DOCSLIB.ORG

This Article Was Originally Published in the Encyclopedia Of

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
This Article Was Originally Published in the Encyclopedia Of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uthor's personal copy ! , William, James on the Mind and Its Fringes , B J Baars,, The Neurosciences Institute, San Diego, CA, USA , ã 2009, Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. , , , , , episodic recall). All of sensory psychophysics Glossary, , is based on this straightforward method, Automaticity, habit – The tendency of , going back to Newton’s discovery of the practiced,, predictable events to fade from subjective color spectrum, which is highly consciousness, after repetition, including , reliable between subjects. voluntary actions, concepts, mental images, , Hypnosis – A state of surprisingly high and attentional, routines. Automatic , compliance with external suggestions, processes tend to be specialized, take up , especially after a perceived induction little conscious, capacity, and may resist procedure, which may be arbitrary or voluntary, control. , symbolic. Hypnotic suggests can influence Behaviorism – An influential physicalistic , sensory perception, the normal sense of philosophy, of psychology, some forms of , voluntary control, emotions, imagery, pain which deny the existence or functional role of , perception, analgesia, and their known brain consciousness., correlates. A high percentage of the normal Conscious, experiences, focal – , population is considered to be ‘‘highly Experiences like sensory perception, visual , hypnotizable’’ as measured by standardized imagery,, inner speech, visualizable action , tasks. Such subjects seem to treat the plans, etc., which tend to have sensory , hypnotist’s suggestions as highly credible, features, like color, texture, taste, object although they do not act in violation of their identity,, and the like. , ordinary social norms. Hypnosis may Conscious, experiences, fringe – involve an absorbed state with minimal Experiences, that lack specific, sensory , self-examination. qualities, like the tip-of-the-tongue state (the , Ideomotor theory – In William James and intention, to seek a missing word), feelings of , others, the notion that conscious goals are knowing, familiarity, and plausibility, intuitive , inherently impulsive, and tend to be carried judgments,, specific intentions to act, out by default unless they are inhibited by expectations,, relational terms in grammar, , other conscious thoughts or intentions. logic and, reasoning, abstract meanings, Introspective reports – Reports about emotional, connotations, and numerous other , conscious experiences, which can range conscious or quasi-conscious events that , from highly reliable ones (such as can be, reported with high accuracy but low psychophysical reports) to unreliable ones sensory, specificity. , (such as mental images evoked by abstract Conscious, experiences, operational concepts). definition, of – While there is no agreed- , Introspectionism – A controversial term upon theoretical, definition of conscious experiences,, in actual practice scientists attributed by behavioristic historians to have used, ‘‘accurate verbal report’’ for nineteenth century researchers on the topic , of consciousness. Introspection was several, centuries with excellent reliability. This is a useful operational definition of a , explicitly disavowed as a useful method by , the most productive experimental large range of conscious experiences, both , sensory and endogenous (as in the case of , psychologist of the nineteenth century, conscious inner speech, visual imagery, and , Wilhelm Wundt.Wundt criticized 459 !"#$#%&'()*+,&-,.&"/#*&0/"(//,!"##$%&'()*+'"&',,+'-.$/-01' ! Author's personal copy ! 460 William James on the Mind and Its Fringes , introspection, as unreliable, and rarely used it. One of the wonderful things about James’ , Principles is his open embrace of the whole range However,, Wundt’s popular introduction to psychology, used introspective examples, of human experiences. He has the rare gift of which, may have misled many of his readers letting go of his own biases for a while to let the , phenomena shine. That, plus his extraordinary in English., Most of Wundt’s extensive body of writing, was never translated into English, ability to describe and analyze subtle aspects of , our experiences makes him more than a man leading, to decades of highly misleading interpretation, of Wundt as an obsessed with philosophical disputes. That is why , ‘‘introspectionist.’’ However, introspective scientists find themselves revisiting James on , topics like selective attention, the stream of con- method, was utilized by the Wuertzburg School, and by Edward Titchener, who were sciousness, the remarkable range of fringe experi- , ences, and much more. strongly, criticized for that by Wundt. Stream, of consciousness – The apparently James attributed his penchant for observation to , unpredictable moment-to-moment contents Luis Agassiz, one of the great naturalists of the , nineteenth century, with whom he traveled on an and discontinuities, of spontaneous conscious, thinking. William James expedition to the Amazon. Like Charles Darwin, , Agassiz was a passionate observer of flora and popularized, the ‘‘stream of consciousness’’ metaphor,, and also the bird flight analogy of fauna, a great collector, endlessly seeking the pat- , ‘‘flights’’ and ‘‘perches’’ in the flow of terns in living things. For example, Agassiz is cred- , ited with discovering the geological evidence for conscious, experiences. , the Ice Ages, a remarkable feat of naturalistic obs- , ervation. From Agassiz, James learned the vital , , habit of trying to free one’s mind from prior ‘‘Psychology,’’, William James wrote in 1890, ‘‘is the beliefs, for, in biology as in psychology, preconcep- description, and explanation of states of consciousness, tions undermine our ability to see. This habit was such as, sensations, desires, emotions, cognitions, rea- , sometimes called ‘botanism,’ the passionate obser- sonings,, decisions, volitions, and the like.’’ vation, collection, and classification of plants and , That, was the broad consensus during most of animals for their own sake. James’ Principles ‘bota- Western, and Asian history, and during the century nized’ the psychology of the nineteenth century. As , of scientific, studies summarized in James’ Principles a compendium of psychological facts and ideas the of Psychology, (1890). Principles has not been surpassed. The period, from 1780 to 1910 was arguably the James despised obstacles to free inquiry and , Golden, Age of consciousness science, simply filled pursued his interest in the mind everywhere, with discoveries, about sensory experiences, mental through hypnosis, nitrous oxide intoxication, , and neurological, disorders, hypnotic suggestion, accounts of religious experiences, his reluctance visual imagery,, voluntary control and its loss, and to get out of bed on a cold morning, the tip-of-the- much more., James’ offers 1400 pages of tongue state, psychic claims, and clinical accounts , Principles inspired, writing on the major questions of human of multiple personality syndromes. He was rarely a psychology., Building on mostly European studies, true believer or a rigid skeptic, but always an , it has given, us classic descriptions of the stream of explorer. conscious, thought, selective attention, mental imag- , ery, hypnosis,, multiple personality, habit, effortful concentration,, the basic arguments for and against Fringe Consciousness unconscious, processes, a theory of voluntary control , and its disorders, the crucial distinction between ,By far the bulk of James’ Principles is devoted self-as-subject and self-as-agent, and much more. ,to the same empirical phenomena we study , On many of these topics James’ thinking is fully ,today. Only a few out of some thirty chapters up to date, and it is embarrassing that much of the ,of that work were philosophical, but those few time he is still ahead of the scientific curve today. chapters have received far more attention than !"#$#%&'()*+,&-,.&"/#*&0/"(//,!"##$%&'()*+'"&',,+'-.$/-01' ! Author's personal copy ! William James on the Mind and Its Fringes 461 , James’ empirical, side. Philosophers have done a Suppose we try to recall a forgotten name. The state of better job, in appreciating William James than have our consciousness is peculiar. There is a gap therein; , but no mere gap. It is a gap that is intensely active. scientists,, in general, though he was at least as A sort of a wraith of the name is in it, beckoning us in a much an, empiricist as a metaphysician. Fringe-conscious, experiences provide an excel- given direction, making
