The Religion of Inductivism As a Living Force

Part II The Religion of Inductivism as a Living Force

For the several employments and of ﬁ ces of our fellows, we have 12 that sail into foreign countries … three that collect the experiments which are in all books … three who collect the experiments of all mechanical arts … three that try new experiments … three that draw the experiments … into titles and tables … three that bend themselves, looking into the experiments of their fellows, and cast about how to draw from them things of use … three that … direct new experiments. … three that raise the former discoveries by experiments into greater observations, axioms and aphorisms. … For our ordinance and rites, … we place … the more rare and excellent inventions … we place the statues of all principal inventors … some of brass; some of marble … some of cedar … some of silver; some of gold. We have certain hymns and services … and forms of prayers … (Bacon, The New Atlantis ) The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways. The point, however, is to change it. (Karl Marx, ﬁ nal Thesis on Feuerbach) Epistemology without contact with science becomes an empty scheme. Science without epistemology is — insofar as it is thinkable at all — primitive and muddled. (Albert Einstein, “Reply”, 1949 , 683Ð4)

This second part of this study is devoted to the more-or-less single-handed implemen- tation by Robert Boyle of the vision of amateur observers contributing to the rise of a new science that Bacon had initiated. It is therefore much devoted to the role of ideol- ogy in the rise of inductivism as a social movement and on the differences between the views on scientiﬁ c method of Bacon and of Boyle, perhaps even between their world- views. For this some attention to some terminological detail is necessary. Let me offer the major ones here with an apology to the reader. Following these let me offer a general view of the current literature on Boyle and contrast it with my view on him. These will hopefully facilitate the reading of the more detailed story that involves methodology and social history of science and bits and pieces from quite a few disciplines. 126 Part II The Religion of Inductivism as a Living Force

Quasi-Terminological Notes

“The Inductive Style”

“Style” as referring to manner as opposed to matter, to the way of presenting things, is used here in a wide sense; “scientifi c style” denotes here the dry and prosaic style typical to modern scienti fi c writings as well as modes of presentation like that of scientifi c dialogues or of power points. My interest is in the style of scientifi c papers proper, especially of inductivist ones, as developed in the Age of Reason. The inductive style is of intentional recording of experiences reminiscent of early Renaissance travel narratives: the inductive style is personal yet formal. A paper in the learned press in this style opens with a description of some experimental appa- ratus if its discussion refers to it and proceeds with a description of some experiments, perhaps adding some reports of other observations, and then concludes with a description of the result of the experiment and ends abruptly, without a word of comment or explanation as to the relevance of the facts it describes. Alternatively, it was reluctantly permitted to add to such a scienti fi c paper a short vague preamble and a few lines at the end that present a conjecture or some theoretical conclusion. Most important, the inductive style excludes controversy and allows reference to a theory that a paper refutes only in allusion. Nowadays papers that conform to this style or mode of presentation are rare 1 ; it was very popular in the eighteenth century. The only freedom granted to a writer during the time in which this style was compulsory was to add a few lines in the conclusion. If the paper lacks these additions, then some previous knowledge of its background is necessary for the under- standing of its import. If the paper includes such additions in its conclusion, the proper way to read it is to start at the end, in order to get a hint at what is the con- cern of the paper.2 The inductive style is an invention — of Bacon and Boyle, instituted in 1661, soon to become traditional. In the mid-nineteenth century, under the infl uence of Michael Faraday, the historical or dialectic or critical style reappeared. It requires discussions of problem and of criticism of extant solutions to it. Some academics still forbid it as it boosts controversy. It does. Some academics fi nd controversy otiose. In some periodicals the inductive style is compulsory to these days.3

1 The best-known example of the use of the inductive style in the twentieth century is in the con- cluding words of the ﬁ rst ( 1953 ) path-breaking paper of Francis Crick and James Watson on nucleic acids: “It has not escaped our notice that the speci ﬁ c pairing we have postulated immedi- ately suggests a possible copying mechanism for the genetic material.” For, this sentence alludes to a speculation, and the classical permission is to use these only very sparingly. 2 Let me report that biologist friends of mine habitually and unawares began reading a paper from the end. 3 Popper narrated that he challenged his friend John Eccles to submit to a leading periodical a paper in the critical style. It was returned with the demand to rewrite it. A few editors have returned papers of mine expressing disdain at my licentious attitude to speculations. Part II The Religion of Inductivism as a Living Force 127

“Speculation” and “Hypothesis”

Bacon, Boyle and Faraday, used “hypothesis” and “speculation” as synonyms. I use these words as they do when I quote or discuss their views. Otherwise, I prefer to distinguish between them: a hypothesis is empirically testable and a speculation is not. Thus, for example, in my terminology Boyle’s atomism is speculative, while that of Dalton is hypothetical. I use the words “theory” or “conjecture” to designate both hypotheses and speculations. The ways these near-synonyms are used vary and change. This is unproblematic as long as any distinction between them is clear to readers.

