"UNIVERSITY STUDENT SUPPORT FOR CARIBBEAN INTEGRATION: A FOUR CAMPUS STUDY" 1
Walter C. Soderlund, Stuart H. Surlin, Robert M. Krause, Frank Innes, Ronald M. Welch
all at the University of Windsor Windsor, Ontario CANADA N9B 3P4 •
Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Conference of the Caribbean Studies Association Kingston, Jamaica May 1993 INTRODUCTION: Following World War II, in spite of reservations evident in the Moyne Report, British policy sought to link the independence of its West Indian colonies to their integration into a federal political system (Will, 1991:5-10). While a West Indies Federation was created in 1958, its British rather than West Indian origins, an emphasis on political over economic factors and the insularity or parochialism of its component parts, led to its collapse before the end of 1962 (Etzioni, 1965:138-139). Excellent accounts of the origins, performance and demise of the Federation are contained in (Proctor, 1957; Springer, 1962; Mordicai, 1968, Millette, 1969;
Axline, 1979; and Payne, 1980). In spite of the failure of the Federation, individual West Indian colonies of Great Britain did achieve their independence between 1962 (Jamaica and Trinidad/Tobago) and 1983 (St. Kitts- Nevis). During the same time, a network of cooperative and integrative schemes among the countries developed; chief among these being the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) in 1965, the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) in 1966, the Eastern Caribbean Common Market (ECCM) in 1968 (which developed into the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States in 1981), and the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) in 1973. The latter organization, presided over by a Council of Heads of Government, has focused primarily on economic and other types of functional cooperation (Emanuel, 1987:1-6). While CARICOM has had its successes, not all assessments of its performance are glowing; in fact some are quite critical. Excellent analyses of its achievements and failures are offered by (Segal, 1968; Milne, 1974; Payne, 1981; Payne 1985;
Axline 1988; Maincot, 1989; Griffith, 1990; Will, 1991; as well as by the West Indian Commission, 1992). As James Millette has observed, "serious collaboration in the West Indies has been and will continue to be one of the most persistent themes in the region's development" (1969:409) and it
appears that a new and perhaps decisive chapter in Caribbean integration began in July 1989, when the CARICOM Heads of Government Conference meeting in Grenada called for the
establishment of an independent West Indian Commission to consult the populations of the respective countries regarding the future of the region (Bowen, 1991:15-17). The Commission was to present its final report in July of 1992, and unquestionably increased
integration among member states was at the heart of its charge: "...against this background of historic change and historic appraisal, [changes in the U.S.S.R., the movement toward a single European market and the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement] the Caribbean could be in danger of becoming a backwater, separated from the main current of human advance into the twenty-first century" (West Indian Commission, 1991:3).
With the end of overt East-West conflict the current international climate is far more conducive to a new thrust toward integration than was the case in the Cold-War dominated 1960s,
1970s and 1980s, which saw the Caribbean caught up in struggles between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (Basdeo, 1990; Serbin, 1990; Pastor and Fletcher, 1991). Internationalization of corporate ownership and the development of mega-trading blocs also serve as powerful incentives for regional integration. Domestic factors, primarily concerned with the severe economic crisis that gripped the region in the decade of the 1980s, appear as well to favour renewed attempts to promote increased integration: "By the end of the 1980's, for the first time, the governments of the thirteen English-speaking nations, including the largest ones, were all determined to reach some level of integration. Guyana's Desmond Hoyte said, 'For small countries such as ours, the lesson is clear: we either integrate or perish'" (Kurlansky, 1992:281-282). The Commission released a progress report in 1991 calling for immediate action on six points, all related to economic integration: unrestricted travel, free movement of skilled people, developing a common currency, enhancing investment, creating a single CARICOM market, and negotiating with the international community in a coordinated way (West Indies Commission, 1991: 30-39).
The focus on economic factors, combined with some attention to cultural concerns, continued in the Commission's Final Report, Time for Action. The Report concluded that political integration was a goal "out of reach" and specifically rejected any "return to federalism". The thrust of the Report was rather on what may be called "instrumental integration" --an emphasis on implementing "integration at practical levels affecting everyday lives" (West Indies Commission, 1992:22-25).
The sharing of sovereignty implicit in any scheme of federalism was rejected by the Commission which opted instead for a form of "sovereignty-association"; or, in its words, "a Community of sovereign states". The report strongly advocated what might be termed "bureaucratic-driven integration". Arguing that "The Caricom 4 ship needs a captain- not only sailing orders", it called for the swift creation of a CARICOM Commission, to give "regional leadership on a day to day basis within the framework of CARICOM as a Community of sovereign states" (West Indian Commission, 1992:78; xxviii; 461-508). In October 1992, the Caribbean Heads of Government met to consider the Commission's report. While it was praised as "a landmark document in charting the course of Caribbean integration," the major recommendation for the creation of a CARICOM Commission was rejected "...in favour of an arrangement in which three regional Prime Ministers would head a structure known as the Caricom Bureau" (John, 1992-93:6). Cost and unnecessary bureaucratic structure were cited as the reasons for rejecting the creation of the CARICOM Commission, although reluctance to relinquish political power in this important initiative no doubt also played a role. At the same time that West Indian integration has resurfaced as an issue, (as well as the possibility of pan-Caribbean integration), also on the region's integration agenda are proposals to develop a political union among the Windward Islands and for closer collaboration between Barbados, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago (Bousquet, 1992-93:7). Thus the early 1990s seem to be a "make or break" period for the success of integrative ventures of both regional and sub-regional scale. Attitudes toward integration on the part of would-be- integrated populations have been long identified as a crucial 5 variable in the success of any venture (Deutsch et al., 1957; Haas and Schmitter, 1964; Etzioni, 1965; Fisher, 1969; Hanson, 1969; Lindberg, 1970, Inglehart, 1970; Nye, 1971; Pentland, 1973; and Puchala, 1981). In particular, Deutsch et al. stress "the mutual compatibility of main values" (1957:46-58), while Haas and Schmitter point to the necessity of "elite complementarity"
(1964:712). The centrality of elite attitudes to successful integration provided the theoretical underpinning for the work of a number of scholars at the University of Windsor examining the origins of Canadian confederation in the mid-nineteenth century
(White, et al., 1979; Nelson, et al., 1990; and Wagenberg, et al.,
1990). While of necessity this research probed elite attitudes through analysis of printed speeches, findings have reinforced the importance of such attitudes in understanding contemporary problems which bedevil Canadian unity (Soderlund, et al., 1990:67-69).