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Mentalism Versus Behaviourism in Economics: a Philosophy-Of-Science
    Mentalism versus behaviourism in economics: aphilosophy-of-scienceperspective⇤ Franz Dietrich Christian List CNRS & University of East Anglia London School of Economics 18 November 2012 Abstract Behaviourism is the view that preferences, beliefs, and other mental states in social- scientific theories are nothing but constructs re-describing people’s behavioural dis- positions. Mentalism is the view that they capture real phenomena, no less existent than the unobservable entities and properties in the natural sciences, such as elec- trons and electromagnetic fields. While behaviourism has long gone out of fashion in psychology and linguistics, it remains influential in economics, especially in ‘re- vealed preference’ theory. We aim to (i) clear up some common confusions about the two views, (ii) situate the debate in a historical context, and (iii) defend a men- talist approach to economics. Setting aside normative concerns about behaviourism, we show that mentalism is in line with best scientific practice even if economics is treated as a purely positive science of economic behaviour. We distinguish men- talism from, and reject, the radical neuroeconomic view that behaviour should be explained in terms of people’s brain processes, as distinct from their mental states. 1 Introduction Economic theory seeks to explain the social and economic behaviour of human (and sometimes other) agents.1 It usually does so by (i) ascribing, at least in an ‘as if’ mode, ⇤This paper was presented at the LSE Choice Group workshop on ‘Rationalizability and Choice’, July 2011, the D-TEA workshop, Paris, July 2012, and the EIPE seminar, Rotterdam, September 2012. We are grateful to the participants and especially Nick Baigent, Walter Bossert, Richard Bradley, Mika¨el Cozic, Eddie Dekel, Ido Erev, Itzhak Gilboa, Conrad Heilmann, Johannes Himmelreich, Marco Mariotti, Friederike Mengel, Clemens Puppe, Larry Samuelson, David Schmeidler, Asli Selim, Daniel Stoljar, Kotaro Suzumura, and Peter Wakker for comments and discussion.
    [Show full text]
  • John B. Watson's Legacy: Learning and Environment
    Developmental Psychology Copyright 1992 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 1992, Vol. 28, No. 3, 360-367 OOL2-1649/92/$3.0O John B. Watson's Legacy: Learning and Environment Frances Degen Horowitz Graduate School and University Center City University of New \brk John B. Watson's contribution is evaluated in relation to his own time, with respect to his historical influence, and in light of current issues in developmental psychology. A survey of a nonrandom sample of current developmental psychologists revealed no consensus with respect to Watson's legacy to developmental psychology. The influence of Watson's insistence on an objective methodol- ogy in psychology remains, although is not necessarily acknowledged. His extreme environmental- ism has been rejected. His concern to understand the principles of learning is reflected in the subsequent work of the Hullians and the Skinnerians. The influence of his underlying premise about the importance of environment and of learning is to be found in such work as studies of the effects of intervention programs. I question the possible costs to the field of the continued rejection of a Watsonian emphasis on learning as an important process in development and behavior. In his time, John Broadus Watson (1878-1958) was contro- felt he had ignored biological variables, but the remainder versial. So he remains. In preparation for this reflective essay tended to disagree with that characterization. on his legacy to developmental psychology, I sent a question- Diversity of opinion is rife in developmental psychology to- naire to a nonrandom sample of mostly senior developmental day, but when asked to evaluate the theoretical and methodolog- psychologists.1 The 45 respondents ranged widely in their per- ical contributions of Baldwin, Binet, Darwin, Freud, Gesell, ceptions of Watson's contributions and in their evaluations.
