S/13000

S/13000 ELEVENTH REPORT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED IN PURSUANCE OF RESOLUTION 253 (1968) CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS THIRTY-FOURTH YEAR SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT No. 2 Volume I UNITED NATIONS New York, 1979

NOTE Symbols of United Nations documents are complosed of capital letters combined T'jii figsures. 1-ention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United iJations udCui.aIejiu. Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/... ) are normally published in quarterly Supplements of the Official :cords of thu ecurity Council. The date of t.- document indicates the suiiTlement in -7hich it appears or in w.hich information about it is given. The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance w.Tith a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January l96), became fully operative on that date. S/13000 11 January 1979

CO1TEI'TS Parvupra; hs IAT2ODUCTIOH ...... Chater I. WORt OF TIiE COi lITTEE ...... A. OrCanization and rrocranme of '.or...... (a) Working procedures ...... (b) Consideration of general subjects .... B. Question of the visit to the United States of America of Ian Smith and other members of the illegal r6gime in Southeru Ehocesia ..... C. Consideration of cases carried over from rrevious reports and of new cases of possible violation of sanctions ...... (a) General cases ...... 1 -3 4 - 123 5 - 32 11 - 19 20 32 33 35 3 o 119 b 2 -i100 (b) Cases opened on the basis of information supplied by individuals and non-governmental organizations (Case Jo. ITGO-) ...... 101 - 115 (c) Imports of chrome, nickel and other materials from Southern Rhodesia into the United States of America (Case 'To. USI-) 11C-119 D. Other activities involvina the Committee aimed at promoting more effective implementation of sanctions ...... 120 - 129 (a) Co-operation with the Organization of African Unity ...... (b) Co-oieration with the Commonwealth Secretariat ...... (c) lHonetary donation from Canadian University Student Body ...... II. THE SUPPLY OF OIL AI1 OIL PRODUCTS TO SOUTHERN' RHODESIA (Case No. INGO-17) ...... 120 . 124 125 - 127 123 1on - 11. Appendix I. Full account of the action tuhen during 1977 on Case Ho. IGO-17, Supply of oil and oil products to Southern Rhodesia ...... Appendix II. Excerpt from Rerort on the Surrnly of Petroleum and Petroleum Products to Rhodesia, by T. H. Bingham, Q.C. and S. ii. Gray, F.C.A., Chapter 14: Conclusions ...... -iii- "P'hr 1

CO iTE- IITS (continited) Chanter Pararaphs TII.'vC.I 3Ty C,\ DVSVE -II'T I FI T9I TIiPL Lf TATTO TOF SA:'CTinS. ... A. Actions talren by GTo2ernr-nts ithtr inderenllently or with resmect to s-ecific cases in response tu inquiries addresser to them t' the B. Transactions reflect-d in foreirn trade fi-ures submittil by rermortina overn'-ents ...... C. Actions taken bry Governments and tie ComTittee with respect to SecuritCouncil resolution 4.O0 (1977) ...... PV, C07 ,JLAP A I'D OT1 RE'PESETTATIO-T TN SOI'TLR1ERN PTTODESA APD OEESZ-ITATIQI QF THE ILLEGAL 1SEGT!7'TV OTHER COUTRTES ...... A. Consular relations with Southern Rhodesia B. Southern Rhodesian representational offices abroad ...... 149 - 155 150-- 153 * 154 -155 156 -i58 156 157 - 158 V. AIPLIPTTS OPRATING TO AP- FPO"i SOUTHLRN RHODESIA Relevant cases examined by the Cor'DLttee . (a) Flights by private conpanies (Case '!o. 15! Tctio roneo) (b) Flights to and from Soithern Phodesia and IATA agreements involving Air Rhodesia (Case TTos. 213 and !MGO-4) .... IT. I i:IfRATTN] AND TOURIf! ...... A. Timi-ration (a) General information . . . (b) Population ...... B. Tourism ...... (a) Grecific cases concerning tourism (b) Admissions into countries of persons travellinr on Southern Rhodesian nassnorts ...... 159 164 . 1(0 - i1(3 . 1614 165 174 102 165 - 160 169 - 174 171 172 .- 17 104 -iv- Page 99 99 101 102 102 166 1S" 102 i04 io4

CO.TTrTITS (continue 1) Ai.i ,_ S T. Report of the Chairman on his personal meetincs With the Permanent L-,-re- sentntives of Govern,"tents in default of rerilies after three reminders Ii Cases carried over from previous renorts and new cases III, Import of chrome., nic':el and other mr.terial from Southern Rhodesia into the United States of America IV. Cases of transactions reflected in forein trade figures submitted by reporting Governments V. Cases opened on the basis of information supplied by individuals and non-governmental organizations VI. Study prepared by the Secretariat oo Southern Rhodesian trade for 1977 The annexes to the present report will be issued separately,

INTRODUCTILIT 1. The present report covers the period bdtwe-ne 1$ December 1977 and 15 December 1978. It follows as a whole the format of previous rer,orts in its body and annexes, but for the sake of or tity, it does not include some of th back-round information already covered in the Previous retorts. 2. Since the issuance of the tenth report (l/529) 1/ ado-ted on 12 December 1977, the Committee has held 1) meetings and the 'Torl-in, -roup on Cases and the Working Group on the Manual on documentation and procedures have held 2 and 1 meetings, respectively (see uaras. 11 and 13 below). The -present report was adopted at the 321st meeting on 22 December 1978. 3. At the 303rd meetin' on 10 January 1978 the Committee elected Ambassador Rikhi Jaipal (India) Chairmian and at the same meeting the Committee elected the delegations of Venezuela and Nireria to provide the first and second vice-chairmen, respectively. I/ Official Records of the Security Council , Thirtr third Year Sn',ecial Supplement io. 2, vol. I.

CHATIER I WORIK Or THE CO- - [ITTLE 4. General information concrnin toc Committee and its 7 orling rroccdures mar be fcund in c..apters I. A of the seventh (S/11594 and Revel) ei lt (S/l1927/Rev.l)2 ninto 0/1225) and tenth (S/1252) retorts of the Comittee. A. Cr anization and rrorranlc of ior' 5. Durirr 103, toe Comittee continued its rractice of holding eehI'r mo-tincs so long as tne proposed meetings did not coincide with meeting5 of the P. curity Council. It instituted a new crocedure b7 establishing a Nor]inz r-rour, on the hanual of documentacio- and procedures for goods orijirating in southern Africa. Information regarding the Committee's conduct of 7orK is given below under the subtitle .rinmg ce cedures". 6. [2&n the Coimittee bce-an its consileration of its *ro;ramrme of work for 197%, reference vas maue to the list of oneral subjects carried over frcm last esr s 1rcar e: as well as naditional mzronoals submitted by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist :epublics. At the end of the discussion, a list "as drain up consolidating, as

Council resolutions; definition of exceptions to the sanctions for medical, humanitarian or educational purposes (Security Council resolution 253 (1968), paras. 3 (d) and 4), discontinuance, except in essential cases, of the practice of holding closed meetings of the Committee and adoption of further measures to ensure that its work is given publicity; co-operation with the Committee established under Security Council resolution 421 (1977) to implement the embargo on the supply of arms to South Africa; co-operation with the Organization of African Unity and other relevant organizations and, where necessary, with individual persons; the raking of all sanctions against the illegal regime of Southern Rhodesia strictly mandatory. 8. The following item, although there was no consensus on its inclusion in the Committee's agenda, was, however, retained as a proposal for future consideration as to its suitability for inclusion in the programme of work; extension of sanctions against South Africa, and/or extension of sanctions to South Africa for the purpose of further effective measures against the Pretoria regime in addition to those enumerated in Security Council resolution 418 (1977) (sanctions in the economic trade, financial and other fields as well as in the field of military and nuclear co-operation). 9. With regard to the specific proposals put forward by various delegations and included in the appendix to the Committee's interim report (S/12450) to the Security Council in the implementation of Security Council resolutions 409 (1977) and 411 (1977), respectively, it was agreed that in so far as those proposals were already before the Council, there was no need to reinstate them in the Cormittee's programme of work, but that any delegation was free to request inclusion of any item for discussion at a particular meeting of the Committee. 10. Information concerning the action taken by the Committee regarding those proposals and the general subjects which the Committee had an opportunity to discuss during 1978 is given below under the subtitle "Consideration of general subjects". (a) Ibrking procedures (i) Election of members of the Working Group on Cases 11. At its 303rd meeting on 18 January 1978, the Cormittee decided to request the delegations of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Venezuela who had served on the Working Group during 1977 to continue to do so in 1978 and the delegations concerned indicated that they would be able to do so. The delegations of Kuwait and Nigeria were then elected to fill the vacancies on the Working Group left by the delegations of Benin and Pakistan whose term of office on the Security Council and its committees had expired at the end of 1977. It was thus agreed that, for 1978, the Working Group would consist of the following five delegations: Kuwait, Nigeria, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Venezuela. The Working Group continued to follow the Committee's procedural practices during the conduct of its work and the chairmanship of the group continued to rotate in alphabetical order after each meeting, as agreed upon in 1977.

(ii) Allocation of meetings 12. At its 304th meetin- on 23 February 1978, the Committee decided to retain the ratio of four consecutive reetins devoted to specific cases and two successive mieetings to general subjects and proposals in a cycle of six meetings since it was still too early to carry out an evaluation of the work of the .orking Group on pending- cases. It was agreed that, should circumstances so require, the Committee could consider changes in its working arrangements J any time in the future. (iii) Establislment of a working r roup on the i1anual on documentation and procedures for goods originating in southern Africa 13. At its 306th meeting on 23 Jarch 1978, the Committee decided to establish a working group consisting of four delegations, to deal exclusively writh the draft lHanual on docuentation and procedures for goods originating in southern Africa. It was agreed that the Urking Group would consist of the following dole'ations: Czechoslovakia, Gabon, India and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Jorthern Ireland. It was also agreed that all sections of the draft manual required scrutiny, revision and updating and the Urking Group Tas entrusted with that task. (iv) The semi -autoiatic procedure with regard to international sports activities involving Southern Rhodesia 11. In conforuity with the Coraiittee's decision at the 269th meeting contained in the ninth report, extending the semi-automatic procedure to information gathered from published sources concerning sports activities involving either individuals or organized groups acting in a nationally representative capacity, or L.embership of Southern Rhodesia in international sports federations, the CoLamittee opened two new sports cases during 1978. Additional information on the individual sports cases may be found in section C of the present chapter. (v) Personal contacts by the Chairman with the Perm.anent Representatives of countries in default of replies after three reminders or at the specific request of the Committee 15. In accordance with the Committee's decision taken at the 273rd meeting and indicated in the ninth report, the Chairman, or the Acting Chairman, has continued to contact the Permanent Representatives of countries, either because of the countries' failure to reply to the Committee's inquiries two nionths after the dispatch of a third reminder to them or at the specific request of the Committee. The Chairman's report in that regard may be found in annex I to the present report. (vi) Circulation to the Committee of the quarterly list of Governments in default of replies after third reminders 16. In accordance with the Committee's decision also taken at the 273rd meeting and indicated in the ninth report, three quarterly lists were circulated to uei.bers of the Comm.littee on 2 February, 11 April and 16 October 1978 showing those countries froymi which replies were still due two months after a third remiinder had been dispatched to them. (vii) Publication of lists of Governments failing to res ond to the Cor ittee's inquiries within the prescribed period of two months 17. In accordance writh the recommendations contained in paragraph 18 of its second special report (S/I10920), which was adopted by the Security Council in resolution 333 (1973), the Committee has continued to publish lists of Governments that fail to respond to its inquiries within the prescribed period of twro months. Since publication of the tenth report, three new lists have been issued as press releases on 31 January, 19 May and 15 Deceriber 1978. 1. At the time of preparation of the present report replies vere overdue and still awaited from Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Lebanon, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Ciozambique, Panana, Paraguay, Sao Tone and Principe, Seychelles, South Africa, Swiitzerland and Zaire. 19. Additional measures taken by the Committee and subsequent developments arising therefrom have already been described in paragraph 15 above with regard to Governments failing to reply even after three reminders. (b) Consideration of general sub~jects (i) Manual of documentation and procedures for goods originating in southern Africa 20. At the 306th meeting, the Committee, bearing in mind the highly technical nature of the draft manual, as well as the changes that had occurred in Africa in the four years since the draft manual had been prepared, especially with the independence of I,1ozambique and Angola, decided to defer consideration of that document until the Working Group on the Manual (see para. 13 above) had had time to review and update it. At the time of the preparation of the present report, the Tlorking Group on the Hanual had not yet completed its review of the document. (ii) Question of conflicting reports of ilember States on the origin of goods declared to have been imported from Southern Rhodesia 21. At the 306th and 311th meetings on 23 March and 11 May 1978, the Committee continued its consideration of the question of conflicting reports in connexion with those cases in which the United States Government had reported imports of chrome ore nickel and other materials from Southern Rhodesia, aboard vessels iwhich were registered in, or belonged to nationals of, countries other than the United States. During the discussion, it was considered worthwhile to continue investifgating the means used by exporters to mislead the shippers in order to gCin some insi-;ht into the manner in which falsification of origin had been effected since similar cases were bound to arise again. Consequently, the

Cor,-,ittee decided to refeL thle question iL 0Tfe documentary evidence used in the conflicting reports to the 11orking Group on the Manual and to retain the otuestion of conflictin- reports on its agendas pending receipt of the final rc-ort frorl the United States. The final report was submitted by the representative of the United States on 15 Deceber 1978 and at the time of preparation of the present report action on that report was still under consideration by ile Coninittee. (iii) Liieasures concerning suspected cases of the crime of mercenary activity. aidin2 and abetting that criie or participatinf, in it 22. Plso at the 306th and 311th ]ieetin!r;s the Cornittee considered the ouestion of the -:easures concerning suspected cases of the crime of mercenary act-ivity_ aiding and abetting that crime or participatin- in it. During the iscussion, reference wyas ?lade to the general declaration of the International conference on iiercenaries (S/12557) and the Prograrmie of Action for the Liberation of Zimbabwe and ifanibia approved by the .Taputo Conference (A/32/109/ Rev.l annex V - S/1231,,/Rev.l), as well as to General Assembly resolution 331. (XXIX) on the definition of agrression and to Security Council resolution 239 (6T). 2/ P eference i;as made also to Security Council resolution 253 (1960), paragraph 8, which called on all i!erdber States to prevent the promotion of erai-. ,ration to Southern Rhodesia. In that context, it wras queried whether merce,vories in Southern Rhodesia would coue under the heading of emigrants to that country. The Com-iittee decided at the 306th meeting to request the representative of the United King;dora to seek commients from his Government as to whether that Governnent's national legislation implementing Security Council resolutions adequately covered the question of mercenaries and whether any tightening of the language was needed, particularly with respect to the punitive action to be taken against their nationals who had been mercenaries in Southern Rhodesia and then returned home. 23. At the 311th r.eeting, the representative of the United Lingdom reported that, in his deleg7ation's view, the question Tas adequately covered by Council resolution 253 (1968), pararraph 8, which called for an end to all ertigration to Southern Rhodesia. As far as the national legislation of the United Kingdom wras concerned, the question was covered by article 14 of Southern Rhodesia 2/ Security Council resolution 239 (1967) was adopted in connexion with the question concerning the De mocratic Republic of the Congo. In paragraphs 2 and 3 of that resolution the Council conde~med any States Thich persisted in per.,.itting or tolerating the recruitment of mercenaries, and the provision of facilities to thent with the objective of overthroing the Governments of States lierbers of the United Nations, and called upon Governments to ensure that their territory and other territories under their control, as well as their nationals, wrere not used for the planning of subversion and the recruitment, t raining and transit of mercenaries designed to ovelthrow the Governent of the Deiocratic R1epublic of the Congo.

United 11ations Sanctions To. 2 Order of 196C. uhich, among other things prohibited any person fror' tJ.ing any action to solicit or encourage others to take up employment or residence in Southern fLhodesia. The representative of France associated himself with the views expressed by the representative of the United Kinrdo, u ,ith regard to paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) and noted that under French national lair, anyone atte-iptinrg to recruit nercenaries in French territory was liable to a terra of imprisomient, cnd anyone found _guilty of involverent in imaercenary activities could be depriveL of French nationality there was therefore no need for further measures. The Committee decided that ithen specific cases concerninG mercenary activity were brought to its attention, it would decide on the appropriate action to be taben rith reference to each particular case in question. (iv) Information fromy the States concerned rith re',ard to measures taken by them to implenent the provisions of the relevant Security Council resolutions 24. The question of information to be provided by States concerned with regard to ueasures taken by them to iuplement the provisions of relevant Security Council resolutions vas considered by the Coriaittee at the 06th and 312th iectings. During the discussion, it was stated that the CoMMittee could not operate without information and that the Lost important source of information was States. It ,as also stated that the purpose of the present iteri w.as to ensure that as uany States as possible co-.operated with the Committee in provi.. ding relevant information. Hote was made of the fact that Security Council resolutions imposing nmandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia contained a paragraph asking the Secretary- .General to report to the Security Council on imieasures which States had taken in impleraentation of the resolution. Thereafter, the Secretary-General had sent notes to States drawing their attention to each resolution and to the relevant paragraph in particular. The Secretary-General had then subraitted the ansrers in the form of reports to the Security Council. It ras also drawn to the attention of the Coi.mittee that in requesting States to provide information, the Council had not set any deadlines for the submission of that information. ijoreover, in some cases, the resolutions had been adopted before certain States were iienbers of the United Hations and formal replies could not be expected from then on such resolutions. The Comrittee decided that the item should be retained on its agenda for further consideration. (v) Complete cessation by all States of the activities of any Southern iModesian offices within their territory other than an office or agency so established exclusively for pensions purposes, and any of their own offices in Southern Rhodesian territory 25. The question of complete cessation by all States of the activities of any Southern Rhodesian offices within their territory other than an office or agency so established exclusively for pensions purposes, and any of their own offices in Southern Rhodesian territory was considered by the Cormittee at its 311th meeting. During the discussion it was recalled that the representative of France had informed the Committee that the Southern 71todesian office in Paris had been closed. It wzas also recalled that the Comittee had definite -7- knowledge that Southern Rhodesian offices existed in Washington D.C. in the United States, and in Sydney, Australia. Furthermore, the Committee had reason to believe that such offices existed in South Africa, but because of the uncooperative attitude of the Government of South Africa it had no definite information on the question. The Governments of Australia and the United States of America had been formally requested to inform the Comiittee of measures they proposed to ta!e to close the respective Southern Rhodesian offices if those offices wrere found to be operating in violation of sanctions. The attention of the two Governments concerned had also been drawm to Security Council resolution h09 (1977) expanding sanctions by prohibiting a transfer of funds from the illegal regirie for certain purposes. Interim replies had been received from the two Governuents stating that they intended to comply with the terms of that resolution. In response to a query as to whether the Southern Rhodesian office in Washington D.C. operated under the auspices of the United i"ingdom, as the ac1ministering Power, the Committee was inforied that that office had been part of the United Kingdom L, ,bassy before the unilateral declaration of independence but that, following that declaration, all connexion had been severed and that the office no longer operated under United Kingdom auspices. The Committee decided to retain this item on its agenda. Additional information on Southern Rhodesian representational offices abroad may be found in section B of chapter IV of the present report. (vi) Co-operation with the Committee established under Security Council resolution 421 (1977) to implement the embargo on the su ply of arms to South Africa 26. The question of co-operation with the Committee established under Security Council resolution 421 (1977) to implement the embargo on the supply of arms to South Africa was also considered at the 311th meeting. Attention ITas drawn to the desirability and need for co-operation writh the new Committee, especially in the area of information. It was observed, on the other hand, that the saue or nearly the same representatives served in both Committees and that there was therefore a nearly automatic overlapping of expertise. 11ile it was clear that effective operation of both Committees was desirable, it was not entirely evident how information on the question of Southern Rhodesia would be relevant to the question of the embargo on the supply of arms to South Africa. The Conuittee decided that any information available to the secretariat of the Comuittee which might be of relevance to the work of the new Committee could be transmitted to that Comittee. The Committee also felt that the Chairman should hold informal meetings with the Chairman of the new Committee to exchanze views on matters of mutual interest. Accordingly, at the request of the Committee, the Chairman sent a letter dated 19 Septeriber 1978 to the Chairman of the new Committee: transmitting the text of the letter from the Antigua Workers' Union (see Case No. INGO--26 in section C of the present chapter), together with a summary of the notes which the Committee had sent to the Governments concerned. Siilarly, in connexion with the same case, the Coujmittee invited the Chairman and members of the newz Co-mittee to a screening of a docuentary film made by the producers of independent programmes on the Canadian and the British Broadcasting Corporations. The joint screening toot place at the 318th meeting of the Committee on 30 YTovember 1978. Subsequently, taking into account the fact that most of the information available on the case so far related iIostly to shipnents destined to South Africa and noting that some aspects of the case were already under consideration by the new Committee, it was felt appropriate to transfer the case as a whole to the new Committee. A letter to that effect was sent by the Chairuan to the Chairman of the new Committee on 7 December 1978. (vii) Overt violations of sanctions 27. At its 311th meetin% the Committee considered the question of overt violations of sanctions. During the discussion, it was suggested that a list of the more flagrant violations of sanctions should be prepared for special consideration by the Committee. A query was raised as to which cases night appear on such a list, aside from the Dyrd Amendment cases (USI-series) which had already appeared in the quarterly lists provided by the Government of the United States of America. The suggestion was made that the existing list could be passed to the Working Group on pending cases for it to prepare some speedy procedure for dealing with such cases. The view was expressed, on the other hand, that the existing procedure whereby any member could propose that the Corzittee consider a given case at any tine was adequate. There was lack of consensus on the matter but the Comnittee decided to retain the item on its agenda. (viii) Expansion of sanctions a.qainst Southern Rhodesia to the full extent of Article 41 of the Charter 20. Also at the 311th meetin5, the Chairman referred to the question of expamsion of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia to the full extent of Article 41 of the Charter and noted that members of the Committee who were also nembers of the Security Council could prepare a draft resolution on the matter and that there might not be any need, therefore, for the Coymittee to deal with it. Nevertheless the Comittee decided to retain the item on its agenda. (ix) Definition of exceptions to the sanctions for medical, humanitarian or educational purposes (resolution 253 (196q), paras. 3 (d) and 4) 29. At the 312th meeting on 18 ay 1978, the Comnittee considered the question of definition of exceptions to the sanctions for medical, humanitarian or educational purposes. During the discussion, there was agreement that the main point was to prevent the use of exceptions provided in Security Council reso-. lution 253 (1968) paragraphs 3 (d) and 4, as a means of breaking sanctions. The Committee decided that it wished to deal with the -ahter in the context of individual cases and to include in its report a statem:ient reflecting the Committee's concern regarding the need to comply with paragraph 3 (d) of Security Council resolution 253 (1960) strictly.

(x) Co-operation with the Org-anization of African Unity and other relevant orFanizations and, where necessary, with individual persons 30. As indicated in the Coziittee's tenth report ((S/12529), paragraph i00) the representative of the OAU had requested the Coammittee at its 299th meeting on 10 Hovenber 1977 to consider granting a permanent invitation to OAU to participate in its work. The request had been included in the Committee's agenda but the Cormittee had not had an opportunity during 1977 to consider the matter. The question of co-operation ith the Organization of African Unity and other relevant organizations and, where necessary, with individual persons was considered by the Committee at its 312th iieeting and it was decided to retain the item on the agenda for further consideration at a later meetin,. Additional information on co-operation with the Organization of African Unity iay be found in section D of the present chapter. (xi) Discontinuance., except in essential cases, of the practice of holdin.,. closed meetingrs of the Cormittee and adoption of further reasures to ensure that its work is given publicity 31. Also at the 312th meeting, the question of discontinuance, except in essential cases, of the practice of holding closed meetings of the Committee and adoption of further measures to ensure that its work is given publicity was taken up by the Committee. During the discussion, the suggestion was made that the Corgnittee could hold public mieetings when the agenda consisted of general subjects. The viewT was expressed, on the other hand,, that sometimes the meetings devoted to general subjects overlapped with those devoted to specific cases and that if the Committee changed its practice of having closed meetings with the option of opening them on occasion, it might find that it obtained less information. It wras noted that the Committee could operate more efficient.ly if its .eetings were closed. It was further noted that the Committee had a good system of issuing press releases and the Chairman could hold press conferences when necessary. The Cormittee decided that it -Tould retain the ezisting systerm of holding closed meetings but reserved the right to decide in individual cases, to open certain .eetings to the public. (xii) The making of all sanctions against the illegal r6, iie of Southern Rhodesia strictly miandatory 32. Also at the 312th meeting, the Committee considered the question of making all sanctions against the illegal regime of Southern Rhodesia strictly mandatory. During the discussion) attention was drawm to the fact that it had not been clearly established that all the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia were mandatory. Some members considered that all the sanctions were mandatory. The view was expressed, on the other hand, that while riany of the Security Council resolutions on sanctions against Southern Rhodesia were unquestionably andatory, the meaning of the other resolutions was not so explicit. The Comittee decided that the secretariat should make a compilation of all Security Council resolutions on sanctions against Southern Rhodesia in order to assist -10- tho Co~mittee in making appropriate recormiendations on how to make all the sanctions mandatory. The list of those resolutions was submitted to the Co_.mittee on 27 October 1978. B. Question of the visit to the United States of Arerica of Ian Smith and other members of the ille,.al r~gir-e in Southern Rhodesia 33. At its 316th meeting on 6 October 1978, the Comittee considered the reported visit to the United States of America of Ian Smith and members of the illegal rkgime in Southern Rhodesia. The Committee heard a statement froia the reDresentative of the United States of America to the United Hlations in which he said, inter alia that the United States Government had granted visas to Ian S_,m!ith and some of his colleagues to visit the United States. The Committee also heard from the representative of the Organization of African Unity to the United Nations the stateuient adopted by the African Group at the United ilationso 34. In view of the urgency and seriousness of this matter and following the Cormittee's decision at the same meeting, the Chairman, in a letter dated 6 October 1978 addressed to the President of the Security Council, transmitted the text of the statement of the representative of the United States and that of the African Group to the Security Council for appropriate action (see S/12885). The texts of those statements are reproduced below: (1) Statement of the United States of America Issuance of a visa to Ian Smith W'We have been involved jointly with the United Kingdom in a major initiative to settle the Rhodesian conflict. ;'Our involveient in this effort has been predicated from the outset on our comLiitment to democratic majority-ruled governments in southern Africa. That cormiitment has not changed. ;'However, the situation has become increasingly dangerous in Rhodesia itself. As conditions worsen, so too do the prospects for resolving the conflict in a way that will bring peace and security to the people of Zimbabwre, and to the region as a whole. 'Over the past 18 months we have spared no effort to try to bring the parties together. To our great regret, those efforts have thus far proven unsuccessful. "The situation is such that we cannot afford merely to let events take their course. We must, if anythinG, redouble our efforts. 'kilor can we afford to miss any opportunity, no matter how remote it may seem, to iipress upon the parties the need for negotiation and compromise as the only alternative to an increasin,-ly brutal war. -11-

'Last April, becretaries Owen and Vance visited Dar-es-Salaam and Salisbury in an effort to reconcile the differences between the parties. TMir visit to Salisbury underscored our determination to maintain a dialo~ue with all parties in an effort to bring about a settlement. "As you Inow, ian Smith and the other re ibers of the Salisbury Executive Council have sought permission to visit the United States in response to an invitation issued by 27 members of the United States Senate. 1Te have weifghed that request with utmost care, having in .nind our responsibilities as a nenber of the United Nlations and our desire to see cn end to the Rhodesion conflict. "In the interest of making every effort to conclude a Rhodesian settlement, we have decided, as an exceptional matter, to grant Smith and other Executive Council menbers perission to visit the U.S. "We intend to use this unique opportunity to continue the discussions with Smith and his colleagues to convince them of the necessity of moving toward a genuine transfer to majority rule. Ye continue to re lard the Anglo-Anerican proposals as the basis for such a settlez:ent. 'We believe that this transfer of power can only take place by -ieans of a negotiated settleaent calling for free and fair internationallysupervised elections through which the will of the people of Zimbabwe can be ezpressed.. 1Te will continue to comply with Security Council sanctions until the negotiation process leads to the formation of a legal, internationally, recognized government in that country.' (2) Statement of the African Group MThe African Group at the United Nations has learned with dismay, and is profoundly concerned, at the decision of the Government of the United States to allow entry to the head of the illegal racist r6gine in Southern Rhodesia, Ian Smith. The Group is constrained to remind the United States Administration that its decision is contrary to the United 1ations Charter and is in direct violation of the letter and spirit of the United Nations Security Council resolutions, particularly resolution 253 (1968) and 423 (1978). In the view of the African Group, this development casts serious doubts on the Administration's much vaunted new policies towards our continent. It would also appear to be inten,ed to give credibility to Smith's claim to have evolved an internal settle.. ment, a claim which has not only been rejected, but also condenmed, as a colossal fraud by the Security Council in paragraph 2 of resolution 423 (1978), which states: Declares as illegal and unacceptable any internal -12- settlement under the auspices of the illeg~al regine and calls upon all States not to accord any recognition to such settlement'. Article 2. paragraph 5, of the United Aations Charter states that All Members shall give the United H1ations every assistance in any action it takes in accord--ance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from givin- assistance to any state against wrhich the United ilations is taking preventive or enforcement action'. While the African Group recognizes the principle of sovereignty of states, it however wishes to remind the United States Administration that this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter 7, as stated in paragraph 7, Article 2, of the United Nations Charter. The African Group also recalls especially operative paragraph 5(b) of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) which calls on states to 'Take all possible measures to prevent the entry into their territories of persons whom they have reason to believe to be ordinarily resident in Southern Rhodesia and whom they have reason to believe to have furthered or encouraged, or to be likely to further or encourage, the unlawful actions of the illegal regime in Southern PRhodesia or any activities which are calculated to evade any measure decided upon in this resolution or resolution 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966.". "Ian Smith is the personification of illegality in Southern Rhodesia. The United States Government voted positively for this resolution and is therefore bound by its terms. The decision of the United States Administration, if implemented, would merely serve to provide solace to Smith's r66ime and certainly undermine further the efforts of the international comrxunity to isolate that illegal r6gime. The basic factor of seizure of power by Smith and a handful of white supporters from the British Crown to pre-empt independence and self determination for the 6 million Africans continues to be the problem. This no nation should circumvent by any manoeuvres. It is evident that the rebel leader would naturally interpret the gesture as proof of acceptability of his illegal regime and a weakening of the international community's commitment against it. Furthermore, the gesture would also serve to encourage the rebel leader to intensify his persistent acts of aggression against the independent African states of Iozambique, Zambia and Botsirana. Such a gesture to the rebel leader can only serve to embolden the illegal regime in its recal-citrance and continued defiance of the will of the international community. The rebel leader to persist in his treasonable acts against the Administering Power and further encourage him in his policies of repression and careless brutality against the people of Zimbabwe. In spite of this retrogressive step, the African Group would like to believe that the United States Administration is still interested in exploring the possibility of a negotiated solution to the Zimbabwe question. The African Group recalls also that the United States Admiiinistration is one of the co-authors of the Anglo-American proposals for settlement of the problems of Zimbabwe. It is logical to expect that the United States Administration would scrupulously avoid any acts which would further aggravate an already depressing situation or place its own settlement proposals in jeopardy. Africa expects the United States Administration which has made pronouncements to the effect that the respect for human -13- rights constitute one of the cornerstones of its foreign policy, to reason its decision bearing in mind the morality inherent in the burning issues f£cin nanhind today in southern Africa, as wrell as the legal and binding obligation it has to discharge under the Charter as a permanent re ,ber of the Security Council. The African Group also appeals to all states to deny transit facilities to the rebel Ian Smith and his collaborators. The African Group draws the attention of the United i ations Security Coucil and the United ]'ations General Assenbly to this act which violates the relevant United 1lations resolutions and urges these bodies to tahe urgent and appropriate action. For its part, the African Group expresses its total and unflinchinc. support for the Patriotic Front.;' 35. Subsequently, the Security Council convened on 10 October 1978 to consider tbe letter fron the Chairman and adopted resolution 437 (1978). In the second and third paragraphs of that resolution, the Council considered that the decision of the United States Government to allow the entry into the United StGates of Ian 0jith and some _embers of the illegal r6gilne in Southern Rhodesia wras in contravention of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) and of the obligations under Article 25 of the Charter of the United iations, and called upon the United States to observe scrupulously the provisions of Security Council resolutions concernin- sanctions. C. Consideration of cases carried over from previous reports and new cases concerning possible violation of sanctions 36. During the period 16 December 1977 to 15 Deceruber 1978, the Committee continued examination of 99 cases of suspected violation of the provisions of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) establishing sanctions against the illegal r~gime in Southern iRhodesie, listed in its tenth report (S/12529, vols. I and II). It also considered 29 newr cases brought to its attention, including 0 cases that were opened on the basis of information supplied by individuals and non -governzental organizations (Case 11,o. IIGO...). The Conittee also received information from Governments on actions taken by theLt to prevent violations or actions taken against violators. Furthernore, the iovaiittee ciecided that 216 cases should be closed. 37. Mhe present section covers those cases in which there have been particular developnents during the period under review. The fact that some cases are Pierely mentioned in passing or even omitted entirely from this analysis means only that the current inquiries being conducted by the Coranittee have not produced any nelT or decisive inforrmation up to the present tine. 32. As a general practice, whenever the Committee receives what appears to be reliable information concerning possible violation of sanctions, it requests the 'ecretary -General to co1municate it to the Governments concerned, so that an ye ; c Tith paragraphs 20 and 22 of Security Council resolution 253 (r' J) they igh-it order investigations and take appropriate action, as well as -orta; ,he CoE±..ittee ith any further information available to them. -14- 39. henever the inforuation transnitted in response to the Cormqittee's rcquest appeared insufficient, uaore details were requested, including copi-s of the cormie'cial docu:aentation submitted to the investigating authorities. In that regard, the Co;m-ittee feels that, when appropriate, it should as a x,.-ttcr of routine receive copies of documentation of any investigatcd case, both for its oino informlation and, when necessary, for transmission to other Govcrnmients potentially concerned. 1,0. In that connexion, the Conaittee again drew7 the attention of the Governl:'_etz concerned to the fact that, in the prevailing circumstances, bills of lading fnd Chamber of Corzerce certificates emanating froia South Africa should not be regarded as sufficient proof of origin. The Committee noted with regret that certain Governments continued to allor the iliportation of cargoes solely on the basis of ouch suspect doct'entation. It recorm.ended that the investigatin authorities should seek additional docurentation, in accordance with the suggestions contained in the menorandur_ on the application of sanctions of 2 Sentember 1969, which had been transiaitted to all Governments on 18 Septeuiber 1969 (see s/9Ohh/Rev.1, annex VI). 3/ 41. 'The complete information concerning cases of suspected violation of sanctions and additional information received by the Conmiittee in response to its inquiries since the publication of its tenth report is contained in annexes iI, III, IV and V. The infor.,ation is briefly reviewed below. (a) General cases i) hetallic ores, metals and their alloys bi2. Concerning, shipments of cortodities in this category, the Committee pursued the study of 21 cases already mentioned in its tenth report and decideo to close nine of those cases (1os. 153, 269, 270, 282, 283, 233, 312, 292 and 259). It also examined 16 new cases (ilos. 316, 317, 313, 319 320, 321, 322, 323-, 324, 326, 327, 328 329, 330, 331> 332). Tvo of the new cases (1bs. 317 and 328), based on information frox'i the United iingdom, hod relevance to Case To. 171 (RISCO), which was the subject of a special report by the Sanctions Coa- iittee to the Security Council (S/11597) in 1975. 4.3. Regarding Case iOo. 130, Agios Georgios, the Governmlent of Greece informed the Comittee in its reply dated 28 IHarch 1978 that the administrative and judicial authorities had investigated the case thorou-hly, including the e;x.amination of writnesses, and had not found evidence fich could substantiate a breach of sanctions by the vessel in question. 3/ Official Records of the Security Council, TTnty-fifth Year, Special Supplerient ijos. 3 and 3A. --15-

