Bibliography of Alvin Plantinga 1958

1958 (a) 'Dooyeweerd on Meaning and Being', Reformed Journal 8, October, 10-15. (b) 'An Existentialist's Ethics', Review of Metaphysics 12,235-256.

1961 (a) 'Things and Persons', Review ofMetaphysics 14,493-519. (b) 'A Valid Ontological Argument?' Philosophical Review 70, 93-101. (c) 'It's Actual, so it must be Possible', Philosophical Studies 12,61-64.

1962 (a) 'The Perfect Goodness of God', Australasian Journal ofPhilosophy 40, 70-75.

1963 (a) 'Christianity and Analytic Philosophy', Christianity Today 8, No.2, 17-20.

1964 (a) Faith and Philosophy (ed.), William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., Grand Rapids, MJ. (b) 'Necessary Being', Faith and Philosophy, pp. 97-110. (c) 'On Being Honest to God', Reformed Journal 14, April, 11-15.

1965 (a) The Ontological Argument (ed.), Doubleday, Anchor Books, Garden City, NY. (b) 'A comment on the Strategy of the Skeptic', Faith and the Philosophers (ed. J. Hick), pp. 226-227.

(c) 'The Free Will Defense', Philosophy in America (ed. by Max Black), Cornell Uni- versity Press, pp. 204-220. This article was my initial attempt to provide a precise and plausible modal formulation of one traditional approach to the problem of evil - the free will defense. I later expand and refme this modal formulation in The Nature of Necessity (1974a) and God, Freedom, and Evil (1974b).

1966 (a) 'Induction and other Minds', Review ofMetaphysics 19,441-461. (b) 'Kant's Objection to the Ontological Argument', Journal of Philosophy 63,537- 546. (c) 'Pike and Possible Persons', Journal of Philosophy 63, 104-108. (d) 'Comments (on Hilary Putnam's 'The Mental Life of Some Machines')', Inten• tionality, Minds, and Perception (ed. H. N. Castaneda), Wayne State University Press, Detroit, pp. 201-205.

1967 (a) God and Other Minds, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY. In this study I explore the rationality of belief in the existence of God. Part I examines natural theology by way of treating the cosmological, ontological, and teleological arguments for the existence of God. I conclude that each of these arguments is unsuccessful. Part II deals with natural atheology, and I take up the problem of evil, verificationism, and the paradox of omnipotence. Here too I find that each of these fails. In Part III I explore various analogies between belief in God and belief in other minds. I conclude that these two beliefs are on an epistemological par: if either is rational, so is the other. But surely belief in other minds is rational. Thus, we must say the same for belief in God. (b) 'Norman Malcolm', Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy , pp. 139-140. (c) 'Radical Theology', Reformed Journall7 May/June, 7-10.

1968 (a) 'Induction and Other Minds II', Review ofMetaphysics 21,524-533.

1969 (a) 'De Re et De Dicto', Nous 3, 235-258.

1970 (a) 'Why Climb Mountains?' Reformed Journal 20, 6-8. (b) 'World and Essence', Philosophical Review 79,461-492.

400 BIBLIOGRAPHY

1971 (a) 'Christians, Scholars and Christian Scholars', The Banner 106, June 18, 4-7. (b) 'What George Could Not Have Been', Nous 5,227-232.

1973 (a) 'Which Worlds Could God Have Created?' Journal of Philosophy 70, 539-552. (b) 'Transworld Identity or Worldbound Individuals?' Logic and Ontology (ed. by Milton Munitz), New York Univeristy Press, NY, pp. 193-212.

