WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY: SOCIAL REFORM UNDER LESTER B. PEARSON

Jim Coutts

The arrival of Lester B. Pearson as prime minister in 1963 opened a window of opportunity on the most creative and significant era of social policy in modern Canadian history. This was no accident of history, writes Jim Coutts, who had a front row seat as Pearson’s appointments secretary. Pearson came to office with a fully developed agenda for economic and social policy, the determination to carry it out, and the means to finance it during a time of plenty. As Coutts writes in this exclusive for Policy Options, in only five years of two minority governments Pearson enacted the Canada- The Gazette, Pension Plan, the Canada Assistance Plan, the Guaranteed Income Supplement and Medicare, all keystones of the modern social security system. “What took King and other Lester B. Pearson From world statesman to social reformer prime ministers more than 40 years to achieve,” writes Coutts, “was expanded at least two fold” during the Pearson years. None of his successors has even come close as an innovator of social policy, notes Coutts (who later became principal secretary to Prime Minister Trudeau) because none had a coherent agenda for progressive social policy. On the eve of the Liberal leadership convention, Coutts’s reflections serve as a timely missive to from a lifelong party activist with unique insider credentials on the development and management of a prime ministerial agenda.

En 1963, l’élection de Lester B. Pearson a inauguré en matière de politiques sociales la période la plus marquante et la plus innovante de l’histoire du Canada moderne. Et cela n’avait rien d’une coïncidence, explique Jim Coutts, qui était aux premières loges à titre de secrétaire du nouveau premier ministre. Car celui-ci avait déjà en mains un programme complet de politiques économiques et sociales qu’il était déterminé à mettre en œuvre, en misant pour le financer sur tous les moyens propres à une période d’abondance. En cinq ans et deux gouvernements minoritaires, rappelle l’auteur de ce texte exclusif à Options politiques, Lester B. Pearson a établi les régimes de pension du Québec et du Canada, le Régime d’assurance publique du Canada, le Supplément de revenu garanti et le régime d’assurance-maladie, autant de clés de voûte du système actuel de sécurité sociale. Selon l’auteur, Mackenzie King et ses successeurs ont mis plus de 40 ans pour réaliser l’équivalent de ce qui fut accompli pendant ces brèves années Pearson. Et depuis, aucun premier ministre n’est venu près d’égaler cette capacité d’innovation faute d’avoir conçu un programme global de politiques sociales progressistes, note celui qui deviendra premier secrétaire de Pierre Elliott Trudeau. À la veille du congrès d’investiture du Parti libéral, Paul Martin gagnerait sans doute à méditer cette réflexion de Jim Coutts, militant libéral de toujours, initié de l’intérieur à la conception et à l’application d’un programme digne d’un chef de gouvernement.

hen George Washington Plunkett, boss of New In the more noble reaches of politics, windows of opportu- York’s notoriously corrupt Tammany Hall polit- nity provide gifted leaders with a chance to advance crucial pub- W ical machine, was led off to prison, he is sup- lic policy. But the window is usually not open for a long period posed to have shrugged and said: “I seen my opportunities, of time, and the politician needs sufficient leadership skills and and I took ‘em.” talented advisors to recognize and seize the opportunity.

