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ISRAEL's 2003 ELECTIONS: a VICTORY for the MODERATE RIGHT and SECULAR CENTER by Cameron S

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ISRAEL's 2003 ELECTIONS: a VICTORY for the MODERATE RIGHT and SECULAR CENTER by Cameron S ISRAEL'S 2003 ELECTIONS: A VICTORY FOR THE MODERATE RIGHT AND SECULAR CENTER By Cameron S. Brown* This article analyzes the reasons for Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s re-election victory and considers what the vote represented in terms of the electorate’s views on various current issues and the balances among political parties in Israel. The article also takes a brief look at the formation of the new government and where it is most likely headed in the near term. On January 28, 2003, Ariel Sharon throwing its leaders out of office gave became Israel’s first incumbent prime overwhelming approval for an encore minister to be re-elected since Menahem performance to a government that seemed Begin won a second term in 1981. As to fail on every front? opposed to Begin’s 1981 victory (when Beyond the battle between the he barely retained power, winning only country’s two largest parties, there were 0.5 percent more of the vote than his two other major trends in this election Labor party rival),(1) Sharon was re- worth noting. One is the weakening of elected in a landslide that doubled his sectarian politics in general, which had a party’s number of seats in the Knesset major impact on several Russian (see Table 1 below). immigrant parties. Another victim of this While this outcome surprised few, trend was Shas--the Sephardi (Oriental), having been predicted by opinion polls Orthodox-led Jewish party that was the from the campaign’s start,(2) Sharon’s surprise success story of the 1999 victory seemed to mystify many political elections. Though it had jumped from 12 pundits in Israel and abroad. Well- to 17 Knesset seats in 1999, Shas lost known Ha’aretz commentator Yoel over one-third of its voter base in 2003, Marcus was especially flustered: which translated into a loss of 6 seats. Lastly, while Shas dropped back to During Sharon's 20 months in near-1996 levels, its main rival--Shinui, a office, the country has skidded staunch secular party--jumped from 6 downhill in every possible sphere: mandates to 15, replacing Shas as the The economy is six-feet under. third largest party. Combined with the More Israelis have been killed in sweeping Likud victory mentioned Mr. Security’s day than under any above, Shinui’s triumph in these elections other prime minister. The man has enabled a development many once never come up with a peace thought impossible: a government formed initiative. We’ve been turned into without the Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) untouchables in the eyes of just parties--a first since 1974 and a very about the whole world. And important development for matters of despite it all, everyone still loves religion and state. Arik.(3) VICTORY FOR THE MODERATE So how is it that a country that RIGHT, LOSS FOR THE LEFT AND historically has no compunction about THE EXTREME RIGHT Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March, 2003) 77 Cameron S. Brown The Israeli public took a significant second term from a position of incredible swing rightward following the failure of strength--both inside his party and in the the Camp David Summit in July 2000 Knesset as a whole. and the subsequent outbreak of violence The key factor for understanding the following September.(4) This shift Sharon’s seemingly paradoxical victory was a key factor in Sharon’s election in in the primaries and general election is 2001, though the longer-term effects were this: while the general security and not clear at that time. What has now economic situation over the past two become apparent is that the shift was to years has by all measures deteriorated the moderate right, with those who had drastically, leaders are not simply judged already been on the right actually having by their achievements. Rather, they are softened their positions to some degree judged by the accomplishments they regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. achieved versus the potential voters believe they had to achieve better results. Why Sharon Won If voters decide that their leaders are not Sharon was the election’s real victor, implementing the best solutions offered, though his Likud party shared in this they usually sack the incumbent. This is success, doubling its strength from 19 to what happened when voters decided that 38 seats. Before the national unity Yitzhak Shamir was not forthcoming government broke up in November 2002, enough on the peace process (1992); Sharon held less than one-third of the Shimon Peres was too soft on security seats necessary to form a coalition (19 of (1996); Netanyahu was not advancing the 61). The Likud was wholly dependent on peace process as much as possible the agreement of a large coalition of (1999); and that Ehud Barak was parties--first and foremost of whom was negotiating under fire and offering too Labor (26 seats). With Labor Party doves many dangerous concessions to the like