1974 (a) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford University Press, Oxford, England. This book is a systematic treatment of modality. Chapter I locates and IlXes the idea of broadly logical necessity. In Chapters II and III, I consider and reject various objections to modality de re and argue that this notion can be explained by way of modality de dicta. Chapter IV presents and explains the concept of possible worlds. In Chapter V, I argue that each object has an essence: a property essential to it and essentially unique to it. Chapter VI examines and dismisses the so-called problem of transworld identity. In Chapters VII and VIII, I take up the question of whether there are possible but nonactual individuals. I argue against such items. Chapters IX and X consider the bearing of the above modal matters on two issues in natural theology: the problem of evil and the ontological argument. I attempt to resolve the former while providing a sound version of the latter. Finally, in an appendix, I explore and partly concur with Quine's claim that quantified modal logic presupposes what he calls Aristotelian Essentialism - the view that objects typically have both accidental and essential properties. (b) God, Freedom and Evil, Harper Torchbook, New York, NY. For the most part, the material presented here is an elementary version of material developed in The Nature of Necessity (1974a). There is one major exception: here I consider in addition the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. I argue that they are indeed mutually compatible. (c) 'Aquinas - 700 Years Later', Reformed Journal 24, 5-7. (d) 'God and Rationality', Reformed Journal 24, 28-29. (e) 'Our Reasonable Service', The Banner 109, Oct. 18,6-8.

1975 (a) 'Aquinas on Anselm', God and the Good (ed. by C. Orlebeke and L. Smedes), Eerdmans Press, Grand Rapids.

401 ALVIN PLANTINGA

(b) 'On Mereological Essentialism', Review of Metaphysics 28,468-476. (c) 'Reply to Henry',Philosophical Books 16, No.3, 8-10.

1976

(a) 'Existence, Necessity and God', The New Scholasticism 50,61-72. (b) 'Necessary Existence: A Reply to Carter', Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6, 105-111. (c) 'Possible Worlds', The Listener 95, June 30. (d) 'Actualism and Possible Worlds', Theoria 42, 139-160. According to the Canonical Conception of Possible worlds, there are or could have been nonexistent objects. For surely there are possible worlds in which you and I do not exist. Hence, where W is such a world, '" (W) is the domain of objects that exist in W, and U is the union of the domains of all the worlds, we find that", (W) of U. So, if W had been actual, U would have had some members that do not exist - there would have been some nonexistent individuals. After Robert M. Adams, suppose we use 'Actualism' to designate the view that there neither are nor could be any nonexistent individuals. Now I enthusiastically endorse Actualism; and the aim of the present study, therefore, is to set out the essentials of an actualist conception of possible worlds.

1978

(a) 'The Boethian Compromise', American Philosophical Quarterly 15, 129-138. After criticizing some recent anti-Fregean views of proper names, I advance a view containing both Fregean as well as anti-Fregean elements. I propose that proper names do indeed express properties. In particular, I hold that proper names express essences. Since individuals have multiple essences, distinct proper names of one and the same object can express logically equivalent but epistemi• cally inequivalent essences of that object. This view, I argue, enables us to resolve various puzzles surrounding empty proper names, negative existentials containing proper names, propositional identity, and the informativeness of some identity statements.

1979

(a) 'The Probabilistic Argument from Evil', Philosophical Studies 35, 1-53. Consider the propositions G: God exists and He is omniscient, omnipotent, and wholly good E: There are 10 13 turps of evil where '10 13 turps' names the amount of evil the actual world contains. Suppose we agree - as I have argued elsewhere - that G and E are jointly consistent. Still, some natural atheologians have maintained that G is somehow improbable

402 BIBLIOGRAPHY

on E. Here I examine the leading interpretations of probability and argue that on none of these are we entitled to think that the probability of G given E is low. (b) 'Is belief in God Rational?' in Rationality and Religious Belief, (ed. by C. Delaney), University of Notre Dame Press, South Bend, IN, pp. 7-27. (c) 'De Essentia', Essays on the Philosophy of Roderick M Chisholm, (ed. E. Sosa), Rodopi, Amsterdam, pp. 101-121.

