One year after Operation Allied Force, some strange notions have taken root. Nine Myths About By Rebecca Grant

ictory through airpower was a seductive slogan in the US around the time of World War II, but this is not “ V the time to re-embrace that myth.” Thus warned a Los Angeles Times editorial in June 1999, just as Operation Allied USAF photo by SrA. Jeffrey Allen Force was ending. Actually, we’ve witnessed the emergence of a new and different crop of myths—numerous untruths and half-truths which have clouded the role of aerospace power and the outcome of the air campaign. Over the past year, doubters have made many claims about what NATO’s airmen did and did not do. They’ve made it look as though the operation was more failure than success. “The past year has seen the operational lessons of Kosovo become encrusted with It is fashionable now to claim old myths about airpower and warfare. Each myth touches on deeper questions that allied airmen did not hit about strategy and military force and reflects pre-existing beliefs and doctrines.” Yugoslav tanks or artillery, that it An Air Force F-16 at Aviano AB, , just before an April 4, 1999, mission. took a Kosovo Liberation Army ground offensive to push Slobodan Milosevic’s Serb army forces out of hiding, that airmen shied away from NATO commander, US Army Gen. ing how to allocate national resources operating at low altitude for reasons Wesley K. Clark, told Congress, and lay plans for maintaining national of personal safety, and that pilots the one indispensable condition for security in the future. mostly hit decoys instead of real victory was the success of the air Myths often contain grains of targets. In extreme cases, doubters campaign. truth, but the myths about aerospace have said that the air war was just Unfortunately, the past year has power and Allied Force threaten to too immaculate and broke the rules seen the operational lessons of Ko­ distort the findings from this unusual of “just war.” sovo become encrusted with old campaign. If these myths were to be Operation Allied Force was a hard- myths about airpower and warfare. credited, one would have to conclude won success for NATO. Diplomacy Each myth touches on deeper ques- that aerospace power is nothing and determination played their roles tions about strategy and military force more than a flashy, unreliable tool in resolving the Kosovo crisis, and, and reflects pre-existing beliefs and of military force. No leader would even now, Kosovo’s long-term fate doctrines. Each myth also represents a long rely on such a force to protect remains unclear. However, as the top potential stumbling block in consider- national interests.

50 AIR FORCE Magazine / June 2000 Myth 1: Kosovo proves that the “halt phase” strategy is a non-starter.

Since the mid-1990s, defense or disprove the halt phase theory. One a few days of bombing on a limited plans have called for the air com- such opinion came from the comman- set of targets. From the operational ponent to rapidly halt invading dant of the US Army War College, perspective, it was too late for a enemy ground forces in a regional Maj. Gen. Robert H. Scales Jr. He halt phase operation. With refugees, conflict. Yugo­slav regular military concluded, “The Serbian dash into the Kosovo Liberation Army, and and special police forces had been Kosovo demonstrates the particular Yugoslav forces colliding across engaged in fighting with the Kosovo futility of attempting to pre-empt an Kosovo, the situation had long since Liberation Army for a year before enemy force using airpower alone.” become a morass of close combat the start of Allied Force, making it Scales went on to suggest that land without a traditional front line. too late to prevent an “invasion.” forces made better tools for strategic NATO did not have enough forces in However, in March 1999, another pre-emption. theater to provide 24-hour coverage contingent of Yugoslav army forces The mythmakers might believe of Yugoslav troops on the move. At- massed and began Operation Horse- that the halt phase failed, but the tacks on mobile ground targets did shoe, Milosevic’s attempt to drive facts were that, for political rea- not begin until the second week of the ethnic Albanian population out sons, there was no opportunity for April. NATO’s desire for a limited of Kosovo. NATO air­power to halt or reverse air campaign took the halt phase At first glance, Operation Horse- the drive of the Yugoslav army. strike option off the table before it shoe seemed to be a chance to prove Long-standing intentions called for could even be considered.

