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Univers!^ Micrdrilms International 300 N. Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Ml 48106

8318362

Gimenez, Pamela Suzanne

THEORIES OF IMAGINATION IN ART EDUCATION PHILOSOPHIES

The Ohio State University PH.D. 1983

University Microfilms I n ter n Sti 0 n si300 N. zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106

THEORIES OF IMAGINATION IN ART EDUCATION PHILOSOPHIES

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate

School of The Ohio State University

By

Pamela Suzanne Gimenez, B.A., M.A.

*****

The Ohio State University

1983

Reading Committee: Approved By

Professor Ross A. Norris Professor Philip L. Smith Professor Kenneth A. Marantz Ross A. Norris, Adviser Department of Art Education ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many people have helped me in this research. I would like to

thank Kenneth Marantz for many enlightening conversations and for his

constant encouragement. Philip Smith has also spent much time talk­

ing with me and has provided careful and constructive criticism of my research as well as helpful suggestions. I am deeply grateful to

Ross Norris, my adviser, for his attention to my work and for his

patience, kindness and encouragement. I have been fortunate to work with Professor Norris not only because he is an excellent and meti­

culous philosopher of art education but also because he has pioneer­

ed the systematic study of imagination in art education. Working

under his guidance in conducting my own research of imagination has been an exciting and rewarding experience.

I would like to thank my friend and colleague, Mary Erickson of

Kutztown State College, for her constant interest in my research.

Over the many years we have known each other, she has been a great

source of encouragement both by her stimulating conversation and by

her insightful questioning.

To my husband, Jose Luis, go my deepest thanks and appreciation

for his understanding and enthusiasm. Without his support and inter­

est this endeavor might have been more task than adventure.

ii VITA

September 3, 1945 ...... Born - Saint Louis, Missouri

1967 ...... B.Â., Webster College Saint Louis, Missouri

1974 - 1976 ...... Educational Research Associate, Education Department, Columbus Museum of Art, Columbus, Ohio

1976 - 1978 ...... Assistant Curator of Education, Education Department, Columbus Museum of Art, Columbus, Ohio

1978 ...... M.A., The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1978 - 1981 ...... Graduate Teaching Associate, Depart­ ment of Art Education, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1979 - 1980 ...... Graduate Student Representative, Department of Art Education, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

PUBLICATIONS

"Imagination," Review of Research in Visual Arts Education, No. 12 (Fall 1980), pp. 50-52.

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Art Education Studies in Philosophy of Art Education Professor Ross A. Norris Studies in Philosophy of Education Professor Philip L. Smith Studies in Experimental Psychology Professor Mari Jones

iii TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 11

VITA 111

LIST OF TABLES vl

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER I 27

Early Liberal Arts Education and Art Education 29 Humanistic Art Education 33 The Theory of Imagination In Humanistic Art Education 43 The Theory of Imagination In Plato's Ethics 48 The Theory of Imagination In Aristotle's Ethics 56 The Theory of Imagination In the Stoic's Ethics 61 Summary 70

CHAPTER II 77

Early Pragmatism In Art Education 78 Pragmatic Art Education 84 Ihe Theory of Imagination In Pragmatism 87 Imagination In the Service of Reason 93 The Theory of Imagination from Proclus 94 The Theory of Imagination from Syneslus 96 The Theory of Imagination from Richard of St. Victor 98 Summary 105

CHAPTER III 112

Early Child Development Theory In Art Education 113 Developmental Theory In Art Education 118 The Theory of Imagination In Developmental Theory 123 The Theory of Imagination In Idealist Aesthetics 130 Imagination In Plato's Theory of Divine Inspiration 141 Imagination In Dante's Theory of Vision 145 Imagination In Rhetoric and Poetic 150 Summary 158

Iv CHAPTER IV

Existential Phenomenology in General Education 168 Existential Phenomenology of Art Education 171 Existential Phenomenology in Art Education Research 180 The Theory of Imagination in Existential Phenomenology 185 The Theory of Imagination from Sartre 188 Imagination and Will: Augustine 196 The Concept of Imagination from Maimonides 200 Summary 208

SUMMARY 218

BIBLIOGRAPHY 222

A. Works Cited in the Text 222 B. Ancillary 231 LIST OF TABLES

List of classical terms. This list is of the terms phantasia and eikasia and their deriva­ tives as first used in pre-socratic and Platonic periods ...... 18

vi INTRODUCTION

Part I

Early art education in the United States, around 1870, is said to have been typified by Walter Smith's rigorous methods of copybook geome­ tric drawing. Smith's belief was that drawing should be utilitarian, having industrial aims, and not mere "play" or "picture making."! For some others, however, drawing was a medium of self-expression and this meant, as Samual Eliot, Superintendent of Schools of Boston, described it in 1878, the "freer play of imagination in drawing."2 An immediate effect of this latter position was to do away with previous methods of copying from copy books; another was to expand the contents of "drawing" to include pictorial composition, figure drawing, and painting. These changes were based on the nascent belief that art education could contri­ bute to the development of the Individual's perception and appreciation of beauty and the development of taste.

The "Manuel Training Movement," instituted in the late 1800's took over the utilitarian functions previously belonging to art educa­ tion. Deprived of these functions, upon which were based justifications for the existence of art education, art educators adopted a quite dif­ ferent position, "art for art's sake," a view held by professional artists of that time.3 In art education, this resulted in an emphasis on the fine arts and art appreciation. Certain earlier movements Ir art education such as "The School Decoration Movement,Initiated in

1 2

1870, were reinforced and gained popularity because of "art for art's

sake." The "Picture Study Movement"^ also grew out of this belief.

The addition of science to the public school curriculum in the late 1890's initiated art education to the "Nature Study Movement"^ and the "Correlation of Subject Matter Movement."^ Again, a practical

function for art education was identified. Art educator's were encour­ aged to adjust the focus of art education from its newly acquired cultural and aesthetic emphasis back to a practical one of using art to study nature and other subjects.

Thus, two beliefs, seemingly at odds, appear to have been held in art education. One belief was "art for art's sake." Art educa­ tor's holding this belief, emphasized the values of acquiring taste and appreciation of beauty. These art educator's advocated methods which allowed for "freer play of imagination," as Green put it. The other belief was "art as practical." Art educator's holding this belief emphasized the importance of acquiring scientific knowledge or facts through the use of art as a practical tool. They did not advocate methods for the use of imagination in drawing but rather, methods which resulted in accurate reproduction or representation of plant and animal specimens.

The "art for art's sake" group and the "art as practical" group each advanced a distinct set of beliefs and assumptions about what art and art education was or should be. These beliefs and assumptions were the basis for justification of educational practice. In this paper, sets of beliefs and assumptions justifying educational practice are called "philosophies." 3

Philosophy treats of distinctions made about the world, know­

ledge and values. In art education, such distinctions are embodied in

particular concepts used to both describe educational objectives and

to serve as criteria for the attainment of objectives. For example,

the "art for art's sake" group used the concept "imagination" in just

this way. However, what "imagination" meant in terms of educational

objectives was not clear. Since the meaning of concepts may differ,

depending upon the philosophical context in which they are used, this

context must be referred to in order to adequately explicate and under­

stand a concept like "imagination."

From the foregoing, two assumptions of this paper can be stated:

one assumption is that educator's hold philosophies which are sets of

beliefs and assumptions used to justify educational practice; the other

assumption is that certain concepts are best explicated within these

philosophical contexts. A third assumption of this study is related

to the above two. This assumption is that a connection exists between

general philosophy and philosophy of education. That is, there are

important general philosophies - such as Realism, Idealism, Pragmatism

and Existential Phenomenology. These general philosophies are also

found in philosophy of education. For example, there is the general philosophy. Existential Phenomenology, represented by Martin Heidegger,

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean Paul Sartre, etc. In philosophy of educa­

tion there is also Existential Phenomenology, represented by David

Denton, LeRoy Troutner, Donald Vandenberg and others.® Though philosophers and philosophers of education may differ about the meaning 4 of philosophical constructs of (e.g.) Existential Phenomenology, there are characteristics of this philosophy which bind these philosophers together as a group or school. These characteristics emerge from the sets of beliefs and assumptions of Existential Phenomenology.

It is not unusual for philosophers of education to set forth pervasive characteristics found in various philosophies. Norman A.

Deeb, for example, in Cloud Nine Seminar: Educational Philosophy in

Satire,9 discusses five major philosophies, attempting to show how these philosophies effect educational practice. His aim is to identify distinct beliefs advanced by each philosophy, about the world, knowledge and values in order that teachers may understand their application to educational practice and from there, to formulate their own educational philosophy. Though Deeb does not dwell on the topic, eclecticism and the educational conflicts often arising from it become apparent to the teacher who may hold one belief about what constitutes knowledge and another, conflicting one, about what constitutes education.

What can be suggested from the connection between philosophy and philosophy of education is that educators may make use of philosophical constructs in order to organize, describe and understand beliefs and assumptions justifying educational practice, i.e., in order to con­ struct philosophies of education. Since art education may be a special branch of education, in the broadest sense of education, its philo­ sophies will have characteristics of philosophy of education and general philosophy. That is, just as there is Existential Phenomenology, and

Existential Phenomenology of education, there will also be Existential 5

Phenomenology of art education. The foregoing assumption is basic to understanding what follows in the rest of this paper.

Most, though not all, of the art educators discussed in this paper have not aligned themselves with a specific philosophy, but simply have advanced strong beliefs about what art education is or should be. Analysis of these beliefs, however, points to their having certain pervasive characteristics of specific philosophies, i.e., art educators hold beliefs and assumptions about the world, knowledge and values. That this is the case can be demonstrated by means of an example.

Let us return to the two art education beliefs about art, "art for art's sake" and "art as practical," in order to consider them in terms of their philosophical characteristics. To accomplish this, simplified versions of two philosophies are presented here. One philosophy. Idealism, is represented by "art for art's sake :" another philosophy. Realism, is represented by "art as practical." Since

"imagination" was a pivotal concept in distinguishing between the educational practice of these two philosophies, the question "what is imagination?" must be asked. In answering this question, I will assume also that a theory of imagination is part of a philosophy.

A major emphasis in Idealism is knowledge by reason. In this philosophy, then, the major feature of art will be mind (or spirit).

Those holding an "art for art's sake" belief will indicate an interest in the idea of art. Beautiful art will be that which embodies ideas of a transcendental nature, beyond its sensuous form. The obliga­ tion of the artist is to embody transcendental ideas in his art so 6

that others may comprehend them. The apprehension of these ideas

constitutes aesthetic experience.

A major emphasis in Realism is knowledge by observation and

induction. In this philosophy, the major features of art will be its properties, and, if art is to be good, these properties should cor­

respond to properties of nature. For those holding an "art as prac­

tical" belief, art may depict, for example, physiological structures of

the world. This materialistic view, based in science, will gauge aesthetic experience by its empirically verifiable or describable sensory aspects, i.e., by physiological feelings, emotions and sensa­

tions. The obligation of the artist is to represent nature. In addition, he must objectify or symbolize his feelings and emotions about the world in such a way that they may be "seen" by others.

When the question "what is imagination?" is asked of the Idealist art educator, he may give the following response: Imagination is the

faculty by which the artist is inspired, (i.e., by God). It functions with intellect in order that the artist may attain Ideals and embody

these Ideals in his work so that the viewer may comprehend them.

It can be understood from this response why teaching methods allowing

"freer play of imagination" might be important to the Idealist art educator. Imagination is seen to account for inspiration, without which the artist can neither attain nor express Ideals. In Idealism

"imagination" is a metaphysical concept.

The same question, asked of a Realist art educator may result in this response: Imagination is that faculty which brings impressions 7

from the world of sensation, in the form of mental images, to illustrate thought. The artist makes use of images of the empirical world to aid him in his representations of that world. He also uses these images as aids in the objectification and symbolization of his feelings and emotions. It can be understood from this response that imagination functions as a kind of memory, which provides the artist with mental images of things in the world, probably in the absence of those things.

In an art curriculum based upon drawing directly from nature very little, if any emphasis will be placed on imagination. In a Realist philosophy, "imagination" is a psychological concept.

This example should demonstrate that art educators make use of philosophical constructs in order to organize, describe and understand beliefs and assumptions justifying educational practice, i.e., in order to construct philosophies of art education. Art education philosophies are assumed to have characteristics of philosophy of education and general philosophy. The differences between the two philosophies dis­ cussed in the example. Idealism and Realism, were found in their beliefs and in their different justifications of educational practice, derived from these beliefs.

The concept "imagination" represented a general idea of what imagination was or meant in each philosophy. The concept was used to describe educational practice. However, since the meaning of the con­ cept "imagination" was not clear, its significance for educational prac­ tice could not be understood. In answering the question "what is imagination?", a theory of imagination, not just a general notion of 8 imagination represented by a concept, was explicated. By explicating the theory of imagination in each philosophy, the meaning of the con­ cept as used to describe educational practice and goals, was under­ stood.

This example was also used to demonstrate that a theory of imagin­ ation is part of a philosophy. That is, it is a part of the larger context of a philosophy. A philosophy is derived from sets of beliefs and assumptions about the world, knowledge and values. A theory of imagination consists in generalizations which purport to describe what is or ought to be; thus, it embodies certain metaphysical beliefs and assumptions. A theory of imagination, since it is part of a philosophy, should be explicated within its philosophical context.

I assume in this paper that art education philosophies, like general philosophies and philosophies of education, have theories of imagination. In order to understand the significance of theories of imagination for art educational practice, such theories must be expli­ cated. The task of this study is to explicate theories of imagination in art education philosophies.

The question comes to mind: why explicate theories of imagination in art education philosophies over other theories, e.g., theories of intelligence or of emotion. A survey of literature in art education points to a concern in that field with knowledge (intelligence) and expression (emotion), but little with imagination. Thus, it would seem that explications of theories of knowledge or expression would contribute to a better understanding of art educational concerns. 9

However, I suggest this may be seen from another perspective. The

history of theories of imagination from philosophy shows that imagina­

tion is seen to have a particularly "comprehensive" nature, quite

different from other human capacities. It has been associated with

both knowledge (the world of intelligence) and with emotion (the world

of sense). Since imagination is seen to have a role in both knowledge

and emotion, it would seem that an explication of theories of imagina­

tion in art education would also allow for an understanding of both

knowledge and emotion.

Art education lacks literature about imagination. But some

authors do use the term. What they mean when they use it, however,

is difficult to determine. For example, when H.B. Green spoke of

Samuel Eliott advocating the "freer use of imagination" in drawing, it

could not be ascertained whether "imagination" meant "creativity" or

whether its meaning was derived from a set of beliefs about the world,

knowledge and values.

Harry Beck Green, Francis Belshe, Frederick Logan and others^®

have written histories of art education in which "creativity" has been

treated. "Creativity" has been an important educational concept and

area of research for the field. These histories, though they have

dealt with the "creativity movement," its inception and progression,

have not dealt with imagination.

Early art education literature on creativity was influenced by

the work of G. Stanley Hall and the child-study movement. Creativity was considered a part of the child's natural development. Earl Barnes,

Herman T. Lukens, Rose Alschuler, LaBerta Hattwick, Margaret Naumberg 10

and others^^ are some early investigators who provided research on

creativity and child development. Though these studies provided

information about children's creative development as suggested by their

artistic expression, they did not provide information about imagination.

Later art education research in creativity has been Influenced by creativity research in psychology initiated in the 1950's. Psycholo­

gists such as Guilford, Wallach and Kogan, Getszels and Jackson, and many others^^, had used experimental methods in order to study and

test creative capacities of individuals. In art education, Victor

Lowenfeld is, undoubtedly, the most widely known art educator for his work in creativity, though this work was not of an experimental nature.

Art educators influenced by Lowenfeld and the creativity psychologists, have provided experimental research in creativity, e.g., Beittel (early work), Burkhart and E i s n e r l ^ have conducted such research. As with earlier art education research on creativity, recent research does not provide information about imagination.

Psychologists have done research on eidetic imagery, commonly called "photographic memory." Initial reporting on eidetic imagery was made in 1938, by R.S. Woodworth. Thirty years later, the study of eidetic imagery was again taken up in psychology by R.N. Haber and

R.B. Haber (1964)14, Since that time more researchers have taken interest in this area of psychology.

More recently in the United States, psychotherapists have devoted research to the development of guided imagery techniques as tools for t h e r a p y . 15 Guided imagery techniques, however, are not new. They have 11 been used by European psychotherapists, particularly in France, for over half a century. Guided imagery technique was pioneered by

Eugene Caslant^^ in France and further advanced by his student,

Robert Desoillel^. The techniques of Desoille have influenced other psychotherapists. These are directed toward enabling the patient,

through the contemplation of certain mental images, to comprehend himself as a being of possibility.

Though researchers in eidetic imagery and guided imagery techni­ ques have indicated a concern with mental imagery, this concern has not been with imagination. For the most part, the concept of imagin­ ation has been dealt with in philosophy.

The literature on imagination from philosophy is vast. (A sample of this literature is presented in the bibliography.) Some outstanding

20th century philosophers to have dealt with imagination are R.G.

Collingwood, Gilbert Ryle and Jean Paul Sartre^®. Their work on imagination is referred to in the following chapters of this paper.

In addition to the literature on imagination in philosophy, between 1861 and 1980, 355 dissertations were written dealing with some aspect of imagination. Most of these dissertations are from the field of literature and related fields, though the fields of philosophy, psychology, sociology and education are represented. One of these, a dissertation by Merle E. Flannery, is from art education^^. This dissertation, however, does not deal with theories of imagination in art education philosophies. It provides an examination of the role of 12 the Immediately sensuous and the intellect in artistic expression and creation. Flannery postulates that though artistic expression consists in sensuous experience, there are intellectual components in the work of art which are of interest to the art educator. The writer concludes that the interplay between the sensuous and the intellectual in artistic expression changes with age and level of sophistication of the artist.

Unless advancing a particular theory of imagination, most other dissertations are not concerned with theories of imagination derived from philosophy. Most dissertation writers from the field of liter­ ature have discussed an author's style in terms of imagination or

"creative imagination." Some dissertations from sociology have pro­ vided descriptions of social-economic groups as well as characteristics of their behavior under the heading "imagination." Dissertations in the field of psychology, in keeping with the methods of that field, have provided experimental research on mental imagery.

Dissertations of interest and related to the present study have been of a philosophical-historical nature. Such dissertations have come from both the fields of literature and related fields, and the field of philosophy. These writers have provided analyses of concepts of imagination within historical settings. Several have focused upon the Romantic Period^® in order to discuss the concept of imagination from various Romantic authors and poets. Some other disserations have provided surveys of the concept over great periods of time, e.g., n 1 from the Renaissance to the Modern . 13

Though much has been written on imagination, historical surveys have been sparse. Of those written in English^^, Mary Wamock's

Imagination (1976)23 ig noteworthy. She has traced the concept from

Hume and Kant, through the Romantics, Ryle, Wittgenstein and Sartre.

From this philosophical analysis, she advances her own comprehensive theory of imagination. L.M. Russow^^ provides a concise description of concepts of imagination advanced by contemporary philosophers such as

Arthur Danto, J.M. Shorter, D.C. Dennett, Alistair Hannay, and Roger

Scruton. Her account of imagination from these philosophers points to a rather constricted concern with either eliminating or preserving the mental image. Other writers such as William Barrett, Edward Casey and

Joseph J. Chamblies25 have provided brief surveys of the concept

"imagination," ancient and modern, within larger works.

Of surveys and histories of the concept of imagination, that of

Murray Wright Bundy, The Theory of Imagination in Classical and Medieval

Thought,26 provides the outstanding example. Bundy's study is analyti­ cal and interpretive. He is not interested to advance a personal theory of imagination. Rather, he lays open the critical meanings of the terms

'imagination' and 'phantasy' from the thought of Plato, Aristotle, the

Stoics, Neoplatonists, from the tenets of medieval faculty psychology and the beliefs of mysticism and, finally, from the terms as they are found in Dante. Bundy examines the two concepts in ontology, epi- stemology, ethics and psychology and from these examinations he identi­ fies the early foundations of "imagination" as an aesthetic concept.

I have relied on Bundy's study in the present paper in order to set 14 forth and discuss the historical foundations of contemporary theories of imagination. My reasons for bringing this history to bear on dis­ cussion of contemporary theories of imagination are given in Part II of this introduction.

In relation to each art education philosophy represented here, some aspect of Bundy's study has been discussed. The explication of theories of imagination in art education philosophies is organized into four chapters each focusing on a specific art education philosophy.

In chapter one, Realism/Idealism is represented by Edmund Feldman's

Humanistic art education. Since Feldman's concern with imagination is found in the relation of ethics to aesthetics, the theory of imagin­ ation in ethics from Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics is set forth.

Discussion of this historical theory is then brought to bear on further discussion of Feldman's theory of imagination. Realism/

Idealism is represented in art education as humanism. For this reason,

Albert William Levi's view of humanism is discussed for purposes of comparison.

In chapter two. Pragmatism is represented by David Ecker's art education philosophy. Imagination has a mediary function in Ecker's view of artistic means - ends ordering. The theory of imagination as a mediary function - "acting in the service of reason" - from Proclus,

Syneslus and Richard of St. Victor, is set forth. This theory of imagin­ ation is brought to bear on further discussion of Ecker's theory.

Because Ecker bases his philosophy in the Pragmatism of John Dewey, this chapter also employs Dewey's writing for an explication of the theory of imagination. 15

Chapter three differs from other chapters in that it focuses upon

developmental psychology and Idealist expressive aesthetics. Develop­

mental psychology is represented in art education by Victor Lowenfeld's

work. Lowenfeld cannot be said to organize theories of child develop­

ment around beliefs or assumptions of a metaphysical nature. His

developmental theory of creativity is scientific, based in psychology.

Lowenfeld's theory has been called "expressive" and has been linked

to Idealist expressive aesthetics. In this chapter, I attempt to demon­

strate the sense in which Lowenfeld's theory may be called "expressive" by contrasting it with the Idealist expressive aesthetics of R.G.

Collingwood. From an explication of the theory of imagination from

Collingwood, derives the distinction in kind between art education philosophy and art education psychology. Bundy's study is referred to

for the theory of imagination as inspiration and expression from

Plato, the Rhetoricians and Dante. Again, discussion of this historical

theory is brought to bear on further discussion of the theory of

imagination as expression.

Existential Phenomenology is represented in chapter four by

Wellington Madenfort and Kenneth Beittel. The theory of imagination in

this philosophy has two aspects : one is the role of imagination as a philosophical method; the other is imagination as representative of man's freedom to choose, or free will. The theory of imagination which connects it to will is represented in Augustine's thought. The theory of imagination from Augustine serves as the basis for further discussion of the theory of imagination as free will. Since Jean-Paul Sartre both 16

uses imagination as philosophical method and advances a theory of

imagination as representative of man's freedom, his work is discussed

in this chapter. Not all Phenomenologists are Existential Phenomeno-

logists. A distinguishing characteristic which sets Existential

Phenomenology apart from other schools of Phenomenology is an over­

riding concern with man's freedom which is the theme and focus of this

philosophy. Another distinguishing characteristic is the form which

phenomenological method may take. Husserl, for example, even though

he may be concerned with man's freedom, is not an Existential Phenomeno-

logist. Husserl's Phenomenology is reductionistic; it requires that

the individual examine the world apart from or outside himself. The

Existential Phenomenologist because he believes that man is a being in

the world, would disagree with a method of examining the world which

demands man's exclusion from that world. The Phenomenologists dis­

cussed in this chapter are called Existential Phenomenologists because

they are concerned with man's freedom and because their phenomenological

method involves examination of the world from within that world; as a being in the world.

A brief historical overview from art education precedes discussion

of each philosophy. The overview provides an historical context for

the philosophy. In each case, other art educators, early and contem­ porary, holding similiar philosophies are identified. I shall now turn

to Part II of this introduction concerning the theory of imagination in

classical and medieval thought. The purpose of this section is to summarize Murray Wright Bundy's study of the theory of imagination as 17 well as to present certain background information pertinent to this study but not appropriate for inclusion in the body of the paper.

Part II

The historical foundation for contemporary theories of imagination

(in art education philosophy) is found in classical and medieval thought.

Though ancient theories have been tempered by Renaissance thought,

The Age of Enlightenment, and Romanticism, these modifications of theories of imagination are also based in controversies which were established early on. In order to better understand the foundations of theories of imagination in art education philosophies, an examination of these historical roots seems necessary. For this examination reference is made to the research of Murray Wright Bundy on the theory of imagin­ ation in classical and medieval thought. Though my own study of

Imagination has differed from Bundy's in both purpose and intent, I agree with him that the importance of modern theories is better under­ stood and explained in light of this history.

Certain important points about the historical theories of imagin­ ation must be made here. Bundy uses the term phantasy (phantasia) as ancient thinkers did, in place of the term imagination (eikasia), usual in modern translations of these philosophers. Phantasia means

'appearance', suggesting the subjective impression of the mind.

Eikasia means the process of copying. (See chart I) This first distinction between the two terms is made by Plato. The meaning of the term 'phantasia' eventually comes to be subsumed under the term

'imagination' (imaginatio) in the Middle Ages. In the present paper. 18

Chart I: List of Classical Terms

This list is only of terms first used in pre-socratic and Platonic periods.

EIKASIA eidolon : (noun) often used as a philosophical term, but later coming to mean 'statue' or 'idol'. eikon: (noun) synonymous with eidolon; Indicates the state of being like; an image, copy or likeness. eiko; (basic verb, passive) derives from eikon; to be like, or capable of being compared. eikazo: (verb, active) derives from eiko; to make like; to copy; to imitate; to portray; and sometimes, to conjecture. eikasma; (noun) synonymous with eikon; indicates the re­ sults of the process of eikazo. eikasia: denoting the process or function ; the result of thought concerning the significance of images. This form used during the time of Plato denotes reflective thought.

PHANTASIA phaino: (basic verb, active) to appear, to be apparent; to come to light. to phainomenon: the phenomenon phainomai, phatazo: (basic verbs, passive) to take a definite appear­ ance; to take shape; to give oneself an appearance; to exalt oneself. phantasma: (noun) indicates not only the appearance (the result of activity implied by the verb) but also a mental state opposed to reality. phantasia: an appearance (not much known about its popular usage before Plato).

Source: Murray Wright Bundy, The Theory of Imagination in Classical and Medieval Thought. 19

I have kept to Bundy’s translation of these terms, when discussing classical and medieval theories.

Two important distinctions between phantasia and eikasia lead to the theory of imagination as a symbol of creative activity. The first of these is made by Plato. Phantasia was popularly used in presocratic times to mean 'appearance'. With Plato, phantasy becomes associated with the free, creative power of the mind. This, Bundy says, is not a particularly positive characteristic as the creative power is prone to all the dangers of error and illusion. Plato comes to view phantasia in mediary capacity. It furnishes images of thought in the higher realm of the soul to the lower realm of sensation. Plato makes the first distinc­ tion between the two terms based on the function of the artist, mimesis or Imitation. This function is equal to the concept "eikasia", the process of copying.

Phantasia, as the creative power which served reason, had been used to characterize the artist dealing in false opinion which resulted in the expression of false phantasies. This characterization led to the association of both the terms 'phantastic' and 'imaginative' with that activity of the artist which was subjective and, thus, illusive.

Plato, associating both terms with the term 'imitation*, distinguished between them in light of reality, i.e., phantastic imitation was less real than icastic imitation.

The second distinction between the two terras is made in the

Middle Ages. Phantasy was relatively free of association with making faithful copies, the work of imagination. At the same time, phantasy was held in suspicion because of its capacity for error and illusion. 20

The medieval translation of phantasia gs Imaginatlo added substance to

these distinctions. Phantasia was used to denote combinatory functions

and imaginatio denoted reproductive powers. Hovrever, when the two terms

came to be used synonomously, imaginatio was attributed with the powers

of freedom and their attendent dangers. This usage served to further the

concept of imagination associated with the aesthetic. Bundy states:

When later a word was needed to denote a kind of creative activity higher than phantasia, it was to the term imaginatio that writers turned as at least free from the charge of being the source of error and illusion. It was also more capable than phantasia of becoming the symbol of creative activity defined in an aesthetic other than that of representation. When the 'image' was redefined in the light of another philosophical principle,then the faculty of imaging, imaginatio, could denote capacities of the human mind not contemplated by Greek empiricism. 27

The significance of the classical and medieval distinctions of

the two terms is found in the eventual aesthetic concept of imagination

as the symbol of creative activity.

The concept of imagination, once disassociated solely from the making of copies, emerges more full-blown as an image-producing faculty with reproductive, productive, mediary and creative capacities. What

is apparent from an historical study of imagination is the diversity

of its roles in mental activity. It is often afforded a peripheral

role in the service of one or more other mental acts, or it is seen to perform solely with allied mental acts, such as memory. Attributed with an image producing capacity, it is also associated with the

'•unreal." Imagination is seldom considered to be one with the activity of the mind as a who]e. What is consistent in its various characteri­

zations is its image producing capacity, its creative capacity and its

freedom, though the latter two vary in degree. 21

Summary

There are four basic assumptions of this paper: (1) that educators

hold philosophies which are sets of beliefs and assumptions used to

justify educational practice; (2) that a connection exists between

general philosophy and philosophy of education and philosophy of art

education; (3) that art education philosophies, like general philoso­

phies and philosophies of education, have theories of imagination; and

(4) that certain concepts are best explicated within these philosophi­

cal contexts. In order to understand the significance of theories of

imagination for art educational practice, such theories must be

explicated. The task of this study is to explicate theories of imagin­

ation in art education philosophies. It is important to do this for

at least two reasons. One reason is that an explication of theories of imagination in art education philosophies has not been undertaken in

the field. One purpose in undertaking this explication is to provide knowledge about theories of imagination in art education and the history of these theories.

The other reason for an explication of theories of imagination

is that imagination has a role in morality as well as in art.

Implied in each art education philosophy examined is that art is moral activity and art education is a moral endeavor. If in no other way,

art education is a moral endeavor in that teachers make curricular

decisions which direct the learning and behavior of students. When

teachers are not intelligent in making curricular decisions, which are moral, the result is that learning and behavior are at odds. It is 22 necessary then that teachers understand this sense in which art

education is a moral endeavor. However, this is not the most Important

sense in which morality comes to play in art education. How it does should become clear in the body of this paper. 23

Footnotes:

1. Harry Beck Green, "The Introduction of Art As A General Education Subject In American Schools," Ed. D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1948, p. 217.

2. Ibid.»p. 222.

3. Ibid., pp. 289-290.

4. Henry Turner Bailey initiated this movement in art education which was carried out by Charles C. Perkins and John D. Philbrick in 1870. Bronson Alcott had earlier advocated school room decoration in his Temple School, 1834.

5. Picture study was initiated in the late 1890's. It consisted in children's study of cheap reproductions of "accepted" masterpieces. Facts about these were memorized by name of artist, dates, etc., by the child. Moral lessons were often drawn from picture study, based on the subject matter content of the materpiece. Ibid. pp. 303-307.

6. The Nature Study Movement, initiated during the late 1800's, involved children in visual representation of plant and animal specimens. This movement provided the subject matter content for drawing and apparently increased children's interest in drawing. Ibid, p. 308.

7. The correlation of subject matter movement grew out of the teaching methods by Johann Fredwick Herbart. Those taking part in this movement stressed teaching methodology, and correlated subject matter as a basis for improvement of the teaching situation. Art was a tool for study. Brought to the U.S. from Germany by Herbert's students, Charles De Garmo, Charles McMurry and Frank McMurray. Ibid, p. 309-311.

8. See general texts on philosophies of education and more specifi­ cally: David Denton, ed. Existentialism and Phenomenology in Education: Collected Essays, (New York: Teachers College Press, 1974).

9. Norman A. Deeb, Cloud Nine Seminar: Educational Philosophy in Satire, (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1975).

10. Harry Beck Green, op.cit., "The Introduction of Art as a General Education Subject in American Schools."

Francis B. Belshe, "A History of Art Education in the Public Schools of the United States," Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1946. 24

Frederick Logan, The Growth of Art In American Schools, (New York: Harper & Bros., 1955).

11. Early studies of child development and creativity: Earl Barnes, ed. , Studies in Education, (Philadelphia: Earl Bames, 1896-97, 2 vols.).

Herman T. Lukens, "A Study of Children's Drawings in the Early Years," Pedagogical Seminary, October, 1896, p. 11.