44. Concerning Case No. 291, Goldbridge, Straat Holland and England IHaru, the Netherlands pointed out in a reply dated i4 February 1978 that the investigation regarding the vessel Straat Holland had been conducted on the basis of the ship's manifest based on the bills of lading. It was further indicated that in the Netherlands manifests were considered to be official transport documents which were also used for verification by customs. The case was considered at the 309th meeting at which the questions of chemical analyses and proper documentary evidence in respect of commodities originating from southern Africa were discussed. It was decided that the question of chemical analyses should be referred to Governments and that the revised recommendations with regard to proper documentary evidence, then under review by the Working Group on the MIanual on Documentation, should be circulated to all rMember States as soon as they were ready. Regarding the same case, a reply is still awaited from the Government of Liberia and the Chairman was expected to meet with the Permanent Representative of Liberia to discuss the matter. 45. With regard to Case No. 297, Cantonad, Santa Isabella, Baikor, Nortrans Karen and Valle de Orozco, the Committee sent notes dated 27 January 1978 to the Federal Republic of Germany and Singapore drawing their attention to the information received from the Netherlands in a note dated 30 September 1977, reported in the Committee's tenth report (S/12529, annex II) with a request for investigations in order to assist the Committee to establish the origin of the chrome in question. The case was discussed at the 309th meeting at which the Committee decided to send further notes to the Governments of Spain and Norway drawing their attentions to the fact that the type of documentary evidence subrittedby them could not be regarded as sufficient proof of origin and requesting that the authorities concerned should obtain other documents of the type recommended to all States in the Secretary-General's note of 18 September 1969. Yotes dated 26 ;!ay 1978 wern sent to Spain and Norway to that -ff,-ct. Switzerlana, in a reply of 9 May 1978, referred to its pooition outlined in Case Nos. 2 and 103 (Nitrex SA and Rif Trading Company, Ltd.) and repeated that it had no powers under its constitution to control transactions conducted by Swiss firms outside Swiss territory. 4/ It indicated further that the authorities had invited GSG-Grundstoffgesellschaft AG, Zurich, to comment on the matters and the spokesman for the company had stated that his company, which had been entered in the companies register on 17 June 1976, and no connexion of either a legal or a commercial nature with Handelsgesellschaft. given in theUnited Kingdom note as the former name of the Swiss company. The Federal Republic of Germany indicated in its replies dated 7 July and 25 September 1978 that the investigation of the firm Zietschmapn GmbH, Duisburg, had not produced any indication that the chrome alloys were of Southern Rhodesian origin since the shipments had been accompanied by certificates of origin issued by the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce. Norway pointed out in its reply dated 3 August 1978 that the investigation had not yet been completed. The Government 4/ The transactions in question took place before adoption by Switzerland of a new law, operative as of 1 January 1978, prohibiting persons domiciled or headquartered in Switzerland from participating in triangular transactions of no benefit to Switzerland. (See the tenth report, S/12529, para. 109.) -16- of Singapore informed the Committee in its reply of 8 August 1978 that the Santa Isabella was a Singapore-registered vessel, owned by Santa Isabella Maritime SA of Panama City. The vessel had been chartered to S.A. Oetker of Hamburg and sub-time chartered for a voyage of general cargo from Durban to Rotterdam by Messrs. Van Loenen (European), Ltd., London. It was further indicated that the relevant documents pertaining to the cargo could not be traced, that all efforts to contact the sub-charterers had been unsuccessful as the company was not shown in the records of the Companies Registration Office in London, and that the sub- charterers had merely chartered the vessel for that one voyage. 46. In connexion with Case No. 300, Gold Beetle and Shunkai Maru, a reply is still awaited from Liberia even after three reminders. 47. Concerning Case No. 319, Hazelbank, the United Kingdom reported to the Committee information relating to a consignment of mixed high and low carbon ferro-chrome suspected to be of Southern Rhodesian origin and shipped to Chile aboard the above-mentioned vessel, given as registered in the United Kingdom and owmed by the Bank Line, Ltd., of London, a subsidiary of Andrew Weir and Co., Ltd., London. The United Kingdom indicated further that part of the consignment in question had been supplied by Univex (Pvt.), Ltd., of Salisbury, through the Johannesburg mineral brokers Industrial Base Ninerals (Pty.), Ltd. to Cia Electro iMetalurgica SA of Santiago. The other part of the consignment had originated from the Inyala Mine of Rhodesia, processed at Ferro Alloys of the Northern Transvaal and sold to the same company in Chile by the Johannesburg mineral brokers Hochmetals Africa (Pty.), Ltd. The United Kingdom note was communicated to Chile, requesting that Government to assist it in its investigations into the possibility that the company mentioned above had been trading with Southern Rhodesia. The Government of Chile indicated in its reply of 14 April 1978 that the corapany in question had indeed acquired a quantity of high and low carbon ferro-chrome transported on board the vessel Hazelbank and discharged at Valparaiso. It was further stated that the consignments had originated from South Africa as confirmed by the certificates which accompanied them. For further information received from the United Kingdom Government regarding the involvement of a vessel of United Kingdom registration and ownership see paragraph 56, below. The Committee considered the case at the 315th meeting and decided that it should be kept open pending the completion of the Hanual on documentation and procedures for goods originating in southern Africa, since the documents submitted by Chile were not sufficient, in the Committee's view, to establish the non-Rhodesian origin of the consignment in question. 48. With regard to Case No. 320, Straat Aulhas, Patagonia Argentina and Santiago del Estero, the United Kingdom informed the Committee that three shipments of ferro-chrome, suspected to be of Southern Rhodesian origin, had been transported to Argentina aboard the above-mentioned vessels of the Netherlands and Argentina. The three shipments had been sold by the Rhodesian company Unive Pvt of Salisbury to Aceria Bragado of Buenos Aires through the Johannesburg mineral agents Arnhold Wilhelmi and Company (Pty.), Ltd., to Acindar SA of Buenos Aires through Arnhold Wilhelmi and Company (Pty.), Ltd., and to the Argentine company Santini SA through the Johannesburg mineral brokers Industrial Base Hinerals (Pvt.), Ltd., respectively. The United Kingdom note was communicated to the Governments of Argentina and the Netherlands so that they might institute investigations into the possibility that companies under their jurisdiction had imported goods of Rhodesian origin into Argentina, or had assisted in their importation into Argentina. The Netherlands Government informed the Committee that the cargo aboard the vessel Straat Agulhas had been offered for transport by the South African firm Rennies Shipping (PE) (Pty.), Ltd., and had no origin other than South Africa. The Argentine Government indicated in its reply that it was in a position to provide the Committee with documentation stating that the consignments in question were of South African origin. 49. Concerning Case No. 327, Phenix I, Westar and Nortrans Tora, the United Kingdom reported to the Committee three suspected consignments of ferro- chrome delivered to agents of I11inatrade AG of Zurich in Duisburg aboard the abovementioned vessels of Liberian, Greek and Norwegian registration, respectively. The information also indicated that a Swiss company, Minatrade AG of Zurich in Duisburg had arranged the sale of the Rhodesian ferro-chrome through the South African agents Mineralex Agencies (Pty.), Ltd., of Johannesburg. The United Kingdom indicated further that the following European companies were believed to have purchased ferro-chrome of Rhodesian origin from Minatrade AG: Acciaieria Foroni, Varese, Italy; Dr. Fabrizio Ruffo di Calabria, Itasarco, Turin, Italy (already involved in Case No. 293 as reported in the Committee's tenth report, S/12529, para. 84); Compagnie des Forges de ChatillonCommentry-Biache, Paris; £agotteaux (Les Fonderies SA), Vaux-sous- Chevremont, Belgium; and Societe Anonyme Usines Emile, Henricot Cart, Saint Etienne, Belgium. The note was communicated to the Governments of Belgium, France, Greece, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Liberia, the Netherlands and Switzerland to assist them with their investigations into the possibility that firms within their territories had been trading with Southern Rhodesia, or that ships owned by companies in their countries had been carrying commodities originating in Southern Rhodesia. The Netherlands Government informed the Committee in its reply dated 3 August 1978 that the cargoes aboard the vessels Phenix I and Westar had been transported in transit to Duisburg in the Federal Republic of Germany at the request of the German shipping agent M. Zietschmann GmbH and that all the documents had been issued in the name of the said shipping agent. The cargo aboard the vessel Nortrans Tora had been shipped in transit to Liege in Belgium at the request of S.A. Magemon, Ile Monsin. It was further indicated that the goods in question were not of Southern Rhodesian origin. In that connexion, the Committee decided to request the Netherlands Government to divulge the nature of the relevant documents examined by the authorities on the basis of which they had reached their conclusion as to the non-Southern Rhodesian origin of the shipment of ferro-chrome in question. Italy indicated in its replies dated 16 and 21 August 1978 that the two Italian firms mentioned above had denied any involvement in such a deal or any business relations whatever with Iinatrade AG of Zurich. The Federal Republic of Germany pointed out in a reply dated 6 September 1978 that the shipments of ferro-chrome on board the vessels Westar and Nortrans Tora had not originated in Southern Rhodesia but in South Africa. The Government of Greece informed the Committee that an investigation had been ordered and that it would -18- communicate the results as soon as they became available. The French Government stated in its reply dated 16 October 1978 that the company in question had no dealings with the above-mentioned German firm and that the ferro-chrome had originated from South Africa. No reply has yet been received from Liberia. 50. In case No. 321, the United Kingdom reported to the Committee on 30 March 1978 that a ccnsigrnment of ferro-chromt-, alleged to be oritinated from the Southern Rhodesian producer Rhodesian Alloys and despatched by rail from Gwelo in Southern Rhodesia to Likasi in Zaire via Sakania in October, 1977, was purchased by G6n~rale des Carri~res et des Hines du Zaire (GECAHINES). The sale was arranged by the Johannesburg mineral agents F.C. Hoore (Pty.), Ltd. The above information was communicated to the Government of Zaire so that they could launch an investigation into the possibility that a company in their territory might have imported goods originated in Southern Rhodesia. Zaire indicated in its reply dated 12 June 1978 that GECA2INES' supplier, without the knowledge of the latter, had indeed ordered 20 tons of ferro-chrome. But the seriousness of the matter had been drawn to the supplier's attention by its client, GECA vIIHES. In that connexion, the Committee requested the Government of Zaire to obtain from GECAMINES, Ltd., the identity of the company's supplier and the exact origin of the ferro-chrome in question, as well as to provide any documentary evidence relating to that origin. 51. Regarding Case No. 331, Mendoza, Pampa Argentina, Santiago del Estero and Patagonia Argentina, the United Kingdom informed the Committee that four consignments of ferro-chrome suspected to be of Southern Rhodesian origin were shipped to Argentina aboard the above-mentioned vessels of Argentine registration for delivery to Cia Sudamericana de Industria y Comercio (INSUD) and Gurmendi SA of Buenos Aires, Acindar SA of Buenos Aires, Ferronor SA of Rosario of Santa Fe, Argentina, as well as Tradimex of Buenos Aires and Acindar SA of Buenos Aires, respectively. The information also indicated that the shipments in question had been supplied by Inyala 11ine of Rhodesia, Univex of Rhodesia and Rhodesia Alloys through the Johannesburg mineral brokers Industrial Base Hetals (Pty.), Ltd., Arnhold Wilhelmi and Co. (Pty.), Ltd., and Hochmetals Africa (Pty.), Ltd. In addition, the ferro-chrome mined at the Inyala Mine had been sold by Ferro Alloys in the north Transvaal, a subsidiary of Ore and Metal Company, Ltd., of Johannesburg. The Argentine Government informed the Committee in its reply dated 24 October 1978 that the shipments in question were of South African origin as reflected in the documents that were attached. 52. In Case io. 332, the United Kingdom reported to the Committee that three consignments of ferro-chrome railed from Gwelo in Southern Rhodesia to the Shaba Province in Zaire might have been of Southern Rhodesian origin. The information indicated further that the consignments in question had originated from the producer, Rhodesia Alloys and had been purchased by Genrale des Carri~res et des Hines Zaire (GECAIINES). The sale had been arranged by F.C. Moore (Pty.), Ltd., of Johannesburg. The United Kingdom note was brought to the attention of the Government of Zaire so that it could launch an investigation into the possibility that a company within its jurisdiction might have imported goods of Southern Rhodesian origin. -19-

53. Regarding Case No. 326, Gold Mountain, the United Kingdom informed the Committee that a suspected consignment of ferro-chrome silicone had been supplied by Rhodesia Alloys, Ltd., and shipped to Japan aboard the abovementioned Liberian vessel for delivery to Hikari Kogyo Company, Ltd., Tokyo. The sale had been arranged by the Johannesburg mineral brokers Arnhold Wilhelmi and Co. (Pty.), Ltd. The United Kingdom note was communicated to the Governments of Japan and Liberia in order to assist them with their investigations of the case. Japan stated in its reply that it had examined the relevant documents, such as the contract, the certificate of origin issued by the Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce, the invoice, the bill of lading, the import declaration and the letter of credit and had concluded that the consignment was of South African origin. The Government concerned indicated further that they had instituted measures which would require importers to make chemical analysis of samples at the time of customs clearance for each cargo imported from South Africa to ensure that chrome ore and ferro-chromium originating from Southern Rhodesia did not enter Japan. No reply from Liberia has as yet been received, even after three reminders. 54. Concerning Case No. 306, Saronicos Gulf, the Federal Republic of Germany informed the Committee in its reply dated 9 February 1978 that the external trade audit conducted at the firm of Hermann G. Staarck, Goslar, had not borne out the suspicion of violations of the Southern Rhodesian embargo and that the firm in question had taken no delivery of either tungsten ore or antimony ore during the period investigated; moreover that the firm had not made any transactions at all involving antimony ore. The Belgian Government, in its reply dated 12 April 1978, indicated that the firm African Shipping S.A. of Antwerp had stated that the wolfram and antimony ores in question were of South African origin and that the firm did not trade with Southern Rhodesia. The Committee noted that in the Belgium reply no mention was made of any specific documentary evidence presented by the firm or examined by the investigating authorities. It, therefore, requested the Government in question to indicate the nature of those documents, copies of which would be welcomed, and to seek assurance that they conformed with the proper documentation recommended to all iember States in the Secretary-General s note of 18 September 1969. The Belgian authorities pointed out in their reply dated 5 October 1978 that the company African Shipping SA of Antwerp was engaged exclusively in forwarding, shipping and warehousing and in only that capacity had it been involved in the said case. It was further stated that the consignments of antimony and wolfram ores shipped aboard the vessel Saronicos Gulf were immediately carried by road to the Federal Republic of Germany. The Belgian company had no document indicating any origin of the goods in question other than South Africa. In that connexion, the Committee, in order to ascertain the origin of the above-mentioned commodities, decided to request the Belgium Government to indicate the port and date of unloading as well as the dates of the overland transportation and the names and addresses of the recipients in the Federal Republic of Germany. The Greek Government mentioned in its reply dated 29 June 1978 that the origin of the cargoes in question could only be verified by the charterers of the ship, Lima avigation of Hamilton, Bermuaa, who also maintained offices in Hamburg, and the shipping agents at Durban, South Africa. -20-

55. With rerard to Case Vo. 323, Malanpe, the United Kingdom reported to the Committee that a consignment of wolfram ore, possibly of Southern Rhodesian orir in, had been shipped aboard the above-mentioned Portuguese vessel to Antwerp for delivery to Hprmann C. Staarck of Goslar in the Federal Republic of Germany. The information also indicated that the merchandise had originated from Iietex (Pty.), Ltd., of Salisbury and sold by the Johannesburg mineral brokers Tochmetals Africa (Pty.), Ltd., through Transimex, a cover company of Sudamin of Brussels. The United Kingdom note was communicated to the Governments of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany and Portugal to assist them with their investigations into the possibility that companies or agents Within their jurisdiction had been trading with Southern Rhodesia, or that ships owned by companies in their territories had been carrying goods originating in Southern Rhodesia. The Belgian Government in its reply dated 25 Septeriber 1978 infurv d tb- Cclm-itt'- thatt 1 udamin h".d declar,-d that th,: merchlndis"' in question, delivered by HocLetals of Johannesburg, had been sold to the Parisbased firm Societ6 Commerciale de A1inerai de Tungstene et de Ferro Tungstene and not to the firm of Staarck, of Goslar. It was indicated further that the firm Transimex Trading was not a subsidiary of Sudamin and that the minerals were of South African origin. Portugal, in its reply dated 6 July 1978, declared that the goods boarded at Durban, had been shipped by African Indents, Ltd., Durban, to African Shipping and Weber Duilding in Antwerp, and that their origin was not Southern Rhodesian. In the same case, the Federal Republic of Germany stated that a preliminary external trade audit conducted at the firm of Hermann Staarck, Goslar, had not confirmed the suspicion that the company imported tungsten ore of Southern Rhodesian origin. The Committee, therefore, asked the Governments of Belgium and Portugal to submit copies of the documentary evidence examined by them in order to proceed to a conclusive examination of this case; it also advised the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, in view of the Belgian reply, not to proceed with its investigations, unless any newr contrary information made their resumption necessary. 56. Concerning Case No. 318, Varda, the United Kingdori' brought to the attention of the Committee information to the effect that Israeli companies Hutor, Ltd., of Tel Aviv and S. Waissman and Son, Electrical Products, Ltd., of Haifa, had imported a consignment of copper rod suspected to be of Southern Rhodesian origin and shipped aboard the above-mentioned vessel of United Kingdom ownership and registration. The information also indicated that Lonrho Rhodesia, the principal suppliers of copper to Rhodesia Cables, Ltd., were to place their copper mines on a care-and-maintenance basis during the early part of 1978. Prior to the closure, Lonrho Rhodesia had offered Rhodesia Cables, Ltd., the purchase of 750 metric tons of copper from the mine stocks. However, Rhodesia Cables, Ltd., had insufficient funds to meet this purchase and suggested to the Johannesburg firm Metal Sales Co., (Pty.), Ltd., to find a customer who would be willing to pay in advance for copper rod, in order to enable Rhodesia Cables, Ltd., to complete the purchase. It was believed that the customer in question was the Israeli firm S. Waissman and Son, Electrical Products, Ltd. The United Kingdom note was communicated to the Israeli Government with a request for investigations of the above matters. The note in question was also sent to all States Ilembers of the United Nations to alert them to the possibility that Iletal Sales Co., (Pty.), Ltd., might offer companies under -21-- their jurisdiction a part of the 750 metric tons of copper on offer by LonrhO 7Ihodesia. Israel, in its repoly dated 3 May 1978, indicated that the investigation had shoim that there was no basis to the suggestions that any Israeli firm had imported goods of Southern Rhodesian origin or that S. VWaissman and Son, Electrical Products, Ltd., of Haifa was proposing to engage in a transaction which would be in breach of Security Council resolution 253 (1968). In a note dated 13 December 1978, also covering Case No. 319 and enclosing documentary evidence, the United Kingdom reported the findings of its preliminary investigations into the reported shipments of copper rod to Israel aboard the vessel Varda, owned by Haverton Shipping Ltd., London. The South African agents had denied, on being asked by the United Kingdom importing agents, that any copper rod had been put aboard the 14V Varda on the pertinent voyage for Israel, the United Kingdom authorities were still waiting for documentary evidence from the agents which might resolve that discrepancy. With regard to the Iazelbank (see Case No. 319 in para. 47 above) the preliminary United Kingdom findings had confirmed shipments of ferro-chromes to Chile but the bills of lading transmitted with the United Kingdom note and the statement said to have been obtained from the South African export agents had indicated South Africa to be the origin of the shipments, the United Kingdom authorities were pursuing the matter further. 57. In Case No. 329, Laurelbank, the United Kingdom reported information concerning a consignment of electrolytic nickel cathodes suspected to be of Southern Rhodesian origin, shipped to Thailand aboard the above-mentioned vessel of United Kingdom ownership and registration. The information indicated further that the supplier was Rio-Tinto-Zinc of Salisbury and that the shipment was sold to Siam Iron and Steel Company, Ltd., of Bangkok via Oravo South Africa (Pty.), Ltd., of Roosevelt Park, Johannesburg. The Government of Thailand declared in its reply dated 13 October 1978 that the goods in question had been imported from South Africa before the Thai Cabinet's decision on 27 June 1978 to prohibit all trade with South Africa. The decision had been made in order to prevent the importation of goods originating in Southern Rhodesia which might be re-exported through South Africa. Accordingly, the Committee expressed its appreciation for the co-operation it had received from the Government of Thailand and decided to request the Government to confirm the actual origin of the consignment. For further information received from the United Kingdom Government regarding the involvement of a vessel of United Kingdom registration and ownership, see paragraph 65 below. 58. In Case No. 313, Carvalho Araujo, the Federal Republic of Germany informed the Committee that an external trade audit of the firm had disclosed that that Hermann C. Staarck of Goslar had imported 1,300 kg. of tantalite ore, of South African origin, for which a certificate of origin had been issued by the Durban Chamber of Commerce. However, the Committee noted that the supporting documentary evidence could not be regarded as sufficient proof of the nonRhodesian origin of the shipment in question and, therefore, requested the Government concerned to obtain some other relevant documents which could give more conclusive evidence in accordance with the proper documentation recommended in the Secretary-General's note to all ilember States on 18 September 1969. The Belgian Government indicated that the firm Sudamin of Brussels had stated -22- on the basis of documents and information in its possession that the tantalite ore had come from South Africa. The Committee was further apprised that the firm Rhenus Transport of Antwerp had declared in the case under inquiry that the consignment in question had come from South Africa. The Portuguese Government pointed out in its reply dated 6 July 1978 that no evidence had so far been found that the origin of the tantalite ore was Southern Rhodesian. 59. Regarding the five cases of shipments of steel billets suspected to be of Southern Rhodesian origin and supplied by the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Corporation (RISCO) (Case No. 236, Trianon; Case No. 239, Shinkai Haru; Case No. 246, Antje Schulte; Case No. 265, Alesandros Skoutaris; and Case No. 266, Aristedes Xilas), the Committee's expert consultant sent an appropriate reminder to the resident representative of UNDP in Mozambique on 26 January 1978. In that note he pointed out that in the said cases of the suspected violation of sanctions, the Committee most regretfully found itself unable to discharge its duties properly because of the lack of response from the State concerned; and that, before reporting the matter to the Security Council, it would like once again to appeal to the Government of Mozambique for its urgent co--operation and support. The resident representative of the UNDP office addressed a note dated 9 February1978 to the Minister of ForeiCn Affairs of Mozambique in which he referred to his note verbale dated 27 January 1977 and attached to it the expert consultant's letter in extenso. No reply has yet been received from Mozambique. 60. In Case No. 284, Alacrity- Case No. 290, Penmen. Case No. 295, Johnny B; Case No. 298, Agios Nicolaos- Case No. 308, Markos, Fulstar and Pytheas; Case No. 309, Aghios Gerassimos; and Case No. 311, Tini P and Charalambos N. Pateras, concerning consignments of steel billets suspected to be of Southern Rhodesian origin and supplied by RISCO, Switzerland indicated in its reply dated 9 May 1978 that the shipments in question had not been destined for and had not originated in Switzerland, and as such the Swiss authorities had no control over them. It was stated further that FEMETCO SA of Zug had officially denied being in any way involved in such transactions. The Ivory Coast informed the Committee in Case No. 298 that the steel billets imported by them were not of Southern Rhodesian origin. However, the Committee requested the Government in question to indicate the country of origin of the merchandise thus imported and to forward, if possible, copies of any documentary evidence relating to the information to that effect. In the same case, Panama pointed out that the vessel Agios Nicolaos was registered in Panama and that the matter was under investigation by the relevant authorities. With regard to Case No. 308, the Greek Government stated in its reply dated 15 February 1978 that both ships Fulstar and Pytheas had never put into Durban as mentioned in the United Kingdom note dated 11 November 1977 but they had called at Port Elizabeth while under time- .charter to the firm Hausa Maritime Company of the Federal Republic of Germany. It was indicated further that a special term was included in the time- charters of both vessels that the charterer was expressly under obligation to exclude Southern Rhodesian goods from his relevant transactions. Concerning the vessel IMlarkos, the Greek authorities informed the Committee in a note dated 25 March 1978 that the matter was still under active investigation. In the same case, the Federal Republic of Germany informed the Committee that, according to the certificates of origin issued by the Chamber of Commerce in Durban and -23- sub~iitted by the firm Klckner and Co., Duisburg, the steel billets shipped aboard the above-named vessels were of South African origin. However, the Coiimittee requested the Government concerned to obtain some other relevant documents which would give more conclusive evidence of the non-Southern ?,hodesian origin, bearinr in mind the proper documentation recommended to all ije:ber States in the Secretary-General's note of 18 September 1969. At the Committee's 310th meeting, the United Kingdom representative stated that the Lloyds Shipping Indexes had confirmed the Greek note of 7 April 1978 that the Pytheas had indeed called at Durban before going on to Port Elizabeth, but the Fulstar had called only at Port Elizabeth. At the same meeting it was decided that the above information supplied by Greece and the United Kingdom should be transmitted to the Federal Republic of Germany in the hope that it might further facilitate the inquiries being conducted by its investigating authorities. In the same case, Switzerland gave a similar answer to that in Case No. 284. In a further reply dated 13 October 1978, the Federal Republic of Germany apprised the Committee that the representatives of Klckner and Co., Duisburg, had expressed their willingness to co-operate and had given assurances that they would endeavour without delay to obtain additional documentation; the results would be communicated to the Committee as soon as they were available. No reply has yet been received from Lebanon even after a third reminder. 61. Concerning Case No. 309, the inforration received was similar to that given in Case 11o. 308 with regard to the Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland. The Turkish Government pointed out in its reply dated 4 August 1978 that import licences had been granted by the Central Bank of Turkey to the firms Ibrahim Sozen Kollektif Sirketi for 2,208,891 kg, Birlik Demir fladde Cekme 8anayii for 929,379 k-. Yeni Gayret Demir Sanayii and Ticaret, Ltd., Sirketi for 1,949,190 kg; Demir Topuz Sanayii and Ticaret A.S. for 3,900,000 kg and Topuz Torcelik Sanayii and Ticaret A.S. for 4,409,600 kg consignments of steel billets, totalling 13,397,057 kg. In each of those licences, the Federal Republic of Germany had been indicated as the recipient of the currency transfer. It was further indicated that the investigation had not produced any evidence whatsoever indicatin- a breach of sanctions and that the authorities had concluded that the above- mentioned firms had engaged in legal commercial transactions, and had purchased the steel billets from Kl6ckner and Co., Duisburg in good faith. The Government of Greece stated in its reply dated 29 July 1978 that the vessel Aghios Gerassimos was omed by Posidon Shipping Co., SA, Panama and managed by Endeavour Shipping Co., SA, Panama. The vessel had been chartered for one trip by Arnhold Wilhelmi and Co., (Pty.), Johannesburg, on 16 February 1977 through Taurus Shipping Co., Ltd., Johannesburg. it was further stated that the vessel had taken on board 13,397,057 kg of steel billets and rolls at Port Zlizabeth and left for Turkey on 25 February 1977. Greece pointed out that it could not check whether the said merchandise was of buuthern Rhodesian origin; that could be verified only by the buyers, the charterers and their shipping agents. 62. In Case No. 311, the Netherlands Government informed the Committee in its reply datcd 28 February 1978 that the vessel Tini P. , sailing under the Cypriot flag, had left Durban on 11 August 1976 and called at Rotterdam on -24-

10 September 1976. In Rotterdam 2,988 tons of bulk chrome alloys and 2,307 tons of steel billets were trans-shipped on 10 and 11 September 1976. The two consignments had been transported to the Federal Republic of Germany and the investigation gave no indications that they could have been of Southern Rhodesian origin. In that connexion, the Committee decided to request the Government concerned to inform it whether the investigating authorities had examined any documentary evidence in support of their conclusion that the goods were not of Southern Rhodesian origin and, if so, to divulge their nature. The Netherlands in its reply dated 27 June 1978 stated that the authorities had conducted a full and thorough investigation including an examination of all documentary evidence available. In the same case, the Belgian authorities informed the Committee in a note dated 24 Hay 1978 that the investigations into the 9,000 tons of steel billets shipped from Durban to Antwerp aboard the vessel Charalambos N. for delivery to the Federal Republic of Germany had not yielded any proof of a breach of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. Cyprus pointed out in its reply dated 14 August 1978 that the vessel Tini P. had been deleted from the Cyprus Registry on 16 December 1976 and that the shipowners and other related persons had still failed to co-operate since the vessel was not any longer under Cypriot registration. The Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland gave the same replies as those in Case No. 308. The Government of Greece informed the Committee in a note dated 2 October 1978 that the matter was still under investigation. 63. Four new cases of shipments of iron and steel, to Lebanon (Case Ho. 317, Kosmas K, Great George, Plelina Tsiris; and Argolicos Gulf), to Seychelles (Case No. 322, Ifafa and Tugela), to Peru (Case 110. 328, Beechbank), and to Chile (Case No. 330, Beechbank), suspected to be of Southern Rhodesian origin, were reported by the United Kingdom. In Case No. 317, the United Kingdom informed the Committee that four consignments of steel billets supplied by the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Corporation (RISCO) had been discharged in the Lebanese port of Tripoli for delivery to the Consolidated Steel Company of Lebanon. The sale of the above consignments had been arranged on behalf of RISCO by Klckner and Co., AG of Duisburg in the Federal Republic of Germany, acting through Femetco AG of Zug, Switzerland and Inter-Hetmin (Pty.), Ltd., of Johannesburg. The said companies were also alleged to be responsible for arrangements for the sale of steel billets in twelve cases mentioned in the Committee's tenth report (Case Nos. 236, 239, 246, 265, 266, 284, 290, 295, 298, 308, 309 and 311). The Lebanese Government stated in its reply dated 13 April 1978 that the steel billets imported from Kl6ckner and Co., AG were of South African origin. It was further indicated in that reply that Klackner and Co., AG had also sold a quantity of iron and steel to the Lebanese Company for Steel Industry and that the relevant documents certified the origin as "Africa". The investigations on this matter were still proceeding and the results would be submitted to the Committee as soon as they were available. In the same case, the Federal Republic of Germany pointed out in its reply dated 19 April 1978 that the certificates of origin for the goods in question, which the Federal Government found itself unable to refute, give South Africa as their country of origin. The Committee, therefore, requested the Government concerned to indicate the nature of the certificates of origin so examined and to seek assurance that such documents, copies of which would be welcomed, conformed with the proper documentation recommended to all l- ember States in the -25-