POLICY OPTIONS 9 NOVEMBER 2003 Jim Coutts

Windows of opportunity can be King wanted to keep the lid on rather Vision” seemed like a smokescreen of taken advantage of only if the govern- than to bring issues to a boil. mystification that materialized out of ment’s leader has a desire to act. I have nothing — and proved to be not much long held the view that there are basi- anadian politics is far more often more than that. will cally two types of politicians, as Jean C in a “steady as it goes” state than indeed be remembered (not necessarily Monnet famously put it: those who an activist state — which makes the favourably) for the abortive Meech Lake want to be somebody and those who brief years of Lester Pearson’s social and Charlottetown accords. But those want to do something. The more I reforms, or ’s 1980-84 constitutional proposals, as well as the reflect on Canadian politics, the less I period of constitutional change, all the far-reaching measures he did succeed in see philosophical divisions between more remarkable. For the most part, enacting, like Canada-US free trade, had right and left. Instead, I see a basic divi- we have had generally admirable polit- been vigorously opposed by the same sion between those who want to take ical leaders who, by natural inclination Mulroney en route to the PM’s office. initiatives, and those who simply want or in response to years of experience, The true committed activists — to carry on with the mechanics of office. emerge as highly cautious public fig- those who attain leadership to do some- To the “mechanics,” those of us ures; they genuinely believe that if thing rather than to be somebody — who are incurable activists must seem they leave office with things no worse normally come to office knowing exact- like dangerous meddlers often doing than they found them, they will have ly what they want to do. They often more harm than good. As principal contributed much. succeed, often fail, and sometimes secretary to Pierre Trudeau I muddle through. But they was cautioned about activism The true committed activists — almost always decide and articu- prior to the 1979 election. We those who attain leadership to do late in advance what they want were seeking initiatives to get something rather than to be to do with power. That said, the out of our slump. Jack critical difference between suc- Pickersgill, Mackenzie King’s somebody — normally come to cess and failures lies in whether cabinet secretary and a long- office knowing exactly what they or not the window of opportu- time Liberal minister, invited want to do. They often succeed, nity opens for them. me to lunch. Pick came to the often fail, and sometimes muddle Certainly the National point quickly. “My boy,” he Policy of both Macdonald and said, “you’re in trouble. You’re through. But they almost always Laurier — which built the doing too much. Stop doing decide and articulate in advance transcontinental railways, things — just govern.” what they want to do with power. opened and populated the Stand-pat and activist The critical difference between West, and preserved the geo- instincts often co-exist graphic unity of the country — throughout the career of a pub- success and failures lies in whether would be the prime example of lic figure. Mackenzie King, or not the window of opportunity an initiative that fitted the though Canada’s dean of delay, opens for them. times and left a long-lasting certainly didn’t lack the desire mark. But there are more recent to build a comprehensive social securi- I would put Jean Chrétien in that historic examples, ranging from C.D. ty system. But he understood the con- camp. Like King, he came to office Howe’s massive program of building flicting moods of Canadian regions with a progressive social conscience and reconstruction following the and groups, and moved at a slow pace but seems likely to leave it more close- Second World War, to the trailblazing in order not to lose any major block of ly identified with longevity in office social and economic initiatives of the support. Hence he was one of the first and winning general elections, than Saskatchewan CCF governments, to advocate unemployment insurance with a remarkable record of social leg- which introduced the first Medicare and Medicare, but took 25 years to islation. He is a man of deep passion program in North America. enact only a rather timid U.I., and and commitment to the party and the The 1960s in Canada were anoth- gave up on Medicare after one rebuff country. But passion is not a substitute er time and place when the right polit- from the provinces. True, no one lead- for purpose. ical leadership coincided with the ing a national party for 29 years bets In Canada, we were also led not too right window of opportunity. Lester the whole bank on one or two initia- long ago by two very different politi- Pearson outlined a bold program of tives. But more often than not, cians who were not committed activists social policy, won an election and whether in the recovery from but simply wanted to attain high office, implemented a good portion of his Depression, preparation for war, deal- and once there, sought symbolic meas- reforms, thus providing the framework ing with military conscription or ures for which they might be remem- for one of the world’s best social secu- beginning postwar reconstruction, bered. John Diefenbaker’s “Northern rity systems.

10 OPTIONS POLITIQUES NOVEMBRE 2003 Windows of opportunity: social reform under Lester B. Pearson

he importance of the period lay f successful policy reform requires a a major policy initiative becomes pos- T not just in the fundamental legis- I window of opportunity and men sible — that is, I have tried to construct lation that was passed, like a national and women who have thought a model that might help explain suc- pension plan and Medicare system. It through exactly what they want to do, cessful measures like the Pearson social reforms. I concluded that at The 1960s in Canada were a time and place when the right least four conditions are political leadership coincided with the right window of required. Only when all opportunity. Lester Pearson outlined a bold program of social four are brought together does a window of opportu- policy, won an election and implemented a good portion of nity open for successful his reforms, thus providing the framework for one of the social change. world’s best social security systems. In summary, windows of opportunity for major lay also in the successful unblocking of it also requires that they focus energy policy reform appear to open when: federal-provincial snarls that had para- on just a few initiatives and see them the public understands the need lyzed most joint action since the through. Tom Kent, Pearson’s chief for and wants that reform; 1920s, including a strategically essen- policy advisor, who taught me most of a political party has a strong parti- tial breakthrough with Quebec. As what I know about social policy, san imperative to make itself the well, Pearson and Company modern- strongly believed that a single admin- agent of reform; ized the language of social policy istration cannot succeed at more than the country feels it can afford the debate in Canada. Full employment two or three important initiatives. cost; and finally, and incomes policy became the goal, Unsurprisingly, he spent the Pearson the right cast of political charac- rather than payments to the poor via years in frequent states of anxiety, ters assembles to champion the band-aid programs. Much was made of because the agenda inevitably became reforms and manage the process. national standards and national poli- filled with what he considered First, reform must answer a need cies. And ways were found to use “sideshows,” like the flag debate. that has grown to major proportions income supplements where necessary Kent also helped convince me that with the public. These conditions most as an end-run around the rhetoric of to be successful, a major initiative clearly prevail when an outside force program universality. must be central to the government’s threatens a nation’s security, as in This essay seeks to analyze how this “being,” to the mission that inspired wartime, or when economic condi- remarkable body of legislation passed its supporters and brought it to office. tions grow intolerable, as happened into law. I will also try to answer the Ploys invented later aimed at public during the Depression, or when mas- question of why such major initiatives opinion are usually quite transparent. sive economic and technological succeed only occasionally, while many Some would cite as an example the so- changes uproot people from their others fail. What conditions are neces- called Trudeau “peace initiative,” basi- homes and places of employment. Of sary? And do these conditions exist cally dreamt up to give energy to a course, there is nothing to prevent an right now, as Canada looks forward a tired PM and administration. While astute political leader from acting to new century under a new leadership? well intended, it was an invention, not stimulate the public mood in the Of several such periods I lived an organic commitment, and was desired direction (or a timorous or through, none left a deeper impression taken as such by many inside Canada devious one from trying to stifle or on me — or much more importantly, and abroad. Time will tell whether deflect the public mood). left the nation better off — than the Jean Chrétien’s fin de régime conver- The model’s second condition window of opportunity that opened sion to big-budget activism is a similar means that policy reform not only from 1963 to 1968, and allowed the phenomenon. must arise from a party’s philosophical Pearson government to implement As a Harvard graduate student in outlook, but must be essential to its Canada’s most sweeping social policy the 1960s, I attended a seminar where election or re-election, its renewal of a reforms. I was a bit-player in the Richard Neustadt and Graham Allison flagging leadership or depleted elec- process, involved largely in day-to-day constructed different “models” to toral base, or its survival as a minority mechanics. But I had a good seat in the explain how successful major public government — or, as in the rare case of theatre as Prime Minister Pearson’s policy initiatives come about. They the Pearson Liberals, to all three. Appointments Secretary: the gatekeep- produced three models explaining how The model’s third condition for er at his office door, screener of his the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis unrolled. reform is a widespread public sense of phone calls, wagon master of his trav- In recent years, I have tried to affordability — that is, the belief that els and sometimes the quiet note-taker apply the modelling approach to why, government finances are under con- at the back of his meetings. at certain points in a country’s history, trol, but even more, a sense that the