While it is important to acknowledge that supportive attitudes in themselves are insufficient for the achievement of integration, it appears highly doubtful that any integration scheme could realize non-coerced, long-term success in the face of elite opposition. Thus a systematic assessment of attitudes toward integration on the part of various elite groups in the thirteen English-speaking member countries of CARICOM should receive high priority on the region's research agenda.`
METHODS:
As a pilot study for a more comprehensive study, during the
Spring and Summer of 1992 (prior to the release of the Final Report 6 of the West Indian Commission) we undertook to survey attitudes toward integration held by university students at four campuses in the English-speaking Caribbean. While not elites per se, university students in the Caribbean certainly can be categorized as elites of the future in their respective societies. Data was collected at four locations,' The University of the West Indies-- Mona, Jamaica (N=75); Cave Hill, Barbados (N=31); St. Augustine, Trinidad (N=28), and University College of Belize, Belize City (N=24); a total of 158 respondents. Data collection was facilitated by local researchers at each of the sites. 4 While not a random sample of the student population, an attempt was made to obtain a representative array of respondents. Specific distributions on key demographic variables are as follows:
Home Country:" Barbados-18%/ Belize-16%/ Jamaica-38%/ Trinidad and Tobago-20%/ Other 8% Gender: Males- 37%/ Females-63% Age: Under 20- 14%/ 20-24- 40%/ 25-29-25%/ 30 and over-21% Level of Education: Undergraduate- 87%/ Graduate-13% Area of Study: Social Science-35%/ Education-16%/ Science-11%/ Medicine/Dentistry-10%/ Other (Arts, Law, Business, Engineering, etc.)-28% Parent's Occupation: Upper Middle Class and above-45%/ Middle Class and below-55% Political Alignment: "Left" (Far or Moderate)-20%/ "Centre"-52%/ "Right" (Far or Moderate)-28%
The concept of "integration" is seen as encompassing three separate but related dimensions: socio-cultural, economic, and political (Lewis and Mathews, 1967). The following definitions of 7 these components were furnished to the respondents prior to the administration of the questionnaire: Socio-cultural integration: the development of groups and agencies to produce cultural content for region-wide exposure: eg., region wide radio and TV networks, book publishers, recording studios, advertising agencies, film-making, newspapers, and magazines. Also included might be region-wide dancing and singing groups, sports teams, festivals/holidays and art centres. A policy-making agency would develop and maintain guidelines for the above activities. Economic Integration: a closer relationship between states implying over time a free flow of goods, services, products and people; a common currency and banking system; and common investment policies. All of these would be tempered by necessary controls arrived at by a region-wide policy-making agency. This aaency would also develop and maintain trade and investment policies for the region with the rest of the world. Political Integration: the development of a federal political system in which power is distributed between a newly-created "central" or "federal" legislature and existing "local" legislatures corresponding roughly to the existing nation- states. No superior-inferior relationship is necessarily implied in the divided authority. The "federal" legislature would have jurisdiction in matters crucial to the integrity of the region, while existing legislatures would have autonomy in matters of local concern (Bobb, 1966).
