Aî/Ierigm Attitudes Toward Germany, 1918-1932
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AÎ/IERIGM ATTITUDES TOWARD GERMANY, 1918-1932 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University By KLAUS FERDINAND SCHOENTHAL, M. A. The Ohio State University 1959 Approved hys A Adviser Department of History TABLE OP COETEFPS Oh&pters: Pages; Introduction ....... ...... 1 I. The Legacy of W a r ................. 3 II. Early Postwar Reactions Toward Germany . , 23 III. The Separate Peace T r e a t y .................. 66 TV, Relief Work and the Beginning of Revisionism . 83 V. Economic Relations, 1919-1923........... 1C6 71. The Reparations P r o b l e m ............. 123 711. American Diplomacy and the Dawes Plan ...... I46 7III. Economic Relations, 1924-1929 .......... 162 IX. Revisionism in Pull Sw i n g ........... 102 X. Reappraisal of German Foreign Policy ...... 204 XI. Hew Apprehensions ...................... 216 XII. Impact of the Young Plan and the I^ression . 236 XIII. The Decline of the V/eimar Republic ....... 254 XIV. Conclusion ............ 268 Appendixes .......................... 272 Bibliography 277 Autobiography 286 11 lEfTRODUCTIOïï Current studies in German-Ajnerican relations have primarily- restricted themselves to a discussion of diplomatic problems. There -were a number of groups in the United States, however, which expressed their opinions and criticisms outside the sys tem of diplomacy. These groups exerted a varying degree of in fluence on the ideas which helped to shape official American policies toward Germany, Moreover, the effect of popular at titudes and pressure groups on policy formation was particu larly strong in the postwar era of weak presidential leadership. An investigation, therefore, of American sentiments toward Ger many as expressed or recorded by newspapers, magazines, and books, and of the interest groups they represented should pro vide a valuable supplement to a history of American diploma tic relations in the interwar period. The following paper attempts to fill a gap in previous research by describing the historical development of these sentiments and to determine their approximate influence on and significance for the poli tical and economic relations between the two countries in the period from spring I918 to summer 1932. Research in the field of political behavior shows that in recent years not more than a quarter of all adult Americans could be called "politically active,*'^ In the isolationist 1920*8 , even less people were concerned v/ith foreign relations, - 1, Julian L. Woodward and Elmo Roper, "Political Activi ties of American Citizens," American Political Science Review (Dec, 1950)Î pp.872 -89, define "political activity” as active participation in several or at least one of the following: (l| voting at the polls; (2) supporting pressure groups by be ing a member of them; (3) personally communicating directly with legislators; (4) participating in political party activity and thus acquiring a claim on legislators; and (5) engaging in habitual dissemination of political opinion through word-of- mouth communication to other citizens. and more specifically with Germany. For this reason, the present study is primarily focused on an analysis of a representative selection of influential public attitudes. Since there is no consensus among competent writers on the question of who has most political power and does or has done most to influence the 2 formation of policy in the United States, the method of selec tion here introduced follows what the author considered as most appropriate for the subject. It is based on two hypotheses: First, it is assumed that a comprehensive examination of archive materials, Congressional debates and hearings, and other sources pertaining to the United States' policy toward Germany would reveal the largest available amount of data on the question of what groups tried to influence governmenta? actions. Second, it is also assumed that an investi gation of important daily newspapers from all sections of the country, and of contemporary magazines and books, would show the sentiments of influential individuals and groups engaged in pub lic discussion and involved in the forming of attitudes toward Germany. It should be possible on the basis of such a selection of sources to arrive at certain valid conclusions concerning the historical development of American attitudes toward republican Germany. 2» Of. John Gunther, Inside America (Uew Yorks Harper and B®ss., 1947)? Foreword, pp.vii-ziv; Elihu Katz and Paul Lazars- feld. Personal Influence (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 1955)? passim; Harold lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (Mew Havens Tale University Press, 1950), PP»60-75I Charles E. Merriam, Political Power, Its Composition and Incidence (Mew libiJks McGraw Hill Book Co., 1934)? pp. 16^? 