Myth 2: Air attacks on fielded forces ultimately were of no importance to the outcome of the war.

This is a myth of classical propor- tions, for it reaches back as far as the earliest employment of airpower in DoD photo World War I. The stalemate on the Western Front led to a desire to at- tack the arms-producing industries that fed the war and to target the morale of the enemy’s nation. Yet even in 1918, airpower also proved its value in strikes against enemy airpower, army troops, command posts, lines of communication, and rear-area supplies. In every conflict since, theater commanders have tasked air to at- tack fielded forces, from World War II to Korea and Vietnam. In Opera- tion Desert Storm, ground order of battle targets made up 65 percent of the targets in the air tasking order of Central Air Forces. These included “One of NATO’s major goals was to inflict damage on the Yugoslav army. Tar­-gets 33,560 of 51,146 total targets. like military barracks, ammunition dumps, and lines of communication also made up a significant fraction of fixed targets. It is just a myth to claim that these attacks The rule of thumb is that Command- were of no importance.” A bombed-out storage depot used by Yugoslav forces. ers in Chief always want to target adversary ground forces that are ac- tive in the battle area. In Ko­sovo, the munication also made up a significant identifying ground force targets and Yugoslav ground forces were burning fraction of the fixed targets. that this is part of the joint forces air houses and driving out refugees, so The case can be made that NATO component commander’s job for the the pressure to target them came from should have prepared earlier to sus- CINC, from Day 1. Responsibility all sides. Ultimately, one of NATO’s tain air attacks on Yugoslav army lies with the air component, not just major goals was to inflict damage on forces, but it is just a myth to claim with the land component. In the end, the Yugoslav army and degrade its that these attacks were of no impor- it was the combination of pressure ability to threaten Kosovo’s popula- tance. Indeed, the serious point that on the armed forces and attacks on tion. Targets like military barracks, emerges from this myth is that com- major strategic targets that made the ammunition dumps, and lines of com- mand of aerospace power includes air war effective.

AIR FORCE Magazine / June 2000 51 Myth 3: The Yugoslav army got away unscathed.

Within days of Milosevic’s capitu- mission reports, gun camera video, Storm were higher, but, by percent- lation, Serbian generals told West­­ern and all other sources in what must age, airmen of Allied Force inflicted newspapers their army had lost only surely have been the most thorough significant damage on the Yugoslav 13 tanks to NATO airmen. The Sunday review of data in the history of war- army. In addition, military facilities Times of London reported that the fare. To count as a validated “hit,” such as barracks and ammunition 11-week NATO bombing campaign the report had to be confirmed by depots comprised about a quarter of did almost no damage to Serb fielded two or more sources. Validated hits the fixed or strategic target list. forces in Kosovo. Many were eager on targets within two kilometers of Clark made these findings public to demonstrate that the claims of each other were counted as a single in September 1999. He sent teams to aerospace power were exaggerated. hit. Despite the stringent criteria, NATO capitals to brief the assessment Serb propaganda played directly Clark’s team found that NATO airmen to allied leaders. Still, in December into a powerful myth that aircraft tallied 974 validated hits on tanks, 1999, The Washington Post reported are not good at destroying mobile Armored Personnel Carriers, artillery that airmen “did not manage to destroy ground targets. Behind that myth pieces, and trucks. a large part of the Yugoslav army in is the premise that it takes ground Raw numbers aside, the percent- Kosovo.” forces to achieve decisive results ages also made clear the Yugoslav Asserting that the Yugoslav army against enemy armies and that air army sustained heavy damage. Of- got away unscathed simply doesn’t plays only a supporting role, scor- ficial data show that the Yugoslav square with the evidence. During ing an occasional lucky hit or two, army in Kosovo lost 26 percent of the Cold War, planners believed a but without the weight and mass its tanks, 34 percent of its APCs, and division that lost 25 to 30 percent central to a campaign of maneuver 47 percent of the artillery to the air of its equipment and forces would and fires. campaign. In Desert Storm, the Iraqi not be effective in combat. By these Clark ordered a survey of the evi- army lost 41 percent of its tanks to standards, the Yugoslav army suffered dence of what the air war had done to airmen, 32 percent of its APCs, and significant attrition. More important, Milosevic’s army. A team of experts 47 percent of its artillery pieces, its forces were hunkered down and reviewed the remaining battlefield according to DoD’s official report. not in positions to mass for maneuver evidence, overhead imagery, pilot The aggregate numbers for Desert under the cover of allied aircraft.