FINDINGS: Student attitudes toward integration in the CARICOM community were measured by two groups of questions: respondent assessments regarding (1) "how soon" scoio-cultural, economic and political integration might be achieved; and (2) perceived levels of support for the three components of integration as held by (i) the "general public", (ii) "university students" as a group, and (iii) the individual respondents themselves. Assessments reaarding the realization of any type of integration were not statistically significant at the .05 level on 8 any of the independent variables. A majority of students from all four countries, in all degree programs, age groups, social classes, political persuasions, both genders, and those who had travelled beyond the Caribbean and those who had not, believe socio-cultural integration is likely to be achieved within ten years and economic integration is likely to be achieved within twenty years. Again, substantial majorities in all sub-groupings expressed the opinion that political integration is unlikely to be achieved within the "foreseeable future". Tables showing the distribution of responses by degree program, age, and social class, contained so little systematic variation that they have been omitted from the discussion. However, data showing the effects of home country, political alignment, gender and extent of travel on assessments of the potential for integration produce distributions that, while not statistically significant, are nevertheless suggestive of insightful trends. These will be examined in Tables 1-4. [TABLE 1- APPROXIMATELY HERE] Data in Table 1 show that at least 60% of students from the four selected countries believe that socio-cultural integration will be a reality within ten years, while only in Jamaica do at least 20% feel this will not happen within twenty years. For economic integration, only in Barbados do less that 50% of students believe that it also will not be achieved within ten years, with fully 35% expressing the opinion that it is unachievable within the foreseeable future. 9 Political integration is perceived quite differently, where everywhere except for Belize, over 50% report that it is unlikely to be realized in the foreseeable future. Interestingly, a quarter of Belizean and Jamaican students see political integration as possible within ten years. In general, students from Barbados are the least optimistic regarding the possibilities of achieving economic and political integration, while, somewhat surprisingly given its location and lack of long-term connections with CARICOM, Belizean students are the most optimistic with respect to the achievement of socio- cultural and political integration. [TABLE 2- APPROXIMATELY HERE] Data in Table 2 show the distribution of responses by the self-reported political alignment of students. While the majority (52%) place themselves in the centre of the political spectrum, more students report their positions as right of centre (28%) than left of centre (20%). 6
"Left" and "right" identifiers among the students display contrasting views regarding the achievement of economic and socio- cultural integration. Data suggest that right identifiers are more optimistic regarding the achievement of economic integration within ten years, 64% vs. 47% than are left identifiers. Also, only 17% of right identifiers feel that economic integration will not be achieved within the foreseeable future as opposed to 30% of left identifiers. It is the latter group, however, which is more optimistic regarding the possibilities for successful socio- 10 cultural integration; 73% . believe that it will be achieved within ten years as opposed to 57% of right identifiers. Neither left, right nor centre students express much optimism regarding the possible implementation of political integration, with overall 58% believing that it will not occur within the foreseeable future.
[TABLE 3- APPROXIMATELY HERE] Table 3 reveals some interesting gender differences. For both socio-cultural and economic integration, males are far more likely to believe success will be achieved within ten years (68%-61%- males/58% 46%-females respectively). At the same time, females are more likely to see both types of integration as beyond reach in the foreseeable future (26%-26%-females/11%-14%-males respectively). The different assessments by males and females seen for both socio- cultural and economic integration are not evident in assessments regarding the success of political integration. [TABLE 4- APPROXIMATELY HERE] Table 4 examines the impact of travel outside the Caribbean on attitudes toward regional integration. Simply put, does exposure to the world beyond the Caribbean increase or decrease expectations for the achievement of integration? Students are divided into two groups ("travel only within the Caribbean" and "travel outside the Caribbean as well as within the region") with no attempt to account for destinations, frequency and length of stays. While extent of travel seems to have no effect on attitudes toward political integration, travel outside the region does appear to have a slight dampening effect on assessments regarding the achievement of both 11 socio-cultural and economic integration: 64% of those not reporting travel outside the Caribbean believe socio-cultural integration achievable within ten years and 55% believe economic integration achievable within the same time period. Analogous figures for students reporting travel outside the Caribbean are 58% and 47%. The second group of questions tapped attitudes toward integration on a ten point scale (1= "very weak support" to 10= "very strong support"). Students were asked to indicate perceived levels of support for socio-cultural, economic and political integration as found among the general public, fellow university students, as well as to report their personal levels of support. In data analysis, the ten point scale was treated as having interval properties. [TABLE 5- APPROXIMATELY HERE] Examination of data in Table 5 leads to two general observations. First, for all three components of integration, the general public is perceived to be less supportive than fellow university students, and fellow students less supportive than respondents themselves. Second, each group (the general public, fellow students and the respondents) are seen to manifest the highest level of support for socio-cultural integration, followed quite closely by support for economic integration, with perceived levels of support for political integration falling below the mid- point in the scale for both the general public and fellow university students (See Grant, 1991 for comparisons to data collected from student teachers in 1985 12 When patterns of mean scores are examined by the four home countries, some interesting variations appear. Among students both from Jamaica and Barbados, perceived support for economic integration, as well as political integration, is at the mid-point in the scale or below. Also, among students from Trinidad and Tobago, personal levels of support for political integration, as well as perceptions for fellow students and the general public, fall below the mid-point in the scale. In general, however, students perceive that both socio-cultural and economic integration enjoy fairly wide support among fellow students and the general public and, political integration is supported by all student respondents except those from Trinidad and Tobago.
Since economic integration occupied such a central position in the Report of the West Indies Commission, attitudes toward its realization merit closer examination. While economic integration as an abstract concept may be very appealing, it can only be achieved through the implementation of specific policies that may entail considerable disruption and hardship for some of the to-be- integrated societies (Will, 1991:24-31). Seven such policy areas involved in achieving economic integration were identified and students were asked to register, on a five point scale, their level of support for each policy.