POLICY OPTIONS 11 NOVEMBER 2003 Jim Coutts

The Gazette, Montreal Prime Minister Pearson presides at his last federal-provincial conference in February 1968 with Justice Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau. Only a few months later, writes Jim Coutts, “the Trudeau forces swept virtually overnight to power with no particular social agenda.”

times are reasonably prosperous and and determination. They must feel The Pearson measures had been a will remain so. that success will make their political long time coming. If Mackenzie King The fourth and final condition for journey worthwhile, and failure will was slow to act on social policy, at least success is the presence of a political mean their time in public life was he established links between social leader and key advisors who not only wasted. In short, the reform must be policy and economic progress. In 1919 understand the problem and its solu- an issue upon which they will stake he won the Liberal leadership and tions, but also have or know enough to their careers and political reputations. engineered a party resolution calling find the requisite administrative and for “an adequate system of insurance communications skills. The combina- o the controlling Liberal triumvirate against unemployment, sickness, tion of players will be most effective if, T of Prime Minister Pearson, his dependence in old age, and other dis- besides political skills, the core group finance minister and national party ability, which would include old age has strong relations with senior public chief Walter Gordon, and his policy pensions, widows’ pensions and servants, influential members of the chief Tom Kent, such an issue was the maternity benefits …” King’s govern- media and the academic, professional agenda of social security reform intro- ment created the first modest pensions and business worlds. duced by the Pearson Liberals in the five- (1927), unemployment insurance I also believe in Tom Kent’s con- year period between 1963 and 1968. (1940), and the “baby bonus” family tention that most of the key political They were without doubt the boldest allowances (1944). Louis St-Laurent players must regard the reform in and most progressive social measures added old age security, other social question as far more than just one of taken in Canada up to that point — and assistance programs, aid to universities many needing attention. It must certainly since, when unhappily there and hospital insurance. In the cautious address a burning problem that consis- has been as much neglect as expansion King–St-Laurent years, the most effec- tently commands their intellect, skills of social security programs. tive Cabinet social reformer was

12 OPTIONS POLITIQUES NOVEMBRE 2003 Windows of opportunity: social reform under Lester B. Pearson

Health Minister Paul Martin Sr. In fact, by the coincidence of the four key con- Second, though certainly affected among his business cronies, C.D. ditions of our “model” for reform, by the World Wars and Depression, Howe sometimes referred to Paul Sr. as beginning with the evolving state of Canada faced nowhere near the devas- “my young Communist friend.” public opinion in both French and tation that these events caused in After the Second World War, two English Canada. Europe and (to a somewhat lesser issues presented major stumbling During the 1960s the Quiet extent) in Britain. And third, the blocks to social change. First, the con- Revolution in Quebec replaced local American tendency to distrust govern- stitution required provincial agreement church-run education and social servic- ment and shy away from state inter- for most social legislation, and even es with public province-wide services for vention had at least some influence in Unemployment Insurance was held up the first time, and overcame conserva- parts of Canada, certainly for as long for more than 10 years by the provinces. The second Reform must answer a need that has grown to major divisive issue was the ques- proportions with the public. These conditions most clearly tion of means-tested versus prevail when an outside force threatens a nation’s security, as universal social insurance. in wartime, or when economic conditions grow intolerable, as The latter issue was politically resolved in favour happened during the Depression, or when massive economic of universality by a 1950 par- and technological changes uproot people from their homes liamentary committee under and places of employment. Jean Lesage and Toronto’s David Croll, who successfully persuaded tive public opinion to do so. Similarly, as the idea of state-run medicine or the public to reject any hint of means Pearson and his federal and provincial pensions seemed certain to overtax tests. But the federal-provincial divi- precursors in social policy had to soften limited resources. sions continued unabated until the elec- up centuries of strict “parish tradition” tion at last of a new reform generation in parts of English Canada. y the outset of the 1960s much of of premiers, such as Ontario’s John The long evolution of social policy B this was different. The Canadian Robarts, Quebec’s Lesage, Manitoba’s from local parish to national state took population had started to become Duff Roblin and New Brunswick’s Louis a little longer in Canada than it did more urban, and the influence was felt Robichaud. Their enlightened outlook, elsewhere. In Great Britain in particu- from post-war immigration from along with Pearson’s relatively flexible lar, the momentum favouring state Europe. Political “spill-over” from the policy of “co-operative federalism,” intervention arose from 19th and 20th US switched at least temporarily from finally broke the federal-provincial log- century social reformers and novelists the traditional distrust of the state jam in the 1960s. and the new science that would be under the Republicans, toward the But social reform became a central called economics. Pearson and more left-of-centre reformism of JFK’s issue only after Pearson set out to Company were fortunate to come to policy hopes. The Roman Catholic rebuild the opposition Liberal party office at a time and place very much in Church monopoly on social services and return to power. While working to the thrall of intellects such as Keynes was evaporating in Quebec. But the strengthen economic policies and and Galbraith. Still, during the first most obvious change lay in the newly improve employment opportunities, half of the century, new thinking favourable economic and financial sit- Pearson and the progressives he favouring government activism cap- uation, creating the second of the four recruited managed to enact four key- tured public support far more slowly in conditions required for our social stones of our modern social security Canada than in Europe. reform model. system between 1963 and 1968: the Three particular factors had rein- The financial outlook is never sim- Canada-Quebec Pension Plan, Canada forced Canadian public opinion’s rela- ply a function of government surplus- Assistance Plan, the Guaranteed tive caution toward creating the es or low public debt. The public also Income Supplement and the Medicare modern welfare state during the 50 must believe that the nation can afford Act. In other words, what took King years before 1960. One was the rela- reforms, and the sense of affordability and other prime ministers more than tively rural nature of the country, does not necessarily follow in tandem 40 years to achieve, was expanded at where only a handful of manufactur- the fiscal policies of the day. least two-fold by a minority govern- ing cities existed until well into the Rather, prosperity was felt by ment in less than five years. mid-century. Since rural communities in the early 1960s because form citizens’ co-ops for economic of the comparison many could make doubt this expansion could have purposes and church groups for social between their experience during the I happened had not an extraordinary assistance, the idea of state-run social 1930s Depression and wartime window of opportunity been opened services can be slow to take hold. rationing, and the longest economic

