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Home , Amram Mitzna, Binyamin Elon, Effi Eitam, Gideon Ezra, Haim Ramon, Meimad

ISRAEL'S 2003 ELECTIONS: A VICTORY FOR THE MODERATE RIGHT AND SECULAR CENTER By Cameron S. Brown*

This article analyzes the reasons for Prime Minister ’s re-election victory and considers what the vote represented in terms of the electorate’s views on various current issues and the balances among political parties in . The article also takes a brief look at the formation of the new and where it is most likely headed in the near term.

On January 28, 2003, Ariel Sharon throwing its leaders out of office gave became Israel’s first incumbent prime overwhelming approval for an encore minister to be re-elected since Menahem performance to a government that seemed Begin won a second term in 1981. As to fail on every front? opposed to Begin’s 1981 victory (when Beyond the battle between the he barely retained power, winning only country’s two largest parties, there were 0.5 percent more of the vote than his two other major trends in this election Labor party rival),(1) Sharon was re- worth noting. One is the weakening of elected in a landslide that doubled his sectarian politics in general, which had a party’s number of seats in the major impact on several Russian (see Table 1 below). immigrant parties. Another victim of this While this outcome surprised few, trend was --the Sephardi (Oriental), having been predicted by opinion polls Orthodox-led Jewish party that was the from the campaign’s start,(2) Sharon’s surprise success story of the 1999 victory seemed to mystify many political elections. Though it had jumped from 12 pundits in Israel and abroad. Well- to 17 Knesset seats in 1999, Shas lost known Ha’aretz commentator Yoel over one-third of its voter base in 2003, Marcus was especially flustered: which translated into a loss of 6 seats. Lastly, while Shas dropped back to During Sharon's 20 months in near-1996 levels, its main rival--, a office, the country has skidded staunch secular party--jumped from 6 downhill in every possible sphere: mandates to 15, replacing Shas as the The economy is six-feet under. third largest party. Combined with the More Israelis have been killed in sweeping victory mentioned Mr. Security’s day than under any above, Shinui’s triumph in these elections other prime minister. The man has enabled a development many once never come up with a peace thought impossible: a government formed initiative. We’ve been turned into without the Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) untouchables in the eyes of just parties--a first since 1974 and a very about the whole world. And important development for matters of despite it all, everyone still loves and state. Arik.(3) VICTORY FOR THE MODERATE So how is it that a country that RIGHT, LOSS FOR THE LEFT AND historically has no compunction about THE EXTREME RIGHT Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March, 2003) 77

Cameron S. Brown

The Israeli public took a significant second term from a position of incredible swing rightward following the failure of strength--both inside his party and in the the Camp David Summit in July 2000 Knesset as a whole. and the subsequent outbreak of violence The key factor for understanding the following September.(4) This shift Sharon’s seemingly paradoxical victory was a key factor in Sharon’s election in in the primaries and general election is 2001, though the longer-term effects were this: while the general security and not clear at that time. What has now economic situation over the past two become apparent is that the shift was to years has by all measures deteriorated the moderate right, with those who had drastically, leaders are not simply judged already been on the right actually having by their achievements. Rather, they are softened their positions to some degree judged by the accomplishments they regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. achieved versus the potential voters believe they had to achieve better results. Why Sharon Won If voters decide that their leaders are not Sharon was the election’s real victor, implementing the best solutions offered, though his Likud party shared in this they usually sack the incumbent. This is success, doubling its strength from 19 to what happened when voters decided that 38 seats. Before the national unity was not forthcoming government broke up in November 2002, enough on the peace process (1992); Sharon held less than one-third of the was too soft on security seats necessary to form a coalition (19 of (1996); Netanyahu was not advancing the 61). The Likud was wholly dependent on peace process as much as possible the agreement of a large coalition of (1999); and that was parties--first and foremost of whom was negotiating under fire and offering too Labor (26 seats). With Labor Party doves many dangerous concessions to the like and while getting nothing in railing daily against the decision to sit in return (2001). a unity government, Sharon had to In January 2003, the average voter appease enough of Labor’s demands to (and especially the crucial swing voter) let its leaders justify staying in the decided that, given the situation Sharon coalition. faced, no other candidate offered a more At the same time, attacking Sharon realistic solution or was likely to do from the right within the Likud party, better. The constraints Sharon faced former Prime Minister Benyamin included: Netanyahu was considered an even more 1) The Palestinians--or at least the serious challenge since his popularity militant groups that the leadership lets set within the party was formidable. Having the agenda--were bent on inflaming the led Sharon in opinion polls from January intifada. Most Israelis believe that groups through April,(5) an especially like and Islamic Jihad, which had foreboding sign of Netanyahu’s strength long rejected any peaceful solution and came in May 2002 when he convinced claimed terrorism could defeat Israel, the Likud Central Committee to vote would pursue such a policy no matter against any possibility of agreeing to the how Sharon responded to the intifada. establishment of a Palestinian state--over Equally, Palestinian polls showed that a Sharon’s strong objection.(6) plurality of Palestinians (nearly 50 Within 90 days of elections being percent) saw the intifada’s goal as Israel’s called, however, Sharon managed first to destruction.(7) To the average Israeli defeat Netanyahu in the Likud primaries voter, this meant Palestinian views and and then trounce Labor in the general policy--and not any excessive force or elections. As a result, Sharon began his failure to offer better peace terms by

