Suuren Voiton Perilliset Muistin Politiikka Ja Patriotismi Poliittisten Nuorisojärjestöjen Toiminnassa Krimillä

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Suuren Voiton Perilliset Muistin Politiikka Ja Patriotismi Poliittisten Nuorisojärjestöjen Toiminnassa Krimillä Suuren voiton perilliset Muistin politiikka ja patriotismi poliittisten nuorisojärjestöjen toiminnassa Krimillä Emma Reetta Henriikka Rimpiläinen Helsingin yliopisto Valtiotieteellinen tiedekunta Sosiaali- ja kulttuuriantropologia Pro gradu -tutkielma Helmikuu 2014 Tiedekunta/Osasto – Fakultet/Sektion – Faculty Laitos – Institution – Department Valtiotieteellinen Sosiaalitieteiden laitos Tekijä – Författare – Author Rimpiläinen Emma Reetta Henriikka Työn nimi – Arbetets titel – Title Suuren voiton perilliset. Muistin politiikka ja patriotismi poliittisten nuorisojärjestöjen toiminnassa Krimillä. Oppiaine – Läroämne – Subject Sosiaali- ja kulttuuriantropologia Työn laji – Arbetets art – Level Aika – Datum – Month and year Sivumäärä – Sidoantal – Number of pages Pro gradu -tutkielma Helmikuu 2014 102 Tiivistelmä – Referat – Abstract Tutkielman aiheena on kahden poliittisen nuorisojärjestön identiteettipolitiikka Krimin niemimaalla Ukrainassa. Toinen tutkituista järjestöistä on pienen venäläismielisen puolueen Russkoje Jedinstvon (suom. ”Venäläinen Yhtenäisyys”) nuorisojärjestö nimeltään Molodye (”Nuoret”). Toinen on Ukrainan suurimman puolueen Partija Regionovin (suom. ”Alueiden Puolue”) paikallinen nuoriso-osasto Molodye Regiony (”Nuoret Alueet”). Järjestöt ovat hyvin erityyppisiä ja erikokoisia, mikä osaltaan hankaloittaa niiden vertailua, mutta tekee sen myös toisaalta hyvin mielenkiintoiseksi. Järjestöjen erilaisuudesta huolimatta ne korostavat toiminnassaan samoja asioita: toisen maailmansodan historiaa ja sen muiston säilyttämisen tärkeyttä. Kummallekin järjestölle tyypillinen toimintamuoto on toisen maailmansodan taisteluiden ja partisaanien kunniaksi pystytettyjen monumenttien kunnostaminen. Lisäksi etenkin Molodyelle olennaista on puolustaa Ukrainan venäjänkielisten oikeuksia. Molodye Regionyn on Ukrainan valtapuolueen nuorisojärjestönä oltava sen sijaan toiminnassaan varovainen ja otettava huomioon myös Länsi-Ukrainan mahdolliset äänestäjät. Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan, miksi muistamisella on niin suuri rooli tutkittujen nuorisojärjestöjen toiminnassa. Lisäksi pyritään selittämään järjestöjen retoriikkaa patriotismista ja fasismista, sillä järjestöjen tapa käyttää näitä termejä eroaa merkittävästi Suomessa ja muissakin länsimaissa vakiintuneesta käytännöstä. Aineisto tutkimukseen on kerätty kahden kuukauden mittaisen kenttätyön aikana Krimillä keväällä 2012. Ajankohta valikoitui kevään merkittävien juhlapäivien, vapun ja voiton päivän perusteella. Tutkimuksen aineisto koostuu nauhoitetuista haastatteluista ja havainnointihuomioista järjestöjen kokouksista sekä Sevastopolissa järjestetyistä vapun ja voiton päivän paraateista. Molodyen jäseniä on haastateltu Krimin pääkaupungissa Simferopolissa ja Molodye Regionyn jäseniä Sevastopolissa. Kaikki haastattelut on tehty venäjäksi. Lisäksi on hyödynnetty järjestöjen verkkosivuilla julkaistuja kannanottoja, manifesteja ja lehdistötiedotteita. Aineistoa analysoidaan antropologisen muistiteorian valossa ja toisaalta retorisen diskurssianalyysin keinoin. Krim on alueena monietninen ja samaan aikaan korostuneen venäläinen. Suurin osa Krimin asukkaista on venäjänkielisiä tai etnisesti venäläisiä. Krimin alueen erityinen kansallinen koostumus näkyy sen väestön äänestyskäyttäytymisessä ja siinä, millaiset poliittiset ideat ovat niemimaalla suosittuja. Tutkimuskirjallisuudessa Krim sijoitetaan usein vastakkaiseen ääripäähän Länsi-Ukrainan kanssa, sillä nämä alueet eroavat toisistaan eniten Ukrainan sisällä. Länsi-Ukrainassa puhutaan ukrainan kieltä ja äänestetään oranssin vallankumouksen puolueita. Krimillä taas puhutaan venäjää ja äänestetään eniten neuvostonostalgisia tai Venäjään positiivisesti suhtautuvia puolueita kuten Ukrainan kommunistista puoluetta ja Partija Regioniovia. Krimin kollektiivisessa muistissa myös korostuvat eri asiat kuin Länsi-Ukrainassa: Krimillä kollektiivinen muisti keskittyy etenkin toiseen maailmansotaan ja sen voittoon, kun taas Länsi-Ukrainassa olennaisempia ovat Molotov-Ribbentrop-sopimus ja lyhyet itsenäisyyden jaksot ennen Länsi-Ukrainan liittämistä Neuvostoliittoon. Erilaiset kollektiiviset muistit jakavat Ukrainassa varsinkin poliittisen keskustan puolueita, jotka eivät muissa kysymyksissä juuri eroa toisistaan. Tutkimuksessa havaittiin, että sekä Molodye että Molodye Regiony tukeutuvat toiminnassaan vahvasti Itä- ja Etelä-Ukrainan kollektiiviseen muistiin. Tämä kollektiivinen muisti perustelee ja legitimoi järjestöjen toimintaa. Tutkimuskirjallisuudesta nostetaan esiin huomio, että Venäjällä toisen maailmansodan muisto legitimoi Venäjän nykyhallintoa ja peittää muun muassa punaisen