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Décrets, Arrêtés, Circulaires 18 décembre 2020 JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE Texte 15 sur 154 Décrets, arrêtés, circulaires TEXTES GÉNÉRAUX MINISTÈRE DE L’ÉCONOMIE, DES FINANCES ET DE LA RELANCE Arrêté du 15 décembre 2020 portant application des articles L. 562-3, L. 745-13, L. 755-13 et L. 765-13 du code monétaire et financier NOR : ECOT2034294A Par arrêté du ministre de l’économie, des finances et de la relance en date du 15 décembre 2020, vu les résolutions du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) et 2253 (2015) concernant l’EIIL (Daech), Al-Qaïda et les personnes, groupes, entreprises et entités qui leur sont associés ; Vu les décisions du comité des sanctions du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies en date du 16 juillet 2020 et du 8 octobre 2020 modifiant la liste des personnes, groupes et entités auxquels s’applique le gel des fonds et des ressources économiques ; Vu les modifications suivantes : – modification des mentions : Moussa Ben Omar Ben Ali ESSAADI, Khalid Ben Ahmed Ben Mohamed JARRAYA, Said Ben Abdelhakim Benn Omar AL-CHERIF, Imed Ben Mekki ZARKAOUI, Kamal Ben Maoeldi Ben Hassan AL-HAMRAOUI, Hamadi Ben Abdul Azis Ben Ali BOUYEHIA, Noureddine Ali Ben Belkassem AL-DRISSI, Azzam Abdullah Zureik Al-Maulid AL-SUBHI, Ibrahim Suleiman Hamad AL- HABLAIN, Tarad Mohammad ALJARBA, Organisation humanitaire de Wafa ; – ajout des mentions : Noor Wali Mehsud, Jamal Hussein Hassan Zeiniye ; Vu le code monétaire et financier, notamment ses articles L. 562-3, L. 745-13, L. 755-13 et L. 765-13, les arrêtés du 17 juin 2020 (NOR : ECOT2013999A), 16 juillet 2020 (NOR : ECOT2015484A) et du 8 octobre 2020 (NOR : ECOT2007479A) du code monétaire et financier sont abrogés. A Saint-Barthélemy, Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, en Nouvelle-Calédonie, en Polynésie française, dans les îles Wallis et Futuna et dans les Terres australes et antarctiques françaises, les fonds, et ressources économiques qui appartiennent à, sont possédés, détenus ou contrôlés par les personnes physiques ou morales, organismes ou entités listés à l’annexe font l’objet d’une mesure de gel. Le présent arrêté entre en vigueur à la date de sa publication au Journal officiel de la République française pour une durée de six mois. Notification des voies et délais de recours Le présent arrêté peut être contesté dans les deux mois à compter de sa notification par recours gracieux adressé au ministre de l’économie, des finances et de la relance, 139, rue de Bercy, 75572 Paris Cedex 12, télédoc 233, [email protected]. Conformément à l’ordonnance du 25 mars 2020 portant adaptation des règles applicables devant les juridictions de l’ordre administratif pendant l’état d’urgence sanitaire, le présent arrêté peut faire l’objet d’un recours pour excès de pouvoir, dans le délai maximal de deux mois à compter du 23 juin 2020, auprès du tribunal administratif de Paris, 7, rue de Jouy, 75181 Paris Cedex 04, téléphone : 01-44-59-44-00, télécopie : 01-44-59-46-46, urgences télécopie référés : 01-44-59-44-99, [email protected]. ANNEXE * ABD AL-AZIZ ADAY ZIMIN AL-FADHIL Alias : a) Abd al-Aziz Udai Samin al-Fadhli ; b) Abd al-Aziz Udai Samin al-Fadhl ; c) Abd al-Aziz Adhay Zimin al-Fadhli ; d) Abdalaziz Ad’ai Samin Fadhli al-Fadhali Date de naissance : 27/08/1981 Lieu de naissance : Koweit No d’identification national : 281082701081 Renseignements complémentaires : basé au Koweit, fournit des services financiers à, ou en soutien au Front el- Nosra pour le peuple du Levant et à Al-Qaida dans la péninsule arabique Désigné par le règlement (UE) 2015/1740 du 29/09/2015 * ABD AL-BAQI Nashwan Abd Al-Razzaq 18 décembre 2020 JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE Texte 15 sur 154 Alias : a) Abdal Al-Hadi Al-Iraqi ; b) Abd Al-Hadi Al-Iraqi ; c) Omar Uthman Mohammed ; d) Abdul Hadi Arif Ali ; e) Abu Abdallah ; f) Abdul Hadi al-Taweel ; g) Abd al-Hadi al-Ansari ; h) Abd al-Muhayman ; i) Abu Ayub Date de naissance : 1961 Lieu de naissance : Mossoul, Iraq No national d’identification : carte d’alimentation no 0094195 Nationalité : iraquienne Renseignements complémentaires : a) nom du père : Abd al-Razzaq Abd al-Baqi ; b) nom de la mère : Nadira Ayoub Asaad Désigné par le règlement (CE) 881/2002 du 27/05/2002, modifié par les règlements (CE) 553/2007 du 22/05/2007, (CE) 969/2007 du 17/08/2007, (UE) 13/2016 du 06/01/2016 * ABD AL-BASET AZZOUZ Alias : a) Abdelbassed Azouz ; b) Abdul Baset Azouz Date de naissance : 07/02/1966 Lieu de naissance : Doma, Libye Nationalité : libyenne Passeports no : a) libyen 223611 ; b) britannique C001146605 Dernière localisation connue : Libye Renseignements complémentaires : cadre Al Qaeda, recruteur Désigné par le règlement (UE) 2016/307 du 03/03/2016 * ABD AL-LATIF BIN ABDALLAH SALIH MUHAMMAD AL-KAWARI Alias : a) Abd-al-Latif Abdallah Salih al-Kawari ; b) Abd-al-Latif Abdallah Salih al-Kuwari ; c) Abd-al-Latif Abdallah al-Kawwari ; d) Abd-al-Latif Abdallah al-Kawari ; e) Abu Ali al-Kawari Date de naissance : 28/09/1973 Nationalité : Qatarienne Passeports no : a) qatarien 01020802 ; b) qatarien 00754833 émis le 20/05/2007 ; c) qatarien 00490327 émis le 28/072001 No d’identification national : carte d’identité qatarienne no 27363400684 Adresse : Al-Laqtah, Qatar Renseignements complémentaires : basé au Qatar, fournit des services financiers à, ou en soutien, à Al-Qaida Désigné par le règlement (UE) 2015/1740 du 29/09/2015 * Abd Al-Rahman Ould Muhammad Al- Husayn Ould Muhammad Salim Alias : a) Abdarrahmane ould Mohamed el Houcein ould Mohamed Salem ; b) Yunis al-Mauritani ; c) Younis al-Mauritani ; d) Sheikh Yunis al-Mauritani ; e) Shaykh Yunis le Mauritanien ; f) Salih le Mauritanien ; g) Mohamed Salem ; h) Youssef Ould Abdel Jelil ; i) El Hadj Ould Abdel Ghader ; j) Abdel Khader ; k) Abou Souleimane ; l) Chingheity Date de naissance : vers 1981 Lieu de naissance : Arabie saoudite Nationalité : mauritanienne Renseignements complémentaires : a) dirigeant de haut rang d’Al-Qaida basé au Pakistan, ayant également des accointances avec l’organisation Al-Qaida au Maghreb islamique ; b) recherché par les autorités mauritaniennes Désigné par le règlement (UE) 960/2011 du 26/09/2011 * ABD AL-SALAM Said Jan Alias : a) Sa’id Jan ‘Abd-al-Salam ; b) Dilawar Khan Zain Khan ; c) Qazi ‘Abdallah ; d) Qazi Abdullah ; e) Ibrahim Walid ; f) Qasi Sa’id Jan ; g) Said Jhan ; h) Farhan Khan ; i) Aziz Cairo ; j) Nangiali Date de naissance : a) 