The Religion of Inductivism As a Living Force

Part II The Religion of Inductivism as a Living Force For the several employments and of fi ces of our fellows, we have 12 that sail into foreign countries … three that collect the experiments which are in all books … three who collect the experiments of all mechanical arts … three that try new experiments … three that draw the experiments … into titles and tables … three that bend themselves, looking into the experiments of their fellows, and cast about how to draw from them things of use … three that … direct new experiments. … three that raise the former discoveries by experiments into greater observations, axioms and aphorisms. … For our ordinance and rites, … we place … the more rare and excellent inventions … we place the statues of all principal inventors … some of brass; some of marble … some of cedar … some of silver; some of gold. We have certain hymns and services … and forms of prayers … (Bacon, The New Atlantis ) The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways. The point, however, is to change it. (Karl Marx, fi nal Thesis on Feuerbach) Epistemology without contact with science becomes an empty scheme. Science without epistemology is — insofar as it is thinkable at all — primitive and muddled. (Albert Einstein, “Reply”, 1949 , 683–4) This second part of this study is devoted to the more-or-less single-handed implemen- tation by Robert Boyle of the vision of amateur observers contributing to the rise of a new science that Bacon had initiated. It is therefore much devoted to the role of ideol- ogy in the rise of inductivism as a social movement and on the differences between the views on scienti fi c method of Bacon and of Boyle, perhaps even between their world- views. For this some attention to some terminological detail is necessary. Let me offer the major ones here with an apology to the reader. Following these let me offer a general view of the current literature on Boyle and contrast it with my view on him. These will hopefully facilitate the reading of the more detailed story that involves methodology and social history of science and bits and pieces from quite a few disciplines. 126 Part II The Religion of Inductivism as a Living Force Quasi-Terminological Notes “The Inductive Style” “Style” as referring to manner as opposed to matter, to the way of presenting things, is used here in a wide sense; “scienti fi c style” denotes here the dry and prosaic style typical to modern scienti fi c writings as well as modes of presentation like that of scienti fi c dialogues or of power points. My interest is in the style of scienti fi c papers proper, especially of inductivist ones, as developed in the Age of Reason. The inductive style is of intentional recording of experiences reminiscent of early Renaissance travel narratives: the inductive style is personal yet formal. A paper in the learned press in this style opens with a description of some experimental appa- ratus if its discussion refers to it and proceeds with a description of some experiments, perhaps adding some reports of other observations, and then concludes with a description of the result of the experiment and ends abruptly, without a word of comment or explanation as to the relevance of the facts it describes. Alternatively, it was reluctantly permitted to add to such a scienti fi c paper a short vague preamble and a few lines at the end that present a conjecture or some theoretical conclusion. Most important, the inductive style excludes controversy and allows reference to a theory that a paper refutes only in allusion. Nowadays papers that conform to this style or mode of presentation are rare 1 ; it was very popular in the eighteenth century. The only freedom granted to a writer during the time in which this style was compulsory was to add a few lines in the conclusion. If the paper lacks these additions, then some previous knowledge of its background is necessary for the under- standing of its import. If the paper includes such additions in its conclusion, the proper way to read it is to start at the end, in order to get a hint at what is the con- cern of the paper. 2 The inductive style is an invention — of Bacon and Boyle, instituted in 1661, soon to become traditional. In the mid-nineteenth century, under the in fl uence of Michael Faraday, the historical or dialectic or critical style reappeared. It requires discussions of problem and of criticism of extant solutions to it. Some academics still forbid it as it boosts controversy. It does. Some academics fi nd controversy otiose. In some periodicals the inductive style is compulsory to these days. 3 1 The best-known example of the use of the inductive style in the twentieth century is in the con- cluding words of the fi rst ( 1953 ) path-breaking paper of Francis Crick and James Watson on nucleic acids: “It has not escaped our notice that the speci fi c pairing we have postulated immedi- ately suggests a possible copying mechanism for the genetic material.” For, this sentence alludes to a speculation, and the classical permission is to use these only very sparingly. 