EU Security and Defence Policy (1999-2004)

ESDP DEF Couv EN.qxp 16/08/2004 11:51 Page 2 EU Security and Defence Policy (1999-2004) EU Security and Defence Policy EU Security and Defence Policy The first five years (1999-2004) Edited by Nicole Gnesotto Preface by Javier Solana Edited by Nicole Gnesotto ion rity Studies dex 16 56 89 19 30 89 19 31 iss-eu.org ESDP DEF Couv EN.qxp 16/08/2004 11:51 Page 3 In Bo In January 2002 the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) beca- me an autonomous Paris-based agency of the European Union. Following an EU Council Joint Action of 20 July Ch 2001, it is now an integral part of the new structures n° that will support the further development of the CFSP/ESDP. The Institute’s core mission is to provide analyses and recommendations that can be of use and relevance to the formulation of the European security n° and defence policy. In carrying out that mission, it also acts as an interface between European experts and decision-makers at all levels. n° Responsibility for the views expressed in this book lies n° exclusively with authors. Publications are also acces- sible via the Institute’s Website: www.iss-eu.org n° Oc n° n° n° n° n° ESDP-Part-ONE.qxp 16/08/2004 11:37 Page 1 EU Security and Defence Policy The first five years (1999-2004) Edited by Nicole Gnesotto Preface by Javier Solana Martti Ahtisaari Jean-Yves Haine Michel Barnier Gustav Lindstrom Carl Bildt Antonio Missiroli Elmar Brok Alberto Navarro & Norbert Gresch Martin Ortega Robert Cooper Ferdinando Riccardi Judy Dempsey Alexander Rondos Lamberto Dini Burkard Schmitt Jean-Louis Gergorin Rainer Schuwirth & Jean Bétermier Theo Sommer Philip H. Gordon Laurent Zecchini Institute for Security Studies European Union Paris ESDP-Part-ONE.qxp 16/08/2004 11:37 Page 2 Cover photos courtesy of Council of the European and Library of the European Commission. The Institute is a non-profit organisation.Many contributors to this book have wished to give their honorarium to charity. Equally, any proceeds from the sale of this book received by the Institute will be donated to charity. Institute for Security Studies European Union Paris Director: Nicole Gnesotto © EU Institute for Security Studies 2004. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the EU Institute for Security Studies. ISBN 92-9198-057-9 Published by the EU Institute for Security Studies and printed in Condé-sur-Noireau (France) by Corlet Imprimeur. Graphic design by Claire Mabille (Paris). ESDP-Part-ONE.qxp 16/08/2004 11:37 Page 3 Contents Preface Javier Solana 5 Introduction Nicole Gnesotto 11 ESDP: results and prospects I Five years of ESDP (1999-2004): an assessment 33 1. Jean-Yves Haine 35 An historical perspective 2. Antonio Missiroli 55 ESDP – How it works 3. Martin Ortega 73 Beyond Petersberg: missions for the EU military forces 4. Burkard Schmitt 89 European capabilities – how many divisions ? 5. Gustav Lindstrom 111 On the ground: ESDP operations 6. Jean-Yves Haine 131 ESDP and NATO 7. Antonio Missiroli 145 Mind the steps: the Constitutional Treaty and beyond II Actors and witnesses 155 8. Martti Ahtisaari 157 9. Michel Barnier 165 10. Carl Bildt 171 11. Elmar Brok & Norbert Gresch 179 12. Robert Cooper 189 13. Judy Dempsey 195 ESDP-Part-ONE.qxp 16/08/2004 11:37 Page 4 14. Lamberto Dini 203 15. Jean-Louis Gergorin & Jean Bétermier 209 16. Philip H. Gordon 215 17. Alberto Navarro 221 18. Ferdinando Riccardi 227 19. Alexander Rondos 233 20. Rainer Schuwirth 241 21. Theo Sommer 249 22. Laurent Zecchini 255 Annexes 261 Chronology 261 Bibliography 281 Abbreviations 285 About the authors 289 ESDP-Part-ONE.qxp 16/08/2004 11:37 Page 5 Javier Solana Preface would like to start with a paradox: of all the prerogatives of states, security and defence policy is probably the one which least lends I itself to a collective European approach; however, after the single currency, it is in this dimension that the Union has made the most rapid and spectacular progress over the last five years. When I took up my post five years ago, no one would have dared to bet that the Union would soon have direct responsibility for crisis management, have a military committee and military staff, be responsible for military operations, have an armaments agency, a solidarity clause in the event of a terrorist attack and, above all, a common vision of the threats we face and appropriate responses to them – in other words a genuinely European security strategy. However, these are now tangible realities in the European Union. What lies behind this progress? To begin with, my first answer requires clarification of the ESDP’s vocabulary and ambitions: the aim of the 15 was to implement an effective policy for managing external crises. The Kosovo disaster played a major