1980

(a) Does God Have a Nature?, Marquette University Press, WI. (b) 'The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology', Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 54,49-63. Many Reformed theologians have rejected natural theology, where the latter is viewed as an attempt to provide proofs of the existence of God. They have held not merely that the proffered arguments fail, but that the whole enterprise is radically misguided. What is intended here, I think, is that belief in God need not be based on argument or evidence from other propositions at all. In brief, it is held that belief in God is properly basic. In this paper, I develop and defend this position.

1981

(a) 'Is Belief in God Properly Basic?', Nous 15, 41-51. (b) 'The Case of Kant' in Introduction to Philosophy (ed. by Jack Rogers). (c) 'Rationality and Religious Belief', Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, (ed. by S. Cahn and D. Shatz), Oxford Univeristy Press, New York, NY, pp. 255-277. (d) 'Reply to the Basinger Brothers',Journal of Process Philosophy 11,25-29.

1982

(a) 'On Reformed Epistemology', Reformed Journal 32, January, 13-17. (b) 'How To Be an Anti-Realist', Proceedings of the American Philosophical Associa• tion 56,47-70. (c) 'Reformed Epistemology Again', Reformed Journal 32, July, 7 -S. (d) 'Tooley and Evil', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60, 66 -7 5.

1983

(a) 'Hector-Neri Castaneda: A Personal Statement', in Agent, Language and the Structure of the World (ed. James Tomberlin), Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, IN, pp. 7-13. (b) 'Guise Theory', in Agent, Language and the Structure of the World (ed. by James Tomberlin), Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, IN, pp. 43-77.

403 ALVIN PLANTINGA

In this paper I state and examine the sweepirtg ontological theory Hector-Neri Castafieda has been developing the past few years: Guise Theory. Castafieda's Theory is rich and complex; it is intriguing, indeed, utterly fascinating. But I argue that it is fundamentally mistaken. (c) 'The Reformed Objection Revisited', Christian Scholars Review 11,57-61. (d) 'On Existentialism', Philosophical Studies 44, 1-20. By the thisness of an individual, let us mean the property of being that indi• vidual. By an individual essence E of an object x, suppose we mean a property that is essential to x and is essentially unique to x. Now I think that objects do have thisnesses; what is more, I think that thisnesses are essences. But modal existentialism opts for a great deal more. One existentialist thesis is that this• nesses are ontologically dependent upon their exemplifications: if an object x had not existed, then its thisness would not have existed. A second existentialist thesis holds that singular propositions are ontologically dependent upon the individuals they involve: if an object x had not existed, then no singular pro• position directly about x would have existed. Here I argue against existentialism.

Forthcoming

1. Faith and Rationality (ed. with N. Wolterstorff), University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, IN. 2. 'Reason and Belief in God', in Faith and Rationality (ed. A. Plantinga and N. Wolterstorff), University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, IN., pp. 16-93. Part I explores the evidentialist objection to theistic belief - the claim that theistic belief is irrational or noetically second-rate because there is insuffi• cient evidence for it. Part II begins with an account of Aquinas' views on faith and knowledge; it argues that the evidentialist objection and the Thomistic conception of faith and reason can be traced to a common root in classical foundationalism, and that classical foundationalism is self referentially in• coherent. Part III explores the Reformed rejection of natural theology, seeing in it ultimately a rejection of classical foundationalism in favor of the view that belief in God is properly basic. What the Reformers meant to hold is that it is entirely right, rational, reasonable and proper to believe in God without argument or evidence from other beliefs at all. Part IV develops and articulates this view and defends it against objections. 3. 'Fideism', in Rationality in the Calvinian Tradition (ed. by H. Hart). 4. 'On Taking Belief in God as Basic', in Religious Experience and Religious Belief" Essays in the Epistemology ofReligion. 5. 'Advice to Christian Philosophers Inaugural Address as John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame', Faith and Philosophy 1, July, 1984.