POLICY OPTIONS 13 NOVEMBER 2003 Jim Coutts

expansion in peace-time history. We Fourth, and last, was the new level Liberal regime’s image of domestic pol- could see the building of homes, of support for the idea of national pro- icy fatigue. offices and universities, of highways, grams for Canadians in all regions. Pearson and the other new politi- pipelines and seaways, and share in New thinking about federalism among cal players were the fourth key. It is the feeling of prosperity. We could do political scientists and both federal always essential not just that players anything; we could afford any change. and provincial senior public servants are individually and collectively in Pearson and the reformers led by encouraged a dramatic shift away from favour of a policy, but that their rela- Walter Gordon had campaigned widely the old notion that social assistance tionships are such that they can sup- on social change ever since the 1958 was a local or strictly provincial mat- port each other and prod each other to Liberal leadership contest. But with the ter. The idea of national responsibility follow through. belief in economic affordability more became central, helping enable such firmly in place, public opinion favour- critical developments as national esides the three men who made ing reform was now even more strongly portability in pensions and (at least in B social reform possible, several influenced by how discussion of social theory) equal access to medical servic- other political players were important, policy was evolving in the press, the es in every region. though the only absolutely crucial one universities and various private-sector was probably Jean Lesage, premier of policy shops. I can recall four examples. ut neither economic prosperity Quebec during most of the Pearson First, linkages were newly strength- B nor evolution in public opinion era. Lesage unblocked the path that ened between economic development would have carried the day if the party Ontario and Quebec had closed for 40 and social policy, emphasizing the con- politics of the decade had not pushed years, removing a constitutional road- tribution to national wealth of job cre- and pulled as it did. The third condi- block across social reform efforts dat- ation and of measures to help those tion for social change is a political sce- ing back to the 1920s. lacking training, good health or ade- nario that forces one particular party While not always understanding quate pensions. Second, instead of forward with a reform plan — that vir- of Lesage’s political theatrics, Pearson pigeon-holing people as poor or frail, tually requires, in fact, that a party understood the extent of the revolu- the debate now focussed on a national leader stake his political career on tion taking place in Quebec society, incomes policy that would apply to all given reforms. and like Gordon and Kent, recognized citizens, with some needing assistance By 1957 the Liberals were viewed the skilful new cabinet and public serv- from time to time. as tired, arrogant and politically uncre- ice talent Lesage had recruited. That led, third, to greater public ative. John Diefenbaker caught and Pearson’s “cooperative federalism” acceptance for targeted income supple- summarized the mood, as all good emerged as a true partnership for ments, as opposed to program univer- politicians can, in a single phrase — reform, replacing at least for a while sality. In earlier programs like Family “the six buck boys,” a reference to the the frequent inclination towards patronizing from Ottawa The financial outlook is never simply a function of and stubborn obstruction government surpluses or low public debt. The public also from Quebec and Ontario. must believe that the nation can afford reforms, and the sense It also helped that Jean of affordability does not necessarily follow in tandem the fiscal Lesage, one of life’s original “networkers,” had worked policies of the day. closely in Ottawa with the Allowance or Old Age Security, political Liberal Government’s frugal monthly new men central to change. Pearson, in architects had used universality to gain pension increase. Yet Diefenbaker then fact, had mentored Lesage’s route into political support, and fought to main- failed to put forward new social policy Cabinet as his parliamentary assistant, tain universality against cost-cutters of his own, a failure that always sur- and the two progressives worked who wanted to cap programs to prised and disappointed me, given his together as critical allies of Health exclude those at or above middle- Prairie populist instincts and his first- Minister Paul Martin Sr. on pension income levels. Now, public consensus class policy advisors. and hospitalization legislation. would eventually emerge to guard Diefenbaker’s inaction, coming on The Ottawa triumvirate of basic universality, but to add extras like top of a less than stellar effort the last Pearson, Gordon and Kent came at the Guaranteed Income Supplement few years by his Liberal predecessors, social policy reform from different for the lower-income recipients of Old opened a golden political door for vantage points. While in the end it Age Security. Thus, the wider public Pearson. His credibility as a potential took the efforts of all three to make could endorse more for those who reformer was high because he had reforms happen, only Kent was single- needed most — while still sharing in been an especially creative foreign minded over social policy during the the overall program benefits. minister, not tarnished with the old full 10 years. With Gordon, social