Rose Aschuler and LaBerta Hattwick, Painting and Personality: A Study of Young Children, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947). Vols. 1 and 2.

______, "Easel Painting as an Index of Person­ ality in Preschool Children," American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, Vol. 13, (1943), p. 616.

Margaret Naumberg, "Studies of the 'Free' Art Expression of Behavior Problem Children in Adolescence as a Means of Diagnosis and Therapy," Nervous Mental Disorders Monograph, No. 71 (New York: Coolidge Foundation, 1947).

12. For a general overview of creativity research in psychology see:

Morton Bloomberg, ed.. Creativity; Theory and Practice (New Haven: College and University Press Publishers, 1973).

Shirley Heinze and Morris Stein, Creativity and the Individual, (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960).

13. Kenneth Beltfel and Robert Burkhart, "Strategies of Spontaneous, Divergent, and Academic Art Students," Studies In Art Education, Vol. 5, (Fall, 1963) p. 20.

Robert Burkhart,Spontaneous and Deliberate Ways of Learning, (Scranton, Penn: International Textbook Co., 1962).

Elliot W. Eisner, "A Typology of Creativity In the Visual Arts," Studies In Art Education, Vol. 4, (Fall, 1962), p. 11.

Victor Lowenfeld, The Nature of Creative Activity (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1939).

______, "Current Research on Creativity," NEA Journal, Vol. 57, (November, 1958) p. 538. 25

14. R.S. Woodworth, Experimental Psychology, (New York: Holt, 1938).

R.N. Haber and R.B. Haber, "Eidetic Imagery: I. Frequency," Perceptual and Motor Skills, Vol. 19, (1964), p. 131.

C.R. Gray and K. Gunnenerman, "The Enigmatic Eidectic Image: A Critical Examination of Methods, Data, and Theory," Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 82, (1975) p. 383.

15. For current research in mental imagery as a therapeutic tool see: The Journal of Mental Imagery.

16. Eugene Caslant, The Method of Development of Supernatural Faculties, (Paris: Rhea, 1921).

17. Robert Desoille, Theory and Practice of the Directed Daydream, (Geneva; Montblanc, 1961).

18. R.G. Collingwood, Principles of Art, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1938).

Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, (New York: Bames and Noble, Inc., 1949) Chapter 8.

Jean-Paul Sartre, Psychology of Imagination, (New York: Washington Square Prfss, 1968).

19. Merle E. Flannery, "Art Education and the Interplay between the Intellect and the Imagination in Artistic Creation," Ed. D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1967.

20. James Theodore Engle, "The Protean Imagination: From Enlighten­ ment to Romanticism" Ph.D. dissertation. Harvard University, 1978.

L. John Forster, "A Study of the Psycho-Philosophical Origins of the Romantic Imagination," Ph.D. dissertation. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1969.

21. Edward C. Kollmann, "Studies in the Mod e m Theory of Imagination with Especial Reference to Its Historical Development from the Renaissance to Kant," Ph.D. dissertation. Harvard University, 1950.

22. Luigi Ambrosi, La Psicologia della Immazinazione nella Storia della filosofia, (Rome, 1898).

Bemard Schweitzer, Die Bildende Kunstler und der Begriff des Kunstlerischen in der~Antike'mimesis’und'phantasia*, (in Neue Heidelberger Jahrbucher, 1925). An historical survey of phantasy as an aesthetic term. 26

Jean Starobinski, "Jalons pour une histoire du concept d'imagination" in La Relation Critique, (Paris: Gallimard, 1970).

23. Mary Wamock, Imagination, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).

24. L.M. Russow, "Some Recent Work on Imagination," American Philoso­ phical Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 1, (1978), p. 57.

25. William Barrett, "History Behind our Backs", in Time of Need: Forms of Imagination in the 20th Century.(New York; Harper & Row, 1972).

Edward Casey, Imagining: A Phenomenological Study .(Bloomington: University ot Indiana Press, 1976 ).

Joseph James Chamblis, Imagination and Reason in Plato, Aristotle, Vico, Rousseau and Keats: An Essay on the Philosophy of Expezicnce, (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974).

26. Murray Wright Bundy, The Tlieory of Imagination in Classical and Medieval Thought, in University of Illinois Studies in Language and Literature, Vol. 12 (May-August, 1927) Nos. 2-3, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1927).

27. Ibid., p. 278. ΠA P T E R I

In this chapter, the theory of imagination in humanistic art education is explicated. Humanistic art education is represented by the work of Edmund Feldman. The educational beliefs of Albert William

Levi, a renown humanist, are also discussed in this chapter, because they constitute a paradigm case of humanities education.

In discussion of Feldman's work, four key concepts will be attended to: "ethics," "aesthetics," "knowing," and "doing."

Ethics and aesthetics are pivotal concepts in Feldman's theory of imagination. For this reason, the theory of imagination in ethics from

Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics is set forth, relying on the study of

Murray Wright Bundy. Discussion of the theory of imagination in ethics is brought to bear on further discussion of the theory of imagination in humanistic art education philosophy.

"Knowing" and "doing" are pivotal concepts in the traditional dis­ tinction of liberal arts education from fine arts education. They are also pivotal concepts in understanding the ways in which Feldman's philosophical position differs from Levi's and where the two coincide,

^eldman can be said to hold beliefs found in both philosophical

Idealism and Realism.

Norman Deeb^ points out general characteristics of Idealism and

Realism. Some of these characteristics may be found in Feldman's

27 28

beliefs about art education. For the Idealist, that which is real

is mental. Knowledge (truth) consists in ideas and ideals, which one

acquires by rational processes. The purpose of education, according

to the Idealist, is to transmit knowledge, or ideals, to the student.

"Goodness" and "beauty" are concepts of the mind which determine

values and ideals. That which is good is good for all individuals.

In the educational setting the teacher acts as a model of virtue whom

students should emulate.

The Realist believes that reality consists in the world of matter,

i.e., that which can be perceived through the senses. Reality exists

outside the mind, in nature. Concepts are derived from sense data

in nature. Knowledge (truth), for the Realist consists in facts ct

information which can be empirically verified. Since nature is that which provides man with knowledge, the purpose of education should be

to teach students to explore their environment, or nature. The Realist believes that goodness and beauty conform to nature. In the educational

setting, the teacher provides students with appropriate stimuli in

order that he may gain the information and facts he needs to live in the world. The Realist also believes in the principles of potentiality

(matter) and actuality (form). Everything in the world is composed of matter as well as form, which is determined by essence. Since form or

essence acts upon matter to actualize it, all things are in a process

of becoming.

Feldman believes that art is a way of learning which unites knowing and doing. He argues for a humanities education wherein 29

combinations of both knowing and doing occur. This Indicates that he

believes, as the Idealist does, that knowledge comes from ideas and

ideals existing in the mind; and, like the Realist, he believes that

knowledge comes from man's interaction with nature. There are other

ways in which Feldman can be said to hold both Realist beliefs and

Idealist beliefs. These will be pointed out in discussion of his

humanistic art education. This discussion begins with historical

background on humanistic art education. It will be seen that philo­

sophical beliefs, like those pointed out above, have had a role in

justification of the arts in liberal arts education from early on.

Early Liberal Arts Education and Art Education

Sir Nikolaus Pevsner notes that a significant change in the con­

ception of art education occurs during Michaelangelo's time.% Up until

this time art education consisted in the teaching of skills and crafts­ manship, based on the medieval guild systems. Of a wealthy family,

Michaelangelo's artistic education and life was outside the guild

systems. He enjoyed much social esteem which, in turn, effected the

social status of artists. A change in the conception of artists occurred from that of craftsmen to that of men of character and

learning. If artists were to live up to this new conception, the then

current direction of art education had to change. The areas of paint­ ing, sculpture and architecture began to be subsumed within the liberal arts. 30

Theoretical foundations were needed to justify art education as a part of the liberal arts and separate from the craft guilds. This theoretical foundation was provided by Leonardo da Vinci^. In keeping with liberal arts education, Leonardo advocated the teaching of know­ ledge over skills. This, says Pevsner, led to a radically different approach to art education. Perspective, theory and practice of pro­ portion, and drawing from drawings and nature were taught before the learner embarked on the practice of his own art. Eventually art academies were instituted and these assumed responsibility for the intellectual education of the artist.

Art academies were quickly subsumed into the political structures of European countries. Heads of state, nobility and civil officials became the foremost patrons of art. Such patronage resulted in a particular style of "official art." The worth of artists began to be estimated in terms of their usefulness to society and state. Artists were expected to execute commissions quickly, in "official" style and to present in these works foimal qualities and meanings pleasing to society.4

According to Pevsner, after the guild structure was completely broken down during the Enlightenment and The French Revolution, two types of artists and art emerge, both created during the 17th century.

One type was the Paris academician who, though he enjoyed high social esteem, was a servant to the court. The court artist was restricted in the form and style of his art. The other type of artist was the

Dutch painter, who worked freely in his studio, under obligation to 31

no one. These two types, Pevsner says, represent a social polarity

effecting the artist arid his art, to the present day.5

By the 19th century, these two distinct views on art and the

artist were solidified and their effects on art education emerge. In

one view was advocated an art education based on the requirements of

the court and the nobility. In the other view, art academy education was rejected as overemphasizing the artist's obligation to society,

state, and nation. This latter group was composed of artists of the

Sturm und Drang and the Romantics. These artists believed that art was created by genius, and genius could neither be taught nor could it

flourish under art academy methods of education. They advocated an

art education which was individual, anti-academic and experimental.

An attempt to resolve these two beliefs about what art and art education should be, can be found in the design of present day liberal arts education in higher education. The result of which has been to include art departments within colleges or programs of the humanities.

Thomas Munro accounts for this conception of the liberal arts by the influence on it of m o d e m democracy. He states:

Democracy has almost eliminated the ancient distinction between the arts of a freeman or gentleman and those of the lower classes. Today the liberal arts are conceived primarily as those which give a broad, well-balanced, humanistic education, and which help to liberate the mind from ignorance, superstitution and blind conformity to custom.&

The case for the arts in liberal arts education, argued from a demo­ cratic perspective, also stresses the equalitarian and practical dimen­ sions of art education. Often the underlying belief supporting justi­

fications for the inclusion of arts within the liberal arts is that 32 art experience is necessary for the education of the "whole" individual.

Feldman argues for humanities education from a democratic tradition, which combines both Idealist and Realist views.

Humanities study in art education usually takes the form of aesthetic education, as is the case with Feldman and other art educa­ tors who hold like philosophies. In the humanist tradition, aesthe- ticians such as Herbert Read. Thomas Munro and Ralph Smith have provided the field with philosophical work in aesthetic education. Read^ draws from both classical and mo d e m resources, such as Plato's

Republic and Carl Jung's psychology, in order to explain his beliefs that art is an educational process which involves essentially the artistic creation of the self. The realization of individual potential, which Read believes to contribute to a harmonious social order, occurs through creative expression. Creative expression, for Read, should be the foundation of education.

Thomas Munro discusses the role of art education in modem demo­ cracy in light of both the artist's freedom and his social responsibi­ lity. Munro argues for the development of aesthetics as an empirical science, based on psychology and sociology as well as the study of works of art.8 The aims of aesthetic education should include the development of "artistic and aesthetic strains in personality;" the transmission of the "cultural heritage of the world's greatest art;" the preparation of the student for "vocational and professional success;" and, the use of arts for "developing constructive, co­ operative citizenship."9 33

Ralph A. Smith Is editor of the Journal of Aesthetic Education and has provided the field with three major anthologies in areas related to aesthetic education.^® Smith has argued, analytically and critically, against such government initiated and sponsored programs as "Artists in Residence" and "Artists in Schools." In conjunction with these writings, Smith has also argued against policy issued on the arts in general education.Smith believes that policy considerations for art education, should reflect objectives of aesthetic education, i.e., they should reflect the humanistic ideal of providing all students with aesthetic experience toward the enhancement of life.

Humanistic Art Education

Edmund Feldman's humanistic philosophy of art education is pre­ sented in his text Becoming Human Through Art.12 The following dis­ cussion will refer to this text. The central concern of the text is aesthetic education, the general objective of which is the development of each child into a fully human person.

Feldman advances beliefs about art, art education, and the student.

One belief is that children make art naturally and spontaneously without formal instruction. This kind of "natural" art-making need not be learned in the classroom setting. It is also not a part of

Feldman's humanistic art education. That is, it is not this natural activity to which Feldman refers when he says that a student should make art as part of his art education. 34

Another of Feldman's beliefs is that art is a way of learning which unites knowing and doing and art education is a comprehensive approach to teaching and learning. Art educators do not train artists nor is the artistic activity of children the only resource for art education. Other resources are the history of art, art appreciation, and art criticism. Art, for the teacher, "is a tool, an instrument for doing a better job of liberal and humane education."13

Feldman also discounts several popularly held objectives for art education, specifically those concerned with child art in the areas of diagnosis, therapy, recreation and professionalism. These areas, he says, and their objectives for the child, should not be confused with humanistic areas and objectives and, further, their proper place is in institutions other than schools.

Feldman's definition of humanism is essentially an Idealistic one.

However, his belief that the process and technique of study is a form of humanism, is based upon a Realist position. He states:

Humanism is the doctrine that man and his works are worth study without regard to any practical or vocational purpose. ...any discipline, any technique we use to learn who and what man is, can be regarded as a form of humanistic study.

Whatever areas of concern the humanist may examine, "it is for the purpose of finding out what light they can shed on man and the problem of being a man." Feldman mandates that art education "reconstitute itself as the study of man through art."^^

There are four categories of study in humanistic art education.

These are the cognitive, the linguistic, the media, and the critical. 35

The first category, cognitive study: understanding the world, is defined as the "acquiring of facts, information, or knowledge about man through art." (his emphasis) In cognitive study the teacher emphasizes learning about three dimensions of man's world: the personal dimension ("individual personality and the expressive meanings of art"); the social dimension ("groups and the social functions of art"); and, the physical dimension ("places and things - the practical uses and the aesthetic effects of art"). The student gains incidental information about and insight into the structure of art through cogni­ tive study. He attempts to find answers to his questions about man and his world by looking at or making art. Feldman describes this as the effort "to convert the formal and sensory qualities of art into conceptual knowledge." Feldman identifies three kinds of knowledge which art leads to:

(1) knowledge of the different kinds of feelings and ideas people have and express to each other; (2) knowledge of the formal organizations and relationships that make objects pleasing, appealing or desirable; and, (3) knowledge of the uses of art in the physical environment.15

Linguistic study is the study of art as language. There are three aspects of art as language: formal qualities, style, and aesthetics. Formal qualities are studied as they are "encountered" in works of art rather than as "definitions or diagrams" apart from the visual experience. Style is studied for its affective character­ istics rather than as historical sequence of artistic movements.

Aesthetics involves studying the work of art as "an organization of forms or visual elements" as well as the viewer's understanding of these 36 forms. Feldman claims that still another way to gain insight into art as language is through artistic performance. For this reason, creative practices have to be included in the curriculum. Such practices should "stimulate awareness of the formal or syntactic traits of art - not that elementary school children should study the visual elements apart from what they mean in a particular work of art." (his emphasis)

Media study involves not only the study of materials of various artforms but also the study of forming processes and how these effect what is expressed. Feldman states that "we must look at the several visual artforms as instances of form taking possession of meaning."

The humanist's interest in such study is "a matter of recognizing how men are themselves shaped by their forms of communication and expression."17

The final area of study, critical study,!® is defined as "the process of introducing order into the child's natural performance as a critic." In general, Feldman considers art criticism as talk about art which involves description, analysis, interpretation, and judgment.

Rather than to assess the value of artworks, the purpose of criticism in Feldman's theory is to involve students in operations of "observa­ tion, specification, conjecture, intuition, inference, self-correction, risk-taking, and finding-out." The process of art criticism as a whole is more important than its individual critical operations. In addition, Feldman feels that critical learning can be carried over 37 from the "context of art to the context of life." If this is true, then critical studies can provide skills which children may use to understand the human situation.19

Feldman believes that reasons for creating art have two features: personal authenticity and teleological design. The former is inherent and refers to "the individual's genuine need to express himself to another person." The latter, which must be learned, refers to "the awareness of society's conventional expectations about the functions art can perform." Teleological design (the purposes of art) is made up of natural and social forces. In regard to this, the child's creative expression, as art, is "shaped by all the forces of reality that nature and society have set in motion."20

Feldman's reasons for creating art are based in both Realist and

Idealist beliefs. Personal authenticity, in that it involves certain inherent characteristics of man, is a concept used to emphasize mind or spirit in the creation of art. Another feature of art is teleo­ logical. Since this feature comes from both nature and society, it exists outside the individual, in the world. The Realist believes that all things come from either nature or man. Feldman, combines both Idealist and Realist beliefs in his justifications for creating art.

Feldman claims that all human creativity has a ritualistic character which "functions as symbolic confrontation with reality."

In simpliest terms, ritual and confrontation involves facing and coming 38

to grips with reality. For Feldman, our confrontations with reality

are opportunity for aesthetic expression which we accomplish through

the expression of our ritualistic needs. He explains this in light of

crisis rites which, he says, entail the creation of art:

These crisis rites represent the conventional moments when individuals, supported by their group, confront reality - that is, when they DO or MAKE or WITNESS something in order to come to terms with existence. This kind of doing and making and witnessing is the foundation of all human creativity. The forms that emerge owe their existence to a dialectical process - a tension between the individual and the conventions of the group, on the one hand; and a dissipation of that tension as the individual and his group engage in a collaborative ritual of making and witnessing, on the other. The art objects then created are inseparable from their ritualistic purpose. From the standpoint of a humanistic theory of art education, they exemplify personal authenticity and teleological design at the same time.21

In this statement, Feldman's concept of "making" emerges more clearly. A cursory consideration of m o d e m crisis rites - marriage, baptism, graduation, death, etc. - immediately shows us that art objects, as we usually think of them, are not created during these events. That is, art is not made as a fundamental part of these rituals. What is "made" is the ritual itself. In this sense, it is a kind of drama the enacting of which, according to Feldman, stabilizes the individual/group relationship, reaffirms group values, and allows for the Individual arousal and dissipation of psychological tension. The ritual itself can be thought of as a creative way of dealing with crisis. In a similiar way, "art making" for the child is a way of ritualizing crises, or confronting reality. "Making art" then, refers to this ritualizing process and not to the direct 39 manipulation of materials the end of which is the production of some art object. That art is made through this process of ritualization is incidental. Feldman says, "making and looking at art is an indirect consequence of identifying crises and trying to deal with them creatively." The task of the art educator is "to help children to face life by showing how its substance can be managed creatively."22

Again, it can be seen that Feldman's beliefs about art making, as ritualization, are based in the realist belief that students must be taught to become aware of and interact with their surroundings.

For Feldman, art is a way of attaining this objective.

A major objection to the inclusion of the fine arts within the humanities has focused on the creative or "making" aspects of the fine arts. Albert William Levi provides a definition of the humani­ ties the argument for which in turn supports this objection.23

Levi distinguishes the arts from the sciences. The latter area is divided into the natural sciences and the social sciences while the former area is divided into the liberal arts and the fine arts.

Fine arts concerns the making of art; the liberal arts, or humanities, concerns the study and teaching of languages and literature, history, and philosophy. Levi terms these three areas respectively, the arts of communication, the arts of continuity and the arts of c r i t i c i s m . 24

Levi's position that the fine arts are not an intrinsic part of the humanities is based on a difference made between "knowledge" and

"creativity" which, Levi says, "should have its expression in the distinction between the 'liberal' and the 'fine a r t s ' . "25 Aesthetic 40 value is a concern for both, but given the pluralism and overlap of value concerns among the humanities, the natural and social sciences and the fine arts which exist in the modem university "it has not always been possible to maintain strict separation between artistic creativity and the historical and critical examination of its pro­ duct. "26 Regarding the latter, Levi is adamant that art and music, when included in divisions of humanities, are to be studied as the

"history of" or the "philosophy of" or as "languages or literatures," that is, as communication.27

Levi believes that the three areas of liberal arts study, the arts of communication, the arts of continuity, and the arts of criticism, are based in human needs and concerns. The arts of com­ munication include the study of values, personal identity, social life and emotional intellectual perceptions as they are reflected in language. The arts of communication have three categories of study: language, structure and s t y l e . 28 The arts of continuity involve the study of history from the "human standpoint" with emphasis on ideas of "human relevance" and "human importance." There are three cate­ gories of study in this area: date, situation, and a u d i e n c e . ^9 The arts of criticism involve the study of literature in terms of logical, ethical and aesthetic dimensions. In each of these dimensions is found the critical standards for, respectively, thinking and reasoning, behaving and judging behavior, and appreciating and enjoying. The arts of criticism have three categories of study: attitude, values, and message. 41

For Levi, the humanities is a tradition concerned with moral and

aesthetic values (virtue), and the achievement of wisdom (knowledge).

The overall effect of virtue and knowledge is the influence of

behavior "contributing to a better living of the personal life."30

Humanistic education, based in concepts of taste, of moral development

and the achievement of wisdom, is education toward the whole man.

Levi's belief that the humanities contribute to the achievement

of wisdom and the betterment of life is based upon two presuppositions:

"...that although contact with wisdom does not always produce wisdom,

that potentiality remains; and, ...though the 'lived' humanities are

to be distinguished from the 'taught' humanities, it is the essential purpose of the latter to service the former, of books to influence behavior."31 Levi identifies three aspects of wisdom. The first is

"wisdom in the cognition of reality." This is wisdom of the psycholo­

gical, human intensity of the social situation and the human struggle within it toward an honest self. The second aspect of wisdom is

"wisdom in the setting of goals." This is wisdom of values and virtues needed to define and strive for individual goals within a profit-

oriented and subversive society. The third aspect of wisdom is "wisdom in the appraisal of life." Such wisdom consists in self-knowledge which comes from assuming responsibility toward self-management,

self-discipline and control.

To summarize, according to Levi, the humanities consist in the

liberal arts of communication (literatures and languages), continuity

(history) and criticism (philosophy). These are a major source for 42 the achievement of wisdom, moral development and the education of taste. These defining properties are seen to delimit the humanities from the natural and social sciences and from the fine arts.

For Levi, art education, in order to be a liberal art, must be the study of art as language, history, or philosophy. Such study is focused upon paradigm cases (masterpeices) which represent absolute ideals (knowledge and virtue) which need be transmitted to all individuals in order to enhance life. These areas are also included in Feldman's categories of humanistic art education. A major difference is that Feldman does not believe in the simple transmission of knowledge as a mode of education. He advocates the aesthetic mode of learning, seen to encompass both the content of learning and the processes of learning. Activity, or doing, is an integral aspect of learning seen to invest present decision making with meaning. Such activity is a creative process considered to be a necessary part of each educa­ tional experience. Activity (doing and performing) does not necessarily refer to the manipulation of art materials toward the production of

"art objects." Feldman's concept of art, it has been seen, is much broader than this. Activity is that aspect of learning which is made public; students may perform with ideas as well as materials. This aspect of learning is seen to constitute evidence of what students have learned as well as to contribute to the process of becoming human by enabling children to make decisions and take risks through inter­ action with both nature and society. The difference between Levi's 43

concept of the humanities and Feldman's is essentially the difference between educational beliefs based in Idealism and educational beliefs based in both Idealism and Realism.

The Theory of Imagination in Humanistic Art Education

Feldman's beliefs about humanistic art education have character­ istics of both Idealist philosophy and Realist philosophy. This is most prominent in his belief that art is a way of learning which unites knowing and doing, and art education is a comprehensive approach to teaching and learning about man. Feldman's concepts of knowing and doing are also relevant to the theory of imagination in humanistic art education.

Feldman's theory of imagination is based in his belief that there is a connection between ethics and aesthetics. This connection is imagination. He asks:

... if we agree that the ability to imagine the consequences of behavior is necessary for making moral choices, how do we apply this wisdom to ordinary classroom teaching? Moreover how is the teaching of art and the whole process of aesthetic education implicated?32

Feldman finds answers to these questions in discussion of the child's ethical and aesthetic development. Feldman believes that the child's ethical development is apparent in his aesthetic behavior.

Feldman identifies four stages in ethical development: pre-school, early elementary, later elementary and adolescence. Ethical behavior occuring at these stages can be summarized as: awareness of self; awareness of the world; awareness of society; and fragmentation of self 44

(the conflict between the adolescent's emotional and intellectual lives). Certain moral values at each stage are manifested in the child's aesthetic activity.

Feldman's stages of development correspond to those found in other art education developmental theory. However, these theories do not always correlate stages of aesthetic behavior with ethical behavior. That Feldman does see these two types of development to be correlated is a factor in a justification of art instruction based on developmental theory. A usual criticism of developmental theory, and this is also Feldman's criticism, is that such theory provides no inherent justification for teaching. It is the correlation of ethical development with aesthetic development that provides justification for teaching. Thus, Feldman describes the teacher's role at various stages in the student's ethical development which he sees as differ­ ing from the teacher's role in other developmental theory. This last kind of teaching he sees to be concerned with stimulating "the child to represent his experience according to scientific findings about the norms of artistic expression at every age."33 Feldman describes, summarily, his assumptions about the child's ethical/aesthetic development and the function of teaching in relation to that.

He states:

... I believe that we can observe the ethical development of children in their aesthetic behavior. That is, their artistic expression and their aesthetic appreciation reveal emerging con­ ceptions of what seems to them good. The function of teaching, then, is to elicit the child's aesthetic behavior, to make it public, and to acknowledge its ethical import by engaging in a dialog with the child and his peers - a dialog that centers on 45

the values expressed in his artistic and aesthetic activity. When we talk about art with children, we talk about alternatives of feeling and doing; we talk about the possible meanings of what they have done and said. That is how we can establish a model of ethical discourse. ... we can meet children on their ethical grounds - the grounds of their creative choices.3%

Though the child may engage in artistic expression by his own initiative and, according to the developmental schema, progress from more naive stages to more sophisticated stages in his artistic expres­ sion, it cannot be said that he will naturally reflect upon this expression nor the values manifested there. As Feldman has pointed out, the preadolescent does not consider his artistic expression as

"art." It is probable that he does not also think of it as having ethical import. The teacher, in one sense, teaches the child to reflect upon his artistic expression through dialog with him and with his peers. This dialog is directed toward helping the child to know what values he holds and what values his "society" holds, to under­ stand the meanings of these values and to conceive of alternate value possibilities. Without this discourse, the child's knowledge of art, his own and that of other, and its ethical import remains tacit.

If ethical development is apparent in the child's aesthetic behavior, and moral values are manifested in artistic expression,

- both are positions which Feldman holds - then it can be concluded that art is a moral activity and the artist a moral agent. Further, as the ritualization of confrontations with reality, artistic expres­ sion must involve not only aesthetic choice-making but also moral choice-making. Ihe products of ritualization, i.e., that which is 46 made public, considered in terms of developmental stages, represent,

for Feldman, "an emerging capacity to imagine relationships: with the

self, with others, with nature, with the man-made environment and with

the idea of society."3^ For Feldman, this is a moral activity, and in terms of the child's artistic expression, a way of doing "good" or "evil." He states:

... the child's visual expression is more than artistic representation, it is a type of moral activity, one of the earliest opportunities a person has for acting like a moral agent. This is precisely what the tribesman does with his concern about illness or fecundity or about identifying a new member of his group. He names and actualizes - that is, gives form - to his hopes and fears and thus comes to terms with them. And that is what we have to do in schools: to help children to face life by showing how its substance can be managed creatively.36

Here Feldman suggests that not only is art a moral activity and the artist a moral agent, but also that art, as the "coming to terms" with reality, is a creative process.

Feldman believes that man must be taught to create values rather than to choose among fixed values. For him, there is a social dimen­ sion to all creative activity. The creator is obligated to and respon­ sible for the society in which he creates. Society is the ultimate judge of the worth of his created values. Feldman also believes that there are existing values or ideals to which man must conform. These are not static values since they derive from the changing ideals of societies and cultures and not from absolute ideals. The ideals of societies and cultures embody the values of many individuals and give direction to man's efforts to achieve a satisfying life. Imagination's 47 role in moral conduct is seen to be that process by which we may envision the consequences of our behavior. The individual, once apprised of desirable consequences is morally obliged to choose behavior which will bring about those consequences. In Feldman's view art, as the ritualization of confrontations with reality, is the process whereby individuals come to assess present situations toward the selection of alternatives resulting in desirable consequences.

Since the individual has a moral responsibility to act rationally, his use of imagination as this process will also be rational; it will be as a mode of thought. On this view, imagination has aspects of intel­ lection and is essentially a rational process directed toward the attainment of ethical and aesthetic goods. To the extent to which imagination is seen to perform specific necessary functions in ethical/ aesthetic activity, art education should be concerned with education about the rational and intellectual use of imagination.

In order to discuss the implications of what has so far been explicated of the theory of imagination in humanistic art education,

I shall turn to an examination of the theory of imagination in ethics from Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. For this examination, I shall rely on the work of Murray Wright Bundy on the theory of imagination in classical and medieval thought. The purpose of this examination is to provide a history of the theory of imagination in ethics as a basis upon which to further explicate the theory in humanistic art education. 48

The Theory of Imagination In Plato * s Ethics

A constructive view of phantasy emerges In Plato's later philo­

sophy. Phantasy had meant an "appearance" and was, therefore, asso­

ciated with the material, the reality of which Plato denied. In

attempting to account for man's deception by phantasies, Plato comes

to acknowledge the existence of a material world. This acknowledgement results In Plato's turn to psychology. In his analysis of the mind's

functions he recognizes phantasy as a mental capacity or function

associated with the appetites, emotions and feelings. It Is then

further associated with opinion. Man responds to the world of Ideas

through the faculty of knowledge, his rational powers, and to the world of material things through his faculty of opinion.

Plato divides these two worlds each Into two sub-dlvlslons,

(four parts), each of which has corresponding faculty In the soul.

In the upper (higher) division of the world of Ideas or the sphere of knowledge, the soul attains a principle which allows It to proceed

"In and through the Ideas themselves." It does not make use of

Images at this level. The corresponding faculty of the soul is reason, noesls, which Is knowledge In Its highest capacity. It Is the "power by which one has Insight, an Intuition of Ideas."37

In the lower division of the sphere of knowledge the soul makes use of Images of things from the material world. This Is the capacity of the soul to Inquire hypothetically; the capacity for scientific knowledge. The corresponding faculty Is understanding, dlanola, the

Imagination of Ideas, which Is concerned with knowledge. Plato's 49 example is that of the mathematician who draws a triangle to help him in his thinking. Here the material image, the triangle, aids scien­ tific understanding. It is not the drawing of the triangle which the mathematician contemplates but, rather, the absolute triangle, the mental concept. The images used in scientific understanding are considered by Plato as "higher" images than those of simple imagination, which exist in the material world, the sphere of opinion. That they are higher is not dependent upon their nature, i.e., what they are images of, so much as it is dependent upon the purpose which they serve.

In the material world, the sphere of opinion, the higher division consists of "everything that grows or is made." The corresponding faculty in the soul is faith, pistis, (or perception), "the power of looking at the phenomenal world." Through faith one accepts "a world of things about which one may have only opinion instead of k n o w l e d g e . "38

The lower division of the sphere of opinion consists in the images of the things in the upper division (the images of things which grow or are made). These images are of two types: shadows and phantasms. The corresponding faculty in the soul is imagination, eikasia, the aim of which is to reproduce things existing in the material world. This is the simple imagination.

Thus far, "image" is the comprehensive term which subsumes

"shadows" and "phantasms." When "phantasy" comes to be the more comprehensive term then it is seen to play an important role in ethics. Plato distinguishes phantasy from imagination; a distinction arising from his theory of art. 50

In Republic VI, the artist is seen to make likenesses of things, material objects, and thus is seen to lack vision. Plato associates artists with the lower type of imagination, eikasia. This associa­

tion is explained through the well known example of the bed. The idea

"bed" is brought into being by God's creative act, which is creation in the highest sense. The carpenter makes a bed according to God's created idea. Plato is clear on the point that no artist or artisan makes the ideas. The artist (painter, sculptor or poet; Plato refers to this individual as a "third man") makes an image of the carpenter's bed through the process of mimesis. The artist's bed is thought of as an appearance, an image of an image, and is twice removed from the truth as it does not deal with the idea "bed" but with that bed which is the product of imagination. This is imagination in its most literal sense, - a copy.