    [Show full text]
  • Understanding Human Consciousness: Theory and Application
    o Journal of Experiential Psychotherapy, vol. 21, n 2 (82) June 2018 Understanding Human Consciousness: Theory and Application Maretha Prinsloo, PhD*i *Cognadev, UK “Consciousness implies awareness: subjective, phenomenal experience of internal and external worlds... Our views of reality, of the universe, of ourselves depend on consciousness. Consciousness defines our existence.” (Hameroff & Penrose, 2014, p. 39) Abstract Introduction: The study of consciousness attracts the attention of psychologists, philosophers and scientists. It is, however, mostly dealt with in a descriptive and speculative manner, without explaining the nature of the subjective experience and the dynamics involved. Objectives: This article aims to provide a brief overview of prominent philosophical, psychological, sociological and quantum physics perspectives on consciousness. The practical implications of consciousness theory are also addressed. Methods: Literature review. Results: From a social sciences point of view, Gebser’s Structure of Human Consciousness model, Clare Graves’s Spiral Dynamics (SD) model and Ken Wilber’s Integral AQAL model are briefly discussed to understand the concept of levels of consciousness and to differentiate between the developmental themes which characterise each of these levels. This is followed by a description of scientific theories and findings. Here the work of prominent philosophers of science, including Dennett and Laszlo, is briefly explored. Neurological and quantum physics discoveries, including the work of Bohm, Pribram, McTaggart, Hameroff and Penrose are referred to and the phenomenon of collective consciousness is explained in terms of the physics concepts of quantum nonlocality and entanglement. Next, the application of consciousness theory is addressed within the contexts of societal transformation, leadership, organisational development, organisational culture and education.
    [Show full text]
  • The Cognitive Revolution: a Historical Perspective
    Review TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences Vol.7 No.3 March 2003 141 The cognitive revolution: a historical perspective George A. Miller Department of Psychology, Princeton University, 1-S-5 Green Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA Cognitive science is a child of the 1950s, the product of the time I went to graduate school at Harvard in the early a time when psychology, anthropology and linguistics 1940s the transformation was complete. I was educated to were redefining themselves and computer science and study behavior and I learned to translate my ideas into the neuroscience as disciplines were coming into existence. new jargon of behaviorism. As I was most interested in Psychology could not participate in the cognitive speech and hearing, the translation sometimes became revolution until it had freed itself from behaviorism, tricky. But one’s reputation as a scientist could depend on thus restoring cognition to scientific respectability. By how well the trick was played. then, it was becoming clear in several disciplines that In 1951, I published Language and Communication [1], the solution to some of their problems depended cru- a book that grew out of four years of teaching a course at cially on solving problems traditionally allocated to Harvard entitled ‘The Psychology of Language’. In the other disciplines. Collaboration was called for: this is a preface, I wrote: ‘The bias is behavioristic – not fanatically personal account of how it came about. behavioristic, but certainly tainted by a preference. There does not seem to be a more scientific kind of bias, or, if there is, it turns out to be behaviorism after all.’ As I read that Anybody can make history.
    [Show full text]
  • Agency & Choice
    Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, Volume 12, Issue 1, Spring 2019, pp. 137-144. https://doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v12i1.414 PHD THESIS SUMMARY: Agency & Choice: On the Cognitive and Conceptual Foundations of Agency in Economics and Behavioral Decision Research JAMES GRAYOT Doctorate in philosophy, February 2019 EIPE, Erasmus University Rotterdam In this thesis, I offer a philosophical perspective on the different conceptions of agency and choice as they are understood and employed in economics and behavioral decision research—this perspective is two- fold: on the one hand, philosophical analysis can clarify ambiguities in definitions and concepts that arise within interdisciplinary research. This is of particular importance given how philosophical concepts such as mind, cognition, and intentionality