Myth 4: Decoys were a major problem.

Doubts about what NATO airmen did to the Yugoslav army echoed in another myth: that NATO airmen hit a significant number of decoys instead of real targets. Here, again, Serbian spokesmen bragged about their use of decoys and pictures DoD photoTrotter by Tracy Spc. of two even made it into the Pen- tagon’s quick-look assessment of Allied Force. Dealing with decoys is old news. By World War II, belligerent nations were masters of the art of decoys as they attempted to foil aerial re- connaissance and bombardiers. In Seattle, Boeing had a B-17 bomber plant covered with burlap houses and chicken-wire lawns to simu- late a housing complex. Picking out decoys became a fine art for “In short, the myth that decoys mattered reveals another face of doubt about aero- photo interpreters. In the Pacific, space power.” A Yugoslav MiG-29 fighter shot down by NATO forces. the Japanese used decoy techniques to camouflage trains and mobile In short, the myth that decoys and image interpreters.” Yet Clark’s anti-aircraft gun emplacements. mattered reveals another face of survey found that in Allied Force, Decades later, decoy Surface-to-Air doubt about aerospace power. Scales NATO airmen hit just 25 decoys—an Missile sites became a specialty of asserted that these dummies “proved insignificant percentage of the 974 the North Vietnamese. effective at spoofing aerial observers validated hits.