[TABLE 6-APPROXIMATELY HERE] Data in Table 6 generally show students to be supportive of all economic integrative policies with the exception of the "abolition of government subsidies", where support is below the 13 mid-point in all countries. However, there are statistically significant between country differences on four of the seven policy areas. Jamaican students register the highest level of support for all economic policies and this appears incongruent with their modest levels of support for economic integration reported above. Belizean students also offer a paradox: contrary to their high levels of support for integration and optimistic expectations for its rapid implementation, they register the lowest levels of support for all policies which would promote the process. Indeed, only on common investment, open competition for contracts, and banking policies, do Belizean students offer levels of support above the mid-point in the scale. These cross-national differences in levels of support for specific integrative policies point to an area of potential concern for the integration process. In addition to the structured questions already discussed, in open-ended questions students were asked to name the single most important problem facing the Caribbean, as well the primary forces specifically working for and against Caribbean integration. A wide variety of responses were offered, and those cited most often are listed in Table 7. [TABLE 7-APPROXIMATELY HERE] While economic issues dominate responses as the "single most important problem facing the region", references to political leadership and parochial attitudes are also prominently on the minds of students. A combination of negative and positive factors are offered as 14 those promoting integration. The chief negative ones are economic need and fear of being left behind, while among the leading positive forces are arts/music/sports/culture, political leaders, the example of Europe, television (Caribvision is especially singled out), as well as the role of academics and intellectuals. While seen by some as a positive factor, the region's political leaders are far more likely to be perceived as the strongest force working against integration.' As well, attitudes and perspectives of Caribbean people are cited as significant negative factors. While political integration was presented by the West Indian Commission as "a sort of Holy Grail shining on the edge of a distance too far away to matter for the time being" (West Indian Commission, 1992:24), this study did ask a question specifically on attitudes toward federalism; whether students approved of the concept in general, and what sort of distribution of powers within a federal system they preferred. The data indicate that 42% of the sample were opposed to any form of political integration. Among the 58% of the sample which expressed an opinion regarding the distribution of powers, nearly 60% preferred a federal system with a roughly equal balance between the two levels of government. A slight preference for a strong central government over strong local governments was indicated by the remaining group. The Commission Report placed a heavy responsibility on a sionificantly enhanced CARICOM to carry out the tasks necessary to achieve economic and socio-cultural integration (West Indian 15 Commission, 1992:461-508). Respondents were asked to share their opinions regarding a number of potentially active organizations in the integration process, some regional and some global. On a 1 to 10 scale (with 1= "very negative" and 10= "very positive") the United Nations scored highest (mean score 6.8), while CARICOM and the Caribbean Development Bank both fared quite well with mean scores of 6.7 and 6.0 respectively. The Organization of American States was virtually at the mid-point (5.6), while the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were ranked lowest with mean scores of 4.3 and 3.7 respectively. The question of extending integration beyond the boundaries of the English-speaking Caribbean was one addressed by the Commission,
which suggested the formation of a CARICOM-promoted Association of Caribbean States: "Reflected in the conclusions and recommendations of the Report is our deeply felt instinct that the West Indies lies at the core of a larger Caribbean community which has a common destiny which in the end we must seek together" (West Indies Commission, 1992:26, 426-431). On this question, students were asked- "How likely is the possibility of extending any of the forms of integration to include the Spanish, French or Dutch-speaking territories of the Caribbean?" While 20% indicated that they did "not know", 47% indicated that it was either "somewhat" or "very" likely, while 33% indicated that it was either "somewhat" or "highly" unlikely. In short, some of the optimism and support evident with respect to integration within CARICOM clearly extends to include the wider Caribbean (Serbin, 1991). 16 A final area of investigation centres on perceptions of which CARICOM countries would realize the greatest benefits from economic integration, as well as measures of "psychological distance" between countries as expressed in feelings of "closest to" and
"most distant from". [TABLE 8- APPROXIMATELY HERE] Data in Table 8 show clearly that students everywhere believe that the "Big Islands" (Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago) will reap the greatest benefits from integration. " Barbados is also seen to be benefiting, interestingly, however, not by students from the island itself. 1C The traditionally "Small Islands" (the Leewards and the Windwards) are seen by all students as benefiting least from integration, while Guyana, Belize and the. Bahamas occupy middle positions) : [TABLE 9- APPROXIMATELY HERE] "Psychological distance". between countries is measured by questions asking students to name the three countries which they feel "closest to" and the three they feel "most distant from". Data in Table 9 show clear bonds of mutual affinity between Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica. While Belizean students feel close•to Jamaica and Barbados, there is no particular affinity on their part for Trinidad and Tobago. Students in Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica, report no closeness to Belize. Patterns of affinity among students in Barbados and Trinidad and
Tobago toward Guyana, as well as the Windwards, merit some comment.
Students in both countries feel significantly "distant from" Guyana 17 and "close to" the Windwards. Geography provides only a partial answer to these patterns, as while clearly the Windwards are located in the same general area as Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana also lies considerably closer to both than does Jamaica. Students from Belize feel significantly "distant from" both the Leewards and the Windwards, while the same holds true for
Jamaican students toward the Windwards.
CONCLUSIONS: It must be reemphasized that the data reported here are based on a small, non-random sample of one "future elite" group in the Caribbean. The findings, therefore, are not generalizable to the wider English-speaking Caribbean nor even to the current population of Caribbean university students. They are, however, most likely illustrative of attitudes toward integration that do exist among university students and their perceptions regarding "how well" proposals for integration will be received by both their fellow students and the population in general. They give a "feel" for current attitudes and, as such, can be used to focus and sharpen future research undertaken on the topic of Caribbean integration. A number of major trends seem worthy of note: 1. A majority of students see socio-cultural and economic integration achievable within ten years. While this is salutatory, ten years is an extraordinarily long time given the rapid pace of change currently seen in the international system. A corresponding majority do not see political integration achievable within the foreseeable future.
