of populations again pointing to civilian resistance (Lyammouri 2020). JNIM is situationally and regionally able to convince the populace to cooperate and subjugate to its rule, however, it still relies on violence to extort its influence in regions where a significant level of entrenchment is not firmly established. The level of resistance seems to be lower than in the case of ISGS as JNIM portrays itself as a more reasonable and pragmatic group, but the group is similarly to ISGS conflicted with local militias and non-state armed groups. JNIM also builds some structures that resemble governmental institutions, however, due to its semi-territorial character these are rather partial and fluid initiatives. Due to these facts and the observable difference from ISGS we code the level of control as medium.

5.2.6 Analysis of Findings and Discussion A clear understanding of the current state and dynamics of the JNIM/ISGS conflict provides important implications not only for the military side of the ongoing counter-insurgency but also for the general strategy of reinstating governmental control over the entire territory. As the groups proved to be capable of growth even through intense counter-insurgency operations, other armed conflicts with non-state armed groups, and significant human and material losses, unidimensional indicators focused on the battlefield such as the number of soldiers or current state of frontlines would not be helpful in understanding the current state of the war. Furthermore, it is basically impossi- ble to find precise data describing in quantitative detail the state of these possible indicators as the situation is in constant flux. Thus, relevant information are primarily estimates and approximations. To deal with this conundrum, we also focused on aspects such as level of territorial control and mobilization capacity, which are crucial in the case

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of the inter-jihadi war as the insurgent groups would not be able to lead effective military operations without them. Although the information gathering through open-source data collection is limited, there are observable differences between the groups as far as the indicators are concerned.

Indicators Clear Ability to Fighting Mobilization Territory central procure capacity capacity control Groups command arms

Yes (Semi-territo- Yes rial)

JNIM High High High Northern/central Mali - eastern Medium Burkina Faso Medium Yes (Semi-territo- Yes rial) ISGS Moderate Moderate High Liptako-Gourma High Low Figure 9: Table of Indicators. Created by the author.

Based on the analysed indicators, we can answer our second research question: “Who is winning the inter-jihadi conflict in the Sahel region?” As the current situation stands, JNIM is evidently dominant when it comes to fighting capacity, ability to procure arms and territory control. Mobilization capacity of both groups remains high with ISGS having tighter control over the group. As the only indicator where ISGS holds higher capability is the control over the group, it can be argued that JNIM is currently winning the war.

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The increased control over the group is caused by a significant autonomy enjoyed by JNIM subgroups. A secondary reason for this might also be rooted in the issue of territory control. Hansen (2019) claims that lower territory control increases group’s cohesion as the militants do not have a safe base to which they could retreat in the face of counter-insurgency and are thus forced to flee to pockets of territory where the group has larger military camps thus minimizing the option to defect and disobey the central command. JNIM is dominant in fighting capability and ability to procure arms. However, this seems to be the result of the two-frontal war ISGS was under in 2020. With the current shift of international forces toward JNIM and the high capacity to recruit still possessed by ISGS, we can expect an increase in ISGS’s capabilities in the following months. The mobilization capacity of both groups remains high as both JNIM and ISGS are repeatedly able to refill their ranks. This is caused mainly by the underlying structural factors caused by an inability of central governments to address the recruitment drivers such as lack of security, perceived or real injustice inflicted by the state institutions, abuses committed by the security forces and dire economic situation. With these drivers unaddressed, we can expect continuous recruitment by the jihadist groups. Although military operations against militants are important, the tactical victories should be followed by governance-related measures. Both groups are semi-territorial in nature with distinct operational territories. As far as the control over their operational territories is concerned, we can observe a clear difference in their approach towards the civilian populations. According to Stathis Kalyvas, territorial control is associated with the type of violence observed in intrastate conflicts. A higher degree of territory control corresponds with decreased indiscriminate violence against civilians as the group is trying to win the support of the local communities (Boukhars 2020). JNIM clearly targets civilians less than ISGS, portrays itself