404 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Discussions (Compiled by Christopher Menzel)

Philosophy of Religion

The Free Will Defense Ackerman, R.: 1982, 'An Alternative Free Will Defense', Religious Studies 18,365-372. Adams, R.: 1973, 'Middle Knowledge', Journal of Philosophy 70,552-554. Adams, R.: 1977, 'Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil', American Philosophical Quarterly 14,109-117. Anderson, S.: 1981, 'Plantinga and the Free Will Defense', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62,274-281. Botterill, G.: 1977, 'Falsification and the Existence of God: A Discussion of Plantinga's Free Will Defense', Philosophical Quarterly 27,114-134. Barnhart, J.: 1977, 'Theodicy and the Free Will Defense: Response to Plantinga and Flew', Religious Studies 13,439-453. Basinger, D.: 1982, 'Anderson onPlantinga: A Reponse',PhilosophicalResearchArchives 8, no. 1499. Basinger, D.: 1982, 'Plantinga's Free Will Defense as a Challenge to Orthodox Theism', American Journal ofPhilosophy and Theology 3,35-41. Bennett, P.: 1973, 'Evil, God and the Free Will Defense', Australian Journal of Phi- losophy 51, 39-50. Burch, R.: 1979, 'Plantinga and Leibniz's Lapse', Analysis 39, 24-29. Chernoff, F.: 1980, 'The Obstinance of Evil', Mind 89, 269-273. Cooper, K.: 1983, 'Here We Go Again: Pike vs. Plantinga on the Problem of Evil', InternationalJournal for Philosophy ofReligion 14, 107 -116. Dore, C.: 1971, 'Plantinga on the Free Will Defense', Review of Metaphysics 24,690- 706. Evans, J.: 1983, 'Lafollette on Plantinga's Free Will Defense', International Journal for Philosophy ofReligion 14,117-121. Feinberg, J.: 1979, Theologies and Evil, University Press of America, Washington, D.C., ch.4. Flew, A.: 1973, 'Compatibilism, Free Will, and God', Philosophy 48, 231-244. Gan, B.: 1982, 'Plantinga's Transworld Depravity: It's Got Possibilities', International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13,169-177. Hedenius, I.: 1971, 'Disproofs of God's Existence?', The Personalist 52, 23-43. Helm, P.: 1974, 'God and Free Will', Sophia 13,16-19. Hoitenga, D.: 1967, 'Logic and the Problem of Evil', American Philosophical Quarterly 4,114-126. Kenny, A.: 1979, The God of the Philosophers, Clarendon Press, Oxford, ch. 5. Kondolean, T.: 1983, 'The Free Will Defense: New and Old', The Thomist 47,1-42. Kroon, F.: 1981, 'Plantinga on God, Freedom, and Evil', International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12,75-96. La Croix, R.: 1974, 'Unjustified Evil and God's Choice', Sophia 13,20-28. Lafollette, H.: 1980, 'Plantinga on the Free Will Defense', International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 11,123-132.

