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Analysis of the Jihadi Infighting in the Sahel Region

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Analysis of the Jihadi Infighting in the Sahel Region FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES Analysis of the Jihadi Infighting in the Sahel Region Diploma Thesis BC. DOMINIK NOVOSAD Supervisor: Monika Gabriela Bartoszewicz, MA, MLitt, PhD Department of Political Science Security and Strategic Studies Brno 2021 ANALYSIS OF THE JIHADI INFIGHTING IN THE SAHEL REGION Bibliografický záznam Autor: Bc. Dominik Novosad Fakulta sociálních studií Masarykova univerzita Katedra politologie Název práce: Analysis of the Jihadi Infighting in the Sahel Region Studijní program: Magisterský studijní program Studijní obor: Security and Strategic Studies Vedoucí práce: Monika Gabriela Bartoszewicz, MA, MLitt, PhD Rok: 2021 Počet stran: 170 Klíčová slova: JNIM, ISGS, Sahel, Process Tracing, Sahelská anomálie, povstalecká fragmentace, džihádismus 2 ANALYSIS OF THE JIHADI INFIGHTING IN THE SAHEL REGION Bibliographic record Author: Bc. Dominik Novosad Faculty of Social Studies Masaryk University Department of Political Science Title of Thesis: Analysis of the Jihadi Infighting in the Sahel Region Degree Programme: Master’s degree programme Field of Study: Security and Strategic Studies Supervisor: Monika Gabriela Bartoszewicz, MA, MLitt, PhD Year: 2021 Number of Pages: 170 Keywords: JNIM, ISGS, Sahel, Process Tracing, Sahelian anomaly, rebel fragmentation, jihadism 3 ANALYSIS OF THE JIHADI INFIGHTING IN THE SAHEL REGION Abstrakt Diplomová práce se zabývá soubojem džihádistických povstaleckých skupin v Sahelu. První část práce se zaměřuje na vysvětlení propuknutí konfliktu mezi džihádistickými skupinami a koncem tzv. “Sahelské anomálie”. V druhé části práce je pak analyzován momentální stav džihádistického soupeření. K naplnění prvního stanoveného cíle práce autor využívá metodu process tra- cing vedenou Pischeddovou (2015) teorií oken příležitostí a slabin. K napl- nění druhého cíle je komparováno a analyzováno pět indikátorů stanovených na základě práce výzkumníků Cunningham, Gleditsch a Salehyan (2009). 4 ANALYSIS OF THE JIHADI INFIGHTING IN THE SAHEL REGION Abstract This diploma thesis deals with the infighting of jihadist insurgent groups in the Sahel region. The first part of the thesis focuses on explaining the onset of violent contestation between the jihadist groups and the end of the so-called “Sahelian anomaly”. In the second part of this thesis, the current state of the jihadi contestation is analysed. To fulfil our first stated goal, the author uses the process tracing method led by Pischedda’s (2015) Theory of Windows of Opportunity and Vulnerability. To fulfil the second goal, we analyse and compare five indicators based on the work of Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009). 5 ANALYSIS OF THE JIHADI INFIGHTING IN THE SAHEL REGION Declaration of Authorship I hereby declare that I have written the following master’s thesis on the topic of Analysis of the Jihadi Infighting in the Sahel Region only by myself. All sources used in this thesis have been cited in the text and are listed in the list of used sources and literature. Brno, May 29, 2021 ....................................... Bc. Dominik Novosad 7 ANALYSIS OF THE JIHADI INFIGHTING IN THE SAHEL REGION Acknowledgement I would like to express my thanks and gratitude to Dr. Monika Gabriela Bar- toszewicz for the extensive guidance, patience, and advice she provided to me while working on this thesis. Secondly, I would like to thank my family and friends for the continuous support throughout my studies. 9 TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents List of Figures 13 List of Abbreviations 14 1 Introduction 17 2 Methodology and Conceptual Framework 20 2.1 Process Tracing .............................................................................. 21 2.2 Indicators ....................................................................................... 25 3 Theoretical Background 28 3.1 Rebel Fragmentation and Infighting .............................................. 28 3.2 Theory of Windows of Opportunity and Windows of Vulnerability ....................................................................................................... 30 3.2.1 Co-ethnicity ........................................................................... 33 3.2.2 Operationalisation of the Theory........................................... 34 4 Co-identity and Historical Background 37 4.1 Salafi Roots .................................................................................... 37 4.2 Factions of Salafism ...................................................................... 39 4.3 Conflict inside the Jihadi Sphere ................................................... 42 4.3.1 Far Enemy Debate ................................................................. 42 4.3.2 Emergence of the al-Qaeda in Iraq ........................................ 