52 AIR FORCE Magazine / June 2000 Myth 5: The KLA offensive had a major impact.

Unlike the previous two myths, and begin intensive operations against areas changed hands, no major this myth assumes that NATO air- ground forces, piecing together the gains were claimed by the KLA. men did have an impact—but that it ground order of battle also became The KLA itself kept publicity to took a surrogate ground force, the a major task. By mid-May, NATO a minimum. Despite that, some Kosovo Liberation Army, to make had three times more strike aircraft concluded that this offensive must the air campaign a success. Retired than it had at the outset, and thus have been what made Allied Force Army Lt. Gen. Theodore G. Stroup it had a stronger ability to target effective. USA Today, for example, Jr., writing in Army Magazine, ground forces. Army analysts at the maintained, “Capitulation came distilled the view: “Milosevic lost Combined Air Operations Center, lo- only after the KLA belatedly shooed his nerve when ground power—in cated at Vicenza, Italy, made a major the Serb troops out of hiding and the form of the Kosovar offensive contribution to this effort. into the deadly sights of NATO and the capability of Task Force Over the months, as analysts tried planes.” Hawk to take advantage of the of- to sort out what had happened and If that were true, one could expect fensive to illuminate the battlefield why, they developed a view that KLA the review of hits scored against with its intelligence, surveillance, operations had, in effect, replicated ground mobile targets to show a and reconnaissance assets—first AirLand Battle and had drawn the strong correlation with KLA ac- unlocked the full capability of Serbs out of hiding. While this is a tivities and an upswing in vehicles airpower.” The myth, therefore, is powerful doctrinal credo for the US struck. However, the after-action that it takes ground power to make military, there is little evidence to assessments showed no strong cor- aerospace power effective. support this conclusion. relation. For example, the highest This myth is a complex one. Dur- First, the KLA primarily used number of kills on military vehicles ing the last phases of the Cold War guerrilla tactics in its ongoing con- came on May 13, nearly two weeks in the 1980s, the Army and Air Force frontations with the Yugoslav army before Operation Arrow. Tank hits joined hands in what the Army named forces and special military police. peaked at seven on May 30, APCs AirLand Battle Doctrine. NATO According to Kosovapress, a quasi- at 11 on June 8, and mortars at 13 planning centered on defense against official Kosovo Albanian news agency on June 3. Hits on artillery pieces a large Soviet and Warsaw Pact ground which published running accounts of crested at 34 on June 1, but the force that would initiate the war. KLA activity, the KLA kept up opera- second-highest count for a single The whole effort hinged on using tions in several areas across Kosovo, day was 29 on May 27. airpower to make up the shortfall particularly where enclaves of ethnic Across the five categories, the only in ground fires in both deep battle, Albanian refugees remained. Typical suggestion of a correlation comes in where only aircraft could reach, and of KLA actions was an early May hits on artillery, but the results are not in close battle, where the line had encounter; a KLA commando unit conclusive. Hits on artillery rose to to be held. Classic joint doctrine reported it had skirmished with Serb 15 on May 25, 12 the next day, and still focuses on how the air and land forces near Junik, on the Albanian 29 on May 27, dropping off to 13 on components of the joint force work border. The KLA claimed it had killed May 28 and just three on May 29. together to identify, prioritize, and at least seven Serb soldiers and re- The best three-day period for hits on attack targets. ported several cross-border shellings artillery came long after Operation In addition, the Army is the from Serb artillery. Another report, Arrow, between June 6 and June 8, undisputed master of intelligence chronicling actions in the south near when NATO claimed a total of 61 preparation of the battlefield. That the border with Macedonia, claimed validated hits. is the art and science of finding destruction of a Serb police “Passat” Many factors contributed to the hit the targets in the ground order of car and its passengers. rates. After May 13, better weather battle. Only the Army mans and The principal KLA offensive and more forces in theater allowed trains forces for this intricate task. was launched May 26, 1999. Ac- allied airmen to rack up more than The surest way to pick out key en- cording to Operative Communique 65 percent of the total hits. From emy ground force targets is to rely No. 79 from Hq. General Staff of May 25 onward, a steady period of on an experienced Army cell that the KLA: “The KLA has organized good weather helped; they claimed uses information from counterbat- and ordered an operation code 45 percent of total hits in the last tery radars, airborne systems, like named ‘Arrow’ to begin along the 16 days of the campaign. The KLA Guardrail, and fused Air Force and political boundaries of launched attacks along the Albanian Navy data to compile a detailed pic- with the specific goal of elimi- border, but NATO registered hits all ture of the opposing ground force. nating Serb units in and around across Kosovo. NATO began Allied Force with just the Albanian border.” Operation Without substantial evidence of a broad sketch of the deployed Yu- Arrow was limited to one sector, coordination, the notion that the KLA goslav ground order of battle. When and even so, it was not a success. offensive is what made NATO’s air Milosevic’s forces surged through A US intelligence official, in fact, campaign effective must be treated Kosovo, the picture changed hour claimed the KLA was “creamed.” as a myth. It is possible for airmen by hour. While the alliance surged The KLA forces came under heavy to find and hit targets without army to deploy more aircraft to the theater Serb artillery fire, and while some forces in place.

AIR FORCE Magazine / June 2000 53 Myth 6: Threat of a ground invasion worked.