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Sharon--had defined the conflict. Those situation and not the preference of Israelis Israelis unhappy about Israeli strategy or their long-term goals. For example, 63 were more likely to blame the previous percent of Israelis are ready to dismantle Labor-led government rather than the most settlements in the and current one for all the problems they were as part of a peace agreement facing. with the Palestinians and, until an 2) Most Israelis believe that at present agreement is reached, 64 percent support (and especially so long as Yasir Arafat a freeze on further expansion of these leads the Palestinian Authority) there is settlements.(12) no chance to end the conflict by This debate over unilateral withdrawal negotiations.(8) Most Israelis believe that did eventually translate into enough Barak’s Camp David and Taba proposals public pressure to force Sharon’s had been serious and very generous (for previous government to build a security many, even too generous, leaving Israel fence, though without a withdrawal, with nothing else to offer).(9) However, along part of the . In fact, if having seen that even those proposals there was one security-related issue that were insufficient for the Palestinian side, Sharon was significantly vulnerable on, it most Israelis decided that either the was that the majority of Israelis (59 Palestinians were not truly interested in a percent) thought he was moving too compromise peace settlement, or that if slowly in building the security fence.(13) they were, it was only one in which they Additionally, Sharon’s government had did almost no compromising. Moreover, only pledged to build a partial fence in a many Israelis believe that negotiating few selected areas--a strategy highly before the cessation of violence would unlikely to succeed in stopping terrorism. persuade the Palestinians that violence Sensing this vulnerability, Sharon’s had been successful in achieving political Labor opponent made gains, and could encourage them to return this into a significant, though not to that tactic in the future. decisive, campaign issue.(14) 3) Aside from doubting any negotiated 4) Sharon also benefited from the fact agreement was possible in the near that even voters who doubted there was a future, Israeli voters were also skeptical peaceful solution to the violence did not that the solution proposed by Sharon’s think a more aggressive approach would opponents--unilateral withdrawal from produce a better result. Especially since most of the West Bank and Gaza--would Israel began Operation Defensive Shield make Israel more secure.(10) While most in March 2002 and Operation Determined Israelis want a border that separates them Path in June, most believed there was from the Palestinians, such a withdrawal little the military should be doing that it was seen--as had happened with the was not doing already.(15) Barak concessions and the unilateral Moreover, during the campaign, withdrawal from southern Lebanon--as Israel’s forces seemed to have turned the more likely to escalate attacks than to tide of the conflict. Despite the many create a more peaceful situation. Lastly, foreign observers and statesmen who said while a fence would reduce the number Israel’s military effort--including of suicide bombers, it would not be able incursions into Palestinian areas--was to eliminate cross-border attacks or unlikely to work,(16) this strategy attacks on settlements, and would be produced substantial results. While terror totally ineffective against rocket attacks organizations conducted attacks on a near similar to those that hit Israeli towns daily basis in the first three months of surrounding the Gaza Strip.(11) 2002--sometimes even two a day--these This evaluation represented a Israeli offensives crippled their consensus judgment on the existing infrastructure and reduced their ability to Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March, 2003) 79

Cameron S. Brown conduct terror attacks. By the time of the the foreign press was intent on labeling elections, Israeli forces were thwarting his positions “hardline.”(18) One between 15 and 40 attempted attacks for prominent move was his consistent call every one that succeeded. for another national unity government, 5) Economically, it was clear that despite Labor having abandoned the three major problems were taking a heavy previous one. Sharon also refused to bend toll but none were blamed on the to the right-wing National Union (NU) government. The first was the inevitable party’s demand in November 2002 to effect of the intifada on foreign create a truly hardline government. investment and the tourism sector, both Sharon continued this policy after the important sources of foreign currency and elections by promising not to invite the employment. The second setback was the NU to be part of the coalition--unless it worldwide recession, especially affecting agreed to all coalition guidelines. the high-tech sector--which had driven Most convincing were Sharon’s Israel’s economic growth in the 1990s. repeated statements about accepting the Third, facing one of the worst recessions Bush Administration’s “road map” in the country’s history, combined with (which 59 percent of Israelis significant inflation and a fear of worse to support),(19) and his readiness to make come, most voters understood that “painful concessions” in negotiations, painful budget cutbacks were required. including the formation of a Palestinian Indeed, while similar economic crises in state. While many commentators found other countries have often produced these words hollow, in standing by these opposition politicians who decry positions in front of his hardline Likud government budget cuts and promise to central committee months before increase spending, such populist rhetoric elections had even been announced, was entirely absent in this election.(17) Sharon demonstrated a degree of This is not to suggest that people were commitment that convinced many voters happy with the cutbacks or felt that his stance on the issue was genuine. government policy to be right on every issue. In particular, Finance Minister How Mitzna and Labor Lost the Elections produced a series of Still another reason for Sharon’s budget proposals based on unrealistic massive victory was that the Labor party growth estimates, while the Bank of sabotaged itself very effectively and Israel’s governor, David Klein was drove away moderate swing voters. As foolishly persuaded to reduce interest New York Times columnist Thomas rates--two mistakes that proved Friedman summed up: disastrous for the economy. Yet, most experts placed the blame for these [Another reason Sharon will win] mistakes on Shalom (who was replaced is the failure of Israel’s Labor after the election) and Klein. Most party to develop an alternative to importantly, a majority of voters the Sharon policy…. [Mitzna’s recognized that the most critical factors problem] is not that he is causing the difficult economic situation advocating what 70 percent of were outside of the government’s control. Israelis want--separation from the Beyond the fact that few people saw Palestinians and giving up most of any good alternatives to Sharon’s the settlements. Rather it is that he policies, another reason Sharon won was has not persuaded Israelis, on a that he made several significant moves to gut level, that he and his party are signal to the public that he truly tough enough to bring this about represents the Israeli moderate consensus in a safe way.(20) in dealing with the Palestinians, even if