Added to this, Socrates then suggests that the artist deals in phantasy. For Plato, the carpenter's bed is an image of an idea

(a higher kind of image). The artist's bed could be called an image of imagination because it corresponded to an original in the material world. It could not be called phantasy, the truth of which is uncer­ tain. Phantasies may not even produce the same impressions in indi­ viduals. Though phantasy falls under the general category "image", it begins to become the more comprehensive term particularly as dis­ cussed in respect to the artist. Plato had already located phantasy in the (irrational) soul and associated it with the appetites and emotions. When the artist is said to deal in phantasy he is, by 51

implication, accused of being influenced by the lower realm of the

soul. Bundy explains:

The charge against the painter - and the sculptor and the dramatist - is that through phantasy they become subjective artists. Not only are they concerned with material objects rather than with ideas, but they insist upon producing this material world from their particular point of view. Imagin­ ation leads the artist to deal with the material, the chang­ ing, the objects of opinion. Phantasy leads him to an error still more serious: to deal with the Individual and the relative. He is by so much farther from the absolute, unchanging ideal.3"

Plato's distinction between imagination and phantasy is based

upon the artist, yet both terms come to characterize the fine arts;

painting, sculpture and dramatic poetry. In the Sophist Plato elaborates on this distinction, suggesting that there are two types of

image-making: imaginative, the making of likenesses, and phantastic,

the making of appearances. In the Sophist, only the plastic arts

are seen to be phantastic.40

Also in the Sophist, Plato recognizes the existence of true and

false thought, opinion and phantasy in the mind. Thought, opinion and

speech, in the lower processes, are the "manifestations of phantasy as the power of receiving and giving expression to one's impressions."

That thought which is concerned with sense and the sphere of opinion expresses itself in phantasies, "opinions which have taken sensible shape." This recognition of phantasy, says Bundy, became indicative of its'Importance in the most ideal thought and the highest creative art."41 52

For Plato there are four types of creative activity. The first and highest type is the creative activity of God in creating the universe. This type has no corresponding mental or acquisitive function. The second type of creation is that whereby God produces phantasies in man's dreams and visions. This type corresponds to noesis, which is the attainment and contemplation of Ideas. However, for Plato, only God is capable of expressing noesis, as it is beyond man's capabilities. Divine phantasy is man's passive reception of impressions from God.

The third type of creative activity is that by which man makes things in the image of an idea, e.g., the making of the bed by the carpenter. This activity corresponds to dianoia, understanding, or the capacity for scientific knowledge, episteme. As we have seen, man uses hypothetical images to aid him in this type of acquisition.

In the corresponding creative activity he also uses images to aid him in his expression. From this Bundy concludes that "the highest human creation involves an act of imagination." Bundy acknowledges that

Plato does not expressly state this. But it is apparent that Plato maintains the distinction between imaginative and phantastic imitation.

The former is involved in the higher creative activity and the latter in the lower types of creative activity. This latter Is the fourth type of creative activity, phantastic imitation, which corresponds to eikasia in the sphere of opinion and involves the receiving of impressions, and a concern with things over ideas. Phantastic 53

imitation is concerned with images of the changing world rather than

absolute ideas, and is, therefore, the lowest sort of imaging.

From this distinction of two types of imitation and two types

of imaging corresponding to two types of human creative activity,

Bundy concludes that the higher type of creative activity corresponds

to the acquisitive activity which uses Images to attain knowledge, while the lower type simply involves the making of images or impres­ sions of things. Bundy explains of the higher type:

... the artist is expressing his ideal through the same power of imagination of which the scientist makes use in his schematic representations. There is this difference, that the one is an aid to the attainment of ideas, the other to their expression. Imagination, both in philosophy and poetry, in the science of thought, and in the art of expression, is the connecting link between the real and the ideal, between the realm of ideas and that of material objects.

In summary, Bundy says: "Such is Plato's view of imagination in the service of reason, necessary both in thought and its artistic embodi­ ment. Imagination aids reason in arriving at universal ideas, and in turn, in giving them concrete expression. "42

This thought in combination with Plato's acknowledgement of the existence of true and false thought, opinion and speech and their expression as true or false phantasies, provides the foundation for

Plato's theory of ethics.

Plato begins by making a connection between sense and memory, both of which in combination give rise to opinions. Phantasy is both an appearance and the expression of an opinion. Memory's role in the acquiring and expressing of opinions is to join with perception 54 in inscribing in the soul true or false feelings. When these feelings are true, true opinions and true expressions of opinion are "written" in the soul, and vice-versa. Bundy suggests that phantasy is the faculty which inscribes in the soul and that this is a new aspect of phantasy differing from that of phantasy as the simple impression.

He states:

Plato is insisting that man gives shape to his opinions, that in the process of forming the simpliest opinion he instinctively forms a mental image to aid him. Our opinion may very easily be false if our memory has played us false and has not adhered faithfully to the original impression. 43

In addition to having opinions of the past, we also have opinions of the future and "a similiar power of phantasy to give shape to them." In this capacity, phantasy is seen to play a necessary role in conduct. In simpliest terms, the good person strives to keep good images, or images of the good, before him, while the bad person has only "imitations of the true" before him. The images of these false opinions lead to pleasure of things which are non-existent, i.e., un-ideal. Bundy states:

This power of phantasy, more intimately than ever bound up with the problem of knowledge, becomes the means by which conduct is regulated. To know oneself, from one point of view, is to know the state of one's phantasies as the various shapes taken by our feelings in determining our acts: our hopes, fears, and desires.44

This notion of the role of phantasy in moral conduct from the

Philebus is supplemented in the Timaeus. Here, Plato says that God places a type of faculty in the lower soul which acts like a "mirror" and which is capable of reflecting thought - the ideal images of the 55 higher soul. This is a second type of phantasy which functions in the soul of appetites and emotions and, because it is capable of reflecting ideal images, serves as a "direct check upon the evil images and phantasies which result in moral conduct." This second type or function of phantasy supplements the normal phantasy, the products of which are images of material things, with images from the higher soul which serve to control moral conduct.

This second type of phantasy in the lower soul also functions importantly in divine inspiration, discussed in a later chapter of this paper. At present, it is important to note that this second type of phantasy transcends all other modes of regulating conduct.

In terms of divine inspiration this higher phantasm (still informing the lower soul) presents truth as idea itself, no longer relying on the images important to understanding, (dianoia).

I have discussed Plato's ethical theory in some detail here as it will be referred to in following chapters. It is also important to make apparent by what routes he comes to change from his initial account of phantasy as an appearance, the reality of which he denied, to that account of phantasy in which it is seen to play a role in psychology, epistemology, aesthetics, ethics and divine inspiration.

Plato's view of the role of phantasy in ethics is elaborated in

Aristotle's philosophy. 56

The Theory of Imagination in Aristotle’s Ethics

Plato, it has been seen, makes an important distinction between knowledge and creativity. Man's acquisitive activity involves the attainment of ideas or ideas of the perfect state by use of hypotheti­ cal images. Man's creative activity on the level of dianoia makes use of similiar images to express these ideas. Imagination is the connect­ ing link between these two realms. For Aristotle, man acquires know­ ledge through contact with material things, while creative activity involves the concrete representation of the artist's concept. That is, the artist takes both "subject matter and means of expression" from the world of senses. Aristotle says in Metaphysics ; "Art comes into being when many observations of experience give rise to a single universal conviction about a class of similiar cases."45

For Aristotle, the material world of things is real and our impressions are a means to truth. He attempts to replace Plato's dualism with a philosophy which explains both the universal and the particular. This is his theory of form and function. Bundy describes the basic thought of this theory:

Everything has its appropriate form or inherent capacity, an ideal which it may realize, something which may be evolved in progress from the lower to the higher. The means of reali­ zation is motion: the living thing is not unchangeable, but ever moving, and this movement is its life as it strives to attain the ideal inherent in the universal concept. The 'real' thing, for Aristotle, is thus something which is 'becoming'.4"

Aristotle's belief in the world of phenomena as reality has implications for the concept of phantasy. First, phantasy is the 57

faculty by which we have phantasms. It is the impression upon the mind of each material phenomenon. It may be true or false, i.e.,

some phantasms may exist while others are only apparent. Bundy notes that Aristotle also maintains that there are laws which govern phantasies and because of this phantasies need not be considered merely illusions.

In Aristotle, Bundy says, the phantasm, as it may correspond to a material reality, is a "means to knowledge." Aristotle breaks

Plato's connection of phantasy with opinion whereby phantasy was an appearance of the material world and, therefore, not considered to be real. One point Aristotle makes is that we are able to control phantasies but not opinions. Opinion is a type of conviction which effects us emotionally. Phantasy does not effect us in this manner because we can control it. Here, Bundy says, Aristotle distinguishes phantasy and conviction as two different aspects of thought.4?

Aristotle first defines phantasy in light of his idea of movement and second, in light of its dependence on sensation, i.e., "phantasy is a kind of motion resulting from sensation or perceptive states."

The cause of impressions will ultimately determine the truth or falsity of a phantasy.48

In associating phantasy with movement, Aristotle lays the founda­ tion for its role in ethics. Though this role for Aristotle is essentially the same as for Plato, it derives from a radically dif­ ferent concept of reality than that of Plato. As has been pointed out, Aristotle views life as a process of movement from lower to higher 58

states, each lower state providing the potential for the attainment

of the actuality of the next, higher state. Phantasy is an essential

link in the progression of thought from perception to conception,

"participating in the nature of both." Phantasy is a type of motion

and it is also a kind of appetite. Bundy says it is an appetite

in two senses. One, simply because it provides images by which man

can avoid pain and seek pleasure. In the second sense, these images

may be so overpowering that man succumbs to them against his better

knowledge - "phantasy overrules reason." Bundy concludes: "The

phantasy of the 'natural man' thus becomes an important element in

determining the laws of conduct."49

But again, as with Plato, this is phantasy functioning in the

lower soul, involving appetency. In the higher soul, involving

intelligence, phantasy gives shape to thought, - "the soul never thinks without a phantasm." Bundy provides a statement from Aristotle which

is worthwhile repeating here as it makes apparent Aristotle's recogni­

tion of the role of the reproductive phantasy in moral conduct.

Aristotle says:

Under the influence of the phantasms or thoughts in the soul you calculate as though you had the objects before your eyes and deliberate about the future in the light of the present. And when you pronounce, just as there in sensation you affirm the pleasant or the painful, here in thought you pursue or avoid (i.e., by similiar means, concrete representations or i m a g e s ) . 50

The deliberate phantasy, as it pertains to ethics, enables man to determine proper behavior through consideration of concrete images.

It is a phantasy constructed of many different phantasms of the simple 59 perceptual type, which present us with a concept. Bundy describes this capacity:

... we do not seek or avoid this or that course by thinking in abstract terms of honor and love, fear and cowardice, but in each case appetite, impelling one to action through the appeal of pleasure and pain, causes the soul to seek or avoid a concrete representation or phantasy of the contemplated act. When we are influenced by shame, it is because we have before us a picture of ourselves after loss of reputation.51

In Aristotle, then, as in Plato, there are two types of phantasy and two corresponding types of appetite: the simple, perceptual phantasy of the lower soul (appetency), pertaining to the senses; and the deliberate phantasy of the higher soul (intelligence), per­ taining to conceptual thought. Aristotle also makes the distinction that in the higher realm Intelligence is always right, whereas in the lower realm, appetency and phantasy as a kind of appetency, can be right or wrong. In addition, phantasy has the power to overrule reason, against man's better knowledge.

The role of phantasy in Aristotle's theory of art corresponds closely to the role in his theory of ethics. We have seen that he defines art as coming into being "when many observations of experi­ ence give rise to a single universal conviction about a class of similiar cases." From this, Bundy says, comes the notion that the artist combines many particular cases of beauty in order to create a single thing of perfect beauty, a universal concept. The artist does not simply reproduce his experiences; he generalizes an ideal from particulars and reproduces this ideal. The theory of imagina­ tion which coincides with this is that of imagination as a combinatory 60 function. This is, essentially, Aristotle's notion of man's power to construct a single phantasy of the deliberate type from many phantasies of the perceptual type to aid him in determining right conduct through contemplation of an ideal good. Aristotle, however, neither makes the connection between phantasy's role in ethics as a combinatory capacity and its possible role in creative activity, nor does he attribute to phantasy the artist's ability to generalize ideals or universal concepts from particulars. Had he considered the latter he might have recognized the capacity of phantasy to freely combine the aspects of experience.

Movement, just as it is vital in ethics is vital in the theory of art. Art, for Aristotle, was not an imitation of nature or a simple image - a copy. It was regarded as an object of thought,

"a phantasm considered as theorhema." Bundy states that, for Aristotle:

... art is not the imitation of a world of being, but of a universe wherein all things are coming to be, i.e., striving through movement to realize their inherent capacities, enabling the observer to see in the poet's creation a general view of nature's purposes and her method.52

The Stoics, though probably more influenced by Aristotle's notion that phantasy had the power to overrule reason, took advan­ tage of both Plato and Aristotles' theories of phantasy in development of an ethical system. The Stoic view of phantasy was, Bundy says, the most influential, with Plato's and Aristotle's, on classical and medieval thought. 61

The Theory of Imagination In the Stoic’s Ethics

Phantasy, In the Stoic's philosophy, was a mental Impression, considered as a subjective (mental) state. Phantasies as mental states were considered to be basic for knowledge. The Stoics theory of knowledge was concerned with the correctness of Judgments which expressed beliefs and the understanding of a thing. Phantasies, since they were basic to knowledge, were Involved In judgments and the grounds for belief.

The type of phantasy basic for knowledge, the mental Impres­ sion, was called the "cataleptic phantasy," "... the mental Impres­ sion which compels assent or acceptance as true, a criterion of facts produced by a real object, and conformable to that object.That to which the cataleptic phantasy corresponded, the true Impression, the actual thing to be phantaslzed, was called ^ phantaston.

The non-cataleptlc phantasy was a mental Impression which had only vague relation to reality or none at all, i.e., little or no correspondence between appearance and reality. This was called a "phantasm" and was comparable to Images had In dreams. That which corresponded to the phantasm, the Illusory or phantastic thing phantaslzed was called ^ phantastlkon (the phantastic). These two terms referred to the "unreality of the vision."54

With the Stoics' distinctions, says Bundy, lie the roots of our present day distinction between the "Imaginative" and the "fantastic."

"Phantasm" and "phantastic" not only referred to dreams but also to those Illusions experienced when awake. In terms of the latter. 62 phantasies could be seen to result in error. This notion had important effects on the theory of imagination from the Stoics and in later thinking. Bundy explains:

... Stoicism, having emphasized the possibility of falsity, had introduced as vital for dialectic and for ethics the problem of the probable phantasy. It is this view, which directs the attention to the phantasm quite as much as to the phantasy, which is responsible in no small measure for a later preoccupation with the dangers of imagination. The psychology of the demonologist, for instance, takes the student back to the Stoic distinction between the pro­ perly imaginative and the phantasic, the cataleptic and the non-cataleptic.55

The Stoics recognized, as the major ethical problem, the "right use of phantasies."56 This was the recognition of man's power to control his phantasies. (This is reminiscent of Aristotle's insistence that man was responsible for his false phantasies as well as his true ones.) Bundy discusses the Stoic ethic by way of the views of

Epictetus which, Bundy says, are more practical than theoretical.

Epictetus is concerned with the existence of phantasies only as this issue can be applied to better conduct. He recognizes the existence of phantasies as apart from "external stimuli," but like

Plato, associates them with opinion. Bundy summarizes Epictetus' thought: "all great and dreadful deeds, we are told, originate in phantasy, - in this and nothing else."5?

As with Aristotle, an important point for the Stoics was that we have the power to control our phantasies. In terms of moral conduct, it is our responsibility to control phantasies and this is accom­ plished through the use of reason. Epictetus makes the point, as had 63

Aristotle, that though irrational beings, (animals), have phantasy, they do not have reason, or a faculty for understanding phantasies.

Because of this they are subservient to man, the rational being.

Epictetus makes the point that if animals had a rational faculty or reason, they would be equal to man. Since they do not have this faculty it cannot be said of them that they are "good," as "goodness" can only be applied to those who have the power of controlling and understanding phantasies and, thus, of regulating their conduct.

In a practical manner, Epictetus suggests replacing "bad" phantasies with inspiring or noble ones for the control of conduct.

This is done under the control of reason. Though Epictetus implies here that not all phantasies are suspect, (that there are noble ones), he is, for the most part, prejudiced against them. He shares with other Stoics the belief that most phantasies are acataleptic and therefore "not capable of scrutiny by reason."^8 This belief of the

Stoics, which was the foundation of their moral program was, Bundy suggests, detrimental to a constructive view of imagination, though it established an important tradition in the history of the concept in ethics. The Stoic view of the supremacy of reason in the control of phantasies persisted in the thought of the Middle Ages.

Of the three traditions discussed here, Bundy points out that only Aristotle maintained a strictly scientific attitude as regards the phantasy in moral life.

What can be said to be common to all three traditions is the belief that phantasy is the capacity by which man regulates his moral 64 conduct by envisioning Its effects. For Plato that function of phantasy which controlled moral conduct was the highest function of phantasy, though located in the lower soul. It transcended all other modes of regulating conduct. We have also seen that Plato makes an important distinction between knowledge and creativity, the connecting link between the two being Imagination. This connection is based upon Plato's distinction between imaginative and phantastic imitation.

The latter, as phantasy is associated with opinion, is concerned with the lower creative activity, - involved with images of the changing world rather than absolute ideas. The former is man's highest creative activity, corresponding to the highest level of knowledge, understand­ ing. Both these higher levels of knowledge and creativity involve an act of imagination: imagination serves reason in attaining universal ideals; in creativity imagination aids in the expression of these ideals.

Aristotle recognizes that the role of phantasy in moral life is to provide concrete representations (images) whereby man can avoid pain and seek pleasure. However, as phantasy is a type of motion, and therefore a kind of appetite, Aristotle recognizes that it also has the power to overrule reason. In this case man will succumb to his phantasies against his better knowledge. This opposition of reason and phantasy is further strengthened by Aristotle's notion that in the higher realm of conceptual thought with its corresponding intelli­ gence deliberate phantasy is always right. But in the lower realm of 65

the senses, appetency, with its corresponding simple or perceptual phantasy, phantasy may be right or wrong.

Hie effects of the opposition of phantasy and reason is apparent in the thought of the Stoics. Their important distinction between the cataleptic phantasy (that phantasy basic to knowledge) and the acataleptic phantasy (that phantasy having little or no correspondence between appearance and reality) is obscured in the Stoic's ethical system. Here, the right use of phantasies under the control of reason becomes the great ethical concern. The fear of the power of phantasy to overrule reason, led to prejudices against it and resulted in the belief that most phantasies were acataleptic, i.e., not capable of scrunity by reason.

Also common to these three traditions, is the association of imagination (phantasy) with the mental image. This association is probably the most persistent in the history of the concept. In ethics we have seen that this capacity to form mental images of the future allows one to contemplate and determine proper behavior. As Bundy put it: "When we are influenced by shame, it is because we have before us a picture of ourselves after loss of reputation." Aristotle was also explicit in referring to the mental image when he said that under the influence of phantasy we calculate "as though you had the objects before your eyes," and again in his claim that "the soul never thinks without a phantasm." The notion that man was able to contem­ plate mental images as though they were objects before his eyes has 66 also been important in the theory of art. That the artist paints or sculpts images that are somehow before him mentally has its roots in the tradition of the rhetoricians, to be discussed later. Basically in this tradition, the orator and the poet held objects before their eyes which inspired emotional experiences which they were able to express or communicate. In turn, the audience was thought to experi­ ence these emotions. This view of imagination's role in the artist's activity was prevalent until the beginning of the 19th century and, in some ways, it still persists but with important modifications.

Essentially, the association from ethics of man's capacity to form mental images, with man's creative activity, stems from the idea of the reproductive function of imagination. This function was associated with the lower soul of emotions, passions and appetites.

According to Bundy, it is this connection of the reproductive func­ tion of imagination with the emotions that provides for the carry­ over from the theory of ethics to the theory of aesthetics.

For Feldman, the ability to imagine possibilities is associated with an ability to understand these possibilities and their meanings, and to bring them to bear on considerations of alternatives, conse­ quences, and the worthiness of actions. This ability to understand what has been imagined was the distinguishing ability, for Epictetus, between men and animals. Imagined possibilities are reasonable and probable as opposed to fantastic. That is, they must be capable of scrutiny by reason. This implies that they are of a certain type. 67

Feldman claims that the ability to imagine the consequences of our behavior is imagination's role in moral conduct. In effecting moral conduct imagination posits possible consequences of behavior to be estimated. This does not mean that moral law is made by means of imagination. Rather, imagination serves to illustrate or depict a rational thought, a product of reason. In estimating possible consequences of our behavior, we may be aware that we are free to perform or not to perform this behavior. This sense of freedom is basic to moral choice-making. Yet, for Feldman, the moral choice, when made, and the action which results, are based on some rule or law which we have freely chosen to "keep," to be bound to. This is a rule which comes from ourselves and is made through the use of reason. The rule is a thought, in this case a moral thought which is a product of reason. It is this thought which imagination illustrates.

As rational, imagination is, as Feldman characterized it, "the chief instrument of the g o o d . "59

The ancients conceived of imagination as both a product associ­ ated with the material world and a process associated with the world of ideas. For this reason, the reality of imagination was always in question. For the classical philosophers, this involved the issue of

"metaphysical truth and error," as Bundy put it. Both these charac­ teristics of imagination from ethics were carried over into the theory of art. Plato acknowledges a moral aspect of art but only when art can be said to be intelligent, having rational grounds. When the poet, like the philosopher, functions on the higher level of ideals. 68 he is capable of expressing these ideals. In this instance, art can convey moral truths. But Plato condemned the representational poet as dealing with the world of senses and thus only presenting imita­ tions of truth. This "art" could not present moral truths; it was, rather, "phantastic" and, as such, dangerous to the moral realm and held in disrepute.

Plato, like Aristotle, does not made recourse to a faculty of creative imagination, though both philosophers recognize a creative capacity in man. This capacity to create on the higher level is, for Plato, associated with man's acquisitive capabilities. For

Aristotle, it is the result of the interaction of intellect with the material world of the senses, the concrete representation of the artist's concept. Both these views characterize Feldman's beliefs about creative activity.

S.H. Butcher says of Aristotle's concept of art (in contrast to that of Plato's):

Fine art was no longer twice removed from the truth of things; it was the manifestation of a higher truth, the expression of the universal which is not outside of and apart from the particular, but presupposed in each particular. The work of art was not a semblance opposed to reality, but the image of a reality which is penetrated by the idea, and through which the idea shows more apparent than in the actual w o r l d . 60

That these ideas did not carry heavily into the moral realm as regards the artist may be due to Aristotle's particular emphasis on the effects of art, which lay in the realm of the spectator and not that of the artist. Aristotle recognizes the moral import of tragedy and poetry for the spectator but he is seldom concerned with this 69 in terms of the artist who works and is guided in this work by certain standards and rules. Butcher describes Aristotle's position on the working of the poet:

The poet presents permanent and external facts, free from the elements of unreason which disturb our comprehension of real events and of human conduct. In fashioning his mat­ erial he may transcend nature, but he may not contradict her; he must not be disobedient to her habits and principles. He may recreate the actual, but he must avoid the lawless, the fantastic, the impossible. Poetic truth passes the bounds of reality, but it does not wantonly violate the laws which make the real world rational.61

According to Butcher, art, for Aristotle, is always rational.

It manifests a higher truth. This is not a truth of "facts" - a practical truth - it is the universal presupposed in the particular.

In terms of moral import, the world of possibilities which poetry presents to the spectator, is a world of moral probabilities the truth of which is grasped more intelligibly than the experiences of the material world. Where imagination (phantasia) plays a role in

Aristotle's concept of art, whether in the activity of the artist or the activity of the spectator, it is controlled by reason.

Feldman resolves some of the dilemma concerning the activity of the artist. That is, he joins both the artist's acquisitive and creative capacities in the making of art. Art is a mode of learning which unites knowing and doing. From this Feldman makes the claim that "artistic creativity is the same as thinking. The difference is that the artist also acts out or tests his hypothesis in the form of actual performance. Thinking does not require publicly visible behavior, although it may lead to such behavior. 70

Feldman's Realism/Idealism beliefs, most prominent in his union of knowing and doing by art, are found also in his beliefs about imagination. Imagination is both a rational process and a creative

(active) one. As a rational process, its creative capacities are stabilized and controlled and put to constructive rather than

"phantastic" u s e s . 63

Imagination, as constructive, is seen to provide the individual with what shall be called here, "realizations." These realizations are images organized intellectually as rational ideas. They are brought into the world, i.e., made public. By imagination we con­ ceive the different outcomes to our confrontations with reality as well as different consequences of our behavior. These outcomes and consequences, the results of action, take the form of realizations which are constructive. Realizations can be said to be both con­ ceived and expressed by way of the individual's imagination. In the moral realm these realizations might be of moral goods or truths; in the aesthetic realm, of aesthetic goods or truths. Imagination, both in its rational and controlled capacities, plays a role in becoming human, which, for Feldman, is always a constructive process.

Summary

It has been seen in the foregoing that Feldman identifies a role for imagination in two areas: it serves as a connection between ethics and aesthetics, and it serves to possibilize different out­ comes from encounters with reality. In attempting to explicate 71

Feldman's theory of Imagination, I have primarily concentrated on these two roles of imagination. I have also brought Feldman's con­ cepts of art and art education to bear on these roles when it seemed appropriate.

In conclusion, I have said that Feldman conceives of imagina­ tion as both rational and creative. In simpliest terms, this has been explained to mean that imagination as rational is a mode of thought which is depicted or illustrated; it is a product of reason.

Imagination in this sense has aspects of intellection. In this capacity imagination effects moral and aesthetic life. Imagination is creative in the sense that it is controlled and constructive.

In this capacity it provides realizations of "good" or truths. In both capacities imagination has a role in becoming human.

It can be seen that in Feldman's concept, both the rational and creative senses of imagination overlap. In its creative capa­ city, imagination is always rational and as such serves as "the instrument of the good." Irrationality does not appear to be an option, i.e., a matter of choice, for Feldman. This is apparent in his position that freedom, which is a product of moral and aesthetic education, involves making decisions based on rational considerations.

Imagination always functions in some instrumental capacity for

Feldman. It is unusual that he does not identify the cultivation of the rational and creative imagination as a function of art education, though this function is implicit in his text. 72

Discussion of the role of imagination in the systems of ethics

from Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics provided the historical back­

ground for the theory of imagination in ethics. The view of imagina­

tion as both a process and a product, from the ancients, is found

also in Feldman's theory. In his theory, imagination is seen to be both a rational process involving thought and a creative process involving action. In Feldman's terms imagination may be called

a process of doing. Feldman believes that the union of knowing

and doing occurs by art, which is both an aesthetic and an ethical activity as well as a way of learning.

Other capacities of imagination have not been a consideration in discussion of Feldman's theory. In what follows, with the explication of other theories of imagination, these capacities will emerge. It should also become clear why they are not relevant to

Feldman's philosophy of art education. 73

Footnotes

1. Norman A. Deeb, Cloud Nine Seminar: Educational Philosophy In Satire, (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1975).

Also see; John S. Brubacher, Modern Philosophies of Education, (New York, San Francisco, Toronto, London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1962). 3rd Edition.

Robert S. Brumbaugh and Nathaniel M. Lawrence, Philosophers on Education, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1963).

William K. Frankena, Philosophy of Education, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1965).

2. Sir Nikolaus Pevsner, Academies of Art, Past and Present, (Da Capo Press, Inc., 1973). Reprint of the 1940 edition.

3. Ibid. pp. 30-36. Wlttkower claims the theoretical foundations of this movement to have been provided by Leon Battista Alberti In his treatise. On Painting, See: Rudolf and Margot Wlttkower, Born Under Saturn; The Character and Conduct of Artists, (New York: Random House, 1963), and Leon Battista Alberti, On Painting, trans. by John R. Spencer, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1956).

4. Ibid. p. 132.

5. Ibid. pp. 138-139.

6. Thomas Munro, Art Education: Its Philosophy and Psychology, Selected Essays, (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1956, p. 290).

7. Herbert Read, Education Through Art (New York: Pantheon Books, 1943).

8. Munro, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

9. Ibid., pp. 15-16.

10. Ralph A. Smith, ed., Aesthetic Concepts and Education, (Urbana, Chicago, London: University of Illinois Press, 1970). _ , ed., Aesthetics and Problems of Education, (Urbana, Chicago, London: University of Illinois Press, 1971). _ , ed., Aesthetics and Criticism In Art Education, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966). 74

11. Ralph A. Smith, "A Policy Analysis and Criticism of the Artists -in-Schools Programs of the National Endowment for the Arts," Art Education, Vol. 30, No. 5 (Sept., 1977), p. 12. ______, "The Naked Piano Player: Or What the Rockefeller Report 'Coming to Our Senses' Really Is," Art Education, Vol. 31, No. 1, (January, 1978), p. 10. ______, "The De-Schooling of Art Education: How It's Happening and What To Do About It," Art Education, Vol. 33, No. 3, (March, 1980), p. 8. ______, "Arts Education, Aesthetic Value, and Policy," Art EducationT Vol. 35, No. 4, (July, 1982), p. 24.

12. Edmund Burke Feldman, Becoming Human Through Art, (Englewood Cliff, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1970).

13. Ibid., p. 138.

14. Ibid., p. 174.

15. Ibid., p. 182.

16. Ibid., p. 184.

17. Ibid., p. 185.

18. For a conceptual analysis of Feldman's use of "evaluation" in the critical process see: George Geahigan, "Feldman on Evaluation," The Journal of Aesthetic Education, Vol. 9, No. 4, (Oct., 1975), p. 29.

19. Feldman, op. cit., pp. 186-189.

20. Ibid., pp. 174-177.

21. Ibid., p. 178.

22. Ibid., p. 180.

23. Albert William Levi, The Humanities Today, (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1970), p. 29.

24. Ibid., p. 16.

25. Ibid., p. 24.

26. Ibid., p. 30.

27. Albert William Levi, "Literature As A Humanity," The Journal of Aesthetic Education, Vol. 10, Nos. 3-4, (July-October, 1976), p. 43. 75

28. Ibid., p. 45.

29. Ibid., p. 54.

30. Albert William Levi, "The Uses of the Humanities in Personal Life," The Journal of Aesthetic Education, Vol. 10, No. 1, (January, 1976), p. 5.

31. Ibid., p. 16.

32. Feldman, op. cit., pp. 100-101.

33. Ibid., p. 146.

34. Ibid., p. 101.

35. Ibid., p. 101.

36. Ibid. , p. 180.

37. Murray Wright Bundy, The Theory of Imagination in Classical and Medieval Thought in University of Illinois Studies in Language and Literature, Vol. 12 (May-August, 1927) Nos. 2-3 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1927).

38. Ibid. . PP . 24-25.

39. Ibid. , P' 39.

40. Ibid. , p. 35.

41. Ibid. , P- 38.

42. Ibid. , PP . 42-45.

43. Ibid. , PP . 46-47.

44. Ibid. , P- 48.

45. Aristotle , De Ani 431b; p. 143, in

46. Ibid. , P- 62.

47. Ibid. . p. 68.

48. Ibid. , p. 69.

49. Ibid. , p. 70. 76

50. Aristotle, op. cit., 431bb; p. 143, in Bundy, op. cit., p. 71.

51. Ibid. , p. 74.

52. Ibid. , p. 81.

53. Ibid. , pp. 88-89.

54. Ibid. , p. 89.

55. Ibid. , pp. 90-91.

56. Ibid. , p. 93.

57. Ibid. , p. 93.

58. Ibid. , p. 96.

59. Feldman is quoting from John Dewey, who is quoting from Shelley. See: John Dewey, Art As Experience (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1958), originally pub., 1934, p. 291.

60. S.H. Butcher, Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art, (New York: Dover Publications, Inc. 4th ed., 1951), pp. 160-161.

61. Ibid. , p. 184.

62. Feldman, op. cit., p. 32.

63. J.C. Gowan discusses the stabilized and controlled imagination in the pre-conscious experience of the child. See: "The Role of Imagination in the Development of the Creative Individual," Humanités, Vol. 14, No. 2, (Spring, 1978), p. 209. CHAPTER II

In this chapter, the theory of imagination in Pragmatic art educa­ tion philosophy is explicated. David Ecker's work in art education is used. Ecker's Pragmatism is based in the philosophy of John Dewey and, for this reason, I shall also draw upon Dewey's writing in this expli­ cation of the theory of imagination. Because much has been written about Dewey and Pragmatism, in this paper I shall deal only with certain key concepts, "experience" and "aesthetic experience," which are central to this philosophy and to the theory of imagination in this philosophy.

