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A Kantian Theory of Art Criticism A Kantian Theory of Art Criticism by Emine Hande Tuna A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy University of Alberta © Emine Hande Tuna, 2016 Abstract My dissertation explores the role of art criticism within Immanuel Kant’s aesthetic theory and its relevance for the particularism-generalism debate in contemporary aesthetics. In doing so, it provides a Kantian answer to the meta-critical question that generated the particularism-generalism divide in the first place, namely whether or not our aesthetic appraisals of artworks are based on natural facts concerning the non-aesthetic properties of those artworks. This is an examination of a neglected area in Kant scholarship since it is standardly assumed that a theory of criticism flies in the face of some of Kant’s most central aesthetic tenets, such as his rejection of aesthetic testimony and general objective principles of taste. If art criticism is an enterprise of providing evaluations of artworks supported by reasons, then it is hard to see what the Kantian art critic can do for us. It does not seem to matter whether the critic provides evaluations since we cannot defer to them. Likewise, any reasons the critic provides by referring to the non-aesthetic properties of artworks would seem completely arbitrary in the absence of general principles governing the relation between aesthetic evaluations and non-aesthetic properties. ii Nevertheless, the assumption that these Kantian tenets preclude the possibility of art criticism is mistaken and it is my aim to show how this can be. The project has two phases. In the first phase I develop a new interpretation of Kant’s theory of artistic beauty. In the second phase I make use of this interpretation to put forward a Kantian account of art criticism, an essentially particularist account which integrates generalist elements. Central to my interpretation is the notion that judgments of perfection, which are non-aesthetic evaluations of artworks’ success in meeting or exceeding our expectations regarding works of that kind, inform our aesthetic assessments. It is precisely this underappreciated role of judgments of perception that I exploit in making room for Kantian art criticism. Critics’ reasons are not arbitrary because these reasons, listing non-aesthetic properties of the work, support non-aesthetic evaluations of success value which in turn contribute to the determination of aesthetic value of artworks. In short, I propose that Kant’s aesthetic theory yields a fruitful theory of art criticism and that this theory presents an alternative to both existing theories of his time and to contemporary theories. iii Preface Some parts of this dissertation have been accepted for publication. The majority of the final section of Chapter IV is a reprint of the material as it appears in Tuna, Emine Hande. “A Kantian Hybrid Theory of Art Criticism: A Particularist Appeal to the Generalists.” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (forthcoming a). A brief part of the second section of Chapter III will be published as Tuna, Emine Hande. “Why didn’t Kant Think Highly of Music?,” in Natur und Freiheit: Akten des XII. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses 2015. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, forthcoming b. iv Anne ve babama, to Alev and Muzaffer Tuna v Acknowledgements I would like to start by thanking my supervisor, Alexander Rueger, for all the help and support he provided throughout my MA and PhD. His class on Kant’s Aesthetics is what initially sparked my interest in the subject and our continued conversations have been an invaluable source as I navigated through Kant’s labyrinthine works. He is also the person who encouraged me to work on the topic of my dissertation and I am very grateful for that. I also owe many thanks to my dissertation committee. Amy Schmitter has been a committee member on both my PhD and MA defenses and I have taken various courses from her. Through her erudition and mentorship, she has not only been one of the most important sources of my intellectual growth but also a continuous encouragement and confidence booster (and we all know that you need that while writing a dissertation). I am grateful to both Jennifer Welchman and Howard Nye for their helpful feedback on the present work but also on the various short papers I have presented over the years, which turned into this body of work. I particularly want to thank Rachel Zuckert for agreeing to be on my committee and for commenting on my work. Her astute remarks will continue to provide guidance as I develop these views further. I had the opportunity to present parts of the present work at various venues. I was afforded many opportunities to discuss my work at the talks organized by the Publication Support Group at University of Alberta. All of the graduate students and faculty members have provided me with much needed feedback and helped me as my ideas took shape vi over the years. I also want to thank the audience members and commentators at various meetings of the American Philosophical Association (APA), the Canadian Philosophical Association, and the American Society for Aesthetics (ASA), and at the International Kant Congress for lively discussions and feedback. Particularly, I want to express my gratitude to APA and ASA for their generous financial support. I am also in debt to Theodore Gracyk, the co-editor of the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, for his detailed and invaluable comments and suggestions regarding my forthcoming paper in the journal. The last section of my fourth chapter is a reprint of this paper, which has been significantly improved thanks to Dr. Gracyk’s input. I also want to thank the students in my Philosophy of Criticism class, who unknowingly helped me and pushed me to develop the views expressed in this dissertation during our discussions. I would like to thank my mother and father, Alev and Muzaffer Tuna, to whom this work is dedicated, for ceaselessly supporting me throughout the years. I want to thank my mother and father in-law, Doina and Grigore Ion, for their care and support. I will be forever indebted to my aunt, Sevgi Güngör, for teaching me about determination and hard work along with some crucial math skills. I want to thank my sister, Merve Tuna, for our sometimes minute-long and sometimes day-long Skype chats. Those were much needed. Finally, I want to say thank you to Octavian Ion, my spouse, even though I know that it is not enough. He worked with me, beside me, at every stage of this dissertation, discussing every idea expressed herein and all the ideas not worthy of being expressed. Thank you is not exactly enough. vii Table of Contents Abstract ............................................................................................................................... ii Preface ................................................................................................................................ iv Dedication ............................................................................................................................ v Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................ vi Table of Contents ............................................................................................................. viii Note on References .............................................................................................................. x Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 2 Chapter I Judgments of Perfection: From Leibniz to Kant ............................................ 16 I. 1. Intellectual Roots of Rationalist Aesthetics: Leibniz and Wolff ............................... 19 I. 2. The development of rationalist aesthetics .................................................................. 28 I. 2. 1. Baumgarten ....................................................................................................................... 28 I. 2. 2. Mendelssohn ..................................................................................................................... 34 I. 2. 2. 1. Mendelssohnian Art Criticism ................................................................................. 42 I. 3. Kant on Perfection ...................................................................................................... 47 Chapter II Informed Impure Judgments of Taste ........................................................... 64 II. 1. Inconsistencies and Problems ................................................................................... 65 II. 2. Extant Solutions ........................................................................................................ 68 II. 2. 1. Crawford’s Interpretation ................................................................................................ 69 II. 2. 2. Incorporation View ......................................................................................................... 75 II. 2. 3. Conjunctive View ............................................................................................................ 79 II. 3. How to Make Informed Impure Judgments of Taste ................................................ 84 Chapter III Informed Pure Judgments of Taste .............................................................. 95 III. 1. The Method of Abstraction
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