Nine Myths About Kosovo by Rebecca Grant
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One year after Operation Allied Force, some strange notions have taken root. Nine Myths About Kosovo By Rebecca Grant ICTORY through airpower was a seductive slogan in the US around the time of World War II, but this is not “ V the time to re-embrace that myth.” Thus warned a Los Angeles Times editorial in June 1999, just as Operation Allied USAF photo by SrA. Jeffrey Allen Force was ending. Actually, we’ve witnessed the emergence of a new and different crop of myths—numerous untruths and half-truths which have clouded the role of aerospace power and the outcome of the air campaign. Over the past year, doubters have made many claims about what NATO’s airmen did and did not do. They’ve made it look as though the operation was more failure than success. “The past year has seen the operational lessons of Kosovo become encrusted with It is fashionable now to claim old myths about airpower and warfare. Each myth touches on deeper questions that allied airmen did not hit about strategy and military force and reflects pre-existing beliefs and doctrines.” Yugoslav tanks or artillery, that it An Air Force F-16 at Aviano AB, Italy, just before an April 4, 1999, mission. took a Kosovo Liberation Army ground offensive to push Slobodan Milosevic’s Serb army forces out of hiding, that airmen shied away from NATO commander, US Army Gen. ing how to allocate national resources operating at low altitude for reasons Wesley K. Clark, told Congress, and lay plans for maintaining national of personal safety, and that pilots the one indispensable condition for security in the future. mostly hit decoys instead of real victory was the success of the air Myths often contain grains of targets. In extreme cases, doubters campaign. truth, but the myths about aerospace have said that the air war was just Unfortunately, the past year has power and Allied Force threaten to too immaculate and broke the rules seen the operational lessons of Ko- distort the findings from this unusual of “just war.” sovo become encrusted with old campaign. If these myths were to be Operation Allied Force was a hard- myths about airpower and warfare. credited, one would have to conclude won success for NATO. Diplomacy Each myth touches on deeper ques- that aerospace power is nothing and determination played their roles tions about strategy and military force more than a flashy, unreliable tool in resolving the Kosovo crisis, and, and reflects pre-existing beliefs and of military force. No leader would even now, Kosovo’s long-term fate doctrines. Each myth also represents a long rely on such a force to protect remains unclear. However, as the top potential stumbling block in consider- national interests. 50 AIR FORCE Magazine / June 2000 Myth 1: Kosovo proves that the “halt phase” strategy is a non-starter. Since the mid-1990s, defense or disprove the halt phase theory. One a few days of bombing on a limited plans have called for the air com- such opinion came from the comman- set of targets. From the operational ponent to rapidly halt invading dant of the US Army War College, perspective, it was too late for a enemy ground forces in a regional Maj. Gen. Robert H. Scales Jr. He halt phase operation. With refugees, conflict. Yugo slav regular military concluded, “The Serbian dash into the Kosovo Liberation Army, and and special police forces had been Kosovo demonstrates the particular Yugoslav forces colliding across engaged in fighting with the Kosovo futility of attempting to pre-empt an Kosovo, the situation had long since Liberation Army for a year before enemy force using airpower alone.” become a morass of close combat the start of Allied Force, making it Scales went on to suggest that land without a traditional front line. too late to prevent an “invasion.” forces made better tools for strategic NATO did not have enough forces in However, in March 1999, another pre-emption. theater to provide 24-hour coverage contingent of Yugoslav army forces The mythmakers might believe of Yugoslav troops on the move. At- massed and began Operation Horse- that the halt phase failed, but the tacks on mobile ground targets did shoe, Milosevic’s attempt to drive facts were that, for political rea- not begin until the second week of the ethnic Albanian population out sons, there was no opportunity for April. NATO’s desire for a limited of Kosovo. NATO air power to halt or reverse air campaign took the halt phase At first glance, Operation Horse- the drive of the Yugoslav army. strike option off the table before it shoe seemed to be a chance to prove Long-standing intentions