2. Students see themselves as more supportive of all forms of integration than they perceive their fellow students and especially the aeneral public to be. 18 3. Students perceive the highest levels of support existing for socio-cultural, followed by economic integration. Lower levels of support, especially on the part of the general public, are reported. 4. While a wide range of problems facing the region and forces working for and against integration are advanced, in the main, students cite economic issues as the most over- riding problems facing the Caribbean, and these are consequently among the main motivating forces behind the quest for integration. Political leadership and insularity are also seen as important factors standing in the way of achieving integration.
5. While quite similar response patterns from students in the four countries are evident, data do show some subtle differences which potentially may be of some significance in the integration process: a. perceived public support of socio-cultural and economic integration is weakest in Barbados. Nor do students there see the island as a major beneficiary from integration;
b. there are statistically significant differences among students in the four countries with respect to support for specific policies promoting economic integration. Support is generally highest among Jamaican students. Belizean students, while favouring integration at the conceptual level, register the lowest levels of support for policies promoting it; c. students on the left of the political spectrum are more optimistic reaarding attainment of socio-cultural integration, while students on the right are more optimistic regarding the attainment of economic integration; d. female students and those who have travelled outside the Caribbean are less optimistic regarding the attainment of both socio- cultural and economic integration; e. organizations key to the integrative process (e.g. CARICOM and the CDB) are not held in similar levels of esteem throughout the region;
f. Students everywhere see Jamaica and Trinidad as realizing the greatest benefits from integration; 19 g. While measures of psychological distance are supportive of a major integration effort between Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, as well as between Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago and the Windward Islands, they are much less hopeful with respect to the incorporation of Guyana in either integration scheme.
Since attitudes toward integration are important, it appears that the West Indian Commission has offered a plan of action that stands at least a reasonable chance of success. It is important that university students (the region's future elite), generally view integration as both feasible and desirable. It is also helpful that there are not wide variations in levels of optimism and support among the students in the four countries, which differ quite widely in size, wealth and economic health. It is not surprising that students rank socio-cultural integration as the most likely to be achieved in the near future. Several regional agencies already actively exist in achieving these goals (e.g. the West Indian Cricket Team, athletic competitions, and regional cultural festivals). A somewhat less optimistic response regarding economic integration is also understandable, in that institutional and structural changes are required for its implementation. While support for these is manifested, differential levels of support for a number of key economic policies are also evident. Clearly, the responding university students distinguish between socio-cultural and economic intearatlon on the one hand, and political integration on the other. However, especially with 20 respect to personal attitudes, there is more support for political integration than there is opposition, as only 42% of the overall sample reject political integration based on principles of federalism. This is seen as offering a reasonable base of support for political integration on which to build in the future. Heartening as well for proponents of pan-Caribbean integration is that 47% of the sample believe that it is at least "somewhat likely" that integration begun in the CARICOM countries will eventually be extended to the wider Caribbean, while only one-third of the respondents reject this possibility. In general we find a Caribbean university student sample both supportive and optimistic with respect to the implementation of both socio-cultural and economic integration. At the same time, we find the sample much less optimistic regarding the success of political integration, however, at the personal level, it does attract reasonable levels of support. Feelings of mutual closeness exist between students in the three countries that are arguably crucial to the achievement of regional integration-- Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. These positives are tempered by some negative considerations. Perhaps problematic is the "distance" felt between students in both Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago toward Guyana and the perception held by all students that integration will benefit the larger islands more than it will the smaller ones. As well there are differential levels of support for economic policies necessary for economic integration to occur and negative evaluations of some institutions which could play a role 21 in the integrative process. Finally, it has been said that "in politics, six months is an eternity", and there is no question that both domestic and international events can have dramatic effects on public opinion. Especially important is that political leadership seize the moment and through action lead aenerally favourable public opinion on the issue. Continued talk and no action could well result in an increase in already high levels of cynicism toward political leaders. Thus, continued monitoring of the attitudinal climate surrounding regional integration, at both the mass and elite levels, is an imperative. NOTES: 1. This research was made possible through a seed grant from the Social Science Research Unit at the University of Windsor. We wish to thank James Chacko and Richard Dumala for their assistance in various phases of the project.
2. On the basis of the work presented here we are preparing a research proposal to conduct a systematic survey of attitudes toward integration among elite groups in the thirteen CARICOM countries. Six elite groups are tentatively designated for inclusion: media professionals, educators, business leaders, union leaders, public servants and politicians. Elites in the four "large" countries (in terms of physical size, population and economic weight --Jamaica, Trinidad-Tobago, Guyana and Barbados) will be over sampled so as to roughly equal the number sampled in the nine "smaller" countries. 3. Originally, we had hoped to include Guyana in our pilot study. However, due to unforeseen problems, we were able to complete only eleven interviews with Guyanese students, too few on which to base any reliable conclusions.