Haim Ramon and Yossi Beilin Palestinians while getting nothing in railing daily against the decision to sit in return (2001). a unity government, Sharon had to In January 2003, the average voter appease enough of Labor’s demands to (and especially the crucial swing voter) let its leaders justify staying in the decided that, given the situation Sharon coalition. faced, no other candidate offered a more At the same time, attacking Sharon realistic solution or was likely to do from the right within the Likud party, better. The constraints Sharon faced former Prime Minister Benyamin included: Netanyahu was considered an even more 1) The Palestinians--or at least the serious challenge since his popularity militant groups that the leadership lets set within the party was formidable. Having the agenda--were bent on inflaming the led Sharon in opinion polls from January intifada. Most Israelis believe that groups through April,(5) an especially like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, which had foreboding sign of Netanyahu’s strength long rejected any peaceful solution and came in May 2002 when he convinced claimed terrorism could defeat Israel, the Likud Central Committee to vote would pursue such a policy no matter against any possibility of agreeing to the how Sharon responded to the intifada. establishment of a Palestinian state--over Equally, Palestinian polls showed that a Sharon’s strong objection.(6) plurality of Palestinians (nearly 50 Within 90 days of elections being percent) saw the intifada’s goal as Israel’s called, however, Sharon managed first to destruction.(7) To the average Israeli defeat Netanyahu in the Likud primaries voter, this meant Palestinian views and and then trounce Labor in the general policy--and not any excessive force or elections. As a result, Sharon began his failure to offer better peace terms by 78 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March, 2003) Israel's 2003 Elections: A Victory for the Moderate Right and Secular Center Sharon--had defined the conflict. Those situation and not the preference of Israelis Israelis unhappy about Israeli strategy or their long-term goals. For example, 63 were more likely to blame the previous percent of Israelis are ready to dismantle Labor-led government rather than the most settlements in the West Bank and current one for all the problems they were Gaza Strip as part of a peace agreement facing. with the Palestinians and, until an 2) Most Israelis believe that at present agreement is reached, 64 percent support (and especially so long as Yasir Arafat a freeze on further expansion of these leads the Palestinian Authority) there is settlements.(12) no chance to end the conflict by This debate over unilateral withdrawal negotiations.(8) Most Israelis believe that did eventually translate into enough Barak’s Camp David and Taba proposals public pressure to force Sharon’s had been serious and very generous (for previous government to build a security many, even too generous, leaving Israel fence, though without a withdrawal, with nothing else to offer).(9) However, along part of the Green Line. In fact, if having seen that even those proposals there was one security-related issue that were insufficient for the Palestinian side, Sharon was significantly vulnerable on, it most Israelis decided that either the was that the majority of Israelis (59 Palestinians were not truly interested in a percent) thought he was moving too compromise peace settlement, or that if slowly in building the security fence.(13) they were, it was only one in which they Additionally, Sharon’s government had did almost no compromising. Moreover, only pledged to build a partial fence in a many Israelis believe that negotiating few selected areas--a strategy highly before the cessation of violence would unlikely to succeed in stopping terrorism. persuade the Palestinians that violence Sensing this vulnerability, Sharon’s had been successful in achieving political Labor opponent Amram Mitzna made gains, and could encourage them to return this into a significant, though not to that tactic in the future. decisive, campaign issue.(14) 3) Aside from doubting any negotiated 4) Sharon also benefited from the fact agreement was possible in the near that even voters who doubted there was a future, Israeli voters were also skeptical peaceful solution to the violence did not that the solution proposed by Sharon’s think a more aggressive approach would opponents--unilateral withdrawal from produce a better result. Especially since most of the West Bank and Gaza--would Israel began Operation Defensive Shield make Israel more secure.(10) While most in March 2002 and Operation Determined Israelis want a border that separates them Path in June, most believed there was from the Palestinians, such a withdrawal little the military should be doing that it was seen--as had happened with the was not doing already.(15) Barak concessions and the unilateral Moreover, during the campaign, withdrawal from southern Lebanon--as Israel’s forces seemed to have turned the more likely to escalate attacks than to tide of the conflict.
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