"University Student Support for Caribbean Integration: a Four Campus Study" 1
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"UNIVERSITY STUDENT SUPPORT FOR CARIBBEAN INTEGRATION: A FOUR CAMPUS STUDY" 1 Walter C. Soderlund, Stuart H. Surlin, Robert M. Krause, Frank Innes, Ronald M. Welch all at the University of Windsor Windsor, Ontario CANADA N9B 3P4 • Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Conference of the Caribbean Studies Association Kingston, Jamaica May 1993 INTRODUCTION: Following World War II, in spite of reservations evident in the Moyne Report, British policy sought to link the independence of its West Indian colonies to their integration into a federal political system (Will, 1991:5-10). While a West Indies Federation was created in 1958, its British rather than West Indian origins, an emphasis on political over economic factors and the insularity or parochialism of its component parts, led to its collapse before the end of 1962 (Etzioni, 1965:138-139). Excellent accounts of the origins, performance and demise of the Federation are contained in (Proctor, 1957; Springer, 1962; Mordicai, 1968, Millette, 1969; Axline, 1979; and Payne, 1980). In spite of the failure of the Federation, individual West Indian colonies of Great Britain did achieve their independence between 1962 (Jamaica and Trinidad/Tobago) and 1983 (St. Kitts- Nevis). During the same time, a network of cooperative and integrative schemes among the countries developed; chief among these being the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) in 1965, the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) in 1966, the Eastern Caribbean Common Market (ECCM) in 1968 (which developed into the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States in 1981), and the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) in 1973. The latter organization, presided over by a Council of Heads of Government, has focused primarily on economic and other types of functional cooperation (Emanuel, 1987:1-6). While CARICOM has had its successes, not all assessments of its performance are glowing; in fact some are quite critical. Excellent analyses of its achievements and failures are offered by (Segal, 1968; Milne, 1974; Payne, 1981; Payne 1985; Axline 1988; Maincot, 1989; Griffith, 1990; Will, 1991; as well as by the West Indian Commission, 1992). As James Millette has observed, "serious collaboration in the West Indies has been and will continue to be one of the most persistent themes in the region's development" (1969:409) and it appears that a new and perhaps decisive chapter in Caribbean integration began in July 1989, when the CARICOM Heads of Government Conference meeting in Grenada called for the establishment of an independent West Indian Commission to consult the populations of the respective countries regarding the future of the region (Bowen, 1991:15-17). The Commission was to present its final report in July of 1992, and unquestionably increased integration among member states was at the heart of its charge: "...against this background of historic change and historic appraisal, [changes in the U.S.S.R., the movement toward a single European market and the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement] the Caribbean could be in danger of becoming a backwater, separated from the main current of human advance into the twenty-first century" (West Indian Commission, 1991:3). With the end of overt East-West conflict the current international climate is far more conducive to a new thrust toward integration than was the case in the Cold-War dominated 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, which saw the Caribbean caught up in struggles between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (Basdeo, 1990; Serbin, 1990; Pastor and Fletcher, 1991). Internationalization of corporate ownership and the development of mega-trading blocs also serve as powerful incentives for regional integration. Domestic factors, primarily concerned with the severe economic crisis that gripped the region in the decade of the 1980s, appear as well to favour renewed attempts to promote increased integration: "By the end of the 1980's, for the first time, the governments of the thirteen English-speaking nations, including the largest ones, were all determined to reach some level of integration. Guyana's Desmond Hoyte said, 'For small countries such as ours, the lesson is clear: we either integrate or perish'" (Kurlansky, 1992:281-282). The Commission released a progress report in 1991 calling for immediate action on six points, all related to economic integration: unrestricted travel, free movement of skilled people, developing a common currency, enhancing investment, creating a single CARICOM market, and negotiating with the international community in a coordinated way (West Indies Commission, 1991: 30-39). The focus on economic factors, combined with some attention