In the preceeding chapter, the theory of imagination in the systems of ethics from the ancients was discussed. From this discussion it was seen that "imagination" was thought to be both a process (associated with the mind) and a product (associated with sense). For Dewey, imagination will also be seen to be both process and product. However, there is a major difference in that for the ancients a "competition" of sorts existed between the two worlds of ideas and sense, most apparent in the moral realm. Imagination, considered as having a role in both worlds, was caught in this competition. Dewey, it will be seen, resolves the dualism of the ancients. The way in which he resolves it has implications for the theory of imagination both in ancient thought and

77 78

In Dewey's. Since, for Dewey, imagination is both process and product,

I shall provide historical background for the theory of imagination

"in the service of reason," relying on the research of Murray Wright

Bundy. I shall begin this chapter with a discussion of early Pragmatism

in art education, concentrating on the philosophy of John Dewey, and on

the Progressive Education Movement so closely associated with Pragmat­

ism and John Dewey.

Early Pragmatism in Art Education

For Dewey, reality consists in experience. Experience arises from

situations in which occurs the interaction between man and his environ­

ment. Man must be able to control his environment if he is to further

growth. Growth is an affair of intelligence. Dewey believes that

intelligence is based in and arises from experience. Intelligence is

the method of science; it is the process of ordering means to ends-in- view. Scientific method is that by which man is able to solve "life"

problems, and thus gain increasing control over his environment. The

purpose of education, then, is to increase human intelligence.

Knowledge (truth) in Dewey's philosophy, is instrumental; it is

the result of experience and the pragmatic test. It is also valuational.

That is, decisions made in inquiry are based on values. These values

are created by man in order to solve problems and meet needs. An individual chooses appropriate means to attain desirable and predictable

consequences of intelligent activity. A desirable consequence is one which "works." Society is the ultimate authority for determining the 79

value of consequences. That which is good is that which man values.

That which is right is action in regard to desirable consequences. All

inquiry, for the paragmatist, then, is a moral activity. That is,

inquiry is the evaluation of situations toward the assessment of what

consequences will bring concerning the securing of future goods. In

this sense, knowledge gained from scientific inquiry is valuational.

Controlling or interacting with one's environment involves con­

crete problems, to which the individual may Da highly sensitive. Such

concrete problems were the basis of Dewey's curriculum. He believed

that students could be motivated to l e a m in respect to problems which

had import for them. Such problems, arising from the environment are

the basis of reflective thinking, Dewey believed.

To the early progressives, Dewey brought the principles that

learning involved both doing and undergoing, and in art as in other modes of expression both technique and idea must be united. Along with

these ideas Dewey provided the psychological bases for teaching which

rested on the basic instinctive activities of the child and the benefits

and values for him of working with materials.

To later progressive art educators, Dewey brought the principle

that aesthetic experience was any consummatory or otherwise intrinsic­

ally valuable experience. This principle along with the earlier one

that the child's development occurred naturally and freely became impor­

tant tenets of the progressive movement. The latter tenet was influenced by the child study movement as well as by Dewian psychology. In art education, these two tenets together led away from the traditional focus 80

on the art product, and its attendant focus on technique, to a concern with the art process as it figured in the child's natural development

and his aesthetic experience.

In art education, an early disciple of Dewey's, Margaret Mathias,

a graduate of Teacher's College, Columbia, published The Beginnings of

Art in the Public Schools, 1924.^ Mathias was an early advocate of progressive education. Her text is a result of her work as art super­ visor in the Cleveland Heights public schools in the early twenties.

Most of the text is dedicated to discussion of the use of materials.

However, Mathias also discusses the expressive stages of artistic process and the educational principles which provide for the child's needs and growth.

The stages of artistic expression are three: "simple manipulation" is the natural desire to experiment with materials; "symbolism" is the individual's attempt at representation, usually by naming or describing subject matter in his works; "realism" is the child's desire to repre­ sent reality and is the stage at which he may feel the need of technique.

Mathias discusses the stages in artistic development in relation to each material introduced in her text. She also includes discussion on the child's growth under sections entitled "Provision for Growth."

Strong Dewian influences are apparent in Mathias's educational principles, some of which are based directly on Dewey's work. How We

Think.2 With these principles, Mathias emphasizes that the educational process must begin with and utilize the child's natural capacities; that 81

thinking is a problem-solving process; and, that the responsibility of

education is to provide students with situations in which problems may

be identified and experienced.3

Though Dewey's influence is evident in Mathias's early philosophy,

in a later text written in 1932, The Teaching of Art,4 she strongly

articulates Dewey's position that art is the response to experience

through material. In her opening paragraph, she states:

Art has two factors, man and his environment. Man experiences his environment. Art is his response to this experience. Two things are essential to response. First, man must sense his environment. Second, he must have materials. If he does not sense his environment, he has no stimulus to response. If he has no materials, he has no means of responding.5

Mathias also puts forth the egalitarian concept of creativity, inherent to progressive education. She claims that everyone has a

"drive to respond to experience" and this drive she calls "creative power." Says Mathias:

At one time creative power was thought to exist in only a few people. Now we believe that everyone has creative power. And further, the psychologist shows us that every­ one must have opportunity to create if he is to have whole­ some development.6

Mathias, in the two passages just cited, advances some of Dewey's thought from Democracy and Education, written in 1916.^ Mathias unites both man and world (environment) under the concept art; an idea which

Q Dewey furthered in Art as Experience, 1934 . In Democracy and Education, the fine arts, which Dewey believed should be dealt with as a part of life rather than treated as special objects, are not demarcated from useful arts. They are seen to differ in degree. "As experiences they have both an artistic and aesthetic quality."9 82

The purpose of art in education, says Dewey, is "the enhancement

of the qualities which make any ordinary experience appealing, appro­

priable - capable of full assimilation - and enjoyable......

This is fundamental to Mathias's notion that the drive to respond to

experience is intertwined with the individual's wholesome development;

the developing individual is responsive to and seeks growth through

new experiences; art enhances the qualitative aspects of experience.

Mathias exemplifies the influence Dewey's Pragmatic philosophy had on

art education in the twenties and early thirties.

Dewey's views on art were probably influenced by those of Albert

C. Bames of The Bames Foundation. The purpose of this institution was to offer instruction in art education based on the educational principles and methods of John Dewey. Barnes applied scientific method

to the study of art, putting Dewey's educational theories into art

education practice. Of these efforts, Dewey says:

Since my educational ideas have been criticized for undue emphasis upon intelligence and the use of the method of thinking that has its best exemplification in science, I take profound, if somewhat melancholy, ironic, satisfaction in the fact that the most thoroughgoing embodiment of what I have tried to say about education is, as far as I am aware, found in an educational Institution that is concerned with art.12

Dewey and Barnes were lifelong friends and shared same educational views and beliefs. Barnes's Interest was specifically in the area of aesthetics and art education and his views are first presented in

the 1929 edition of Art and Education, about five years before Dewey published Art as Experience. Though Barnes's art education philosophy ' 83

is based in Dewey's Pragmaticism, it appears that Dewey's later thinking

about art was influenced by Bames. Like Dewey, Bames does not advance

a theory of imagination. However, others of the Bames Foundation such

as Laurence Buermeyer,^^ do write of the role of imagination in art

processes. Buermeyer's writings suggest that by imagination one is

able to enter the world of nature and man. The artist depicts these

imaginative ventures in his work. Beurmeyer implies that the activity

of imagination in artistic process is dependent upon prior intellectual

processes the result of which enlighten and inspire. Imagination's role

in art appears to be that of recreating the world into an orderly place;

in this capacity imagination functions under the influence of desire.

This thought is found in Dewey's Art as Experience where he discusses

imagination as the adjustment of past experience with new experience,

in efforts to bring meaning to new experience. His publication of

Art As Experience in 1934 probably served to further Pragmatic art

education.

Frederick Logan pointed out in 1955, that though Dewey's book on

art had gone unchallenged in art education, it was difficult to assess

its influence. Logan maintained that "Dewey was probably relatively

unread, [in the field of art education] and consequently only vaguely understood."14 since that time, there is reason to believe that Dewey's work has been more systematically examined by art educators. For

example, Vincent Lanier's 1^ work in art education reflects certain beliefs of Dewey's Pragmatism. Lanier is an advocate of popular art, which he considers to be directly immediate and pervasive in the environment. Contemporary media are a forceful stimuli of consummatory 84

aesthetic response. For Lanier, the value of art education is in the

development of critical consciousness of social issues, upon which

contemporary art is based. This function he believes to be the moral

function of art education.

A major proponent of Dewey's Pragmatism, however, is David Ecker.^^

I shall now turn to a discussion of Ecker's Pragmatic phiolosophy of art education. This discussion will focus on Ecker's view of the artistic process as qualitative problem solving. From that discussion I shall

turn to a discussion of the theory of imagination in Pragmatic philosophy.

Pragmatic Art Education

In his writing, Ecker held that art processes are the methodological ordering of means to ends. The ordering is not a strinctly logical and instrumental one, but is directed by a pervasive quality which serves both as the end to be achieved and the means for achieving it. Accord­ ing to Ecker, qualitative symbols act in a mediating capacity and may be seen in a triadic relation. Ecker explains:

While a theoretical symbol represents anything other than itself, a qualitative symbol represents a system of relations in which itself is included, i.e., the qualitative symbol presents itself and represents the relation of contrast.

Ecker examines both what painters do in ordering artistic means to ends and what they say they are doing. His examination results in a description of the artistic process as a series of problems and their controlled resolution. He claims that the artist exhibits control over his materials by arranging qualitative means (line, color, texture) to achieve his qualitative end. In the process of this ordering he is guided by a quality "which is common to his previous work or to a 85

particular style." This pervasive quality acts as his method. Ecker

defines pervasive qualities as "controls" (directive criteria) by which

component qualities are arranged in the artistic process. "The artist

utilizes qualitative method to arrange qualitative means toward quali­

tative ends." From this Ecker concludes that art is an affair of

intelligence - "it is intelligence in qualitative ordering."^®

Here Ecker relies on Champlin's and Villemain's^® philosophy of

education to break down a traditional distinction between scientific and

artistic thought. Champlin and Villemain, students of Dewey's thought,

reject the traditional distinction which associates science with reason

and intelligence, and art with feelings and emotions. They reject

these ideas primarily as untestable. "In its place," Ecker states,

"their theory [philosophy] establishes qualitative (aesthetic) and

theoretical (scientific) intelligence as operating in all areas of

human experience."20 It must be noted, however, that Ecker sees art

as a specialized product of qualitative intelligence. Further, he is

intent upon distinguishing between qualitative and scientific problem

solving based on their different controls.

Ecker examines a sequence of photographs of a painting in order

to indicate that the qualities present in the initial sketch are

present in the final painting, even though some of these qualities have been modified or painted over. Ecker's purpose here is to furnish

support for his claim that alternatives in artistic ordering diminish in number after the initial elements (qualities) are established.

These initial elements serve in a controlling capacity for the pro­

gress of the work (the selection and/or rejection of further qualitative 86

elements) and are for the most part, present in the final product.

This is an instance of artistic thinking. Ecker states:

Artistic thinking, then, occurs when present or possible qualities are taken as means, or ways of proceeding, toward qualitative ends-in-view, a total quality. The pervasive quality directs artistic behavior from stage to stage until a coherent whole is realized. This purposive activity may be conducted entirely in qualities - component, pervasive, total.21

Ecker's ideas here are carried over into a conception of art

history as a "series of problems and their solutions."22 The most

provocative solutions to these problems (masterpieces) provide impetus

to artists of succeeding generations to work at related problems. New

pervasive qualities may emerge from older ones, a belief which Ecker

views as exemplifying the continuity of artistic thought.

Ecker identifies six steps or stages in artistic qualitative

problem solving which correspond to Dewey's stages of reflective think­

ing: (1) a presented relationship; (2) substantive mediation; (3) deter­ mination of pervasive control; (4) qualitative prescription; (5) experi­ mental exploration; and, (6) conclusion: the total quality. These

stages describe what the artist does in the artistic process. They need not occur in the oder presented.

Ecker concludes his investigation with a definition of artistic process :

... qualitative problem solving is a mediation in which qualitative relations as means are ordered to desired qualitative ends. ... Whenever qualitative problems are sought, pointed out to others, or solved, therein do we have artistic endeavor - art and art education.23

Given the means - ends ordering process of artistic problem solving, imagination, like other mental acts, would serve in a mediary way in this 87

ordering process. In this capacity, imagaination would seem to have

a close resemblance to or affiliation with intelligence, as Ecker

defines intelligence:

Intelligence ... is the procedure of ordering means to ends; it involves purpose and control. Intelligence is always an affair of experience; it is a dynamic process which arises from past experience; it acts significantly to modify the context of present experience; and it is assessed in terms of its conse­ quences in future experiences. It is, then a reconstructing, creative activity whereby present materials (alternative means) are selected and rejected on the basis of whether they will secure anticipated futures (selected ends).24

An examination of the relation of imagination to intelligence in Prag­ matic philosophy requires a further explication of qualitative problem solving. To provide this explication 1 shall examine the work of John

Dewey.

The Theory of Imagination in Pragmatism

Dewey does not advance a systematic theory of imagination, though he does discuss it, at times, throughout various works. In a general sense,

Dewey conceives of imagination as a process for the mental reconstruction of the empirical world from disorder into order. It integrates percep­ tual experience into the whole funding of experience and it brings past experience to bear upon present experience, bringing meaning to the pre­ sent.

Dewey appears to equivocate in his definition of imagination.

Imagination is seen as both the perception of meaning and as that which acts upon perception in the adjustment of past experience with present experience. Imagination is also seen to have qualities of intelligence and to act upon intelligence. However, this is not an 88

equivocation. Imagination is both a process and a product, for Dewey.

In the explication of Dewey's theory of imagination, it will be seen

that imagination is thought to have a role in both thought and sensation.

Dewey defines imagination as:

The direct perception of meaning - of ideal worth in sensuous forms; or as the spontaneous discovery of the sensuous forms which are significant, most ideal, and which, therefore, reveal most to the intellect and appeal most to the emotions.25

Imagination is perception. For Dewey, perception, in general, is a process wherein sense-data are transformed into intelligible symbols which instrumentally represent a portion of the individual's environ­ ment. In experience, the relations between doing and undergoing, the action and its consequences, are joined in perception. "This relation­ ship is what gives meaning; to grasp it is the objective of all intelli­ g e n c e . "^6 Perception of this relationship "constitutes the work of intelligence."27 Imagination as perception brings about the transfor­ mation of symbols into meaning:

Were it not for the accompanying play of imagination, there would be no road from a direct activity to representative knowledge; for it is by imagination that symbols are trans­ lated over into direct meaning and integrated with a narrower activity so as to expand and enrich it.28

In its function as the direct perception of meaning, imagination also serves to assist the intellect in the organization of experience.

Experience, according to Dewey, involves intelligence, perception, memory, emotion and imagination. A certain type of experience is never the result of just one of these functions but, rather, these functions as they are brought to interact with the environment. The merging of all these faculties is most pronounced in aesthetic experience: 89

Imaginative vision is the power that unifies all the constituents of the matter of a work of art, making a whole out of them in all their variety. Yet all elements of our being that are displayed in special emphases and partial realizations in other experiences are merged in aesthetic experience. An they are so completely merged in the immediate wholeness of the experience that each is submerged: - it does not present itself in consciousness as a distinct element.29

Experience, according to Dewey, is aesthetic when it is consummatory.

That is, when the instrumental means are invested with the values which are consummatory of ends, then experience is aesthetic.

"Aesthetic objects" are those things which are "immediately enjoyed and suffered," and "things directly possessed."^® An activity which is composed simultaneously of both instrumental means and consummatory ends (i.e., wherein the means are invested with the consummatory values of ends) is called art.31 In art all the functions of experience are united. "... art is the most direct and complete manifestation there is of experience experience." Says Dewey:

In art as an experience, actuality and possibility or ideality, the new and the old, objective material and personal response, the individual and the universal, surface and depth, sense and meaning, are integrated in an experience in which they are all transfigured from the significance that belongs to them when isolated in reflection. 32

Imagination in its mediary capacity, is a unifying activity in experience. It is necessary to the conscious fusion of old meanings and new situations. Dewey explains:

For while the roots of every experience are found in the inter­ action of a live creature with its environment, the experience becomes conscious, a matter of perception, only when meanings enter it that are derived from prior experiences. Imagination is the only gateway through which these meanings can find their way into a present interaction; or rather ... the conscious adjustment of new and old ^ imagination.33 90

The adjustment of the old and the new is the nature of the imagina­

tive experience in art. Dewey describes this in terms of the conflict

between inner (subjective) vision and outer (objective) vision which

the artist experiences. At an early point in his artistic process the

inner vision of the artist seems richer to him than the outer vision.

"It has a vast and enticing aura of implications that are lacking in

the object of external vision." Then a reaction to the inner vision

occurs, - its message appears vague compared to the succinctness and

force felt from the external object. Dewey says:

The artist is driven to submit himself in humility to the dis­ cipline of the objective vision. But the inner vision is not cast out. It remains as the organ by which the outer vision is control­ led, and it takes on structure as the latter is absorbed within it. The interaction of the two modes of vision is imagination; as imagination takes form the work of art is bom.^^

In addition to its responsibilities for the direct perception of meaning, the perception of relationships or connections in contexts

(the adjustment of the old and the new), imagination is also seen by

Dewey to be a necessary condition for reflective thinking and scientific

inquiry as aesthetic experience. Dewey's analysis of inquiry involves

five steps: (1) a felt difficulty; (2) its location and definition;

(3) suggestion of possible solutions; (4) development by reasoning of

the implications of the suggestion; and, (5) further observation and experimentation leading to its acceptance or rejection.35

Imagination's role in inquiry can be described as functioning in the initial recognition and ultimate resolution of a problematic

situation. Imagination first serves as the point of origination in 91

reflective expedience as an act of thought. Imagination then pervades each subsequent component of Inquiry.

Reflective thinking, then, cannot occur in the absence of imagina­

tion because the latter functions to recognize a situation as problematic or indeterminate. In addition, as Imagination pervades and advances each component of the act of reflective thought, it acts as a qualita­ tive control in thought in that it is a conscious adjustment between the old and the new. It senses the relationship between the qualitative meanings of a perception. As Ecker has pointed out, all thinking depends upon the awareness of qualities. It is the unique quality that pervades a situation which acts as a control over all means to ends-in-view ordering.

While imagination is a qualitative aspect of all experience, it is not itself that quality which pervades the problematic situation of the artist. Ecker maintains that the artist thinks in and with quali­ ties, i.e., the artist thinks in the qualities of his medium. But qualities, for Ecker, are symbols and as we have seen symbols are transformed into direct meaning through the activity of imagination.

Here a more precise role for imagination can be suggested for Ecker's theory. Though a qualitative criterion directs artistic ordering of qualitative symbols, imagination is that which actively seeks out and selects possible materials for the achievement of a qualitative end, e.g., to present total quality in the final work of art.

Furthermore, as artistic qualitative problem solving is modeled on inquiry and analysis of reflective thought, it cannot occur in the 92

absence of imagination. As we have seen, according to Dewey imagination is that which "feels doubt" or recognizes the situation as problematic or indeterminate, clarifies the problem, and provides guided conjecture toward a problem's resolution. It thus pervades each component of the problem solving experience.3?

For both Dewey and Ecker, imagination functions in artistic process both as a product and as a process. In the former capacity, it takes the form of ideas or thoughts which contain certain aspects of the eventual solution. As a process imagination locates possible means for the achievements of the end-in-view, the final work of art.

For Dewey, imagination is closely tied to intelligence and perception. At times he refers to imagination in its "product" capacity as perception - the direct perception of meaning and the perception of connections or relationships in a situation. Tied to intelligence, imagination has characteristics of and functions much the same as intelligence. In artistic process as in scientific inquiry, imagination mediates between past and present experience, bringing old meanings to bear on new situations, giving meaning to these situations. Thus, experience (artistic or otherwise) becomes conscious and perceptible. Imagination in Pragmatic philosophy is seen to evoke the means toward attaining the artistic end-in-view. Because these ends are then seen as means toward further ends, imagination mediates between the two toward the completion of the work of art. 93

Roots of the theory of imagination in Pragmatic philosophy - as a mediary function and as both a product and a process - are found in classical and medieval thought. In this thought, imagination, is seen to mediate between reason and sense. This capacity of imagination was termed by traditional thinkers "imagination (or phantasy) in the service of reason." I shall now turn again to the work of Murray Wright

Bundy on classical and medieval theories of imagination. I shall then bring this discussion to bear on further consideration of the theory of imagination in Dewey's Pragmaticism.

Imagination in the Service of Reason

A pervasive tradition in the history of the theory of imagination, initiated by Plato and elaborated by Aristotle, is that of the imagin­ ation in the service of reason. Closely tied to this tradition is the concept of imagination as a mediary. In aesthetics, the concept of the imagination in the service of reason is the basis of artistic symbolism.

Plato, we have seen, did not bring this concept to bear on the activity of the artist. Rather, it was the mathematician who made use of hypo­ thetical images to aid him in contemplation of Ideas. Aristotle recog­ nized three kinds of phantasy: the simple impression; the composite image from common sense; and, the reproductive imagination. The first kind, the aesthetic phantasy (equivalent to instinct) was associated with the lower soul or emotion and appetite. It could overpower reason.

The reproductive imagination, the deliberated phantasy, functioned in the higher soul, providing mental images to thought. Aristotle 94

conceived of these images as weakened sensations. The deliberative

phantasy was also that which played an important role in moral conduct

because it had the capacity to suppress phantasies from the lower soul.

The Neoplatonlsts, particularly Froclus and Synesius, relying on

the Platonic Dialogues and /ristotelian psychology, furtheied tie

concept of phantasy in the service of reason.

The Theory of Imagination from Froclus

Froclus defines phantasy as "a kind of intellectual power giving

shape to ideas. It is a kind of reason experiencing within, which, though it desires to rise, is weak because of its descent into the body. It is the last echo, as it were, of intellect, and is not improperly called passive intellect."^®

Froclus makes an important distinction between imagination and phantasy in respect to the fine arts (poetry). This distinction is based on Flato's implication that the aim of phantastic imitation was to give pleasure while icastic imitation was concerned with the faith­ fulness of the representation. Froclus goes beyond this and explicitly connects phantasy with pleasure. Bundy states:

Froclus seems to have been the first to make explicit this distinction between 'phantasy' and 'imagination', and hence to involve the terms in the formulation of the aesthetic problem, 'Does poetry seek to please or to tell the truth?' The answer of Froclus Is that it seeks to please when phantastic, to tell the truth when imaginative.39

However, when Froclus comes to discuss imagination and phantasy in terms of poetry, he ends by connecting them both with opinion; imaginative imitation with right opinion and phantastic imitation with wrong 95 opinion. For the Neoplatonists, opinion was associated with the lower soul. Opposite opinion is thought, which functions in the higher soul. Art, whether a case of imaginative or phantastic imitation can only be judged by standards other than thought. "For the Neoplatonistic mystic it is not lofty art because it is not the kind of thought which is philosophy or the kind of mental process which is above thought, intuition of the Divine."40 Bundy notes that Froclus' confusion is the result of assessing the role of imagination and phantasy in works of art by metaphysical standards rather than aesthetic ones. It is also the result of both Plato's principle "that the lower is the image of the higher," and Aristotle's principle "that every thought must have its phantasy" or concrete representation .41

Froclus, however, brings these two principles together in his discussion of the myth, wherein he recognizes the creative capacity of phantasy in expression. The myth, he says, presents "supra-sensible truth in sensible form, i.e., in terms of phantasy." Though it is not truth itself, it brings the "soul in contact with truth," in dreams and waking experiences. Bundy says:

In these phantasy acts by giving emotional power to that which in itself is not calculated to affect the emotions, by giving form to what was originally formless. The myth becomes a kind of phantastic mind (ton phantastikon nous) and a means of instruction through images. It gives shaoe to the intellectual light of truth, concreteness to thought.42

Here Froclus provides something of a resolution to his thought that phantasy is a kind of intellectual power giving shape to ideas and, at the same time, a function of the lower soul connected with emotions and opinion and, in art, pleasure. 96

The Theory of Imagination from Synesius

Synesius' theory of phantasy Is found In his treatise on dreams,

written before his conversion to Christianity. Synesius strengthens the

concept of phantasy In the service of reason, that which gives shape to

thought, and also emphasizes phantasy as a mediary function. Purely

Neoplatonlc, Synesius begins his treatise with the typical trilogy of

mind, soul, and reality. The mind Is that w’llch Is (being); the soul Is

that which Is In the process, being (becoming); mind Is In relation to

soul, as reality Is In relation to the world of things and appearances.

Mind functions to comprehend the spiritual, while soul functions to

comprehend the material (the world of phenomena). Synesius believes

that there Is a relation between these two worlds, and attempts to

explain this relation as an evolution of a lower world from a higher

one. The soul , since It functions to comprehend a lower world, must

also have the capacity to recognize the external truths revealed there.

The notion of a lower world coming from a higher allows Synesius to

make a connection between mind and soul, because soul Is connected

with both nature and the higher world from which It derives. Mind com­

prehends being by Intuition and soul comprehends the world of phenomenal

impressions which are the bases of concepts by tîîe use of

phantasy. In turn, because the workings of the mind can only be grasped

through general concepts which provide knowledge, phantasy Is the power

by which the workings of mind are comprehended. Bundy says: "We thus

arrive at the significant deduction that we get no knowledge of that which Is In the primary world (soul) unless an Impression has come to 97

phantasy. The function of phantasy is thus to help one know the realm

of suprasensible reality in terms of the lower world of sensible experi-

ience."43

For Synesius, phantasy mediates between spirit and matter, mind

and soul, and is the "paradox of the human mind.It makes us aware

of the baseness of human life and is also a means of communication with

God. The paradoxical nature of phantasy for the Neoplatonists is,

Bundy says, a direct result of their endeavor to combine Platonic

dualism with Aristotelian psychology.

We cannot form concepts without the aid of phantasy unless reason

goes beyond it, making contact with immaterial form. But, Synesius

says, the usual life is one of "phantasy in the service of reason."

In order that one may commune with God "diseased" and "disordered"

phantasy must be prevented and this is effected by maintaining a con­

stantly active intellect. In this state "the soul will no longer be

under the influence of external objects, and this intermediary essence,

phantasy, is then able to abandon itself to the direction of the Primary

Soul, and, purifying itself, it mounts to the heavens." For Synesius,

phantasy is "at once the source of error and a means of spiritual vision."45

Synesius' combination of the empirical and the mystical allows

for both the concept of phantasy in the service of reason, that

there can be no conceptions without phantasy and, in the case of intuition

of the Divine, the notion that there is conception without phantasy. 98

Synesius, Bundy says, demonstrates more clearly than other Neoplatonists,

the eclecticism of their theories of phantasy.

Of the psychology of the mystics, Bundy explains that because mysticism is essentially concerned with vision it relies on the faculties of medieval descriptive psychology only in so far as they are seen to

"contribute to or Impede vision of the highest sort." Phantasy and imagination have a definite place in descriptive psychology, he says, between the material and the immaterial, and are involved in both.

For the mystics, however, this position is relative and wavers between higher and lower opinions of phantasy and imagination. Again, with the mystics is found an attempt to unite the Platonic and the Aristotelian traditions. I shall discuss the mysticism of Richard of St. Victor.

His allegorical writings provide a description of phantasy in the service of reason as the concept originated with Plato.

The Theory of Imagination from Richard of St. Victor

As with other mystics, Richard of St. Victor is interested to discover the relation of imagination to contemplation; the highest activity of mind. Imagination is one of six varieties of contemplation. It takes three forms. By means of the first kind, "in and according to imagination" we simply gaze at visible objects; by the second kind "imagination according to reason" we analyze what we see; and, by the third kind

"reason according to imagination" we are able to speculate about the invisible through contemplating the visible.

For Richard, imagination is a means for uniting body and mind; it mediates between mind and sense when mind cannot attain the highest 99 form of contemplation. This relationship is most apparent in Richard's allegory Benjamin Minor. Here he represents reason as the mistress

(Rachel) and imagination as her handmaiden (Bilhah). It is necessary for the mistress to keep in contact with the world of senses, but she cannot, because of her station, do so directly: "'... it is not proper for a daughter young and tender to go running about outside, or for a servant (such as one of the senses) to be irreverently bursting into her mistress's r e c e s s e s . '"47 Imagination as the handmaiden functions to mediate between reason and the senses, bringing to reason, by way of pictures, what it derives from the senses.

Imagination, though it has its dangers (it can be an unruly and loquacious handmaiden), is also necessary to the rational in "contem­ plation in reason according to imagination." This involves contemplation of the invisible by way of the visible. Imagination is connected to the senses in which vision is corporeal. Intelligence is pure and cannot see the visible. Imagination brings the visible to intelligence.

Richard provides an example of imagination in the service of reason as

"contemplation in reason according to imagination.";

This, I think, is the reason why Rachel has children first by her handmaiden, Bilhah. For sweet it is in imagination at least to retain a memory of that which intelligence cannot yet apprehend by the force of reason. ... Therefore Rachel persuades herself the more easily to think of true good and to raise the mind to desire for these by a certain imaginary beauty, rather than to fix thought upon false and deceptive goods. And this is the reason why Rachel wishes her handmaid to go to her husband. There is no one who does not know that this is the first way to the contemplation of the invisible.48 100

This imagination which is a means to contemplation, Richard calls

the rational imagination; it is a higher function than imagination associated with instinct. This higher power also functions to regu­ late the moral life. By it we can conceive of heaven and hell. In the religious and moral life, Richard sees imagination in the service of both reason and intelligence. Bundy explains:

...of the former, by enabling the mind through its knowledge of the form of one object to imagine another; and of the second, by enabling the mind to rise through the sight of the visible to the contemplation of the invisible.49

In Richard of St. Victor is found the notion, originating with

Proclus, that the myth presents supra-sensible truths to the mind by means of phantasy and constitutes a kind of phantastic mind.

The major concern of the three writers who have been considered here, is imagination in the service of reason; thought being given shape.

Eventually, this concept became the basis of symbolic imagination in aesthetics. In this concept is recognized both the reproductive and the productive or combinatory powers of imagination; the former by which imagination is linked to emotion; the latter by which imagination could recombine the materials of sense. This last was the free, creative capacity of imagination which, when judged by non-aesthetic standards, was feared in the moral realm.

Imagination's mediary capacity, between the material and the immaterial, was strengthened by the inherent dualism in Neoplatonism.

The attempt to establish a relation between both worlds necessarily involved phantasy, as it was seen to belong to both. Bundy says: 101

If the lower was regarded as an image of the higher, phantasy, the pictorial capacity, might be the mirror for receiving the image or reflection. Or, if the attempt was made to bridge the gulf, then phantasy, by nature both corporeal and incor­ poreal, might be conceived of as the indispensable mediary.

This dualism, says Bundy, both provided the necessary structure for a constructive theory of imagination, and at the same time created its greatest dilemma. Of the two worlds, phantasy was associated with the lower, it could operate in the higher only by analogy. This problem is never resolved, but becomes more complicated. Two phantasies are defined, "one an image of the other.

For Dewey, we have seen, imagination is also in a mediary capa­ city, and is both a product and a process. But here it mediates means to ends rather than mediating sense and reason. For ancient authors, theory of imagination is based in an inescapable dualism. Dewey's theory of imagination on the other hand, is based in his philosophy of experience which resolves this dualism. I shall illustrate briefly hnn dualism is effected by Dewey's concept "experienceI shall then consider in what ways "experience" effects the theory of imagination in Dewey's philosophy.

Both Plato and Aristotle, we have seen, held a conception of reason as a lofty faculty associated with the intellectual, ideal and spiritual life. It was opposed to and disassociated from the practical life of worldly concerns; the life of the body, senses, emotions and appetites. Both phantasy and imagination are associated with the practical, sense world by way of their capacity to provide images of 102

this world. Phantasy is also identified with this lower world in its

capacity to overthrow reason and effect moral conduct.