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Mitzna’s failure of persuasion rested negotiations from the point at which the mainly with his proposed path for parties had left off at Taba. While most achieving the end goal of separation.(21) Israelis believe that Israel had already His approach even convinced many offered all it could, Mitzna was clearly Israelis who had supported past Labor signaling an intention to go beyond that candidates and major concessions to the limit. The Likud credibly suggested that Palestinians that electing him would be Mitzna was willing to offer the return of dangerous for the country’s security. hundreds of thousands of Palestinian That proposed path included at least four refugees into Israel--a notion even electorally disastrous elements. rejected by several outspoken peace First, Mitzna said he would “fight activists like and David terror as if there were no negotiations, Grossman.(23) and negotiate as if there was no terror.” Finally, Mitzna promised that his first However, this slogan was seen by most priority as prime minister (even before Israelis as reversing Israel’s historic negotiations began) would be to policy, including that adopted by withdraw unilaterally from the Gaza Strip Mitzna’s own Labor party predecessors, and immediately dismantle all settlements as well as abandoning one of Israel’s there. Moreover, even should main points of leverage. Moreover, the negotiations fail, Mitzna intended to problem of terrorism was not merely that withdraw unilaterally from the West it provoked emotional reactions by Bank. While the proposition of unilateral Israelis, but that they saw it was an withdrawal was already controversial, important indication of the perceptions, Israelis regarded Mitzna’s proposal as a strategy and goals of the Palestinian surefire strategy for future negotiations to leadership which could not be ignored. fail, as it gave the Palestinians no Continuing to battle the tide of Israeli incentive to make any reciprocal consensus, Mitzna stated his willingness concessions or even diminish the level of to negotiate with Arafat, saying that it violence. was for Israelis to decide who would be On all these points, Mitzna had lost so their and for the Palestinians to much credibility that his declaration only decide who would be theirs. Yet, the a few weeks before the election that he PA’s ruler had lost all credibility among would not join a unity government under Israelis since the failure of Camp David any circumstances simply became one in July 2000, with the majority also more position undercutting his own considering him responsible for the support.(24) After all, one of the main outbreak of the intifada. Even Yossi rationales for swing voters--or those with Sarid, head of the left-wing party, doubts about Mitzna’s stance--would be had publicly given up on negotiating with that a stronger Labor party might join a Arafat.(22) Even outside of Israel, U.S. coalition and moderate Sharon. But once policy at the time saw Arafat as a barrier voters were presented with an all-or- to peace and Arafat’s standing in Europe nothing option regarding Mitzna, most and even in the Arab world was at one of did not hesitate to choose the latter its lowest points. Therefore, most swing alternative. voters saw Mitzna’s idea as a giant step But if Mitzna’s positions were so backward at a time when pressure was on divergent from the present Israeli the Palestinians to find a more moderate consensus, why did the Labor party leadership. membership choose a candidate so The third aspect of Mitzna’s platform obviously unable to win the swing vote, that troubled many voters (and which and so in a sense, forfeit the election? Likud ads used effectively against him) The question is especially pertinent was his willingness to begin the considering that the party primaries were Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March, 2003) 81

Cameron S. Brown held only two months before the general kept it in government, unless the party election, thus leaving Mitzna with made a major change it would never have insufficient time to moderate his a chance of leading a government.(28) positions in order to capture the political Another major element of Mitzna’s center. victory in the primaries was that, in One of the key reasons for Mitzna’s contrast to the well-known figures of victory in the primaries was suggested by Labor’s left-wing, who had little or no a poll taken for the Israeli TV talk show chance of winning an election, Mitzna at “Politika” on the eve of Labor’s least represented something new. He was primaries. About 60 percent of party an outsider to national politics, even members favored remaining in the though he was the sitting mayor of opposition after the general elections as for the past eight years. The attempts of opposed to the 28 percent who felt that his rivals in the party primaries to portray Labor should re-enter a national unity him as a political novice (they used the government.(25) It seems that the core of army term “tiron,” meaning the rank of Labor supporters were not aiming to win private) backfired. With the current polls the 2003 election, but rather voted showing that Sharon would win in any according to what they considered to be case, the party’s voters could afford to in the long-term interest of the party. take a chance and think in terms of With the Labor party struggling for finding a new, long-term leadership.(29) survival, its members decided that the This did not mean that Labor would party’s only chance to recover was to inevitably lose by a huge margin. ensure that it developed a unique policy Mitzna’s mistakes did matter. For alternative, and thus regain their political example, only a week before the general identity--even if that meant spending four elections, one poll found that if veteran years in opposition. Yoel Marcus Labor politician and former Prime remarked that Mitzna’s support in the Minister Shimon Peres had been running primaries showed that party members at the head of the Labor list, the party “are sick of trailing after the Likud… would have received 29 mandates instead [and] want an alternative.”(26) of 19.(30) While Shimon Peres always During the nearly two years spent as a does best in elections he is not running junior partner in the Likud-led in,(31) the poll did demonstrate that government, Labor was unable to voters were repulsed by the specific mobilize its own supporters or put candidate the party was fielding for the an alternative policy. Moreover, premiership at least as much as they were the coalition government was entangled disenchanted with the party itself. with the party leadership struggle, since Benyamin Ben-Eliezer, Labor’s leader, A Loss for the Extreme Right as well got along well with Sharon and The aspect of the 2003 election most represented this partnership strategy.(27) commonly overlooked was that the losers Many also found that, while Ariel Sharon were not only on the left but on the had the final say on policy, as members extreme right as well.(32) Having always of the coalition the party shared in the fiercely opposed the and responsibility for government policy, rejected yielding captured territory-- leaving Labor without the ability to claiming it would lead to the type of criticize its rival’s failures. At the same violence that did occur--the extreme right time, ironically, the more Labor expected the rightward swing of many influenced the government and Israeli voters would also strengthen their moderated Sharon’s positions, the more it numbers. strengthened his power and general Instead, many rightist voters rallied popularity. While Ben-Eliezer’s stance for a more centrist national unity