This myth suggests that Milosevic 200,000 troops, most of which as this one has lasted, if not longer. folded his cards not because of 78 would have come from us,” as ... You wouldn’t send in your ground days of air attacks but as a result Secretary of Defense Wil­liam S. troops until you’d started to pound of speculation in the press about a Cohen later said. “It became very the capabilities” Milosevic had in forthcoming ground offensive. “To clear to me that it was going to be Kosovo. the extent there was victory, it became a very hard sell, if not impossible, The Department of Defense’s possible because the Administration to persuade the American people.” quick-look report on the war said, did escalate its public wrestling with Politics was not the only factor “US and allied leaders decided that the idea of possible ground interven- constraining the NATO ground op- execution of a phased air operation tion,” concluded Michael E. O’Han­lon tion. It also made good operational was the best option for achieving of the Brookings Institution. This myth sense to let the air campaign have our goals.” is the final echo of the assumption that the time it needed to apply pressure. Whisperings about ground forces a joint force is only effective when Clearly, that was the view of Army took a back seat to NATO’s main there are boots on the ground. Gen. Henry H. Shelton, the Chairman agenda: Make the air campaign work. In reality, NATO was never close of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Shelton, The Western alliance’s 50th an- to preparing for a ground invasion. responding to a reporter’s question niversary summit in April focused Albania welcomed ground forces, just after Belgrade threw in the towel, on cementing allied agreement to but Macedonia refused to let its explained his view of the situation. intensify and stick with the air cam- territory be used to stage such an Said Shelton: “I think all of us paign. Leaders of the alliance were attack across international borders. understand that if the decision had determined to prevail and eventually Few NATO allies supported the idea, been made to send in ground troops, said they would not take any option off and opinion in the US Congress we still would have had an air cam- the table. However, it was the NATO was against it. A ground campaign paign, and that air campaign would air campaign that was the prime tool “would have meant 150,000 to have lasted probably at least as long of military action.

Myth 7: Operation Allied Force validated joint doctrine.

Myth No. 7 took shape as bland operations. The “land operations,” tions, joint doctrine naturally speaks and harmless praise for jointness. presumably the deployment of the best to how the components work For example, the DoD report de- AH-64 Apache attack helicopters together. The components do not get scribed Allied Force as “a real-world to Albania, never resulted in com- an equal share of the action in every laboratory for gaining insights into bat operations. The maritime force campaign. In fact, the modern defi- the capabilities envisioned in Joint under the US Navy’s Sixth Fleet nition of jointness should be that the Vision 2010” and remarked on how was a major player, but its efforts components do not have to be equally “we successfully integrated air, comprised Tomahawk Land Attack balanced to achieve results. land, and sea operations throughout Missile strikes and generation of Operation Just Cause, the invasion the conflict.” carrier air wing sorties as part of the of Panama in 1989, had more lessons The attempt to read and critique allied air campaign. about land force and airborne opera- Allied Force as an air–land–sea opera- Joint doctrine is a guide for com- tions. Operation Allied Force was an tion does not comport with common manders, not a ready-made analytical aerospace campaign, and its major sense. There are very few combat les- framework for assessing campaigns. lessons lie with aerospace doctrine, sons here for traditional combined With its emphasis on combined opera- not validation of a vision.

Myth 8: No one flew lower than 15,000 feet.

This myth accuses the allies of to pilots. Low-altitude tactics had component commander, worked overprotecting the airmen at the ex- proved disastrous in the early stages with the wing at Aviano AB, Italy, pense of operational results. of Desert Storm, and, after that, most and the restrictions were soon The first problem with this myth is strikes were carried out from medium changed. For strikes in Kosovo, the implication that only low-altitude altitude. During Allied Force, the forward air controllers flew as attacks get results. It is true that the initial guidelines for a 15,000-foot low as 5,000 feet and strike air- allies did not want to lose pilots for “floor” were put in place to reduce craft could attack from as low as fear of shattering the political cohe- the risks from shoulder-fired SAMs 8,000 feet, at the pilot’s discretion, sion backing the campaign. Initial and anti-aircraft guns. when necessary. Systems like the restrictions reflected a desire to When target identification be- stabilized binoculars on the A-10 hold the alliance—and the air cam- came a problem, USAF Lt. Gen. made very-low-altitude work un- paign—together by minimizing risks Michael C. Short, the allied air necessary.