This identification of the reason with the spiritual and Ideal,

and the identification of the sense with the practical, the worldly,

and the "experiential", effects the role of imagination; it comes to

be associated with both. This paradox was central to the thought of

Synesius for whom imagination was at once the source of error and a

means to spiritual vision. Richard of St. Victor considered imagination

as the connection between mind and body. Proclus in his discussion of

myth, also attempts to use imagination to connect reason and emotion.

In Dewey's philosophy, experience has a central position which

encompasses dualistic extremes. The division of reason and sense

(experience), of knowing and doing, originating with the classic philoso­

phers and adjusted by philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries,

is dissolved in Dewey's philosophy. Knowing and doing are both encom­

passed in experience. Experience, for Dewey, includes not only the

practical meaning which it had for classic and medieval philosophers

but also the intellectual meaning that it had for philosophers of the

17th and 18th centuries as a way of knowing. The union of these two

is found in the method of science; experimental method which entails both knowing and doing. Dewey describes this union:

When trying, or experimenting, ceases to be blinded by impulse or custom, when it is guided by an aim and conducted by measure and method, it becomes reasonable - rational. When what we suffer from things, what we undergo at their hands, ceases to be a matter of chance circumstance, when it is transformed into a consequence of our own prior purposive endeavors, it becomes rationally significant - enlightening and instructive.52 103

Trying (experimenting) involves man's interaction with the environment

(nature) toward the transformation of "raw" into meaningful experience.

For Dewey, this interaction and transformation is most pronounced in art as experience. The consummatory nature of art as experience is brought about by the interaction of intelligence and imagination which work together to unite all the elements of a situation.

There is a major way in which Dewey's concept of experience recasts the traditional theory of imagination. As experience unites both knowing and doing, it collapses the hierarchy of mental functions placing reason at the highest pinnacle and sense and emotion at the lowest level.53 Without this hierarchy, imagination is seen to function in conjunction with all human capacities in an integrated and wholistic fashion. It does not "serve reason" as the traditional writers thought of it. Rather, it interacts with intelligence in mediating means-ends processes.

It was said earlier that imagination, in the thought of the ancients, was a mediary between the two worlds of thought and sense; there existed a "competition" between these worlds. Dewey resolves this competition through the concept "experience," by which both thought and sense are seen to serve the same ends.

Another effect of the concept of experience on traditional theories of imagination is to disentangle it from problems of truth. We have seen this to have been a concern for Plato and Aristotle as well as the three writers previously considered. The traditional concept of 104

truth as revelation was seen to be an affair of the rational and

spiritual. Truth consisted In eternal essences and universais.

Imagination (phantasla) to greater or lesser degrees, was thought to

be a means to truth or vision; at least, It was to assist In some way

In this process. It was not so much a power of man as a power of God.

But that It was also associated with the material world and the lower

soul of man made imagination suspect even In Its higher capacities In

the process of revealing truth. In Dewey's pragmatism, "truth" does

not consist in eternal essences and unlversals. Man leams by doing.

Truth Is an outcome known as that which works. As a result of the

ongoing means/ends ordering which involves the doing and undergoing of

experience, there are no ends In themselves. There is the constant

conversion of ends Into means and so on. When no ends In themselves

exist, truth can never have an Immutable quality.

Dewey's concept "experience" allows us to see the dualism of

traditional thinkers in another way. At the heart of their dualism was the function of Imagination which they saw as mediating the world of

thought and the world of sense. Implicit In this Is that the traditional

thinker had need of a way to link thought and sense, knowing and doing,

the rational and the emotional, though this link was never a synthesis.

In the simpliest sense, imagination, for the ancients, was a proximatlon

of Dewey's concept of experience. Dewey's concept of Imagination,

like that of the ancients, recognizes Imagination as both "product" and

"process." Because of this, there may appear to be little difference between the ancient's theory of Imagination and that of Dewey. However, 105

Imagination, for the ancients, was seen to serve in specific capacities in association with reason, and other capacities when associated with emotion. Unable to conceive of the same faculty in both capacities, the traditional thinker's conception of imagination was as two separate capacities or types, both of which were closely related without being the same. In Dewey's theory is found the synthesis of both the process and product capacities of imagination. This synthesis occurs through experience, which is seen to unite characteristics of imagination and to direct them toward same ends.

Summary

In this chapter, the theory of imagination in Pragmatic art educa­ tion philosophy was explicated using the writings of Ecker and Dewey.

Ecker believes art education to play a major role in the develop­ ment of qualitative intelligence, a case of which is artistic problem­ solving. For him, art education is that situation in which qualitative problems are sought and solved. In artistic process as in scientific inquiry, imagination mediates between past and present experience, bringing old meanings to bear on new situations and giving meaning to these situations. By this action of imagination, experience becomes conscious and perceptible.

Imagination's role in inquiry can be described as functioning in the initial recognition and ultimate resolution of a problematic situation. Imagination first serves as the point of origination in reflective experience, as an idea. Imagination then pervades each sub­ sequent component of inquiry. 106

The history of imagination as a mediary capacity which gave shape

to thought, originated with Plato and was elaborated by Aristotle.

This theory was discussed in the work of Proclus Synesius, and Richard of St. Victor. For these writers, imagination was thought to have a role in both thought and sense, in the rational and the emotional.

The dualism of these traditional thinkers was discussed in light of

Dewey's concept of experience. Experience is seen to arise from situations in which the interaction of the mind's internal states and the external states of the environment occurs. This interaction is an affair of intelligence; the methodological ordering of means to ends. In Dewey's theory, the functions of imagination as both product and process are synthesized by the interactive nature of experience which directs these functions toward same ends. 107

Footnotes

1. Margaret Mathias, The Beginnings of Art in The Public Schools, (New York: Charles Scribner s Sons, 1924).

2. John Dewey, How We Think, (Boston: D.C. Heath and Co., 1910) Revised, 1933.

3. Mathias, The Beginning of Art in the Public Schools, p. 11.

4. Margaret Mathias, The Teaching of Art, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932). Mathias also wrote another text before this: Art in the Elementary School, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929).

5. Ibid., p. 1.

6. Ibid., p. 1.

7. John Dewey, Democracy and Education, (New York: The Free Press, 1966). Originally published, 1916.

8. , Art As Experience, (New York: O.P. Putnam's Sons, 1958). Originally published 1934, p. 22; Chapter 3.

9. Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 238.

10. Ibid., p. 238.

11. Other art educators influenced by John Dewey: Belle Boas, Art in the School, (New York: Doubleday, Doran, and Company, Inc., 1924).

Florence Cane, "Art - The Child's Birthright," Childhood Education, Vol. 7, (May, 1931), p. 482.

Margaret Naumberg, The Child and the World, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1928).

Melvin E. Haggerty, Art A Way of Life, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1935). Haggerty initiated the Owatonna Project in Minnesota in the 30's. The project, which was a school- community program in the arts, had as its foundation the belief that art was practical.

12. John Dewey, et. al.. Art and Education, (Merion, Penn.: The Barnes Foundation Press, 1954), p. 7, Third edition, revised and enlarged, originally published, 1929. 108

13. Laurence Buermeyer, "Art As Creating," in Dewey, et. la.. Art and Education, p . 55.

14. Frederick Logan, Growth of Art in American Schools, (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1955) p. 203.

15. Vincent Lanier, "The Scismogenesis in Contemporary Art Education," Studies in Art Education, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Fall, 1963), p. 5.

______, "The Future of Art Education or Tiptoe Through the Tealeaves," Art Education, Vol. 29, No. 3, (March, 1976), p. 12.

______, "The Unseeing Eye: Critical Consciousness and The Teaching of Art," in The Arts, Human Development and Education, ed., Elliott W. Eisner, (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1976) p. 19. ______, "The Five Faces of Art Education," Studies in Art Education, Vol. 18, No. 3, (Fall, 1977), p. 7.

16. David Ecker has also furthered the beliefs of Pragmatic philosophy in areas other than artistic problem-solving. He has developed a system of aesthetic inquiry based on art criticism and has advanced the belief that the child is a natural philosopher. From this last position, he advocates the development of curriculum approaches which encourage philosophical inquiry. For a sample of Ecker's writings on both these areas see: David W. Ecker, "Analyzing Children's Talk About Art," The Journal of Aesthetic Education, Vol. 7, No. 1, (Jan., 1973), p. 58.

"Justifying Aesthetic Judgments," Art Education, Vol. 20, No. 2, (May, 1967), p. 5.

, "How to Think in Other Categories: The Problem of Alternative Conceptions of Aesthetic Education," The Journal of Aesthetic Education, Vol. 4, No. 2, (April, 1970), p. 21.

______, "The Critical Act in Aesthetic Inquiry," in The Arts, Human Development, and Education, ed. Elliott Eisner, (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1976), p. 111.

_, "Philosophy: A New Context for Art Educa­ tion," Paper presented at "The Conference on Approaches to Curriculum," organized by the Institute for the Study of Art in Education, and held at New York University on February 11, 1977.

17. , "The Development of Qualitative Intelligence," in Aesthetics and Problems of Education, ed., Ralph A. Smith, (Urbana, Chicago, London: University of Illinois Press, 1971), p. 176. 109

18. , "The Artistic Process as Qualitative Problem-Solving," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 21, (1963), p. 287.

19. F.T. Villemain and L.N. Champlin, "Frontiers for an Experiment­ alist Philosophy of Education," The Antioch Review, Vol. 19, (1959), p. 345.

F.T. Villemain, "Democracy, Education and Art," Educational Theory, Vol. 13, No. 4, (Fall, 1963), p. 112.

______, "Methodological Inquiry into Aesthetic Subject Matter," Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society, Detroit, Michigan, March 26-29, 1961, p. 151.

20. Ecker, "The Artistic Process as Qualitative Problem-Solving," p. 287.

21. Ibid., p. 288. Ecker is criticized on this point by Eugene F. Kaelin, see; "Aesthetics and the Teaching of Art," in Readings in Art Education, eds. Elliott W. Eisner and David W. Ecker, (Waltham, Mass: Blaisdale Publishing Company, 1966).

22. Ibid., p. 285.

23. Ibid., p. 289.

24. Ecker, "The Development of Qualitative Intelligence," p. 178.

25. John Dewey, "Psychology," in The Early Works of John Dewey, Vol. 2, (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967), p. 171. Originally published, 1997.

26. Dewey, Art As Experience, p . 44.

27. Ibid. , p. 45.

28. Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 237.

29. Dewey, Art As Experience, p. 274.

30. John Dewey, Experience and Nature, (New York: Dover Publications, 1958), p. 87. Second edition, revised. Originally published 1929.

31. Dewey's meaning for the term 'art' appears to flucuate between a popular, broad conception, and a narrower, specialized one. The latter refers directly to works of art. The former refers to social and physical endeavors. See: 110

C.M. Smith, "The Aesthetics of John Dewey and Aesthetic Educa­ tion," in Aesthetics and Problems of Education, ed. Ralph A. Smith, (Urbana, Chicago, London: University of Illinois Press, 1971), p. 64.

32. Dewey, Art As Experience, p. 297.

33. Ibid., p. 272.

34. Ibid., p. 268.

35. Dewey, How We Think, p. 72.

36. Ecker, "The Artistic Process As Qualitative Problem-Solving," p. 286.

37. A concise description and explanation of imagination in both artistic and scientific processes can be found in the work of Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning, (Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press, 1975).

38. Murray Wright Bundy, The Theory of Imagination in Classical and Medieval Thought, in University of Illinois Studies in Language and Literature, Vol. 12, (May-August, 1927), Nos. 2-3 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1927), p. 139.

39. Ibid. P* 141.

40. Ibid. P* 142.

41. Ibid. p. 143.

42. Ibid. P" 145.

43. Ibid. p. 148.

44. Ibid. P* 150.

45. Ibid. P- 152.

46. Ibid. P- 202.

47. Migne "Patrol ed., Philip Schaff, 14 Vols., (New York: 1886-90) in Bundy, The Theory of Imagination in Classical and Medieval Thought, p. 203.

48. Ibid., p. 10, in Bundy, p. 204.

49. Bundy, The Theory of Imagination in Classical and Medieval Thought, p. 205. Ill

50. Ibid., pp. 271-272.

51. Dewey provides discussion of the problems of classical dualism In several of his writings. See:

Democracy and Education, (New York; The Press Press, 1966); and The Quest for Certainty, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1960). Originally published, 1929.

52. Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 273.

53. Intelligence Is the greatest value for Dewey, but this does not mean that It Is a "higher" mental capacity. Intelligence Is man's Interaction with his environment. It Is not a static "substance" In the mind which functions Independently of other mental capacities. For Dewey, the degree to which one success­ fully solves problem situations Is the measure and test of Intelligence. In respect to this. Intelligence Is a continuous process between man and environment. See: Experience and Nature, CHAPTER III

In this chapter, the theory of imagination is explicated in Victor

Lowenfeld's theory of the child's artistic development. Lowenfeld's

developmental theory of creativity is based in psychology. His theory

has been called "expressive" and has been linked to Idealist expressive

aesthetics. In this chapter the attempt will be made to demonstrate

the sense in which Lowenfeld's theory may be called "expressive" by

contrasting it with the Idealist aesthetics of R.G. Collingwood. From an explication of the theory of imagination from Collingwood and Lowen-

feld, derives the distinction between art education philosophy and art education psychology. A key concept dealt with in this explication is

"expression." Murray Wright Bundy's study is referred to for the theory of imagination as inspiration and expression from Plato, the Rhetoricians

and Dante. Discussion of this historical theory is brought to bear on

further discussion of the theory of imagination as expression.

Art education developmentalists view child art as the result of

the child's progression through ordered stages of development. This development is seen to be a natural process which is sometimes thought

to be determined by perceptual growth. Art produced at various stages of the child's development has been interpreted in different ways as

indicating levels of intellectual, emotional, creative and social growth. Most developmentalists in the field of art education believe

112 113

that each child has an innate capacity for creative development. This

development is related to the child's conception of himself and to his mental and emotional health. The essential role of art education is one of facilitating the child's creative growth and development. Art is the vehicle whereby the child best develops his creative potential.

This development is seen as "wholistic" in nature, composed of both sensuous and conceptual elements.

These beliefs about the child's artistic development have founda­

tions in late 19th century and early 20th century art education. I shall describe these foundations before discussing Lowenfeld's develop­ mental theory.

Early Child Development Theory in Art Education

Frederick Logan, in The Growth of Art in American Schools, points out that the pervasive philosophy influencing the late 19th century art educator was Hegelian Idealism. This philosophy applied to art educa­ tion was interpreted to mean "pure form, ideal embodiment, right seeing, transformation of material nature in the service of the highest ideals."

Art education in the 1890's, Logan says, emphasized ideal forms and qualities in art. He explains:

The interpretation of Hegel, as applied by the art teachers, assumed that art, 'high' art, or 'good' art was a revelation of the divine, or at least, the artist's aim was to objectify his own sense of the ideal. ... In one's work in art it was necessary to determine what kind of training or experience would make pos­ sible the doing of an ideal work of art.l

Within this 19th century Hegelian aura, psychologists turned their research to the study of the child. In 1881, G. Stanley Hall established the first research laboratory of child study at Johns Hopkins University. 114

Harry Beck Green summarizes the findings fi)f early child study move­

ment research:

They 'discovered' that the child has an emotionàl life as well as a corporeal existence, and that his education depended upon expression as well as impression. The effect of this concept was to broaden the scope of the content and to begin the shift of emphasis in art education from the product to the child.^

The early child study movement served to change the emphasis in art

education from restrictive technical drawing activities to freer

"expressive" drawing activities.

The child study movement led to the child-centered school, which

emphasized the child's creative self-expression. Concern with the

development of creative self-expression resulted in an emphasis "not

upon finished work, skill, and technical perfection, but upon the release

of the child's creative capacities, upon growth in his power to express

his own unique ideas naturally and freely, whatever the medium.

Dewey's contribution. Green says, though often misinterpreted or misunderstood, strengthened the emphasis on the child. Art, as taught

in Dewey's laboratory school, instituted in Chicago in 1896, stressed

process rather than product and technique was not emphasized with

younger children. The art product itself was seen to be "good" or

to have value, no matter what its state, if it achieved the end or

purpose which the child had in mind. This approach, often misinter­

preted, had disrtterous effects on art education. Teachers maintained

a "hands off" attitude toward teaching, leaving the child to work by whatever methods he choose. They believed that to influence or inter­

fere with the child's work destroyed his spontaneity and creativity. 115

During the 1920’s, the Progressive Education Movement became the most influential proponent of the child-centered view. This movement, which had popularized some wrong interpretations of Dewey's philosophy, also supported the views of Sigmund Freud. The influence of Freud's views led to a recognition of the values of art education for mental and emotional health.

In the 1920's also, another major art education influence was represented in American classrooms which displayed reproductions of

Viennese student art work; the products of Franz Cizek's Juvenile

Art Class. Cizek had studied at the Academy of Fine Arts in Vienna and had begun teaching art in the Vienna schools the year before he instituted the Juvenile Art Class. Cizek had become interested in child art while studying in the Academy and, through observation of children making art, had concluded that "All children drew similiarly, but not schematically. ... It seemed that all children unconsciously followed eternal laws of form." Cizek worked with pre-adolescents because he believed that the adolescent lost the creative "flare" he had had when younger.4

Cizek's work with children had little support or recognition in

Austria. His methods were opposed by other teachers. However, he was much admired in other parts of Europe and in the United States, and his students' work was exhibited widely in these countries in

1914. His popularity convinced authorities to allow him to continue his teaching in Vienna. 116

Clzek was against method In the art classroom. He was also non- directive In his teaching. Green describes Clzek's beliefs about the child and child art:

Clzek believed that all children have something to express, and that such expression should develop naturally. He stated as follows some of his beliefs concerning the achievement of this natural development of self-expression: the child should never be encouraged to copy nature. He should not be questioned about his drawing. The more Intelligent the child, the less creative ability - 'Intelligence kills creative ability'. The child who has ability In one creative field does tend to be creative In other fields.5

The effect of Clzek's Influence was to place emphasis on child art as a creative natural process which Involved the child's free self- expression. As a result of these beliefs, art teachers assumed Clzek's

"non-methods" In the classroom. Children were left to freely express themselves.

This brief overview of art education's history has touched upon only those Influences and trends which appear to have constituted the art educational milieu at the time Lowenfeld's text appeared In 1947.

Two Ideas stemming from child-centered research and education seem outstanding. One Is that the child has an emotional component which needs expressing; the other Is that the child makes art naturally and spontaneously without benefit of education and this art making Is seen to be creative. These two Ideas In art education have served to focus attention on the child and his development rather than on the art product. Since the free natural expression of the child Is seen to be creative, creativity came to be a major focus for research In art education. 117

Early child study specialists believed that the child's expres­

sive artistic work provided knowledge about his interest, experiences

and development. Those who studied children's drawings, such as Earl

Bames, Herman T. Lukens, and M.V. O'Shea,^ believed that through study

of the child's creative expression they gained insight into his

innermost life.

Contemporary theorists of children's artistic development, have interpreted child art from various perspectives. Rhoda Kellogg? interprets the child's symbols as indicative of man's common humanity and participation in the collective unconscious. The symbols and patterns which the child creates are thought to be inherited from primitive man's religious forms and to exist in the preconscious.

These symbols and patterns are said to correlate with the child's age, i.e., simplier forms precede more complex forms; circles are made before squares. Herbert Read® also supports the notion that child art repre­ sents symbols of an archetypal nature which indicate certain mental characteristics present in man's preconscious. Rudolf Amheim® offers a view of the child's artistic development which emphasizes perceptual growth. His view claims that the child draws what he sees rather than what he knows. As the child develops, levels of perceptual differen­ tiation are indicated by Increased differentiation in children's graphic expression of the things which they perceive.

The most influential theory of the child's artistic development in art education has been Lowenfeld's. I shall now turn to a discussion of his work. 118 Developmental Theory In Art Education

Lowenfeld's work in the child's artistic development is presented in his text, Creative and Mental Growth.10 This text is referred to in the following. Lowenfeld taught art in the public schools of

Vienna as well as at the Hohe Warte Institute for the Blind in

Vienna. His work with blind children contributed much to his theory on the creative development of children. He came to the United States in 1938 and began teaching at Pennsylvania State College in the art education department in 1946. Prior to his teaching there, he had begun to compile the research for Creative and Mental Growth, first published in 1947.

Lowenfeld provides a systematic conception of the stages of the child's artistic development. These stages are seen to be innate or natural in the child's development. As such, the child must pass through one stage before he is able to enter the next. Lowenfeld maintains that the form and content of a child's artistic work is influenced or effected by his specific stage of development, as well as by his social and environmental experience. The value which the child places on experience is also reflected in his work. A small child drawing his family would typically depict the mother as larger and possibly more detailed than other members. This Indicates the mother's central role in the child's experience of "family."

The stages of development in child art are as follows: (1) Scrib­ bling state (2 to 4 years of age); (2) Pre-schematice stage (4 to 7 years of age); (3) Schematic stage (7 to 9 years of age); (4) Gang age

(9 to 11 years of age); (5) Stage of reasoning (11 to 13 years of age); 119

(6) Crisis of adolescence. With these stages Lowenfeld identifies seven

areas of growth which must be integrated in experience in order for growth to occur; the intellectual, the emotive, the social, the perceptual, the physical, the aesthetic, and the creative. The creative is the integrative area of growth. Each stage of the child's develop­ ment is assessed in light of these seven areas of growth.

Lowenfeld describes two types of perception - visual and haptic.

The majority of individuals as they develop tend more or less, toward one of these modes of perception. Visually oriented persons seek experience in the external world, outside the body. The visual type tends to grasp objects as wholes in perception and then to analyze them into details and aspects. The artistic work of the visually oriented individual is representational.

The haptic individual seeks experience in kinesthetic ways - he apprehends the external world through tactile perception. Haptically oriented persons do not grasp wholes as do visually oriented persons. Instead, they build up tactile impressions into wholes when their emotional interest is sustained. Their artistic work tends to represent their feelings of tactile impressions rather than the visual qualities of an object. Since visual and haptic perceptual traits are genetic, and therefore determined, Lowenfeld cautions the art teacher against requiring a haptic type to produce representational works and vice-versa.

Lowenfeld does not advance what could be called a "method of instruction." He prescribes that the teacher identify with the creative 120

needs of the child and subordinate himself and his own desires to these

needs. Furthermore, teachers must be acquainted with the physical

and psychological needs of the child at all stages of development.

Once these prerequisites are met, the teacher's role is to motivate

and stimulate the child's artistic activity by helping him to become

aware of his environment, his bodily sensations and his personal

experiences and feelings. The child's artistic activity and expression

will demonstrate his creative growth or lack of growth. In the latter

case wherein the child's artistic work demonstrates that he cannot

identify himself with his own experience, the teacher helps him to face

the experience, identify with it, and express the exprience creatively.

For example, if a child cannot paint "skating," the teacher evokes from

him a detailed account of the experiences involved in skating, whether

or not this is a vicarious or actual experience. The teacher does this

primarily through questioning, conversation and physical activities

which motivate the child to identify with the experience.^

Traditional approaches to teaching art are discouraged, e.g.,

copying and the study of design elements and principles. Lowenfeld

also discourages the use of coloring books. All these, he says, prevent the child's spontaneous and free expression in his creative work. As one of Lowenfeld's fundamental beliefs is the importance of the freedom of creative expression for the individual, he denounces

any approach or technique which can be seen to constrain this freedom.

Art, for Lowenfeld, is an integrating principle in creative experience, which unites emotional, intellectual, perceptual and 121

aesthetic components into a single whole. Growth should occur in

these four areas simultaneously. This integrated growth enables

children to ultimately achieve a more unified and better adjusted

life. Creative experience then is necessary for the education of

the "whole child," - a fundamental tenet of Lownfeld's theory - and

ultimately for the achievement of an integrated culture.

The integration brought about by creative experience takes place

only if the child identifies with the experience. That is, integra­

tion takes place inside the individual, by what Lowenfeld calls

"self-identification." Self-identification is a necessary condition

for expression. That is, once self-identification takes place the

child is able to express experience creatively. Self-expression

refers to the mode of expression and not to thoughts or ideas in terms

of general content. Lowenfeld says that what matters in expression

is not the "what" but the "how." In order for a child to self-

identify with experience and thus to express experience creatively, he must "grasp it and project himself into it." Lowenfeld states:

No art expression is possible without self-identification with experience expressed as well as with the medium by which it is expressed. This is one of the very intrinsic factors of creative expression. If we do not identify ourselves with these forces, art expression loses the very essence of its nature - its creativity.12

Self-identification is also necessary for appreciation of art.

Since art expresses "the experience of the creator with the thing

and never the thing itself," the viewer must be able to identify with

the creator in order to appreciate and understand the work of art.

There are certain considerations which effect appreciation such as 122

the developmental level of the appreciator, the subject matter and

the means of expression.

As a necessary condition for creative production and appreciation

as well as the development of well-adjusted individuals who contribute

creatively to society, self-identification is seen by Lowenfeld to be

a major concern for art education. It is the major task of the art

educator to facilitate the child’s self-identification with experience whenever the child indicates an inability to do so himself.

Lowenfeld is essentially concerned with the individual's subjec­

tive relations with himself, man and the world of his existence. To establish these relations as positive is an ongoing, developing process which .ha believes to be creative. Art is the vehicle whereby man

activates this process, thus internalizing experience. The changing

subject matter of creative activity is this subjective relation with man and environment which involves intellectual and emotional growth.

Lowenfeld’s educational aim is to preserve man’s dignity and freedom in an increasingly hostile and constrictive world. Because of the nature of his concern, Lowenfeld posits the means whereby man pre­ serves his dignity and freedom - his creative capacity - as a psycholo­ gical process. Each person then can be said to posses his own poten­

tial creative abilities. ’’Creativity is an instinct which all people possess, an instinct which we primarily use to solve and express life’s problems. ...Creative growth starts as soon as the child begins to document himself.” Since the mode whereby the individual documents himself changes as his subjective relations with others and to his 123 environment change, Lowenfeld describes this process of change in developmental terms. According to Lowenfeld, the creative potential of the child needs cultivation and must not be inhibited. This last results in the loss of confidence in the individual's original power to create. If man does not comprehend and contemplate himself as creative then he loses his capacity and drive to "create himself."

Though Lowenfeld claims creativity to be an instinct - a drive without which man cannot exist - it must be preserved throughout the individual's growth, and united with the mature mind. This he sees as the role and priviledge of art education.13

The Theory of Imagination in Lowenfeld's Theory

Lowenfeld's theory of imagination is found in his discussion of the post-adolescent stage of development. He claims that what the child presents in his creative work are representations of value rather than aesthetic evaluations. Based on this he assumes that the "child's world of Imagination is bound up with the self, with subjective feel­ ings, and subjective relations toward surroundings."14 As the child approaches adolescence, he loses this subjective relationship to the world of symbols. His creative productions are dominated by a "critical awareness." What this means is that by post-adolescence the child has developed a conscious approach to his work which overcomes his subjective attitude. He is unable "to establish close correlations between imaginative thinking and the final product."1^ When this occurs the individual's "confidence in his world of imagination is shaken."16 A battle between the two impulses ensues, evident in the 124

Individual's creative work. Eventually he may give up creative work

during this period. Critical awareness toward their imaginative

activity accounts, Lowenfeld says, for the decrease of creative ability of adults.

Lowenfeld says that the change in the adolescent's imaginative

activity is apparent in the contrast between the adolescent's mode of play and that of the child.

Children play without awareness of their action, using their imagination to make up for what reality does not provide. ...if adults would do the same, they would be considered insane; such is the difference between controlled and uncon­ trolled imagery.17

Lowenfeld seems to be saying that conscious control of imaginative activity develops as the child grows older, with a major change occurring at adolescence with the onset of critical awareness. Since critical awareness of imaginative activity is seen to account for the decrease of creative ability in both adolescents and adults it is implied that imagination has a kind of maturation level at which it ceases to func­ tion in its previous fashion. That is, imagination is tempered by the concerns and demands of the "real" world of the adult, as well as by reason and knowledge in setting goals and making decisions. Lowenfeld seems to be suggesting that at maturation, imagination functions less

"imaginatively" and more reasonably. This may be apparent in the adolescent's artwork which typically portrays a concern with realistic representation rather than "fantastic" representation.

In his comparison of the child's mode of play and that of the adolescent, Lowenfeld is equating imagination with pretending. Child's play is a case of pretending and the adolescent's is not. 125

A difficulty here is with Lowenfeld's use of the phrase "imaginative activity" which may be said to characterize two activities, imagining and pretending. Gilbert Ryle makes a useful distinction between how we use the words 'pretending' and 'imagining':

... and we use words like 'play' and 'pretend' for deliberate, concerted and rehearsed performances, whereas we are more ready to use words like 'fancy' and 'imagine' for those activities of make-believe into which people casually and even involuntarily drift. Underlying these two differences there is, perhaps, this more radical difference, that we apply the words 'pretend' and 'act the part,' where an overt and muscular representation is given of whatever deed or condition is being put on, while we tend, with plenty of exceptions, to reserve 'imagine' and 'fancy' for some things that people do inaudibly and invisibly because 'in their heads,' i.e., for their fancied perceptions and not their mock a c t i o n s . 18

When Ryle's distinction is applied to Lowenfeld's comparison of play forms, the change in "imaginative activity" which takes place at the onset of adolescence can be explained as a change from the overt mani­ festation of the child's pretending to the more covert imagining of the adult. This then may not be a change in the creative capacity of the more mature person, as Lowenfeld claims, but a change in the mode of imagining. Since there is no reason to believe that children do not also imagine in covert manners, Lowenfeld, in this discussion, must be referring to the activity of pretending, which he sees to be present in the child's play but not the adolescent's or adult's.

Lowenfeld, we have seen, is concerned with the manifestation of creative and mental growth in the child's development. This mani­ festation takes some physical form, i.e., it is an observable event present either in the child's artistic work or in his behavior. The 126

mode of imagining of the adolescent and adult seems not to be the same

sort of observable event as the child's pretending. This may be, in

part, why Lowenfeld claims that the adult shows a decrease in creative

activity when it may be the case that the adult's creative activity

and mode of imagining takes a covert form (according to Ryle). For

Lowenfeld, the "state" of imagination in the young child's play

behavior is better referred to as "pretending."

In the child's artwork, imagination is indicated by the presence

of "intuitive imagery." Lowenfeld explains:

Such intuitive imagery must be expressed; it must be translated into concrete form. This is the main difference between phantasy and art. As soon as phantasy is translated into some form of expression through the intuitive power of the creator it ceases to be mere phantasy. Educationally this is of great significance because it answers the often placed question of how far we should go in stimulating the phantasy of children without 'overstimulat­ ing' them. We cannot go far enough as long as the child uses it and turns it into 'concrete and factual material,' such as his creations. 19

Lowenfeld is concerned with imagination as it is manifested in

some overt form, e.g., the child's physical behavior in pretending and

the presence of intuitive imagery in the child's artistic work. He also

conceives of art education as a therapeutic endeavor which serves to

stimulate and facilitate the child's natural development. Lowenfeld's

method for observation and assessment of the child's creative and mental growth is essentially behavioristic, in the simplest sense.

That is, the child's mental state or behavior is studied through his

physical behavior which also includes his artistic work. Lowenfeld may not believe that mental behavior is bodily behavior, but neverthe­

less his belief or assumption is indicated in his method. If this is his 127

assumption then the child's creative expression is 6f particular

importance in assessing his developmental progress because it serves

as a visual analogue of that progress. This may be why Lowenfeld

stresses the "how" not the "what" of self-expression; the mode of

expression not the thoughts or ideas expressed.

This discussion of the underlying assumptions of Lowenfeld's

psychological theory of the child's artistic development and the role

of imagination in that theory, leads to a problem. Essentially the

problem does not arise from Lowenfeld himself, but from what has been

said or claimed about him. It has been claimed (and is popularly

assumed) that Lowenfeld's developmental theory is based in the tenets of

expressive aesthetics. Expressive aesthetics is a branch of Idealist

philosophy. Though it should be apparent from discussion of Lowenfeld's

theory that there is no foundation for this claim, history has shown

that people believed his theory to be "expressive."

To discuss this claim about Lowenfeld, I shall first offer evidence

for its existence. I shall then discuss R.G. Collingwood's theory of

expressive aesthetics, closely connected to his theory of imagination.