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Israel's 2003 Elections: A Victory for the Moderate Right and Secular Center position. First, the (Freedom) are also the religious-secular and party headed by Michael Kleiner--whose communal divides.(37) While the 1999 slogans were “It’s us or them” and “Only elections had brought sectarian-based by force”--failed even to pass the 1.5 parties (specifically those representing percent threshold required to enter the Sephardi and recent Russian- Knesset.(33) Another indication was that speaking immigrants) to their highest the next most extreme party, the National level of influence ever, the 2003 elections Union, actually lost one mandate in the dealt a harsh blow to these same 2003 elections. Finally, Netanyahu’s parties.(38) resounding defeat in the Likud primaries The hardest hit in the 2003 elections (losing to Sharon by a 16 percent margin) were the numerous parties which sought was also a loss for the far right, as to represent recent immigrants from the Netanyahu had campaigned on a platform former . With over 1 million closely resembling that of the National people having immigrated to Israel from Union, namely no Palestinian state and the former USSR since 1987 (making the immediate expulsion of Arafat. them one-sixth of the total population), In fact, this election actually added there had arisen several distinctly Russian credence to what numerous opinion polls parties, three of which had had already demonstrated: the rightward representatives in the Knesset after the swing of many Israelis was only half of a 1999 elections. In 2003, none of the new two-part phenomenon. The second half Russian parties attracted nearly enough was that, in terms of their positions support to pass the 1.5 percent threshold, regarding a permanent solution to the and all three parties that had been in the conflict with the Palestinians, many parts previous Knesset disappeared, having of Israeli society have actually swung merged with parties that shared their leftwards. A telling indication of this views on the Arab-Israeli conflict. larger trend is that a plurality of Likud On the far right, ’s party members (not central committee Yisrael Beitenu (“Israel is our home”) members) now supports the emergence of joined with the National Union during the a Palestinian state.(34) course of the previous term. On the far A second indication is that while left, ’s Democratic many Israelis were once largely Choice party, which had previously split indifferent to the settlements, most are from Yisrael biAliya, merged into Meretz now unsympathetic: 62 percent are during the election campaign.(39) Yisrael willing to dismantle most settlements in a biAliya itself, led by , peace agreement (up from 38 percent two only managed to win two seats and joined years ago); a clear majority believes in with the Likud two weeks after the freezing settlement expansion; and 70 election. percent of Israelis support tough One might suggest that these mergers governmental policy against extreme represent the beginning of this group’s Israeli elements in the West Bank and absorption into Israeli society. More Gaza Strip, even if this results in a likely, however, is that these parties confrontation with settlers (53 percent found it politically necessary to merge believe that the Israeli government is not with other parties to retain influence in strict enough in this regard).(35) the Knesset at all. The poor electoral performance of these parties was partially THE DEMISE OF SECTARIAN due to the renewed Palestinian-Israeli PARTIES violence, which pushed more of the Israeli politics have always involved electorate to vote along security rather divisions across three issues: the debate than sectarian lines. An equally important over the Arab-Israeli conflict,(36) there factor was that the election law--which Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March, 2003) 83

Cameron S. Brown since 1996 had given the public one vote a rival party called “Ahavat Yisrael” for prime minister and another for the (Love of Israel) under the spiritual legislature--had reverted to its previous guidance of the 100-year-old Kabbalist, form of one vote for one party. While Yitzhak Kaduri.(42) Competing many had previously availed themselves for precisely the same votes, Ahavat of the chance to cast one vote for prime Yisrael was considered a major threat that minister, based on national--i.e., security- could divide support for Shas. -issues, and a second based on sectarian The outlook for Shas was so bad that, considerations, this option was no longer at the beginning of the election campaign, available. most polls predicted it would end up with This change, brought about in large only 8 Knesset seats. It appears that what measure due to concern that too many saved Shas from an even more small parties were making it hard and humiliating defeat was Ahavat Yisrael’s costly to assemble a ruling coalition, had failure to rally sufficient support, the a significant impact on the elections. It corruption scandal that erupted following strengthened bigger parties at the expense the Likud primaries, and the rise of of smaller ones, as Labor and Likud Shinui (below), which triggered a combined gained 10 percent more seats in counter-reaction. 2003 than in 1999. It also caused a drop in both the number of parties running for THE RISE OF SHINUI Knesset (31 in 1999 versus 26 in Yet for one small party, even the 2003)(40) and the number of parties in intifada and the change in election laws the Knesset (15 parties elected in 1999 was insufficient to thwart its appeal. and 19 when dissolved versus 12 at Apart from the Likud, the only other clear present).(41) winner in the 2003 elections was Shinui These same factors were similarly (Change), a secular party led by former detrimental for Shas--the Sephardi journalist Yosef “Tommy” Lapid. From Orthodox-led party that had probably the 6 mandates it won in 1999, the party benefited more than any other from the multiplied its representation in 2003 to previous two-ballot system. Most of its 15, becoming the Knesset’s third largest voters were Likud supporters, but as party.(43) these voters were able to cast ballots for What was the secret to Shinui’s both parties under the old system, they spectacular success? Like Shas in the had given Shas an ever increasing previous election, the meteoric rise of number of mandates: 6 mandates in 1992, Shinui is best explained as the political 10 in 1996, 17 in 1999. In 2003, manifestation of underlying social however, the party dropped down to 11 discontent; in this case, discontent that mandates, capturing only 8 percent of the had been gaining in intensity since the vote (as opposed to 13 percent in 1999). early 1990s. From the perspective of Shas’s One long-standing issue is the leadership, however, things could have commonly held view that ultra-Orthodox turned out much worse. The last four people do not bear their proper share of years had created an unbridgeable rift the national burden. As part of an between the party’s spiritual guide agreement since the founding of the state, and its former charismatic Israel has exempted Haredi leader Arieh Deri (who spent most of (Jewish seminary) students from serving those years in prison for a bribery in the army. If students leave the yeshiva conviction), leaving Deri out of politics. to work, however, their exemptions are This rift also forced out most of the major no longer valid; therefore, most choose to figures who had supported Deri within continue their studies and are Shas. As a result, these supporters created subsequently supported by the state. In