54 AIR FORCE Magazine / June 2000 Myth 9: “Just war” demands that airmen shed their own blood.

Shortly after the end of the war, retired Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Bernard E. Trainor wrote that “high-tech weap- onry permitted pilots to fly high out of harm’s way while visiting destruc- tion below.” Trainor added, “Another troubling and similar aspect of the

so-called ‘immaculate’ air campaign USAF photo TSgt.by Blake BorsicR. is the ability to drive an enemy to his knees without shedding a drop of the bomber’s blood.” Sen. John McCain (R–Ariz.), the former Presidential candidate, called the conduct of Allied Force “the most obscene chapter in recent American history” as US military forces “killed innocent civilians because they were dropping bombs from such ... high altitude.” Do pilots have to die to make it a just war? According to various myth­ “Allied Force was not an air show. It was real and dangerous combat. One analy- makers, the answer is Yes. This myth sis found that aircrews were three times more likely to have been targeted and attacked by Surface-to-Air Missiles than was the case in Desert Storm.” USAF Capt. assumes that the aircrews in Allied David Easterling in an A-10 bound for combat. Force took no risks and that war is not legitimate at all unless soldiers put themselves in peril, marching crews were three times more likely More important, the validity of shoulder to shoulder to close with to have been targeted and attacked military action rests on principles: the enemy. by SAMs than was the case in Desert in this case, a reluctant decision by The first thing that needs to be Storm. The Serbian air defenses re- NATO to use force to stop Milo­ said is that Allied Force was not an sorted to canny tactics to keep alive sevic’s ethnic cleansing of Kosovo. air show. It was real and dangerous both themselves and their chances Bloodshed, or the lack thereof, is not combat. One analysis found that air- of shooting down a NATO warplane. the measure of justice in war.

hese nine myths touch cusing on a search for vindications of recanted his own longtime skepticism something much deeper combined arms doctrine and dwelling about airpower. “After this war, ... than yesterday’s news. on decades-old superstitions, should there will be no grounds for debate Kosovo myths flourish be- center on how to make aerospace power or dispute,” he said. “Aircraft and T cause aerospace power still more effective. The air arm has long pilotless weapons have been the only is not accepted as a leading been an indispensable tool for joint weapons employed. The outcome is tool in military campaigns. operations and a primary weapon for therefore a victory for airpower and Myths about the centrality of ground shaping theater-level strategy. Over the airpower alone.” forces and exaggerated claims about last decade, joint and allied air­power Operation Allied Force was in aerospace shortcomings and failures formed the backbone of major of- many respects a unique and diffi- all have in common an important ele- fensive operations, from Desert Storm cult campaign. But above all else ment: the belief that aerospace power in 1991 to Deliberate Force in Bosnia it showed that aerospace power has on its own can achieve only limited in 1995 and to Allied Force in 1999. become a tool of choice, not only for results. Those who keep looking for Each campaign had its political com- joint operations, but for operations evidence to fit the maneuver–fire- plexities, but the utility of aerospace with allies. The Kosovo crisis holds power framework blind them­selves power stood out every time. many lessons relevant to future de- to the new patterns formed by the Britain’s John Keegan, perhaps the fense planning and to programs for constant use of aerospace power in a world’s leading historian of military improving aerospace power. With variety of joint operations. affairs, saw Allied Force as the end of that work ahead, it is time to leave The defense debate, rather than fo- the road for many airpower myths and the myths behind. ■

Rebecca Grant is president of IRIS, a research organization in Arlington, Va. She has worked for the Rand Corp., in the Office of Secretary of the Air Force, and for the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. This article is based on an analysis she performed for the Air Force Association and the Aerospace Education Foundation. Her previous article for Air Force Magazine, “Eisenhow- er, Master of Airpower,” appeared in the January 2000 issue.

AIR FORCE Magazine / June 2000 55