14 OPTIONS POLITIQUES NOVEMBRE 2003 Windows of opportunity: social reform under Lester B. Pearson reform was often a junior partner to his measures favouring economic nationalism. And while Pearson spoke the words of social reform crafted by Kent from 1958 to 1960, he didn’t fully buy into the changes until he saw them as the last route to redefine Liberalism and regain power after 1960. From that point on, his commit- ment continued until the programs were enacted — even if at times he was distracted by other issues and the usual political turmoil. Political players successfully pur- sue reform only when they use ideas as a means of gaining or renewing power. Although the Liberal program was before the public in the 1958 cam- paign, the Diefenbaker parade was then in full swing. So for the next four years, Pearson, Gordon and Kent used the program to rebuild the shattered Liberal opposition by attracting pro- gressive new party activists, candidates, media and academic support. As a core group with a purpose, their commit- ment enabled them to capture and change the face of the party, and once elected in 1963, to influence the shape of the new Cabinet and its agenda. Pearson positioned his two key players effectively, with Gordon as finance minister and Kent as chief pol- icy advisor in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) until 1966. Prime minis- ters can’t simply pound the cabinet table and dictate policy. They must lis- ten to conflicting views and if the pro- tagonists for reform are weakly positioned, it is difficult for a PM to lean their way. That is why it was so important that as PMO senior policy advisor, Tom Kent was the scribe — he “had the conch.” The prime minister’s words were Tom’s words, the briefs were The Gazette, Montreal Tom’s briefs, and Tom managed the Prime Minister Pearson with Quebec Premier Jean Lesage — federal-provincial partners in Cabinet agenda. He and Gordon social progress during the 1960s. Robertson, the Cabinet secretary, man- aged to keep social reform at the top of final surprise items which Jack ters, their deputies, and important the docket. Pickersgill would add when colleagues provincial officials, and was consulted This was no easy task in those were tired and wanted to go home). on most domestic policy initiatives. days. Cabinet meetings could last eight Through it all, Kent wrote the social Like few others I’ve met in public hours, two or three times a week; agen- policy papers that the Cabinet consid- life, Kent could think, write, argue and das at times had 25 items (plus two ered, worked closely with key minis- persuade with enormous power. If his