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Israel's 2003 Elections: A Victory for the Moderate Right and Secular Center addition, the Haredi sector is provided generally advocates a separation of with its own separate school system, one religion and state, something along the that trains its youth for religious studies lines of the American model. but does not bestow the tools necessary The two most comprehensive surveys for taking an active role in the economy on the religious behavior and beliefs of (such as English, math, or computer Israeli Jews (carried out in 1991 and skills). 1999) demonstrated widespread public When the number of Haredim (the support for most of Shinui’s main plural of Haredi) was small, the proposals: inequality could be overlooked. However, as the Haredi population has grown, so • drafting yeshiva students (85-90 too has the number of youth receiving percent say “yes” and exemptions and the amounts of money “definitely yes”); allocated to the Haredi sector, which • public transportation on the produces proportionately little in tax Sabbath (63-65 percent say revenue. This, in turn, greatly angered “yes” and “definitely yes”); many secular Israelis, who have to spend • institution of civil marriage (43- several years on active military duty (and 49 percent say “yes” and in reserve duty afterwards), suffer more “definitely yes”, although only casualties, and pay more in taxes in order 15 percent say they would get to support the lifestyle of the Haredim. married solely in a civil In fact, while other small parties service); suffered from the worsening security and • cutting government funding for economic situation, in Shinui’s case, it the Ministry of Religious appears to have helped the party Affairs (39 percent say “yes” significantly. With the non-Haredi sectors and “definitely yes”).(44) having to bear the brunt of the mounting security and financial burden, Shinui The inability of the traditional secular tapped into the discontent of the middle party, Meretz, to bring about any change classes who found themselves serving on these issues led many voters to huge amounts of reserve duty on the one abandon it for Shinui. Since Meretz hand and squeezed financially by the vowed never to join a Likud-led recession and tax burden on the other. government, it was also sure to remain While there had been resentment for the powerless and in opposition post Haredi sector before the intifada began, elections. As opposed to Meretz, Shinui the inequity has simply become successfully portrayed itself as a truly unbearable for many since. centrist party on security issues (i.e., Another source of secular discontent is more moderate than Labor for those who what secular Israelis refer to as “kfiyah thought that party had gone too far to the datit” (religious coercion)--especially left) and as a defender of middle class laws which mandate, for example, that interests. most stores are closed and that there is no After the 2003 election, Shinui was public transportation on the Sabbath. In easily able to reach an agreement with the addition, all areas of personal status (NRP)--which (marriage, divorce, and burial) are represents the Orthodox nationalist sector outside of civil jurisdiction, and are and has its own rivalry with the Haredi handled instead by each religion’s official parties--and join a government led by bodies. Yet, a significant proportion of Sharon. The question will be whether it Israelis despise being forced to accept can fulfill its promises and become a these religious dictates. Instead of the long-term major party or whether it will status quo, this section of society prove to be a temporary phenomenon. Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March, 2003) 85

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Shinui’s sweeping victory created for a woman candidate on its list. While enormous expectations from its voters, Shas is still not ready to cross that line, it such that a failure to implement its did feel the need to hold a highly platform could bring its downfall.(45) publicized gathering for the female On the other hand, should Shinui be supporters of the party--a gathering that too successful--especially on certain emphasized over and over again that sensitive issues--the backlash could drive women do have a strong influence in away traditional or religious voters from Shas, even if it is behind the scenes. The the Likud. Accordingly, Sharon must be shift has also been felt on the ministerial careful, agreeing to implement changes level, as Sharon’s previous government where there is a broad consensus but not included a record high of three women going so far as to alienate elements of his ministers and two deputy ministers.(48) own party. It is interesting to note that in response THE NEW COALITION to the unpopularity of the Haredim, as GOVERNMENT well as long-term structural changes Though the Likud party won a within the community, United tremendous victory in the election, the (UTJ, an Ashkenazi Haredi party needed to find coalition partners party) has begun moving toward a more with 21 seats in order to have the 61 Zionist position, which represents required to form a government. How nothing less than a quiet ideological Sharon chose to form his government and revolution. For example, despite its the coalition agreement the parties signed historic explicit denunciation of Jewish are indicative of its likely policy priorities statehood, the UTJ’s campaign slogan in (see Table 3 below).(49) the 2003 elections was “The difference Aside from managing the conflict with between a plain, ordinary (stam) state and the Palestinians, Sharon has to handle a Jewish state.” A second indicator is that two key issues: improving the economy in its failed coalition negotiations with and altering the status of the Haredim. In the Likud, the UTJ agreed for the first order to make progress in either area, time to take a ministerial post instead of Sharon could not form a coalition with merely the chairmanship of a either Shas or UTJ. Sharon was also parliamentary committee.(46) In the unwilling to repeat his previous mistake future, the more the Hardei parties will of allowing the UTJ to chair the powerful feel they are losing the conflict with Knesset Finance Committee, a move that Shinui, the more likely this change will had allowed it to extort extra funds by accelerate. threatening to hold up the budget. Another noteworthy shift is the larger At the same time, Sharon was role of women in high political roles, a unwilling to form a government situation largely brought about by an completely devoid of religious parties. increasing number of parties using Accordingly, the first agreement he primaries to determine their candidates initialed was with the NRP. Though after and leadership. Traditionally, the number the election Mitzna had showed some of female members in parliament hovered signs of backtracking on his promise not between 8 and 10. But in the Knesset to join a coalition, it was clearly not his elected in 1999 there were 16 female preference, and he was likely to agree MKs (Members of Knesset), and in 2003, only if the Likud would concede to nearly that number rose to 18 women.(47) This all of Labor’s demands. Even should trend even forced the religious parties to Sharon acquiesce, due to its internal grapple more seriously with the issue. For resistance to sitting in a unity government example, for the first time the National (see above), Labor was almost certain to Religious Party reserved a realistic place be a highly unreliable partner. Given this