Secretary-General's note of 18 September 1969. In a further reply dated 13 October 1978, the Federal epublic of Germany gave a similar answer to that in Case iTos. 308 and 309. The Government of Cyprus informed the Committee in a note dated 24 October 1978, enclosing documentation, that there was no evidence leading to the conclusion that the cargoes in question transported aboard the vessels Kosmas K, Great George and 1ielina Tsiris had originated in Southern Rhodesia. To substantive reply has yet been received from Greece. The Swiss authorities -ave a similar reply to that in Case No. 284. 4. ~ith regard to Case No. 322, Ifafa and Tugela, the United Kingdom reported to the Committee on 22 'larch 1978 information to the effect that two suspected consignments of mild steel round bars were shipped to Seychelles aboard the above mentioned vessels which are registered in Durban, South Africa, and owned by Rennies Coasters (Pty.), Ltd., Durban, and African Coasters (Pty.)j Ltd., Durban, respectively. The information also indicated that the goods in question had been ori inated from RISCO and sold to Builders Centre Seychelles, Ltd., Seychelles. The Seychellois authorities pointed out in its reply dated 6 June 1978 that according to Durban bills of lading certified by Arnhold Uilhelmi and Co. (Pty.), Ltd., as a consignor, the two consignments in question, shipped by Safcor 71echanised Exports (Pty.), Ltd., Fynnland, South Africa, to Builders Centre, Seychelles, Ltd., were produced in South Africa. 65. WHith regard to Case No. 328, the United Kingdom reported to the Committee on 7 July 1978 a suspected consignment of steel wire rods supplied by RISCO and shipped aboard the vessel Beechbank, owned and registered in the United Ningdom, to Productora de Alambres y Derivados SA (Prolansa) of Lima, Peru. The above commodity had been sold via agencies of Coybell, Ltd., and Arnhold 'Tilhelmi and Co. (Pty.). Ltd., both of Johannesburg, and Representaciones QuiLicas SA (Requimsa) of Lima, Peru. The Peruvian Government indicated in its reply dated 24 August 1978 that the bills of lading and certificates of origin contained nothing to indicate that the goods in question originated in Southern Rhodesia. In a note dated 13 December 1978, also covering Case Nos. 329 and 330 and enclosing documentary evidence, the United Kingdom reported information obtained from Andrew Weir and Col. Ltd., London, owners of the vessels Beechbank and Laurelbank, confirming shipments of wire rods and steel grinding balls carried aboard the T'V Beechbank for the consignees in Peru (named above) and Chile (see Case No. 330, in para. 66, below) respectively and of electrolytic cathodes carried aboard the WV Laurelbank for a consignee in Thailand (see Case ITo. 329, in para. 57, above). The accompanying bills of lading and Chamber of Comerce certificates had indicated South Africa as the or.in of the cohmodities in question. In view of the insufficient nature of the documentary evidence obtained the United Kingdom Government had requested Andrew Weir and Co. Ltd. to obtain further evidence, including in each case the naMe of the consignment~s manufacturer. 66. Concerning Case No. 330, the United Kingdom informed the Committee in a note dated 7 July 1978 of a shipment of manufactured metal suspected to be of Southern Rhodesian origin transported aboard the vessel Beechbank, given as o7ned and registered in the United Kingdom, to Compafia ilinera de Tocopilla SA of Santiago, Chile. The United Kingdom note indicated further that the consignment in question, reported to have originated from the Rhodesian firm U.S. Craster (Pvt.) of Salisbury, was sold via the agencies of the mineral -26- brokers Metex (Pvt.), Ltd., of Salisbury and Hocbmetals Africa (Pty.), Ltd., of Johannesburg. The Government of Chile in its reply dated 6 November 1978, enclosing documentation, stated that the commodity in question wis of South African origin. For further information received from the United Kingdom Government concerning the involvement of a vessel of United Kingdom recistration and 'wnership, see paragraph 65, above. 67. Concerning Case No. 316, Hellenic Hero, the United Kingdom informed the Committee that a consignment of refined antimony metal had been shipped from Genoa to Durban aboard the above-mentioned, Greek re'-istered vessel. The note stated further that metal, shipped by the Italian company, Paolo Scerni of Genoa, had been sold to Chloride Rhodesia (Pvt.), Ltd., through the Rhodesia ineral broker iletex (Pvt.), Ltd., of Salisbury and Sudamin of Brussels. The Government of Italy indicated in its reply dated 14 !-arch 1978 that the customs documents had clearly shown that South Africa was the country of destination of the commodity in question. The Greek Government pointed out in its reply dated 10 May 1978 that there was absolutely no ground that would substantiate a breach of the sanctions on Southern Rhodesia by the said vessrl. The Belgian authorities stated in its reply dated 6 June 1978 that the firm Sudamin hAd declared that the above- mentioned Rhodesian companies were unknown to it and that the antimony metal in question had been sold to the firm Hochmetals Africa of Johannesburg. The Committee decided that the case should be closed. 68. In Case iTo. 324, Nortrans Karen, Elpis, Porto and Falcon, the United Kingdom reported to the Committee information concerning four consignments of nickel squares supplied by Anglo.-American Corporation of Salisbury, antimony concentrates, sold through Peabody Robson (Pty.), Ltd. wolfram ore, supplied by Metex (Pty.) of Salisbury- and antimony ore originated from the Belingwe Star Hine, suspected to be of Southern Rhodesian origin) shipped to France aboard the above-mentioned vessels of Norwegian, Greek, Portuguese and Liberian registration, respectively. The United Kingdom indicated further that the commodities in question had been shipped through Inkoop GmbH of Zurich, Sudamin (Cie Sud-Americaine des iinerais et des M6taux S.A.) of Brussels, Peabody Robson (Pty.), Ltd., of Johannesburg to the following French companies. SA Acieries et Fonderies de la Haute Sambre of Berlaimont; 'Tarrel Fr~res of Rivede-Gier, Soci~t6 Fonderie Chavy of Asnieres and Framin International of Paris. The Belgian Government informed the Committee in its note dated 1 June 1978 that Sudamin purchased and not sold a consignment of approximately 50 metric tons of antimony ore from the firm Framin International of Paris and that it resold the consignment to the firm Sica at Chauny in France. France pointed out in its reply dated 14 June 1978 that the metals purchased by the Framin company were of South African origin, that the two companies Fondery Chavy and Acierie et Fonderie de la Haute Sambre had not had recourse to imports and that Narrel Freres had found no trace of a purchase made from the Inkoop company of Zurich. The Greek Government informed the Committee that the vessel Elpis was time-chartered at Hamburg on 10 April 1976 to Lima Navigation Ltd., Bermuda. The Nctherlands stated in its reply dated 22 August 1978 that the carao aboard the vessel Nortrans Karen was not of Southern fhodesian ori-in and that the vessel 21pis was not carrying any antimony upon its arrival in Rotterdam. The Committee, therefore, requested the Government concerned to provide the name of the port at which the vessel Elpis was reported to have discharged its -27- c-r.o of intirony prior to its arrival in Rotterdam, as well as the identity and addresses of the shippingj agents in the Federal Republic of Germany and of the urchasers in that country and in France to whom part of the cargo aboard thy. vessel ortrans Karen wcre transported. The Norwegian authorities informed the Committee that the matter was still under investigation. Portugal stated in its reply dat,-d 2 October 1978 that the ore loaded in Durban aboard the vessel Porto was shipped by Oceanair Natal (Pty.) of Durban to Framin International, Paris. The information requested from the Netherlands was submitted by that Government in a note dated 7 11ovember 1978 and, at the time of preparation of the present report, it was still under consideration by the Committee. ITo reply has yet becn received from Liberia. (ii) Kin rl fuls 69. Fo new case concerning suspected transactions in mineral fuels has been submitted to the Committee since its tenth report. (iii) Tobacco and cig:arettes 70. During the period under review, the Committee examined nine cases already mentioned in its tenth report and decided to close Case Nos. 156 and 287. Two new cases concerning tobacco and cigarettes were brought to the attention of the Committee (Case Nos. 325 and 333). Concerning Case No. 196, Streefkerk and Swellendam, the Government of Halawi transmitted on 6 January 1978 to the Committee one copy of a schedule containing the information on shipments of ioalalii tobacco to the Netherlands during the period August to October 1974. From the analysis of the document it appeared that the quantity of tobacco exported from 11ala.i exceeded that reported by the Netherlands. In Case No. 262, Pereira DEca) the Portugucse authorities informed the Committee in a note dated 2 Octobtr 1978 that the matter was still under investigation. 71. With regard to Cese No. 286, the Committee sent a note to Liechtenstein rkqu(-sting the authorities to undertake more fundamental investigations and at least to seek assurance from Tobmark, Ltd., that it did not or does not still engage in trade transactions with the Southern Rhodesian company, Trading Enterprise (Pvt.), Ltd. A r(ply dated 19 June 1978 was received from Liechtenstein, in which it indicated that all documents relating to the business transactions of Tobmark, Ltd. for the years 1975-1977 had been examined. bkw vor, the investigation had given no indication of a violation of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia. It was indicated further that the said Government had issued an order on 25 January 1978 prohibiting persons domiciled nr established in the Principality of Liechtenstein from participating in certain transactions outside the Principality relating tc goods, credits or trtnsfers of funds ,',riginating in or destined for Southern Rhodesia and to certain services connected therewith. 5/ 5/ Similar regulations by Switzerland had previously been communicated to the Committee. Relevant comments in that connexion are given in chapter III bjlow, pares. 149 (j) and 151. -28- 72. Concerning Case No. 296, Elpis, the represLentative of the United King dcm on the Committeo made a statement to the effect that the correct Elpis was actually owned by Kollintzaf Marine Company SA of Piraeus, which appeared to be a subsidiary of Santa Sofia Cia., Navigation of Panama. The Committee transmitted the above information to the Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and Greece. The Federal Republic of Germany in its reply dated 1 August 1978 stated that the investigations had disclosed that Southern Rhodesian origin of the tobacco imported by Baark and Bendt, Hamburg, could not be established and that the firm had been warehousing tobacco for the Swiss mail-drop company of Pansped AG. The Greek Government informed the Committee in its note dated 2 October 1978 that the matter was still under investigation. 73. With regard to Case No. 301, Klipparen and Serpa Pinto, the Committee transmitted to LEozambique on 14 February 1978 the information received from Sweden, accompanied by certificates of origin issued by the Chamber of Commerce of Beira, which indicated that the tobacco shipped aboard the vessel iliDparen had originated in iozambique, and requested the Government concerned to undertake the necessary investigations in order to assist the Committee to confirm the origin of that tobacco. The Committee indicated further that it would be interested to know to what extent it was normal practice for tobacco of iozambican origin to be shipped through South African ports. The Committee also requested the Government of Portugal in a note dated 14 February 1978 to inform it of the origin of the 264 volumes of unmanufactured tobacco loaded at Durban, South Africa, onto the vessel Serpa Pinto on 9 to 13 November and 21 Tovemuber to 1 December 1976, and stated that it would welcome copies of relevant documentary evidence. In the same case, the Torwegian authorities in their reply dated 27 February 1978, enclosing documentation, stated that six consig.nments were of iHozaiobican origin and one consignment was of South African origin. A further note dated 13 April 1978, enclosing documentary evidence, was received from Denmark, in which it pointed out that the tobacco shipped aboard the Swedish vessel Ilaipparen was of Mozambican origin. The case in question was considered at the 309th meeting of the Committee at which it was decided that a note should be sent to Switzerland transmitting the information submitted by Egypt in its note of 16 October 1977 and requested further information about the board of directors of the Swiss firm Industria AG, as there iras a possibility that iirs. Silvia de 11onte might be involved in the management of that firm. Portugal informed the Committee in a note dated 2 October 1978 that the matter was still under investigation. 74. Concerning Case No. 307, Paraguay declared in its reply dated 5 June 1978 that the firm La Vencedora S.A. had never imported tobacco from the territory of Southern Rhodesia, although it had on two occasions, imported tobacco from South Africa. It was further stated that the firm Henri Wintermans of Eersel, whose headquarters was in the Netherlands, bought, selected and exported the tobacco to Paraguay for the manufacture of cigars (not cigarillos) of Wintermans' brand by La Vencedora S.A. The Netherlands indicated in its reply that tobacco of Southern Rhodesian origin had never been used before nor after 1965 by any manufacturer of cigars in Netherlands. According to standards in the Netherlands, tobacco of Southern Rhodesian origin could only be used for the manufacture of cigarettes and, therefore, the mixture of tobacco did not contain any tobacco from Southern Rhodesia. -29-

75. In Case No. 310, Lendas, the Federal Republic of Germany stated in its reply dated 9 March 1978 that the investigation concerning the firm Johann Kriete, Bremen, had not yet been concluded and that bankruptcy proceedings had been instituted against its assets. The note indicated that preliminary findings showed that another Bremen firm, through a company headquartered in Switzerland, had bought 33 tons of tobacco of Zambian origin off-loaded at Antwerp in Fay 1977 from the above-mentioned Greek vessel. The Government of Greece informed the Committee in a note dated 25 March 1978 that the matter was still under investigation and that the name of the vessel Lendas had been changed to Omalos. Belgium apprised the Committee that as soon as the results of the inquiry were concluded, it would transmit them to the Committee. In a further note dated 7 June 1978, the Federal Republic of Germany pointed out that the only tobacco unloaded from Lendas for German companies in either Antwerp or Bremen was the consignment of 38,903 kg of Zambian oriGin. Greece, in its second reply of 29 June 1978 indicated that the vessel had been chartered on 11 Narch 1977 by Deraldo Ferreira Lima Wavigation, Ltd., of Hamburg, and therefore that only the shipping agents at Durban, the charterers and those who received the merchandise could be in a position to know the origin of the tobacco in question. The Belgian Government informed the Committee in its reply dated 10 July 1978 that the firm Tabaknatie, Antwerp was a forwarding agent, acting exclusively on behalf of its importing or exporting clients, and that, according to the information in its possession, the tobacco was of South African origin. Accordingly, the Committee sent notes to the Federal Republic of Germany requesting further information and documentation, and to Zambia inquiring whether the authorities there could corroborate that a shipment of 33,903 kg of tobacco, reported to have been imported by the Federal Republic of Germany, was from Zambia. 76. With regard to Case No. 325, the United Kingdom reported to the Committee on 19 April 1978 that the Belgian tobacco purchasing company, Intabex Belgium NV of Antwerp, registered in Geneva, Switzerland, had asked a Southern Rhodesian tobacco company Tradimpex (Pvt.), Ltd., of Salisbury, if it could commission Benson and Hedges (Southern Rhodesia) to supply 10,000 cases of cigarettes with the brandname "Benson and Hedges," each case containing 10,000 cigarettes in standard international packets of 20. The information further indicated that the order would be in excess of £1 million and the final destination for the goods might be the Middle East. The United Kingdom note was brought to the attention of the Governments of Belgium and Switzerland so that they could investigate the possibility that a company under their Jurisdiction was involved in attempting to act as agents for the sale of Southern Rhodesian cigarettes. A reply dated 12 June 1978 was received from Belgium in which it was stated that the firm Intabex of Antwerp maintained no trade relations with Tradimpex, Ltd., of Salisbury and that it had not transmitted any order to the firm of Benson and Hedges concerning a shipment of cigarettes to the Middle East. No reply has yet been received from Switzerland even after a third reminder. 77. Concerning Case No. 333, Tokyo Venture, the United Kingdom informed the Committee on 22 September 1978 that approximately 230 metric tons of tobacco, alleged to have been sold by Inter-Continental Leaf Company (Pvt.), Ltd., of Salisbury and loaded aboard the above-mentioned vessel of Liberian registration and Panamanian ownership, at the port of Durban on 13 July 1978, had been -30- imported by the Israeli company Dubek, Ltd., of Tel Aviv. The Israeli authorities declared in a note dated 18 October 1978 that the shipment in question was not of Southern Rhodesian origin. No replies have as yet becn received from Liberia and Panama. (iv) Cereals 78. No new case of suspected violation of sanctions in this category has been submitted to the Committee since the tenth reDort. (v) Cotton and cotton seeds 79. During the period under consideration, no new case concerning suspected transactions in cotton and cotton seeds has been brought to the Committee's attention. (vi) Meat 80. No new case involving meat transactions has been opened since the submission of the tenth report. The Committee pursued the consideration of Case No. 314. In a note dated 23 December 1977 (S/12506), Zaire declared that the aircraft involved was in fact Zairian and the company which owned it had stated that the aircraft had been temporarily rented by a private company in the Lumuimbashi area. It was further indicated that the Zairian authorities had begun an inquiry in order to put an end to the violation of the sanctions decreed against Southern Rhodesia. Pursuant to the Committee's decision, a further note dated 5 January 1978 to Zaire requesting additional information on the matter and, in particular, the circumstances in which Zairian aircraft could engage in a series of flights transporting meat between Salisbury and Lumumbashi in contravention of the provisions of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) prohibiting the importation of commodities from Southern Rhodesia, and the operation of air flights to or from that Territory. Zaire, in its reply dated 18 January 1978, informed the Committee that the aircraft shot down over Mozambique did not belong to the national airline, Air Zaire, but to a private company. The Government strongly condemned the above-mentioned case of fraud against the legislation in force and assured the Committee that severe measures would be taken under the laws of the country. The Belgian authorities indicated in their reply dated 26 January 1978 that they were in no way involved in the incidents reported by Mozambique concerning the mandatory sanctions against the illegal r~gime of Southern Rhodesia. The Committee discussed the case in question at its 308th meeting on 6 April 1978 and decided that further notes should be sent to Belgium and Zaire. A note dated 17 April 1978 was sent to Belgium, in which the Committee drew the attention of the Government concerned to the provisions of paragraph 3 (b) of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) and requested that appropriate measures should be taken with regard to the violation of sanctions in the present case, and that the mandatory provisions of the Security Council should be strictly observed in the future. The second note was sent to Zaire on 30 May 1978, in which the Committee requested specific information as to the nature of the proposed measures and as to whether they had already been taken, as well as any information on any -31- previous violations of the mandatory sanctions against the illegal r~giue in Southern Ehodesia by the African Lux Line, the Cafrigel Conmpany or any other business established in Zaire. A further reply dated 12 June 1978 was received from hiLgium indicating that the authorities had no control over activities of any kind carried out by foreign companies outside Belgian territory r'nd that the activities cf the Zairinn company mentioned by the eozambique Government i7crc consequ,-ntly, no concern whatsoever of the Belgian Governmcnt. The note also mentioned that the Belgian pilots had been bound by a contract of employment with the Zairian company in question, the activities in which they had enag d resulting fro-,! their contract of eaployment, and that they had only boon carrying out the instructions of the i.anagement of the company, for iwhich they could not be hold responsible. The responsibility, therefore. rested solely with the Zairian private company in question and in no way concerned the Belgian Government. Accordingly, the Committee decided that the issue raised by Belgium should be referred to the United Nations Legal Counsel to seek his opinion on it. T,!o reply has yet been received from Zaire, even after a third reminder. 81. Case No. 154: Tango Romeo,, which concerns front airline companies operatin for the benefit of Southern Rhodesian interests, is referred to in _ore Cdtai! in ch:pter V of the present report. It is mentioned here because the Wain cargo of those aircraft when departing from Southern Rhodesia is reported to consist of meat and meat products. (vii) Sugar 82. DurinC the period under consideration, no new case concerning suspected trans'actions in sugar has been brought to the attention of the Committee. (viii) Fertilizers and ammonia 33. iTo new case f suspected violation of sanctions in this field has been submitted to the Committee. In Case Nos. 48v 52 and 66 Portugal indicated in its note dated 2 October 1978 6/ that the alleged violations of sanctions had taken place before 25 April 1974. The Government that had been invested after the April revolution had made it quite clear that it had re)uliated the P( licy of the previous r6gime as regards Southern Rhodesia, and that it had been Prepared to co-operate fully writh the United Fitions in imposing mandatory sanctions against the illegal r~gime. The Portuguese Government requested the Cc!Mittee in the note in question to take those changes into consideration and hav[ all cases which in the above category removed from the records. It was further stated that the Portuguese Constitution had been approved in 1976 and, 6/ The note niso covered Case ios. 9, 18, 82, 154, 173, 182 and 289 (subscquently renunbred as INGO-19), concerning which Portugal gave the same explanation. -32- faithful to its promise, the Government had set out immediately to establish the legal basis for the full implementation of Security Council resolution 253 (1968), and the resolution had been incorporated into the Portuguese legal system on 29 July 1977. (ix) Machinery 84. Since the submission of the tenth report, no new case of suspected violation of sanctions has been submitted to the Committee in this category. The Committee pursued the examination of Case Nos. 170, 221, 267 and 305 and decided to close Case No. 170. With regard to Case No. 221, the Belgian authorities informed the Committee in a note dated 9 June 1978, accompanied by documentary evidence, that the company Electrothermil Philips Acec (Elphiac) had stated that the oscillating tube support supplied on its behalf by Siemens of Berlin in September 1975 was not bound for Southern Rhodesia. The documentary evidence showed that a Siemens cooling tank for an RSIO41V RF power valve, valued at BF 49,250, had been dispatched by flight number SA 257 on 13 September 1975 from Frankfurt to Johannesburg by order of the firm Tractor Transport and Equipment (Pty.), Ltd., Transvaal, South Africa. 85. In connexion with Case No. 267, Straat Hong Kong, the Committee decided to send a note dated 8 June 1978 to Botswana, indicating that the Government of the Netherlands had confirmed that the industrial sewing machine in question, supplied by the Japanese company of Elize Incorporated, Osaka, had indeed been taken on board the above-mentioned vessel at Kobe, Japan, on 8 November 1975 and had been unloaded at Cape Town, South Africa. In addition, the Government of Japan had informed the Committee that the machine, which was being shipped back after necessary repairs by Elize Incorporated, had actually been shipped from Kobe on 19 November 1975 and had been unloaded at Port Elizabeth, South Africa, for onward delivery to Industrial Sales Agencies, Ltd., Francistown, Botswana, the company in whose name the repairs had been made, through Mr. Michael David, Port Elizabeth, South Africa. Subsequently, the Government of Japan had given the serial number of the machine as 9661059 and had reaffirmed that it had first been exported to Mr. Michael David, the same person to whom it had later been re-exported after the necessary repairs. In the same note, the Committee requested the Government concerned to undertake the necessary investigations in order to assist it in determining the final destination of the machine in question. No substantive reply has yet been received from Botswana. 86. Concerning Case No. 305, Alcoutim, the Government of Portugal informed the Committee in a note dated 2 October 1978 that no evidence had so far been found that the final destination of the shipment of parts for diesel locomotives to S. E. Muller and Partners, Durban, by Aeroferte-Agentes Transit~rios e de Carga A~rea, Lisbon, was in fact Southern Rhodesia. (x) Transport equipment 37. The Committee pursued the examination of four cases already reported in the tenth report (Case Nos. 168, 173, 182 and 195), and no new case of suspected violation of sanctions was brought to its attention during the period under review. The Committee decided to close Case Nos. 168, 173 and 182. With regard to Case No. 195, Soula K, the Committee at its 310th meeting considered the said case and recalled that the information given to it by the Governments of Japan and Greece had not appeared compatible. Accordingly, the Committee decided to send a note dated 26 May 1978 to the United States requesting that Government to seek from the -33- charterer of the vessel, as reported by Greece, the Japanese comnany Hitsui oSK Lines, located at the World Trade Center, New York City, information as to jrhether the shi-rlrent had occurred and if so, w.hat type of motor vehicles and srare parts had been unloaded. The United States, in its reply dated 22 August 1978, pointed out that the information received from the New York office of Mitsui Lines had indicated that neither iitsui New York nor any other United States-based ritsui Lines office had been involved in the chartering of the vessel involved, the Soula K. As a result, the Committee decided to send notes to Greece and Japan requesting further information and clarification to make it Possible to conclude the case. The proposed notes were sent to the two Governments on 1k December 1978. (xi) Textiles and related products 88. No new case concerning suspected transactions in textiles and related products has been submitted to the Committee since its tenth report. (xii) Sports activities and other international competitions 39. The Committee pursued the study of 16 cases of sports activities and other international competitions already mentioned in its last report and decided to close 12 of them (Case Nos. 166, 175, 192, 199, 205, 216, 229, 234, 258, 264, 294 and 303). Two new cases have been opened, Case No. 334, Southern Rhodesian team and the international 7,240 km Cape-to-Uruguay yacht race, and Case No. 335, Participation of a Southern Rhodesian team in the World Ploughing Contest in the Federal Republic of Germany. The Committee paid particular attention to sports cases of a representative nature. With regard to Case No. 219, the Committee sent a further note dated 30 June 1978 to the General Secretary of the International Tennis Federation (ITF), in which it expressed its great disappointment at the apparent indifference of ITF to the continued membership of Southern Rhodesia in that organization, particularly in view of the Committee's appeal to ITF over the years to effect the expulsion of Southern Rhodesia from the organization. The Committee also drew the attention of ITF to paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 277 (1970) which urged member States of any international or regional organizations to suspend any membership or associate membership of the illegal regime of Southern Rhodesia from their respective organization. In Case Nos. 253 and 285, Portugal informed the Committee in its note dated 2 October 1978 that the Portuguese Golf Federation had agreed to organize the World Championship in Portugal in 1976 on condition that no racial, social or political discrimination was practised. As there was no adequate legislation at that time, six players holding Southern Rhodesian passports had apparently been allowed to enter the tournament, an occurrence no longer permissible since the adoption of resolution 188/77 by Portugal. Concerning Case No. 260, the Committee decided to send a further note dated 8 June 1978 to the Government of Belgium indicating its regret that the tennis match, under the Federation Cup Women's Championships, played in Philadelphia, USA, in August 1976, between the Belgian team and the team purporting to represent Southern Rhodesia had been in contravention of the spirit and intent of the Security Council mandatory sanctions against the illegal regime and might have been contrary to the letter and law of those sanctions. The Committee also hoped that similar incidents would not recur. 90. Concerning Case No. 334, the Committee received information from published sources to the effect that a nationally representative Southern Rhodesian team was preparing to participate in the international 7,240 ik Cape-to- Uruguay yacht race to be held in January, 1979. The Committee transmitted. in a note dated 6 November 1978, the information in question to the Government of Uruguay for investigation and comments thereon. -34-

91. With regard to Case No. 335, the Committee received information from published sources to the effect that a nationally representative ploughing team from the illegal regime of Southern Rhodesia had taken part in the World Ploughing Contest, held in Wickstad, Federal Republic of Germany, in September 1978. The Committee brought the matter to the attention of the Government concerned in a note dated 6 November 1978 and requested an investigation and comments thereon. (xiii) Banking, insurance and other related facilities 92. During the period under review, the Committee pursued the consideration of four cases concerning the above activities already reported in the tenth report (Case Nos. 163, 171, 208 and 304) and decided that Case Kos. 163 and 208 should be closed. No new case in this category has been brought to the attention of the Committee. In this connexion, it should be noted that Case No. 171 is still under active consideration. In particular, the Committee discussed the matter at its 308th meeting and decided to send a note to the Austrian Government expressing its satisfaction with the reassurances given by the said Government and concluded that no useful purpose could be obtained by pursuing the matter further with regard to Austria. The note was sent on 9 May 1978. 93. In Case No. 304, concerning the transfer of personal funds to and from Southern Rhodesia, the Committee received assurances from the Governments of Australia, Cameroon, Canada, China, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, India, Iran, Luxembourg, Norway, the Philippines, Sweden, Turkey and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that no currency remittances abroad, payments to and from Southern Rhodesia, had been made and were prohibited in compliance with relevant Security Council resolutions on Southern Rhodesia. (xiv) Tourism and other related matters 94. No new case concerning tourism and other related matters has been sutmitted to the Committee during the period under review. The Committee pursued the examination of five cases already included in the tenth report (Case Nos. 143, 1901, 213, 227 and 275) and decided to close Case Nos. 190, 213 and 275. Details concerning Case Nos. 143 and 227 are given in chapters IV and VI respectively. (xv) Other cases 95. Regarding other cases of possible violations of sanctions not listed under specific headings, the Committee pursued the examination of Case Nos. 154, 201, 214, 218, 243, 247, 259, 261, 263, 273, 274, 293 and 302 referred to in the previous report and decided that Case Nos. 218, 247, 259 and 263 should be closed. No new case has been reported to the Committee in this category. In Case No. 201, Denmark reported to the Committee that the value of goods exported to Southern Rhodesia in 1977 had been 1,159,000 Danish crowns. The Committee discussed the matter at its 310th meeting and decided to send a note dated 28 June 1978 to Denmark requesting information as to the categorized nature of the Danish exports to Southern Rhodesia during the year 1977. A reply dated 11 August 1978, with the list of the commodities exported in the period under review., was received from Denmark, stating that no Danish exports to Southern Rhodesia had included any commodities listed in operative paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 232 (1966). Additional information on this case, and on Case Nos. 214 and 243 referred to in paragraph 96, below, is given in section B of chapter III, below. -35-