role here, as it triggered a common desire on the part of Europeans to act together to develop, within the Union framework, all the instruments necessary for defus- ing crises. The so-called ‘Petersberg tasks’ define perfectly these initial ambitions of the Union. We have therefore developed these instruments, defined capabilities, undertaken to achieve the goals we set ourselves, and accumulated experience in real crisis situations – in partic- ular in Bosnia, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It is on the basis of these acquis that the ESDP has been able to move forward and broaden the scope of its action: the adoption, in December 2003, of the European Security Strategy which I had submitted to the 25 European Heads of State and Government, thus represents the logical outcome of pragmatic, and in the end successful, collective action. The second explanation is extremely simple: to paraphrase the clas- sic distinction between ‘wars of choice’ and ‘wars of necessity’, I would say that the Union’s security and defence policy is no longer a choice but a necessity – for at least three reasons. The first is the growing number of crises and situations of international instability that form the Union’s strategic environment, both in its neighbourhood, the Balkans, the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and in more distant parts of 5 ESDP-Part-ONE.qxp 16/08/2004 11:37 Page 6 Preface the world like Afghanistan or the DRC. The second reason is directly linked to globalisation: in a globalised and chaotic world, it is no longer possible to separate artificially prosperity and security. If we try to, we are deluding ourselves. The economic and commercial influence now achieved by the Union of 25 – a quarter of world GNP, 450 million inhabitants – the ever closer integration of their economies and their development mean that Europeans can no longer stand comfortably aside from the world’s convulsions or evade their political responsibili- ties to assuage the effects of globalisation. The third reason, finally, is the multilateralism which is now unavoidable in the management of international crises: as no nation can do everything or deal with everything alone, the Europeans of the Union will have to accept a growing share of responsibility in stabilising crises, either on their own as in 2003 in the DRC, or with America and other partners when they feel it is necessary. For all these reasons, including the constant ‘desire’ for Europe voiced by European citizens when they are asked about their future security, European defence policy is not only in constant pro- gression: it has now reached its threshold of irreversibility. But there must be no mistake: the ESDP is not a process of militari- sation of European construction. My aim right from the start, at the head of this adventure, was to promote the Union as a global political player, capable of mobilising all the resources available – economic, commercial, humanitarian, diplomatic and, of course, military – to act in a coherent and above all effective manner over the whole of its international environment. Therefore it was necessary to start by developing what did not yet exist: a minimum of instruments and capabilities, both civilian and military, which were essential if the Union was to have any international credibility. These tools then had to be incorporated in a global strategic concept, a sort of general philosophy for the Union’s action in the world: in my view this is the real merit of the European Security Strategy, which the Thessaloniki European Council placed in my hands. Adopted by the 25 Heads of State and Government in December 2003, the strategy is, in a way, the European Union’s ‘strategic identity card’: a global security player, vigilant as regards both terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs, and more tradi- tional sources of instability – regional conflicts, the break-up of states, large-scale organised crime – especially as these different types of threat fuel one another in many parts of the world. A responsible security player, convinced that its security and the promotion of its values depend on the achievement of three strategic aims: facing up to the various threats, building security in the Union’s immediate neighbour- 6 ESDP-Part-ONE.qxp 16/08/2004 11:37 Page 7 Javier Solana hood and promoting an international order based on effective multilateralism. Finally, a credible security player, both more active in the management and above all the prevention of crises, more determined to develop the necessary military, diplomatic and industrial capabilities, and more coherent in implementing its various instruments of external action.

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