121 ANALYTICAL PART as the defender of the local communities and has more complex local outreach. Although the group does not enjoy wide popular support so far, the long-term implication of increasing level of embeddedness in local populations and its gradual acceptance of the jihadist presence is worrying. If the JNIM can provide a competing governance structure and further penetrate the society, countering its activities would become much more difficult. ISGS, on the other hand, does not initiate any significant local outreach or governing initiative. Although the long-term risk of ISGS obtaining support from the local population seems to be minimal at this point, this level of low territory control corresponds with higher targeting of civilians, thus bringing a different kind of conundrum for the governments. Perhaps the most important conclusion that can be derived from this analysis is the need for different approaches in order to decrease the influence and growth of the jihadist groups. As far as ISGS is concerned, the international community and regional governments should focus primarily on providing a sustained security presence in rural regions. This could be achieved in several ways. First, permanent stationing of security forces in these regions would signal a continuous presence of security forces and assure the populace that they will be protected. Increased focus should be put on creating a more mobile force that would be able to quickly respond to security incidents. Another crucial step would be to bolster the control of state borders to stem the mobility of ISGS and prevent it from freely moving between the different states and curbing the trafficking activities. Lastly, the regional governments must deal with the abuses of security forces against local populations. Concerning security forces should be held accountable publicly and deployed forces need to be educated and trained on the importance of winning the support of the local population.

122 ANALYTICAL PART

To counter JNIM as far as the security situation is concerned, the same conclusion holds as the groups share a similar tactical approach to their military operations. Above this, governments must bolster their local outreach to community leaders and representatives. Providing social services, solving local disputes, communicating with locals, and enforcing the rule of law is essential to regain the trust of the populace. Special focus should be put on the Fulani community and other marginalized groups as it is they who are historically the most affected by the jihadist violence and institutional marginalisa- tion. Lastly, the radical narratives that contribute to the social tensions need to be addressed as well. The voice of local religious leaders preaching non- violence needs to be amplified and supported by regulatory action against more extreme religious institutions and voices.

123 CONCLUSION

6 Conclusion

This research aimed to analyse the onset of the jihadi infighting in the Sahel region and map its current state. Based on the process tracing of the dynamics predating the eruption of the violent contestation we answered our first research question “Why did the ‘Sahelian anomaly’ end?”. We argue that the changes in the distribution of relative power in the jihadi subsystem together with changing dynamics in pressure put forward by the national and international forces changed the benefit/cost calculation of JNIM. A window of opportunity opened for the declining JNIM when international forces launched a counter-insurgency offensive against ISGS and allowed JNIM to launch a two-frontal war against ISGS. Our analysis of the collapse of the so-called “Sahelian anomaly” was led by Pischedda’s (2015) Theory of Windows of Opportunity and Vulnera- bility. From the nature of our research design, the theory-building aspect of this work was secondary; however, two important theoretical observations were made. First, in Chapter 4, we argued that the co-ethnicity factor which is, according to Pischedda (2015), essential for the probability of inter-rebel war can be replaced by a different kind of co-identity that would provide similar dynamics for the benefit/cost calculations of groups. In our case this co- identity factor runs alongside the ideological lines. Our argument was further supported by the analysis of the end of the “Sahelian anomaly” as the fluctuation of the fighters between two ideologically proximate groups was established as one of the main drivers of the collapse of their relationship. The second theoretical observation made was regarding the role of the government forces in the outbreak of infighting and mixture of the two dynamics. Although Pischedda (2015) briefly discusses the possibility of the two dynamics mixing, this area has a significant theory-building potential. In

124 CONCLUSION our researched case, the shift in the governmental focus on the rising rival allowed the declining hegemon to launch an offensive. No such observation was made by Pischedda in his theory. Therefore, we argue that more qualitative work focused on the onset of the inter-rebel war is warranted in order to fill the blind spots of Pischedda’s theoretical approach. As the theory proved to be a useful framework for our analysis, we believe that its further use provides an exciting area for future research. By analysing the contemporary state of the inter-rebel war, we answered our second research question “Who is winning the inter-jihadi conflict in the Sahel region?”. Due to the deeper level of entrenchment in the local context, higher degree of territory control and currently decreased fighting capacity of ISGS we argued that JNIM is currently winning the contestation. Above this, the analysis allowed us to make an observation regarding the limits of the current counter-insurgency strategy. Based on the analysis, we expect that the Sahelian theatre of jihad will grow in its importance both for the academic community and the international community. In recent years both groups continued their geographical expansion even through intense military counter-insurgency. As regional governments struggle with addressing the underlying issues that enable the groups to regroup repeatedly, we expect the groups to expand their activities to neighbouring countries. Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, and Benin seem to be the most likely countries for expansion in short to mid timeframe due to the presence of both JNIM and ISGS alongside the Burkinabe borders. In mid to long timeframe, Senegal might also be threatened by JNIM’s presence in west Mali. Lastly, probably the most worrying possibility is a scenario of ISGS expansion through Niger and connecting with ISWAP in Nigeria. Thus, the volatile situation in West Africa provides both challenges and opportunities for researchers in areas of insurgency, rebel fragmentation, and jihadism.

125

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