96. In connexion with Case No. 214, it is worth noting that, according to the Annual Statistics of External Trade of Switzerland (1977), the Swiss imports from and exports to Southern Rhodesia during the year 1977, as summarized for the Committee, amounted to SwF 20,383,799 (GUS 8,518,000) and SwF 4,598,228 ($US 1,929,000), respectively. Case No. 243 (Federal Republic of Germany trade with Southern Rhodesia) is still under active consideration by the Committee. 97. With regard to Case No. 261, Italy informed the Committee in its note dated 14 March 1978 that the further investigation and the information provided by Ljr. Mauro Bini, of Iontefibre S.P.A., revealed that the Italian company in question had not at any time engaged in negotiations, through Mr. Mauro Bini or any other officers, in this case and in general with the Southern Rhodesian firm, Security Mills (Pvt.), Ltd., of Bulawayo, nor in any way had it facilitated the transfer of the goods to that territory. The information indicated further that the company in question could not be considered responsible for any further transaction made by their customers regarding the goods after delivery. No reply has yet been received from Switzerland even after a third reminder. The Committee discussed the case at its 310th meeting and decided that a note, together with the documents submitted by the Italian authorities, should again be sent to the Permanent Observer of Switzerland in order to assist that Government in locating the Swiss firm Atlas Trading as well as United Overseas Bank. The note was sent on 13 November 1978. 98. Concerning Case No. 293, the matter was considered at the 308th meeting on 6 April 1978, at which the Committee decided that the matter of authentic certificates of origin containing deliberately misleading information should be taken into account in the communication to be sent to the International Chamber of Commerce in connexion with Case No. 270. The matter was taken up in a letter dated 24 May 1978 addressed to the Secretary-General of the International Chamber of Commerce, Paris, France, by the Chairman of the Committee in connexion with Case No. 270. The Committee also decided that the Working Group on the manual for documentation should continue to study the matter of misleading certificates of origin. In the same case, a reply dated 9 June 1978 was received from Belgium, in which it indicated that the authorities had questioned the company Ch. Monseur S.P.R.L. of Li6ge regarding the allegation of violation of the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. In reply, the company attested that it had not traded, directly or indirectly, with either Southern Rhodesia in general or the company Univex in particular. In addition, the company stated it had never sold or resold minerals originating in South Africa; the Belgian customs services had been unable to detect any breach of the sanctions imposed by the Security Council on the part of the company in question. 99. Regarding Case No. 302, Falcon, Phenix and Rocadas, the Swiss authorities pointed out in their reply dated 19 December 1977 that they had explained in detail their position in Case Nos. 2 and 103, that the Swiss authorities had no control over transactions of this nature unless the goods in question entered Swiss territory. It was further indicated that the authorities had asked Centrex SA at Geneva to comment on the allegations, and it had replied that it had never had any dealings with Michele Enterprises (Pvt.), Ltd., of Salisbury, and, in fact, had never heard of that firm. 100. In connexion with Case No. 154, Tango Romeo, Gabon, in its reply dated 6 February 1978, declared that the Government would re-examine the allegations with the greatest attention and would communicate the results as soon as they -36- were available. Reference in that note was made to Gabon's notes of 20 January and 14 November 1977. The note indicated further that the Gabonese Republic once again completely rejected all the allegations contained in the United States note dated 12 December 1977 with respect to the company Air Gabon Cargo. Moreover, it pointed out that the Government was currently engaged in negotiations with Argentina for the conclusion of an agreement for the delivery of meat. The note under review was brought to the attention of all tember States of the United Nations in accordance with the request of the Gabonese Government. Portugal, in its reply dated 13 February 1978, informed the Committee that allegations in connexion with Case No. 154 had taken place before the independence of Mozambique and Angola and such incidents would not again occur under the responsibility of the Portuguese Government. The Iraqi authorities, responding to the Committee's note to all Member States of 9 November 1977 (see the tenth report, S/12529, annex I1, (254) Case No. 154, paras. 23 and 26) requested from the Committee, in a note dated 24 February 1978, clarifications on whether Iraq should allow Air Trans Africa (ATA) to land in or overfly Iraqi territory; whether the action should include the other three companies, Affretair, Air Gabon Cargo and Cargoman; and whether Iraq should allow the employees of those companies to enter its territory. The Committee discussed the case at its 307th meeting on 30 March 1978, decided that the replies received from the Governments of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Sri Lanka and Zambia had been satisfactory and recommended that the points raised in connexion with the reply from Gabon should be mentioned by the Chairman during his proposed meeting with the Permanent Representative of that country. With regard to the question raised by Iraq, the Committee recommended in its note dated 26 April 1978 that Iraq should take action in accordance with the suggestions contained in the United Kingdom note of 24 October 1977, namely, by prohibiting Air Trans Africa, Air Gabon Cargo and Cargoman from entering Iraqi air space or landing in Iraqi territory. In a further note dated 22 March 1978, the United Kingdom reported to the Committee information concerning the activities of Air Trans Africa of Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia and its front airlines, Air Gabon Cargo and Cargoman, Ltd., of Seeb Airport, ,Muscat. The said information was brought to the attention of the Governments of Oman, the Netherlands and France so that appropriate investigations could be made, as well as to all Member States of the United Nations with a request that they deny use of their airports and entry into their air space to the aircraft of the companies in question. Details of the above-mentioned United Kingdom note and other developments regarding Case No. 154 are presented in chapter V, section A, below, as well as in annex II to the present report. (b) Cases opened on the basis of information supplied by individuals and non-governmental organizations (Case No. INGO-...) 101. During the period under review, the Committee has opened eight new cases on the basis of information supplied by individuals and non-governmental organizations: Case No. INGO-22 (Possible acquisition of 20 Cessna F337 Milirole aircraft by Southern Rhodesia), Case No. INGO-23 (Gun-smuggling to Southern Rhodesia by United States nationals), Case No. INGO-24 (Package tour to Southern Rhodesia by a Japanese travel company), Case No. INGO-25 (Scheduled flights to and from Southern Rhodesia and facilities provided by British Airways), Case No. INGO-26 (Shipments of arms from Antigua to Southern Rhodesia via South Africa), Case No. INGO-27 (Visit of a Southern Rhodesian tobacco official to the Netherlands), Case No. INGO-28 (Package tours to Southern Rhodesia organized from the Netherlands) and Case No. INGO- 29 (Supply of computer equipment to Southern Rhodesia). In addition, the Committee pursued the consideration of nine cases already reported -37- in its tenth report and decided that Case I-o. INGO-7, Case No. INGO-8, Case Ho. INGO-15 and Case io. IIGO-19 should be closed. 102. The Committee noted that some of the most important cases before it had been opened on the basis of information supplied by non-governmental organizations. The Committee, therefore, had expressed its appreciation for the contribution from such orgaizations and noted the importance of the need to maintain that co- operation in the future. 103. In Case Io. INGO-4 (Air Rhodesia and IATA agreements), the Committee received a note dated 9 February 1978 from Portugal indicating that the Portuguese airline Transportes Aereos Portugueses (TAP) had terminated all interline agreements with Air Rhodesia. Thus only South Africa has not yet informed the Committee of South African Airways' intentions with regard to that airline's ties with Air Rhodesia. The Committee decided at its 313th meeting to send a note to 'r. Knut Harinaskj6ld, Director-General of the International Air Transport Association, Montreal, Canada, requesting a comprehensive account of the cancellations of IATA/Air Rhodesia interline agreements, particularly the effective dates of those cancellations. 101!. Concerning Case No. INGO-13 (Mining operations in Southern Rhodesia by Canadian-owned companies), the Committee considered the matter at its 308th meeting and decided to keep the case open, pending receipt of information concerning Canada's intention regarding the questions raised by that Government originally. 105. Information concerning Case No. INGO-17, which the Committee considered im-ortant enough to merit a chapter by itself, is given in chapter II, belov, and full details on the case are contained in annex V to the present report. 06o. In Case No. IITGO-20 (Promotion of tourism to Southern Rhodesia by a United States firm), the Committee sent a note dated 8 June 1978 to the United States requesting more definite assurance that the firm Transportation Consultants International (TCI) had actually stopped the objectionable activities, which had given rise to the case, as well as any details on Hr. Derek Ebben, general manager of the Rhodesian United Touring Company, particularly the means of his entry into the United States and the range of his activities. The United States, in its reply dated 20 June 1978, informed the Committee that the firm bad responded that it would cease such actions. Should the firm TCI take steps regarding promotion of travel to Southern Rhodesia the United States Department of Justice would prosecute the firm on the same basis as any other offender. The note indicated further that the activities of Mr. Derek Ebben were still under investigation and would be communicated to the Committee as soon as they were available. 107. With regard to Case No. INGO-21 (Loan to Southern Rhodesia by a Canadian bank). the United Kingdom informed the Committee in a note dated 1 February 1978 that a substantive reply would be sent to the Committee when the Director of Public Prosecutions had completed his consideration of the matter in question. At the 304th meeting on 23 February 1978, the representative of Canada on the Committee made a statement regarding the case to the effect that the matter had been referred by the Department of External Affairs to the Canadian Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce and that, as the allegations warranted further -38-- investigation the case had been turned over to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. He indicated further that the investigation of the case under review was extremely complex and that the Canadian authorities were treating it ith utmost seriousness. The results of the investigations would be communicated to the Committee as soon as they were hnown. The representative of Canada made a further statement at the 314th meeting on 13 July 1978 indicating that the Canadian authorities considered that there were sufficient grounds to continue their investigation and would advise the Committee of the progress of the investigation as further information became available. By a note dated 15 December 1978 Canada informed the Committee that the investigations by the Canadian uuthorities had been completed; it had been decided not to pursue the matter any further because of the lack of evidence to support charges that a violation of Canadian domestic legislation had taken place and the inability to isolate an offence falling within Canadian jurisdiction. The Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce in Nassau, Bahamas, had indeed granted the loan in question, but it had secured assurances that none of the money loaned was to be invested in Southern Rhodesia. If any violation of the sanctions had occurred subsequently, therefore, the offence lay within the jurisdiction of either the Bahamian or the United Kingdom authorities. 108. Regarding Case No. INGO-22 (Possible acquisition of 20 Cessna F337 Iilirole aircraft by Southern Rhodesia), a communication dated 23 November 1977 had been received from Mr. Eric Prokosch, a member of the American Friends Service Committee, Inc., a non-governmental organization in the United States of America, reporting information concerning the supply of 20 Cessna F337 aircraft, made in France, to the Southern Rhodesian Air Force. The aircraft had arrived in Southern Rhodesia by circuitous routes in mid-1976 when they had been ostensibly ordered by a "Spanish fishing company" in the Canary Islands. The said communication indicated further that the French producer of the aircraft, Reims Aviation, was 49 per cent owned by Cessna of the United States, that the primary structures of the F337 aircraft were made in the United States before being shipped to France and that their engines, also of American design, were produced by Rolls Royce in England under licence from another American company, Teledyne. An aircraft of that make was also reported to have been shot down over Mozambique. The above information had been brought to the attention of the Governments of France, Mozambique, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States with a request for thorough investigations and comments thereon. France, in its reply dated 6 February 1973, informed the Committee that the American Cessna F337 aircraft was made in France and that its civil version was generally exported free of restrictions, while the exportation of the military version was subject to the approval of the Interministerial Committee on the Exportation of Military Equipment. In addition, the investigation carried out by the French authorities had indicated that no civil or military aircraft of the type in question had been sold by France to Southern Rhodesia and that the buyers of the military type of aircraft had undertaken to comply with the non-reexportation clause. Moreover, it was difficult to determine the exact origin of aircraft so sold unless their serial numbers and engine numbers were also given. The United Kingdom pointed out in its reply dated 17 February 1978 that Rolls Royce did not normally ask its customers for details of the end user, unless there was reason to suspect that the aircraft in which the engine or part was to be installed was likely to be consigned to a user in a country against which the Government of the United Kingdom or of the United States was operating an embargo. In case of doubt, Rolls Royce would indicate on the order that the goods supplied must not be reconsigned to Southern Rhodesia. The reply also indicated that, as the Cessna Aircraft Company -39- effectively controlled Reims Aviation, which was itself resident in a country operating such an embargo, Rolls Royce had not deemed it necessary to be specific in seeking an assurance as to the onward sales of the aircraft in which the Rolls-Royce engines were to be installed. Nevertheless, Rolls Royce was 1iriting to all its distributors and aircraft engine customers that it did not agree to the onward sale of engines and parts to Rhodesian customers. Meanwhile, the Committee received a further communication dated 13 April 1973 from Mr. Prokosch, giving, among other things, the serial numbers of the Cessna F337 aircraft in question. This additional information was transmitted to France, Spain and the United States in order to facilitate the investigations already under way by their aQpropriate authorities. The Committee also sent a note to Panama in connexion with the additional four aircraft reported in the new communication from 1ir. Prokosch to have been sent to Southern Rhodesia via that country. Spain had stated in its reply dated 6 June 1978 that it had not been possible for the investigating authorities to find any licence, either for import or for export, which might in any way arouse suspicion that a Spanish company, much less a fishing company in the Canary Islands, had imported any Cessna F337 Milirole aircraft for subsequent re-export to Southern Rhodesia. The United States indicated that the matter was under serious investigation and the Committee would be informed when the results were available. In a further note dated 6 December 1978 the United States confirmed that the investigation by the United States Department of Commerce into this matter was continuing, therefore the information provided in the note was tentative. That information none the less supported the denial of the Government of Spain that the aircraft in question ever had entered Spanish territory. There was no record of the sale or transfer of Cessna 337 Milirole aircraft in either the United States commercial or military attach& offices in Madrid and none of the individuals assigned to those offices at the time could recall such a transaction. Furthermore, at least four Cessnas which Iilavnews alleged to have been assembled in France and spirited to Southern Rhodesia were in fact manufactured in the United States and remained there. The United States would provide a full report to the Committee when its investigation was completed. At the 321st meeting the representative of France indicated that a further reply from his Government was in the process of being prepared for transmission to the Committee. iPo replies have yet been received from Mozambique and Panama. 109. In Case No. INGO-23 (Gun-smuggling to Southern Rhodesia by United States nationals), the Committee received a communication dated 16 February 1978 from Mr. Prexy Nesbitt, co-ordinator of the Committee to Oppose Bank Loans to South Africa, a non-governmental organization in New York, United States, which reported information on gun smuggling activities operating out of Ohio, United States, based on a court case account in a local newspaper, the Xenia Gazette, (Xenia, Ohio, 12 January 1978). The United States inforred the Coinmittee that criminal proceedings against the individuals allegedly involved in the present case were under way and the Committee would be promptly informed of the results as soon as they were available. 110. With regard to Case No. INGO-24 (Package tour to Southern Rhodesia by a Japanese travel company), a communication dated 31 lHarch 1978 was received from Mr. Tadahiro Ogawa, Chairman of the Japan Anti-Apartheid Committee, a non-governmental organization in Tokyo, Japan. The information indicated that a Japanese travel company, Tours Express, Inc., was offering a package tour that included a visit to Victoria Falls, Southern Rhodesia, which would also involve travel by Air Rhodesia. Japan stated in its reply dated 22 Pay 1978, that the company Tours Express, Inc., had apologized for its inadvertence, -4o-. promised to cancel the visit to Victoria Falls and assured the Government that it had not arranged any similar visit to Southern Rhodesia before and would not repeat the error of doing so again. 111. In Case No. INGO-25 (Scheduled flights to and from Southern Rhodesia and facilities provided by British Airways), a communication dated 20 April 1978 was received by the Committee from the Executive Secretary of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, a non-governmental organization in London, the United Kingdom. The information reported that facilities for scheduled flights to and from Southern Rhodesia had been announced by British Airways in its international routes time- table for the period 1 April-28 October 1978. The Committee transmitted the communication in question to the Governments of the United Kingdom, South Africa, Cape Verde and Spain with a request for investigations as to whether British Airways had been promoting services to Southern Rhodesia or to ascertain whether the reported stop-overs to and from Southern Rhodesia by British Airways were actually occurring. Spain stated in its reply dated 10 July 1978 that there was no scheduled flight of South African Airways between Salisbury and London with a stop-over in Las Palmas, but that there was one on the return journey. The Spanish authorities had already begun to take steps to eliminate traffic rights between Las Palmas and Salisbury. In its reply dated l4 July 1978, the United Kingdom indicated that the question of the current time-table of British Airways, with its reference to flights to Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia by other airlines was still being studied by the authorities. However, the United Kingdom Government took the view that the matter did not constitute a contravention of either the letter or spirit of the relevant Security Council resolutions concerning Southern Rhodesia. No replies have yet been received from Cape Verde and South Africa. 112. In Case No. INGO-26 (Shipments of arms from Antigua to Southern Rhodesia via South Africa), a communication dated 1 June 1978 had been received from the American Committee on Africa, a non-governmental organization in the United States, forwarding a copy of a letter dated 15 March 1978 from the Antigua Workers' Union (AIJ), originally addressed to the Urban League of the United States and describing shipments of arms and ammunition from Antigua to Southern Rhodesia via South Africa. The communication indicated that the Government of Antigua had given permission to a Canadian company calling itself Space Research, Inc., to store, test and transship arms from Antigua to Rhodesia via South Africa. The Committee considered the case at its 313th meeting on 6 July 1978. The representative of Canada made a statement to the effect that legislation had been enacted in Canada prohibiting the export of arms and spare parts to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia and that the Government had undertaken an investigation of the allegations made by AWdJ in order to determine whether any infraction of Canadian law had taken place. At the same meeting the Committee decided to transmit to the Security Council Committee established by resolution 421 (1977) concerning the question of South Africa, the letter from AWU together with a summary of the notes which it had sent to the Governments concerned. On 17 July 1978 the Committee transmitted the communication in question to the United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway, Panama, South Africa and the United States with a request for investigations into the possibilities that firms or vessels under their jurisdiction might have knowingly exported or transported contraband merchandise to the illegal r6gime in Southern Rhodesia and to inform the Committee of the results as soon as they were available. Denmark stated in its reply dated 23 August 1978 that the vessel Lindinger Coral had sailed in March 1977 from Rotterdam to Calibar and that in M'ay 1977 the said vessel had sailed from St. John, New Brunswick to St. Johns, Antigua under time charter to Messrs. Anship, Ltd., Montreal, Canada. According to the Charter agrecments, the vessel was to carry lawful merchandise, the charterer had no permission to carry weapons on the vessel and the shipowner had n hnowledge whatsoever that such transportation had taken -lace. Panama indicated in its reply dated 20 September 1978 that the case was still under innuiry and as soon as the results were received they would be sent to the Committee. The United States informed the Committee in its reply dated 5 October 1973 that the Government was conducting an investigation into the allegation and would be informed regarding the results when they became completed. The United Kingdom submitted to the Committee a reply dated 6 October 1978, together with an enclosure which consisted of a statement by the Government of Antigua. In the said note, the United Kingdom indicated that according to the bill of lading the cargo aboard the British vessel Lady Scotia included no rifles or machine guns. According to the enclosure, the Government of Antigua, in its statement. dismissed as mere fabrications and total lies, instigated by opposition elements in Antigua for political motives, reports suggesting that the Government and the Space Research Corporation (SRC) had been shipping arms to South Africa. At its 318th meeting on 30 November 1978, at its request, the Committee was shown a documentary film on suspected shirments of arms to southern Africa via the Caribbean island of Antigua, made by the producers of independent programmes on the British Broadcasting Corporation and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation television networhs. The film show was also attended by the Chairman and members of the Conmittee on the arms embargo against South Africa. After the film the Chairman /of the Southern Rhodesia Committee/ issued a press statement on the matter. However, since the information obtained subseouently and the exoos6 of the film indicated that for the most part the evidence available at present related to shiuients destined for South Africa, it was considered appropriate to transfer the case to the exclusive consideration of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 421 (1977). If any evidence should subsequently emerge Eointing to any arms shi-rents to Southern Rhodesia, the relevant information could then be sent back to this Committee. 113. In Case No. IlIGO-27 (Visit of a Southern Rhodesian tobacco official to the Hetherlands), the Committee received a communication dated 14 July 1973 from the Holland Committee on Southern Africa (Angola Comit6), the Netherlands reporting that from 6 to 10 August, Dr. If. 1-7. Deal, described as a representative of the Rhodesian Tobacco Research Board, was planning to visit the Research Institute of Plant Diseases in Wageningen. the Netherlands, an institution of the Dutch 'inistry for Agriculture. The purpose of his visit was linked to the fight against nycosis in Southern Rhodesia, in order to increase the Rhodesian tobacco production for exports. At its 315th meeting on 21 July 1978, the Committee considered the case in question and, in view of the urgency of the matter, decided to request the Acting Chairman to seek a personal meeting with the Permanent Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations, expressing the Committee's concern that the admission of Dr. M. W. Deal into the Netherlands would almost certainly constitute a violation of the mandatory sanctions against the illegal r6gime in Southern Rhodesia (Security Council resolution 253 (1968), para. 5), the meeting should be followed by a formal note to the Government concerned reQuesting coi'ments on the measures contemplated by the authorities to ensure no-violation of the sanctions. On 25 July 1978 the Permanent Mission of the Netherlands to the United Nations informed the Committee that the Government had already been apprised of the matter and shared the Connittee's view that the admission of Dr. Deal into the Netherlands would be contrary to the United Nations sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, and that investigations were under way in order to deny him admission into the Netherlands. In view of the information received from the Netherlands the proposed visit by the Acting Chairman did not -42- take place. ieanhile, a communication dated 7 August 1978 was received by the Committee from the Anti-apartheid Beweging, Bonn, the Federal Republic of Germany, indicating that Dr. Deal had been refused entrance to Holland, but was planning to travel to the Federal Republic of Germany to participate in a congress in Miunich on 15 August 1978. Accordingly, the Committee sent a note to the Federal Republic of Germany requesting an indication of the measures contemolated b- the authorities to ensure no-violation of the Security Council mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. In its preliminary reply dated 1h August 1973, the Federal Republic of Germany gave assurance that any bearer of a Rhodesian passcort would not be allowed to enter their territory and that the Committee would receive the results of the investigations as soon as they were available. The Tetherlands. in its reply dated 21 August 1978, informed the Committee that the intended visit of Dr. Deal had not taken place. The Federal Republic of Germany informed the Committee, in its reply of the same date, that Dr. Deal travelled on a regular British passport and therefore had been admitted into the country and had attended the International Congress of Plant Pathology in Munich, but that another traveller using a Southern Rhodesian passport had been denied entry. Subsequently, the Committee sent notes to the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany expressing its gratitude to the former for its co-operation in successfully barring entry to Dr. Deal and informing the latter of the action taken by the Uetherlands authorities and also requesting particulars about the other traveller. 114. With regard to Case Io. INGO-28 (Package tours to Southern Rhodesia organized from the Netherlands), a communication dated 22 September 1978 was received from Dr. Sietse Bosgra of the Holland Committee on Southern Africa, under the ausnices of the Boycott Outspan Action, the Holland Committee and the 1Torl:ing Group Kairos, all non-governmental organizations in the Netherlands. The information reported that the Dutch tourist organization A'TB and all other member organizations of the A!T (Alliance Internationale de Tourisme) had collaborated with the Rhodesian Automobile Association in arranging rackage tours from the Netherlands to Southern Rhodesia. The Committee transmitted the communication in question on 7 November 1978 to the Netherlands with a request for an investigation and comments thereon. 115. In Case No. INGO-29 the Committee received information in November 1978 frcm the Anti-Apartheid ilovement, a non-governmental organization in London, to the effect that computers and related equipment manufactured by a United Kingdom company, ICL, might be reaching Southern Rhodesia through the facilities of the company's subsidiary in South Africa, the International Computers (C.A.) (-Pvt.) Ltd. consequently, notes dated 11 December 1978 were sent to South Africa and the United Kingdom requesting the authorities there to investigate the activities of the companies within their jurisdiction so as to determine whether any of those activities might constitute violations of the Security Council mandatory sanctions against the illegal r~gime in Southern Rhodesia. (c) Imports of chrome nickel and other materials from Southern Rhodesia into the United States of America (Case No. USI-...) 116. The Committee pursued the examination of seven of the cases of importation of Southern Rhodesian chrome, nickel and other related materials into the United States of America already reported upon in the tenth report and decided to close four of them (Case 1-o. USI-30, Nediloyd Kimberly, Case No. USI-31 Nedlloyd Kembla, Case No. USI-44, Kaderbaksh and Case No. 45, Ocean Envoy). The importations had occurred with the knowledge of the United States Government under the legislative -43- facility permitted by the so-called Byrd Amendment, which had become effective on 1 January 1972. The cases were based on information contained in reports regularly submitted to the Committee on a voluntary basis by the United States representative. However, legislation was signed on 18 March 1977 by the United States Government repealing the "Byrd Amendment:' (see the tenth report, S/12529, paras. 94 and 103 (i)). No new case based on such reports was opened by the Committee during the period under review. Details of all the cases of imports into the United States are given in annex III to the present report. 117. In Case No. USI-5, Hellenic Leader and Case No. USI-35, Hellenic Sun, Greece indicated in its notes dated 28 March 1978 that the administrative and judicial authorities had thoroughly investigated the two cases above, including the examination of witnesses by the investigating magistrates and had found no evidence to substantiate a breach of the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia by the vessels in question. 118. With regard to Case No. USI-46, Phaedra E, the Committee discussed the matter at its 309th meeting and decided to send further notes to Greece, Liberia and Portugal. Accordingly, notes dated 25 May 1978 sent to Greece, Liberia and Portugal as follows. The note to Greece expressed the Committee's surprise at the Greek authorities' findings that there had been no indication whatever-that the chrome ore in question had been of Southern Rhodesia origin, when the reporting Government itself, the United States, had reported the importation to have come from Southern Rhodesia. The note pointed out further that the documentary evidence transmitted to the Committee could not be considered as sufficient proof of the non-Southern Rhodesian origin of the shirment. The Committee, therefore, requested the Greek Government to undertake further investigations, bearing in mind the proper documentation recommended to all Member States in the SecretaryGeneral's note of 18 September 1979 and to be informed of the measures contemplated by the Greek authorities in the event of the shipment being proven to have originated in Southern Rhodesia. In the note to Liberia, the Committee pointed out to the Government the information received from Greece that, during the pertinent voyage, the vessel Phaedra E had been under charter to a Liberian company, Oxford Marine, Ltd., Monrovia. In view of the clear violation of sanctions that had occurred, the Committee requested the Liberian authorities to investigate the circumstances in which a vessel under charter to a Liberian company had been permitted to carry the prohibited merchandise, contrary to the provisions of paragraph 3 (c) of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) and to inform it of any action that might be taken to prevent the participation by Liberian nationals or by vessels chartered by them in transactions connected with the illegal r~gime in Southern Rhodesia. In the note to Portugal, the Committee requested information pertaining to relevant shipping or export documentary evidence that might have been available to Portuguese authorities because, at the probable time of loading, the port of Maputo had been under Portuguese administration. Greece, in its reply dated 29 June 1978 pointed out that shipping documents did not always contain sufficient or exact information about the origin of respective cargoes, and that it was not feasible for the master of a vessel to investigate the true origin of merchandise in such cases. The correct origin of a cargo could be verified by the country of destination. Nevertheless, the Government would continue to pursue vigorously the case in question. Portugal, in its reply dated 12 June 1978, indicated that the Portuguese authorities had handed over the administration of the port of Maputo to the Government of Mozambique since the independence of that country on 25 June 1975, while the loading of the shipment had taken place around 9 March 1976. Accordingly, the

Portuguese authorities no longer had any responsibility in the administration of that port, and regretted being unable to provide the required documentary evidence. No reply has yet been received from Liberia. 119. As indicated in the tenth report (S/12529, para. 94) the representative of the United States by a letter dated 15 December 1978 submitted the final report of United States imports of chrome, nickel and other materials covering the period ending 30 June 1977. At the time of preparation of the present report action on the information received from the United States was still under consideration by the Committee. D. Other activities involving the Committee aimed at promoting more effective implementation of sanctions (a) Co-operation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 120. In accordance with established practice the Committee continued to invite a representative of OAU to attend its meetings, or those of its Working Group on cases, at which were scheduled for discussion cases involving, directly or indirectly, any member State of OAU. There were also occasions, as indicated below, when the representative of OAU participated in the work of the Committee during consideration of other matters of mutual interest. The question of the OAU request for a permanent invitation to participate in all the work of the Committee and the action taken by the Committee in that connexion have been dealt with under item (b) (x) in section A, above. 121. Further to the invitation to the Chairman to participate in the meetings of the Co-ordinating Committee of the Liberation Committee of OAU in Libya (see the tenth report, S/12529, para. 101) the Committee advised the Chairman to accept the invitation, which the Committee regarded as a welcome instance of measures aimed at promoting further co-operation between OAU and itself. The Chairman was personally unable to travel to Libya, as he could not be away from the United Nations Headquarters at the time but, at his request, the Committee was represented at the meetings by the Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations, by virtue of Nigeria being the delegation providing the second Vice-Chairman of the Committee. The meetings were held from 13 to 1 February 1978. 122. In July 1978 the Committee received reports from published sources indicating that action had been initiated in the United States Senate aimed at adopting legislation by which the United Nations sanctions against the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia would be lifted by the United States Government. By a letter dated 18 July 1978 addressed to the Acting Chairman of the Committee, the Acting Executive Secretary of OAU to the United Nations transmitted the text of a press release issued on the matter by that office the day before. The statement spoke of reports that the United States Senate intended to pass legislation lifting the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia for six months and cutting off aid to front-line States said to be providing bases for the Patriotic Front, the Zimbabwe liberation organization recognized by the OAU. It called upon the United States not to violate the decisions of the United Nations but instead to encourage the United Kingdom-United States efforts to convene an all party conference on the question of Southern Rhodesia.

123. The matter was considered by the Committee at the 315th meeting which the representative of OAU was invited to attend. Pursuant to the Committee's decision at thiat meeting a press release was issued on 24 July 1978, giving a brief sum nary of the OAU communique, emphasizing that only the Security Council, which had instituted the sanctions in the first place, had a right to lift them, and urging all iiember States to continue to respect and apply strictly the provisions of all the Security Council resolutions on Southern Rhodesia, bearing in raind, in particular, the provisions of resolution 423 (1978). By the same decision, the Acting Chairman sent letters of the same date to the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations, transmitting the text of the press release and requesting him in turn to transmit the same to the appropriate authorities of his Government- and to the Acting Executive Secretary of OAU to the United Nations, informing him formally of the action taken by the Committee on the matter. 124. Also in October 1978 the Committee received information from published sources, according to which the United States Government had decided to grant tourist visas to Ian Smith and other members of the illegal r6gime in Southern Rhodesia to visit the United States. The Committee discussed the matter at its 316th meeting on 6 October 1973, which the representative of OAU was invited to attend. He presented to the Committee the text of the statement issued on the subject by the African Group at the United IFations at the conclusion of their meeting the day before. That statement and the statement made by the representative of the United States provided the basis of the Committee's consideration of the matter. Details of the meeting and of the action taken by the Committee subsequently are given above under section B of the present chapter, above. (b) Co-operation with the Commonwealth Secretariat 125. The Committee maintained its co-operation with the Commonwealth Organization through contact at various times with members of the Commonwealth Secretariat on matters of mutual interest - the Organization has a Committee on Southern Africa which deals, among other things, ith the question of sanctions against Southern .odesia. The contact is often by telecommunication but sometimes members of that Secretariat, while at Headquarters, use the opportunity to call on members of the Committee bureau and of the Committee Secretariat in order to exchange mutually beneficial information. 126. In October 1973, a communication was received from the Commonwealth Organization enclosing a copy of the report, Oil Sanctions against Rhodesia - Proposals for action, which had been prepared for the Commonwealth Secretariat by lvx. M1artin Bailey and Ir. Bernard Rivers, in the aftermath of publication of the Bingham report. 7/ At the suggestion of the Chairman, as a representative of a member State of the Commonwealth, additional copies of the report were obtained and circulated to all members of the Committee for information on 11 October 1978. 127. Subsequently, a further telecommunication dated 2 November 1978 was received from the Commonwealth Secretariat, transmitting the text of a press release issued that day by the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa at the conclusion of its meeting held to discuss the Bingham report and the oil sanctions. The press release, recalling that Committee's previous recommendation on the matter, 3/ 7/ See also chapter II beloir. 8/ Commonwealth press release issued on 17 October 1977 (see the tenth report, S/12529, Dara. 102). -4- extended that recommendation by suggesting that the United Kingdom Government, in conjunction with the United States, France, Iran and other relevant Governments, should seeh from the South African Government verifiable guarantees that no oil or oil products would be exported frcm South Africa to Southern Rhodesia- in the event of failure to secure such guarantees from the South African Government, the Security Council should be requested to impose in mandatory form an embargo on the supply of crude oil and petroleum to South Africa itself. At the suggestion of the Chairman, the text of the Commonwealth Secretariat press release was circulated to all members of the Committee for information on 4 December 1978. (c) Monetary donation from Canadian University Student Body 128. By a letter dated 19 December 1977 the Committee received a donation of $US 25 from the Students' Federation, University of Ottawa, Canada, who expressed their great concern over the abhorrent racial situation prevailing in southern Africa and their hope that their contribution might be used in the best way to be decided by the Committee towards alleviating the situation, With special regard to Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabe). At its 304th meeting on 13 February 1978 the Committee expressed its great appreciation for the thoughtful donation by the Ottawa University Student Body and decided that the funds should be turned over to the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for southern Africa for use in training students from that region, who, oving to the policies of racial discrimination practised by the regimes there, often lacked facilities for quality education in their own countries. In a letter dated 6 April 1973 the Chairman conveyed the Committee's sentiments on the matter to the Ottawa University Student Body, informing them also of the action taken by the Committee with regard to the donation.

