War Department

WAR DEPARTMENT OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS LIBRARY CLASS BOOK t>*:. j linger REPORT OF THE CHIEF ENGINEER. I . v • WAR DEPARTMENT .OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF E~!GIH~iRS LIBRAA't § REPORT OF THE CHIEF ENGINEER. ENGINEER DEPARTMENT, Washington, November 30, 1850. SIR: The following report explains the condition of the fortifications under construction or repair on the seacoast and northern border. It also gives the condition of the Military Academy, and refers to other matters committed to this department. FORTIFICATIONS, AND MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS CONNECTED * THEREWITH-. There may be advantage in referring to the history of the system of for¬ tifications upon our seacoast. Soon after the organization of the govern¬ ment under the constitution-, it became apparent, that though remote from the old continent, our distance might not avert a participation in the wars that the French revolution had spread over the rest of Christendom; and, accordingly, considerable expenditures were made on forts and batteries at the principal seaports. The defences remaining from oui; revolutionary war (being erections in earth for temporary purposes merely) afforded little or no aid; and as all the principal harbors had to be protected at once, and the means of the treasury were not large, the works then erected were small, and for the greater part temporary, both from the nature of their materials and the mode of construction. This state of things answered while we had no more powerful maritime enemy to contend with than France, especially as she had full employment for all her military means upon her own coasts, or in waging wars on he r own ‘continent. When, however, in consequence of the attack on the Chesapeake frigate, and the injuries inflicted on our commerce by English cruisers, there arose a probability that we might soon be at issue with Great Britain, our government became sensible—considering the inadequacy of the above-mentioned provision of defences—of the necessity of an immediate enlargement of the system. Large appropriations were forthwith made for defence, and were continued from year to year, and great activity was given to the labors of construction, so that when the war actually broke out in 1812 there was not a town upon the seaboard of any magnitude that was not supplied with one or more batteries; a portion of these being, however, works erected under the first system. At that time, the incidents which may be said to be natural to a state of active warfare were too familiar to all, to permit any expectation that, with an enemy enjoying the mastery on the water, a place would find safety in its littleness from the marauding expeditions of smaller cruisers. 0 The clamor of local apprehension was not to be disregarded by the government; and the consequence was, as above stated, that every town, 4 small as well as great, whether upon the coast or on the navigable estu¬ aries and rivers, was supplied with defences. And there can be no doubt that to the mere fact of the existence of defences may be ascribed an ex¬ emption from loss of blood and treasure, greater in value a hundred times than the money bestowed on their erection. These defences, which maybe said to have constituted the second sys¬ tem, were, however, so numerous, that, under only moderate appropria¬ tions, (then always granted in a gross sum,) they could only be, for the greater part, small; and being built, for the sake of present economy, of cheap materials and workmanship, were perishable as well as weak. So well did the government understand this weakness, however, that they called out to the support of all the most important posts large bodies of troops, at enormous expense, causing these troops to be covered by additional and extensive lines of field-works. No sooner was the war over than the government, in fresh recollection of the weakness of the system on which they had been obliged to depend, and of the great additional expenditures they had been obliged to incur in large assemblages of troops, and in various temporary devices, determined to enter promptly upon an adequate permanent system. To this end experienced ‘naval, and engineer officers were directed to make close examination of the whole coast, examining all the existing works, and selecting points necessary to be occupied by new fortifications, and such as were proper for navy yards and depots. The board of of¬ ficers which was soon constituted for this purpose, applied themselves several years uninterruptedly to this duty; giving, each year, particular re¬ ports of their operations, and presenting plans for such fortifications as were most immediately necessary. They divided the whole system into classes, according to the relative importance of the proposed works, in the order of time; the works of each class standing, moreover, in their own class, according to their relative importance in that respect. This, being what may be called the third system, has now been under construction some thirty years; it has met the support of each succeeding administration, which, in measure as advancement was made therein, has called for the support of Congress for such new works as came next in turn. These calls have sometimes encountered delay; but, after careful exami¬ nation by the military committees, have always been acceded to; and the general result even now, when a good deal required for complete protec¬ tion is yet untouched, is, that the most important points of the coast are in comparative security; permanent forts and batteries being already provided, and now entirely ready for upwards of four thousand cannon. The leading objects of this system are to provide permanent fortifi¬ cations for the most commanding and influential positions on the ap¬ proaches to the principal cities, towns, or public establishments; preferring such positions as, while they will exclude an enemy’s squadrons, will, in case he should resort to a landing, oblige him to make a considerable detour before reaching his object; and preferring, moreover, when they can be foqnd, such positions as shall yield incidentally important protec¬ tion to other objects. Fort Delaware, now in progress in Delaware hay, is an illustration. The only defence of Philadelphia at this moment is Fort Mifflin, a small 5 and weak fort surviving from the “Mud Fort” of the revolutionary war. It is seven miles below Philadelphia, and certainly ought not to he relied on to cover that great city from a sudden attack by a squadron of steamers. The city itself affords no means of resistance, nor would it have time to pre¬ pare any, since the first intelligence of the arrival of such a squadron on the coast might be their appearance before the wharves. But Fort Delaware is forty miles below; and being made, as it certainly may, to close the river against further progress, no enemy could hope to reach the city by landing and marching thither, with the population of New Jersey, and even of New York, tailing on his flank on one side, and that of Delaware and Mary¬ land on the other. .And while this fort will thus effectually cover the city of Philadelphia, it will cover also the Chesapeake and Delaware canal ; the railroad from Baltimore to Philadelphia; the great powder manufactories on the Brandywine; the towns of New Castle, Wilmington, and Chester, and other places. The fortifications at Hampton Roads (Forts Monroe jaml Calhoun) ford an illustration of another kind. They cover primarily the great southern naval establishment near Norfolk, the city of Norfolk itself, and the towns, &c., on James river, from attacks by water. They cover also the anchorage of Hampton Hoads, which will be a harbor of refuge to the commerce of that part of the coast, as well as to that of James river and Chesapeake bay. Should an enemy attempt to approach the navy-yard at Norfolk from a landing in Lynnhaven bay, they moreover allow the suc¬ cor that will flow down James river to be landed in his rear, cutting off retreat to his ships. They permit a light squadron of our own, anchored in Hampton Roads, to cover the whole of Chesapeake bay and its tribu¬ tary rivers from the predatory enterprises of any smaller squadron. Some towns of lesser note, as regards population, become objects of im¬ portance, from their connexion with commerce, or with government estab¬ lishments, or as being in peculiar geographical positions. Mobile is not a large city, and it is almost out of an enemy’s reach, owing to the shal¬ lowness of its bay; but hundreds of ships lying every winter close to the ocean, awaiting their cargoes of cotton, can find no protection except in forts at the mouth of the bay. Nor can the commerce and communication between Mobile and New Orleans have any other sure protection at this inlet. Pensacola has little of its own to excite the cupidity of an enemy; but its bay is the best harbor, and within this bay is the only navy-yard in the Gulf. Considerations of this, or analogous nature, bring within the defensive system quite a number of places and positions. There will still remain, however, a larger number of places which will be entitled to protection only on account of the degree to which they are likely, of themselves, to invite predatory attacks. When the more important parts of the system are provided for, it will be for Congress to decide whether these also shall receive a portion of its favor. These are regarded by the board as consti¬ tuting the last class. It thus appears that the object of the present system of defence is to cover important and valuable points on the maritime frontier from an enemy’s attacks; to do this gradually, in measure as the state of the treasury will permit, and in an order corresponding with their importance and value respectively—each new undertaking being separately and ex¬ pressly sanctioned by Congress.

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