05/02/1981 ; b) 01/01/1972 Nationalité : afghane Passeports no : a) OR801168 (passeport afghan établi au nom de Said Jan ‘Abd al-Salam délivré le 28/2/2006 et expire le 27/2/2011) ; b) 4117921 (passeport pakistanais établi au nom de Dilawar Khan Zain Khan, délivré le 9/9/2008 et expire le 9/9/2013) No d’identification nationale : 281020505755 (no d’identification koweïtien sous le nom de Said Jan ‘Abd al- Salam) Renseignements complémentaires : a dirigé, vers 2005, un camp d’« entraînement de base » pour Al-Qaida au Pakistan Désigné par le règlement (UE) 178/2011 du 24/02/2011 * ABDEL RAHMAN Abd Allah Mohamed Ragab Alias : a) Abu Al-Khayr ; b) Ahmad Hasan ; c) Abu Jihad Date de naissance : 03/11/1957 Lieu de naissance : Kafr Al-Shaykh, Égypte Nationalité : égyptienne 18 décembre 2020 JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE Texte 15 sur 154 Renseignements complémentaires : a) se trouverait au Pakistan ou en Afghanistan ; b) membre du Djihad islamique égyptien Désigné par le règlement (CE) 1629/2005 du 5/10/2005, modifié par les règlements (CE) 803/2008 du 8/08/2008, (UE) 34/2012 du 17/01/2012 * ABDUL RAHMAM Muhammad Jibril Alias : a) Mohammad Jibril Abdurrahman ; b) Muhammad Jibriel Abdul Rahman ; c) Mohammad Jibriel Abdurrahman ; d) Muhamad Ricky Ardhan ; e) Muhammad Ricky Ardhan bin Muhammad Iqbal ; f) Muhammad Ricky Ardhan bin Abu Jibril ; g) Muhammad Yunus ; h) Heris Syah Date de naissance : a) 28/05/1984 ; b) 03/12/1979 ; c) 03/03/1979 ; d) 08/08/1980 Lieu de naissance : East Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara, Indonésie Adresses : a) Jalan M. Saidi RT 010 RW 001 Pesanggrahan, South Petukangan, South Jakarta, Indonésie ; b) Jalan Nakula of Witana Harja Complex Block C, Pamulang, Banten, Indonésie Nationalité : indonésienne Passeport no : S335026 (faux passeport indonésien) No d’identification nationale : a) 3219222002.2181558 (carte d’identité) ; b) 2181558 Renseignements complémentaires : a) membre de haut rang de Jemaah Islamiyah directement impliqué dans la recherche de financements pour des attaques terroristes ; b) nom de son père : Mohamad Iqbal Abdurrahman Désigné par le règlement (UE) 853/2011 du 24/08/2011 * ABDUL SAYED Aly Soliman Massoud Date de naissance : 1969 Lieu de naissance : Tripoli, Libye Nationalité : libyenne Passeport libyen no : 96/184442 Renseignements complémentaires : membre du Groupe libyen de combat pour l’Islam Désigné par le règlement (CE) 760/2007 du 29/06/2007, modifié par le règlement (UE) 34/2012 du 17/01/2012 * Abdullah Anshori Alias : a) Abu Fatih ; b) Thoyib, Ibnu ; c) Toyib, Ibnu ; d) Abu Fathi Date de naissance : 1958 Lieu de naissance : Pacitan, EastJava, Indonésie Nationalité : indonésienne Désigné par le règlement (CE) 674/2006 du 28/04/2006 * ABDULPATTA ESCALON ABUBAKAR Alias : a) Abdulpatta Abubakar Escalon ; b) Abdul Patta Escalon Abubakar ; c) Abdul Patta Abu Bakar Date de naissance : a) 03/03/1965 ; b) 01/01/1965 ; c) 11/01/1965 Lieu de naissance : Tuburan, province de Basilan, Philippines Nationalité : Philippines Passeports philippins no : a) EC6530802, expire le 19/01/2021 ; b) EB2778599 Identification nationale no : a) Arabie saoudite 2135314355 ; b) Arabie saoudite 202112421
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