44 4.3.3 The Split of the Salafi-jihadi Sphere ..................................... 46 4.4 Transnational Competition ............................................................ 49 5 Analytical part 52 5.1 Process tracing ............................................................................... 52 5.1.1 Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims) ........................................................... 53 5.1.2 Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) ........................... 56 5.1.3 Relationship and Power Imbalance ....................................... 58 11 TABLE OF CONTENTS 5.1.4 The Formative Years of ISGS (2015-2017) .......................... 59 5.1.5 Emergence of JNIM and its Capabilities (2017) ................... 64 5.1.6 Theoretical Explanation for the Lack of Infighting ............... 67 5.1.7 Foreign Intervention and Government Forces ....................... 70 5.1.8 The Relationship Until the Beginning of Infighting .............. 74 5.1.9 Rise of ISGS and Shifting Distribution of Power ................. 78 5.1.10 The Infighting ........................................................................ 81 5.1.11 Analysis of Findings and Discussion .................................... 90 5.2 Indicators ........................................................................................ 97 5.2.1 Clear Central Command ........................................................ 97 5.2.2 Fighting Capacity ................................................................ 102 5.2.3 Ability to Procure Arms ...................................................... 106 5.2.4 Mobilization Capacity ......................................................... 109 5.2.5 Territory Control ................................................................. 113 5.2.6 Analysis of Findings and Discussion .................................. 119 6 Conclusion 124 Sources 127 Number of characters: 198 409 12 LIST OF FIGURES List of Figures Figure 1 (p. 24): Sufficient/Necessary Conditions for Affirming Casual In- ference. Source: Collier 2011 Figure 2 (p. 33): Benefits/Costs of Inter-rebel War. Source: Pischedda 2015, 46 Figure 3 (p. 52): Map of the Sahel Region. Source: Zyzou, 2020 Figure 4 (p. 63): Number of Terrorist Attacks by ISGS 2016-2020. Created by the author on the basis of ACLED data. Figure 5 (p. 67): Number of Terrorist Attacks by JNIM 2017-2020. Created by the author on the basis of ACLED data. Figure 6 (p. 72): Regional Security Responses in the Sahel. Source: AFD, 2020 Figure 7 (p. 82): Battles Between JNIM and ISGS (1 January 2020 – 31 De- cember 2020). Source: Nsaibia 2021 Figure 8 (p. 115): Map of Operational Territories of JNIM and ISGS. Source: Sollazo and Nowak 2020, 6 Figure 9 (p. 120): Table of Indicators. Created by the author. 13 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS List of Abbreviations ACLED – The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project AQ – al-Qaeda AQIM – al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb EUCAP Mali – European Union Capacity Building Mission in Mali EUCAP Niger – European Union Capacity Building Mission in Niger EUTM Mali – European Union Training Mission Mali G5 Sahel – The Group of Five for the Sahel GATIA – The Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies GSPC – Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat H1 – Hypothesis 1 H2 – Hypothesis 2 IED – Improvised Explosive Device IS – The Islamic State ISGS – The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara ISIS – The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant ISWAP – The Islamic State West Africa Province JNIM – Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin MINURSO – United Nations Mission for the Referendum in West- ern Sahara MNLA – The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad MSA – Movement for the Salvation of Azawad MUJAO – Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa NGO – Non-governmental Organisation RPG – Rocket-propelled Grenade SALW – Small Arms, Light Weaponry 14 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS SVBIED – Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device US – The United States UN MINUSMA – United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabili- zation Mission in Mali 15 INTRODUCTION 1 Introduction The African continent, due to the deteriorating security situation in the Sahel region, the Horn of Africa, Mozambique, and most recently central Africa, is quickly becoming one of the most significant regions for jihadist activity. When it comes to the intensity of fighting, it is dwarfed only by the Syrian and Iraqi theatres of jihad. Above this, the jihadi movement has been under- going an internal split since the rise of the Islamic State in 2014. The move- ment fragmented into two competing blocks represented by al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. The transnational competition between the groups turned vio- lent and recently moved its centre of competition to Africa.
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