“Hypothesis” and “Fact”

Following the older tradition, I often use the word “fact” to designate statement of fact. The difference between a fact and a statement is of paramount importance in logic and in some philosophical discourses. Not here. Since I discuss here inductivism, I usually use here the word “fact” to designate statement of fact universalized, at times called “general fact” in comments on classical science and “low level generalization” in comments on contemporary methodology. A general fact then is not any observed event but its supposed generalization. There is some subtlety involved here that somehow led to many useless philosophical debates. My advice to the interested in the logical analysis of these subtle matters is to consult Karl Popper’s Logic of scienti ﬁ c Discovery (1935 , 1959) ¤¤14, 22, and 30.

On the Recent Literature

When I wrote my dissertation (over half a century ago) the literature on Robert Boyle was scant. It soon began to grow in earnest; it is already monumental. It includes the tremendously learned surveys by R. E. W. Maddison in series of papers and books, the correspondence of Henry Oldenburg that Alfred Rupert Hall and Marie Boas Hall have edited (Oldenburg et al. 1969 ) and that of Robert Boyle that Michael Hunter, Antonio Clericuzio and Lawrence M. Principe have edited (Boyle et al. 2001 ) , as well as the collected works of Boyle that Michael Hunter and Edward Davis have edited (Boyle et al. 1999 , 2000), not to mention the many books and many more essays that Michael Hunter and others have published since, that contain much fascinating information. Current literature discusses Boyle’s religious and metaphysical writings that receive much too little attention in the present study. I praise this literature for its integration of his theology in his philosophy, especially its attention to his efforts to harmonize and even unite science and faith. For my purpose suffi ce it, 128 Part II The Religion of Inductivism as a Living Force however, to note some generalities. Boyle advocated a view that he ascribed to Philo Judeus: research is the worship that befi ts natural religion. Here he echoed popular sentiment: both Bellarmino and Galileo found it in Psalm 19.4 To this Boyle added that revelation is inessential for religion: it is the merciful gift from the Lord to sinners, his giving them a second chance. In his Things above Reason he expressed his unwavering rationalism, saying, it is unthinkable that the Good Lord would make unreasonable demands. He also said, belief is not open to manipulation: I cannot control it. He dissented from Descartes, however, ascrib- ing to the soul moral sentiment (the expression is his) in addition to thinking. Natural religion belongs to thinking and revealed religion to the moral sentiment, as the Bible is a text in morality, not in reason. Hence, the expression of good will is in charity and in religious activities; science must be in the hands of (wealthy) amateurs. Hunter is today the leading Boyle scholar. To the little extent that he shows interest in the social history of science, he tends to follow Steven Shapin (1994 ) whose philosophy differs greatly from the one offered in this text (Agassi 1997 ) . As to Hunter’s view of Boyle’s methodology, Rose-Mary Sargent says of it adroitly (Sargent 2003 , 52): Without argument … Hunter presents Boyle as having advocated an unproblematic and thoroughgoing empiricism that re fl ected an ‘aversion’ to reason. Hence, the less said of it, the better. His views on the sociology of science as well as on scientifi c method insure that he and I will remain not very interested in each other’s observations on them. Let me nonetheless comment on one idea of his. He dismisses the view of the early Royal Society as fully homogenous. In my view for what it is worth, the Society was remarkably homogenous. The greatest difference of opinions there was about superstitions — such as those of Joseph Glanvill — that is hard to dismiss or consider unimportant (Debus 1967 ) ; it show great unanimity among its Fellows, since the rules of repeatability kept all superstitions out and helped distinguish them from science. This is far from trivial. For one thing, it renders observations of colors scienti fi c, contrary to tradition. It also renders scienti fi c many observations about dreams and mirages. For another thing, this same ruling clearly renders pseudo-scientifi c behaviorism, a twentieth-century innovation that appeared as the paragon of science.

4 The ﬁ rst half of Psalm 19 reads:The heavens declare the glory of God; the skies proclaim the work of his hands. Day after day they pour forth speech; night after night they reveal knowledge. They have no speech, they use no words; no sound is heard from them. Yet their voice goes out into all the earth, their words to the ends of the world. In the heavens God has pitched a tent for the sun. It is like a bridegroom coming out of his chamber, like a champion rejoicing to run his course. It rises at one end of the heavens and makes its circuit to the other; nothing is deprived of its warmth. The law of the Lord is perfect, refreshing the soul. Part II The Religion of Inductivism as a Living Force 129

Regarding differences of opinion in the early Royal Society, the main item on my agenda is the disagreement between Boyle and almost all other Fellows that seems to me signi ﬁ cant: they wanted him to establish a secular college and he staunchly refused. Also, most of them hoped for inductive certitude; he did not, as his skepticism was unqualiﬁ ed. Yet he had to accommodate for their views, as he needed badly their active cooperation as experimentors. On these matters the current literature has taught me very little.