A comparison of Collingwood's theory of imagination and Lowenfeld's

description of imagination should make apparent the striking contrast between the two positions. I shall then provide historical background,

from Plato, Dante and the Rhetoricians, on the theory of expression

and the relation of this theory to the theory of imagination. Again,

I shall rely on Murray Wright Bundy's research on the theory of imagin­

ation in classical and medieval thought. This, in the end, will 128

provide four points of view on expression and its relation to imagin­

ation, three of which strongly present the Idealist view, the remaining

one (that of the rhetoricians) representing a popular view.

The Idealist position on imagination and art education was dealt

with, to a degree, in the section on Feldman's theory. Feldman holds

a position of philosophical Realism/Idealism. My purpose in again

considering Idealism here is to contrast this position with that of

Lowenfeld's, particularly in regard to the theory of imagination in

both. Aside from this purpose, a consideration of Collingwood's

Idealist position as well as those of Plato and Dante, allows for the

opportunity to examine the Idealist theory of expression and imagina­

tion when taken to its logical conclusions.

It is sometimes assumed that justification for most art education

theory is based on a particular aesthetic theory. Aesthetic theory,

emphasizing a certain view of art, provides the guidelines or beliefs

from which art educaters construct positions on art and education.

Lowenfeld has been associated with expressive aesthetics in the Idealist

and Neo-Idealist traditions. Donald Arnstine, writing on art education

theory for the Encyclopedia of Education in 1971, discusses art as the

expression of emotion. Those holding this view, he says, "argue that

the emotions which cannot adequately be described by science or arti­

culated in discursive language, find expression only in the forms of

art which do not just describe but directly present what is felt to

the beholder." Amstine points out the various concerns of different writers in this tradition. He states: "The arts, on this view, become 129

a requirement for everyone's education, for only through art can society

remain civilized (Read, 1943) and individual's maintain a healthy and

balanced mental life (Lowenfeld, 1 9 5 7 )."20

In this article, Lowenfeld's concern for mental health is seen to

be associated with expressive aesthetics. What becomes apparent is that

the psychologist may have different concerns than the philosopher in

considering the "expressive" or "emotional" content of art. Lowenfeld,

we have seen, does believe that emotion can be described by science

(though this may not be the emotion which concerns the aesthetician).

Further, for Lowenfeld, the work of art is a vehicle for the venting

or presentation of emotions which releases them from the maker. The

work of art allows the psychologist to assess the emotional state of

the maker; and this is clearly Lowenfeld's interest. The assumption

here is that the artist "feels" or experiences some emotion which he

expresses in such a way that this emotion is apparent in the artistic

work. However, the aesthetician does not assume that the artist was

feeling "sadness" when sadness was expressed. The psychologist, then,

brings different standards (and concerns and interests) to his scrutiny

or analysis of the work of art than those of the aesthetician. These

differences will become more defined as we proceed with the discussion.

More recently, (1979) Efland associates Lowenfeld with expressive

tradition in aesthetics as well as with psychoanalytical psychology, which he claims is aligned with expressive aesthetics. Efland defines

both the psychological and the philosophical traditions. He states: 130

Expressive theory in aesthetics says that art is the expression of the artist's feelings and emotions is the primary source of its value. Correspondingly, psychoanalytic psychology views all human behavior as being in some way expressive of unconscious needs and drives elaborated, compromised, and channeled into overt behavior by the ego.

Efland does not give reasons or explanations for his association of

Lowenfeld with expressive aesthetics, i.e., he does not describe or say how this tradition in aesthetics is manifested in Lowenfeld's work.

Efland also claims that Lowenfeld "drew upon Freudian insights in the preparation of his two books on art e d u c a t i o n . .."22 However, Efland does not say which Freudian insights these were.

Lowenfeld's thought, though it has little to do with education or aesthetics, has much to do with psychology. It is in relation to developmental psychology and not to aesthetic theory that his view of expression is best understood. The distinction between "expression" in Lowenfeld's developmental psychology and "expression" in Idealist aesthetics can be found in their different theories of imagination.

I shall now turn to a discussion of the theory of imagination in

Idealist aesthetics.

The Theory of Imagination in Idealist Aesthetics

In the introduction to this paper, it was pointed out that late

19th century Idealist art educators, in the United States, attempted to change the current conception of art education. Prior to this, in Switzerland and Germany, other Idealist educators were using innovative methods which eventually effected educational methods in the United States. 131 Pestalozzi^^ (early 19th century) and Friedrich Froebel^^ (Mid-

19th century) were two Idealist educators who have influenced art education. Both are often described as precursers to Dewey's educa­ tional thought because of their emphasis upon activity, social relation­ ships in the classroom, the use of concrete objects for learning con­ cepts, and the mastery of manual skills. This approach to education may have influenced Dewey. However, both Pestalozzi and Froebel share a kind of "idealism" about the nature of the child and education. Act­ ivity, for example, was thought to be both a natural and a divine impulse in the child which must be guided toward the production of things which conformed to ideals in the mind or the divine order of creation.

Both believed that their methods of education would produce superior adults who would improve the world. Their Idealist beliefs about education have not had a major impact upon art education, while their methods, particularly the use of concrete items for learning concepts, are still used today.

Important for the Idealist art educator will be features of art as mind or spirit. Imagination, as that by which inspiration occurs, will be seen to have an important role in art making. The logical outcome of Idealist beliefs about art making is found in the aesthetic theory of R.G. Collingwood. I shall now discuss his theory.

Collingwood advances a theory of artistic imagination in The

Principles of Art. For Collingwood, imagination in artistic expression is paradigmatic. I shall discuss only the outstanding features of

Collingwood's theory of imagination, however. 132

Central to Collingwood's theory is the claim that art is an imaginative activity by which emotions are expressed. "By creating for ourselves an imaginary experience or activity, we express our emotions; and this is what we call art."^^ That which expresses emotion is a consciously controlled bodily activity. This activity Collingwood calls "language" which he equates with art. Collingwood uses "language" in a broad sense to include "any activity of any organ which is expres­ sive in the same way in which speech is expressive. In this wide sense, language is simply bodily expression of emotion, dominated by thought in its primitive form as consciousness."26 All language, says Colling­ wood, has a relation to bodily gesture. The physical artwork, e.g., a painting on canvas, is representative of the artist's "speech gestures"

(though it is not these speech gestures) and serves as a record of these to inform the audience of the speech gestures it must make in order to experience the artist's experience. This activity of con­ structing and reconstructing speech gestures is an imaginary activity.

Collingwood says:

The aesthetic experience, or artistic activity, is the experience of expressing one's emotions; and that which expresses them is the total imaginative activity called indifferently language or art.2'

That imagination expresses emotion implies a connection between imagination and emotion which Collingwood examines in terms of the structure of experience. All experience can be seen in terms of three levels: the psychic, the imaginative, and the intellectual. The present discussion will concentrate on the psychic and imaginative levels only. Each level is distinct, though their hierarchical arrangement 133

is unalterable: the intellectual level presupposes the imaginative

(conscious) level, which presupposes the psychic (preconscious) level.

Psychic experience provides the material for imaginative experience

and that, in turn, provides materials for intellectual experience.

Psychic experience is the material for all art. It is a con­ stantly moving flow of sensa "charged" with emotion, below the level of consciousness. Collingwood says that we must presuppose this level

for we cannot know it directly as we can the other levels which involve consciousness. Psychic experience is mere sentience. We know of its existence as it is given to consciousness and as we observe it in others. Collingwood equates it with feeling. Feeling proper, which is psychical experience, is composed of both sensation and emotion.

Feeling proper is essentially experience of which we are not aware. By an act of attention or awareness we become conscious of

feeling. Feeling is then transformed "from being impressions of sense" to being "ideas of imagination." Collingwood sees the word "imagination" to be synonomous with the word "consciousness," indicating the level of experience at which impressions are transformed into ideas. The difference between the two is that "consciousness" refers to the activity whereby impressions are converted into ideas, i.e., it "effects the conversion," whereas "imagination" refers to feeling which has under­ gone this process of conversion. Collingwood says: "Imagination is thus the new form which feeling takes when transformed by the activity of consciousness."28 134

Since mere feeling, as impressions of sense, has both emotional

and sensuous characteristics, when converted to ideas feeling must also

have these characteristics. Ideas then have an emotional component to be expressed. (Collingwood defines ideas as "something which we no

longer simply feel but feel in that new way which we call imagining.

Emotion, for Collingwood, is passive, i.e., it is attached to sensa as a

"charge." He says, "... to whatever level of experience an emotion may belong, it cannot be felt without being expressed. There are not unexpressed e m o t i o n s . "30 Emotions are expressed differently at each level. At the psychic level expression of the emotional characteristic of an impression "consists in the doing of involuntary and perhaps even wholly unconscious bodily acts."^^ Psychical expression is uncon­ trollable. At the imaginative level, the emotional characteristic of an idea is expressed by bodily acts which are "experienced in our new self-consciousness as activities belonging to ourselves, and controlled in the same sense as the emotions they express. Bodily actions expres­ sing certain emotions, in so far as they come under our control and are conceived by us, in our awareness of controlling them, as our way of expressing these emotions, are language.

We have seen that, at the imaginative level of experience, language, as the consciously controlled bodily gestures which express emotion, is identified with art. These consciously controlled bodily gestures are not physical, i.e, they are not performed in any overt way, but are performed in imagination. Consciously controlled bodily gestures are not the physical activity of the artist as he lays on 135

paint - these actions are not the speech gestures of language. What

this means is that in the expression of art, there is no content dis­

tinct from form. That is, art as experienced by the artist is pure

imagination. As such, there can be no distinction of subject from ob­ ject. In like manner, there can be no distinction of content and form.

Since the work of art proper is an activity of the artist's consciousness, it must be considered in what relation the work of art proper stands to the audience and to the artifact. First, it is per­ tinent to distinguish from the work of art proper the work of art

"falsely so called." One such view of art, which Collingwood calls the technical theory of art, maintains that art is essentially craft.

This type of artistic activity is seen as a perversion of art because it entails the use of art for ulterior purposes and for the arousal of predetermined emotion says Collingwood. The craftsman produces things in order to arouse in his audience that emotion already attributed to the "type" or class of thing produced. This arousal is seen as passive in comparison to the experience of genuine art, which is active.

Arousal consists only in an increase in emotion. If the craftsman arouses emotion in his audience, and leaves them aroused with this emotion, his craft is called "magic." If the emotion is expended then his craft is called "amusement."

The activity of the artist which produces the artifact is neither means to an aesthetic experience, nor the reproduction of an already completed aesthetic experience or activity. It is, Collingwood says, an activity bound up in some way with the development of aesthetic experience, though the two activities are not identical. 136

There is no question of 'externalizing’ an Inward experience which Is complete In Itself and by Itself. There are two experiences, an Inward or Imaginative one called seeing and an outward or bodily one called painting, which In the painter's life are Inseparable, and form one single Indivisible experience, an experience which may be described as painting Imaginatively.

As the work of art proper Is a total Imaginative experience, the paint­ ing Itself Is not the work of art proper and the painting of It Is not

Identical with the artist's aesthetic experience. But, Collingwood says, "Its production Is somehow necessarily connected with the aesthetic activity, that Is, with the creation of the Imaginative experience which Is the work of art." This connection Collingwood explains In terms of the theory of Imagination and l anguage.^3

The aesthetic experience Is Imaginative experience generated by consciousness. This Imaginative experience presupposes a sensuous experience. Sensation, as soon as It comes Into being. Is transmuted

Into Imagination by consciousness. This sensuous element in aesthetic experience Is, Collingwood says, the "so-aalled outward element," e.g., "the artist's psycho-physical activity of painting." He explains;

Unless this sensuous experience were actually present, there would be nothing out of which consciousness could generate the aesthetic experience which Is 'externalized' or 'recorded' or 'expressed' by the painted picture.

Every element of this sensuous experience, as It comes Into being In the painter's consciousness Is "converted Into Imaginative experience at birth." That which Is externalized or recorded In the painting Is the artist's experience of looking at the subject and painting It ttogether. In terms of the audience this means that the painting pro­ duces "sensuous-emotional or psychical experiences which, when raised from Impressions to Ideas by the activity of the spectator's 137 consciousness, are transmuted into total imaginative experience identi­ cal with that of the painter. This experience of the spectator's does not repeat the comparatively poor experience of a person who merely looks at the subject; it repeats the richer and more highly organized experience of a person who has not only looked at it but has painted it as well."34

The imaginative experience which the audience has from looking at the painting is identical with that of the artist in painting it.

However, Collingwood says, there can never be any absolute assurance that these two experiences are identical. The audience, as under- stander, does not just undertake the task of reconstructing the artist's imaginative experience. This reconstruction can only be accomplished in part. For Collingwood, the relation of the artist to audience is not one of mere communication, but one of collaboration. That is, the artist expresses "the emotions which he shares with his audience" not just his own emotions. The artist is a spokesman for his audience,

"imposing upon himself the task of understanding his world, and thus enabling it to understand itself." Collingwood describes the relation­ ship of collaboration between artist and audience;

In this case his [the artist's] relation to his audience will no longer be a mere by-product of his aesthetic experience...; it will be an integral part of that experience itself. If what he is trying to do is to express emotions that are not his own merely, but his audience's as well, his success in doing this will be tested by his audience's reception of what he has to say. What he says will be something that his audience says through his mouth; and his satisfaction in having expressed what he feels will be at the same time, in so far as he communi­ cates this expression to them, their satisfaction in having expressed what they feel.35 138

The audience, then, does not hold a passive role in the artist's endeavor. Its function is, as Collingwood says, "to do it over again for themselves." The audience is always present to the artist in his making as an aesthetic factor by which he determines what pro­ blems to solve (what emotions to express) and by what forms such solutions may be constructed.^^

What should be most apparent from this brief description of

Collingwood's theory is the logical outcome of an Idealist bias or point of view in aesthetic theory. The work of art is imagination; it is never physical. Collingwood, as we have seen, suggests a necessary connection between the two, based on a notion that the sensuous or outward element of the artist's activity in painting provides the stuff from which consciousness generates imaginative experience. This relation between the artist's aesthetic experience and his painting of a work in no way alters the state of the painting: it is an arti­ fact, not a work of art.

Collingwood does not place emphasis on the artist's self- expression. He does not regard the artistic work as expressing, or venting, an overflow of emotion which in turn is thought to excite this emotion in the audience. Self-expresssion, for Collingwood, emphasizes the artist - "the person" - and leads to the false belief that what is presented in artistic work is the expression of this person rather than ourselves. Collingwood says that the emphasis on self expression: 139

... has set us off looking for ’the man Shakespeare’ in his poems, and trying to reconstruct his life and opinions from them, as if that were possible, or as if, were it possible, it would help us to appreciate his work. It has degraded criticism to the level of personal gossip, and confused art with exhibitionism.37

We have seen that Lowenfeld is concerned with self-expression

in artistic activity to the extent that it constitutes a record of

the artist’s (emotional) psychological state. The work of art is

thought to be the physical manifestation of what is going on "in the maker’s head" which is Lowenfeld’s concern; not the work of art itself.

The work of art for Collingwood is pure imagination; for Lowenfeld it is both a tool which serves to stimulate psychological states and a record of those states.

An outstanding factor in distinguishing Lowenfeld’s theory from expressive theory is the concept of imagination. Imagination, for

Lowenfeld, consists in the physical manifestation of the individual's play activity; here it is a case of pretending. In children this activity is in lesser relation to reality while in the adult it is thought to be controlled by reality. This distinction is based on that overt behavior of child and adult which can be said to be imagina­ tive. In terms of the child’s artistic work, the overt manifestation of imagination consists of intuitive images which the child concretizes in his work. The implication is that without an overt display of some behavior said to be imaginative, the degree of presence or absence of imagination cannot be assessed. Lowenfeld, however, assesses it as not present or not active in the life of the adult to the degree to which 140

the adult does not perform imaginatively. This is not to suggest

that Lowenfeld would claim that without physical manifestation of

imagination, imagination could not be said to exist. This is not

his purpose. It is only to say that without manifestation of

imagination in some overt manner, imaginative activity cannot be

assessed.

For Collingwood, in contrast with Lowenfeld, imagination is the

conscious level of experience at which the work of art is created.

Further, it is by art as an imaginative activity that emotions are

expressed. We have seen this to mean that, as regards the work of

art, there can be no distinction between form and content, between

subject and object. Imagination is essentially feeling, but feeling

"tamed or domesticated" by consciousness and not the brute feeling which is mere sensation (impression). All subsequent levels of

thought are based on this level of consciousness and deal with feeling as transformed into imagination (Idea). Imagination is not only the level of consciousness at which art is made, it is also in imagination

that emotion is expressed, itself resulting in the work of art.

Language, which is art, is "an imaginative activity whose function is to express emotion."38 in Collingwood's theory imagination is central to art.

That imagination plays a central role in aesthetic theories of expression is revealed in the history of these theories. I shall now turn to that history, relying on Bundy's research on the theory of 141

imagination in classical and medieval thought. Further discussion of

Collingwood and Lowenfeld will be in relation to this history.

Imagination in Plato's Theory of Divine Inspiration

In previous discussion of Plato's divisions of knowledge and

creativity, it was seen that Plato identifies four types of creative

activity; the two highest types were attributed to God and the two lower

types to man. The highest type of creative activity is that whereby

the universe is made by God from pure idea. There is no correspond­ ing acquisitive level for this creative activity. The second highest

type of creativity is that whereby God produces phantasms in man's dreams and visions. The corresponding acquisitive activity is noesis.

The third type of creativity and man's highest creative function is

that whereby the carpenter makes a bed according to the ideal "bed."

The corresponding acquisitive activity is dianoia. The lowest type of man's creative activity is the production of impressions of objects in the material world (imitation or image-making). The corresponding acquisitive activity is eikasia. (These types of creativity have been discussed in the chapter on humanistic art education.) The present discussion is concerned with the second highest creative activity whereby God produces phantasms in dreams and visions of man.

Bundy emphasizes that this creation of phantasies in divine inspiration "is an activity of God, not of man." He describes divine inspiration: 142

It results in the inspiration of poet and prophet. This fury of the inspired mad man - receiving these phantasms from God through a power of phantasy of his own - analogus to that dialectic which leads to the contemplation of Ideas: only in dialectic there is a striving to attain the idea, while in the operation of divine phantasy (God’s creative activity) man is a passive recipient of impressions from above.

Bundy also notes that the inspired poet, for Plato, is unable to express

these visions, i.e., "they profess an inability to give adequate

expression to their visions." The world of noesis, Bundy says, is,

for Plato, "beyond human imagination. God alone is capable of its

expression."

Bundy suggests that as Plato comes to recognize the role of phantasy he appears to move away from the world of ideas, the con­

templation of which formerly would have been the source of inspira­

tion or ecstacy. Plato recognizes that on the level just below intuition, mental functions require images in order to think of the abstract.

Here, the concept of phantasy is close to noesis. But man's capacities

for phantasy and imagination could not have been identical with this highest mental function; they are, Bundy says, only means to it.

He explains:

Human imagination was tied to the laws of matter; and no theory of human image-making could lead to a theory of intuition of immaterial ideas. In Plato's dualism there was a gulf between spirit and matter over which a faculty concerned with the latter could not easily pass; there was a point, ... beyond which human phantasy could not go. It could not of its own power result in intuition.

Keeping the above in mind, Bundy provides the assumptions from Plato about man's activity in inspiration and the assumptions about God upon which a doctrine of divine inspiration could be based. He states: 143

But inspiration implies, not so much an activity on the part of the individual, as a right condition of receptivity and a communication both of power and of vision by a higher Being. It does not even imply that the vision will be comprehended through our highest intellectual powers. The inspired man, from his point of view, is not necessarily the wisest. It is not essentially by means of the loftiest imagination that the vision is seen. ...In turn, a doctrine of divine inspir­ ation must start from the belief in a God who not only compre­ hends in his own person all objects worthy of contemplation, but has definitely ascribed to him a power and function through which these ideas, these worthy objects of vision, may be communicated to the favored being who is in fit condition to receive them.40

We have seen that in the theory of ethics from the Philebus,

Plato recognizes the importance of phantasy in moral conduct. In the

Timaeus, Plato adds to this theory by describing a power "like a mirror," located in the lower body of desires (specifically, in the liver), which functioned to reflect thought from the higher level and

thus, served to check evil phantasies resulting in immoral conduct.

This second type of phantasy, was capable of producing the ideal ob­

jects which the higher soul contemplated. But this second type of phantasy also functioned in divine inspiration, both in dreams and in waking states. The individual in the state of inspiration was not cap­ able of interpreting his visions by reason until he had regained his normal state. The interpretations of the vision, Plato says, are the work of the phantasmata, "an expositor of 'dark sayings and vision.

This creative activity of God - the placing of phantasms in the emotional and passionate part of man - result in the phantasies of the

"receiver." (Those who are fit to receive the ideas of the divine.)

This is a kind of imitation, Bundy says, and phantasike. "This object of vision is not the abstraction of discursive thought or even the 144

image of an idea; but the idea itself made intelligible through its perfect embodiment, its expression in sensible terms. It is a con­

crete, individual thing of beauty, an artistic product for the inner eye, a perfect object of vision." We have seen the bearing which this

type of phantasy has upon the regulation of moral conduct; it also surpasses the acquisitive level of dianoia as it does not make use of hypothetical images to attain truth. This means that phantasy

comes to realize the highest level of intelligence, noesis.

Bundy says :

So it is that Plato comes to regard this power of phantasy - once accused of being wholly un-ideal - as the very faculty which, rightly informed by light from above, results in vision higher than reason can attain. Reason can only inter­ pret that higher phantastic v i s i o n . 42

In the process of divine inspiration knowledge is the recollec­

tion of a previous state. Plato assumes that as a soul has taken human form it has already seen the truth. Knowledge, in this instance, is not the capacity for discursive thought, but the capacity for in­ sight. This capacity, Bundy says, "is something more than an ability

to keep before it an ideal of absolute Being. It is a question of how a soul, once having seen this reality, this ideal truth and beauty, can come to gaze upon it again. Vision is thus the result of what we may call a spiritualized me m o r y . "43

This power of insight constitutes a particular state of madness only attainable by the philosopher and poet and the highest type of soul; the madness of the lover. The philosopher, the lover, and the poet have the highest insight because they alone have the capacity to 145

remember the eternal beauty of the previous, ideal world. This memory is not of abstractions but of images of the beauty of the heavenly. "Their madness lies in their inability to perceive the reason for the connection between the earthly copy and the heavenly object of v i s i o n . "44 Bundy states:

Thus Plato crowns his theory of knowledge with a theory in which phantasy is recognized as the power by which the mind grasps truth made visible by the phantasy of G o d . 45

In Dante's theory of vision, which is also his theory of peotry,

Plato's views are made explicit, as a theory of imaginative symbolism.

Imagination in Dante's Theory of Vision

Bundy acknowledges the views of Thomas Aquinas as influential in

Dante's thought on imagination; Dante is, like Aquinas, an Aristo­ telian and adhers to the medieval tradition of Aristotelian psychology,

But in his concern with a theory of vision, Bundy finds his interests closer to those of Augustine, the Neoplatonists and the mystic. It is because of Dante's overriding interest in the theory of vision, with ideas deriving primarily from Plato combined with medieval

Aristotelianism, that Bundy describes his theory as the culmination of medieval thought in imagination.

Dante's complete theory is found in the Divine Comedy. Bundy sees a relation between the Divine Comedy and the Timaeus in terms of the question which had concerned Plato. Bundy poses this as:

"How does God make truth known to mortal man? The answer was that

God caused imaginative visions in dreams."46 Dante's theory of vision deals with an important distinction. Vision, which is 146

"light," comprehends a capacity for receiving or instigating the vision, and also a capacity for its expression. The expression of visions had never been a concern for the mystics, who held that "true vision was ineffable" and could not be made intelligible. Bundy says of the Divine Comedy that it is "perhaps the greatest conscious attempt in the history of art to express, to make intelligible, a vision."4?

The connection between 'vision' and 'light' stemmed from the

Neoplatonists, particularly Synesius, and also from Augustine, who,

Bundy suggests, is probably the major source for Dante's theory.

Augustine had elaborated the concept of the productive/combinatory imagination and had established a close relation between will and imagination.

Augustine had recognized the importance of phantasy and had, in

De Trinitate, described three kinds; the first he called visio which originated in sensation; the second, phantasy proper, was that which caused pictures in the mind; and the third was phantasy in the ser­ vice of reason. In De^ Genesi ad Litteram he considérés three kinds of vision: the corporeal, the spiritual and the intellectual. There is,

Bundy says, a correspondence between the three kinds of phantasy and the three kinds of vision. The 'vision of sense' corresponds to visio and the 'vision of imagination' to phantasy proper. The third kind of vision, the 'vision of the intellect,' does not correlate with any type of imagination as it is pure intellect. Bundy suggests that

Augustine's system of phantasy and vision is the psychological basis for the Divine Comedy. 147

Bundy makes a comparison between the three canticles of Dante's

poem with the three kinds of vision which Augustine considers in the

tractate on Genesis. He states:

The "Inferno" and the first eight cantos of "Purgatorio" are ... a series of corporeal visions; the remainder of the second canticle and a portion of the third record visions which Dante thinks of as 'spiritual', specifically the work of imagination; and the rest of "Paradiso" is a record, ... of intellectual vision, to which the lower kinds are only auxiliary, - visions in which one has direct insight into the nature of virtues and vices.48

In the first three canticles of the Divine Comedy, Dante, like his precursors, is concerned with the psychological conditions under which man receives visions of the spiritual and by what faculties.

He is also concerned to know by what process and faculties the mind acquires a capacity for higher vision. The problem of expression is always central to these concerns. Keeping the above in mind, Bundy summarizes the three canticles in terms of vision and imagination.

The visions of the "Inferno" are material images produced by the first type of imagination, visio, and effecting the emotions.

The effects of the simple imagination on the emotions, says Bundy, is to cause these visions to be "conducive to a higher morality."

The imagination here is under the control of reason, typified by Virgil.

The visions of the first eight cantos of the "Purgatorio" are also the product of the simple imagination. Bundy notes that at this point,

Dante's emotional reactions appear less intense than in the "Inferno," and that "the rational element seems to have increased: Dante is less often deeply effected, and Virgil is more often called upon for explanation."49 148

The ninth canto of the "Purgatorio" introduces the first of three

dreams in the poem. With this dream the type of vision changes.

These are not visual images, Bundy says, but symbols. "The imagination

is at work in a different way, constructing visual representations in

order to aid reason in attaining truth." The nature of these visions

becomes increasingly higher, produced by higher powers of imagination,

until they culminate in the vision of Beatrice. At this point Virgil

no longer acts as guide, - reason cannot enter paradise. Bundy states:

... the imagination no longer furnishes visions, either immediately derived from sensation or reconstructed to serve as symbols, for the sake of reason. Faith supercedes reason as guide; Beatrice takes the place of Virgil and we enter 'Paradiso'.

But the visions here, as they are less related to material things, are difficult to explain. Bundy continues:

... because words, the symbols of thought, suggest the material, the sensible, not the immaterial and spiritual. These visions are so ineffable that, finally, when the last canto is reached, where Dante would declare how he gazed upon the light eternal, he can only confess a lack of adequate powers of expression: before this light his phantasy failed.50

Expression is not a concern for Dante during the first two can­ ticles wherein he is primarily interested to describe the processes by which he develops the capacity for vision. But as the visions become more spiritual, he asks: "How can heavenly vision be made manifest?" And he questions the limitation of language to furnish symbols for spiritual ideas. This, coupled with his belief in an ideal universe - "a universe of which this phenomenal world is neither an imitation nor yet an unrealized form" - makes the problem so 149 overwhelming. Bundy describes Dante's artistic problem as "the result of the determination of a mystic to seek complete expression of immaterial visions." He explains:

Dante ... was too essentially a poet, a creator, to be content with a consciousness of his insight unrelated to the problems of artistic communication; like Plato, he modified his idealism to fit the facts, - the facts that the world of experience is real, does also exist, and that in this world are men and women to whom he must bring his ideas and his visions if they are to live.51

... he must express his vision in terms comprehensible to the human imagination.52

Dante comes to understand that "the spiritual reveals itself in the physical, ... the immaterial is made manifest In the form of sense

- through images, the work of the higher power of fantasy. In this theory of symbolism, ... revelation of the spiritual realities must be made in terms of sense through imagination." Dante also considers

"expression," i.e., art, as that by which the reader is able to imagine.

And, Bundy points out, there is a passage in which he asks the reader to "use his imagination as a means of comprehending a truth which is to be revealed." Here he expresses his vision by describing physical, symbolic images which the reader pictures in imagination. But this, at times, fails - though he may remember his vision, he lacks means to express it; he can find "no means of calling up in the mind of the reader an image similiar to his own."53 Bundy says:

Dante asserts that the language of imagination, as well as that of imitation, falls short of adequate expressiveness: he is distinctly conscious of the impiety of endeavoring through imagination to give shape and color to the highest spiritual realities. 150

With the fine inconsistency, however, of Platonism at Its best he clings to an art of allegorical representation through this very faculty.54

Imagination in Rhetoric and Poetic

We have seen that the association of phantasy with the emotions and appetites was the basis for its role in the theory of aesthetics.

This association was based on the reproductive function of imagination.

The tradition in aesthetics which grew from the account of phantasy as reproductive and associated with the emotions persisted until the

19th century. This tradition, established by the rhetoricians of the first century a.d., asserted a view that the orator and poet, stimu­ lated by objects which they phantasized as before their eyes, underwent emotional experiences based on these Images and communicated these experiences to the audience. In discussion of this tradition, Bundy refers to the writings of Quintilian, Longinus and Plutarch.

Bundy notes that though the term 'phantasia' was used in rhetoric and poetic and applied to literary problems, this did not result in an actual theory of phantasy. As both the rhetorical and poetic traditions were merging at this time, what was said of phantasy in one tradition had application in the other.

Quintilian in a passage, asks the question: "But how are we to generate these emotions in ourselves, since emotion is not in our own power?" His response points to a critical concept of phantasy which, Bundy says, is little known. Quintilian says:

There are certain experiences which the Greeks called phantasia, and the Romans visions, whereby things absent are presented to our imagination with such extreme vividness that they seem 151

actually to be before our very eyes. It is the man who is really sensitive to such impressions who will have the greatest power over the emotions. Some writers describe the possessor of this power of vivid imagination, whereby things, words and actions are presented in the most realistic manner, by the Greek word eyphantasiotos; and it is a power which all may readily acquire if they will. From such impressions arises that enargeia [vividness] which Cicero calls 'illumination' and 'actuality', which makes us seem not so much to narrate as to exhibit the actual scene, which our emotions will be no less actively stirred than if we were present at the actual o c c u r e n c e . ^5

Bundy points out that this conception of phantasy is based in empiri­

cal psychology and not in the Platonic tradition of inspiration.

Phantasy in the rhetorical tradition comes from sensation. It is,

Bundy says, "an ordinary power of reverie, put to practical use in

o r a t o r y . "56 Though phantasy and emotion are closely connected, this

relation does not have the moral implications of the descriptive psychologies.