CHAPTER II THE SUPPLY OF OIL AND OIL PRODUCTS TO SOUTHERN RHODESIA (Case No. INGO-17) 129. The Committee attaches considerable importance to the question of the supply of oil and oil products to Southern Rhodesia and as evidence of this it has decided to devote this separate chapter to that question. For the previous information concerning the matter and for the history of its consideration by the Committee attention is drawn to the Committee's tenth report (S/12529, annex V, Case No. INGO-17). The full account of the case as contained in that report is herewith attached as appendix I to this chapter. 130. In 1978 the case was first considered by the Committee at the 308th meeting on 6 April. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics pointed out that the interim report of the Committee to the Security Council the previous year (S/12450) had contained a draft resolution aimed at tightening the oil embargo against Southern Rhodesia. Had the Committee been able to make progress at that time in that connexion, it would have helped to prevent continued violations of sanctions in that particular field. At that meeting, the Committee decided to postpone consideration of the case until a later date. 131. A letter dated 1 July 1978 was received by the Committee from Ir. Bernard Rivers and fir. Martin Bailey. They indicated that they had continued their investigations of the subject of the supply of oil and petroleum products to Southern Rhodesia and had interviewed numerous past and present employees of the oil companies involved. Those numerous sources had confirmed the central thesis that the South African subsidiaries of Shell, BP, Total, Mobil and Caltex had for over a decade supplied oil in bulk to various South African intermediaries (particularly Freight Services, Ltd. ) with the deliberate knowledge and intention that the oil would be passed on to their Southern Rhodesian subsidiaries. 1r. Rivers and k. Bailey enclosed with their note two articles on the subject in question published in The Observer (London), of 25 June 1978 and the New Statesman (London), of 30 June 1978. 132. A communication dated 16 August 1978, containing information relevant to the present case, was received from the Holland Committee on Southern Africa, a non-governmental organization in the Netherlands. The communication indicated that on 10 August 1978 that committee had organized a successful press conference on the role of Shell (a Dutch-British multinational corporation) in sanctionsbreaking, to which they had invited two Dutch members of Parliament, Mr. Harry Van Den Bergh of the Labour Party and Mr. Jan Nico Scholten from the Christian Democratic Party. Mr. Van Den Bergh and Mr. Scholten considered the new information on Shell's role so important that they had decided to ask the Dutch Government to make full inquiry into the role of Shell, and said that, if the Dutch Government was not willing to do so, they would propose that the Butch Parliament form a special commission for that purpose. -48-

133. A further communication dated 18 September 1978 was received from the Holland Committee on Southern Africa, informing the Committee that members of the Dutch Parliament within the coming days would officially ask for "a rarliamentary inquiry into the breaking of the oil sanctions against Rhodesia by the BritishDutch oil multinational Shell.' The Chairman sent a reply dated 27 September 1973 to the above-mentioned non-governmental organization, expressing the Security Council Committee's appreciation for the active part being played by the Holland Committee to ensure strict implementation of the sanctions and to follow up on investigations into reported violations of those sanctions. 134. Meanwhile, the Committee received additional information from the United Kingdom in a letter dated 19 September 1970, submitting to the Committee the 410-page report of the results of the inquiry by Mr. T. C. Bingham Q.C. and Mr. S. M. Gray into the supply of petroleum and petroleum products to Southern Rhodesia after the imposition of sanctions (the Bingham report). The letter indicated further that the British Government and the oil companies under United Kingdom jurisdiction had given Mr. Bingham their full co-operation, and that written and oral evidence had been received from other organizations and individuals. The report had been referred to the Director of Public Prosecution to consider whether further inquiries should be undertaken with a view to possible criminal proceedings for breaches of United Kingdom sanctions legislation. Chapter 14 of the Bingham report entitled "Conclusions" and containing the report's factual conclusions, submissions and observations is reproduced in appendix II to this chapter. 135. The Committee also received from the Commonwealth Secretariat, London, a paper entitled Oil Sanctions Against Rhodesia: Proposal for Action, of 2 October 1978. The paper contained five chapters: The Bingham Report, Rhodesia's present supply arrangements, Action to tighten oil sanctions against Rhodesia, The feasibility of an oil embargo against South Africa and Conclusion. 136. The case was considered again at the 317th meeting on 12 October 1978. At that meeting, Mr. Bernard Rivers, in accordance with his request in a letter dated 22 September 1978, appeared before the Committee and made a statement on the supply of oil and petroleum products to Southern Rhodesia, with special reference to the Bingham report. The content of his statement, as summarized in the Committee's records, is reproduced under Case No. INGO-17, in annex V to the present report. 137. Referring to the statement by Mr. Rivers, the representative of the United Kingdom said that he would refrain from commenting on the first part of the statement, since it consisted mainly of extracts from the Bingham report, which was currently being studied by the Director of Public Prosecution. However, Mr. Rivers had made several references in his statement to the existence of a new "swap" arrangement, but there appeared to be no evidence in his statement to indicate that there was at present any formal arrangement between BP, Shell and other oil companies, on the one hand, and Natref or the Southern Rhodesian Government, on the other. The representative of France associated himself with the statement made by the United Kingdom representative that there was no evidence of the existence of any new "swap" agreement. Mr. Rivers pointed out that an article, a copy of which he had transmitted to the Secretariat of the Committee, had appeared in The Sunday Times of London of 17 September 1978. exposing the new "swap" arrangement. He also drew attention to one point which he said had been stressed by Mr. Bingham in his report, namely that, if the denials of all the parties concerned, including Natref, were to be believed, the conclusion must be -49- that Southern Rhodesia had never received any oil. In any event, in order to clarify the points just raised, he would try to prepare an informal paper describing those operations, acording to his understanding of the information given in Mr. Bingham's report. The Chairman stated that whatever terms were used, "arrangement" or "swap arrangement", oil continued to reach Southern Rhodesia3 that was the main point. 138. At the same meeting the representative of Mauritius proposed that the Committee should submit a report on the question to the President of the Security Council and request a meeting of the Council on the matter. The representatives of China, Czechoslovakia, India, Nigeria and Venezuela supported the proposal by the representative of Mauritius that the matter should be put before the Security Council. 139. The representative of Kuwait asked whether Mr. Rivers could provide information on the involvement of other companies, such as Caltex and Totl, in similar transactions. She understood that in 1968-1970 Total-South Africa had been directly involved in supplying oil to Southern Rhodesia. Mr. Rivers replied that the report, The Oil Conspiracy, on which he had begun his research several years earlier and had accumulated a very comprehensive dossier, including many documents of Mobil subsidiaries in Southern Africa on the supply of oil to Southern Rhodesia by Mobil (and other companies as well), had prompted the United States Treasury Department to conduct an investigation into the matter. Unfortunately, that investigation had come to nothing because he had not been able to reveal his sources to the Treasury Department so that the sources could testify publicly in order to authenticate the documents. He indicated further that he was convinced, as a result of his own research and that of Mr. Bingham, that between 1966 and 1976 at least, the five large companies - Total, Mobil, Caltex, Shell and BP - had all joined, through their subsidiaries in South Africa, in supplying oil to Southern Rhodesia. The information contained in the Bingham report confirmed in all respects the results of the research which he himself had previously carried out. With regard to Mobil, Caltex and Total, he did not know whether those parent companies had been aware of the activities of their subsidiaries; there was no evidence to that effect. In the case of BP and Shell, there was no room for doubt of the supply of oil and petroleum products to Southern Rhodesia, since the Bingham report established the facts of the matter. It would clearly be essential for the Governments of France and the United States, which possessed the means, to conduct an inquiry forthwith in order to verify the basis for the assertions made in the Bingham report. Concerning the participation of Total-South Africa, Mr. Rivers said that the company was mentioned many times in the Bingham report, but in cases where Total-South Africa had given assistance to BP and Shell. Mr. Bingham implied that Total-South Africa had not been content merely to assist PP and Shell but had itself supplied oil directly to Southern Rhodesia. 140. The representative of the United States said that his Government had made no official statement concerning the results of the inquiry carried out by the United States Treasury Department, because of the difficulties encountered during the inquiry, but now wished to do so. He then stated that, in view of the difficulty of collecting evidence, Owing to the existence of the South Africa Secrecy Act and the lack of witnesses, the Commission of the Treasury Department responsible for conducting the inquiry had been unable to establish that the South African subsidiary of Mobil Oil had actually taken part in the supply of oil and oil products to Southern Rhodesia. -50- 141. The representative of France indicated in his statement that the French Government had learnt from the parent company in Paris that, according to the reports and accounts provided to the latter by its South African subsidiary, there were no grounds to believe that the company had been supplying oil to Southern Rhodesia, even if the accounts and reports implied that it had set up a "swap" arrangement with other companies, which is a very common procedure throughout the world. 142. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics pointed out that, according to one of the conclusions in the Bingham report, the consumption of oil products by Southern Rhodesia, after having plummeted as a result of the UDI, had amounted to 410,000 tons in 1968 and now had almost doubled, reaching 8007000 tons in 1978. That was the outcome of the policy of sanctions- breaking carried out through the activities of the major oil companies in Southern Rhodesia. That situation involved a central issue that could not fail to be of concern to the Security Council. Accordingly, his delegation supported the proposal made by several delegations-and by the Chairman of the Committee to the Security Council in one case of flagrant violation of the sanctions - namely, that the Security Council should itself consider the matter. 143. In accordance with the Committee's decision at that meeting, a letter dated 13 October 1978 was sent by the Chairman to the President of the Security Council, enclosing the text of the United Kingdom transmittal letter and the text of chapter 14 from the Bingham report entitled "Conclusions"; the Chairman's letter, together with its enclosures, was issued as a document of the Security Council (S/12894) on the same day. In his letter the Chairman informed the President that the United Kingdom's transmittal letter and the Bingham report had been put before the Committee and discussed at the 317th meeting and that it had been decided that the matter should be left to the Security Council to consider at an appropriate time. 144. Meanwhile, a communication dated 2 November 1978 was received from the Commonwealth Secretariat in London transmitting the text of a press release issued by that secretariat following a meeting of the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa, held the same day, to consider the Bingham report. The communication indicated, inter alia, that the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa recommended that the Governments whose companies supplied crude oil or oil products to South Africa, or who were themselves, or through their agencies, engaged in that trade should now make it clear to the South African Government that it faced a stark choice. Either it co-operated with the rest of the international community in providing effective guarantees, which would ensure that the evasion of oil sanctions was brought to an end, or it placed in jeopardy the continued supply of petroleum to the Republic itself (see also para. 127 in section D of ch pt. ', above 145. In that connexion, the Committee noted that South Africa, as in other cases, had never responded to the Committee's inquiries concerning the case in question, even after several reminders and the publication of its name in the Committee's quarterly lists of Governments in default of replies. -51-

146. Meanwhile, the represci~tative of the Thited Kingdom transmitted thu text of the relevant portion ot a statement made in the House of Comons on 7 November 1978 by the Foreign and Coimrnorxeplth Secretary of the United Kingdom during the debate on the Bingham report. The representative of the United Kingdom indicated that the statement contained a comprehensive account of the British Government's position with regard to the so-called new "swap" arrangement referred to by Lffr. Rivers and that it should be read in the light of those allegations and in addition to his own preliminary comments on l. Rivers' statement (see paras. 135 and 136 above). The relevant portion of the Foreign and Comrronwealth Secretary's statement is reproduced below: "... It is obviously ur'gent to satisfy ourselves - I think that everyone in the House will agree - that, whatever was the position in the past, British oil companies and their subsidiaries are now playing no part whatsoever in the supply of oil to Rhodesia. I personally saw the oil corpz.ny chairmen of RP and Shell in April last year to tell them why I was establishing the inquiry and I made it clear to them that I expected them to take firm action to close any loopholes in their or their subsidiaries' involvement in the supply of oil to Rhodesia. The report traces the efforts made since then by the British oil companies to ensure that they and their South African subsidiaries were no longer directly or indirectly involved in the supply of oil products to Rhodesia. Last autumn Shell and BP told me the terms of the assurances which they had received from their South African subsidiaries, to the effect that these companies were not directly or indirectly concerned in supplying Rhodesia. "The report brought to light, however, an arrangement between the companies' subsidiaries in South Africa and the organisations which continue to supply Rhodesia. The report records that, when in 1976 the supplies made by the South African subsidiaries of the British oil companies to agents acting for the Rhodesian purchasing organisation were taken over by the South African state oil company, the subsidiaries were compensated by increased access to their own customers in part of the South African market, according to a formula which took into account their previous level of supplies to Rhodesia. Such arrangements were still in force when the Bingham report was completed. "I took up this matter with the oil companies as a matter of the greatest urgency. I left them in no doubt that in my view such arrangements were totally incompatible with the spirit, if not the letter, of the assurances they had passed to me. They have now told me that, although their subsidiaries were until quite recently involved in such arrangements, these have now been terminated and their South African subsidiaries are not now involved in any marketing activity related to the supply of oil by others to Rhodesia. "I have decided to refer the details of the vernment's exchanges with the companies on these matters to the Director of Public Prosecutions so that he may consider them in conjunction with the relevant passages of the Bingham report. I have also -52- brought to his attention further material which has come to light relating to three "spot" sales of naphtha by BP Trading - a British registered company - earlier this year to the South African State oil company, or brokers understood to be acting for that company. Where Castrol is concerned, in view of the reference in the preface of the report to that company, the DPP will be already considering whether to investigate the matter further. "One further point remains outstanding. We are in discussion vith Associated Octel, a company which has Shell and BP among its major shareholders and which supplies to South Africa a lead additive which is used in local refineries to improve the quality of petrol. This company falls outside the scope of the assurances given for their groups by Shell and BP relating to the sale of oil and oil products to Rhodesia, and we are seeking in its case also to obtain satisfactory assurances of non-involvement in supply to Rhodesia. "I have now placed Shell and BP formally on notice of the Government's strongly held view that no company in the Shell or BP group should be involved in the supply of oil to Rhodesia, whether direct, indirect or by participation in marketing arrangements related to the supply of oil by others to Rhodesia. The Government expect that the head offices of the companies will at all times act accordingly, and in particular that the necessary steps will be taken by them to ensure that all the assurances in these matters which they have given to the Government are faithfully adhered to both in the letter and the spirit. I have sought and received undertakings that any difficulty encountered by their companies or their subsidiaries in maintaining this position would be immediately notified to the Government so that appropriate action, whether of a practical, diplomatic or legal nature, can be taken. Both companies assure me that they have put the necessary procedures into effect to ensure that this responsibility can be faithfully discharged. The Government are determined to take every step in their power to ensure that, so long as sanctions are in force, neither Shell nor BP, nor their South African subsidiaries, nor any other company in the Shell - BP groups, will ever again eupply Rhodesia directly or indirectly, or enter into any arrangements related to the supply of oil by others to Rhodesia. I hope now that other Governments will feel able to take similar action in respect of their own oil companies 147. At the 32lst meeting the representative of the United States informed the Committee that, based on the information contained in the Bingham report and that obtained from other sources, the United States Treasury Department had decided to re-open its investigations of 1977 into the possible violations of that Department's regulations relating to the applications of the sanctions of the United Nations Security Council against Southern Rhodesia. His delegation iias not in a position to examine the details of the current investigations but would issue a full public report as soon as the investigations were completed. -53-

148. Also at the same meeting the representative of the United Kingdom informed the Committee that on 15 December 1978 the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom had stated in the House of Commons that the Government would reconend to Parliament, after the recess, the establishment of a special commission of inquiry to investigate the policy of oil sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, in the light of the Bingham report. -54-

Appendix I Full account of the action taken durng 1977 on Case No. INGO-I7 (Supply of oil and oil products to Southern Rhodesia) (Excerpt from the tenth report, S/12529, annex V) 1. Previous information concerning this case is contained in the ninth report. 2. Additional information regarding the action taken on the case since the submission of that report is given below. 3. Second and third reminders werc sent to South Africa on 17 January and 28 February 1977 respectively. 4. A communication dated 28 Feb-uary 1977 was received from Mr. Mike Terry, Executive Secretary of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, a non-governmental organization in London, forwarding a pamphlet entitled Shell and'BP in South Africa, written by Martin Bailey and published jointly by the Anti-Apartheid Movement and the Haslemere Group, both of the United Kingdom. The pamphlet contained a chapter on the supply of oil and oil products to Southern Rhodesia by the Shell and BP companies. A great deal of the infcrmation in that chapter consisted of summariez and extracts from the Oil Conspiracy report, which had been submitted to the Committee by representatives of thd Center for Social Action of the United Church of Christ and the Anti-Apartheid Movement, both of the United States, during their appearance before the Committee at the 274th meeting. a/ The other relevant information in the aforementioned chapter from the pamphlet is reproduced below: "Busting Sanctions "The story of how petroleum has been supplied to Rhodesia since UDI illustrates two important aspects of the operations of the oil companies in Southern Africa. First, the oil companies are naturally concerned with maximising profits and they have shown little interest in encouraging major=I" rule. Secondly, the South African government, through a series of laws and regulations, has restricted the activities of the oil companies and forced them to serve the interests of the white r6gimes. a/ See the Committee's ninth annual report, Official Records of the Securit'. Council, Thirty-second Year, Special Supplement Ho. 2, vol. II, annex V, Case No. INGO-17. -55-

"Petroleum is vital to the Rhodesian economy. After Ian Smith declared UDI, on 11 November 1965, one of the first measures taken by the United Iations was the imposition of an oil embargo against the rebel regime. The pipeline from the Mozanbican port of Beira into Rhodesia was shut, cutting off supplies of crude oil for the Umtali refinery. The refinery, with a capacity of 20,000 barrels a day, is owned by Central African Petroleum Refineries. Both Shell and BP each hold a 21 per cent stake in the refining company. "Yet, despite the embargo, Rhodesia continued to receive sufficient supplies of oil. On 5 February 1966, after an intensive surveillance of the South African-Rhodesian border at Beit Bridge, the Rand Daily !ail reported that three or four vehicles were crossing the frontier every day with fuel. A photograph, published in the newspaper, showed a Rhodesian oil tanker. Just visible through a thin coat of grey paint was a large 'P' - part of the 'BP' insignia of British Petroleum. 55/ Soon Shell also joined BP in supplying Rhodesia by road from South Africa. Later in 1966 Shell and BP co-operated with Mobil to finance a 100,000 gallon oil depot at Messina. This was just ten miles from the Beit Bridge border and the depot was presumably built for supplying petroleum to Rhodesia. "Since UDI, the Rhodesian subsidiaries of Shell and BP have been 'directed' companies, under local legislation, and the headquarters of the oil firms in London claim to have no control over their operations. Shell and BP, it could be argued, might have been able to take some action to put pressure on their Rhodesian subsidiaries to comply with UN policy. Nevertheless, at present they are not legally responsible for the activities of their Rhodesian companies. Shell and BP, however, still retain control over the operations of their South African subsidiaries. "Hhen Shell's South African subsidiary plans its future sales, it apparently includes a special category enigmatically entitled FS. 61/ This stands for Freight Services, the main intermediary used by Mobil, and the figure is believed to cover purchases made for subsequent resale to Mozambique, 14alawi ... and Rhodesia. Every three months Freight Services, acting on behalf of themselves and the other intermediaries, apparently sends Shell details of its requirements for a variety of oil products, specifying how much they estimate will be needed over the next 3 and 12 months. 62/ Their requirements for Rhodesia have averaged a fairly steady rate over the past few years. "Spokesmen for Shell and BP, contacted in London, have not denied that "55/ Robert C. Good, UDI (London, 1973, p. 127). "61/ The Oil Consp4rae (New York, Center for Social Action of the United Church of Christ, 1976), p. 26. "62/ Ibid. their South African subsidiaries sold petroleum to Freight Services. 66/ ieither of the oil companies appears to have investigated allegations that Freight Services has been supplying oil to Rhodesia. "The simple facts of the situation are that Shell and BP both refine oil in Durban; the two companies distribute petroleum inside Rhodesia; and clearly fuel has been flowing from South Africa to Rhodesia. There is therefore little doubt that Shell and B? oil has been reaching Rhodesia. The only question that remains is whether the South African subsidiaries of the two companies are themselves involved in this trade. But until Shell and BP have announced that they have taken measures to ensure that their products are not exported to Rhodesia, clouds of suspicion will remain. "Government Control "If Western oil companies took steps to prevent their petroleum from reaching Rhodesia, then they could in fact be liable to prosecution under South African law. The petroleum firms are forbidden from restricting their customers or the destination of their products. "The degree of government control over the South African oil industry was recently illustrated when Mobil sent a Vice-President and two top executives of its International Division to South Africa to look into allegations that oil had been supplied to Rhodesia. These leading Mobil officials, according to a company statement, 'consulted a leading South African lawyer, who advised them that if they attempted to carry out any investigation in South Africa, they themselves would be subject to prosecution as foreign agents under the ... Official Secrets Act'. 67/ Three senior- employees of a Western company were therefore in danger of being imprisoned as spies merely for enquiring into the affairs of their whollyowned subsidiary in South Africa. "Only about 4 per cent of South Africa's oil imports are re-exported to Rhodesia. South Africa would therefore presumably be reluctant to endanger its supply just to keep the Smith regime afloat. If, however, the South African government actually prevented Western petroleum companies from refusing to supply Rhodesia, then this would provide an additional justification for extending the embargo to include South Africa itself. ,I "66/ Correspondence with author. "67/ Mobil, press statement, Washington, 17 September 1976." 5. A note dated 28 February 1977 was sent to the Netherlands inquiring whether the investigation has been completed and the result could be communicated to the Committee. 6. In accordhnce with the Committee's instructions laid down at the 166th meeting, an acknowledgement dated l March 1977 was sent by the Secretariat to t-. author of the communication. -57- 7. A reply dated 10 March 1977 was received from the Netherlands, the substantive part of which reads as follows: "In connection with the allegations contained in the report 'The Oil Conspiracy' the letherlands Government approached the Board of the Royal Shell Group. As a result of the ensuing contact it became clear that the Netherlands branch of the Royal Shell Group is in no way responsible for the activities of Shell South Africa. The spokesman of the Royal Shell Group added that the Royal Shell Group had no knowledge whatsoever of any supply of oil or oil products to Southern Rhodesia in which Shell South Africa was involved. He pointed out; however, that it was not possible to keep track of resales by South African consumers of products sold by Shell South Africa as South African legislation does not allow seller to impose restrictions on such resales." 8. A reply dated 2h March 1977 was received from France concerning Case No. IIGO-18, in which reference was made to the question of the supply of oil and oil products to Southern Rhodesia. The reference had arisen from information received from a non-governmental organization in Paris reporting a number of trade and other relations between France and Southern Rhodesia, including the supply of oil and oil products to Southern Rhodesia by the French company Total. The text of the reference to this matter is reproduced in the present annex under Case No. INGO-18, paragraph 2, subparagraph 3. 9. A note dated 13 April 1977 was received from the representative of the United Kingdom, transmitting the text of a statement made by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom on 8 April 1977, concerning the question of the supply of oil and oil products to Southern Rhodesia. In accordance with the request contained in the note, the text of that statement, reproduced below, was circulated to members of the Commlittee. "The Government have been studying allegations of evasion of sanctions against Rhodesia by major oil companies. As a result I have decided to set up an enquiry to conduct an investigation on my behalf into these allegations under the statutory powers provided 'in Article 15 and Schedule 1 of the Southern Rhodesia (UN Sanctions) (No 2) Order 1968. "The terms of reference of the enquiry will be as follows: to carry out an investigation with the objects "(a) of establishing the facts concerning the operations whereby supplies of petroleum and petroleum products have reached Rhodesia since December 1965; (b) of establishing the extent, if any, to which persons and companies within the scope of the Sanctions Order have played any part in such operations; "(c) of obtaining evidence and information for the purpose of securing compliance with or detecting evasion of the Southern Rhodesia (UN Sanctions) (No 2) Order 1968 ('The Sanctions Order'); (d) of obtaining evidence of the commission of any offences against the Sanctions Order which may be disclosed. -58- "I shall announce the composition of the enquiry shortly. "I have informed the Chairmen of Shell and BP of the Government's decision. They have promised the full co-operation of their companies i:1 the enquiry. "The Netherlands Government have also been told that the enquiry will iheld." 10. In the absence of a reply from South Africa, the Committee again included that Government in the twelfth quarterly list, which was issued as a press relea ,. on 14 April 1977. 11. A communication dated 6 May 1977 concerning the present case was received from Messrs. Bernard Rivers and Martin Bailey, both of the Haslemere Group, described as a research action group on third-world issues, based in the United Kingdom. The text of the communication reads as follows: "As you have heard, the United Kingdom Foreign and Commomealth Secretary recently announced the establishment of an official inquiry to look into- allegations of sanctions-busting by British oil companies. b/ This step was taken just a few weeks after the publication of a report on 'Shell and BP in South Africa' c/ - published by the Haslemere Group and the Anti-Apartheid Movement - which claimed that there was strong evidence to suggest that the South African subsidiaries of the two companies were supplying Rhodesia. "The Haslemere Group and the Anti-Apartheid Movement have now prepared a detailed submission to the official Inquiry outlining the evidence they have available at this stage. This submission was presented to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London on 25 April, and we have pleasure in formally presenting your Committee with a copy. "The two of us have studied the problem of oil sanctions-busting for some years. One of us (Bernard Rivers) wrote 'The Oil Conspiracy'; this was released in New York last year, and contained the first detailed revelations on the subject. The other of us (Martin Bailey) wrote 'Shell and BP in South Africa', already mentioned above. The submission to the British Inquiry was written by the two of us together. "It is clear from the speeches of President Kaunda and others that the question of how oil gets to Rhodesia is absolutely vital, and is of increasin: concern to African leaders. Bearing this in mind, you may wish to consider the possible merits of circulating the enclosed submission to members of your Committee, or even more widely within the United Nations. "We are actively continuing our research programme on this matter, and one of us (Bernard Rivers) is keeping in close contact with the Commonwealth Secretariat. Wle are interested not only in the British oil companies involve", b/ See para. 9 above. c/ See para. 4 above. -59- but also in the American and French ones (robil, Caltex and Total). if yOu have any queries on cur submission, or :ould like us to assist the Sanctions Cc:ittee by (for instonce) -;.riting a further study paor on the subject, please get in touch; we would of course be happy to help in any way possible. On our side, we would be pleased if you could possibly send us copies of any reports of your Comnittee in which the question of oil is mentioned." 12. The text of the submission referred to was circulated to the Committee for consideration, in accordance with the request contained in the communication, a summary of the submission, as provided by the authors, is reproduced below. Summary CHAPTER ONE - BACKGROUND A. The.Oil Companies in Rhodesia and South Africa Five oil companies distribute in Rhodesia - Shell, BP, Mobil, Caltex and Total - and the same companies also operate in South Africa. All Rhodesia's oil now clearly comes from South Africa. B. The Ownership of BP and Shell The British government has a 68 per cent stake in BP. Shell is an Anglo-Dutch group. The South African operations of both companies are wholly-owned subsidiaries. CHAPTER 1B,70 - EVIDENCE A. Stockpiling Before Sanctions In the months before UDI the oil companies in Rhodesia - especially Shell and BP - helped Smith build up substantial stockpiles. Zambia, on the other hand, had very small stocks by the time of UDI. B. Initial Response to Sanctions The South African subsidiaries of Shell and BP appear to have helped Rhodesia survive the first few weeks of sanctions by assisting the effort to supply the country by road tankers. C. From Road to Rail Rail was the only economic method for Rhodesia to obtain its oil. But until the publication of a report entitled 'The Oil Conspiracy', little was known of exactly how Rhodesia arranged the importation of oil. D. The Paper-Chase Secret Mobil documents show that the South African subsidiary of the company use d a coMplicated paper-chase to supply Rhodesia with oil through intermediaries. -60-

E. Shell and BP Strong evidence has emerged to suggest that Shell and DP established their own paper-chases to provide oil for Rhodesia. The main intermediary used was Freight Services Ltd. F. Sources of Further Evidence Likely sources of further evidence of sanctions-busting by Shell and BP are listed. CHAPTER THREE - COMENT A. The Response of the Oil Companies The head offices of the oil companies have not denied that their South African subsidiaries supply Rhodesia via intermediaries. B. Legal Constraints Mobil's headquarters claim that supplies to Rhodesia through intermediaries could not be cut off because of the South African Official Secrets Act and 'conditional selling' legislation. It is not clear, however, if these laws would actually be enforced, or whether they are a convenient shield for the oil companies to hide behind. C. Conclusion If this South African legislation is not likely to be enforced, then the oil companies should take immediate steps to ensure that supplies do not reach Rhodesia. On the other hand, if the legislation is enforced, then this would make it even more necessary for the British government to work for an extension of oil sanctions to cover South Africa. 13. In accordance with the instructions laid down by the Committee at the 166th and 233rd meetings, an acknowledgement was sent to the individuals who submitted the information. l. At the 294th meeting on 21 July 1977 the Committee decided to invite Mr. Bernard Rivers, of the Haslemere Group, London, and author of The Oil Conspiracy report, who was currently in New York, to appear before the Committee at the following meeting and give it any additional up-to-date information on the supply of oil and oil products to Southern Rhodesia. 15. At the 295th meeting on 25 July 1977 Mr. Bernard Rivers made a statement to the Committee, which was summarized in the Committee's records as follows: Mr. Rivers said that the testimony he had to present was based on a wealth of information which he had gathered while doing research, over a period of two to three years, on the matter of oil supplies to Southern Rhodesia. In orally presenting his report he would condense it, and later provide copies for full perusal by members of the Committee.

He had just completed a report on sanctions-breaking by Western oil companies for the Commonwealth Sanctions Committee in the United Kingdom, and was speaking as a member of the Haslemere Group, an ad hoc group in the United Kiriigdom involved in research and publication of occasional reports on %lestern economic involvement in the third world. The prediction made 11 years earlier by the British Prime Minister that the Rhodesian rebellion would be over "within weeks, rather than months", was based on the assumption that oil sanctions would be effectively implemented. That had never been the case. Rhodesia had no oil of its own and, before the imposition of sanctions, had been importing nearly all its requirements in the form of crude oil, subsequently refined at the country's only refinery, near Umtali. The refinery was supplied by a pipeline from Beira, built by a subsidiary of the British-based multinational company Lonrho. Five oil companies owned subsidiaries in Rhodesia - Shell, British Petroleum, Mobil, Caltex and Total, all being wholly owned by parent companies based in Europe or in the United States. After the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) the subsidiaries had become "directed" companies under Southern Rhodesian legislation, while the subsidiaries in South Africa and Mozambique had continued their activities as before. Both the Nozambique-Rhodesia pipeline and the refinery at Umtali had been dormant since the end of 1965, and since that time Southern Rhodesia had had to import not crude oil but the entire range of oil products. It had continued to do that, but few people knew how the products were reaching Southern Rhodesia. The report The Oil Conspiracy, published in June 1976 by the Center for Social Action, had been based on secret documents obtained from the South African and Southern Rhodesian subsidiaries of ilobil by OKKELA, an underground group of white South Africans dedicated to combating apartheid. The report had revealed for the first time how Southern Rhodesia had obtained most or all of its oil from the South African subsidiaries of the five oil companies. Those South African subsidiaries had not sold the oil products directly to Southern Rhodesia, they had sold them through intermediary companies in South Africa. Mobil had called the scheme a "paper-chase". Its purpose was to avoid detection, and the South African subsidiaries would sell oil Products to a South African company, usually Freight Services Limited, in the knowledge that the oil would then be passed on to other intermediary companies and eventually sold to the customer in Southern Rhodesia through GEITTA, an agency set up by the Smith regime to co-ordinate the importation of oil products. As GENTA resold to the Southern Rhodesian subsidiaries of the five oil companies for final sale to the public, the South African subsidiaries of the five companies could claim that they made no sales to Southern Rhodesia, although supplying most of Southern Rhodesia's needs indirectly. The Oil Conspiracy had revealed that the five companies intended their products to reach Southern Rhodesia. An internal MobilRhodesia memorandum in the report showed that the scheme had been devised to avoid any link between Mobil-South Africa and M!obil-Rhodesia. Until 1976, most of Southern Rhodesia's oil went from South Africa to Southern Rhodesia via Mozambique. The central allegations of the report were that the South African subsidiaries of the five oil companies had provided virtually all Southern Rhodesia's oil requirements since UDI, that the sale had taken place through South African intermediaries, thus enabling the oil companies to claim that they made no sales directly to Southern Rhodesia, and that the involvement of the South African subsidiaries was deliberate. -Since the publication of the report, there had been a nunber of developments: The New York Times had -62- rublished an article on 2 August 1976 providing independent confirmation of certain key allegatiors in The Oil Conspiracy Hobil and the Unitd Church of Christ had been called to Le~tif'y before the United States Senate Sub-Comnitt-. on African Affairs on 17 September 1976; the Government of Ghana had issued a statement on 24 December 19'r6 based on "incontrovertible evidence" and condemning the activities of the five oil companies in supplying Southern Rhodesia; President Kaunda of' Zambia had publicly condemned the companies in mid-January 1977; Joseph Garba, Nigeria's Federal Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, had spoken in Lagos in late January 1977 of the Western oil monopolies' continued evasion of United Nations decisions against apartheid; President Kaunda had raised the matter at a meeting on 31 January 1977 with M.r. Ivor Richard, Chairman of the Geneva Conference on Rhodesia; President Kaunda had called for a tightening of oil sanctions at the Afro-Arab Sumit in Cairo on 8 March 1977; the United African INational Council of Zimbabwe had sent a memorandum on 10 March 1977 on oil sanctions-breaking to the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, referring to new evidence; President Kaunda had announced on 3 April 1977 that Zambia intended to sue the five oil companies for supplying Southern Rhodesia; British television news had reported on 6 April 1977 that the Government of Nigeria was threatening to freeze local assets of Shell and British Petroleum if the South African subsidiaries of those companies did not cease to supply Southern Rhodesia; Dr. Owen, the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, had announced on 8 April 1977 that he was setting up an official inquiry to investigate allegations that Shell and British Petroleum had been supplying Rhodesia; the Ietherlands Government had announced on 9 April 1977 that it would assist with the inquiry; the British-based multinational company Lonrho had revealed on 10 April 1977 that it was planning to sue the five oil companies on evidence of sanctions breaking; Robert Mugabe, joint leader of the Patriotic Front, had criticized Western Governments on 16 May 1977 for permitting their oil companies to supply Southern Rhodesia; Sonny Ramphal, Commonwealth Secretary-General, had called on 16 May 1977 for oil sanctions to be extended to cover South Africa if I'Western companies based there did not stop supplying Southern Rhodesia; the United States Treasury had released a report on 17 May 1977 on its investigations concerning the allegations against Mobil; the Maputo Declaration in Support of the Peoples of Namibia and Zimbabwe, released on 21 May 1977, had called for a tightening of oil sanctions by Governments; the United States General Accounting Office report, issued on 23 May 1977, had criticized the United States Treasury and other agencies for assigning too low a priority to the implementation of sanctions; Lonrho had commenced its legal proceedings against the five oil companies on 31 May 1977; oil sanctions-breaking had been debated at length at the meeting in London of Commonwealth heads of Government, who had undertaken to strengthen enforcement procedures in their own countries so as to prohibit exports of oil and oil products which might find their way to Southern Rhodesia; in June 1977 Joshua Nkomo, joint leader of the Patriotic Front, had condemned the five companies for sanctions breaking; in late June 1977 the OAU Political Committee had expressed support for Zambia's legal moves against the five oil companies; the Government of Zambia had written to the five companies on 2 July 1977 informing them of its intention to sue them; and in early July OAU heads of State, meeting in Gabon, had agreed to send a six-nation ministerial commission to oil- producin& countries to ask them to halt oil supplies to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. -63-