to cultural concerns, continued in the Commission's Final Report, Time for Action. The Report concluded that political integration was a goal "out of reach" and specifically rejected any "return to federalism". The thrust of the Report was rather on what may be called "instrumental integration" --an emphasis on implementing "integration at practical levels affecting everyday lives" (West Indies Commission, 1992:22-25). The sharing of sovereignty implicit in any scheme of federalism was rejected by the Commission which opted instead for a form of "sovereignty-association"; or, in its words, "a Community of sovereign states". The report strongly advocated what might be termed "bureaucratic-driven integration". Arguing that "The Caricom 4 ship needs a captain- not only sailing orders", it called for the swift creation of a CARICOM Commission, to give "regional leadership on a day to day basis within the framework of CARICOM as a Community of sovereign states" (West Indian Commission, 1992:78; xxviii; 461-508). In October 1992, the Caribbean Heads of Government met to consider the Commission's report. While it was praised as "a landmark document in charting the course of Caribbean integration," the major recommendation for the creation of a CARICOM Commission was rejected "...in favour of an arrangement in which three regional Prime Ministers would head a structure known as the Caricom Bureau" (John, 1992-93:6). Cost and unnecessary bureaucratic structure were cited as the reasons for rejecting the creation of the CARICOM Commission, although reluctance to relinquish political power in this important initiative no doubt also played a role. At the same time that West Indian integration has resurfaced as an issue, (as well as the possibility of pan-Caribbean integration), also on the region's integration agenda are proposals to develop a political union among the Windward Islands and for closer collaboration between Barbados, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago (Bousquet, 1992-93:7). Thus the early 1990s seem to be a "make or break" period for the success of integrative ventures of both regional and sub-regional scale. Attitudes toward integration on the part of would-be- integrated populations have been long identified as a crucial 5 variable in the success of any venture (Deutsch et al., 1957; Haas and Schmitter, 1964; Etzioni, 1965; Fisher, 1969; Hanson, 1969; Lindberg, 1970, Inglehart, 1970; Nye, 1971; Pentland, 1973; and Puchala, 1981). In particular, Deutsch et al. stress "the mutual compatibility of main values" (1957:46-58), while Haas and Schmitter point to the necessity of "elite complementarity" (1964:712). The centrality of elite attitudes to successful integration provided the theoretical underpinning for the work of a number of scholars at the University of Windsor examining the origins of Canadian confederation in the mid-nineteenth century (White, et al., 1979; Nelson, et al., 1990; and Wagenberg, et al., 1990). While of necessity this research probed elite attitudes through analysis of printed speeches, findings have reinforced the importance of such attitudes in understanding contemporary problems which bedevil Canadian unity (Soderlund, et al., 1990:67-69). While it is important to acknowledge that supportive attitudes in themselves are insufficient for the achievement of integration, it appears highly doubtful that any integration scheme could realize non-coerced, long-term success in the face of elite opposition. Thus a systematic assessment of attitudes toward integration on the part of various elite groups in the thirteen English-speaking member countries of CARICOM should receive high priority on the region's research agenda.` METHODS: As a pilot study for a more comprehensive study, during the Spring and Summer of 1992 (prior to the release of the Final Report 6 of the West Indian Commission) we undertook to survey attitudes toward integration held by university students at four campuses in the English-speaking Caribbean. While not elites per se, university students in the Caribbean certainly can be categorized as elites of the future in their respective societies. Data was collected at four locations,' The University of the West Indies-- Mona, Jamaica (N=75); Cave Hill, Barbados (N=31); St. Augustine, Trinidad (N=28), and University College of Belize, Belize City (N=24); a total of 158 respondents. Data collection was facilitated by local researchers at each of the sites. 4 While not a random sample of the student population, an attempt was made to obtain a representative array of respondents. Specific distributions on key demographic variables are as follows: Home Country:" Barbados-18%/ Belize-16%/ Jamaica-38%/ Trinidad and Tobago-20%/ Other 8% Gender: Males- 37%/ Females-63% Age: Under 20- 14%/ 20-24- 40%/ 25-29-25%/ 30 and over-21% Level of Education: Undergraduate- 87%/ Graduate-13% Area of Study: Social Science-35%/