feature in economic studies of rational choice. Hence, one project of this thesis is to subject contemporary research on questions about agency and choice to such philosophical scrutiny. On the other hand, the questions and topics discussed in this thesis can be understood as an exercise in philosophy of science: they deal explicitly with questions and topics that pertain to the theoretical and empirical practices of scientists. This includes traditional microeconomic disciplines, such as decision theory and game theory, as well as interdisciplinary research in behavioral economics, neuroeconomics, and experimental psychology. Chapter 2 illustrates the contentious relationship between agency and choice by focusing on a cluster of debates
    [Show full text]
  • Mentalism Versus Behaviourism in Economics: a Philosophy-Of-Science Perspective
    Mentalism versus behaviourism in economics: aphilosophy-of-scienceperspective Franz Dietrich & Christian List⇤ First version 1 April 2012, this version 17 May 2015 Abstract Behaviourism is the view that preferences, beliefs, and other mental states in social- scientific theories are nothing but constructs re-describing people’s behaviour. Mentalism is the view that they capture real phenomena, on a par with the unobserv- ables in science, such as electrons and electromagnetic fields. While behaviourism has gone out of fashion in psychology, it remains influential in economics, espe- cially in ‘revealed preference’ theory. We defend mentalism in economics, construed as a positive science, and show that it fits best scientific practice. We distinguish mentalism from, and reject, the radical neuroeconomic view that behaviour should be explained in terms of brain processes, as distinct from mental states. Keywords: Mentalism, behaviourism, revealed preference, decision theory, scientific realism. 1 Introduction Economic theory seeks to explain the social and economic behaviour of individual human agents (and sometimes that of other agents, such as firms). It usually does so by (i) ascribing, at least in an ‘as if’ mode, certain mental states, such as beliefs and preferences, to the agents in question and (ii) showing that, under the assumption that those agents are rational, the ascribed mental states lead us to predict, and thereby to ⇤Contact details: F. Dietrich, Paris School of Economics & CNRS, CES-Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne, Maison des Sciences Economiques, 106-112 Boulevard de l’Hˆopital, 75647 Paris cedex 13, France; URL: <http://www.franzdietrich.net>. C. List, London School of Economics, Departments of Government and Philosophy, London WC2A 2AE, U.K.; URL: <http://personal.lse.ac.uk/LIST>.
    [Show full text]
  • Mentalism, Behavior-Behavior Relations, and a Behavior-Analytic View of the Purposes of Science Steven C
    The Behavior Analyst 1986, 9, 175-190 No. 2 (Fall) Mentalism, Behavior-Behavior Relations, and a Behavior-Analytic View of the Purposes of Science Steven C. Hayes Aaron J. Brownstein University of Nevada-Reno University of North Carolina at Greensboro In a behavioral view, the purposes of science are primarily prediction and control. To the extent that a scientist embraces both of these as a unified and generally applicable criterion for science, certain phil- osophical and theoretical practices are counterproductive, including mentalism in both its metaphysical and metatheoretical forms. It is possible and often worthwhile to recast some mentalistic talk into an issue ofbehavior-behavior relations. When behavior-behavior relations are approached non-mechanisti- cally, however, analysis cannot stop at the level of the relations themselves. Several analytic concepts common in the behavioral community share some ofthe dangers ofmentalism ifnot employed properly, including such concepts as self-reinforcement, response-produced stimulation, and self-rules. Criticism of a behavioral approach to amine some of the philosophical under- human behavior has been frequent since pinnings of a behavior-analytic view of its inception. Recently, a type ofcriticism science. Many of the points we hope to has emerged from knowledgeable critics make have been made elsewhere, but the suggesting that there is a more rapid path discussions have often been directed to- to the kinds ofscientific knowledge sought ward other specific concerns and have by behaviorists (e.g., Keat, 1972; Wes- not always been interconnected or given sells, 1981, 1982). Even individuals who a comprehensive rationale. Keystones of formerly have been sympathetic to a be- a behavior-analytic position can then ap- havior-analytic position have embraced pear to be dogmatic or arbitrary, rather this line of criticism.