4. We wish to express out thanks to Christine Barrow, Elizabeth Chavarria, Wenty Bowen and Carol Clark, who assisted us with or collected data in Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Belize respectively. It would have been impossible to do the study without their help. 5. There is considerable evidence regarding a connection between levels of economic prosperity and attitudinal structures. The four countries from which our student sample is drawn offer varied combinations of size, wealth and economic health. These differences make similarities in responses toward integration even more compelling. Population Pop Size GDP/ Growth Unem- 1991 Growth (sq km) per of GDP played (est) Rate capita % % 1985-90 1988 1989 1990 Barbados 260,000 0.2 431 $5,740 3.5 14.7 Belize 196,500 2.4 22,965 1,587 5.1 N/A Jamaica 2,387,000 1.2 10,991 1,351 6.3 15.3 Trinidad/ Tobago 1,291,000 1.7 5,128 3,699 -0.2 20/1 Data from: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean 1990 Vol_ I (Santiago, Chile: United Nations, 1992); Ibid., Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean 1990 (Santiago, Chile: United Nations, 1991); and Arthur S. Banks, ed. Political Handbook of the World, 1991 (Binghamton, N.Y.: CSA Publications, 1991). 23 6. We have noted a similar "shift to the right" among students in North America. 7. For comparison, see Rudolph Grant's analysis of data collected from student teachers in 1985. "Political Learning and Awareness among Student Teachers: A Caribbean Study." European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, 51 (1991):677-89. 8. With "politician-bashing" so much in vogue, it is hard to estimate how much of this criticism is well thought out with respect to leaders actually hindering integration and how much is merely a product of general alienation directed toward politics and politicians. 9. Between country variations were statistically significant at least at the .05 level on evaluations of all international and regional actors. Generally, evaluations were highest in Belize and lowest in Barbados. 10. This is congruent with a "rational choice" model of decision-making regarding support for integration. 11. This appears to be a turn around from the commonly held assumption that the earlier West Indies Federation would favour the "smaller" islands. ti(Florida
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ATLANTIC
OCEAN Anguilla a Barbuda Antigua • (400.• Guadeloupe v • 10 Dominica Martinique St. Lucia St. Vincent 0 b Barbados
CARICOM Antigua & •arbud• • ananiaa Sorbed•• ••11x• Dominica Granada Guyana Jamslos Yont••rtat at. Kltt• Colombia St. Lucia It. Viacom SCALE Trteilditti I Tobago • 0 100 200 300 8 km REFERENCES Axline, W. A. (1979). Caribbean Integration: The Politics of Regionalism. London: Frances Pinter. (1988). Regional Co-operation and National Security: External Forces in Caribbean Integration. Journal of Common Market Studies, 27:1-25. Basdeo, S. (1990). The Single European Act: A CARICOM Perspective. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 32: 121-141. Bobb, L. (1966). The Federal Principle in the West Indies: An Appraisal of its Use. Social and Economic Studies, 15:239-265. Bousquet, E. (Dec/Jan1992-93). Move on Windward Islands' Unity. Caribbean Contact, 19:7. Bowen, W. (1991). Do We Feel West Indian? Caribbean Contact, 18: 15-17. Deutsch, K., Burrell, S., Kann, R., Lee Jr., M., Lichterman, M., Lindgren, R., Lowenheim, F., and Van Wagenen, R. (1957) Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Emanuel. P. (1987) Approaches to Caribbean Political Integration. Occasional Paper No. 21. Cave Hill, Barbados: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies. Etzioni, A. (1965). Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Fisher, W. (1969). An Analysis of the Deutsch Sociocausal Paradigm of Political Integration. International Organization, 23: 254-290. Grant, R. (1991) Political Learning and Awareness among Student Teachers: A Caribbean Case Study. European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, 51:67-89. Griffith, W. (1990). Crisis in Caribbean Integration. Caribbean Studies,23:27-48. Haas, E. and Schmitter, P. (1964). Economic and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections About Unity in Latin America. International Organization, 18:705-737. Hanson, R. (1969). Regional Integration: Reflections of a Decade of Theoretical Efforts. World Politics, 21:242-271. Inglehart, R. (1970). Public Opinion and Regional Integration. International Organization, 24:764-795. 26 John, D. (Dec/Jan 1992-93). No to Caribbean Commission. Caribbean Contact, 19:6. Kurlansky, M. (1992). A Continent of Islands: Searching for the Caribbean Destiny. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley. Lewis, S. and Mathews, T. (1967). Caribbean Integration: Papers on Social, Political and Economic Integration. Rio Piedras, P.R.: Institute of Caribbean Studies, University of Puerto Rico. Lindberg, L. (1970). Political Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon Requiring Multivariate Measurement. International Organization, 24:649-731. Maingot, A. (1989). Caribbean International Relations. in The Modern Caribbean, eds., F. Knight and C. Palmer. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Millette, J. (1969) Review Article: The West Indies: The Federal Negotiations. Social and Economic Studies, 18:408-420. Mordecai, J. (1968) The West Indies: The Federal Negotiations. London: George Allen and Unwin. Milne, R.S. (1974) Impulse and Obstacles to Caribbean Political Integration: Academic Theory and Guyana's Experience. International Studies Quarterly, 18:291-316. Nelson, R., Soderlund, W. Wagenberg, R., and Briggs, E.D. (1990). Canadian Confederation as a Case Study in Community Formation. in The Causes of Canadian Confederation, ed., G. Martin. Fredericton, N.B.: Acadiensis Press. Nye, J. (1971). Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement. in Issues in Comparative Politics, eds., R. Jackson and M. Stein. Toronto: Macmillan. Pastor R. and Fletcher, R. (1991). The Caribbean in the 21st Century. Foreign Affairs, 70:98-114. Payne, A. (1980). The Politics of the Caribbean Community, 1961-79: Regional Integration amongst New States. Manchester: Manchester University Press. (1981). The Rise and Fall of Caribbean Regionalism. Journal of Common Market Studies 19:255-280.