405 ALVIN PLANTINGA

Lomasky, L.: 1975, 'Are Compatibilism and Free Will Compatible?', The Personalist 56,385-388. Mackie, J.: 1982, The Miracle of Theism, Clarendon Press, Oxford, ch. 9. Mavrodes, G.: 1970, 'Some Recent Philosophical Theology', Review ofMetaphysics 24, 82-111. Moore, H.: 1978, 'Evidence, Evil, and Religious Belief', International Journal for Phi• losophy of Religion 9,241-251. Moore, H.: 1978, 'Evidence - Once More: Reply to E. Wierenga's "Reply to H. Moore's 'Evidence, Evil, and Religious Belief'''', International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9,252-253. Perkins, R.: 1983, 'An Atheistic Argument from the Improvability of the Universe', Nous 17, 239-250. Petersen, M.: forthcoming, 'Recent Work on the Problem of Evil',American Philosoph• ical Quarterly. Pike, N.: 1977, 'Divine Foreknowledge, Human Freedom, and Possible Worlds', The Philosophical Review 86, 209-216. Pike, N.: 1979, 'Plantinga on Free Will and Evil', Religious Studies 15,449-473. Pike, N.: 1966, 'Plantinga on the Free Will Defense: A Reply', Journal of Philosophy 63,93-104. Ratzsch, D.: 1981, 'Plantinga's Free Will Defense', International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12,235-244. Rowe, W.: 1973, 'Plantinga on Possible Worlds and Evil' (Abstract), Journal of Phi• losophy 70,554-555. Sterba, J.: 1976, 'God, Plantinga, and a Better World', International Journal for Phi• losophy of Religion 7,446-451. Steuer, A.: 1974, 'Once More on the Free Will Defense', Religious Studies 10,301- 311. Tomberlin, J. and F. McGuinness.: 1977, 'Good, Evil, and the Free Will Defense', Religious Studies 13,455-475. Tooley, M.: 1980, 'Alvin Plantinga and the Argument from Evil', Australian Journal of Philosophy 58, 360-376. Wainwright, W.: 1968, 'Freedom and Omnipotence', Nous 2, 293-301. Walton, D.: 1975, 'Language, God, and Evil', International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6, 154-162. Wierenga, E.: 1978, 'Reply to Harold Moore's 'Evidence, Evil, and Religious Belief', International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9,246-251. Windt, P.: 1973, 'Plantinga's Unfortunate God', Philosophical Studies 24, 335-342. Yandell, K.: 1981, 'The Problem of Evil',Philosophical Topics 12,7-38. Young, R.: 1975, Freedom, Responsibility, and God Macmillan London, ch. 14.

The Epistem%gy of Belief in God Ameriks, K.: 1978, 'Plantinga and Other Minds', Southern Journal of Philosophy 16, 285-291. Baldwin, A., De Boer, J., and Losin, P.: 1982, 'Reformed Epistemology: Three Replies', Reformed Journal 32 (April), 21-25. Boyle, J., Hubbard, J., and Sullivan, T.: 1982, 'The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology: A Catholic Perspective', Christian Scholar's Review 11,199-211.

406 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Christensen, W., and King-Farlow, J.: 1971, 'Gambling on Other Minds - Human and Divine', Sophia 10,1-6. De Boer, J., Baldwin, A., and Losin, P.: 1982, 'Reformed Epistemology: Three Replies', Reformed Journal 32 (April), 21-25. Depaul, M.: 1981, 'The Rationality of Belief in God', Religous Studies 17,343-356. Friguegnon, M.: 1979, 'God and Other Programs', Religious Studies 15,83-89. Goetz, S.: forthcoming, 'Belief in God is not Properly Basic', Religious Studies. Grigg, R.: 'Theism and Proper Basicality: A Response to Plantinga', International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 123 -127. Gutting, G.: 1982, Religious Belief and Religious Skepticism, Univ. of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, ch. 3. Hubbard, J., Boyle, J., and Sullivan, T.: 1982, 'The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology: A Catholic Perspective', Christian Scholar's Review 11, 199-211. Hughes, G.: 1970, 'Plantinga on the Rationality of God's Existence', The Philosophical Review 79, 342-352. Iseminger, G.: 1974, 'Successful Argument and Rational Belief', Philosophy and Rhetoric 7,47-57. Kenny, A.: 1983, Faith and Reason, Columbia Univ. Press, New York, ch. 1. King-Farlow, J., and Christensen, W.: 1971, 'Gambling on Other Minds - Human and Divine', Sophia 10,1-6. Losin, P., Baldwin, A., and de Boer, J.: 1982, 'Reformed Epistemology: Three Replies', Reformed Journal 32 (April), 21-25. Ostien, P.: 1974, 'God, Other Minds, and Inference to the Best Explanation', Canadian Journal ofPhilosophy 4, 149-162. Ray, P.: 1976, 'An Inductive Argument for Other Minds', Philosophical Studies 29, 129-139. Richman, R.: 1972, 'Plantinga, God, and (Yet) Other Minds', Australian Journal of Philosophy 50,40-54. Rudinow, J.: 1971, 'Gambling on Other Minds and God', Sophia 10,27-29. Saunders, J.: 1973, 'Persons, Criteria, and Skepticism', Metaphilosophy 4, 95-123. Slote, M.: 1966, 'Induction and Other Minds', Review of Metaphysics 20, 341-360. Sullivan, T., Boyle, J., and Hubbard, J.: 1982, 'The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology: A Catholic Perspective', Christian Scholar's Review 11, 199-211. Tomberlin, J.: 1970, 'Is Belief in God Justified?', Journal of Philosophy 67, 31-38. Tomberlin, J.: 1969, 'Plantinga's Puzzles about God and Other Minds', Philosophical Forum 1,365-391. van Hook, J: 1982, '''Knowledge'' in Quotes', Reformed Journal 32 (June), 8-9.