After the construction of the oil pipeline from Beira to Southern Rhodesia in 1962, the Lonrho subsidiary responsible for construction had signed a contract with the five oil companies under which they Guaranteed t} u they would use no other route to supply Southern Rhodesia. When the pipeline had been closed after the imposition of sanctions, and the oil companies had decided to send oil products. to Southern Rhodesia from South Africa, they had been acting in breach of the contract. In consequence Lonrho had made a consistent loss on the pipeline, and had been collecting evidence for a lawsuit against the oil companies for breach of contract. If Lonrho ion its case, it would also be proving that the oil companies had been evading United Nations sanctions. The Haslemere Group had obtained a copy of the correspondence between Lonrho's Chief Executive, Mr. R. W. Rowland, and United Kingdom Government officials. According to that correspondence, when the five oil companies had still been under the control of their parent companies overseas prior to UDI, they had helped Ian Smith to prepare for UDI by building up stocks of oil within Southern Rhodesia between mid-October and early December 1965. It was probable that the companies had thereby reduced their supplies to Zambia, which had had no refinery at the time of UDI and had been receiving its supplies from the Southern Rhodesian refinery at Umtali. The oil companies had also apparently supplied the Southern Rhodesian Government with ongoing data on the level of stocks in Zambia, and that had assisted Southern Rhodesia's attempts to "hold Zambia hostage". The low level of Zambia's stockpile suggested that oil sanctions would not be imposed against Southern Rhcdesia, as Zambia would thereby be seriously harmed. Southern Rhodesia's oil reserves had been increased by the oil companies from 24 days' supply to 90 days' supply by the time sanctions had been imposed, and Southern Rhodesia had had sufficient time to establish new ways of importing oil from South Africa. Oil had first been brought into Southern Rhodesia by road or rail via Mozambique, and until March 1976 by ship from Durban to Lourenqo Marques and then by rail into Southern Rhodesia. The Chairman of the Southern Rhodesian Government agency GEUTA had flown to South Africa every six weeks to negotiate quantities and prices of fuel with four of the oil companies, subsequently instructing the South African firm Freight Services Limited to purchase the agreed quantities as GENTA's agents. The oil had been sent in refined form to Lourengo Marques, and had been 'in bond" during the entire journey, thus never featuring in the trade figures of South Africa or Mozambique. The scheme had saved on customs payments and reduced the chances of detection. Numerous details, including statistics of the quantities of oil supplied to Southern Rhodesia by each oil company from 1966 to 1976, had been provided by Mr. Rowland in his correspondence. The Zambian Government was now taking its own legal action against the five oil companies, accusing them of depriving Zambia of oil in the mid-1960s in order to build up stocks in Southern Rhodesia, and causing considerable financial loss to Zambia. The Zambian Government's case would be based on evidence in The Oil Conspiracy, on evidence gathered by Lonrho, and on its own evidence. Mobil had replied to the allegations in The Oil Consiracy in its testimony to the United States Senate Sub-Committee on African Affairs by saying that the United States sanctions regulations did not prevent the South African subsidiaries of United States companies from trading with Southern Rhodesia as long as United States personnel and products originating in the United States were not involved. The South African and Southern Rhodesian subsidiaries of Mobil had refused to comrent on the alletations, claiming that they would thereby be violating the South African and Southern Rhodesian -64-

Official Secrets Acts; and officials sent by ilobil in Neir York to South Africa to carry out investigations had been told that they would be prosecuted as foreign agents under those Acts if they attempted to investigate the sUtjecL in South Africa or Southern Rhodesia. Mobil had also been advised that its South African subsidiary could not refuse to sell oil products to any custoner within South Africa that was willing to pay the current price, nor could it impose conditions on sales. However, neither Mobil nor any of the other oil companies in question had ever denied the central allegation that its South African subsidiary had deliberately sold oil to Southern Rhodesia via intermediaries. Mobil had claimed that it could not find out from its South African subsidiary whether the allegations were true, nor could it prevent th' sales from taking place. There was not sufficient time to discuss in detail the various legal points made by Mobil and the other oil companies, but a number of basic points could be made. Firstly, the oil companies had correctly stated that the sanctions legislations of the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands and the United States did not apply to their South African subsidiaries. That was a crucial loop-hole in the various national legislations on sanctions and the Committee might wish to consider how United Nations sanctions orders could be modi'ied so as to make the parent oil companies legally liable for any sanctionsbreaking activities by their South African subsidiaries. Secondly, under a strict interpretation of sanctions legislation, the export of oil to South Africa might constitute a contravention of the legislation, as it did under the United Kinsdom's sanctions order, which forbade the supply of goods to any person in circumstances where the supplier or deliverer had "reasonable cause to believe" that the goods would be supplied to a person in Southern Rhodesia. As it was known that Southern Rhodesia was now obtaining all its oil requirements through South Africa, the Cormittee might wish to seek a precise legal opinion on the possibility of Member States prosecuting oil companies which supplied crude or refined oil to South Africa, on the grounds that some of that oil could reasonably be expected to reach Southern Rhodesia. Thirdly, each parent oil company might find it harder to disclaim liability for the actions of its South African subsidiary if it were persuaded by its Government to appoint as chairman of the subsidiary a person of the same nationality as the parent oil company. Fourthly, the oil companies appeared to be applying a,,. excessively strict interpretation of the South African Official Secrets Act, since the parent oil companies must be in a position to find out how oil was reaching Southern Rhodesia if another company - Lonrho - and an underground political organization were able to do so. The information which the parent oil companies needed to obtain from their South African subsidiaries essentially concerned not South Africa, but Southern Rhodesia, and therefore could not be construed as information "nrejudicial to the safety and interestz of South Africa", in the sense of the South African Official Secrets Act. Fifthly, the oil companies had never suggested that there had ever been any legislation in Mozambique to prevent them from investigating and controlling the activities of their subsidiaries in that country; yet those subsidiaries had until 19Y6 played a key role in getting oil fkom South Africa to Southern.Rhodesia. Finally, the oil companies' argum.ents were also based on a questionable interpretation of South African legislation regarding what was known as "conditional selling7. -65.

Shortly after the publication of The Oil Consniracy, the Unitei State Treasury had carried out an 11-month investigation into the alleg'zi~ns ,2inst fobil. It had concentrated on the narra.r question of Tneher Unit2 Ztates personnel or products were involved, rather than on the wider question of whether Mobil's South African subsidiary had actually been supplying Southern Rhodesia via intermediaries. Even then, the Treasury renort had been ilmost entirely inconclusive, since Treasury investigators had been unable to obtain any information from South Africa and had therefore been able to authenticate only one of the documents mentioned in The Oil Consriracy. It seemed barely credible that the United States Government had been unable to verify facts which were almost common knowledge. The Treasury report revealed very considerable weaknesses. Firstly, no attempt had been made to investigate the activities of Mobil'in Mozambique, through which oil products were sent from South Africa to Southern Rhodesia. If the Official Secrets Acts of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia prevented investigation in those two countries, w-hy had the Treasury investigators not gone to Mlozambique? Secondly, no attempt had been made to inquire of the Mozambican Government as to the ultimate destination of the frequent cargoes of refined oil transported to Maputo from the Mobil refinery at Durban. Thirdly, no attempt had been made to pursue the leads uncovered by The New York Times, which had reported in a full-page article in August 1976 that it had obtained independent confirmation of certain key aspects of Mobil's scheme to supply Rhodesia. Equally strong criticism could be made of the United Kingdom Government. In April 1977, as a result of revelations and pressures by the Haslemere Group and others, that Government had announced that it would make an official inquiry into the operations whereby petroleum products had been reaching Southern Rhodesia. However, it had not even named the people who were to assist in the inquiry, and the inquiry had still not formally begun. Yet the United Kingdom oil companies had been refusing to answer questions from stockholders regarding the allegations of sanctions-breaking, on the grounds that the official inquiry was "looking into the matter". In addition, it was now known that the inquiry would be held in camera and that it would be mostly "on a narrow point of law" rather than "an over-all inquiry into oil sanctions and their breaking". The Sunday Times, of London, in two major articles, had revealed the results of its own detailed investigations. They had shown independently how the South African subsidiaries of Shell, BP, Mobil, Caltex and Total had been supplying Southern Rhodesia both directly and via Mozambique. The articles had revealed the role of GENTA, the quantities of oil being sent and the use of South African intermediaries. Yet those articles had been published no less than a decade earlier, in 1967. He therefore wondered whether the parent oil companies had carried out exhaustive investigations as a result of the articles, and whether Western Governments had reported the allegations to the Committee. The question arose as to what extent the United Xingdom and United States Governments wanted the true facts to emerge. The war being fought in and around Southcrn Rhodesia was made possible by fuel imuorted into that country. Firm action was needed now, not at the end of a slow and under-staffed inquiry which avoided confronting key issues. -66-

A change had apparently occurred in the stand taken by the United Kingdom Government. 1hereas it had stated in September 1)76 that it had accepted assurances from Sh-ll 42,d £2 " that neither tihy nor any cn:pany in ujhich they had an interest had engased either directly or with others in supplying oil to Rhodesia, the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had recently indicated that he now accepted that the South African subsidiaries were involved in the sanctions breaking, the question simply being whether it took place with the connivance of international oil companies or purely because their subsidiaries in South Africa broke the system. Since the closure of Mozambique's border with Southern Rhodesia in March 1976, there were now only three routes by which oil could reach Southern Rhodesia. The most important Qne was the rail link between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, opened in September 1974; the second and more expensive route was a road link between the two countries; and the third was a rail lir routed via Botswana and owned by Southern Rhodesia, a fact which made it difficult - but not impossible - for Botswana to stop the flow of oil. Although the natter was surrounded by secrecy, research suggested that Southern Rhodesia's current consumption of oil products was between 14,000 and 18,000 barrels per day, roughly equivalent to 600,000 tons per annum and representing some 7 1/2 per cent of that produced in the South African refineries. With regard to action to reduce the flow of oil, two basic approaches were possible. Firstly, pressure could be exerted to persuade the South African subsidiaries to prevent their oil products from reaching Southern Rhodesia. Such action would no doubt require pressure on the South African subsidiaries by the parent comnpanies; that in turn would probably involve the exertion of pressure on the five oil companies by their respective Governments. That pressure on the parent companies could take two main forms: firstly, the Governments could use non-legislative means in the form of a public request backed by private pressure. In the case of BP and Total, the Governments of the United Kingdom and France, which had majority holdings, could also intervene directly. Thus, the parent oil companies could be persuaded to insist that their South African subsidiaries test South African law by requiring guarantees from purchasers of bulk consignments of oil products that the oil products were not destined for transshipment to Southern Rhodesia. The parent companies could also threaten to replace the boards of directors Cf their South African subsidiaries with more amenable and non-South African personnel; to cut back on the supply of investment capital and technological assistance; and, ultimately, to cut off oil deliveries. The second form of pressure would be for the four Governments to extend sanctions legislation sc as to render the parent oil companies legally liable for the activities of their South African subsidiaries with regard to trade with Rhodesia. A further suggestion was that the Governments of certain countries in which the five oil companies had extensive investments could threaten to impose an extra tax on the profits of the subsidiaries in the absence of evidence that the 01: had stopped reaching Southern Rhodesia from South Africa. If those various forms of pressure proved ineffective, firmer action would be required. The second basic approach would therefore consist of curtailing the supply of oil to South Africa unless meaningful guarantees -67- could be obtained from the oil. companies or from the South African Goverrtment that oil would not subsequently reach Southern Rhodesia. Iloves could be E-ade through the United Nations for modification of the laws of M"ember States tc make it illegal to supply or transport oil to South Africa. In that connexion, although Iran provided most of the oil supplied to South Africa, and thus to Southern Rhodesia, the oil was transported to South Africa in ships registered in a number of different countries. Ultimately, of course, the Security Council could also impose a naval blockade on South African ports. Such a move might well lead to confrontation with South Africa; but so long as South Africa refused to accept Security Council decisions on Southern Rhodesia, a confrontation of some kind would appear to be inevitable. No simple step could be guaranteed to make United Nations oil sanctions against Southern Rhodesia totally effective. Member States might wish to consider implementing simultaneously several of the. possible moves which he had outlined. The international community must not meekly accept the arguments put forward by the oil companies. In effect, the companies were claiming that they had lost control of their multimillion-dollar subsidiaries in South Africa, even though they continued to receive the Drofits from their operations. If that argument was valid, then those companies should withdraw from South Africa; if it was not, then pressure of all kinds should be exerted on them and on the South African Government until oil ceased to reach Southern Rhodesia. As President Kaunda of Zambia had indicated, there could be no greater contribution to the liberation struggle in southern Africa than to end the sale of oil to Southern Rhodesia. 16. A letter dated 29 July 1977 addressed to the Chairman of the Co-mittee was received from the representative of the United Kingdom, the substantive part of which reads as follows: "I. In view of some of the testimony put before the Committee by Mr. Rivers at our 295th meeting, I thought it would be useful if I gave you an interim report on the present status of the inquiry being conducted by my Government with regard to allegations of evasion of sanctions against Rhodesia by major oil companies. "2. Mr. Bingham has been working on the inquiry since his formal appointment on 10 May. Among his other activities he has met three times with the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and he has also met with the United States Treasury officials who conducted the Mobil investigation. An accountant has been appointed to assist Mr. Bingham. "3. The inquiry's terms of reference were announced by the Secretary of State on 8 April and remain unchanged. They are to carry out an investigation with the objects: "(a) Of establishing the facts concerning the operations whereby supplies of petroleum and petroleum. products have reached Rhodesia since 17 December 1965; "(b) Of establishing the extent, if any, to which persons and companies within the scope of the Sanctions Order have played any part in such operations; -68-

"(c) Of obtaining evidence and information for the purpose of securinz compliance iith or detecting evasion of the Southern Rhodesia (United Nations Sanctions) (No. 2) Order 1968 (tThe Sanctions Order'); "(d) Of obtaining evidence of the commission of any offences against thSanctions Order which may be disclosed. "4. As stated by the Secretary of State at that time, the statutory instrument under which the enquiry was launched is the Southern Rhodesia (UN Sanctions) (Wo. 2) Order 1968. This requires that the investigation be conducted in camera, which is in any case appropriate because of the possibility that the investigation will uncover evidence justifying court proceedings. "5. The Secretary of State rebuts any suggestion that the inquiry is intended to be a whitewash. He has personally impressed upon Mr. Bingham the need to press on with the enquiry as fast as possible and his determination to get at the facts. "6. As the Committee will not be meeting again for some weeks, I should be grateful if you would arrange for this letter to be circulated to our fellow members. 17. A letter dated 12 October 1977 addressed to the Chairman was received from Mr. Bernard Rivers of the Haslemere Group, described as a research action group on third world issues, based in the United Kingdom. The substantive part of the letter reads as follows: "On 25 July 1977 ! was given the opportunity of testifying before the Sanctions Committee. I spoke on the subject of how the South African subsidiaries of Western-owned oil companies have been supplying Southern Rhodesia with oil since the Unilateral Declaration of Independence. This is a subject which, in my capacity as a freelance British economist, I have been researching for over 3 years. "When I testified, I mentioned that I have also worked as a consultant to the Commonwealth Working Group on Sanctions. Together with my colleague Martin Bailey, I was cormissioned to produce a lengthy report entitled 'Oil Sanctions against Rhodesia', which was in effect the only input used by the Working Group. "The purpose of this letter is: 1. to bring to your attention the attached front-page article from the Observer (London) of last Sunday, 9 October 1977. You will note that the article reports that the eleven-nation Working Group, of which Britain is one member, has completed its deliberations, and has unanimously recommended that unless the South African Government guarantees to prevent oil supplies reaching Rhodesia, 'the United Nations Security Council should be asked to impose in mandatory form, an embargo on the supply of crude oil and petroleuM products to South Africa itself'. -69-

2. to request permission to testify for a second time before the Sanctions Committee. In testifying, I would seek: (a) to nla orz ,T 1nth!t tart of my original testimony where 1 made certain suggestions as to how oil sanctions could be made effecti>* (b) to bring to the attention of the Committee certain further and up-to-date information which Nartin Bailey and I have obtained on how Southern Rhodesia obtains its oil; (c) to respond, insofar as I am able, to any questions which members of the Committee might have on this issue. If convenient, I hope it migjht be possible to appear before the Committee at an early date. Please be assured that, whether or not I am invited to testify, I remain anxious to assist the Committee in any way possible in its current deliberations, which I consider to be of the utmost importance." 18. In response to the request contained in the above-cited letter, the Committee decided to invite Mr. Rivers to present further oral testimony on the question of the supply of oil and oil products to Southern Rhodesia at its 298th meeting. At that meeting, held on 20 October 1977, Hr. Rivers made a statement to the Committee which was summarized in the Committee's records as follows: "Mr. RIVERS (Member of the Haslemere Group and Consultant to the Commonwealth Secretariat, London) said that most of the information he had supplied to the Committee at its 295th meeting had applied to the period prior to the closure of Mozarnbioue's border with Southern Rhodesia in March 1976. A considerable amount of information had been acquired since then which he did not intend to make public as yet but which he would like to pass on to the Committee. Copies of the full text of his testimony would be made available for distribution to all members. "The South African subsidiaries of all five of the oil companies concerned were still supplying oil to Southern Rhodesia. There was physical proof that South African subsidiaries of Shell, British Petroleum, Total, Mobil and Caltex were actually transporting oil to a storage depot at Messina, close to the Southern Rhodesian-South African border whence it was being carried by road and rail into Southern Rhodesia. Unmarked trucks, often belonging to the oil companies themselves, were being used for road transport and there was a secret colour coding system to identify them. There was extremely close co-operation between the five Western oil companies in South Africa. Every month they held what was known as an 'industry meeting', presided over by BP-South Africa, to discuss matters of mutual concern, including the sale of oil to Southern Rhodesia. In at least one case, the parent company was fully aware of the activities of its South African subsidiary. In addition, ships belonging to one or more of the parent oil companies sometimes carried crude oil to South Africa that had been purchased in certain Arab countries which in recent years had attempted to enforce an oil embargo against South Africa; some of the cargo manifests and other documents were actuilly printed with the words 'iot for delivery to South Africa'. The oil companies were therefore deliberately undermining the stated -70- policy of various Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) with regard to South Africa. Iqmportant documentary evidence had recently been obtained in Maputo, with the approval of the Mozambican Government, concerning the key roles of the Southern Rhodesian Government agency GENTA and Freight Services Limited in getting oil throuGh to Southern Rhodesia. The documents related mostly to the small percentage of Southern Rhodesia's oil which had been supplied by the then Portuguese-owned Sonarep refinery in Lourengo Marques prior to the independence of Mozambique. All those documents would be made available to the Committee. A secret memorandum written by an official in the Office of the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia in December 1971, when Southern Rhodesia believed the lifting of sanctions to be imminent, clearly showed how companies in South Africa and Mozambique had helped Southern Rhodesia to evade sanctions. Considerable further documentation was available in Mozambique, mostly dating from the period when that country had been a Portuguese colony, and he thought that the Committee might wish to approach the Government of Mozambique with a view to sending a representative or consultant to Maputo to study the material. "Together with a fellow consultant, Martin Bailey, he had submitted a lengthy report on oil sanctions against Southern Rhodesia to the Commonwealth Working Group on Sanctions, which had in turn reported to its parent committee, the Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa, of which all Commonwealth countries were members. That Committee had released a public statement the previous day recommending that Governments whose companies supplied crude oil or oil products to South Africa, or who were themselves, or through their agencies, engaged in that trade should make it clear to the South African Government that it must either co-oterate with the rest of the international community in ensuring an end to the evasion of oil sanctions or jeopardize its own continued supply of petroleum. In the event of South Africa being unwilling to give the necessary guarantees, it called for a decision by the Security Council to impose a mandatory embargo on the supply of crude oil and petroleum products to South Africa itself. The Commonwealth Committee had also considered a recommendation to the effect that the scope of existing legislation prohibiting the supply of oil or oil products to Southern Rhodesia should be extended to apply to South African subsidiaries of the oil companies. "The latter proposal, on which certain reservations appeared to have been expressed within the Commonwealth Committee, would be virtually identical in its effect to the proposal contained in the draft resolution submitted to the Security Council Committee by India, on which he wished to comment. "In the first place, that draft resolution merely requested Member States to re- examine their legislation; there was nothing to stop them procrastinating or deciding that they were unable to make the proposed changes. Second, it had been suggested that the United States and the United Kingdom might have legal problems in implementing such a resolution, but legal experts saw no fundamental problems as long as an honest distinction was made between the legal and political aspects; solutions to any legal problems could undoubtedly be found once a particular Government decided that it wanted to implement a -71- resolution. Third, there was some validity in the argurient that unilateral actions to invoke legislation with extraterritorial aspects might est!'-blh undesirable rrccedentz, but, ,rhen extraterritorial legislation was wai applied Ls a result Qf a clear nandate expressed through a Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United "ations, such reservations did not necessarily apply. 'A resolution of the kind proposed by India could and should be implemented, but it would not by itself be sufficient to stop the oil gettin to Southern Rhodesia. It had two main drawbacks. First, it would probably lead to a protracted confrontation betreen the legal systems of South Africa and the countries in which the oil companies were based and there was a real risk that oil would continue to flow to Southern Rhodesia in the meantime; it was clear from the copy of a previously unreleased letter from the South African Secretary for Comnerce addressed to Mobil in New York that under Sou:h African law the local subsidiaries of the oil companies were permitted, indee virtually instructed to sell oil to intermediaries w.ho would sell it to Southern Rhodesia. Second, it would not be easy to apply such a resolution to South African-controlled or South African-owned oil companies, such as the Government-owned Sasol Marketing (Fty.) Limited. In order to overcome these problems, it would be necessary for national legislation introduced oursuant to the adoption of the proposed draft resolution by the Security Council to provide that parent companies must ensure strict compliance by their subsidiaries with provisions prohibiting the supply of oil or oil products to Southern Rhodesia; that, in order to facilitate supervision of their South African subsidiaries and to minimize the Possibility of conflict with the South African Official Secrets Act, parent companies must appoint to the board of their South African subsidiaries a director with special responsibility fcr ensuring compliance with sanctions legislation; and that, where any subsidiary in South Africa, as a result of coercion or threats of coercion, contravened sanctions legislation, the supply of oil or oil products to such a company thereafter must be absolutely prohibited. "In addition to the difficulty of applying such a resolution to South African-controlled oil companies, it would also take time for it to be aonlied effectively to other Testern-controlled or Iranian-controlled companies. As the recent statement issued by th6 Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa had made clear, it would be necessary for the Security Council to adopt a second resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter calling for an embargo on the supply of crude oil and petroleum products to South Africa itself. It would be difficult to make such a resolution fully effective immediately but it could very quickly be made 90 per cent effective and ways of closing the remaining loop-holes could be devised durin, the early stages of operation of the embargo. Conversely, it might transpire that the embargo could be lifted after a short while once it had achieved its desired effect. "A rather half-hearted compromise proposal had been put forward in certain quarters to the effect that the supply of oil to South Africa should be cut back by the percenta-e which it was thought South Africa was passing on to Southern Rhodesia. South Africa's oil consumption was some 20 times that of Southern Rhodesia and he could not see how effective ways could be found of ensuring that attc:mpts to reduce South Africa's oil supplies by one twentieth -72- would not be circu:wvented. Since South Africa did not publish its oil import statistics, and sice there was naturally a steady !7roith in those imports, proble:s of ireasure:c11t would arise. "Ihe vt.m t-mr.. ,!--s a sensitive one which could well be of ky significance for the Comnittee. It was impossible to consider proposals to stop oil reaching Southern Rhodesia without taking note of the current Ang'o-American initiative for a Southern Rhodesian settlement. The question was, should the Security Council move immediately or should it wait until it was clear whether or not the Anglo-American initiative was going to succeed. President Kaunda of Zambia had recently pointed out that the initiative was based on the false piremise of Smith's willingness to volunteer to surrender, but the past 12 years had shown that he would do no such thing. President IKaunda had also accused the British and American authors of the proposals of conveniently omitting a complementary set of ideas, including a fixed time-table to stop the flow of oil to Smith's rebel army. That statement echoed his own sentiments. Oil sanctions should be implemented as soon as possible in order to force Smith to give up power without engaging in his usual tactics of procrastination and deception. "If agreement could not be reached within the Committee for immediate action along the lines he had suggested, he would strongly recommend that tht Cormnittee should agree on actions to be taken in the event that General Chand reported to the Security Council later in the year that he had been unable to obtain agreement on a cease-fire and a rapid transfer to majority rule. In such a situation, the Committee should recommend to the Security Council the adoption of two resolutions, one based on the draft resolution submitted by India and the other calling for the extension of oil sanctions to South Africa, as suggested by the Coimonwealth Comrittee on Southern Africa. Moreover, the permanent members of the Security Council should give a firm public undertaking that, in such a situation, they would not veto the resolutions in question. In recent weeks there had been numerous reports in the British and South African press to the effect that the British and United States Governments had already decided that they would definitely support the extension of oil sanctions to South Africa if Smith did not agree to an acceptable settlement. Information he had received from well-placed sources indicated that the idea was merely 'under active consideration' and that no such decision had been made by either Government. In the year and a half since the first clear evidence had been released of the way in which the Western oil companies had been supplying Southern Phodesia via their South African subsidiaries, none of the Western Governments in question had publicly acknowledged that the allegations were correct or publicly indicated that it was determined to act at any time to halt that flow. Such statements and actions were long overdue." 19. A letter dated 25 October 1977 was sent by the Chairman, in accordance with the Cormittee's request at the 298th meeting, to Mr. Rivers expressing the Committee's appreciation for his contribution to its work. 20. By a letter dated 16 November 1977, the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations transmitted to the Chairman, for circulation to members of the Committee, the text of a note also of the same date concerning the activities of the Total oil. company in the Republic of South Africa. The text of that note is reproduced belong: -73-

"In his statements to the Sanctions Cormmittee on 25 July and 20 October 1977, Mr. Bernard Rivers accused Total, a subsidiary of the Compagnie Franc-7ie des P~troles, of being involved in surpl!yin, retrle:: products to u'ut, rn Thoacsia. "In view of the seriousness of the allegations, the French Government conducted an investigation which brought to light the following facts: "Total-South Africa owns a 30 per cent interest in iatref, which controls the Sosolburg refinery. "The output of this refinery is 3.5 million tons per year, of which Total's share is slightly more than 1 million. Total distributes its entire share through its network of stations in South Africa, exporting none of it except for a few international sales of fuel for aircraft and ships. "South Africa's total refining capacity is 21 million tons per year. Thus, it has no need whatever to resort to foreign companies in order to supply the 600,000 tons or so of petroleum products which Southern Rhodesia consumes annually. "The French Government is therefore of the view that Total, not being involved in any way in supplying Rhodesia, is not violating the sanctions in force against that country. Accordingly, it categorically denies the allegations of ?r. Bernard Rivers in so far as they pertain to itself. "The French Government reaffirms that it scrupulously complies, to the utmost of its ability, with the various resolutions adopted on the subject by the Security Council." 21. A letter of acknowledgement dated 29 November 1977 was sent by the Chairman to the Permanent Representative of France. -74-

Appendix II Except f-rom Report on the Suply of Petroleum and Petroleum Products to Rhodesia by T. S. Bingham, C.A. Chapter 14: Conclusions 14.1 In this Chapter we summarise our main factual conclusions, we summarise and reviev the major argirzentz advanced on behalf of the Shell and BP Groups and we make certain concluding observations. 14.2 We refrain from expressing any cpinion as to whether any company or any individual has or may have at any time cormnitted any criminal offence under the Sanctions Orders. Our Terms of Reference do not in our opinion permit, still less require, us to do so. We have, however, in Annex III, gathered together information and references w.hich mey be of relevance in considering whether criminal offences hav,- been committed: the information and references there given relate to the more important companies which feature either in the organisation charts referred to in Chapter I, paragraph 1.45 or in the chain of supply to Southern Africa described in Chapter I, Section C. A. FACTUAL CONCLUIONS 14.3 It is convenient that we should summarise our main conclusions. In making this summary we would emphasise (a) that a proper understanding and fair appreciation of the facts summarised require reference to the indicated passages in the full text. (b) that the summary is of facts now known: many of the facts now sumrmrarised were not contemporaneously known to one or other or both of the Groups in London; some were not known uitil the relevant documents were assembled from many sources for presentation to us; some came to light in the course of the Investigation. It would be wrong to assume that all the events now sumarised were kno-,wn to the Groups in London at the time the events were taking place. 14.h Our main conclusions are these: (i) Shell notified the Rhodesian Government before UDI that the Shell and BP Groups vrould continue to perform their contractual obligations unless or until force majeure prevented them doing so. There may have been informal expressions of o-inion to the effect that sanctions were unlikely to be imposed and, if imposed, were unlik~ely to be effective. The Groups did not deliberately encourage the Rhodeian Government to make its illegal declaration of inderendence and did not assure that Geverrment that it wcould maintain supplies if snnctions ,ere inmc.ed. (Chapter IV, pariLrapis 4.3 - 4.16). -75-