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Israel's 2003 Elections: A Victory for the Moderate Right and Secular Center predicament, Sharon had little incentive fence in the West Bank, covering about to keep out parties that took half the border there.(51) uncompromising positions on The issue where the current negotiations with the Palestinians. In government cannot make substantial addition, once Sharon had a religious progress is towards peace, though here party, he could more easily turn to the voters’ expectations are low. If this Shinui, which was eager for progress on question does come back to center stage, both the economic and religious fronts. though, Sharon is in a position to accept a While these two parties gave Sharon a settlement freeze in practice, as he has 61-seat government, he decided to initial already done in principle. The NRP and an agreement with the National Union for National Union might threaten to leave added leverage should the NRP prove a the government in this situation, though hesitant partner. Sharon might be able to avoid this From this base, the coalition has a outcome. chance to succeed on four immediate If, however, more far-reaching issues: negotiations with the Palestinians are able • Cancellation of a law giving to resume, presumably following a real preference to large families, cease-fire and perhaps accompanied by designed to provide added Arafat’s weakening or replacement, subsidies to the Haredim (whose Sharon would need to convince Labor to population growth rates are the enter another national unity government highest in Israel). to be able to deliver on negotiation • Dismantling the Religious Affairs promises. While Labor currently assures ministry, with many of its powers Sharon that it will provide a safety net moving to the Interior Ministry’s from outside the government, under these jurisdiction. circumstances the pressure from the • Repealing the “Tal Law” which public and party members would likely continued the large-scale push Labor to rejoin the coalition. deferment of yeshiva If the Palestinians were to make a students.(50) serious and credible effort to achieve a • A massive tax and compromise peace, Israeli public opinion reform to reduce the public sector, would shift accordingly. Sharon will have lighten the tremendous tax to respond to any opportunities, but given burden, and stimulate the his own credibility across the political economy. spectrum, he would be in a good position to do so--if he could overcome his own In tandem with such moves, the new ideological convictions. Conversely, government will try to cut the budget and should the Palestinians refuse to rein in relieve some of the secular public’s terrorism and end the intifada, he will discontent, which could also involve likely continue to enjoy his current levels alterations in laws regarding personal of support. status, especially marriage. Addressing Of course, a key factor here is other issues on which he has been Sharon’s age: How many years will he be criticized, Sharon forced Silvan Shalom able to continue as prime minister? For from the Finance Ministry, replacing him the current political balances of power are with Netanyahu (a move also designed to very much dependent on his presence. undercut his principal rival by giving him Netanyahu would be the most likely a tough, unpopular job that removes him successor, though he is generally a much from security issues) and ordered the more polarizing figure. Additionally, construction of at least 160 kilometers of Sharon has tried to strengthen several of

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Opinion on National Security 2002, pp. fence, Palestinians will spend a day 10, 16-17. celebrating that most of the occupation 9. According to a poll taken by the Harry has ended, and the next day will continue S. Truman Research Institute for the the intifada, in order to obtain the rest of Advancement of Peace immediately their demands…. In fact, Palestinians following the breakdown of the Camp may fight more fiercely if they feel their David talks, 57 percent of Israelis held terror has forced Israel into a new that Barak had compromised too much. ghetto.” David Grossman, “Illusions of a 12, 2002 10. Specific polls on the subject of public . period asked, which organization was 12. Palestinian Center for Policy and conducting the polling, and most Survey Research and The Harry S. importantly, the specific polling question Truman Research Institute for the asked. When the number of terrorist Advancement of Peace, “Palestinian and attacks climaxed in the spring of 2002, Israeli Public Opinion Poll - November support for unilateral separation neared 2002, Summary of Results.” 60 percent, though only when asked West Bank while annexing 80 percent of 13. Poll taken from the Israeli TV show the settler population (Ma’ariv, April 12, “Politika,” January 7, 2003. 2002). In periods of relative calm or 14. The topic of building a fence the when asked about a full withdrawal from entire length of the Green Line figured the West Bank, the amount of support prominently in Labor’s election was always below half (Yedioth Ahronot, advertisement campaign (ta’amulat May 4, 2002; and Arian, Israeli Public bichirot). Opinion on National Security 2002, p. 15. There were several additional reasons 26). why more punishing policies were not Mark Heller made an important point supported by most Israelis: 1) very few when he said that the support for Israelis are anxious to resume a full, unilateral separation was largely support permanent occupation of either the West for the idea in principle only, as “the Bank or the Gaza Strip; 2) Israelis same polls also show the majority understand that international opinion is breaking down before any attempt to against any extreme Israeli retaliation, translate the principle into a concrete line with the threat of UN condemnation, or on the ground.” Mark A Heller, “The worse yet, limited economic sanctions by Challenges Facing Israel’s Peace several European countries hovering Candidate,” Observer, January 5, 2003 overhead; and 3) most Israelis believe in . One of the ideas raised by the 11. While likely to hear these arguments extreme right is transferring part of the from political conservatives or the Palestinian population to Jordan. Though military, these ideas were certainly not lately there has been a slight rise in the limited to them. For instance, peace percent of Israelis supporting the notion activist and author David Grossman of transfer, a clear majority disagrees wrote, “Last month in London, I heard with the idea. See for instance, Arian, Yasir Abed Rabbo, the Palestinian Israeli Public Opinion on National information minister, say in a Security 2002, pp. 27-30. conversation with Israelis from the peace 16. This included the adoption of UN camp that if Israel withdraws behind a Security Council Resolution 1402. Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March, 2003) 89