terrorin muiston. Tämä estää tehokkaasti vakiintuneesta konsensuksesta poikkeavat tulkinnat. Tutkimuksessa esitetään, että Krimillä muistamisen korostaminen liittyy järjestöjen toiminnassa pohjimmiltaan populäärien identiteettien rakentamiseen. Järjestöjen jäsenet kokevat etenkin toisen maailmansodan muiston vaalimisen hyvin tärkeäksi, eikä sodan muistamisen tärkeyttä voi heidän mielestään kyseenalaistaa. Tämä muistamisen imperatiivi tulee tutkimuksessa esiin korostuneen positiivisen omakuvan pohjana. Järjestöjen tapa käyttää patriotismin käsitettä retoriikassaan kytkeytyy toisen maailmansodan valtavaan merkitykseen venäjänkielisessä postsosialistisessa ympäristössä ja kollektiivisessa muistissa. Järjestöt rakentavat positiivisen sisäryhmän patriotismin käsitteen ympärille ja kontrastoivat sitä voimakkaasti fasismiin ja nationalismiin. Nationalismin kytkeminen fasismiin mahdollistaa järjestöjen poliittisten vastustajien esittämisen moraalisesti kyseenalaisina. Avainsanat – Nyckelord – Keywords Krim, poliittiset nuorisojärjestöt, kollektiivinen muisti, muistin politiikka, toinen maailmansota, Venäjä, Ukraina, identiteettipolitiikka Sisällys 1 Johdanto ......................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 Tutkimuksen tausta ja tutkimuskysymys ................................................................ 3 1.2 Metodologia ja aineistot .......................................................................................... 6 1.3 Lyhyesti järjestöistä ................................................................................................. 8 1.3.1 Molodye za Russkoje Jedinstvo ......................................................................... 11 1.3.2 Molodye Regiony ............................................................................................... 13 1.4 Tutkimuksen etiikka ja ongelmat: analyysi lännen ja idän välissä ....................... 14 1.5 Muutamia määritelmiä........................................................................................... 16 1.5.1 Muisti ja historia ................................................................................................. 16 2 Krimin historiaa ja politiikkaa ..................................................................................... 20 2.1 Toinen maailmansota ............................................................................................ 21 2.2 Krim Neuvostoliiton romahtamisen jälkeen .......................................................... 24 2.3 Keskeiset teemat postsosialistisessa poliittisessa ympäristössä ............................ 26 2.4 Valtiojohtoinen patriotismi Venäjällä ja kiistat historian vääristelystä ................. 27 2.5 Venäjän pyrkimykset vaikuttaa sen lähiulkomaihin.............................................. 30 2.6 Poliittinen tilanne itsenäisessä Ukrainassa ............................................................ 31 2.7 Krimin venäläiset liikkeet ..................................................................................... 34 2.8 Nuorten poliittinen aktiivisuus Ukrainassa ........................................................... 35 3 Kollektiivisen muistamisen teoriaa .............................................................................. 37 3.1 Kuvitellut yhteisöt ................................................................................................. 38 3.2 Menneisyyden merkitys nykyisyydelle ................................................................. 41 3.3 Kollektiivinen ja sosiaalinen muisti ...................................................................... 44 3.4 Muistaminen rituaalina ja ruumiillisena toimintana .............................................. 47 3.5 Muistin paikat ........................................................................................................ 50 3.6 Muistin tapahtuma ................................................................................................. 53 3.7 Legitimaatio, yhdistäminen ja erottelu .................................................................. 55 4 Krimiläisten nuorisojärjestöjen muistin politiikka ....................................................... 57 4.1 Muistamisen imperatiivi ........................................................................................ 58 4.2 Sukupuolinäkökulma toisen maailmansodan muistamisessa ................................ 61 4.3 Suuri isänmaallinen sota ........................................................................................ 63 4.4 Sotakultti legitimaatiomyyttinä ............................................................................. 66 4.6 Sotakultti nykypäivän Venäjällä ja Ukrainassa ..................................................... 68 4.7 Patriotismi nuorisojärjestöjen retoriikassa ............................................................ 70 4.8 Patriotismi,
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