Longinus, in discussion of the second of five sources of sub­

limity (vehement and inspired passion), affirms the tradition among

the rhetoricians. He says :

Images (phantasiai) moreover, contribute greatly, my young friend, to dignity, elevation, and power as a pleader. In this sense some call them mental representations. In a general way the name of image or imagination (phantasia) is applied to every idea of the mind, in whatever form it presents itself, which gives birth to speech. But at present day the word is predominantly used in cases where, carried away by enthusiasm and passion, you think you see what you describe, and you place it before the eyes of your hearers. 2. Further, you will be aware of the fact that an image has one purpose with the orators and another with the poets, and that the design of the poetical image is enthrallment, of the rhetorical - vivid description. Both, however, seek to stir the passions and the emotions.57

Longinus' distinction between the poetical and the rhetorical phan­

tasies indicates his preference for rhetoric. Phantasy and vividness 152 are associated but vividness refers only to the rhetorical. However,

Plutarch, also familiar with this tradition, associates vividness with the poetical phantasy. He says:

Neither, as one pleased to say, are poetical fancies, by reason of their lively expressions, rightly called waking dreams; but the dialogues of persons enamored, discovering with their absent loves, and dallying, embracing, and expostu­ lating with them as if they were present, much rather deserve this name. ... the imaginations of lovers, being as it were enamelled by fire, leave the images of things imprinted in the memory, moving, living, speaking, and remaining for a long time.58

Bundy notes that the common source of the ideas of these three writers is the reproductive phantasy and the association of phantasy and passion. It was this tradition, he says, of the "force and vivid­ ness of simple reproductive phantasies in poetry and oratory which was to develop into the commonplace of Renaissance thought... ." Of

Longinus, Bundy says that his notion that the term phantasy "may be applied to every idea of the mind, in whatever form it presents itself, which gives birth to speech" is indicative of a basis in Platonic philosophy.59

The description of phantasy from the rhetoricians is that of the simple reproductive capacity of the faculty rather than the creative capacity. There is no notion in these views of phantasy as divine inspiration. However, Bundy says that the description of phantasy from Quintilian, Longinus and Plutarch, and its importance in rhetoric and poetic, contributed toward the eventual recognition of phantasy as a creative function. 153

The rhetoricians provide a good example of speculative philosophy interpreted in light of practical concerns. Their concern was with education, dialectics, and this focused on the student's capacity for or power of expression and persuasion. As the reactions of the audience were of great import in rhetoric and poetic, concern was also directed toward analysis of the psychological effects of modes and styles of expression. This view is exemplary of what Collingwood calls "magic"

- art as craft in the technical theory of art. "Magic" was the name for the arousal of emotions by the artist which were not expended.

Craft, for Collingwood, involves the ability to bring about a pre­ conceived end or result. It is a "way of bringing human beings into certain desired conditions."^® For the rhetoricians this involved learning in what ways the audience reacted to certain styles of expression, and by what means such reactions could be effected or elicited.

It is also interesting that the educational methods of the rhetoricians served to popularize a description of imagination which, at the common sense level, still prevails. This is the idea that the artist "paints" images which are before his mind's eye, i.e., from imagination. This idea is present only vaguely in Lowenfeld, however,

For him, the existence of such images is significant only as they are depicted in the child's work. In one sense, this was also the concern of the rhetoricians who attempted not so much "to narrate as to exhibit" the scene before their mind's eye. 154

Plato's doctrine of divine inspiration presents a theory of knowledge which recognizes imagination as the means whereby man is able to realize truth presented by the phantasy of God. Through imagination man is able to connect with the divine. This gift of insight is given to those who have a capacity for seeing earthly beauty and whose lower nature is in a proper state of reception. The inspired poet is unable to express his visions - they are beyond human imagina­ tion because they are on the level of noesis, and only God can express them. However, these visions are present to the inspired through memory of the images of heavenly beauty. This insight results in a state of madness which is the madness of the lover.

With Dante, Plato's thought is made more explicit. Dante is concerned not only with the capacity to receive visions but also with the capacity of expression. The logical outcome of Dante's concerns is present in Collingwood's theory. That is, Dante is interested to express his visions in terms understandable to human imagination.

Art is that by which the audience is able to imagine. But though he is unable to express his vision, he remembers it. He is unable to find means of conjuring up an image in the imagination of the audience similiar to his own. The vision, then, is expressed in imagination.

The work of art exists in imagination where it was created. In another sense, as these visions of heavenly beauty are of the highest type, they are quite distinct from their physical expression. They are spiritual realities revealed in sensuous form through imagination. 155

Dante Is aware of the "impiety" of giving shape to these spiritual realities. Here, Collingwood is close to his theory. But, being immersed in artistic rather than philosophic problems, Dante wants to overcome the purely Idealist bias: he wants to make his visions manifest in the world.

Collingwood seems also aware of the artistic problem. He claims a necessary connection between the artist's aesthetic experience which exists in imagination and his physical activity in, e.g., painting.

And this connection is based on the sensuous component of experience which, when it comes into being is transformed by consciousness into imagination. But, I suggest, it is merely a technical explanation of this connection. More plausible is that the artist, as spokesman for the community, takes on the task of "saying for it the things it wants to say but cannot say unaided.Dante appears to understand the function of the audience in these terms, as Collingwood describes it: "... for their function as audience is not passively to accept his work, but to do it over again for themselves."

It is always difficult and perhaps unfair to make comparisons of thought across great stretches of time. That has not been my intention here, but rather, to provide historical background for an expressive theory in aesthetics in general, and Collingwood's theory specifically.

That Collingwood, as a scholar is familiar with both Plato and Dante does not necessarily mean that he has been influenced by their thought; to demonstrate this has not been my aim. His theory, however, does provide the culmination of this thought in contemporary philosophy. 156

The concerns of the rhetoricians are not the concerns of Plato and

Dante. And, probably, with their description of Imagination in rhetoric.

In contrast to the theory of imagination in divine and artistic inspir­ ation, Collingwood's distinction between "art proper" and "art, falsely so called," becomes clear.

Some of the factors constituting art education preceding the appearance Lowenfeld's text have been described. These were:

(1) a pervasive Idealist philosophy which conceived art as the revela­ tion of the divine; (2) the turn of psychological research to the study of the child and his art, leading to the child-centered school;

(3) the misinterpretation of Dewey's philosophy to mean that teachers should not Interfere with the natural creative activity of the child;

(4) the free self-expression emphasis of Cizek's Juvenile Art Class, which reinforced the "hands-off" approach to art teaching; and,

(5) the application of Freud's doctrines to child art in the interest of mental health and therapy. All of these were strong influences on the interests of art educators prior to Lowenfeld's text. Lowenfeld himself appears to hold the position that the child develops naturally and this development is represented in his artistic work as creative and mental growth. Creative growth is the integrator for other types of growth - emotional, social, aesthetic, physical, etc. Thus, his description of education is a description of the child's natural development.

Lowenfeld does not hold a theory of expression In any of the senses which have been examined here. He uses the word "express" 157

interchangeably with the words "translate" and "indicate," and, in

general, that is the meaning of "express" in Lowenfeld's thought.

It means that the child "says," "tells," "depicts," or "indicates" something in his artistic work. As child art is thought to be an analogue of the child's creative and mental growth, "express" used to mean "indicate" is appropriate. That is, growth is indicated, not expressed in the sense of "expressed" emotion. Lowenfeld does not use

"expression" to mean, for example, what the Romantics meant by it: the pouring forth of emotion, or the venting of emotion. Neither does he use the word to mean what it means in Collingwood's theory, nor does expression refer to divinely implanted visions.

Lowenfeld's description of imagination differs from the theories of imagination found in Plato and Collingwood in a major way. That is, from the Idealist point of view imagination is that which receives heavenly visions (for Plato) and expresses emotion (for Collingwood).

In neither case do the workings of imagination bear on the physical world. Plato's inspired poet cannot express his visions, though he remembers them; they remain in imagination. In like manner, for

Collingwood, the artist experiences the work of art in imagination and the work of art is not the painting existing in the physical world. Lowenfeld, in contrast, bases his description on physical manifestations of imagination (qua "pretending") seen either in overt human behavior or in the results of that behavior, i.e., the art work.

This view of imagination is consistent with his view of growth, in 158

general. That is, growth cannot be assumed to occur unless it is

indicated in some overt manner.

Summary

This chapter has presented two somewhat opposite views on imagina­

tion. For the Idealist's point of view, imagination represents, in

certain senses, a superordinate position in the theory of knowledge

or intellect. In Plato's doctrine of divine inspiration, imagination

is able to surpass reason and to function on the level of noesis.

It is through imagination that man comes to know ultimate truths

revealed through the phantasy of God. For Dante, imagination is bound

up not only in the problem of proper reception of visions but also

in the artistic problem of expression of these visions. From Colling­ wood comes the resolution of these problems in aesthetics; the work of

art proper exists in imagination and not in the physical world at all.

The rhetoricians provided a practical view of imagination as an

educational tool in the arts of expression and persuasion. Interest­

ingly, it is this description of imagination rather than the theories

examined here, which was popularized and prevailed until the early

19th century. This view is still prevalent, with certain modifications, in common sense thought.

For Lowenfeld, as we have seen, imagination is the physical manifestation of specific behavior, i.e., as in pretending, and specific imagery, i.e., of an intuitive nature, in child art. Imagin­ ation appears to have - relation to creativity in that the degree to 159

which imaginative behavior is present or is Indicated seems to be an

indicator of an individual’s creative activity. As we have seen,

Lowenfeld considers creative activity to wane once a critical aware­

ness of imaginative activity sets in. Imagination provides the child

with a world of make-believe which is not dependent upon reality;

whereas the mature individual, tied to the real world, must reject

these imaginations. With this subordination of imagination to reality,

the creative "instinct" which all persons are thought to possess, becomes weak and may disappear all together. For Collingwood, it never

can. Thus, though Lowenfeld's theory may be "expressive," it cannot be an Idealist philosophy of art education. 160

Footnotes

1. Frederick Logan, The Growth of Art in American Schools, (New York; Harper & Bros., 1955), p. 91.

2. Harry Beck Green, "The Introduction of Arts as a General Education Subject in American Schools," Ed. D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1948, p. 315.

3. Ibid., p. 320.

4. Ibid., pp. 353-356. Most of Green's report on Cizek is from a personal interview with him in Vienna in 1933.

5. Ibid., ÿp. 355-356.

6. Earl Barnes, ed., Studies in Education, (Philadelphia: Earl Bames, 1896-98, 2 vols.).

Herman T. Lukens, "A Study of Children's Drawings in the Early Years," Pedogogical Seminar, October, 1896.

M.V. O'Shea,"Children's Expression Through Drawing," Addresses and Proceedings of the National Education Association, 1894.

7. Rhoda Kellogg, What Children Scribble and Why, (San Francisco: N-P Publications, 1959).

8. Herbert Read, Education Through Art, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1943).

9. Rudolf Amheim, Art and Visual Perception: The Psychology of the Creative Eye, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954).

10. Victor Lowenfeld, Creative and Mental Growth, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1957). Third edition. Second revision. Originally published, 1947.

11. Ibid., p. 27.

12. Ibid., p. 23.

13. Ibid., p. 59.

14. Ibid., p. 259.

15. Ibid., p. 283.

16. Ibid., p. 261. 161

17. Ibid., p. 280.

18. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, (New York: Bames and Noble, Inc., 1949), p. 264.

19. Lowenfeld, Creative and Mental Growth, p. 282.

20. Donald Arnstine, "Art, Experience and Education - A Philosophical Inquiry," in The Encyclopedia of Education, (Crowell-Collier Education Corporation, 1971), p. 321.

21. Arthur Efland, "Conceptions of Teaching in Art Education," Art Education, Vol. 32, No. 4, (April, 1979) p. 22.

22. Ibid., p. 28.

23. Kate Silber, Pestalozzi: The Man and His Work, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960).

Gerald Lee Gutek, Pestalozzi and Education, (New York: Random House, 1968).

24. Elizabeth Peabody, "A Plea for Froebel's Kindergarten as the First Grade of Primary Art Education," Kindergarten and Child Culture Papers, Barnards American Journal of Education, 1980, p. 151.

25. R.G. Collingwood, The Principles of Art (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1938).

26. Ibid., p. 235.

27. Ibid., P* 275.

28. Ibid., P- 215.

29. Ibid., p. 235.

30. Ibid., P* 238.

31. Ibid., p. 229.

32. Ibid., P- 235.

33. Ibid., PP . 304-308.

34. Ibid., PP . 307-308.

35. Ibid., P- 312. 162

36. Ibid., p. 315.

37. Ibid., p. 316.

38. Ibid., p. 225.

39. Murray Wright Bundy, The Theory of Imagination in Classical and Medieval Thought, in University of IllinoisStudies in Language and Literature, Vol. 12, (May-August, 1927), No.s 2-3, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1927), p. 42.

40. Ibid. PP . 48-49.

41. Ibid. P- 52.

42. Ibid. P- 53.

43. Ibid. P- 55.

44. Ibid. P- 56.

45. Ibid. P- 58.

46. Ibid. p. 232.

47. Ibid. P- 228.

48. Ibid. PP . 233-234.

49. Ibid. p. 231.

50. Ibid. P- 232.

51. Ibid. p. 246.

52. Ibid. P- 50.

53. Ibid. P* 251.

54. Ibid. P- 254.

55. Ibid. P- 106.

56. Ibid. P- 107.

57. Ibid. P" 108.

58. Ibid. p. 109. 163

59. Ibid., p. 110.

60. Collingwood, The Principles of Art, p. 18.

61. Ibid., p. 312. CHAPTER IV

In this chapter, the theory of Imagination in Existential

Phenomenology is explicated. Existential Phenomenology is a recent philosophy in art education. This chapter presents the work of two

art educators who hold this philosophical position: Wellington (Duke)

Madenfort and Kenneth Beittel. My purpose in presenting the work of both authors is that though they share similiar philosophical concerns, these concerns have different applications; Madenfort is concerned with

teaching while Beittel is concerned with research. Discussion of both will provide not only an understanding of Existential Phenomenology in art education and research, but also an understanding of the theory of imagination in this philosophy for both teaching and research in art education.

I shall discuss Existential Phenomenologv in order to identify outstanding features which bind writers of this philosophy together.

The nature of Existential Phenomenology is such that it does not permit its writers the standarization of thought and method which characterize other, systematic philosophy. In keeping with this, more differences than similarities will be found between Madenfort and Beittel; though they share underlying concerns. However, my purpose here rather than to compare their work is to lay out major parts of their Existential

Phenomenological positions in order to explicate their theory of

164 165 imagination. Following a consideration of their work I shall discuss the theory of imagination in Jean-Paul Sartre's philosophy and method­ ology. I shall once again provide an historical background for the theory of imagination in Existential Phenomenology from the research of Murray Wright Bundy in classical and medieval thought.

Key concepts to be discussed in this chapter are "freedom" and

"rationalism." These concepts are pivotal to Existential Phenomenology and to the theory of imagination in that philosophy.

Early Existentialism came as a revolt to nineteenth cer.turv rationa].isn: (rational humanism) which stressed the univeise as a total system evolving toward increasingly higher goals. In this system the

"individual" could only be comprehended rationally. Existentialists claimed that the universe was not a predictable system, but unpredictable.

"Order," they said, was not a feature of the world but a concept imposed by the social world. The universe could not be grasped by the individual through generalizations and abstractions formulated by reason, nor could the individual be comprehended by reason alone.

Mary Warnock^ discusses interests and ancestry of Existentialism,

Human freedom, for example, is an interest which Existentialists have in common. About it she says:

They aim, above all, to show people that they are free, to open their eyes to something which has always been true but which, for one reason or another may not always have been recognized, namely that men are free to choose, not only what to do on a specific occasion, but what to value and how to live.^

The common ancestry of Existentialism she believes has two elements. One element is the ethical tradition which emphasizes man 166

"as the possessor of a will, man as a voluntary agent." The second element is the phenomenology of Husserl, which for Warnock also dis­ tinguishes non-philosophical Existentialism from philosophical Existen­ tialism. She explains:

The non-philosophical Existentialist will share the common inter­ ests of his philosphical cousin, but he will not share a method. This is not just a matter of what form he chooses to write in, but rather of whether or not he is attempting a systematic accound of man's connection with the world.

The method of Existential Phenomenology distinguishes Existentialism from other philosophies which also have been concerned with human freedom; it is also that which more than their common interests binds them "into a recognizable 'school' of philosophy." "...The methodology consists in a perfectly deliberate and intentional use of the concrete as a way of approaching the abstract, the particular as a way of approaching the general." This characteristic Warnock terms the

"concrete imagination." The "concrete" for the Existentialist, is associated with inwardness and 'truth-for-the-thinker.' The abstract is 'death-to-inwardness.'

Husserl's particular mode of Phenomenology came to be rejected by the Existentialists. This is apparent in the writings of Heidegger,

Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, all whom employ phenomenological method which differs from Husserl's and each of which is unique.

For the Phenomenologist consciousness is always consciousness of something, it is intentional. This notion originated with Brentano and was the basis of Husserl's Phenomenology. Intentionality refers to 167 the Internal existence of objects of consciousness; e.g., objects of belief are internal to the belief. Intentionality is a contrary position to one that holds objects of belief, emotion, sensation, to exist in the external world. One gains access to things in conscious­ ness (i.e. intentionally) by bracketing out the external world. It is an attempt by the Phenomenologist to turn away from what Husserl called the "natural attitude" - our common sense beliefs about the world - toward the object of consciousness itself. Husserl's aims are counter to those of some existentialists, because his phenomenological reduction was conceived as the basis for a rigorous scientific method for reveal­ ing general truths. Warnock points to the change from Husserlian reductionistic Phenomenology to Existential Phenomenology. Says

Warnock:

... his [Husserl's] beings are still in some sense looking out upon a world which it is possible to 'put in brackets.' ... The original statement of Brentano, that consciousness is always consciousness of something, has become an urgent demand that the world and its occupants should be treated together. The crucial change from phenomenology to existentialism comes at this point.

The method of hermeneutic Phenomenology which grows out of this change is, Warnock says, an "exercise in concrete imagination." "... When the meaning of the world of consciousness comes to be analysed, the method is to reveal meanings in the world which, the moment we understand them, we are supposed to recognize as the meanings which we had in fact assigned to the world all along.

The "method" of hermeneutic Phenomenology is, as Warnock says, a

Phenomenology in a kind of "loose" sense: Heidegger's mode of 168

describing the world will not be Sartre's mode. But this method is

Existential Phenomenology and it differs from Husserl's reductionistic

Phenomenology in that it is directed toward revealing "how things really

are if we think about them, and open our eyes to our true position in

the world."G For the Existential Phenomenologist, consciousness is

always in the world as well as of it.

The two elements of Existential Phenomenology which Warnock has identified, concern with human freedom, with its roots in the ethical

tradition of voluntarism, and the methodology of concrete imagination, will be the central topics for consideration in this chapter. I shall now turn to a brief discussion of Existential Phenomenology in general education as an introduction to that philosophy in art education.

Existential Phenomenology in General Education

Existentialism found its way into general education around the mid-

1950's. There the effort was to explore Existential tenets for their import to general education. The earliest source dealing with Existen­

tialism in general education appears in Modem Philosophies and Educa-

tion, the 54th yearbook for the National Society for the Study of

Education, published in 1955. In one chapter of this yearbook, Ralph

Harper discusses the significance of Existential philosophy for educa­

tion in an article entitled "The Significance of Existence and Recogni­

tion for Education." The philosophy's major import for education, according to Harper, is its emphasis on the individual's unfolding awareness of himself within his situation. This awareness enables the 169

Individual to realize his uniqueness and the ensuing challenge of his

existence. Harper sees as the aim of education, "making the Individual

aware of the meaning of homelessness, of belng-at-home, and of ways of

returning."? Education need stress the making of authentic choices

through understanding and knowledge of oneself. Harper sees the roles

of student and teacher as Interchangeable. The teacher maintains a

delicate balance between himself, the student and the subject matter,

and Is able to change his method or approach In response to the student.

An early major work to discuss Existential philosophy and education

Is Existentialism and Education, by George Kneller, 1958.® Although

Kneller appears critical of the usefulness of Existential philosophy as a source for the solution of educational problems, he stresses the value of the philosophy's emphasis on the Individual's responsibility for his own knowledge and on human personality and the emotional life of man. As well as to Identify similarities between the existential notion of "becoming" and the social reconstructlvlsts bent toward the

future, Kneller also draws relationships between Existentialism and

those positions In education which emphasize the student's attainment of his highest potential.

In 1966, Van Cleve Morris published Existentialism in Education.9

Like Harper and Kneller, he stresses the value of Existential philosophy

for the student's subjectivity and authenticity In the educational situation. His model for the existential teacher Is a socratlc one.

In the 1960's, scholarship In the field of Existential philosophy of education was combined with work on Phenomenology. Currently the 170

literature indicates a turn away from earlier views on the value of

Existential Philosphy for education. These writings explain Existential

and/or Phenomenological modes of analysis, as well as topics of educa­

tional concern analyzed by these modes, implying that definitions vary

from one educational situation to another, taking sense or meaning from

the context p r e s e n t e d .

Existential Phenomenology is a relatively recent movement in education on which we probably do not have sufficient distance to gauge its effects. In art education it is difficult to point to the origins of the Existential Phenomenological influence. Eugene Kaelin, a philosopher of Existential Phenomenology has had some impact on art education through his writings on aesthetic education in art education.

Kaelin has shared a professional comraderie with David Ecker, the outcome of which provided the field with comparisons, differeniations, and criticisms between Pragmatism and Existential Phenomenology as they bear on art education.

Recently, other art educators have indicated Existential Phenomenol­ ogical positions in their writings about art education. Merle Flannery and Elmer Day are two art educators holding Existential Phenomenological 13 beliefs about art and art education. Flannery indicates an interest in Phenomenology as a method of research in art education. Day is concerned with phenomenological method as a way of understanding the import of dream imagery and metaphor in the artistic process. In addition to these art educators, those who have studied with Beittel are 171 now providing the field with writings about art education based on

beliefs of Existential PhenomenologyThough these writings shed

much light on Existential Phenomenology in art education, in this chapter

I shall refer to two "early" Existential Phenomenologists in art educa­

tion. I shall first discuss the writing of Wellington Madenfort and

then the writing of Kenneth Beittel. In discussion of both these

art educators, it will be useful to keep Warnock's distinction between

the philosophical and the non-philosophical Existentialist in mind.

In Madenfort we shall see only an interest in Existential Phenomenology.

In Beittel's work we shall find a more systematic attempt to describe

man and his relation to the world.

Existential Phenomenology of Art Education

Wellington Madenfort indicates an early interest in Existential

Phenomenology more than other art educators. His dissertation, a

phenomenology of aesthetic experience, was written in 1965.^^

Madenfort acknowledges Lowenfeld as a major influence on his belief

that the "living body" has "significance not only for art expression,

but for the way in which we experience the world." In his article,

"Aesthetic Education, Sex, Armoring, and Death,Madenfort discusses his belief that visual perception is extended by and includes bodily

experience, as an idea initially stemming from Lowenfeld. However, for

Madenfort, Lowenfeld does not carry through this idea sufficiently and

8 0 he turns to Phenomenology, particularly that of Maurice Merleau-

Ponty. 172

Central to Madenfort's position is that aesthetic interaction with works of art carries over into our relations with ourselves, others and

the world. Aesthetic education is a humanizing process which points not only to qualities of the world but also to the meaning of shared-living and knowing one another "in immediate and sensuous fullness." Madenfort believes that what we l e a m from works of art is that we are free to create ways of communicating with one another aesthetically.

Madenfort stresses the importance of the coming together of the student and teacher in sensuous aesthetic immediacy; a bond which must exist for learning to occur for both.

When we come to know our experiences aesthetically, we come to know when education and learning are occurring and when they are not. We know that the open space of learning and education does not have any location. We know that learning only occurs when we do not view ourselves in relation to any place or limits. We are totally and sensuously with what we are viewing. We are open. We move openly and continuously, extending and spreading, changing and varying, in spite of any spatial or temporal limits or any limits w h a t e v e r . "18

In this same article, Madenfort describes the university situation as a system of deteriorating values and loss of integrity within which all are alienated and oppressed by its authority. In order to overcome this we must "feel free enough to learn, teach, and express ourselves aes thetically."19

Madenfort attempts to bring about this sense of freedom in the classroom situation by exploring the "immediately sensuous." Madenfort does not define or discuss the nature of the immediately sensuous.

However, one can glean a sense of the meaning of this concept so important 173

to his thought. It appears to refer to those perceived qualities of

things not hidden, but given. Because they are "given" they are

immediate.

Madenfort's writing takes the form of descriptions about experienc­ ing the immediately sensuous.. In the classroom, descriptions of the immediately sensuous may be more physical than verbal. The value of

these experiences supposedly is that they "convince us we once were and still are."^® Since the immediately sensuous is the subject matter of aesthetic education, Madenfort attempts to exemplify his own engagement in and experience of this. Such exemplifications take the form of

"unusual" physical activity, e.g., swimning in the air, acting out flying, etc. Students, he reports, become disturbed and uncomfortable.

Some leave the classroom. Eventually, both teacher and students come from the disturbing situation to its resolution, according to Madenfort.

His intention can, perhaps be better understood in terms of what David

Denton, an Existential philosopher of general education, has described as the "dissonance metaphor;"

... the creating of these existential spaces which produce dis­ sonance and then facilitate harmony and a conception of knowledge, namely, that knowledge is the harmony resulting from the resolu­ tion of dissonance between certain states of feeling and the intelliectual notions which might possibly be incoherence with those feelings. The metaphor also implies that the teacher is a very active, directive, even forceful person in the situation, on the one hand, creating various cognitive-emotive pressures in the existential space, while on the other, freeing that space, so that students might work out, act out, live out their own resolutions of dissonance.21

Elsewhere, Denton has described teaching as "a moment of human inter­ connectedness which can't be reduced to anything other than itself."22 1:74

Here, Denton sheds light on Madenfort's concerns about separate­

ness .

The theme of separateness recurs in Madenfort's writing. Practical­

ly, separateness of students and teacher is overcome in the classroom

through sensitivity training touch-conversation games, non-verbal

communication techniques, and sensory awareness activities. These

explorations of bodily feeling are also for the purpose of discovering

the role of the body in creative/artistic expression.

The significance of the awareness of bodily feelings is, for

Madenfort, a completion of visual experience; i.e., kinaesthetic and

tactile sensations are considered to be a part of visual experience.

He shares, with Merleau-Ponty, a concept of visual perception as bodily comprehension. Visual perception includes tactile sensation, signify­ ing our existence physically.

Madenfort, like Merleau-Ponty, believes that our understanding of perception arises from immersion in the world. Warnock provides a description of key concepts in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of percep­ tion which are useful here in understanding Madenfort's mode. The

first key concept is perception as the relation between consciousness and the world. It is the second key concept from Merleau-Ponty, which provides insight into Madenfort's thought. She describes this concept:

Secondly, there is the concept of 'transcending' the given ('dépassement'). Man is able to project his intentions and his interpretations on what is physically before him, and is not committed to any particular projection. He is able, up to a point, to construct his own world, and his perception of the world is, therefore, always ambiguous. It is not wholly 175-

physiological nor wholly psychological; his world itself may always turn out to be different from what it seemed. One can perceive only if there is something to perceive; but what one perceives is not identical with, nor limited to, what is there.23

Merleau-Ponty's concept of "transcending" provides a framework to con­ sider Madenfort's approach to aesthetic education, and his particular mode of phenomenology. For Madenfort, it is an impressionistic account of his experience of the immediately sensuous. As we have seen, this is also involved in our relations between ourselves and others and is the subject of aesthetic education. Thus, Madenfort links the experienc­ ing and the perceiving of emotion as one action which in time is linked to perception as understanding of meaning. But these all are based in and arise from sensuous immediacy. Perception is not "stark" for

Madenfort; i.e., "what one perceives is not identical with, nor limited to, what is there." This means that perception and, consequently, knowledge, can never be given "by the world." The world is not the source of perception. Only the individual can be the source of per­ ception. Because it is the individual who "constructs his own world," his perception of that world will be ambiguous.

Merleau-Ponty shows us that awareness of the relationship between world and body stems from a concern with man's pre-reflective conscious­ ness of the body. This relationship is forgotten in the natural attitude. That is, in the natural attitude man adheres to his common sense beliefs that the world is only inert and material, separate from humankind. For Merleau-Ponty, the world is living form and energy; it is vital and man shares in this vitality. In his thought there is 176 no distinction to be made between the external and the internal, between the perceiver and the thing perceived; the very point of

Madenfort's writings.

A strong emphasis in Madenfort's writing is that visual percep­ tion expresses our bodily mode of existence. He understands visual perception to include tactile sensations. It is by perception that we experience sensuous immediacy, or the "sensuous qualitites of the unity of our relationships with other people.It appears that Madenfort's conception of perception has a mulitude of meaning. That is, for him there seems to exist a kind of hierarchy of modes of perception, each of which subsumes other mental and/or physical acts. Because Madenfort is not systematic in his thought about perception but, rather, expres­ sive of what he believes to be perceptual experiences, it would not only be difficult, but also unfair, to make a definitive statement about what perception is for him. One thing that can be said however, is that perception is a superordinate mental and physical act, other such acts being subsumed under it generically. No important role for imagination will be found in this position. Madenfort acknowledges imagination in passing. But whatever it may mean to him, it will be subordinate to or subsumed under perception.

The problem arising from acclaim for one mental act over others is that it obscures the functions which other mental acts may perform.

The mental act which concerns us is imagination. Yet, it is suggested here that much of what Madenfort attributes to perception Involves 177 imagination; both are in certain ways continuous acts. Edward Casey, philosopher, explains that, in the aesthetic experience, there is a

"continuation at the imaginative level of what began at the level of perception." In this sort of experience "the imaginative extension of perception serves to enrich perception itself." This enhancement of perception occurs "through the active animation of the work's per­ ceptual qualities. Such animation builds on prior imaginings... ."

Casey says that the movement from the external to the Internal, from perception to imagination, is subtle, unnoticable and reversible. This is accounted for by the fact that perception is never completely replaced by imagination in the Case of aesthetic experience. Casey goes on to say:

Perception continues throughout aesthetic experience as a basso continuo onto which the melody line of imagination may be subtlely and non-irrevocably superimposed.25

Madenfort would probably not deny the enhancement of perception in aesthetic experience, but, I suggest, he would not account for this by imagination, but by a "higher" kind of perceptual activity, i.e., the body engaging in "a continuous on-going dialogue" with the work of art. For Madenfort, the work of art conveys sensuous meanings and these meanings are comprehended "bodily."

We shall see in discussion of Sartre the denial of any continuity between perception and imagination; but Sartre has important philoso­ phical reasons for this denial. Madenfort neither denies nor affirms a continuity of perception and imagination. In his non-philosophical 178

Existentialism, he simply seems not to have considered the metaphysical implications of his position on perception. We cannot go beyond his position here.

However, it can be said that Madenfort adheres to a belief that aesthetic experience is wholly perceptual in character. Since percep­ tion accounts for a wide expanse of experience for Madenfort, including love, friendship, teaching, learning, works art, being, and becoming, to name a few, and since that which is of interest in all these experi­ ences is the sensuous component, which itself, encompasses functions usually attributed to other realms, it is impossible to know precisely how he defines the term "perception."

It might be suggested that Madenfort, as a teacher, would want to have students exercise their imagination; but this effort will always be contingent upon the student's bodily comprehension of the aesthetic experience. Madenfort's own writings would be commonly described as

"imaginative." These writings are about his experiences with the immediately sensuous. For example:

Could we be looking at a painting and seeing space blueing? Is blue blinking and twinkling at us? Are we looking at the painting, or is the painting looking at us? Or is it pos­ sible that we are simply the painting, sensuously moving, extending and spreading, changing, and varying? Are we cerulean blue gliding wide, gliding widening blue cerulean wide?26

Edward Casey has described the kind of writing Madenfort engages in as "sensuous iraagining-how." This mode of imagining subsumes aspects of "imagining-that" because it Involves states-of-affairs. In

"imagining-how" what "we imagine how to do, think, feel, etc., is 179

usually presented in the form of a state of affairs." The important component in differentiating between "imagining-that" and "imagining-how," according to Casey, is a "sense of personal agency." Of this he says:

To imagine-how is to project not merely a state of affairs simpliciter, (i.e., one in which the imaginer is not a participant) but a state of affairs into which the imaginer has also projected himself (or a surrogate) as an active being who is experiencing how it is to do, feel, think, move, etc., in a certain m a n n e r . ^7

Imagining-how sensuously involves the experience of an "ongoing, internally developmental quality that is absent from cases of imagining- that."7® This quality is present in sensuous imagining-how as the imaginative experience is viewed from the position of a personal agent who forms part of the state of affairs.

From this discussion, it can be suggested that, for Casey, imagina­ tion would play a role in Madenfort's aesthetic education, both as a method to describe sensuous experience, and as a way of extending perceptual experiences by sensuous imagining-how. In this particular case, i.e., the example of Madenfort's writing, a person is these sensuous elements. Both involve the student in exercising imagination; the former in order to express his sensuous experiences; and the latter in order to enhance these experiences.

