99:31 the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate's Evaluation of SKB's
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SKI Report 99:31 The Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate’s Evaluation of SKB’s RD&D Program 98 Review Report April 1999 ISSN 1104-1374 ISRN SKI-R--99/31--SE Contents Page 1 Introduction 1 1.1 General 1 1.2 SKI’s Work on the Matter 2 2 SKI’s Evaluation and Proposal for a Decision-Making Process 5 2.1 Introduction 5 2.2 SKI’s Evaluation 5 2.2.1 Method Selection and System Analysis 5 2.2.2 Focus of the RD&D Programme and the Feasibility of the KBS-3 Method 7 2.2.3 Safety Assessments 8 2.2.4 Siting 9 2.3 Decision-making Process 10 2.3.1 Premises 10 2.3.2 SKI’s Conclusions concerning Future Action 11 2.3.3 SKI’s Proposal for the Position to be Adopted by the Government on Method Selection 12 2.3.4 SKI’s Proposal for the Clarification of Certain Issues Relating to Future Work in the Decision-Making Process, Including the EIA 14 3 Method Selection and System Analysis 17 3.1 Introduction 17 3.2 SKB’s report 18 3.3 Comments by the Reviewing Bodies 20 3.4 SKI’s Evaluation 24 3.5 SKI’s and SSI’s Joint Evaluation 33 3.6 SKI’s Overall Evaluation 34 4 Siting 37 4.1 Introduction 37 4.2 Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and Consultation 38 4.3 General Siting Studies and Feasibility Studies 44 4.3.1 Introduction 44 4.3.2 North-South/Coast-Interior 45 4.3.3 County-specific General Siting Studies 47 4.3.4 Feasibility Studies 49 4.4 Selection of Sites for Site Investigation 51 4.4.1 Background prior to Site Selection 52 4.4.2 Selection Procedures and Criteria 56 4.5 Site Investigations and Site Evaluation 59 4.5.1 Geoscientific Site Investigation Programme 60 4.5.2 Site Evaluation 63 4.6 SKI’s Overall Evaluation 64 4.6.1 EIS and Consultation 64 4.6.2 General Siting Studies and Feasibility Studies 66 i 4.6.3 Selection of Sites for Site Investigations 68 4.6.4 Site Investigations and Site Evaluation 69 5 Technical Development 71 5.1 Introduction 71 5.2.Canister 71 5.2.1 Design Basis 71 5.2.2 Selection of Material 73 5.2.3 Design of Reference Canister 74 5.2.4 Sealing 75 5.2.5 Non-destructive Testing 76 5.2.6 Trial Fabrication of Full-Scale Canisters 77 5.2.7 Quality Assurance 78 5.2.8 Full-Scale Testing of Technology 79 5.2.9 SKI’s Evaluation of the Canister 80 5.3 Encapsulation 82 5.4 Transport 84 5.5 Final Disposal Technology 85 5.5.1 General Comments 85 5.5.2 Design of the Repository 85 5.5.3 Full-Scale Testing of Technology 88 5.5.4 SKI’s Evaluation of Final Disposal Technology 89 5.6 Retrieval of Deposited Canisters, Monitoring 90 5.6.1 General Comments 90 5.6.2 Retrieval Methods 90 5.7 Safeguards and Physical Protection 92 5.7.1 Safeguards 92 5.7.2 Physical Protection 93 5.8 SKI’s Overall Evaluation 93 5.8.1 General Comments 93 5.8.2 Canister 94 5.8.3 Encapsulation 95 5.8.4 Transport 95 5.8.5 Final Disposal Technology 96 5.8.6 Retrieval and Monitoring 96 5.8.7 Safeguards and Physical Protection 97 6 Safety Assessments 99 6.1 Introduction 99 6.2.Safety Assessment Methodology 99 6.2.1 System Description 99 6.2.2 Scenarios 101 6.2.3 Safety Assessment Models 103 6.2.4 Treatment of Uncertainties 108 6.2.5 Quality Assurance 110 6.3 Safety Report Programme 112 ii 6.4 SKI’s Overall Evaluation 114 6.4.1 Safety Assessment Methodology 114 6.4.2 Safety Report Programme 116 7 Research 119 7.1 Introduction 119 7.2 Spent Fuel 120 7.2.1 Introduction 120 7.2.2 Experimental and Theoretical Studies of Fuel Dissolution 120 7.2.3 SKI’s Overall Evaluation of Spent Fuel 123 7.3 Canister Material 123 7.3.1 Corrosion 123 7.3.2 Materials Testing 125 7.3.3 Non-destructive Testing 125 7.3.4 SKI’s Overall Evaluation of the Canister Material 126 7.4 Buffer and Backfill 126 7.4.1 Introduction 126 7.4.2 Performance Requirements on the Buffer Material and Backfill 127 7.4.3 Results from Studies of the Buffer and Backfill Material 128 7.4.4 SKI’s Overall Evaluation of the Buffer and Backfill 131 7.5 Structural Geology and Mechanical Stability of the Rock 132 7.6 Water Flow in Rock 136 7.7 Groundwater Chemistry 138 7.7.1 Introduction 138 7.7.2 Analysis of Types of Groundwater 139 7.7.3 Chemical and Biological Processes in the Groundwater 141 7.7.4 SKI’s Overall Evaluation of Groundwater Chemistry 143 7.8 Radionuclide Chemistry, Sorption and Diffusion 143 7.8.1 Introduction 143 7.8.2 Radionuclide Chemistry 143 7.8.3 Sorption and Diffusion 144 