2 Let me report that biologist friends of mine habitually and unawares began reading a paper from the end. 3 Popper narrated that he challenged his friend John Eccles to submit to a leading periodical a paper in the critical style. It was returned with the demand to rewrite it. A few editors have returned papers of mine expressing disdain at my licentious attitude to speculations. Part II The Religion of Inductivism as a Living Force 127 “Speculation” and “Hypothesis” Bacon, Boyle and Faraday, used “hypothesis” and “speculation” as synonyms. I use these words as they do when I quote or discuss their views. Otherwise, I prefer to distinguish between them: a hypothesis is empirically testable and a speculation is not. Thus, for example, in my terminology Boyle’s atomism is speculative, while that of Dalton is hypothetical. I use the words “theory” or “conjecture” to designate both hypotheses and speculations. The ways these near-synonyms are used vary and change. This is unproblematic as long as any distinction between them is clear to readers. “Hypothesis” and “Fact” Following the older tradition, I often use the word “fact” to designate statement of fact. The difference between a fact and a statement is of paramount importance in logic and in some philosophical discourses. Not here. Since I discuss here inductivism, I usually use here the word “fact” to designate statement of fact universalized, at times called “general fact” in comments on classical science and “low level generalization” in comments on contemporary methodology. A general fact then is not any observed event but its supposed generalization. There is some subtlety involved here that somehow led to many useless philosophical debates. My advice to the interested in the logical analysis of these subtle matters is to consult Karl Popper’s Logic of scienti fi c Discovery ( 1935 , 1959) §§14, 22, and 30. On the Recent Literature When I wrote my dissertation (over half a century ago) the literature on Robert Boyle was scant. It soon began to grow in earnest; it is already monumental. It includes the tremendously learned surveys by R. E. W. Maddison in series of papers and books, the correspondence of Henry Oldenburg that Alfred Rupert Hall and Marie Boas Hall have edited (Oldenburg et al. 1969 ) and that of Robert Boyle that Michael Hunter, Antonio Clericuzio and Lawrence M. Principe have edited (Boyle et al. 2001 ) , as well as the collected works of Boyle that Michael Hunter and Edward Davis have edited (Boyle et al. 1999 , 2000), not to mention the many books and many more essays that Michael Hunter and others have published since, that contain much fascinating information. Current literature discusses Boyle’s religious and metaphysical writings that receive much too little attention in the present study. I praise this literature for its integration of his theology in his philosophy, especially its attention to his efforts to harmonize and even unite science and faith. For my purpose suf fi ce it, 128 Part II The Religion of Inductivism as a Living Force however, to note some generalities. Boyle advocated a view that he ascribed to Philo Judeus: research is the worship that be fi ts natural religion. Here he echoed popular sentiment: both Bellarmino and Galileo found it in Psalm 19. 4 To this Boyle added that revelation is inessential for religion: it is the merciful gift from the Lord to sinners, his giving them a second chance. In his Things above Reason he expressed his unwavering rationalism, saying, it is unthinkable that the Good Lord would make unreasonable demands. He also said, belief is not open to manipulation: I cannot control it. He dissented from Descartes, however, ascrib- ing to the soul moral sentiment (the expression is his) in addition to thinking. Natural religion belongs to thinking and revealed religion to the moral sentiment, as the Bible is a text in morality, not in reason. Hence, the expression of good will is in charity and in religious activities; science must be in the hands of (wealthy) amateurs. Hunter is today the leading Boyle scholar. To the little extent that he shows interest in the social history of science, he tends to follow Steven Shapin (1994 ) whose philosophy differs greatly from the one offered in this text (Agassi 1997 ) . As to Hunter’s view of Boyle’s methodology, Rose-Mary Sargent says of it adroitly (Sargent 2003 , 52): Without argument … Hunter presents Boyle as having advocated an unproblematic and thoroughgoing empiricism that re fl ected an ‘aversion’ to reason.

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