The Ontological Argument Coburn, R.: 1971, 'Animadversions on Plantinga's Kant', Ratio 13,19-29. Grim, P.: 1981, 'Plantinga, Hartshorne, and the Ontological Argument', Sophia 20, 12-16. Grim, P.: 1979, 'Plantinga's God', Sophia 18,35-42. Grim, P.: 1979, 'Plantinga's God and Other Monstrosities', Religious Studies 15,91-97. Hasker, W.: 1982, 'Is There a Second Ontological Argument?', International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13,93-102. Mackie, J.: 1982, The Miracle of Theism, Clarendon Press, Oxford, ch. 3.

407 ALVIN PLANTINGA

Mavrodes, G.: 1966, 'Properties, Predicates, and the Ontological Argument', Journal of Philosophy 63, 549-550. Mavrodes, G.: 'Some Recent Philosophical Theology', Review of Metaphysics 24, 82- 111. Oakes, R.: 1974, 'God, Electrons, and Professor Plantinga', Philosophical Studies 25, 143-146. Pinkerton, R.: 1977, 'Kant's Refutation of the Ontological Argument', Indian Philosoph· ical Quarterly 5, 19-38. Tapscott, B.: 1971, 'Plantinga, Properties and the Ontological Argument, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31,604-605. Tooley, M.: 1981, 'Plantinga's Defense of the Ontological Argument', Mind 90, 422- 427. Van Inwagen, P.: 1977, 'Ontological Arguments',Nous 11,375-395. God's Attributes Basinger, D., and Basinger, R.: 1981, 'Divine Omnipotence: Plantinga vs. Griffin', Process Studies 11, 11-24. Blumenfeld, D.: 1978, 'On the Compossibility of the Divine Attributes', Philosophical Studies 34, 91-103. Gellman, J.: 1975, 'The Paradox of Ombipotence and Perfection', Sophia 14, 31-39. La Croix, R.: 1974, 'God Might Not Love Us', International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5, 157-161. Mann, W.: 1982, 'Divine Simplicity', Religious Studies 18, 451-471.