POLICY OPTIONS 15 NOVEMBER 2003 Jim Coutts

intellect was well known, less so was his Ottawa when he was asked by Clifford bold action. Unlike the workaholic ability to manoeuvre around the rocks Clark, Canada’s towering deputy min- Kent, Pearson was a gregarious of changing circumstances. A brilliant ister of Finance, to work as his assis- charmer always surrounded by bright student at Oxford, he became a British tant. Gordon hesitantly asked Clark if experts eager to research issues and Intelligence code-breaker working on he had the “communist” sympathies devise policies for him. Thus prepared, the “Ultra-Secret Project” at Bletchley. attributed to him by Bay Street. Clark Pearson used meetings not to focus on After the war he ascended the editorial was patient enough to explain the dif- further policy refinement, but to feel ladder at the Economist and the ference between communism and out his interlocutors, looking for com- Guardian, and was the youngest mem- social democracy and in the course of mon ground or openings, calculating ber of the legendary dining club found- time, helped mould Gordon into the what could be gained by giving up a ed by John Maynard Keynes. He progressive who would later coach little ground here or there. To Gordon emigrated to Canada and became editor Pearson. Gordon always considered and Kent, this often seemed like vacil- of the Winnipeg Free Press. Clark the strongest intellect and policy lation, or even betrayal. To Pearson, it Although Kent was the primary initiator Canada had seen, and his was simple diplomatic craft. author of the social policies, he relied on conversion from Bay Street poo-bah to Pearson and Gordon to steer them social reformer is impossible to fathom s PM, Pearson correctly argued that through cabinet and caucus. Almost cer- without taking account of Clark’s A leading a party means keeping all tainly, there would have been no Liberal influence. the players on the bus. I recall one day social reform in the 1960s with- when Kent came to Pearson’s out Walter Lockhart Gordon. As Political players successfully pursue office with an important pen- minister of Finance, while no reform only when they use ideas as sion reform memo and found spendthrift, he gave clear signals a means of gaining or renewing him angrily preoccupied with a that the country could afford raucous Commons debate, the proposed reforms. Initially power. Although the Liberal struggling to counter the strongest minister in the program was before the public in Diefenbaker’s low attacks with Cabinet, he could and did weigh the 1958 campaign, the Diefenbaker even lower counter-attacks. Tom in to support social initiatives parade was then in full swing. So for emerged from the PM’s inner while more cautious ministers office exclaiming, “The man is advocated King-like caution. the next four years, Pearson, Gordon mad!” But he loyally refined an Part of Walter’s strength and Kent used the program to amendment to salvage the pen- was based on being the key rebuild the shattered Liberal sion strategy, and Pearson next minister in the large Ontario opposition by attracting progressive day ran with it. Tom now caucus. He had recruited or emerged from Pearson’s office encouraged many of the new new party activists, candidates, drawing in satisfaction on his Ontario MPs to run, and he and media and academic support. pipe. “Jim,” he commented, “as they were mutually loyal. On William Blake said, ‘the tigers of several occasions, he called in his chits Gordon finally left his Bay Street wrath are wiser than the horses of to gain Ontario support for the reform career for Ottawa and Liberal politics invention’.” agenda. More than anyone, Gordon with perhaps four goals: to counter- Another aspect of Pearson’s sup- engineered the Liberal election victory balance aggressive foreign investment, posed waffling on social reform was his in 1963. He had thus become a politi- to advance social security reforms, to view that government leaders must not cal mentor to many new ministers and elect Mike Pearson as prime minister, become hostage to one set of policies MPs, enabling him to quarterback the and eventually to have a shot at lead- or one game plan for implementing reforms in the party, caucus and ing Canada himself. To me, a mark of them. Other areas of public policy were Cabinet room. his stature was that he stuck tena- also important to him and to the coun- Gordon’s beginnings in public life ciously with social reform even when try, including French-English unity were fastidiously nonpartisan. He once he was beaten back on the other (which inspired the B&B commission), told me that he was just as proud of his fronts. This kind of dedication by the adoption of a national flag, and for- work as troubleshooter for Ontario major players is central to the social eign trade initiatives which developed Conservative Premier George Drew reform model I outline. into the precedent-setting North (who had asked him to head Ontario Lester Bowles Pearson approached American Auto Pact. Perhaps above all, Hydro), as he was of heading the Royal things quite differently from either Pearson was personally determined to Commission on Canada’s Economic Gordon or Kent. The PM was certainly restore Canada’s role abroad, which Prospects for the St-Laurent Liberals. no sloppy thinker, nor did his achieve- had suffered during the Diefenbaker The young Gordon had first gone to ments abroad suggest any aversion to years and soon would face the chal-

16 OPTIONS POLITIQUES NOVEMBRE 2003 Windows of opportunity: social reform under Lester B. Pearson lenges of the Vietnam War. Because Pearson had many balls in the air, Kent and Gordon often saw his attempts to balance them as a source of weakness and delay in getting on with social reform. I understood their impa- tience. But Pearson the diplomat under- stood a great deal about the tactical need to pace reform. He felt you have to press for a while, and then back off to wait for more good openings. In the end Pearson proved just as skilled at broken- field running in Ottawa, as he had at the United Nations General Assembly. I believe that Prime Minister Pearson came through with reform in the end because the combination of his diplomatic skill and basic social outlook were exactly right for this particular window of opportunity. Pearson’s gut reaction to social reform was a bit old- fashioned, shaped in part by two factors. First, he was literally raised in a manse, the son of Methodist preachers schooled to balance the Christian imperative to comfort and care for the poor and sick, with the more frugal outlook that people should also help themselves. Pearson never struck me as a deeply religious man; but as a trained Courtesy, Jim Coutts historian from a church background, Liberal leader Lester B. Pearson with Jim Coutts, Liberal candidate for Parliament, during a he was aware that for centuries the campaign stop at Lethbridge, , in the spring of 1962. Pearson’s campaign plane is a lumbering old North Star from Trans-Canada Airlines (TCA), as was then known. church had provided virtually all social assistance and that its reformers had coaxed political leaders to act. He was be made of Pearson.) But he also felt Medicare and some of Gordon’s econom- not an avid churchgoer. But I attended that King was far too timid in institut- ic measures seemed in danger. Whether United Church in Ottawa with Pearson ing social reform. the right of the Liberal party would have on several occasions when he squirmed Pearson told me that if he had come vetoed this initiative was a moot point: a bit as the local preacher spoke about into politics from the outside — rather David Lewis, who always saw Liberals as society’s needs and governments’ too than via the public service — he would the greatest threat to Canadian socialism, timid leadership in social legislation. have joined the CCF/NDP. He was intel- convinced Douglas that the NDP should Pearson’s instincts on social reform lectually sympathetic to its views on have no part of it. And the Liberal gov- were more importantly shaped by his social policy and on international peace, ernment social reform program, in the particular experience in government and and it didn’t hurt that end, passed into law with the help of politics. In two lengthy conversations we and many other CCF leaders had been NDP votes. had when I was his appointments secre- Protestant ministers, bringing back tary, he talked about where he saw him- Pearson’s youthful roots in the manse. hirty-five years have passed since self on the political spectrum. A little-known political fact was that T Pearson, Gordon and Kent created a He did not have a high opinion of in 1965, Pearson allowed Walter Gordon new plateau for social security in Canada. Mackenzie King, whom he directly and national party organizer Keith Davey The three federal administrations and worked with as under-secretary of state to actively explore the possibility of scores of provincial governments that for External Affairs. Pearson’s strongest merging the Liberal party with the NDP. followed have added relatively little to objection to King was over his shoddy At least two secret meetings were held permanent major social reform and treatment of ministers and staff. with Douglas and Deputy Leader David sometimes allowed or even encouraged (Ironically, the same criticism would Lewis, at a time when new programs like its weakening. While this is not the place

