Adam's Spectacles

ADAM’S SPECTACLES NATURE, MIND AND BODY IN THE AGE OF MECHANISM Noga Arikha A dissertation submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Warburg Institute University of London 2001 1 Abstract This thesis explores the ways in which the mind-body relationship was problematized after Descartes, in the context of the scientific revolution in the second half of the seventeenth century, both in France and in England. It is an attempt to historicize ongoing debates within the cognitive sciences and the philosophy of mind about the problem of consciousness. By reconstructing a history of the status of the self-aware, human mind through the history of scientific explanation, I address the question of whether or not a complete, scientific explanation of higher consciousness is possible. Adopting a conceptual, rather than chronological framework, I concentrate on figures who played a role in the scientific, theological and philosophical debates of their day, rather than on the subjects studied in modern philosophy curricula, although Descartes, Locke and Malebranche are present throughout. Part I focuses mainly on post-Cartesian views on dualism. Part II relates these theoretical debates to discussions about the nature of scientific enquiry. The thesis begins with Fellows of the Royal Society, including William Holder and George Dalgarno, who discussed the possibility of devising a language for the deaf, as well as the nature of language, ideas and perception. Orthodox followers and later interpreters of Descartes like Gérauld de Cordemoy, François Fenelon and Louis de La Forge also wrote about these issues. Debates over the Cartesian ‘beast-machine’ thesis and over definitions of reason and instinct, are considered next, by looking at the works of Ignace-Gaston Pardies, Antoine Dilly and Pierre Bayle. These discussions were a manifestation of the need to define human nature apart from its physical embodiment. Part II begins with a consideration of the various ways that sceptical traditions informed programmes of scientific enquiry on both sides of the Channel, through the writings of Joseph Glanvill and Bernard de Fontenelle, among others. Arguments about teleology and about the relation between anatomical form and physiological function by thinkers and natural philosophers such as Robert Boyle, Nicolaus Steno and Thomas Willis are treated in the next chapter. These enquiries prepare the ground for the final chapter, which considers texts by physicians and anatomists, including Claude Perrault and Guillaume Lamy, on the physiology of the ‘corporeal soul’. 2 CONTENTS Acknowledgements 4 A note on the text 7 Introduction 8 I. Signs of mind and the souls of beasts 29 Presentation 30 1. Deafness, ideas and the language of thought 40 2. From other minds to animal bodies 76 3. The beast-machine controversy: reason, instinct and the causality of motion 107 II. Teleology, science and scepticism 131 Presentation 132 1. Other worlds: the science of knowledge 140 2. Understanding function: the organs of cognition 165 in animal and man 3. From sense to soul: God, reason and human will 201 Conclusion 242 Bibliography 248 3 Acknowledgements This project, like many PhD dissertations, has taken a fairly long time to complete. It has been a privilege to be able to spend these years on research, thinking and writing, with few cares in the world apart from the joys and anxieties usually associated with the contemplative life. For better or worse, this is a doctorate I can claim to have needed to write, and I am immensely grateful to all those who have supported me in my wish to pursue this line of enquiry, and who have believed in its potential interest. The Warburg Institute has been a unique institutional home and a haven of old scholarly values. The topic of the dissertation was conceived here, where the commitment to interdisciplinarity allows for great freedom of thought. Jill Kraye, who has guided this project at the Warburg, is bound to be one of the most available, supportive and dedicated supervisors anywhere. The thesis, such as it is, would not have come into existence without her presence; nor would it have found its shape without her editorial rigour, her intellectual discipline, her measured but constant encouragement, and her interest in helping me find a methodology suitable for the development of an argument more philosophical than historical. Most importantly, she has taught me how to temper my inordinate flights into abstraction, with a dose of the historian’s sobriety here and a dose of passion for clear thinking there. Charles Hope is another member of the Warburg staff to have witnessed the work’s progression from inception to completion, reading chapters as they slowly poured out, with sympathy, interest and a welcome eye for incoherences. Outside the Warburg, David Papineau generously read the text as it took shape, providing me at regular intervals with necessary philosophical comments