(ii) It seems very likely that in the weeks preceding promulgation of the 1965 Sanctions Order stocks in Rhodesia rose above the normal level. We do not think that any major concerted effort to that end was made, and limitations on storage capacity precluded substantial stockpiling. TWe doubt if the margin by which stocks were increased significantly affected the subsequent course of events. (Chapter IV, paragraphs 4.17 - 4.23). (iii) It appears that stocks of refined products in Zambia immediately prior to the 1965 Sanctions Order were at a very low level. It may be that there was 'some interception in Rhodesia of supplies intended for Zambia, or a deliberate failure to consign to Zambia supplies which would otherwise have been consigned, but the evidence available to us does not show that this was so. (ChapterIV, paragraphs 4.24 - 4.28). (iv) We are satisfied that Shell did not, in the weeks immediately preceding the 3965 Sanctions Order, negotiate with the Portuguese to vary the form of documentation for imports in transit through Mozambique with a view to concealing the destination of products consigned to Rhodesia in the event of an embargo. (Chapter IV, paragraphs 4.29 - 4.38). (v) Upon the making of the 1965 Sanctions Order Shell on behalf of Consolidated and the Shell and BP Groups acted promptly to nrtify the Consolidated companies in South Africa, Mozambique and Rhodesia of the terms of the Order and to seek the compliance of those companies with its terms. A cargo of oil on the high seas en route for Rhodesia was diverted. Further supplies of crude were stopped. Orders suspected of being for Rhodesia were rejected. (Chapter V, paragraphs 5.2 - 5.5 and 5.43). (vi) Pumping of oil to CAPREF ceased on the 31st December 1965 and the Refinery closed down on the 15th January 1966. No crude oil has reached the Refinery since that date and it remains closed down. (Chapter IV, paragraph 4.22 and Chapter V, paragraphs 5.49 and 5.74). (vii) The Consolidated management immediately stopped the despatch of products from the Durban Refinery and the Luboil Blending Plant and (after a pause to assess the legal position) acted to prevent the supply from South Africa to Rhodesia of products which had traditionally been supplied from the Consolidated companies in South Africa to their affiliates in Rhodesia. (Chapter V, paragraphs 5.3, 5.8, 5.23 and 5.25). (viii) Oil products began to reach Rhodesia by the road route over Beit Bridge at a rate rising from about 35,000 gallons per day in February up to about 100,000 gallons per day in May 1966. Subsequently the quantities entering Rhodesia by this route declined. Supplies were sent partly by South African supporters of the Rhodesian regime and partly by South African and Ehudesian contractors, and were increasingly obtained by GENTA (the Rhodesian oil procurement agency). Tr nsoort beloziging to the South African Consolidated marketing companies was not involved. Come transport belonging or lonsed to Rhodesian contractors but painted (or previously painted) with the colours of the Rhodesian Consoliaated companiez was used to obtain supplies; sowe of these -76- companies' own transport may also have been used. It is certainly possible, though not proved, that the Rhodesian Consolidated comnpanies actively participated in the procurement of supplies by road from the Transvaal. Another Rhodesian marketing company did so. The source of the products carried to Rhodesia by road cannot be clearly ascertained, but it is likely that they derived from all the South African marketing companies. (Chapter V, Section C). (ix) The local management of the Consolidated companies in South Africa was impeded in its initial efforts to restrict the flow of oil to Rhodesia by the insistence of the South African Government that there should be no embargo within South Africa on supplies to Rhodesia and by the strong pro-Rhodesian sympathy of virtually all vhite South Africans employed by the companies. Desoite these imoediments the local management of Consolidated tried during about the first six months or so after the 1965 Sanctions Order to prevent or reduce the flow of oil to Rhodesia. (Chapter V, Section D). (x) In February 1966 oil products began to be carried by rail from South Africa via Mozambique to Rhodesia. This traffic reached a peak in May 1966 and thereafter declined, ceasing altogether in March 1967. The quantity of all products carried by this route during 1966 amounted to some 87,000 tons. It seems highly probable that industrial customers of all the South African marketing companies bought rail tank cars of product surplus to their requirements and re-consigned them to hodesia. It seems clear that Parry Leon and Hayhoe Linited bought rail tank cars of product and re-consigned them to Rhodesia. The figures suggest that a substantial proportion of this traffic consisted of purchases by Parry Leon and Hayhoe from the Consolidated marketers in South Africa, and that some members of the South African management must have known of the destination of these products. (Chapter VII, paragraphs 7.2 - 7.5 and 7.60 - 7.62). (xi) In December 1966 Shell locambique delivered about 3,000 tons of oil products free on rail at Lourenco Marques to Parry Leon and Hayhoe pursuant to contracts made between Shell South Africa and Parry Leon and Hayhoe in Johannesburg. During 1967 about 150,000 tons were so delivered. Shell South Africa was under strong pressure from the South African Government, if not under legal obligation, to make sales to South African buyers able to pay the price, which is what Parry Leon and Hayhoe were. While the product probably passed technically through the ownership of Shell Mocambique, it was supplied by the Consolidated marketing companies in South Africa and was in the main transported to i4ozambique from South Africa. Parry Leon and Hayhoe sold these products to GEUTA and consigned them to Rhodesia. Additional quantities may well have been similarly delivered to Parry Leon and Hayhoe for carriage to the Transvaal. (Chapter I, paragraph 1.71, Chapter III, paragraphs 3.3 - 3.5, Chapter V, paragraphs 5.28 and 5.81 and Chapter VII, paragraphs 7.18, 7.37(ii) and (iv), 7.39, 7.58 and 7.59(ii)). (xii) W-hen M4r. Vasconcellos in Mozambique appreciated that goods delivered to Purry Lccoa ind !%zyhoo, or some of them, were being carried to Rhodesia he raised the m:atter with the top mana gement in South Africa. He was told (in effect) to continue ".m11!: suc'h deliveries. The mrnarement in South Africa was" -77- however concerned to avoid the affixing of rail tank car labels shouing a Rhodesian destination within the Shell Mocambique installation and was insistent that no consignments were to be made direct to Rhodesian destinations. (Chapter VII, paragraphs 7.29, 7.30, 7.33 and 7.36). (xiii) 1r. Walker's personal position as a South African citizen and General Manager in South Africa with overall local responsibility for Mozambique was a difficult one because he could not faithfully comply at the same time both with the policy of the 1965 Sanctions Order that supplies should be denied to Rhodesia and with the policy of the South African Government that South African traders should be free to trade with Rhodesia. He believed it was arguable that since neither he nor Shell 11ocambique knew for sure that any particular consignment was destined for Rhodesia there was no contravention of the 1965 Sanctions Order. (Chapter VII, paragraphs 7.25 and 7.37(v)). (xiv) Mr. Walker informed the British Embassy in South Africa of his view that oil for Rhodesia was going through various intermediaries from all the companies supplying South Africa, probably in about the same proportion as their share of the South African market, and that he believed the other companies would make good any shortfall in supplies made by the Consolidated marketing companies. (Chapter VII, paragraph 7.38(iii)). (xv) Until January 1968 the Shell and BP Groups in London believed that no sales were made by the Consolidated marketing companies in South Africa and Mozambi.ue to customers who v.ere krown or thought to be selling the products on to Rhodesia. That belief was based on information and assurances given by the General Manager in South Africa, Mr. Walker. These assurances were passed on to HIMG which, until towards the close of 1967, fully accepted them. (Chapter VI, paragraphs 6.31 - 6.33, 6.35 and 6.39). (Xvi) From about May 1966, when the scale of the supply to Rhodesia became known, ITIG was very much concerned to stop that supply. During 1967 a number of schemes were explored and diplomatic moves made to that end. MIG ca&e to believe that without the co-operation of South Africa and Portugal, and in the absence of a restricted crude supply by the CFP Group to the SONAREP Refinery, the supply to Rhodesia could not (without an embargo on supplies to South Africa and Mozambique) be stopped altogether. The attention of H 'G was then concentrated on achieving a position in which it could truly be said that British companies were not engaged in supplying Rhodesia and that no British Lil was reaching Rhodesia. Towards the end of 1967 1-1G began to suspect that customers to whom goods were delivered free on rail at Lourenco Marques by Shell Mocambique were consigning them to Rhodesia. (Chapter VI, paragraphs 6.7 - 6.10, 6.15 - 6.30, 6.39 and 6.72). (xvii) Information given to Shell in London in January 1968 led the Groups to believe that Parry Leon and Hayhoe, to whom goods were delivered free on rail at Lourenco Narqucs, might be conzignn then to Rhodesia. A visit paid to ?outh Africa and M-o-:anbique by r' 21vcsent:ltives of Shell in London confirmed that belief. (Chapter VI, parar;raL'is 6.42 - 6.52 and 6.55). -78-

(xviii) In about February 1968 Shell South Africa made an arrangement with Total South Africa that orders for products to be delivered free on rail at Lourenco ;larques, placed on Shell South Africa by customers suspected of selling on to Rhodesia, should be fulfilled with product supplied by Total South Africa from its Matola installation in exchange for an equivalent quantity of product supplied to it by the Consolidated companies in South Africa at a convenient point or points in that country. (Chapter VI, paragraph 6.59 and Chapter VIII, paragraphs 8.2, 8.6 and 8.7). (xix) On the 21st February 1968 representatives of the Groups disclosed to the Comronwealth Secretary that deliveries had in the past been -made free on rail at Lourenco Marques to customers who had re-sold to Rhodesia and that arrangements had been made for orders placed by suspicious customers henceforward to be met from non-British sources at Lourenco Marques. It may have been indicated that the CFP Group was the most likely non-British source and that a product exchange was involved. The details of the Total exchange arrangement were communicated to HMG in the course of the following year if not on that occasion. H'G considered that this was the best arrangement which could be made in the circumstances but realised that it would not of itself prevent or reduce the quantity of oil reaching Rhodesia. (Chapter VI, paragraphs 6.75, 6.76, 6.80 and 6.83). (xx) The Total exchange arrangement was implemented and operated for a period, during which orders placed on Shell South Africa by Parry Leon and Hayhoe and (after 1969) Freight Services were physically met with product supplied and handled by Total South Africa at Lourenco Marques against an equivalent supply elsewhere. This arrangement was superseded by an arrangenent under which products supplied by the Consolidated South African marketing companies were handled through the Total installation at Lourenco Marques for a fee and then delivered by Total to Freight Services. This arrangement with Total ended at about the end of 1971. (Chapter VIII, paragraphs 8.3 - 8.12). (xxi) After the ending of the arrangements with Total orders placed by Freight Services on Shell South Africa were met from products supplied by the Consolidated South African marketing companies and delivered by Shell Mocambique at Lourenco Marques. Most if not all of these products were consigned by Freight Services to Rhodesia. (Chapter VII, paragraph 7.37(ii) and Chapter VIII, paragraphs 8.16 and 8.23 - 8.25). (xxii) It was known to the top management of the Consolidated companies in South Africa arid (after the event) Mozambique that the arrangements with Total South Africa had come to an end. It was known to the top management in both countries that deliveries to Freight Services at Lourenco Marques were handled by Shell Mocambique. (Chapter VIII, paragraphs 3.12, 8.13 and 8.29). (xxiii) During visits to South Africa in early 1974 it came to the attention of 'fr. Francis (Shc-i) and Mr. Sandford (NP) that the Total exchanc arrangement had ended and that Shell Mocambique was handling deliveries to Freight Services. Mr. Francis told the local management of SERVICO or Shell -79-

South Africa that steps should be taken at once to remove Shell "!ocazbique from the chain of supply to Freight Services. This wras not done before the closure of the i!oz :bcque/Bhodesia border in iarch 1976, althcugh the quantities delivered by Shell :"o~anmhae to Freight Services diminished following the opening of a direct rail link bet,,een South Africa and Rhodesia in September 1974. Mr. Francis discussed the matter w-th his immediate superior Mr. de Liefde and thought that he had effectively c.mzunicated an understanding of the problem. Such was not the case: Mr. de Liefd aid not appreciate that Shell 11ocambique might be in jeopardy nor that there ain:: .ny departure from arrangements notified to Ii4G. Mr. Francis did not make any :eport en this matter to any other member of the Shell management nor ascertain 7ihether his instructions to SERVICO or Shell South Africa had been carried out, aithoush he was led to believe for a time that Freight Services traffic to Rhodesia had swtitched from Lourenco Marques to the .new rail link. Early in 1975 he learned that some Freight Services supplies to Rhodesia were still being handled by Shell Mocambique in Lourenco .1arques but thought that these were minor residual deliveries which gradually petered out. Mr. Sandford informed his immediate superior fir. Robertson what be had learned in South Africa and of the concern that he felt abcut it, but Mr. Robertson knew very little of the events in 1968 and misconceived the status of Freight Services and did not communicate any sense of urgency or alarm to the most senior levels of BP management or to Shell. Mr. Sandford pursued the matter with Mr. Francis but in October 1974 concluded (w:rongly) that the new rail link had attracted the Lourenco Marques oil traffic and thus solved the problem. Thereafter he did nothing before his retirement in September 1975. (Chapter VIII, paragraphs 8.38, 8.42 - 8.44, 8.55, 8.60, 8.69, 8.70 and 8.72 - 8.74). (xxiv) The quantities of product delivered to Parry Leon and Hayhoe and Freight Services free on rail in Lourenco Marques, either by Total South Africa (during the exchange/throughput period) or after that period by Shell Mocambique, pursuant to orders placed on Shell South Africa (or BP Southern Africa), and thereafter sold to GEUTA and consigned to Rhodesia, were during the calendar years 1968-1975 inclusive probably not less than the following: 1968 165,000 tons 1969 180,000 tons 1970 190,000 tons 1971 220,000 tons 1972 275,000 tons 1973 300,000 tons 1974 300,000 tons 1975 250,000 tons (Chapter VIII, Section C). (xxv) When the busincss formerly conducted under the Consolidated Agreements in Soth Africa cma.ie to be split between the Shell and BP Groups, BP insisted on obtaininm anri obtained half of the business, with Freirlht Services. Its chief local rerresentativre in South Africa knew what that business consisted Of. So, with varying degrees of comprehension, did a small number of officers in London. (Chapter VIII, paragraphs 8.33, 8.39 and 8.60 - 8.63). -80-

(xxvi) From larch 1966 until the independence of Mozambique in June 1975 ships entering Beira with cargoes of oil or oil products were subject to scrutiny by patrolling vessels of the Royal Navy. The volume of refined products reaching Rhodesia through Beira between the 1965 Sanctions Order and the closure of the liozambique/Rhodesian border in March 1976 was inconsiderable. No crude oil reached Rhodesia by this route. (Chapter IX). (xxvii) Throughout the period since the 1965 Sanctions Order some minor ;roducts have reached Rhodesia from South Africa by means of the railway line through Botsvana. No attempt was made to intercept these supplies within that country either before or after the inde'endence of Botswana because it was believed that Botswana was economically dependent on the railway line and vulnerable to economic retaliation by Rhodesia, and also because of South African insistence that the line be kept open. The South African Covernment and the Consolidated marketing companies in South Africa were made aware of }114G's wish that supplies to Rhodesia by this route should be kept to a minimum. We are satisfied that the volumes of oil products carried by this route were ixdest, never reaching 10,000 tons in any year for which figures are available (1966-1969). There is no evidence that volumes increased thereafter. (Chapter X). (xxviii) Throughout the period from the 1965 Sanctions Order until the present, minor products such as lubricants, base oils, greases, SBPs and bitumen have in the main reached Rhodesia direct frot South Africa. GFlNTA were probably not involved in the procurement of lubricants and base oils, but Freight Services and at least one other intermediary (DL Petroleum) were involved in these sales. The procurement of minor products other than lubricants and base oils may have been handled by GEflTA but we think it more likely that GENTA procured bitumen only. Freight Services acted as intermediary in sales of all these products also. (Chapter XI). (xxix) During 1975 an increasing share of supplies to Freight Services was made by SASOL or SASRAF direct from the Republic of South Africa by the new rail link. The supplies came from NATREF. At about the time of the Mozambique/ Rhodesia border closure in March 1976 SASOL or SASRAF took over all responsibility for the supply to Freight Services of those main products (in particular motor gasoline and gasoil) which HATREF produced. The South African marketing companies who had previously done business with Freight Services were, as to 85% of the business so lost, compensated by increased access to the NATREF area of the Transvaal. So far as we have been able to ascertain, this situation has continued up to the present. It seCms probable that neither the Shell nor the EP marketing companies in South Africa are now selling to Freight Services or to any intermediary who is known to be selling on to Rhodesia. (Chapter XIII, Sections A and D). (xxx) After a lapse of some years contact between MING and the Shell and BP Groups concerning the enforcement of sanctions was renewed in the summer of 1976. In a letter to I94G dated the 30th June 1976, following publication of The 0i Ccnsoiroc; in the United States by the Center for Social Action of the United Church of Christ, disclosure was not made of the deliveries by Shell -81-

Mocabioue to Freight Services between 1972 and M'larch 1976 and the impression was given that the situation had remained subszantially unchanged since February 1968. It was known tc !r. Fra-ncis (who drafted the letter) that such deliveries had been made, although he thought that. they had begun later and stepped earlier. It was not appreciated by i-r. Francis' superiors in Shell that such deliveries had been made at a!l: ";r. Francis had discussed the m!:Itter w-ith :,r. de Liefde but the latter had not grnsped the situation. It is not entirely clear whether the contents of this letrer were disclosed to BP before the letter was sent but BP received a copy of the 'etter subsequently and approved of it. The responsible senior management of BP at.this ti-e (June 1976) had not teen involved in the discussions with 1BIG in 1968-196, and did not anpreciate the changes which had occurred in the arrangements then notified to 11MG nor the possible implications of such changes. (Chapter XIII, paragraphs 13.!8 - 13.23). (xxxi) Since a date very shortly after the 1965 Sanctions Order the Consolidated marketing companies in Rhodesia have been subject to directicn by the illegal Rhodesian Government on pain of criminal penalty for non- compliance. It has never been suggested to the Shell and BP Groups by W0. that they should liquidate those companies or suspend their operations; had either of these courses been attempted the Rhodesian Government would have appointed a Custodian of the companies. The Groups have received information concerning these companies sporadically, but not concerning procurement of supplies. Directors of the companies resident in England have played no part in their management. Shell (as the channel of communication under the Consolidated Agreements) have remained in contact with the companies and have been able to influence some policy decisions, but neither the Groups nor Consolidated have enjoyed any effective power of control. (Chapter III, paragraphs 3.11 and 3.14, Chapter V, paragraph 5.4 and Chapter XII, paragraphs 12.4 - 12.11 and 12.24 - 12.29). (xxxii) The primary role in procuring main products for consumption on the Rhodesian market was played (at least so far as the Consolidated companies were concerned) by GENTA, which appears to have allocated the available supplies to the existing Rhodesian marketers roughly in proportion to their market shares. So far as we know, Caltex Oil Rhodesia played no part in procuring supplies save in the early months of 1966. There is some evidence that the Consolidated companies in Rhodesia did, probably to a minor extent, participate with GENTA in procuring supplies. We have had no direct evidence concerning Mobil and Total. (Chapter I, paragraphs 1.74, 1.75 and 1.77, Chapter V, paragraph 5.81, Chapter VII, paragraph 7.57, Chapter VIII, paragraphs 8.39 and 8.66(ii) and (vi) and Chapter XII, paragraphs 12.15 - 12.19). (xxxiii) At the time of UDI, total conoumption of all petroleuri products in Rhodesia was running at an annual rate of about 410,000 tons. The total fell after UDI but .!as restored to the old level by about 1969 and thereafter increased until it now stands at about 800,000 tons. (Chapter XII, paragraph 12.12). $ -82-

B. SUB'IISSIOITS (1) SHELL 14.5 At the outset of our Investigation ,Mr. C. C. Pocock, Chairman of The "Shell" Transport and Trading Company Limited, stressed to us that the principle of delegating m anagerial authority to local Shell companies was one in which the Royal Dutch/Shell Group really believes and which it fully practises. Apart from certain business principles which must always be observed, and matters such as financial policy and management appointments which are of direct concern to the shareholder, the business of management is entrusted to the local management. As a letter circulated to Shell companies in November 1976 put it, "Fullest practicable managerial autonomy resides with each Shell company". We are satisfied that in practice very considerable managerial autonomy was granted to Group companies in Southern Africa during the period under consideration, although their performance was carefully monitored in London and non-routine decisions were the subject of consideration there. 14.6 It was stressed, secondly, that chief executives and local staffs within the Group are expected to obey the laws of countries where they live and work. This formed part of a Statement of General Business Principles drawn up by the Group and circulated to companies in 1976: "Companies should endeavour always to act commercially, operating within existing national laws in a socially responsible manner, and avoid involvemcnt in politics". This recommendation reflected OECD guidelines accepted by HMG in 1976 (see International Investment. Guidelines for International Enterprises, Cmnd. 6525, 1976). Sir Frank McFadzean, himself a former Chairman of "Shell" Transport and Trading, laid particular emphasis on the importance, in his view, of local com~panies so far as possible avoiding involvement in national politics. Wle think that both elements of this principle, compliance with local law and avoidance of corporate political commitments, formed part of the Groupts philosophy and practice in Southern Africa throughout the period. 14.7 At the conclusion of our Investigation SIPC made to us a detailed written submission drawing attention to a number of factors which, it was said, must have affected the minds and conduct of those in Shell who were concerned with handling the mamy and difficult problems caused by sanctions. In summary, Shell contended (i) that its belief from the outset was that sanctions could not prevent supplies of oil reaching Rhodesia because ample supplies would be forthcoming from South Africa: the withholding of supplies to South Africa by Shell would have caused grave damage to British commercial interests there (including the sequestration by the South African Government of Shell's own assets) but it would not have stopped the flow of oil products to Rhodesia. -83-

(ii) that Shell was the subject not only of a conflict between the policies of the British and South African Governments but also of an irreconcilable conflict between the policy of the Sanctions Orders (which Shell thought could only be safely complied with by cutting of supplies to South Africa) and the policy of H7-IG that there should be no economic confrontation with South Africa: given the duty to comply with the local law this gave rise to the most acute practical problems. (iii) that acceptance of the Total exchange by H14G was inevitable if confrontation with South Africa was to be avoided, but it was felt by Shell to be a fairly transparent device sinco it involved continued contractual relations by Shell South Africa with (and facilitation of supplies to) Parry Leon and Hayhoe, who were known to be supplying Rhodesia; the only change was that the product supplied to Parry Leen and Hayhoe now belonged to Total South Africa who in exchange received products (supplied by English-incorporated Shell and BP trading companies) elsewhere in South Africa. (iv) that those concerned naturally and foreseeably interpreted H2'rG's concern as being to have a technical defence to the accusation that British oil was reaching Rhodesia, that defence being based on a narrow: construction of the Sanctions Order. (v) that between 1966 and 1972 talk of a Rhodesian settlement was frequently in the air: since South African help was sought in persuading MIr. Smith to compromise there was an added reason for avoiding confrontation. (vi) that those ' who knew of the Total exchange must have appreciated that closure of the Mozambique border would necessarily have ended the Total exchange as arranged in 1968. l.8 This submission raises certain questions involving the evaluation of government policy upon which we do not feel entitled under our Terms of Reference to comment. But it also raises factual issues upon which the evidence given to us does enable us to make observations: (a) Shell did fromn the outset consider that sanctions against Rhodesia could not be effective unless South Africa also were blockaded. Within HI'.G also there was appreciation of difficulties which the sanctions policy faced. (Chapter V, paragraph 5.3). (b) Sir Frank !,!cFadzean told us that it was his- view and that of Mr. Berkin at the time of the 1965 Sanctions Order that if Shell had refused to supply South Africa the South Africans would have sequestrated Shell's assets; they also thought that the South Africans had enough engineers and that thcre was enough crude oil available to enable the South Africans to r'un SAP.F without Shell's co-opertion. We have not investigated this matter, but have no reason to doubt Sir Frank and -r. Derhin's conte,:rorary ,udjaent. -84-

(c) in a practical (as opposed to a legal) sense there was an obvious conflict between the policy of IE-G that oil trade to Rhodesia should be reduced as much as possible and the South African Government's rolicy that South African buyers should be free .to buy oil within South Africa irrespective of the use or destination to which they intended to use or send it. (Chapter III, paragraphs 3.3 - 3.5 and Chapter V, paragraphs 5.6 - 5.33). For British citizens subject to the laws of both countries there was a conflict of jurisdictions in a legal sense. (Chapter II and Chapter III, paragraphs 3.3 - 3.5). (d) shortly after the 1965 Sanctions Order Shell expressed the view that the only sure way of avoiding a breach of the Order was to cease supplying the South African registered corapanics. (Chapter V, paragraph 5.17). (e) it was the policy of M1 in the years 1965-1969 at all costs to avoid economic confrontation with South Africa (Chapter V, paragraph 5.21 and Chapter VI, paragraphs 6.16, 6.20, 6.26, 6.27, 6.36, 6.72 and 6.85). We have received no evidence as to policy in later years. It was recognised on all sides that the cutting off of supplies to South Africa by Shell and BP Groups was likely to provoke such confrontation. At his meeting with company representatives on the 21st February 1968 the Commonwealth Secretary said that there were no doctrinaire or ideological objections to trade with South Africa, save in the arms field,' and other similar statements were made on other occasions. (Chapter VI, paragraph 6.75). (f) the Consolidated marketing companies in South Africa and their employees faced very severe problems in seeking to give effect to the policy of the Sanctions Orders (Chapter III, paragraphs 3.3 - 3.5, Chapter V, paragraphs 5.89 - 5.93 and Chapter VII, paragraphs 7'.25 - 7.27). (g) the effect of the Total exchange was as summarised in Chapter VIII, paragraph 8.7. (h) the companies were initially doubtful as to the legality of the Total exchange but did not disclose those doubts to HNG (Chapter VI, paragraphs 6.65 - 6.68 and 6.75(iv)). On the 6th February 1969 Sir Frank ;cFadzean expressed the view that the exchange seemed ;'pretty thin" to him but "legally sound". (Chapter VI, paragraph 6.83(iii)). 111G was of opinion that "the legal position was sound and could be defended", and was never prepared to countenance what it regarded as breaches of the Orders by British companies. It was appreciated within the companies (as was the case) that HIG regarded it as important to be able to assert that British oil was not reaching Rhodesia. (Chapter VI, paragraph 6.83(iii) and 6.86). (i) there were two or three occasions over the years 1966-72 when it was widely believed that a political settlement with Rhodesia might be -85- inminent: for example, at the time of the talks on HM4S TIGER and HES FEARLESS, and at the time of the Douglas-Hone proposals in 1971. (j) since the Total exchange (as arranged in 1968) involved delivery of refined products free on rail in Lourenco Marques before onward carriage of some or all of them to Rhodesia, the arrangement could not survive closure of the loza-bique-Rhodesian border. (Chapter VIII, paragraphs 8.3 and 8.7). We have endeavoured to take full account of this submission by S.I.P.C. both in reachinr and formulating our factual conclusions and in making the Observations which we do in Section C of this Chapter. (2) B.P. 14.9 The position of BP was in some respects the same as that of Shell and in some different. The main difference was that during those periods when and in those areas where the Consolidated Agreements were in force BP were, even as compared with Shell in London, one step further removed from direct involvement in the business operations of the local companies (except, in the case of Mozambique, from 1st September 1975 onwards). We have treated this subject at greater length in Chapter I, Section B. The role of BP wras necessarily subsidiary. Another difference, which would seem to have influenced BP's conduct on occasion (for example, in favouring immediate disclosure to HMG in February 1968), was the large Government shareholding in BP. BP were, however, at one with Shell in their approach to the principle of managerial autonomy. The point was put by BP in this way: ';The South African subsidiary companies were not created or used as a sham to enable English companies to evade the requirements of English law. Their creation occurred many years ago. The autonomy 17hich they enjoyed was conferred on them bona fide, and was a response to a problem which confronts every major business operating in many countries, namely, that the host governments insist that enterprises operating in their country be to that extent identified with the national interest of that country, and in particular that commercial policy be not dictated by the political policy of the group's home governnent. These are the conditions in which the BP Group trades in South Africa." 14.10 BP Would endorse the principle that local companies should comply with local laws and, as the foregoiri quotation makes clear, base their decisions en commercial rather than political grounds. 14.11 BP's overriding subMission was that the Grouo management in London consistently co-operated in the enforcement of sanctions whenever its assistance was requested by iPlG, and that were on occasion it was not able to assist its position was vr.., full:, uXvined to IiVG. This is in our opinion trite of the early years; but for v'Iriou3 reasons summarised above there was not a full (or -86- indeed any) explanation to HUG of the situation found to exist in early 1974, and when the South African business was split BP showed no reluctance to undertake half the Freight Services trade. C. OBSERVATIONS 14.12 In offering observations-ur.on certain of the facts recounted and summarised above, we wish to reiterate that we are excluding from our consideration questions as to whether any criminal offence has been committed by any company or any individual. 14.13 TUe think it unfortunate that Mr. Valker should, as General Manager in South Africa with responsibility for Mozambique, have failed between about the end of 1966 and February 1968 to lay the facts known to and suspected by him before his superiors in London and that he should have given categorical assurances which those facts did not warrant. The Shell and BP Groups in London and HI4G were as a result led to misunderstand the means by which Rhodesia obtained its oil supplies. Because of this misunderstanding both the Groups and H11G unwittingly adopted false positions at that time. 14.14 The easiest course for Mr. Walker personally would have been to disclose his knowledge and suspicions to Shell Centre and let others bear the burden of deciding what to do. It has not become clear to us -whyhe did not do so. He nay have wished to avoid embarrassing the Shell management in London. He may also have wished to safeguard the business he was running in South Africa. Awareness of the very stringent South African official secrets legislation may have played a part. We do not think these considerations justify his conduct even if they explain it. 111.15 In making this criticism we bear in mind the submission made to us against attributing blame to relatively junior individuals. We are also acutely aware of the difficulty of Mr. Walker's position as a South African living in a society very unsympathetic to the policy of the Sanctions Orders. But as General Manager of the Consolidated operation in South Africa Mr. Walker was not in a junior position, and it must in our view follow that if.fullest practicable managerial autonomy is to reside in each local company then the management of that company must be regarded as responsible for the decisions which it makes. 14.16 Given the prevailing management philosophy, the information received from local sources and the knowledge that existed in the Groups of local political attitudes in South Africa and MIozambique, we do not think the Groups are to be criticised for failing during 19(5 and 1967 to send a team from London to investigate methods of Rhodesian supply directly. W-hen, in January 1968, suspicion deepened, such a team was sent. We are surprised that the report made by that team did not cause some dissatisfaction with the information previously supplied from South Africa, but we have not heard that it did. The reason is, we think, that the facts were not, even in February 1968, known to the Groups nearly as fully as they are now. -87-

14.17 It was in our view a proper course for the Groups, once apnrised of the facts, to disclose them and the proposed solution to HMG and seek H1MG's acceptance of that solution. We are unsure.whether the proposed solution was fully communicated in February 1968 but during the year following 174G was given sufficient information to enable a fair judgment to be made. The contrary has not been suggested to us. The proposed solution was accepted. It was thereafter reasonable for the Groups to proceed upon that basis. 14.18 The Total exchange arrangement plainly did not have the effect of denying supplies of oil products to Rhodesia. That an arrangement having this deficiency was accepted by [14*G had, we think, an important consequence. It induced among some of those most directly concerned (notably Mr. Francis and 1r. Walker) a belief that compliance with the Sanctions Orders was to be regarded as a matter of form rather than of substance, that it was the letter which mattered, not the spirit. The failure to communicate to or within Shell Centre certain matters which, as we think, should have been communicated may be traceable to this belief. 14.19 We think it possible also that, because of their differing viewpoints and backgrounds, H1MG and the Groups may have seen the Total exchange rather differently. To H11MG the arrangement was acceptable because it took British oil companies out of the line of supply to Rhodesia and enabled it to be said that British oil was not reaching Rhodesia. In the light of Britain's primary international responsibility for Rhodesia, that seemed an object worth achieving even though the arrangement would not deny oil to the illegal regime. To company representatives, familiar with product exchanges as an everyday fact of the international oil business, the exchange might, like other exchanges, have appeared to be merely an alternative means of making a supply. This approach may, we think, have coloured the thinking of some oil company employees. 14.20 When, following the Total exchange, official pressure on the Groups eased, there was a marked reduction in the prominence given to the whole question of Rhodesian sanctions among those within the Groups who were concerned with the affairs of Southern Africa. This had a consequence of its own in the inadequate briefing on this subject of some key executives who came fresh to the Southern African scene after 1968: on the Shell side, for example, neither Mr. de Liefde on appointment as Regional Co-ordinator nor Mr. McCutcheon on appointment as Managing Director of SERVICO was instructed as to the past history or the Group policy on this subject; the same was in varying degrees true on the BP side of Mr. Laidlaw when he became Regional Managing Director, Mr. Robertson when he became Regional Director of BP Trading, Mr. Savage when he became Regional Co-ordinator, Mr. M-ilne when he became the BP representative in South Africa and Mr. Trechman, either when lie went to Mozambique as Senior Assistant in 1973, or when he became the local General Manager in September 1975. Bearing in mind the information given to HMG in February 1968 and HI*Gts request recorded in Sir Frank McFadzean's note of that meeting that it should be informed of any change in the situation, we think it clear that the Grounz should not have allowed this subject to slip so far into the background. Those responsible for keeping H1'G informed of any chivue in the situation could not do so without a reasonable working knowledge of what the situation was. -88- i4.21 It was plainly the duty of Mr. Walker as General Manager in South Africa, knowing as he did the outline of what transpired between H MG and the Grouns in early 1968, to inform Shell Centre of the ending of the Total exchange and the procedures adopted thereafter. Again we are unclear why he did not do so. Again we think the considerations listed in paragraph 14.14 above played a part. te think also (despite his denial) that he was probably influenced by the lack of official and company concern currently apparent in relation to questions of sanctions enforcement. 14.22 When 11r. Francis and Mr. Sandford (both of whom had detailed knowledge of what transpired between H'14G and the Groups in 1968-1969) learned in early 1974 of the ending of the Total exchange and of the arrangements which had followed it, their duty was in our opinion to make sure that the change in the arrangements notified to HMG was fully appreciated by the responsible members of the senior management of their respective Groups. While it was for the senior managements to decide whether a further approach to 11MG was indicated and whether any (and if so what) action should be taken to stop supplies, those managements should have been put in a position to make the decision. Both Ir. Francis and Mr. Sandford raised the matter with their superiors, but neither effectively communicated the important fact that a system of supply was in force which significantly departed, in the renewed involvement of Shell iocambique, from the arrangements notified to H1-MG in 1968-1o,69. This was unfortunate. 14.23 It was further, we think, the duty of Messrs. Francis and Sandford, after learning the true facts in early 1974, to take steps to satisfy themselves, directly or indirectly, that Shell Mocambique had been removed from the chain of supply to Freight Services (or, if it had not, to seek some alternative expedient). While the detailed steps to be taken could reasonably be seen as a matter for the local management, achievement of the result was clearly a matter of direct concern to the Groups themselves in view of their relations with HMG and the obligations of some companies and individuals under the Sanctions Order. Although for a tine Mr. Francis believed that supplies had switched to the new rail link, he learned in early 1975 that some (as he thought, residual) deliveries were continuing to be made by Shell Mocambique to Freight Services. He was never positively told that these deliveries had ceased and should not, we think, have let the matter rest. We do not doubt the genuineness of Mr. Sandford's belief formed as a result of his visit to .!atola in October 1974 that the Freight Services traffic had switched from Lourenco Marques to the direct route from South Africa, and we bear in mind the action which Mr. Sandford had already taken (see Chapter VIII, paragraph 8.38) and the fact that BP were at this time still two steps removed from formal responsibility for management of marketing in South Africa; even so, we think Sandford was easily satisfied. 14.24 Had the Groups in London appreciated that a change of obvious significance had occurred in the arrangements notified to 1"PG in 1968-1969, we think it clear that HMG should have been told and consideration given to what (if any) action should be taken to ensure that the Sanctions Orders were complied with. Their failure to tell HPG can be excused only on the basis (which we accept) of their ifnorance or inadequate appreciation of the change which had occurred. -89-