Ontology

Actualism and Possible Worlds Austin, D.: 1981, 'Plantinga on Actualism and Essences', Philosophical Studies 39, 35-42.' Brody, B.: 1972, 'De Re and De Dicto Interpretations of Modal Logic or a Return to Aristotelian Essentialism', Philosophia 2, 117 -136. Brody, B.: 1980,Identity and Essence, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, ch. 5. Camp, J.: 1971, 'Plantinga on De Dicto and De Re',Nous 5, 215-226. Carter, W.: 1975, 'On Relative Possibility',Philosophia 5, 489-498. Carter, W.: 1976, 'Plantinga on Existing Necessarily', Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6,95-104. Carter, W.: 1972, 'Plantinga on Disembodied Existence', The Philosophical Review 81, 360-363. Chandler, H.: 1976, 'Plantinga on the Contingently Possible', Analysis 36, 106-109. Corrado, M.: 1974, 'Plantinga on Necessity De Re', Logique et Analyse 17,445-452. Fitch, G.: 1978, 'Plantinga's Necessary A Posteriori Truths', Canadian Journal of Phi· losophy 8, 323-327. Fumerton, R.: 1976, 'Chandler on the Contingently Possible', Analysis 37, 39-40. Gean, W.: 1975, 'The Logical Connection Argument and De Re Necessity', American Philosophical Quarterly 12,349-352. Jager, T.: 1982, 'An Actualist Semantics for Quantified Modal Logic', Notre Dame Journal of Formal LogiC 23, 335-349.

408 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Jager, T.: forthcoming, 'De Re and De Dicta', Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic. Loux, M.: 1972, 'Recent Work in Ontology', American Philosophical Quarterly 9, 119-138. Maloney, C.: 1980, 'On What Might Be', Southern Journal of Philosophy 18,313-322. McMichael, A.: 1983, 'A Problem for Actualism About Possible Worlds', The Philosoph• ical Review 92,49-66. Norton, B.: 1980, 'De Re Modality, Generic Essences and Science', Philosophia 9, 167-186. Rowe, W.: 1973, 'Plantinga on Possible Worlds', Journal of Philosophy 70, 554-555. Tolhurst, W.: 1982, 'On an Alleged Inconsistency in Plantinga's Defense of Actualism', Philosophical Studies 41, 427-430. Tomberlin, J.: 1970, 'A Correct Account of Essentialism?', Critica 4,55-67. White, M.: 1977, 'Plantinga and the Actual World', Analysis 37,97-104.

Essences and Proper Names Ackerman, D.: 1976, 'Plantinga, Proper Names, and Propositions', Philosophical Studies 30,409-412. Austin, D.: 1981, 'Plantinga on Actualism and Essences', Philosophical Studies 39, 35-42. Austin, D.: 1983, 'Plantinga's Theory of Proper Names', Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 24,115-132. Mendelsohn, R.: 1978, 'Plantinga on Proper Names and Propositions', Philosophical Studies 34, 211-218. Oberdan, T.: 1980, 'Plantinga's Doctrine of Essences', Auslegung 7,130-143. Smith, C.: 1981, 'Plantinga on the Essence of Essence', Analysis 41,164-167. Tichy, P.: 1972, 'Plantinga on Essence: A Few Questions', The Philosophical Review 81, 82-93.

Selected Book Reviews

God and Other Minds Crombie, 1.: 1970, Philosophical Quarterly 20,312-313. Loux, M.: 1970, The New Scholasticism 44, 184-188. Rowe, W.: 1969, Nous 3, 259-284. Slote, M.: 1970, Journal ofPhilosophy 67, 39-45.

The Nature of Necessity Adams, R.: 1977,Nous 11, 175-190. Bacon, J.: 1976, Grazer Philosophische Studien 2,239-246. Corrado, M.: 1975,International Philosophical Quarterly 15,231-234. Fine, K.: 1976, The Philosophical Review 85, 562-566. Haack, S.: 1976,Philosophy 51,62-79. Harachovec, H.: 1981, Philosophische Rundschau 28,68-83. Swinburne, R.: 1976,Mind 85,131-134.

409 ALVIN PLANTINGA

Does God Have A Nature? Freddoso, A.: 1983, Christian Scholar's Review 12,78-83. Hehn, P.: 1982, Philosophical Books 23, 50-5l. Kondolean, T.: 1981,ReviewofMetaphysics 34, 798-799. Mann, w.: 1982,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42,625-630. Rowe, W.: 1983, The Philosophical Review 92, 305-306.

God, Freedom, and Evil Hick, 1.: 1978, Religious Studies 14,407-409.

410