POLICY OPTIONS 17 NOVEMBER 2003 Jim Coutts

to review all that happened in social pol- But very soon, the beginnings of world essentially worsened Trudeau’s mixed icy in that period, applying the four-part economic turmoil, highlighted by soar- social policy record. Oddly, however, model to the Trudeau, Mulroney and ing inflation, an energy crisis and a evolution of social policy in the Chrétien governments allows us to assess debate over price and wage controls, Mulroney and Chrétien years took a how the factors of political imperative, dominated the political scene. This not rather unexpected political twist. public mood, perception of affordability only dampened government and public During much of that time, public and the cast of political characters have enthusiasm for social reform but also opinion was chilled by neoconservative ideology in the US and the I believe that Prime Minister Pearson came through with advent of Thatcherism in the reform in the end because the combination of his diplomatic UK. Nor did partisan politi- skill and basic social outlook were exactly right for this cal imperatives exist, since particular window of opportunity. both Mulroney and Chrétien were elected and re-elected contributed to action and inaction dur- ushered in a period when what had been with large majorities. As for the question ing those intervening years. “affordable” seemed no longer to be so. of affordability, governments every- Needless to say, during Pierre About the only aspect of the four- where targeted debt, deficits, and the Trudeau’s 16 years leading the Liberal part model that consistently favoured high tax burden. Few Canadians and party, the public mood toward social social policy under Trudeau was the even fewer elected politicians believed change shifted several times. government’s “cast of characters.” It expansion of social security was afford- Unhappily, public enthusiasm for included social progressives like able. In fact, the stage seemed set for reform was highest in the first four Trudeau himself, , Gérard Mulroney’s new Conservative govern- years, when no government appetite to Pelletier and , and key ment to lurch sharply right-ward. advance social policy existed. Unlike senior officials like Health and Welfare’s That it did not do so was in some the Pearson years, when detailed goals Al Johnson. To their credit, they man- measure a tribute to the importance of and strategies were readied while power aged to hold the line against demands the fourth leg of the “model” — the was slowly gained, the Trudeau forces to dismantle parts of the social security political cast of characters, beginning swept virtually overnight to power with system. They also developed new think- with the new prime minister himself. no particular social policy agenda. In ing on incomes policy, created the first Although he said different things fact, some in the new government felt Child Tax Credit, made Unemployment to different audiences, Brian Mulroney’s the Pearson crowd had tried to do too Insurance a regional incomes policy of social policy position was essentially much, and were improvisers and help- last resort, and extended certain exist- that legislation like Medicare and the ful fixers (an attitude that hurt the ing programs — all of which con- Canada Pension were a “national treas- retired prime minister deeply). tributed to significantly alleviating ure,” a “sacred trust.” Unlike a Mike So with the supreme logic and lack poverty during the Trudeau period. Harris, Mulroney would have no neo- of political horse sense that character- Their most intriguing innovation, per- conservative thinkers brewing up poli- ized its first term, the new Trudeau gov- haps, was to broaden the definition of cy in the back room. ernment decided to review most social policy to include citizen partici- Ironically, Mulroney was proud as government programs from top to bot- pation and “quality of life” issues. punch to bask in the reflected light of tom, and then systematically create a Still, the Trudeau government nei- Ron Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, as new set of public priorities. The result of ther set out for, nor achieved, major a fellow conservative and enemy of big this seemingly endless process was a lost social reform. It mostly held the line government. But in fact, Mulroney policy opportunity of great magnitude. against the reactionary social forces had come to politics at a time of social It ignored Kent’s principle that success- sweeping through other Western gov- reforms and was deeply in sympathy ful governments should come to office ernments. But even here, in the battle with them. The neoconservative cloth- with a few major priorities firmly set. to contain spending and meet con- ing did not fit well on an essentially stant provincial demands, the Trudeau progressive leader who did not want to y 1972 the Trudeau government had government in 1977 opened the door dismantle the social progress of the B wasted its most promising time, and to later crippling of federal Medicare past 40 years: he simply wanted to run public enthusiasm had turned to frustra- and social funding by creating the sys- things for a while. tion. Ironically, the 1972-74 minority tem of Established Program Financing. It was even more ironic that the government that resulted might have After Trudeau, our four-part successor who came to office clothed in saved the day for reform because it tem- “model” spent most of the last 20 years the mantle of “old liberalism,” rather porarily created a new political impera- essentially in negative mode. than “new conservatism,” went much tive — by giving the NDP progressive left Unsurprisingly perhaps, both the further toward retrenchment than under David Lewis the balance of power. Mulroney and Chrétien governments Mulroney ever dared. Jean Chrétien,