Homage to Robert Boyle

I never swore allegiance to custom. Boyle, Seraphick Love , letter dedicatory

And then I have to remind myself that the subject of my study is the same as the subject of many demanding scholarly publications. I share with them the view of Boyle as a shy and reclusive rich aristocrat, a frail, rather hypochondriac bachelor who lived for decades in his sister’s home, a pious scholar and a leading scienti ﬁ c researcher. I do not share with them their view of him as a Baconian, although I am aware of Bacon’s having inﬂ uenced him deeply. The common assessment of Boyle as superstitious I deem a gross exaggeration.5 In particular, my endorsement of the traditional view that alchemy is superstitious does not prevent me from asserting, as I do, that Boyle’s (and Newton’s) variant of it is rational. The gulf between the received image of Boyle and mine may be seen from the intriguing discussion in (Principe 1995 , 392) about the young Boyle: he wanted his reader to do something … his writing was intended not as a pedantic or even as a didactic exercise but rather as a spur to action, to a way of life or a way of thinking. Before his conversion to natural philosophy Boyle had become quite accomplished in this way of writing, as the 1648 Seraphic Love witnesses. The level of exhortation or encouragement, then, is one barometer of Boyle’s departure from his early moralist style. To this Principe adds a note: This is not to say that Boyle’s mature works are wholly devoid of exhortation or a desire for readers to act; however, they do lack the forcefulness and overtness of the early works. Needless to say, what Principe calls exhortation seems to me Boyle’s hallmark, pertaining to experimental philosophy much more than to theology. I view Boyle as the father of a movement of amateur researchers performing simple and easy

5 See the alarming review of Boyle’s Works (Dear 2002). “What on earth are we to make of Boyle? For the simple truth is that he was something of a prize fool” says David Wootton ( 2009 ) , in his review of Hunter’s Boyle: Between God and Science that echoes the sentiment expressed in that book. 130 Part II The Religion of Inductivism as a Living Force

experiments6 in accord with Bacon’s exciting vision. 7 I fancy him (as no one else does) as one who felt the weight of the world on his shoulders (as few people ever had, such as Pericles, Plato, Alexander, Caesar, al-Farabi, Maimonides, Cromwell, Pestalozzi, Churchill, Russell, Einstein, Pope John 23 rd). He designed and fashioned a new movement of amateur researchers. His peers wanted him to found a secular college; he refused on ideological grounds. They wanted from him inductive certitude; he was a staunch skeptic. He developed what today we would rec- ognize as a correspondence school for scienti fi c empirical research, a school whose customers were the most unlikely crowd: middle-aged, poorly educated aristocrats. He wrote like this: let us make experiments with saltpeter because it is important for the following reasons. … Purchase it at a drugstore; here is a list of synonyms for it, so that your druggist will know what you want. We have to purify it fi rst thus: …. . Now you will have a reasonably pure sample and we can start working. He would say such things as, if you want to know whether the color of a stone is original or painted, break a corner of it and see if it is of the same color all the way. He argued for the objectivity of colors (contrary to Galileo, who said, you might just as well say that the tickle is in the feather), saying, with my eyes closed I can see the curtains around my bed having any color I like, but when I open them I cannot see them but as red. We should remember that Newton con- tested the view of Descartes about billiard balls, and that the Royal Society Fellows met with public ridicule for their interests in fl eas. Bacon conceived of the society of amateurs; Boyle fashioned it.

6 “In science the successors stand upon the shoulders of their predecessors; where one man of supreme genius has invented a method, a thousand lesser men can apply it. … In art nothing worth doing can be done without genius; in science even a very moderate capacity can contribute to a supreme achievement” (Russell 1918, 41). Russell’s view of art, incidentally, is too Romantic. What he said of science seems to me to hold also for art. 7 Thomas Birch, Boyle’s ﬁ rst biographer, said this explicitly (Works , 1744, 1, 13; quoted in (Wilson 2008 , 231)): He set himself to phylosophise, and to persuade the nobility and gentry of the nation, who had the means and leisure to pursue such sorts of studies, to follow his example. … it … would make them better Christians, but likewise more useful members of society.

The Royal Society of London of fi cial website holds a very different view. It depicts its fi rst phase as a part of Gresham College, http://royalsociety.org/about-us/history/gresham-college/ , thus tacitly denying that amateur research played a signi fi cant role in its formation. It even denies that amateurs made a scienti fi c difference: Banks was in favour of maintaining a mixture among the Fellowship of working scientists and wealthy amateurs who might become their patrons. This view grew less popular in the fi rst half of the 19th century and in 1847 the Society decided that in future Fellows would be elected solely on the merit of their scienti fi c work.

This is a misleading suggestion that the Society had no Fellows who were amateur researchers of note.