199-212, 304- 05; C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (Mew York; Oxford Univer sity Press, 1956)9 pp.3-28 . Chapter I THE LEGACY OP WAR German-American diplomatic relations had begun to deteriorate before the First World War under the impact of political and eco nomic rivalries, Germany and the United States were political antagonists in the Pacific and the Caribbean where both countries were late-comers in the race for imperialistic expansion. At the same time, German economic competition in South America became in creasingly stiff. Under these circumstances, distrust of German designs grew in this country. This was by no means restricted to diplomatic circles. By 1914, the major newspapers, and a growing number of influential American citizens, especially politicians and businessmen, were "more or less anti-German."^ Their main targets of criticism were German imperialism as shown in the Ve nezuelan incident of 1902, the Kaiser’s blustering speeches, his 2 government’s "arrogance," and German militarism. It is not surprising, therefore, that a large number of Ameri cans favored the cause of the allies when the First World War broke out. Many individuals of political and social influence were anti- German from the outset. Thus Count Bernstorff relates in his Mem oirs that his many social contacts in Washington proved worthless from the very beginning of the war "because the so-called Four Hundred departed in a body into the enemy camp,"^ Germany also lacked supporters among important historical and political writers. This was somewhat surprising since the older generation of college and university teachers, especially in the 1» Clara Eve Schieber, The Transformation of American Sentiment Toward Germany, 18?0-1914 (Bostons Comhill Publishing Co., 1923), pp.265ff. 2. Ibid., pp.222-24. 3, Count Johann M.A.H. Bernstorff, Memoirs of Count Bernstorff (Hew York: Random House, 1936), p.l03« historical profession, had either studied in Germany or studied German methods of research. These experiences might have produced a favorable impression or even a sentimental attachment to that country. Yet among the early historical evaluations of the Euro pean war, none was especially friendly toward Germany and Austria. Hot a single historian publishing during the years from 1914 to 1917 seems to have felt that the Central Powers were, as they claimed, waging a defensive war. Even authors who made great efforts to be impartial in their discussions of the background of the European war, showed an in clination to put more blame on Germany or Austria than on the allies. This tendency was already visible in the first American book on the origin of the war, Albert B. Hart’s The War in Europe, ^ which was completed in October 1914» Though Hart found the main cause for the war in the spirit of militarism which in his opinion permeated all European powers, he censored Austria especially for 5 pushing the matter unnecessarily with its ultimatum to Serbia. Carlton J.H, Hayes* textbook A Political and Social History of Modern Europe,^ the first edition of which appeared in 1916, discussed the origin of the war in a similar manner. The deeper causes of war, Hayes explained, were such obstacles to peace as armaments and the acceptance of "scientific" justifications of nationalism and militarism. They had developed in all European nations almost equally and existed also in America. But the im mediate cause of the war v/as the mistaken foreign policy of Ger many. The German government, Hayes thought, was more to blame than others, because it had "misjudged the temper of Russia" and 4. Albert B, Hart, The War in Europe (New Yorks D. Appleton and Co., I9I4)® 5 . Ibid., pp.lOlff. 6. Carlton J.H, Hayes, A Political and Social History of Modem Europe, 2 Vols. (Hew York; The Macmillan Co.," 1916). had helped Austria in the moment of crisis believing that the 7 Russians would, yield without a fight. Such restrained criticisms, however, had far less impact on the reading public than the popularly written attacks on Germany by men like James M. Beck, a prominent jurist, and William E, Thayer, a mdely read historian. Beck's The Evidence in the Case was according to the author an "impartial" investigation to determine which power was morally guilty of bringing about the war. Beck based his argument on the allied official document releases which he judged to be reliable. At the same time, he accused the Germans of having suppressed "docu- 9 ments of vital importance.” Beck’s forceful indictment ended with the conclusion that Germany and Austria had "precipitated the war in a manner so underhanded as to suggest a trap."^^ His book was widely read and commented upon by other authors. Its importance can be assessed by the fact that it launched the "war-guilt question” which was to have a decisive influence on American 11 sentiments toward Germany during and after the war. Particularly well received by the reading public was William R. Thayer's Germany Versus Civilization which appeared in March 1916 . Thayer found the key to the understanding of contemporary Germany in her "Prussianization" which he maintained had been going on since I87 O.