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between what Arafat tells me in In Kofi Annan’s statement at the conversation and what takes place time, after condemning the Palestinian afterwards in reality...” and concluded terror attacks, saying they would bring that any further negotiations with Arafat them no closer to establishing a would be “a waste of time.” Palestinian state, he went on to condemn consistently voiced criticism over Israel’s 23. Oz wrote in an op-ed in July 2000: use of disproportionate lethal force, Now [Arafat] demands that the especially in civilian populated areas in Palestinian exiles should return response to these attacks. Such use of not only to Palestine, but also to force will bring neither peace nor security Israel, thus upsetting the to Israel.” demographic balance and . 26th Arab country…. The 17. If anything, the watchword of these Palestinians have a right to their elections--from the day they were own free and independent announced--was “national responsibility” Palestine. But if they also want to (ahriyut leumit). have Israel, they should know that 18. See, for instance, “Labor Party they will find me ready to defend Continues Slide in Polls a Week Before my country: an old peace activist Election,” Associated Press, January 20, ready to fight for the survival of 2003. Israel. 19. Palestinian Center for Policy and Amos Oz, “Specter of Saladin,” New Survey Research and The Harry S. York Times, July 28, 2000. Truman Research Institute for the For David Grossman on the Advancement of Peace, “Palestinian and refugee issue, see especially “A Heart Israeli Public Opinion Poll - November Aches as Peace Slips Away” Los Angeles 2002, Summary of Results.” Times, January 14, 2001 20. Thomas Friedman, “The New Math,” . misdiagnose Israeli reluctance to follow and January 16, 2003 him: “‘People are in fear -- they are in a . The me as we rode around one morning. polls show a slight drop, from 22 to 19 ‘They have lost confidence that you are mandates. In other words, Labor was able to negotiate with the other side, so clearly going to lose the elections well they stick to what they know--even if it is before the announcement. Moreover, it is not working. What I am trying to bring is very difficult to claim that Mitzna’s logic and the truth, but people are announcement was even the primary thinking from their guts.’” Thomas reason for this small downward slide. A Friedman, “Israel Waits for Godot,” New more important factor was that York Times, January 19, 2003. accusations of corruption, which had . to Labor as well. For instance, a Ha’aretz 22. Ma’ariv, June 21, 2002. Sarid said poll conducted at the same time found that “I have simply come to the that 48.6 percent of Israelis believed

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Likud and Labor were comparably view that Sharon’s party had betrayed its corrupt; 26.1 percent believed Likud was traditional positions. more corrupt, and 10.9 percent thought 34. It is important to note that this Labor was more corrupt. (Ha’aretz, support is not automatic. For instance, January 16, 2003). when Likud supporters are asked if they . question “assuming the terror stops and 25. Marketwatch and Politika poll, Arafat doesn’t rule the Palestinian November 19, 2002. Authority anymore,” then Likud support 26. Yoel Marcus “Bluffing Time is reaches nearly 50 percent. Ma'ariv, Over,” Ha’aretz, November 8, 2002. December 6, 2002. In fact, under those 27. Although Ben-Eliezer did pull Labor same conditions, a plurality of Likud out of the coalition in November 2002, it voters (47 percent) also support the was clearly a move he was forced into evacuation of all the settlements in the taking, as he was trailing in the upcoming Gaza Strip. Labor party primaries (only a few weeks 35. Palestinian Center for Policy and away) and the majority of Labor voters Survey Research and The Harry S. disagreed with Ben-Eliezer’s strategy. If Truman Research Institute for the the move had been genuine, it would Advancement of Peace, “Palestinian and have come earlier and Ben-Eliezer would Israeli Public Opinion Poll - November not have pushed Mitzna to re-enter a 2002, Summary of Results.” unity government following the elections. 36. Many Middle East experts comment 28. Haim Ramon, the other contender for about the enormous role the Arab-Israeli the position of chairman, actually was Conflict plays in the discourse of Arab one of the first to offer many of the countries, and how much the political alternative positions that Mitzna held. To processes of those countries get weighed his detriment, Ramon has created a great down (and the necessary democratic deal of resentment within the Labor party reforms get postponed) by the constant for his past actions, and simply lacks attention given to the conflict. It is worth charisma and often comes off poorly on noting that a similar process has occurred television interviews. Moreover, as a in Israeli politics, shown by the fact that younger politician, he also lacks the since the beginning of Zionist politics, stature of a national leader, someone most parties have first and foremost been capable of assuming the massive burden defined by their stance towards the of the premiership. Arabs, and only then by their stances on 29. See for instance, Yediot Ahronot, all other issues. November 8, 2002. 37. I refer to this as communal rather 30. Ma’ariv, January 20, 2003 than ethnic, as “Jewish” is considered by . ethnic identity, followed by their “aida” 31. For an excellent overview of this (community). While the recent Russian phenomenon, see Yossi Verter “‘Peres immigration would usually fall under the Effect’ strikes again,” Ha’aretz, January Ashkenazi category, their status in Israel 21, 2003. is significantly different than that of most 32. One of the very few to notice was other Ashkenazi groups, due to their Efraim Inbar. See: “Winning the Center,” numbers and general lack of integration. Jerusalem Post, February 9, 2003. 38. For an overview analysis of the 1999 33. The party’s name, the original name elections, see Barry Rubin, “Israel’s of what is now the Likud--illustrated its Election and New Government Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March, 2003) 91

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Coalition,” MERIA News, Vol. 3, Issue 7 Levinsohn, and Elihu Katz, Beliefs, (June 1999) Observances, and Social Interaction . Guttman Israel Institute of Applied Social 39. See Jerusalem Post, November 25, Research, December 1993). 2002. The party’s leader was given the 45. Since the signing of the coalition number 5 spot on the Meretz list, thus agreement, there have already been virtually guaranteeing him a seat in the several signs of this disappointment, for Knesset, whereas had the party run alone, instance: Moti Dinus, “When Tommy it was unlikely to have passed the 1.5 betrayed me,” Yediot Ahronot, February percent threshold. 25, 2003; and “Editorial: Where's the 40. David Magen’s Center Party change?” Ha'aretz, February 24, 2003. officially announced it was withdrawing 46. Ha’aretz, February 21, 2003. two days before the 2003 elections, 47. For the list of current women though official tallies still included the members, see the Knesset website: party. . For Sharon wielded in conducting coalition essays on previous representation, see R. negotiations, Ha’aretz columnist Uzi Werczberger, “The Advancement of the Benziman seems to have underrated the Status of Women - Israel 2001” change: “Yesterday’s vote shows, among and MK , ballot system has not met expectations: “Women in Public Life” . the 16th Knesset has failed to create two 48. The ministers were in Education, large parties, equal in power; it has not Industry and Trade and Regional significantly cut the number of factions Development, the deputy ministers were and it has not strengthened the ruling in National Infrastructure and Defense. ability of the elected government.” Uzi 49. The government’s basic guidelines Benziman, “Was Returning to the Single can be found at: (Hebrew version) Ballot System a Mistake?” Ha’aretz, (English version) inane thought that any system should power. 50. With a non-military alternative 42. For more on the party, see Avirama available, this could easily be applied to Golan, “Party Backed by Rabbi Kedourie Arab-Israelis as well. Such a move has Announces Political Platform,” Ha’aretz, the potential to drastically improve the November 19, 2002. tarnished relations between the State and 43. Shinui had actually been a party its Arab citizens, as they would then elected to the Knesset in 1981, 1984, and become equally eligible for the numerous 1988, but had disappeared until Lapid’s benefits granted to veterans of military or takeover in 1999. national service. 44. Shlomit Levy, Hanna Levinsohn, and 51. Ha’aretz, March 6, 2003. Elihu Katz, Beliefs and Observance of (Jerusalem: Louis Guttman Israel 52. Ma’ariv, Yediot Ahronot, and Institute of Applied Social Research, Ha’aretz, January 30, 31, 2003. There 2002), pp. 21-24 and Appendix A, pp. were a few alterations in the number of 10-12. See also Shlomit Levy, Hanna mandates made after the votes of all