7.8.4 The Influence of Colloids, Microbes and Concrete 146 7.8.5 SKI’s Overall Evaluation of Radionuclide Chemistry, Sorption and Diffusion 147 7.9 The Biosphere 147 7.10 Other Waste 149 7.10.1 Introduction 149 7.10.2 SFR Waste 149 7.10.3 Other Long-lived Waste, SFL 3-5 150 7.10.4 SKI’s Overall Evaluation of Other Waste 152 7.11 Alternative Methods 152 7.11.1 Partitioning and Transmutation (P&T) 152 7.11.2 Disposal in Deep Boreholes 155 7.11.3 SKI’s Overall Evaluation of P&T and Deep Boreholes 156 7.12 The Äspö Hard Rock Laboratory 157 7.12.1 Introduction 157 7.12.2 Verification of Pre-investigation Methods – Stage Goal 1 158 iii 7.12.3 Finalise Detailed Characterization Methodology – Stage Goal 2 159 7.12.4 Testing of Models for the Description of the Barrier Function of the Rock – Stage Goal 3 160 7.12.5 Demonstrate Technology for and the Function of Important Parts of the Repository System – Stage Goal 4 161 7.12.6 SKI’s Overall Evaluation of Activities at the Äspö Hard Rock Laboratory 163 7.13 Natural Analogues 165 7.13.1 Introduction 165 7.13.2 Maqarin, Jordan 165 7.13.3 Oklo, Gabon 166 7.13.4 Palmottu, Finland 166 7.13.5 SKI’s Overall Evaluation of Natural Analogues 166 7.14 Paleohydrological Programme 167 7.15 Deep Drilling in Laxemar 168 7.16 Scientific Information 169 7.17 SKI’s Overall Evaluation of SKB’s Research Programme 170 8 Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilitites 177 8.1 General 177 8.2 SKI’s Overall Evaluation 177 References 179 Reviewing Bodies 183 iv 1 Introduction 1.1 General According to the Act (1984:3) on Nuclear Activities, the full responsibility for the safe management and final disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste rests with the owners of the Swedish nuclear power reactors. In accordance with the Act (1992:1537) on the Financing of Future Expenses for Spent Nuclear Fuel etc., the owners are also responsible for ensuring that funds are set aside to cover the future expenses of the management and final disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste. Furthermore, nuclear reactor owners must conduct, and every three years, submit a research and development programme for the management of the spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste. The programme must also cover the measures which are necessary for the de- commissioning and dismantling of the nuclear installations. The Ordinance on Nuclear Activities stipulates that the programme must be submitted to SKI for evaluation no later than on the last day of September, once every three years. SKI must submit the programme documents to the Government, along with its own statement. The owners of the nuclear power reactors have formed a joint company, the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co (SKB) which, on behalf of the owners, fulfils the owners’ statutory obligations with respect to the management and final disposal of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste and conducts related research and development. The programme now submitted by SKB is the latest in the series which started with R&D Programme 86. However, as early as 1984, SKB’s programme had been evaluated in connection with the presentation, for the first time, of the KBS-3 method as a basis for an application to start up the Forsmark 3 and Oskarshamn 3 reactors. The current programme was submitted in September 1998 and is called RD&D Programme 98 (programme for Research, Development and Demonstration). In the Government’s decision of December 19, 1996 concerning SKB’s RD&D Programme 95, the Government stated that SKB must “carry out a system analysis of the entire final disposal system (encapsulation plant, transportation system and a re- pository). This system analysis shall allow for an overall, integrated safety assessment of the entire final disposal system, including how principles for safety and radiation protection are to be applied, in practice, in the safety assessment work. Furthermore, the system analysis shall include an account of the alternative solutions to the KBS-3 method described by SKB in previous research programmes or which have been described in international studies. Different variations on the KBS-3 method should also be described. In addition, the consequences which would arise if the planned repository is not constructed (zero alternative) as well as ongoing international work on transmuta- tion shall be presented”.