18 OPTIONS POLITIQUES NOVEMBRE 2003 Windows of opportunity: social reform under Lester B. Pearson

Courtesy, Tom Kent enthusiastically aided by his finance Perhaps the window of opportuni- pre-announce that he would retire in minister, spent nearly a decade doing ty simply wasn’t there. And yet, the February 2004. To buy political peace, little new in social policy, while fatten- fall and winter of 2002-03 saw dramat- he explained that he needed the addi- ing budget surpluses by deeply cutting ic change in most conditions of the tional 18 months to complete (or more real-dollar per capita social funding, “model.” A perking economy and sev- accurately, to begin) an agenda of most notably in Medicare. A major eral large federal surpluses were erod- urgent social reforms. effort to redesign the Child Tax Credit ing the view that reform was Fortuitously, I had spent time with succeeded. Several stopgap Medicare unaffordable. And`the public mood Prime Minister Chretien earlier that funding announcements were made in began to shift priorities. year, opining that the way now anticipation of elections, but they still The fall of 2002 also saw the cre- seemed clear for major initiatives of left its financing reduced and insecure. ation of a new political imperative his own choosing. But the PM didn’t And at least as many Canadians now favouring the reform “model,” when choose. Indeed, he expressed the live in poverty as did in 1984. Prime Minister Chrétien was forced to strong view that Canadians didn’t

POLICY OPTIONS 19 NOVEMBER 2003 Jim Coutts

want policy and program initiatives in the hospital field, one key is covered by a flexible combina- this period — they wanted the govern- Romanow-Kirby recommendation tion of scholarships, affordable ment to lie low and do little. Perhaps is the creation of multi-functional student loans and part-time he knew where the majority view lies, clinics for the well being of all employment. for he has usually been a shrewd judge Canadians. I admit to some per- While fighting against illness and of the public mood. But in matters like sonal bias. After being diagnosed poverty and to widen opportunity completing the social security net, the with prostate cancer, I sought the in Canada, we need also to take a voices of the needy are seldom heard help of medical doctors and other more global view of who needs our by pollsters or party leaders. practitioners, and put together a help. Today, Africa alone has 30 package of life-style and dietary million refugees. Often there is no nce Prime Minister Chrétien’s changes that seemed to have as question of state intervention, for O self-created 18-month window good a chance of meeting my they have no state. Why doesn’t closes, will another window of oppor- needs as radical surgery or radia- Canada work more effectively to tunity for social change open? It is tion. Doctors at Toronto’s Mt. extend the concept of “Doctors hard to be wildly optimistic. If the Sinai Hospital already have Without Borders” (and the pundits are right and Paul Martin is opened a clinic that will help University of Waterloo’s “Engineers confirmed for a term as prime minis- patients in this area, and similar Without Borders”) to include ter, facing a weak and divided opposi- approaches in heart disease and teachers, entrepreneurs, village tion, where would be the “political breast cancer have worked else- planners, and food experts “with- imperative” for bold reform? At the where. Multi-disciplinary and pre- out borders”? In the longer term, same time, we could face spillover ventive group approaches should this country’s international social effects from a Bush administration become more widely available in contribution must also include bent on waging war while enacting the public Medicare system. judicious use of a more generous unprecedented tax cuts for the This country must focus more immigration policy and stronger wealthy — a formula for trillions of resources on the well-being of the insistence on the responsibilities — dollars in deficits and potential child. Much evidence shows that not just the trade opportunities — upward pressure on interest rates. In young Canadians are now where of economic globalization. these circumstances, how long would most poverty is, and that their Today we still allow twenty per- Canadians continue to believe that physical and mental well-being is cent of our people to live in poverty; reform is “affordable”? And without threatened. Sound research the number of homeless in our major that belief, will the public mood already exists to guide what can be cities grows each year; and thousands again begin to turn negative toward done in areas like diet, nurturing of Canada’s children are under- social reform? and parenting. nurtured, under-nourished, and suffer As always, much will depend on At the university level, new think- physical and mental dysfunction. the quality of Canada’s leadership. ing is needed to ensure that our If the tasks seem daunting and a Remarkably, all four national parties brightest students, whatever their bit of encouragement is needed, one will have installed new leaders before economic background, are not can go back at this point to Tom Kent. the next election. The question is financially barred from the best in It was 45 years since he penned the whether from that election will higher education. Commendably, Liberal policy resolutions that raised emerge that small cast of characters individual, government and cor- the curtain on an unprecedented era of with the vision, passion, skill and porate donors have boosted sup- social reform. Now 80, Kent delivered determination to put a new reform port for university research pro- another insightful paper last fall on agenda in place. grams and for physical facilities. the future of Canadian social policy. This retrospective article is not the But public and private sectors The basics had not changed. He was place to outline a new social reform need to focus on accessibility. talking still of how we develop the strategy. But perhaps I can underline Steep tuition and cost increases opportunities, how we extend the tol- several important needs that have now threaten to put some of our erance, the respect and help, that soci- struck me repeatedly in the public hos- leading research universities ety has promised to us all. pital and international education sec- beyond the reach of undergradu- tors, where I have spent much of my ates from all but prosperous fami- Jim Coutts was appointments secretary to time in the last decade working with lies. One possible model is the Prime Minister Pearson from 1963-66, voluntary organizations. “need-blind admissions” approach and principal secretary to Prime Minister The preservation and moderniza- at private universities such as Trudeau from 1975-81. This essay is tion of public Medicare is a priori- Harvard, where any successful adapted by the author from a longer ty task which has barely begun. In applicant with real financial need political work in progress.

20 OPTIONS POLITIQUES NOVEMBRE 2003