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Israel's 2003 Elections: A Victory for the Moderate Right and Secular Center soldiers and foreign diplomats were with Balad. The qualifying counted, which gave Likud and NRP an threshold (1.5%) from all valid votes is additional seat each, at the expense of 47,226 votes. The number of votes per and Hadash. mandate is 25,138. 53. Percentage of votes come from the 54. Yediot Ahronot, January 30, 2003, Knesset website: “24 Hours” supplement, p. 2. These . Surplus vote election coverage can be found at agreements meant that number of . percentage of votes received. The following parties signed such agreements: Labor with Meretz, Shinui with Greens, National Union with Yisrael biAliya, NRP with Am Ehad, Shas with UTJ, and

Table 1: General Election Results (number of mandates in parentheses is from 1999 election)

Party Mandates(52) Percent of Vote(53) Likud* 38 (19) 29.39 Avodah- (Labor) 19 (26) 14.46 Shinui (Change) 15 (6) 12.28 Shas 11 (17) 8.22 National Union (NU-HaIchud 7 (8) 5.53 HaLeumi) Meretz 6 (10) 5.21 National Religious Party 6 (5) 4.20 (NRP-Mafdal) United (UTJ) 5 (5) 4.29 One Nation (Am Ehad) 3 (2) 2.76 Democratic Front for Peace 3 (3) 2.98 and Equality (Hadash) National Democratic Assembly 3 (2) 2.26 (Balad) Yisrael biAliya (Israel by 2 (6) 2.15 Immigration)* (Ra’am) 2 (5) 2.08 Others under 1.5%** 0 (6) 4.18 Total 120 99.99%

*Yisrael biAliya merged with Likud after the elections (February 7, 2003), giving the Likud and additional 2 mandates (totaling 40 seats). **Other parties who did not pass the 1.5% threshold: Ahavat Yisrael (0.17%), Center (0.06%), Citizen and State (0.05%), Democratic Action Organization (0.06%), Green Leaf (Ale Yarok) (1.20%), Greens (Hayerukim) (0.41%), Herut (1.15%), Lahava (0.04%), Leeder (0.03%), Men`s Rights in the Family (Ra-ash) (0.04%), Progressive National Alliance (0.65%), (0.06%), Yisrael Aheret (0.23%), Za-am - (0.03%) Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March, 2003) 93

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Table 2: The Demographic Breakdown of the Election Results (by percent)(54)

Tel- Old New Religious Arab West Bank Party Jerusalem Haifa Aviv cities cities cities sector settlements Likud 27.8 28.4 28.2 35.2 36.0 8.4 2.3 28.6 6.9 Labor-Meimad 9 22.6 22.3 17.2 8.8 2 6.3 4 45.5 Shinui 6.9 15.5 16.4 16.6 11.3 2.1 6.6 7.8 Shas 12.6 7.2 2.9 6.9 12.4 22.8 2.4 8.5 0.5 National Union 5.6 2.6 6.1 5.2 8.7 2.2 0.4 15.6 1.3 Meretz 4.8 11.1 5.4 4.6 2.5 4.2 1.4 27 NRP 6.5 2.5 2.8 4.3 3.4 5.6 14.4 3.7 UTJ 18.6 1.3 2 1.5 3.1 51.2 10.8 One Nation 1.4 1.8 2.6 3.8 5 0.7 0.9 Hadash 2.4 28.8 Balad 2.2 21.4 Ra’am 18.6 Yisrael biAliya 1.9 3.6 2.1 4.1 0.4 1.7 0.4

Table 3: The 30th Government

Prime Minister Ariel Sharon (Likud) Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom (Likud) Defense Minister (Likud) Finance Minister Benyamin Netanyahu and (Likud) Justice Minister Yosef “Tommy” Lapid (Shinui) Education, Culture and Sport Minister (Likud) Labor and Social Affairs Minister (National Religious Party) Interior Minister Poraz (Shinui) Communications Minister + Ariel Sharon Transportation Minister Avigdor Lieberman (National Union) Construction and Housing Minister (National Religious Party) Health Minister Danny Naveh (Likud) Industry and Trade Minister (Likud) Religious Affairs Minister + Ariel Sharon Internal Security Minister Tzahi Hanegbi (Likud) Agriculture and Rural Minister (Likud) National Infrastructure Minister (Shinui) Science and Technology Minister Eliezer Zandberg (Shinui) Environment Minister Yehudith Naot (Shinui) Tourism Minister (National Union) Immigration and Absorption Minister (Likud) Ministers without portfolio , , Natan Sharansky, possibly Dan Merridor (all Likud) +Ministry scheduled to be dismantled. 94 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March, 2003)