and questions on some crucial points. A meeting with Simon Schaffer at the very beginning provided enough material for the next years; Rivka Feldhay’s interest early on was encouraging. Alexander Goldbloom helped me on many occasions from his base at the Wellcome Institute. Talks with Kristine Haugen have been illuminating. Thanks to Georges Rey for a provocative conversation, to Kenan Malik for a provocative argument and to Luca Turin for a provocative remark. I am grateful 4 to Richard Serjeantson, who read and annotated the chapters on animal minds with care and interest. Daniele Derossi has taught me much on Renaissance anatomy. Many thanks to Gloria Origgi for some especially pointed and clarifying comments she made on a few sections of the thesis; to Pia Pera and Adam Freudenheim for reading the introduction; and to Roberto Casati for helpful remarks early on. I am also grateful to David Goodhart and Prospect Magazine for providing me with a ‘real world’ base and to Edmund Fawcett for lengthy lunches and a writing outlet. Daily interaction with members of the Warburg, whether staff or students, is bound to have left much more than an academic mark on life after the PhD. François Quiviger’s friendship over the years extends far beyond the Institute; his insights and our exchanges on topics we both have battled with have been formative in countless ways. Surrounded by art historians, I have not had time to miss the images absent from this thesis; but I have learned how to begin understanding them better. Ending the day in the photographic collection invariably revived the mind and gaze; thanks to Paul Taylor, Mariana Giovino and Rembrandt Duits for their catching enthusiasm. My sense of belonging to a wonderful community was due in large measure to the affection of Liz McGrath and that of Ruth and Nicolai Rubinstein, as well as to Nico Mann, who, as Director of the Institute, contributed much to this sense of belonging. I thank him for giving me the opportunity to spend these marvelous years here. Working in the bright second-floor student room of the Warburg building, overlooking the squares of Bloomsbury, has been a remarkably joyful experience; the company of Annie Giletti, Marika Leino, David Porreca and Alessandro Scafi over the last year of work has sweetened the rush to completion. Daniel Andersson’s many appearances were energizing; I thank him for comments he made on the subject of this thesis and for bibliographical advice. Guido Rebecchini was a supportive accomplice earlier on, as was Julie Boch, who sojourned further along the corridor and shared her insights on Enlightenment literary history. The process of conceiving and writing this doctorate has been marked by numerous friendships and conditioned by timely, crucial meetings. I can only mention a few here. It is fair to say that the seeds of the project were sown when I first met Israel Rosenfield and Catherine Temerson some eight years ago - before I had even decided 5 to pursue postgraduate studies - at the end of a formative internship at the New York Review of Books. While there, I had already begun developing an interest in the history and philosophy of the mind sciences; but it was fed over the following years by many conversations with Israel, by his scepticism about our capacity to understand minds and brains and his knowledge of the role of history in shaping our beliefs about them. More people than I can name here helped the thesis grow, directly or indirectly. I am grateful to John Armstrong, Guido Branca, Robyn Davidson, Anthony Dworkin, Edmund Fawcett, Adam Freudenheim, Eva Hoffman, Toby Mundy and Turi Munthe for stimulating talks and for their interest; to Jeff Spier and Monique Kornell, Katia Basili, Mira Margalit, Pia Pera, Benedetta Tournon, Ute Wartenberg and Margrit Wiesendanger, present even from abroad; to my upstairs neighbour Larry Dreyfus for practicing his viola da gamba at home; to Daniele and Susanna Derossi, for their generosity. I have relied much on Alain de Botton’s insightfulness. Ian Buruma has influenced me over the years more than he might imagine. I met Claudia La Malfa in the second-floor student room at the Warburg, and she knows what her presence means. Miriam Rothschild’s passion for science has fanned my curiosity for well over a decade; week-end long conversations and her encouragement have been a great source of inspiration. Laura Bossi, whose thinking is close in spirit to mine, has also been encouraging in a most positive way. Finally, another serendipitous encounter occurred just over a year ago, with Gloria Origgi and Dan Sperber; in many ways, meeting them has been like finding another home. I was told that the last year would be hell; but it was not. It is most probably thanks to Enrico Galliani that I have been able to hold on to sanity and finish the thesis at last; he knows how grateful I am for his patience, criticism and loving support.

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