14.25 Once it was appreciated by the Groups in January 1968 that a situation had arisen in Mozambique of which the Grouos had not previously been fully informed and which was not rersarded as acceptable, it should in our view have been seen as unsatisfactory (a) for the British-registered company in Mozambique to be rianaged locally'by Portuguese citizens not subject to the 1965 Sanctions Order and (b) for that company to report through and to be operationally subordinate to a nanagement in South Africa which was inhibited in giving full effect to the policy of that Order. BP did at this time ask that the General Manager in South Africa should be relieved of responsibility for Mozambique. Shell had reasons for resisting the proposal and it was not pursued. It seems to us that this was a precaution which could and should have been taken and that the introduction of the Total exchange should not have been regarded as obviating the need for it. U1hen, in 1975, BP appointed an expatriate General Manager in Mozambioue, immediately answerable to BP in London, the appointment was unfortunately made without consideration of Rhodesian supplies: deliveries to Freight Services accordingly continued to be made until the Mozambique/Rhodesian border was closed, the General Manager having no instructions to the contrary. 14.26 The letter written by Shell to HIG following publication of the UCC Report in June 1976 was in our view bound to convey the iTpression, as it did, that the arrangements disclosed in 1968-1969 had remained continuously in force witil closure of the Mozambique/Rhodesia border in March 1976. Since Sir Frank McFadzean as signatory of the letter had not been informed to the contrary and believed this to be the case, he cannot be blamed. But we think that Mr. Francis, as author of the letter, who knew that it was not the case, should not have allowed this impression to be given. Although we fully accept that he had no thought or intention of misleading either his superiors or HTG, we think that even (or perhaps particularly) at this late stage the need for full disclosure should have been apparent. 14.27 The criticisms w.rhich we have made have related in the main to failures to disclose, either within the Groups or by the Groups to HMG. We do not regard these failures as in any way unimportant. The Groups should have been able to base their actions and determine their conduct vis-a-vis HMG on the basis of such full and accurate information as was available. In the context of the relations prevailing between it and the Groups, HmG should have been able to base its policy towards the Groups and to determine its conduct internationally on a clear understanding of the salient facts so far as these were knoin to the Grouns. In the event both IIMG and the top management of the Groups, save for limited periods (the early months of 1966, the period of 2-3 years after February 1968 and perhaps the period after March 1976), were ignorant of facts which should have been the subject certainly of consideration and possibly of action. This ignorance led H1MG and the ton management of the Groups unwittingly to make statements and give assurances which they would not have done with full knowledge of the facts. -90-

CHAPTER III ACTIONS TAKEN BY GOVERNMENTS IN IMPLE4ENTATION OF SANCTIONS A. Actions taken by Governments either independently or with respect to specific cases in response to inquiries addressed to them by the Committee 149. During the period covered by the present report, the Committee continued to receive information concerning a number of legal actions and other measures taken by Governments, either on their own initiative or in direct response to inquiries addressed to them by the Committee, in implementation of the sanctions against the illegal r~gime in Southern Rhodesia. The information concerning such specific cases is given below. (a) In a note dated 20 December 1977, Portugal, in response to the Committee's inquiries concerning Case No. 285 (Participation of a Southern Rhodesian team in the Eisenhower Trophy Golf Tournament in Portugal) informed the Committee of the measures taken by the Government to implement various decisions of the Security Council. The note stated that the Portuguese Government had adopted, on 13 July 1977, resolution 188/77, aimed at incorporating into the Portuguese legal order the provisions of Security Council resolutions 253 (1968) and 388 (1976) imposing mandatory sanctions against the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia. With regard to Security Council resolution 409 (1977) the note said that the provisions of that resolution were still under consideration by the competent Portuguese authorities. (b) On 23 January 1978 the representative of the United States transmitted information obtained from published sources 9/ stating that the United States Commerce Department had on 12 January 1978 levied a fine of $25,000 against the South Africa subsidiary of a United States company, Gardiner-Denver (Africa) Ltd., itself a subsidiary of Gardiner-Denver Co. of Dallas, Texas. Four employees of the South African unit had set up a dummy corporation in 1972, which had sold $392,000 worth of mining and drilling equipment to Southern Rhodesia. In addition to the fine the firm's United States export privileges were suspended for two months and the firm was put on probation for 22 months on pain of further loss of the privileges for the rest of the period in the event of any other violation of the sanctions within that period. (c) In a communication dated 30 January 1978, Brazil informed the Committee of the new measures adopted by that Government, replacing those reported previously, 10/ by which the Government wished to ensure verification 9/ "Facts on File (USA)" from World News Digest, Washington, vol. 38, No. 1941, 20 January 1978. 10/ See the tenth report, S/12529,'para. 103 (n). -91- of the non-Southern Rhodesian origin of certain mineral products by providing for chemical analysis of the goods before they were released to the importers. The new regulations banned the imports not only of ores which proved to originate from Southern Rhodesia, but also of ores which came from that area of South Africa bordering on Southern Rhodesia and which might possess very similar chemical properties. The new measures were also further amplified by the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations when, at his request, he was invited to address the Committee at the 310th meeting on certain specific cases on the Committee's list involving Brazil. (d) In reply to the Committee's inquiries concerning Case Nos. 213 and INGO-4, Portugal, in a note dated 9 February 1978, stated that the Portuguese airline Transportes Aereos Portugueses (TAP) had terminated agreements existing between itself and the Southern Rhodesian based airline, Air Rhodesia. In a further comprehensive communication dated 2 October 1978 covering several cases, including Case No. 213, Portugal confirmed that as from 2 November 1977 all flights to and from Southern Rhodesia had been cancelled by TAP. (e) At the 304th meeting on 23 February 1978, the representative of the United Kingdom informed the Committee that a British company, Beck and Co. (ieters) Ltd., and its export sales manager, "Jr. John Sherwood, had both pleaded guilty on 7 December 1977 to five charges of exporting petrol pumps and spares to Southern Rhodesia, and had been fined totals of £8,500 and £500, respectively. (f) In response to the Committee's inquiries concerning Case No. 154, Tango Romeo (pertinent details of the case are given in section A of chapter IV, of the tenth report (S/12529) and in chapter V of the present report) a number of Governments informed the Committee of the specific measures taken by them as follows: Gabon (note dated 6 February, repeated in a statement to the Committee by the representative of Gabon at the 311th meeting on 11 May) stated that it was in the-process of negotiating with Argentina an agreement for delivery of meat /to Gabon/; 11/ the Philippines (note dated 28 February) stated that it had issued Foreign Service Circular No. 9-78 ordering that all possible measures should be taken to prevent entry to the Philippines of all the employees of Affretair and ATA listed in the circular, Congo (note dated 12 April) said that it had already prohibited, notwithstanding the difficulties that might arise, all airlines flying to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia from making stops in its territory: Turkey (note dated 10 May) reported that the competent Turkish authorities had denied clearance for overflight requests by Cargoman Ltd. for an Omani aircraft (DC-A8) flying from Milan to Oman; India (in a note dated 29 June) said that it had taken necessary action to deny the use of Indian airports and airspace to aircraft controlled by Air Trans Africa, Air Gabon Cargo and Cargoman Ltd.; Spain (note dated 25 July) stated that it had issued instructions to the departments of Airports and Air Navigation 11/ The information originally available to the Committee had indicated that Gabon was one of the recipients of meat and meat products from Southern Rhodesia air freighted by Affretair, among that airline's various operations. That airline has since been reported by Gabon to have been dissolved and incorporated into the national airline company, Air Gabon. -92- to prohibit the aircraft of Cargoman from landing in or overflying Spanish territory; France (note dated 9 August) reported that it had sent a letter dated 4 July to the Director-General of Union des transports aeriens urging him not to use the services of the company Cargoman in the future. (g) With regard to Case No. INGO-19 (Tobacco) the representative of the United Kingdom informed the Committee at the 308th meeting on 6 April that although there was no sufficient evidence to support the origin (Southern Rhodesian or other) of a consignment of tobacco suspected to have been of Southern Rhodesian origin and detained in the United Kingdom, the authorities there had ordered the tobacco impounded; there was no question of returning the tobacco to the consignor. (h) In a new case (No.INGO-23) brought to the Committee's attention by a non-governmental organization in the United States and obtained from published sources, the United States Government had instituted proceedings against certain persons resident in the United States on charges of dealing in guns believed to be destined for Southern Rhodesia. In an interim reply dated 22 August the representative of the United States confirmed the reports but declined any further comment on a matter that was still the subject of litigation in a court of law. i) In two cases (Nos. 315 and 329) concerning shipments to Thailand of electrolytic copper rod and electrolytic nickel cathodes, respectively, suspected to be of Southern Rhodesian origin, that Government, in a note dated 7 July and confirmed in another one dated 13 October, informed the Committee that the Thai cabinet had decided on 27 June 1978 to prohibit trade with South Africa, which should help to avoid the possibility of importing Southern Rhodesian goods reo- exported through South Africa. (j) Responding to the Committee's inquiries in Case No. 286 (Tobacco), Liechtenstein, in a reply dated 16 June and transmitted to the Committee by Switzerland in a note dated 6 July, reported similar measures to those adopted by Switzerland, in order to ensure non-violation of the sanctions by persons operating from Liechtenstein (and Swiss) territory. 12/ (k) In a reply dated 16 August 1978 concerning case No. 326 (shipment of ferro- silicon chrome) Japan reported that as of 15 August 1977 the Government had instituted measures to ensure that chrome-ore or ferro-chromium originating in Southern Rhodesia did not enter Japan; henceforward importers had to make a chemical analysis of samples at the time of customs clearance for each cargo imported from South Africa, and the authorities were in the process of making similar provisions for silicon chrome. 12/ See para. 151, below. Previously, the Committee had learnt, as a result of information obtained informally from the Office of the Permanent Observer of Switzerland to the United Nations, that Liechtenstein and Switzerland belonged to the same customs union with the same trade regulations, though not necessarily the same foreign trade policy (see tenth report, S/12529, annex II, (116) Case No. 286 para. 8). -93-

(1) In Case No. 297 concerning reported shipments of chrome aboard various vessels, including one of Singaporean registration, Singapore informed the Committee in a note dated 8 August 1978 that upon registration of their vessels the owners of every Singaporean vessel were issued with a circular on economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. The text of the circular was annexed to the note: it drew attention to the provisions of paragraphs 3 (c) and (e) of Security Council 253 (1968), which were quoted in full. (m) In Case No. I11GO-27 the Netherlands confirmed, in a letter to the Acting Chairman of the Committee dated 21 August, that it had successfully instituted measures by which Dr. M. W. Deal, described as a tobacco expert with the Southern Rhodesian tobacco industry, had been denied entry into the Letherlands early that month for the purpose of attending an international conference there. By a letter of the same date concerning the same case the Federal Republic of Germany informed the Committee that although Dr. Deal had been admitted into the country to attend a similar, private conference later in the month, as he was using a United Kingdom passport, the Federal authorities had denied entry to another traveller using a Southern Rhodesian passport who wished to enter the country for the purpose of attending the same conference. (n) Further to the action taken by the United Kingdom and mentioned in the tenth report (S/12529, para. 103 (g), Case No. INGOool7) the United Kingdom by a note dated 19 September transmitted the rc:port by fir. Bingham, QC, and ir. Gray on the supply of petroleum products to Southern Rhodesia (relevant details of this matter are contained in chapter II above). The note stated that the report had been referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions to consider whether further inquiries should be undertaken with a view to criminal proceedings for breaches of United Kingdom sanctions legislation. (o) In October 1978 the Committee received information from published sources indicating that the United Kingdom Government had denied entry or transit visas to Ian Smith, the leader of the illegal r6gime in Southern Rhodesia, during his projected visit to the United States. At the 316th meeting on 6 October, when the Committee was considering the question of that visit (for details see section B of chapter I, above) the representative of the United Kingdom made the following statement: "No United Kingdom visas had been applied for and the question of granting them did not arise. Ian Smith was however denied transit facilities and under existing British law he is liable to prosecution if he enters the United Kingdom even if he is merely in transit to another destination. In refusing his request for transit facilities the United Kingdom authorities made it clear that if there appeared to be overriding reasons for granting immunity in the interim of a negotiated settlement, the Government would consider it. But there is no power to alter the existing British lawr by executive action and the Government would have to lay before Parliament an Order conferring temporary immunity on him from legal proceedings while he is in the United Kingdom. At present the United Kingdom does not consider that a visit by hir. Smith would contribute to the objectives of achieving a negotiated settlement and therefore does not feel that it would be appropriate to ask Porliament to grant him immunity." (p) In a statement submitted on 13 December 1978 the United Kingdom informed the Committee of two successful prosecutions against persons in the United Kingdom who had been found guilty of violations of the sanctions. For -94- having knowingly imported copper art pictures and copper ornaments from Southern Rhodesia in the fraudulent evasion of the prohibition on the importation of such goods, Messrs. Adam Ismail and Ismail Gulam Ismail had both pleaded guilty to the charges and had been each sentenced to a total of £90 plus £25 costs on 19 October 1978, the goods in question had been confiscated by the authorities. In the second prosecution, Mr. A. F. Cook and T'r. IT. J. Catlin had been convicted on 14 November 1978 for having imported copper art work worth £31,000 from Southern Rhodesia; Cook had received 12 months imprisonment, suspended, and Catlin had been fined £1,350. (q) In a statement submitted on 15 December 1978 the United States informed the Committee that on 8 December 1978 United Airlines, an airline company in the United States, had entered a plea of nolo contendere in a United States District Court and had been convicted of violating the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia by entering into a contract for training DC--8 aircraft pilots for Affretair, a company hnovm to be controlled by Air Rhodesia (see para. 160 in chapter V below). The maximum fine of $10,000 had been imposed upon United Airlines, and an order for forfeiture of about $,US 40,000 worth of training ecuipment unless United Airlines could nay that sum as well. B. Transactions reflected in foreign trade figures submitted by reporting Governments 150. The Committee continued its consideration of the three cases opened on the basis of transactions reflected in foreign trade figures submitted by reporting Governments- Case iTo. 201 (Danish trade with Southern Rhodesia), Case No. 214 (Swiss trade with Southern Rhodesia) and Case No. 243 (Federal Republic of Germany trade with Southern Rhodesia). In two of those cases the Committee continued to receive from the Governments concerned, periodic reports of their cumulative trade with Southern Rhodesia. According to those reports, the Comittee noted, Danish trade had amounted to D12r 1,159,000 worth of exports to Southern Rhodesia during 1977 and Swiss trade to Sw? 4,598,228 worth of exports and SuF 20,383,799 worth of imports from Southern Rhodesia. No figures were received from the Federal Republic of Germany for any trade with Southern Rhodesia during 1977. 151. The three cases were considered together at the 307th meeting on 30 Mlarch 1973 at which the Committee noted that most of the trade in question was explained by the Governments concerned as permissible under the educational, medical and humanitarian exceptions, a comprehensive list of the various items of the trade under each category such as that given by the Federal Republic of Germany for its 1976 trade 13/ was thus useful in indicating the nature of the trade involved. Pursuant to the Committee's decision at that meeting a note dated 15 May 1978 was sent to Switzerland expressing the Committee's satisfaction at the measures promulgated by the Swiss authorities 14/ and aimed at ensuring non- violation of the 13/ See the tenth report, S/12529, annex IV, Case No. 243, para. 7. Subsequent to that meeting, detailed breakdowns of the Danish and Swiss trade figures with Southern Rhodesia for 1977 were received by the Committee and are similarly referred to in annex IV to the present report, under each respective case. 14/ Ibid., Case Do. 214, paras. 8 and 9. -95- mandatory sanctions against the illegal r~gime in Southern Rhodesia through the activities of persons operating from Swiss territory. The note also expressed the hope that Swiss authorities would make use of the new measures to inform the Committee of how those measures were being implemented. 152. In reply to the Committee's inquiries as to the nature of the trade transacted with Southern Rhodesia Denmark pointed out, in a note dated 11 August 1978, itemizing the trade under the relevant categories, that none of the prohibited trade had taken place between Denmark and Southern Rhodesia during 1977 and reaffirmed that the trade that had actually taken place had consisted of exports from Denmark permitted under the educational, medical and humanitarian exceptions stipulated in paragraphs 3 (d) and 4 of Security Council resolution 253 (1968). At the recommendation of its Working Group on cases, the Committee, noting the small amount of Denmark's trade with Southern Rhodesia, and, bearing in mind the consistent assurances given by Denmark for that trade, decided to regard that case (No. 201) as closed. In keeping with the sentiments expressed at a previous meeting, however, the Committee expected to continue to receive for its information reports of Denmark's trade with Southern Rhodesia. 153. The question of trade with Southern Rhodesia under the exceptions permitted by the provisions of paragraphs 3(d) and 4 of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) was one of the topics included by the Committee in its programme of work for 1978 for consideration as a general subject. Details of the action taken by the Committee in that regard are given under item (b) (ix) in section A of chapter I, above. C. Actions taken by Governments and the Committee with respect to resolution 409 (1977) 154. Since the issuance of the tenth report information has been received from Australia, Portugal and the United States in connexion with the implementation of Security Council resolution 409 (1977). It may be recalled that by the provisions of that resolution, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, expanded the scope of mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia to include prohibition of the use or transfer in territories of States of any funds from Southern Rhodesia for certain purposes. The resolution also requested the Committee to examine the application of further measures under Article 1 of the Charter and to report to the Council thereon as soon as possible. The action taken by the Committee in that regard was indicated in the tenth report (S/12529, para. 113). 155. The measures taken by Portugal with regard to that resolution have already been indicated in paragraph 149 (a) above. Those taken by Australia and the United States were more specifically in relation to the question of Southern Rhodesian representational offices abroad, and are dealt with more substantively under that item in chapter IV below. -96-

CHAPTER IV CONSULAR AND OTHER REPRESENTATION IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA AND DEPRESENTATION OF THE ILLEGAL REGIME IN OTHER COUNTRIES A. Consular relations with Southern Rhodesia 156. The situation with regard to consular or other representation in Southern Rhodesia has not changed since the submission of the tenth report. the Coimittee has received no further information indicating that any other country than South Africa maintains consular offices in Southern Rhodesia. B. Southern Rhodesia representational offices abroad 157. Information available to the Committee indicates that the illegal r6gime in Southern Rhodesia still maintains representational offices only in two countries as follows: the Rhodesia Information Centre, Sydney, Australia, and the Rhodesian Information Office, Washington. D.C. United States. With the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 409 (1977), the Committee had hoped that the Governments concerned would have ready means of stifling the activities of the illegal regime's offices in their countries, since those offices could not operate at the levels reported of them without constant and substantial replenishments of funds from the illegal regime. As indicated in the tenth report Australia had informed the Committee that measures would be taken to implement resolution 409 (1977) and the United States that it favoured the application of that resolution and was studying the best way to implement it. Those assurances were reaffirmed by Australia and the United States in notes to the Committee dated 23 February and 6 March 1978 respectively. 158. The question of the two known Southern Rhodesian representational offices abroad was considered by the Committee at two meetings, following which two special reminders were sent to Australia and the United States on 17 Hay and 25 September 1978, inquiring whether the Governments had reached a final decision on the measures contemplated by them regarding the Southern Rhodesian representational offices and the final actions by the Governments in that respect could be communicated to the Committee. In a letter dated 30 November 1978 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee, the Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations repeated the assurances that the Australian Government was still giving active consideration to the preparation of legislation which would give effect to resolution 409 (1977) and would be consistent with the various established freedoms in Australia. The letter also discounted as misleading, press reports attributed to sources in Southern Rhodesia 15/ that Australia had no objection to the replacement of the 15/ In November 1978 the Committee received information from published sources (The Herald Salisbury, Soutnern Rhodesia) reporting farewell courtesies accorded to M4r. van der Spuy by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Australia. ilIr. van der Spuy was described as a veteran diplomat who was retiring back to Southern Rhodesia after directing the Rhodesian Information Office in Sydney for six years. -97- former director of the Rhodesia Information Office in Sydney; actually the position of the former director, who had returned to Southern Rhodesia, had been taken by an Australian, but neither person had been accorded any status by the Australian authorities. However, the takeover of the office by an Australian citizen, the letter stated, would not prejudice the Government's consideration of the matter. In a statement submitted on 15 December 1978 the representative of the United States gave further assurance that his Government recognized its obligations under Security Council resolution h09 (1977); while no final decision had yet been made, the Government retained the matter under active consideration. -98-

CHAPTER V AIRLINES OPERATING TO AND FROM SOUTHERN RHODESIA 159. Previous information concerning this matter is contained in chapter IV of the tenth report (S/12529). With the announcement by Portugal of the termination by rAP (see para. i (d) in chap. II, above) of its IATA interline agreemen with Air Rhodesia and of its flishts to and from Southern Rhodesia, South Africa is the Dnly country still maintaining direct air-links with Southern Rhodesia. South African Airways also remains the only airline member of IATA that has not vet informed the Committee, through the South African Government, of any action taken ;r intended to be taken concerning its iATA agreements with Air Rhodesia. Such agreements had been determined by the Committee to be contrary to the mandatory sanctions against the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia, as stirulated in paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 253 (1968). Relevant cases examined by the Committee (a) Flights by private companies (Case Ho. 154: Tango Romeo) 160. Case No. 154, popularly known as 'Tango Romeo' from the call sirnal given by its Southern Rhodesian owners to one of their original aircraft operating from Libreville, Gabon, continued to occupy a great deal of the Committee's attention. Gabon had informed the Committee that the airline company, Affretair, originally reported to have been operating flights by such aircraft from Gabon for the benefit of Southern Rhodesia, had been dissolved and incorporated into the national airline, Air Gabon. The Conittee is still awaiting information from Gabon as to whether, to whom and in what currency any compensation was given for the defunct airline and as to what had happened to that company's former employees. Subsequently the Committee received information from 7overnmental sources, as well as from published sources indicating that new airline companies controlled by the Southern Rhodesian airline, Air Trans Africa (ATA) were continuing similar flights operated from Gabon, Geneva and Muscat. Tn the meanwhile, information was received from certain Governments as follows in response to certain aspects of the case previously brought to their attention by the Committee: Gabon (note dated 6 February and repeated in a statement to the Committee at the 311th meeting on 11 May) rejected all the allegations contained in the United States note submitted to the Committee at the 302nd meeting (see the tenth report, S/12529, para. 123); Portugal (note dated 13 February) said that it was unable to take action on matters involving Angola and Mozambique during the old Portuguese regime, but gave assurances that the new legal order in Portugal was committed to the decisions of the Security Council; Traq (notes dated 24 February and 24 March) inquired what specific action was required of it with regard to the ATA aircraft said to be overflying Iraqi space and landinr in Iraq; the Committee suggested that Iraq take action in accordance with the recommendation contained in the United Kingdom note of 24 October 1977 (see the tenth report, S/12529, para. 122)- and the Republic of the Congo (note dated 12 April) categorically denied reports of importation of meat from Southern Rhodesia as contained in the United States note cited above, characterising the reports as defamatory allegations. -99-

161. peanwhile in a further note dated 22 iarch 1972 the United ' in-. "or- iorted additional information on the operations of the two subsidiaries of ATA, Air Gabon Cargo and Cargoidan Ltd, of iuscat. According to that information ATA had recently acquired a Canadian- built Dritannia aircraft. previously used by the Rhodesian Air Force Lo add to the fleet operated on ATAs behalf by Air Gabon Cargo and Cargoman Ltd, AT-Vs European operations were directed from Geneva Switzerland and Cargona was already r. ainrg regular runs betwreen Amsterdai,_ and the Persian Gulf it was believed to have obtained landing: rights in Iran and the United Arab '_P: irates and over,-fli.ht clearances from Bulgaria, Turkey and Yugoslavia. and had a p-0roached Groan to undertake negotiations on its behalf with the Governments concerned for ladir, rights in India, Lynpt and i'igeria, Car,-o an, said to be carrying out an increasing nuwber of charter flights on behalf of the Union de transports aeriens c Paris was also reported to be landin' in several other countries. Iraq, Singapore S.TiUzerlaiad Spain) France and Zaire, 162. The Comnittee regarded the activities of ATA and its front airline companies as a serious impediment to the effective implementation of the mandatory sanctions against the illegal r6gime in Southern Rhodesia, It therefore decided to send the text of the United Kingdom note to the Governments primarily concerned, nralely Oman. toe etherlands and France so that they ni.ht undertake the necessary lnvestiaLiar: as well as to the rest of ibember States with the reouest that they deny use of their, airports and entry into their air space by aircraft controlle, by ATA Air Gabon Cargo and Cargoman Ltd. 163. The measures taken by various Goverrm _ents (i.e.,. Gabon, the Philippines, the Republic of the Congo, Turkey, India, Spain and France) aimed at frustrating, the activities of those airline companies have been indicated in paragraph 143 (f) of chapter III above. Additional inforniation from some of those Governments and other relevant information received from other Governments on the .iatter is given below. The United Arab Emirates (letter dated 22 k.iarch) stated that it had no information recarding, Cargonian Ltd. as pertaining to Southern Rhodesia. Once that information, as contained in the United Ainrdom note., had been brou-ht to the attention of the co? noetent authorities of the United Arab !±1irates, instructions had been given to stop such flights and cancel overfliEhts and landing rights in that country. The Seychelles (noted dated 7 June). confirmed enlisted several flights through that territory by Air Gabon Cargo between October 1977 and Hay 1978, the Committee is still awaiting details of the call signals and other identification data relating to the Air Gabon Cargo aircraft granted facilities by the Seychelles authorities. France (note dated 9 August) quoting the text of paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 253 (1968)., maintained accordingly that it was the responsibility of the State directly concerned to take measures that were required if the facts alleged were so established. Bulgaria (note dated 14 December) informed the Commf.ittee that the information contained in the United Kingdom note insofar as it referred to bulgaria was totally incorrect and without any foundation, the Bulgarian authorities cate-orically denied those allegations and reaffirmed Pulgaria s strict compliance with the sanctions imposed by the Security Council upon the illegal racist5 minority rdgime in Southern Rhodesia Yugoslavia (note 15 December) refuted categorically the allegations that Air Trans Africa or any of its subsidiaries had obtained overflight clearances from Yugoslavia before or after 1977, and pointed out that Yugoslavia fully complied with the resolutions adopted by the United -atifl concerning the cuestion of Southern Rhodesia, especially resolution 253 (1960)) and -100- would continue to do so. An acknowleergement dated 23 February 1978 was also received fro Omran stating that the Government was examinin, the contents of the United Kingdom note and was rivin- it the attention it deserveCt (b) Flights to and from Southern Rhodesia and IATA apreements involvin_. Air Rhodesia (Case Nos. 213 and I±GOSL!) 164. As indicated in paragraph 4 above, only South Africa apnears still to maintain direct air links with Southern flhodesiao Case dio. 213o in which Portuga IWas the only other country known to maintain such links w Was closed after Portugal informed the Co-u-Mlittee of TAP's cancellation of those links. The links by South Africa were moreover, further evidenced in a new case (I GO-.25) concErning facilities given by British Airways to South African Airways under which that airline was reported to be operating regular flights between London and Salisbury. Southern Rhodesia, via Ilha do Sol Las Palmas and JohannesburCg. Details of that case, as well as information regarding case Io. IGO-4 are given in paragraphs 111 and 103 of section C in charter I, above, respectively, -101-

C.HAPTh" VI L11IIGRATIOir AA,!D TOURTSII A, Inriration (:.) General information 165. The illegal regiae has continued to give attention to imilirration and tourism both for political and economic reasons. Tourism is an important source of foreign currency for the ill'l r&gime. ( b ) Po-ulation 166. Southern Rhodesia-s total population end of 1977 as shown in table i beloIT. A with statistics for previous years are as increased by 230000 to 6,860000 at the breakdowm of that figure and comparison follows. Table 1 POPULATIOl OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA (rounded figures. in thousands) 16/ Year (31 Deceiiber) 1965 1,7/ 1971 1972 1973 1975 1976 1977 1970 13/ Africans 51310 5.490 5 700 5 900 6 ii0 6 320 6 560 6 64o Europeans 210 255 267 271 2714 278 273 263 260 Asians Coloureds 8-0 9o4 9.6 9.7 O99 i00 10.0 10.2 10.3 10,5 12,6 17,3 18.1 19.0 19.9 20.9 22.0 23.0 23.6 !/ SupplemenL to the I onthly Digest of Statistics July 1976 (Central tatistical Office *Salisbury). (In using the statistics published by the illegal regime the Coin iittee usually exercises a certain amount of caution.) 17/ As of 30 June 1965. ! "/ Provisional firfures as at 30 June 197. Suplement to the Tionthly Digest Of 2t- '-tisuics October 19'7;_. (Central Statistical Officer-- Salisbury)- -102- Total 4. 14o 5. 590 5,780 6.ooo 6.200 6 420 6:630 6.86o 6 930 167. AccordinRp to the figures putlished by the illegal r~gime, the number of white people leaving Southern Rhodesia continued to increase in 1977. The ;, : e"in European irmti'lration in recent years is as follows Table 2 15/ 1smir-rant 5 14 743 13 966 9 649 12,425 77782 5,730 i iit'rant s 5_141 7 751 9o69 10 497 14,654 6 ..3 Pet migration 9 407 0.325 i1682 50o 1 .923 -7 072 -10 g0 168. According to the figures released there was a net loss of 3,676 in T.uropean iLration during January-June 1973_ compared to the loss of 5. 761 in the same Period of 1977. The statistics for the first six months of 1978 compared with the saie fiures for 1976 and 1977 are as follows, Table 3 Immigrant s 1976 (January-June) 1977 (January June) 1978 (January-June) 20 4,799 2941 2 017 Emig rant s 8,702 6.493 -2 279 -5 761 -3,676 19__/ Lxcept where otherwise indicated, the rest of the figures in this chapter were gathered from the ilonthly Dipest of Statistics, August 1970 (Central Statistical Office - Salisbury) which stated that the figures from Januar; 1977 to date were provisional. 20/ According to the fioures released by the illegal rNgime in October 1973 (New York Times 14 November 1978) the white population declined by 1,490 in September, the largest single monthly loss in the country's history. According to the same figures 11 .241 whites had immigrated in the first nine vonths of the year, representinc a 4.5 per cent drop from the 2.400000 white population at the be innin' of the year. -103- 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 w~et ni.rrat ion D. Tourism 1,)9, The trend in the tourist industry is indicated in the follo,int, figures,: Table 4 VISITORS FRI IO ABROAD In transit On business For eucti ion On holidoay 1965 103 ,16 1976 1977 12 4o 0OU 14. C°'h0 7,615 1 74. 170. A decrease in JLnusryoJune durin, shows . foreign tourists to Southern Rhodesia is ,-iven for the period ech of the last three successive years. as the table below Table 5 FOREIGN TOURISTS TO SCUTHERN RHODESIA 1976 (January-June) 1977 (January.June) 1978 (January.-June) SPecific cases concerninj tourism 78 841 44 226 41 713 171. During the period covered by the present consideration of a number of cases concerning of the action taken by the Coimmittee on those chapter I C, and in chapter IV above, Action given below. report the Conimittee continued its tourism already on its list. Details cases are given in paragraph 9 in taken by the Conn'ittee on Case 227 is (b) Admissions into countries of persons travelling on SouthernPhodesian passports -- 172, As indicated in the tenth report (S/12529_ para. 137) the Co inittee received in a memorandum dated 8 December 1977 the opinion of the United i1ations Legal Counsel with regard to the Swiss Government~s position on passports and the potential irllications for ifember States of the acceptance of that position. The text of the Legal Counsels opinion was included in annex II of the tenth report (see under (252) Case No. 227, para. 10). 173. The case was considered by the Committee at the 307th ireeing on 30 i ,arch 1978In pursuance of the Co-rinittees decision -.t that Yieeting a note dated 30 lay 197r was sent to SwitzerlanJ, together with -the text of the Legal Counsels opinion -lO4- 25-.1'l( 22,8. 8 20 363.. 14909 142 Total 5 64: 7. 75 5, 257 4 907 2,194. 200.725 229,570 244, 104 140423 103. 515 343.,378 272,704 281'. 697 169,354 121 ,979 pressing the Comnittee's feelinig that, as the Legal Counsel had also poi-ited out ,ere appeared to be some contradiction between the position of the Swiss Goverr!:,ent 1 the present case and the undertah in.- :iven by that Govern-x-eiit in its statel- ,ent 10 February 1967, further reaffirmed in the Governments note of 17 February 1977 ieat the S.iss Federal Council would take steps to ensure non violation of the ijted rations sanctions policy. The Comniittee therefore requested the Governments )mnlents on the matter. together with an indicaticn of what ieasures the Swiss thorities contemplated taking in view of the above, i ,entioned undertakin.. j4o In the saire case Portugal reaffirmed in a note dated 2 October 1970 that after loption by the Portuguese Government, on 13 July 1977, of its resolution 18C/77 arsons holding Southern Rhodesian passports were under no circunstances allowed a-try into Portugal. For further details re-ardin- this case see under (246) ase Ho. 227, in annex II to the iJresent report. -105-