called for could even be considered. Myth 2: Air attacks on fielded forces ultimately were of no importance to the outcome of the war. This is a myth of classical propor- tions, for it reaches back as far as the earliest employment of airpower in DoD photo World War I. The stalemate on the Western Front led to a desire to at- tack the arms-producing industries that fed the war and to target the morale of the enemy’s nation. Yet even in 1918, airpower also proved its value in strikes against enemy airpower, army troops, command posts, lines of communication, and rear-area supplies. In every conflict since, theater commanders have tasked air to at- tack fielded forces, from World War II to Korea and Vietnam. In Opera- tion Desert Storm, ground order of battle targets made up 65 percent of the targets in the air tasking order of Central Air Forces. These included “One of NATO’s major goals was to inflict damage on the Yugoslav army. Tar -gets 33,560 of 51,146 total targets. like military barracks, ammunition dumps, and lines of communication also made up a significant fraction of fixed targets. It is just a myth to claim that these attacks The rule of thumb is that Command- were of no importance.” A bombed-out storage depot used by Yugoslav forces. ers in Chief always want to target adversary ground forces that are ac- tive in the battle area. In Ko sovo, the munication also made up a significant identifying ground force targets and Yugoslav ground forces were burning fraction of the fixed targets. that this is part of the joint forces air houses and driving out refugees, so The case can be made that NATO component commander’s job for the the pressure to target them came from should have prepared earlier to sus- CINC, from Day 1. Responsibility all sides. Ultimately, one of NATO’s tain air attacks on Yugoslav army lies with the air component, not just major goals was to inflict damage on forces, but it is just a myth to claim with the land component. In the end, the Yugoslav army and degrade its that these attacks were of no impor- it was the combination of pressure ability to threaten Kosovo’s popula- tance. Indeed, the serious point that on the armed forces and attacks on tion. Targets like military barracks, emerges from this myth is that com- major strategic targets that made the ammunition dumps, and lines of com- mand of aerospace power includes air war effective. AIR FORCE Magazine / June 2000 51 Myth 3: The Yugoslav army got away unscathed. Within days of Milosevic’s capitu- mission reports, gun camera video, Storm were higher, but, by percent- lation, Serbian generals told Western and all other sources in what must age, airmen of Allied Force inflicted newspapers their army had lost only surely have been the most thorough significant damage on the Yugoslav 13 tanks to NATO airmen. The Sunday review of data in the history of war- army. In addition, military facilities Times of London reported that the fare. To count as a validated “hit,” such as barracks and ammunition 11-week NATO bombing campaign the report had to be confirmed by depots comprised about a quarter of did almost no damage to Serb fielded two or more sources. Validated hits the fixed or strategic target list. forces in Kosovo. Many were eager on targets within two kilometers of Clark made these findings public to demonstrate that the claims of each other were counted as a single in September 1999. He sent teams to aerospace power were exaggerated. hit. Despite the stringent criteria, NATO capitals to brief the assessment Serb propaganda played directly Clark’s team found that NATO airmen to allied leaders. Still, in December into a powerful myth that aircraft tallied 974 validated hits on tanks, 1999, The Washington Post reported are not good at destroying mobile Armored Personnel Carriers, artillery that airmen “did not manage to destroy ground targets. Behind that myth pieces, and trucks. a large part of the Yugoslav army in is the premise that it takes ground Raw numbers aside, the percent- Kosovo.” forces to achieve decisive results ages also made clear the Yugoslav Asserting that the Yugoslav army against enemy armies and that air army sustained heavy damage. Of- got away unscathed simply doesn’t plays only a supporting role, scor- ficial data show that the Yugoslav square with the evidence. During ing an occasional lucky hit or two, army in Kosovo lost 26 percent of the Cold War, planners believed a but without the weight and mass its tanks, 34 percent of its APCs, and division that lost 25 to 30 percent central to a campaign of maneuver 47 percent of the artillery to the air of its equipment and forces would and fires.