(1985). Wither CARICOM? The Performance and Prospects of Caribbean Integration in the 1980s. International Journal, XL:207-228. 27 Pentland, C. (1973) International Theory and European Integration. London: Faber and Faber. Proctor, J. (1957) The Development of the Idea of Federation in the British Territories. Caribbean Quarterly, 5:5-33.
Puchala, D. (1981). Integration Theory and the Study of International Relations. in From National Development to Global Community: Essays in Honour of Karl W. Deutsch, eds., R. Merritt and B. Russett. London: George Allen and Unwin. Segal, A. (1968). The Politics of Caribbean Economic Integration. Rio Piedras, R.R.: Institute of Caribbean Studies, University of Puerto Rico. Serbin, A. (1990). The Caribbean: Myths and Realities for the 1990s. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 32: 121-141. (1991). The CARICOM States and the Group of Three: A New Partnership Between Latin America and the Non-Hispanic Caribbean. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 33:63-85. Soderlund, W., Nelson, R., Briggs, E.D., and Wagenberg, R. (1990). Attitudes towards Community Formation in British North America: The Atlantic Provinces and the Province of Canada Compared. British Journal of Canadian Studies 5:57-77, Springer, H. (1962). Reflections of the Failure of the First West Indies Federation. Boston: Harvard University Press. Wagenberg, R., Soderlund, W., Nelson, R., and Briggs, E.D., (1990). Federal Societies and the founding of federal states: an examination of the origins of Canadian Confederation. in Canadian Federalism: Past, Present and Future, ed., M. Burgess. Leicester: Leicester University Press. West Indian Commission, (1991). Towards a Vision of the Future. Progress Report of the Work of the Independent West Indian Commission. (1992). Time For Action. Report of the West Indian Commission. Black Rock, Barbados: Cole's Printery. Will, W.M. ((1991). A Nation Divided: The Quest For Caribbean Integration. Latin American Research Review, 26:3-37.
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TABLE 1
PERCEIVED LIKELIHOOD OF ACHIEVEMENT OF SOCIO-CULTURAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION, BY HOME COUNTRY BARBADOS BELIZE N=29 N=25 Socio- Econ Polit Socio- Econ Polit cult cult Not foreseeable 17% 35% 76% 8% 21% 42% Within 20 yrs 21 21 17 21 25 33 Within 10 yrs 62 45 7 71 54 25
JAMAICA TRINIDAD AND N=60 TOBAGO N=31 Socio- Econ Polit Socio- Econ Polit cult cult Not foreseeable 27% 17% 53% 17% 10% 58% Within 20 yrs 12 27 22 23 36 26 Within 10 yrs 61 56 25 60 55 16 TOTAL N=145 Socio- Econ Polit cult Not foreseeable 20% 20% 57% within 20 yrs 18 27 24 within 10 yrs 63 53 19
Spcio-cultural Economic Political X —=5.727 X'=6.828 Xi=8 . 425 DF=6 DF=6 DF=6 NS NS NS TABLE 2 PERCEIVED LIKELIHOOD OF ACHIEVEMENT OF SOCIO-CULTURAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION, BY POLITICAL ALIGNMENT
LEFT RIGHT N=30 N=42 Socio- Econ Polit Socio- Econ Polit cult cult Not foreseeable 20% 30% 60% 21% 17% 60%
Within 20 yrs 7 23 27 21 19 21 Within 10 yrs 73 47 13 57 64 19
CENTRE TOTAL N=76 N=148 Socio- Econ Polit Socio- Econ Polit
Not foreseeable 21% 21% 57% 21% 22% 58% Within 20 yrs 21 33 25 18 27 24 Within 10 yrs 57 46 18 60 51 17
Spcio-cultural Economic 'olitical X"=3.848 XL =5.483 X'=.635 DF=4 DF=4 DF=4 NS NS NS TABLE 3
PERCEIVED LIKELIHOOD OF ACHIEVEMENT OF SOCIO-CULTURAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION, BY GENDER MALE FEMALE N=56 N=9S Socio- Econ Polit Socio- Econ Polit cult cult
Not foreseeable 11% 1 4 °0 53% 26% 26% 59% Within 20 yrs 2i 25 28 17 29 22 Within 10 yrs 68 61 19 58 46 18
TOTAL N=154 Socio- Econ Polit cult Not foreseeable 20% 21% 57% Within 20 yrs 18 27 25 Within 10 yrs 61 51 19
Spcio-cultural Economic loolitical X=5.038 X =3.787 X'=.753 DF=2 DF=2 DF=2 NS NS NS TABLE 4 PERCEIVED LIKELIHOOD OF ACHIEVEMENT OF SOCIO-CULTURAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION, BY EXTENT OF TRAVEL TRAVEL ONLY IN TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE CARIBBEAN THE CARIBBEAN N=91 N=62 Socio- Econ Polit Socio- Econ Polit cult cult