    [Show full text]
  • We Are All Methodological Behaviorists
    Behavior and Philosophy, 41, 1-10 (2013). ©2015 Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies WE ARE ALL METHODOLOGICAL BEHAVIORISTS Marcus Bentes de Carvalho Neto Universidade Federal do Pará ABSTRACT: Methodological and radical behaviorisms have been contrasted not only with respect to their consideration, or lack thereof, of private psychological events, but also with respect to their criteria for scientificity. Skinner (1945), in particular, dismissed the criterion of scientific truth by agreement (an inherently social criterion) and argued for its replacement by a form of individualistic pragmatism. In this article I argue that truth by agreement remains as fundamental to science as it ever was. In this sense, and regardless of indirect validations of claims about private events, we are all methodological behaviorists. Key words: methodological behaviorism, radical behaviorism, agreement, replicability, science Behavior analysts are acquainted with a traditional and unqualified division between two types of behaviorism, the (merely) methodological and the radical one (Skinner, 1974/1976; for a detailed analysis of methodological behaviorism see Moore, 1981, 2001). A keystone of the methodological-vs.-radical distinction rests on the kind of data to be included in our scientific understanding of behavior. Methodological behaviorism, it is argued, adheres to a rigid and naive version of operationalism that was already present in the traditions of logical positivism and realism. As a consequence, methodological behaviorism deals exclusively with what can be publicly observed: Observation thus became (...) fundamental to [methodological] Watsonian Behaviorism1: Observation defines the category of behavior as a subject matter. Behavior is what is observable, but only observable by the other one (...). To qualify as subject matter for a behaviorist, behavior must affect the senses of other organisms; it must be available for measurement and recording by others.
    [Show full text]
  • Antidualism and Antimentalism in Radical Behaviorism*
    Behavior and Philosophy, 43, 1-37 (2015). © 2015 Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies ANTIDUALISM AND ANTIMENTALISM IN RADICAL BEHAVIORISM* José E. Burgos** University of Guadalajara Abstract: Radical behaviorism (RB) is antidualistic and antimentalistic. Antidualism is the rejection of ontological dualism, the partition of reality into physical and nonphysical. Antimentalism is the rejection of the ontological theses that mind is causal, internal, subjective, and nonbehavioral in nature. Radical behaviorists conflate both rejections, based on depictions of mentalism as inherently dualistic. However, such depictions are fallacious. Mental causation and mind as internal are fundamentally incompatible with dualism and hence inherently materialistic. Mind as subjective and nonbehavioral in nature are compatible with dualism, but can be construed materialistically. I exemplify with the mind-brain identity theory. The same arguments apply to functionalism, which is also materialistic and provides a more plausible philosophical interpretation of cognitive psychology as a paradigmatic example of mentalism at work in psychology. I propose that radical behaviorists’ accusations of dualism against mentalism rely on an invalid redefinition of “dualism” in terms other than the physical-nonphysical partition. All of this only weakens RB’s antimentalism. Radical behaviorists are advised to stop making those accusations and adopt a behavioristic ontology of mind, such as mind-behavior identity, to reject alternative nondualistic ontologies. Key words: radical behaviorism; antidualism; antimentalism; mind-brain identity; cognitive psychology; functionalism; mind-behavior identity * A preliminary version of this paper was presented in Pereira, Colombia, September, 2014. ** I thank an anonymous reviewer, Andrew Brook, Sigrid Glenn, Peter Killeen, Sam Leigland, Joseph Mendola, Ted Schoneberger, Eric Schwitzgebel, John Staddon, Warren Tryon, and William Uttal for many valuable comments to previous drafts.
    [Show full text]
  • Mind and Body
    Mind and Body Fall 2014 1 The Real Mind-Body Problem Nagel, “What Is It Like To Be a Bat?” (1979) “Consciousness is what makes the mind- body problem really intractable. Without consciousness, the mind-body problem would be much less interesting. With consciousness, it seems hopeless.” 2 Descartes‘s Doctrines Meditations (1641) • Strict Separation between Humans, Animals – Animals as Unconscious Reflex Machines – Consciousness Frees Humans from Reflex • Substance Dualism – Body Characterized by Extension – Mind Characterized by Thought • Interactive Dualism – Knowledge Through Sensory Organs – Thoughts Affect Bodily Actions 3 1 The Cartesian Impasse • How Can a Material Substance Affect an Immaterial Substance? • The Pineal Gland – Location – Singular – Uniquely Human The Persistence of Dualism • Religious Doctrine – Soul Separates Man from Animals – Soul = Mind = Consciousness • As “Folk Psychology” – We have Bodies and Minds – They are Somehow Different – Mind and Body Interact Somehow • As Scientific Psychology – Doctrine of Mentalism – Psychology as the Science of Mental Life 5 Escaping Descartes's Impasse: Varieties of Dualism • Occasionalism – Nicholas Malebranche (1638-1715) – All Causality Resides with God • Dual-Aspect Theory (Property Dualism) – Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) – God Ordains Isomorphism between Mind and Body • Psychophysical Parallelism – Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) – Correlation Established by God 6 2 Escaping Descartes' Impasse: Varieties of Immaterialist Monism • Mentalistic Monism (Idealism) – George Berkeley (1685-1753) – No Reality Other than the Mind • Mind-Stuff Theory – Morton Prince (1854-1929) – All Matter Contains “Mind-Stuff” 7 Escaping Descartes' Impasse: Varieties of Materialist Monism • The Automaton Theory – Julien Offray de la Mettrie (1709-1751) • Pierre Jean George Cabanis (1757-1808) – Humans are Conscious Automata • Epiphenomenalism – T.H.