Nor foreseeable 17% 15% 56% 27% 31% 58%
Within 20 yrs 20 30 26 15 23 23
Within 10 yrs 64 55 17 58 47 19
TOTAL N=153 Socio- Econ Polit
Not foreseeable 21% 22% 57%
Within 20 yrs 18 27 25
Within 10 yrs 61 52 18
Spcio-cultural 4conomic Dolitical X 4 =2.881 X4 =5.150 X 4 =.278 DF=2 DF=2 DF=2 NS NS NS TABLE 5
PERCEIVED LEVELS OF SUPPORT FOR SOCIO-CULTURAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION, BY HOME COUNTRY
(Mean Scores) 1= very weak 10=very strong BARBADOS BELIZE N=28 N=25 Gen Pub Univ Stud Personal Gen Pub Univ Stud Personal Socio-cult 6.6 7.1 8.3 7.2 7.8 8.3 Economic 5.2* 5.6 7.2 6.2 6.7 7.3
Political 4.3* 4.7* 6.1 4.3* 4.7* 6.3
JAMAICA TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO N=59 N=31 Gen Pub Univ Stud Personal Gen Pub Univ Stud Personal
Socio-cult 5.8 6.5 7.3 6.1 6.8 7.1 Economic 5.5* 6.5 7.6 6.0 6.7 7.6
Political 4.3* 5.4* 5.7 4.4* 5.2* 5.3*
TOTAL N=143 Gen Pub Univ Stud Personal Socio-cult 6.3 6.9 7.6 Economic 5.7 6.4 7.5 Political 4.3* 5.1* 5.8
* mean scores at or below the mid-point in the scale. TABLE 6
EVALUATION OF SPECIFIC COMPONENTS OF ECONOMIC INTERATION, BY HOME COUNTRY (Mean Scores) 1= very positive 5= very negative BARBADOS BELIZE JAMAICA TRINIDAD TOTAL & TOBAGO N=28 N=25 N=59 N=31 N=143 Common and open 2.9 2.5 1.9 2.0 2.2 investment policies Unrestricted movement 2.3 3.0* 1.9 2.3 2.3 of people Unrestricted movement 2.2 3.0* 1.9 2.4 2.3 of goods and services Common banking and 2.5 2.4 2.1 2.2 2.3 financial regulations
Open competition for 2.9 3.0* 2.5 2.8 2.7 contracts
Common currency 2.9 3.0* 2.5 2.8 2.7 Abolition of 3.4* 3.5* 3.1* 3.3* 3.3* government subsidies
*mean scores at or above the mid-point in the scale. TABLE 7
RESPONSES TO MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM FACING THE CARIBBEAN AND STRONGEST FORCES WORKING FOR AND AGAINST INTEGRATION
single most important problem 'acing -Lae Leylon: (Top Five Responses) N 1. General economic situation 25 2. Political insularity 22 3. Political leadership 11 4. Lack of common identity 8 Lack of financial resources 8 Indebtedness 8 5. Poverty and unemployment 7
QUESTION: "What do you believe is the strongest force promoting the concept of integration in the West Indies today?" (Top Five Responses) N 1. Economic needs 20 2. Arts/music/sports/culture 19 3. Political leaders 9 4. European integration 7 TV (Caribvision) 7 5. Academics/intellectuals 6 External influences 6 Fear of being left behind 6 Common identity 6
QUESTION: "What do you believe is the strongest force working against the concept of integration in the West Indies today?" (Top Five Responses) N 1. Political leaders 32 2. Insularity/nationalism 17 3. Attitudes of people 12 4. Linauistic/cultural differences 8 5. Mistrust 5 TABLE 8 CARICOM COUNTRY BENEFITING "MOST" AND "LEAST" FROM ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, BY HOME COUNTRY (FIRST THREE RESPONSES TOTALLED, HOME COUNTRY INCLUDED)
BARBADOS BELIZE JAMAICA TRINIDAD & TOBAGO N=29 N=24 N=56 N=32 MOST/LEAST MOST/LEAST MOST/LEAST MOST/LEAST
BARBADOS 10 15 5 1 33 5 13 8 ( - 5) (+4) (+21) (+5) BELIZE 0 0 3 9 0 1 0 2 (-6) (-1) (-2)
JAMAICA 18 5 13 1 36 0 15 5 (+13) (+12) (+36) (+10) TRINIDAD & 18 4 12 2 39 3 15 10 TOBAGO (+14) (+10) (+36) (+5) GUYANA 9 4 0 2 11 12 9 7 (+5) (-2) (-1) (+2) BAHAMAS 1 2 0 1 2 1 2 0 (-1) ( - 1 ) (+1) (+2) LEEWARD 0 3 0 5 1 1 5 9 ISLANDS ( -3) ( - 5) (-10) (-4) WINDWARD 15 21 2 2 4 13 6 9 ISLANDS (-6) ( - 9) (-3) TABLE 9 CARICOM COUNTRY FEELING "CLOSEST TO" AND "MOST DISTANT FROM", BY HOME COUNTRY (FIRST THREE RESPONSES TOTALLED, HOME COUNTRY EXCLUDED) BARBADOS BELIZE JAMAICA TRINIDAD & TOBAGO N=29 N=24 N=56 N=32 CLOSE/DIST CLOSE/DIST CLOSE/DIST CLOSE/DIST
BARBADOS / / 12 2 29 5 19 1 (+10) (+24) (+18) BELIZE 0 2 1 2 1 4 (-2) (-1) ( - 3) JAMAICA 9 9 18 .0 / 14 7 (+18) (+7) TRINIDAD & 17 5 5 2 19 5 TOBAGO (+12) (+3) (+14)
GUYANA 3 10 2 2 7 7 0 13 ( - 7) (-13) BAHAMAS 1 1 3 3 5 1 3 3 (+4)
LEEWARD 5 14 0 14 8 9 5 6 ISLANDS ( - 9 ) (-14) (-1) ( - 1 ) WINDWARD 26 12 3 11 12 23 15 5 ISLANDS (+14) ( - 8) (-11) (+10)