    [Show full text]
  • From Mentalism to Behaviouralism
    06/03/2014 The Psychology of Adaptation Chapter 10 Brandon Gillespie Zac Giovannini-Green Philip Hillier Mario Doyle Evolution and Psychology • Questions raised by evolution 1. The species question In what ways do the body and brain shape human behavior? 2. The individual question In what way is growth of the individual, through adaptation to the environment, considered comparable to organic evolution 1 06/03/2014 Lamarckian Psychology Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) The founder of the psychology of adaptation • Principles of Psychology (1855) – Herbert Spencer • Integrated associationism and sensorimotor physiology with Lamarckian evolution • Answering the species and individual questions: • The law of ‘associationism’ attached to psychology • Ex. Intelligence 2 06/03/2014 Spencer and the Brain • Viewed the brain as an organizer of infinite experiences • Takes all the sensorimotor information and forms associations • Instincts and reflexes no longer a challenge for Associationists and Empiricists • Given the Lamarckian idea of heritability • All brains work by associationism • Quantitative not qualitative differences Influence of Spencer’s Framework • Comparative psychology • Aimed to find a single dimension of associative “intelligence” to arrange all species • Behaviorism • Attempted to find the laws of learning based on mammalian models and apply them to human psychology • Social Darwanism • The human species should be governed by the process of natural selection in order to perfect humanity 3 06/03/2014 Darwinian Psychology “IT IS NOT
    [Show full text]
  • BURGOS Proofs
    Behavior and Philosophy, 44, 46-79 (2016). ©2016 Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies MENTALISM VERSUS DUALISM: REPLIES TO COMMENTARIES José E. Burgos1 University of Guadalajara ABSTRACT: The target paper’s main point is that mentalism and, to this extent, mentalistic (e.g., cognitive) psychology can only be materialistic and, hence, cannot be dualistic. The commentaries to the paper are insightful and stimulating. A few call for corrections, the rest for further clarification. Most criticize the mind-brain identity theory. This criticism is beside the point, as I did not intend to champion this theory (or functionalism), but only use it to illustrate how mentalism commits us to materialism. Still, all the criticisms of the theory are fallacious (ad hominem attacks against philosophers of mind, commitment to a particular ontology of causation and personhood). Other commentators criticize my focus on ontology, also fallaciously, by arguing ad populum (few scientists are interested in it) and name-calling that misrepresents ontology as anti- scientific. Overall, none of the commentaries invalidates the target paper’s main point. Key words: mentalism, dualism, radical behaviorism Mentalism versus Dualism: Replies to Commentaries The commentaries to the target paper (Burgos, 2015) are insightful and stimulating. Some call for corrections to, others for further clarification of some specific claims, but none invalidates the target paper’s main point. Before my replies, it will be helpful to summarize the point: Contrary to what some radical behaviorists have claimed, mentalism (or cognitivism) is necessarily materialistic and, hence, cannot possibly be dualistic, not even “imply,” “invite,” “lead to,” or “open the door to” dualism.
    [Show full text]