Madenfort does not make a systematic attempt to set forth the beliefs of Existential Phenomenology. His writing does indicate that he shares the beliefs and concerns of these philosophers. Both his emphasis on the freedom of the body and his particular mode of writing and teaching are, in the Existential mode, against the tenets of rationalism. His might be called "naive Existentialism"; it is like 180 the Existentialism of Albert Camus, Jean Genet, and, to some extent,

Sartre. "Naive Existentialism" (a term coined for present purposes) is based in the belief that the tenets of Existentialism are best exempli­ fied by art rather than philosophy. Sartre is said to have believed that his literary and dramatic works better described the concerns of

Existentialism than his systematic philosophical attempts. Madenfort, like these Existentialists, uses "art" to persuade others about the value of those experiences most important to him; experiences of the immediately sensuous.

Existential Phenomenology in Art Education Research

Kenneth Beittel is known in the field of art education for his earlier empirical research on creativity. Sometime after 1970, Beittel turned from this mode of research to one not well represented in art education; one based on anthropologic ethnography often called

"participation-observation." This mode of research is a kind of sociolo­ gical phenomenology which, as its common name suggests, requires that the researcher stand within the research situation as a part of it.

In his text. Alternatives for Art Education Research: Inquiry into the Making of Art,29 Beittel presents modes of participation-observation research. Modes of this type of investigation range from the "Presenta­ tional" through the "Interpretive," "Historical," and "Contextual," culminating in a shift away from research of one individual to research of the group.30 Other than the last, Beittel's modes are based on research situations involving an individual artist at work. 181

Research accounts. In the presentational mode, take the form of expressive literature and history about the artist's subjective per­ spective, but with minimal interpretation.31 The other modes provide accounts which are progressively more interpretive and based on histori­ cal and contextual perspectives which "connect the inferred and shared stream of consciousness of the working artist more closely with obser­ vable in-process events, series linkages, contextual impingements and the like."33

Beittel's research alternatives rest on two assumptions:

The first is that so-called mentalistic concepts are essential to the study of the making of art. ... The second assumption is that as researchers we must act as special participant observers if we are to gain access to the internal events and the guidance system at work in the unique expressive situation, and, ... we must reflect the latter within a serial and a contextual perspec­ tive. 33

These two assumptions arise from Beittel's belief that "mentalistic phenomena" involved in art making, are "priviledged," and in some ways are directly inaccessible or unsharable. The role of the participant observer, says Beittel, is toward "understanding and knowledge." This role lies within the larger role of research in the making of art which is, "to enhance and further the qualitative and human phenomena which are its concern." For Beittel the focus of research and the major concern of art education are the same: "knowledge of the uniqueness of the expressive situation, and of each history of expressive sit­ uations." The focus on knowledge of art also includes appreciation of art which Beittel describes as the knowledge of "the uniqueness of each relationship with art, in the existential s e n s e . "34 182

Knowledge is acquired through what Beittel terms the "Roshomon effect." Here, Beittel borrows from the Japanese film ("Roshomon") wherein the same events are related from several points of view. The purpose of the Roshomon effect is to invite the study of art making and art appreciation in a similar way as in the film - as unique life situations. Beittel explains:

Let the accounts of the unique proliferate, and let the view­ point of the person reporting define his own relation (unavoidable, though called 'contamination' in some behavioral studies) to the events he is trying to understand. 35

In the research situation, the Roshomon effect allows for perspec­ tives which have "theoretical and transubjective meaning" and which extend those unique and various situations which are aesthetic occasions.

The Roshomon effect allows for the extension of points of view of the expressive situation, "but it also indicates that all points of view miss the point of expression. The hope was that we would come to the inexhaustible, infinite notion of expression by converging on the presence of the expressive transaction itself, on its very I-Thou character which transcends viewpoints." This effort requires the

"indirect witness" of the artist, close to the artist's stream of con­ sciousness in the act of expression. The participant-observer does not merely gain rapport with the artist, "he responds to the very otherness 36 of the other, not only as artist, but as a thou confronting an I."

The Roshomon effect entails a degree of arbitariness concerning the selection of one feature for study over another in the research situation. According to Beittel, the expressive situation is concrete

(it involves concrete particularizing givens) and though it cannot be 183

known, It can be studied. His focus of study is the artistic series,

rather than a single expressive act, which allows a view "wherein" the

"form" of the series incorporates the individual processes or expres­

sive acts as their "content." Study of the artistic series provides

opportunity for speculations or intuitions about the expressive situation which are not generalizations. Of this method of research he says:

It does not, however, plunge me willy-nilly into the transcenden­ tal world of essences, as Husserlian phenomenology would have it. I skirt 'thin atomism' in the reductive, behavioristic, mechanistic, positivistic methods (to which the modes herein are alternatives), on the one side, and a 'fat gestaltism' or an excessively narrow phenomenology, Platonist in flavor, on the other.

Arid:

Whatever the reader thinks of my arbitrary focus on a given expressive act, he can hardly deny that I deal with its real structure as a historic event. The concern is with behavior: observed, shared, inferred, and experienced. It is a catholic and open perspective.3?

Here Beittel makes the characteristic Existential-Phenomenological rejection of reductionistic Phenomenology. This consists, as we have seen, in a rejection of the belief that there exists a world apart

from the individual, which can be bracketed out or away from man and examined by an ego which can only be transcendental. Further implied in what Beittel has said is the rejection of the notion that such examination of phenomena provides truth or signification of those phenomena. He says : "... full knowledge of any thing, by thought, is impossible." It is in living relation that the self and the other are intuitively grasped. Both the world and its occupants must be

considered together. Beittel advocates a hermeneutical Phenomenology 184 which, as a science of interpretation and explanation, is seen to reveal the signification of man in the world. What should be kept in mind is that significance is dependent upon the attitude of the inter­ preting or explaining consciousness. Here, participation "moves from negative psychology to love - as a transcendence of both self and other for 'full knowledge'."38

Within this Existential Phenomenological stance, Beittel identi­ fies the artist's series of works and their setting as constituting the most "valid sample" of expressive situations for study. This series of works is seen as the context of the artist. Beittel says of this context :

Therein the a^ hoc use of medium, the recurrence of themes and images, the inclusive plans and strategies by which he guides himself, the peculiar transformations of process feedback, the response to chance and accident, and the like are available for understanding and tentative description and interpretation.3’

Access to the expressive situation is also gained through

"stimulated process recall" which involves the artist reflecting on his own unique expressive situation. Access to the latter is essential to the "grasping of aesthetic p h e n o m e n a . "40 Beittel, by means of his research modes, attempts to connect both the internal and the external events of the expressive situation since both are part of the psychic nature of aesthetic experience. He sees this process as one of

"imaginative reconstruction in the subjective or stream of consciousness mode.That is, the researcher's efforts are directed toward rewriting available information - notes, taped transcripts, pictorial evidence, etc. - about the evolution of a work of art as though "the 185

artist were thinking to himself as he works." The researcher's role,

as special participant-observer, is to come close to the work of art

as psychic event. The degree of imaginative reconstruction is dependent

upon the mode utilized. Presentational modes of research, closer to

the artist's stream of consciousness, may take the form of literary,

impressionistic accounts. Historical-contextual modes, twice removed

from the artist's stream of consciousness, are more interpretive, less

impressionistic accounts.

Beittel's particular concern is the immersion of the participant-

observer in the ongoing artistic series, from within which inquiry is

conducted. He states:

By inclusion in the serial, art is a reality, for agency, meaning, intuition, imagination, and the 'otherness' of the expressive situation are all operative. The artist's relation to himself over time becomes a desirable yet mythic affair, for the researcher is enclosed within a history of projection and transcendence. ... He (the researcher) will not worry that he cannot know the dancer from the dance (as Yeats put it). He will study the dancer and the dance simultaneously, utilizing all the responsive, empathie, interhuman, phenomenological means available to him. The passional, the projections, and the transcendences must touch the inquirer too.42

The Theory of Imagination in Existential Phenomenology

A discussion of imagination relevant to Beittel's theory of

research must be based on the Roshomon effect. The Roshomon effect exemplifies the Existential Phenomenological view that each individual

is responsible for the meaning or signification of his situation in

the world. This responsibility arises from man's comprehension of himself as an existential being-for-itself and the freedom of choice 186 which, inevitably. Is his. I shall discuss this last idea presently

In respect to Imagination, relying on the writings of Sartre. Here,

In terms of Beittel's research methods, the comprehension of the Indi­ vidual as belng-for-ltself encompasses both artist and researcher In the research situation. There exists a shared existence which Is always essentially "other" but within which a relationship Is establi­ shed between the artist's "making of art and the knower's experience of that occasion."43 The nature of this relationship cannot be gen­ eralized for It Is unique. It Is always concrete, never abstract.

Imagination's role Is concrete also. It Is the means by which the participant-observer gains access to the expressive situation by

Imagining himself within It. It Is also by Imagination that the expressive situation Is reconstructed. And, to the degree to which

Imagination plays a role In the artist's construction of the artistic series. It Is also a focus for research. It Is studied In the expres­ sive situation. Because Imagination Is a subject of research and because the research effort Involves the use of Imagination to arrive at some understanding of Imagination (as well as other components of the expressive situation), there Is a paradox. But no more so than the concept of "participation-observation" Is paradoxical. This points to the heart of Beittel's research effort. He wants to describe the expressive event, the artistic series In order to gain knowledge of the uniqueness of each expressive event; yet he admits that this Is essentially unknowable. He modifies this paradox somewhat by saying that though the expressive event cannot be known. It can be studied. 187

Beittel is not interested to resolve the paradox, however, but to play

upon it. Thus, the Roshomon effect provides for a conglomerate of

parts all pertaining to the expressive event, all adding to the descrip­

tion of that event, but never determining the event itself. To recon­

struct the expressive situation imaginatively means that the "reporter" must account for certain experience which, though we know it to exist,

can never be described strictly in behavioristic terms; for example,

of freedom or love. For Beittel, these experiences, though they may be

elusive, are importantly figured in the research situation. He is able

to account for them by imaginative reconstruction.

Here, we must refer again to Warnock's distinction of Existential

Phenomenology from other philosophies which have shared its common interests. This distinction is one of methodology which consists in

"a perfectly deliberate and intentional use of the concrete as a way of approaching the abstract, the particular as a way of approaching the

general." This methodological characteristic of Existential Phenomen­ ology is concrete imagination. By concrete imagination the world is described in such a way that its meanings emerge. In this effort, the

Existentialist cannot "describe the world as a whole. He must take examples in as much detail as he can, and from these examples his intuition of significance will become clear." The Existential Pheno­ menologist then attempts to expose significance through concrete

Imagination. The nature of revealed significance is its presence in

the world; its concreteness. Says Warnock: 188

The more minutely, therefore, and the more accurately the visible and tangible properties of things are des­ cribed, the more possible it will be to see what they mean, and in what way they 'reveal b e i n g ' . 44

The present task is to provide an account of concrete imagination in Existential Phenomenology in order that we may understand its implications for the art education theories of imagination discussed here. To do this I shall discuss Jean-Paul Sartre's use of the con­ crete imagination as well as his theory of imagination. What Sarte will have to say of imagination will not be found in all Existential

Phenomenological theories of imagination. But I shall adhere to

Warnock's assertion that the characteristic of concrete imagination as method distinguishes this philosophy from others, binding certain authors together as a group. It is not a particular style of writing or phenomenological description which exemplifies concrete imagination.

It is the utilization of concrete imagination to describe the world in such a way that its meanings emerge. Beittel, we have seen, directs his research endeavor toward this end and his methods of participation- observation are so designed. I shall now turn to a discussion of Sartre's use of concrete imagination.

The Theory of Imagination from Sartre

Sartre's theory of imagination provides a radical contrast to traditional theory.45 He criticized earlier thought on imagination as being overly concerned with the nature of the mental image, both in perception and in abstract thought. Sartre viewed these attempts to 189

Isolate the mental image as the distinguishing feature of imagination,

as substantiating underlying beliefs that these images were things

existing in the mind. Sartre claims that there are no images in

consciousness. Rather, the image is a type of consciousness; an act, not a thing. The image is a "being-conscious-of-something." Sartre's

insistence that the image is a kind of consciousness and not a thing in consciousness derives from the Phenomenology of Brentano and Husserl.

In this view, to imagine something is to be conscious of something in

a certain way. Because consciousness is always of something, it is intentional. Thus, imagination, as consciousness, is also an inten­

tional act.

Consciousness, for Sartre, is the individual's separateness from the world. That is, the individual must be separate from the world con­ sciously in order to be aware of himself and of the world. Following this is the realization that one may consider the world from the point of view of how it might be otherwise. This realization has implications for an individual's freedom of choice. Warnock states:

For consciousness simply consists in the possibility of seeing that there are choices to be made, and in seeing that things need not be, or need not be described, as they actually are.4&

The distance of consciousness which is the separateness of the individual from the world is a nothingness.47 Nothingness is a part of the indivi­ dual and it is appalling. To realize oneself as nothing is to also realize that one cannot become a concrete something in the way that things having a causal existence are something; e.g., in the way that my inkpen is an inkpen, or my table, a table. Noethingness, which is 190 part of the nature of consciousness, can be denied by man, through what

Sartre calls "bad faith."^8 This is the pretension that one is not what one is but something other. It is the denial of one's being. It is to pretend that one is a creature of necessity, without freedom of choice.

Bad faith can only be a characteristic of the behavior of beings with consciousness, for bad faith is a denial of consciousness. It is to be non-conscious; to not see that the world may be described other than as it appears; to not see that there are choices to be made. Conscious­ ness, because it is separate from the world, may see the world as it is and as it might be. "This distance from the world produces not only human freedom but also the power of imagination which essentially con­ sists in representing things as they might be, but are not."^9

According to Sartre, there are two types of imaginative awareness.

One type is that by which we may imagine something non-existent or absent. The other is that in which we imagine what is perceived to be or mean something other than itself. Of the first type, Sartre says that the object of this imaginative awareness, at the moment it exists, is posited as nothing - positing what is not. This image, which Sartre calls an analogue, is both the object and the not object for which it stands.

With the second type of imaginative awareness, the perceptual object is seen as itself (an analogue); i.e., as having no reference beyond itself. It is this second type of imaginative awareness which concerns us here and which Warnock has called the concrete imagination. 191

Warnock points out that Sartre's method of argument is the anec­

dote. This is not a device for exemplifying argument but is, she says,

an actual step in the argument without which we cannot follow his thought.

His concrete descriptions are envisioned and interpreted by the reader under his direction. Perceived things in the world cannot be grasped

as having emotional significance unless they can be seen in this way.

Warnock states: "One can see them so only if they are described in exact

and concrete detail through the eyes of one who already sees this signi­

ficance in them.”50

Sartre's use of the concrete imagination by way of anecdotes indi­

cates to the reader the nature of imagination itself. His procedure is

to describe natural, everyday objects of experience as if they had meaning beyond themselves. Things take on a strange or foreboding character. They are threatening. This concern with things is intended to illustrate the absurdity of existence. By imagination we come to see something, an object in the world, as having meaning, as something other than itself. Sartre's wel'-known passage in the novel Nausea, wherein Roquentin contemplates chestnut roots, exemplifies this. In the passage, Roquentin suddenly comes to see these roots as a kind of viscous sprawling blackness which is ambiguous and can no longer be described or explained as the common thing that it was. He sees in its existence a disgusting presence which overcomes his sensory bounds and reveals the structure of the world. He says:

So, I was in the park just now. The roots of the chestnut tree were sunk in the ground, just under my bench. I couldn't remember it was a root anymore. The words had vanished and with them, the 192

significance of things, their methods of use, and the feeble points of reference which men have traced on their surface. I was sitting, stooping forward, head bowed, alone In front of this black, knotty mess, entirely beastly, which frightened me.51

The chestnut roots, for Roquentin and through him for the reader,

reveal meaning beyond themselves. From this meaning the Individual

gleans his relation to the world. Warnock says: "If one sees the

world Imaginatively as significant, then one can see that It has the

characteristics which he believes that It must have." Imagination,

for Sartre, Is "the faculty of freely taking one object as an analogue

of another, of regarding an object as showing the way beyond Itself...."

(Her emphasis.)52 For Sartre, then, concrete Imagination functions

to reveal significance in the world.

The above discusses concrete Imagination as the method of Existential

Phenomenology. Aspects of the nature of Imagination In Sartre's theory must also be discussed If we are to draw closer to an understanding

of Its meaning. Many of Sartre's claims about the role of Imagination

are controversial because they deny traditional assumptions about the

role of Imagination. One of these Is imagination's relation to per­

ception. From the above discussion of concrete Imagination It would

appear that Imagination does stand In some relation to perception as

It reveals the hidden meanings of things perceived. For Sartre,

Imagination Is opposed to perception. On this he Is adamant.53 What

Is of Interest here Is that Sartre does not contribute to an under­

standing of the "concise" nature of Imagination by denying these

traditionally attributed roles. But through this denial, he does 193 attempt to construct the significance of imagination for man's existence.

In the Psychology of Imagination, Sartre asks what essentially it is that a consciousness must have in order to imagine. He answers,

"it roust have the possibility of positing an hypothesis of unreality."

This means that consciousness as intentional, must be able to posit a nothingness in relation to reality. Imaginary objects embody degrees of negation, posited as "non-existent, or as absent, or as existing elsewhere or not posited as existing." The unreal object posited by consciousness conveys a sense of being beyond reality. Sartre goes on to say;

To posit an image is to construct an object on the fringe of the whole of reality, which means therefore to hold the real at a distance, to free oneself from it, in a word, to deny it. Or in other words, to deny that an object belongs to the real is to deny the real in positing the object; the two negations are complementary, the former being the condition for the l a t t e r . 54

Consciousness, to imagine, must be only to posit the world as a

"synthetic situation" from which the image is beyond reach; to "posit the world as a nothingness in relation to the i m a g e . "55 if conscious­ ness were not separate from the world but "in-the-midst-of-the-world" then it could not posit the world as a nothingness. Such a conscious­ ness would "contain only real modifications aroused by real actions and all imagination would be prohibited to it, exactly in the degree to which it would be engulfed in the real." Here Sartre is objecting to the tenets of psychological determinism; the notion of conscious­ ness as a series of determined psychical facts. For Sartre, 194 consciousness is able to imagine because it can "escape from the world," it is able "by its own efforts to withdraw from the world." In order to imagine, consciousness must be free. He states:

It is therefore enough to be able to posit reality as a synthetic whole in order to posit oneself as free from it and this going- beyond is freedom itself since it could not happen if conscious­ ness were not free.56

And:

Thus, if consciousness is free, the noematic correlative of its freedom should be the world which carries in Itself its pos­ sibility of negation, at each moment and from each point of view, by means of an image, even while the image must as yet be constructed by a particular intention of consciousness.51

The escape of consciousness from the world, its freedom, is grounded in its being-in-the-world, which becomes the condition for imagina­ tion. Sartre summarizes the conditions for consciousness to imagine:

... in order to imagine, consciousness must be free from all specific reality and this freedom must be able to define itself by a 'being-in-the-world' which is at once the constitution and the negation of the world; the concrete situation of the con­ sciousness in the world must at each moment serve as the singular

motivation for the constitution of the u n r e a l . 58

Sartre concludes from this that imagination is "the whole of con­ sciousness as it realizes its freedom; every concrete and real situa­ tion of consciousness in the world is big with imagination in as much as it always presents itself as a withdrawing from the real."^^

Herein lies the significance of imagination for man's existence; it is the "necessary condition for the freedom of the empirical man in the midst of the world."80 And, conversely, because man is free he can imagine. Were consciousness not able to imagine, man would be overcome by the real, the existant and he would not be able to grasp 195 more than this existant. By imagination, man grasps the meaning of the real, he makes this meaning explicit, but in doing so he

"collapses the world," "which is then no more than the negated foundation of the unreal." Negation itself can only be realized by an act of imagination. "That which is denied must be imagined.

It is apparent from Sartre's writing on imagination that he wants to deny that it has an empirical function. He is interested to give imagination dignity as an essential part of consciousness and as a function of mind. In keeping with this interest, he represents imagination as a certain type of consciousness distinct from other types, e.g., perception, memory and anticipation. It is not attached to or dependent upon or subordinate to these other functions. His reasons for this are clear. If imagination is the necessary condition for man's freedom then, for Sartre, it must be entirely free itself.

It must not be able to be accounted for in terms of causal explanation.

Imagination springs up of its own accord; it is not caused; it is not determined.

In Sartre we find not only the use of concrete imagination to reveal the truth of possible being, we have in his theory of imagination the necessary condition for human freedom. This freedom, or "freedom of the will," we have seen, is that common interest which binds together all Existentialists as well as their unique methodology.

Because problems of human freedom or freedom of will have been a topic of other thinkers I shall now turn to one of these, Augustine, whose particular concern was with the connection of the will to 196 imagination.62 My purpose here is to provide historical background for the relationship between imagination and will for Existential-

Phenomenological thought. This background can then be brought to bear on a further discussion of the theory of imagination in Existential

Phenomenology in art education. For this discussion, I shall turn to the work of Murray Wright Bundy on the theory of imagination. I shall refer to Bundy's writings on Maimonides, as well as on Augustine.

It should be noted that though the roots of Existentialism have been located in Socrates, Tertullian, Augustine, Thomas Aquines and others, what is of greater concern here is the roots of the connection of imagination and will. Such a connection is found in Augustine but not, for example, in Thomas Aquinas, though both have been called precursors to Existentialism. For this reason, I shall discuss

Augustine's writings here. Maimonides is important to discuss because his argument against the Mohammedan thinkers on imagination is classic and will bring us to some vital distinctions effecting the theory of imagination.

Imagination and Will; Augustine

Augustine's views are based in both Neoplatonism and Christian theology. Discussion of Augustine's views on imagination begins with his response to the question of his friend, Nebridius, who asks in a letter: "'Why, 1 should like to know, do we not affirm that the phantasy derives all its images from itself, rather than say that it receives these from the senses.'"63 Augustine responds to this 197

question by Insisting that the mind can have no Imagination unless

Informed by s e n s e . Augustine, Bundy says, wants to parallel a

3-fold division in man with God’s Trinity. For Augustine there are

actually two 3-fold trinities of man: a trinity of the outward man,

and a trinity of the inner man. The trinity of the outward man Is

"composed of the thing visible, the act of vision (vlslo) and a desire

for vision, an Impulse which brings object and thinking subject together

and results in an impression or bodily form" The external object and

the internal form are distinguishable and this distinction, Bundy says,

is essential to Augustine: "... it is only by an act of attention or

of will that the two become one, that what the eye sees becomes the

internal impression." The act of vision, vlslo. Is the simple

Impression, a memory Image, which Augustine refuses to call phantasy.

In his second trinity of the inner man, this memory image provides

the mind with the materials for the powers of the internal trinity.

Here, mind is able to retain these images without the presence of the

external object. Again, by an act of will the memroy Image Is united with the "thinking subject." "The result Is internal vision, phantasy,

or Imagination." Augustine's distinction here Is between the simple

memory Image, vlslo, and the reproductive imagination. Both had been

recognized previously by Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, but both had

been called phantasla. Augustine's distinction between them, Bundy

says, allowed for phantasy a higher function because It Is not

associated with the vlslo of the lower realm of sense. 198

Augustine Insists on the power of the will in both the outward and inner man to confuse our simple impressions with physical states and the memory image itself with phantasies deriving from them. His importance, Bundy says, "Lies in his assertion that these errors of imagination are acts of will."&6 Augustine's distinctions between the external and how the mind operates on it, and his emphasis upon freedom of will result in a view of imagination which includes more than just its reproductive capacities; "a power of conception as tran­ scending memory is the distinctive mark of imagination."67 And this occurs only by freedom of will. Bundy quotes Augustine:

I remember, no doubt, but one sun, because according to the fact, I have seen but one: but if I please, I conceive of two, or three... . I remember it just as large as I saw it...

yet I conceive of it greater or as less according to my w i l l . 6 8

The imagination then is never the simple impression but an inter­ nal vision which is not of sensation. Bundy states:

What Augustine accomplished was to give a new emphasis to the freedom of the imagination to make its own synthesis of sense- experience, to connect this with the freedom of the will, to make the creation of phantasies distinctly an affair of the 'inner eye.' ... Man is no victim of his impressions: a power of will enables him to be master of them, to transform them into phantasies conducive to right conduct, or into phantasms leading to his damnation.69

Here Bundy points to Augustine's Neoplatonic bent toward psychological analysis and, with this, his concern, as a Christian, to make moral judgements. This combination, Bundy says, causes Augustine at one moment to describe and differentiate mental powers in an analytical and scientific manner, and at another moment to deny the reality of the very phenomena he had described. Of these two impulses, the 199 empirical and the mystical, the latter was more dominant and effects

Augustine’s theory of vision. The third type of vision which is intellectual, does not correspond to phantasy in the service of reason, however, but transcends phantasy altogether. This vision surpasses all types of imagination. Intellectual vision is a capacity of reason which "occurs where no imaginary likenesses are i n v o l v e d . Certain concepts, for example love, are comprehended by insight, i.e., con­ ceived by the intellect. Imagination, for Augustine, is a means to insight but it is not insight itself. Imagination must be under the control of the rational in order that truth be recognized. In prophecy, Bundy says, imagination is essential but un-ideal. However,

Augustine's view of its workings in prophecy is as an evolutionary process. Bundy states:

... the body hands over its visions to spirit or imagination, in turn, if under the proper guidance of reason, ministers to the intellect, which is over it.71

Spiritual vision is able to attain some degree of truth, however, and this capacity for Augustine is imagination. Bundy describes this vision:

... there is a vision of the highest sort in which God is seen, not in terms of carnal sense, or, again, in spirit, in the assumed likeness of body, but in his own nature, as the rational and intellectual part of man is able to conceive of him, divorced from all bodily sense, and, in turn, from all puzzling spiritual significance.^^

The important connection which Augustine makes between will and imagination is ultimately overcome by the mystical impulse which assumes the supremacy of reason over all mental and physical powers.

Augustine understood imagination by virtue of the freedom of will 200 as a combinatory power which, in a sense, was not tied to either memory or sensation. It had the power to transform "fact." Desire, or will, for Augustine was the power to realize what was imagined.

We find in Augustine's connection of will and imagination the beginnings of a thought which culminates in Sartre. This is essen­ tially the notion that man possesses freedom, freedom of will, the evidence for which lies in his capacity to imagine. But also, it is the capacity to imagine which is the condition for man's freedom.

Though Augustine may have laid some of the foundations for this notion, he could never have attained it. For him imagination had the power to disturb the freedom of the will, but also by the power of the will to make the phantasy true.

The Concept of Imagination from Maimonides

Maimonides (Moses ben Maimon) like Aquinas whom he influenced, displays a synthesis of Aristotlelian psychology and Christian theo­ logy; traditions of the empirical and the mystical. For Maimonides there exists a basic contrast between imagination and intellect.

This contrast is once again explained in terms of a tri-level hierarchy indicated by the Hebrew term 'temunah' which has three meanings:

"outlines of objects perceived by the senses; the forms of our imagin­ ations, i.e., the impressions retained in imagination when the objects have ceased to affect the senses; and third, the true form of an object, perceived only by the intellect." In its last sense, the term can be applied to God.?^ 201

Adam’s sin, says Maimonides, was to give way to the desires having their source in imagination, rather than to retain his power of intellect by which he could distinguish right and wrong. For

Maimonides, intellect, not imagination, is the power by which man is man. For him, the two faculties are at odds. "The Intellect analyzes, divides, forms abstract ideas, generalizes, and distin­ guishes the properties of genius." Imagination has none of these capacities. It can conjure up phantasms having no actual correspon­ dence to things in the material world. At the same time, it cannot produce a purely immaterial image of an object. It does not, he says, provide any test for the reality of an object. Because it is a defective faculty, Bundy says, the word "imagination" is never used in speaking of God, but rather the words "thought" and

"reason."74

Maimonides applies the contrast between intellect and imagination to the relation between appearance and reality, the Mohammedan view prevalent at that time and against which he argued. Bundy summarizes his thought:

... these thinkers, he says, are often guided by Imagination rather than intellect. They observe that everything conceived by imagination is admitted by the intellect as possible, e.g., that the terrestrial globe should become an all-encompassing sphere, or that a man might have the height of a mountain, might have several heads and the like. ’The philosophers,' says Maimonides, 'object to this method and say, you call a thing impossible because it cannot be imagined; and thus you consider as possible that which is found.possible by imagination, not by intellect.' 'They describe as possible that which can be imagined, whether the reality correspond to it or not, and as impossible that which cannot be imagined. 202

Maimonides here objects to the Mohammedan notion that our capacity to comprehend something in imagination, to grasp it, constitutes a criterion of its reality. For him, there can be no connection between this thought and the concept of God. He insists that some things impossible in imagination are real, "e.g., the earth as a globe upside down." Imagination, he says, can perceive only pro­ perties of things, and for this reason it cannot imagine some things which are real for it cannot perceive these things.

This argument is pertinent here. Maimonides has a more con­ structive view of imagination in prophectic vision. But in this capacity imagination is still subordinated to intellect which needs to be in proper relation to it to bring about proper vision.

Maimondes' argument against the Mohammedan thinkers is typical of the

Aristotelian tradition in medieval faculty psychology. Though a close comparison is not useful here, he argues against the Existen­ tial position that neither man nor the world can be known truly in rational terms. We have seen, that for Sartre the power to imagine is not only man's freedom, it is through imagination that conscious­ ness which is always "in-the-world" transcends that world, and in so doing collapses it. Through imagination, not the rational, man may comprehend the truth of possible being. What the Existential position brings to the theory of imagination is in clear contrast with the view that man comprehends reality and knows truth through his rational faculties. 203

This contrast William Barrett discusses as a contrast between

the ’’vital" and the "rational;" problems of existentialism and essen-

tialism which he sees as pervasive throughout the history of philosophy.

Barrett first explains this contrast of the vital and the rational

in terms of the Greek and Hebraic traditions; a constrast between the

Greek concern for knowledge and the Hebraic concern with practice.

Hebrews did not reflect critically or philosophically upon the gods

as the Greeks did. The Hebrew confronts his god not by reason, but

by his whole existence, as a whole man.Barrett states:

Hebraism does not raise its eyes to the universal and abstract; its vision is always of the concrete, particular, individual man. The Greeks, on the other hand, were the first thinkers in history; they discovered the universal, the abstract and timeless essences, forms, and Ideas. The intoxication of this discovery (which marked nothing less than the earliest emergence and differentiation of the rational function) led Plato to hold that man lives only insofar as he lives in the eternal.

Hebraic knowledge was not intellectual, as it was for the

Greeks’. It was not, says Barrett, knowledge gained from reason, but knowledge gained from living. A knowledge of which, perhaps, we

are not even able to speak. Knowledge for the Hebrews came "through body and blood, bones and bowels, through trust and anger and con­

fusion and love and fear; through his passionate adhesion in faith 78 to the Being whom he can never intellectually know,"

It is these characteristics of Hebraic men which Barrett says

Existentialism has attempted to revive in contemporary consciousness.

To follow Barrett's story from the Hebrews and the Greeks is beyond

the scope of this paper. But what he says is that in his emphasis on 204

the rational, man has sacrificed (lost) the meaning of life, for this

is always to be found more in faith than in reason; in the vital

rather than in the rational.

It may be through the concept of the vital that we can better

understand the direction of Existential Phenomenology in art educa­

tion. It is apparent that for Madenfort and Beittel knowledge, or

rather, the concept of knowledge, must be expanded to include that which is essentially personal. What form knowledge may take, or what knowledge is of, is necessarily in question here. Madenfort, as non-philosophical, to borrow Warnock's distinction, is not suf­ ficiently systematic in his thought to describe knowledge in art education. However, from him we do have a sense of importance of the individual in determining what knowledge is of. For Madenfort, knowledge as it is of the immediately sensuous is that by which we come to live life in all its aesthetic dimensions. Clearly, Madenfort's concern is with the vital. Thus his discussions of the student- teacher relationship, sexuality, and death can be seen as an effort to vitalize aesthetic education; it moves from it's strict ration­ alization. He consistently brings the reader away from the "natural attitude" to focus upon the world as we can imagine it, sensuously.

Beittel, we have seen, is explicit in his rejection of research based on models "from the social sciences where empiricism wedded with logical positivism and public verifications" are the norm.^^

These modes, he believes, necessarily ignore the experiential base of the expressive situation. For Beittel, the experiential base of 205 knowledge centers on the concrete; upon the artist in expressive situations. Knowledge, in the research situation, is about both the artist and the researcher. Such knowledge can only come through

"anger and trust and fear and confusion and love," in a word, from living the expressive situation. For Beittel, this is the relation­ ship between artist and researcher. Knowledge has a personal com­ ponent. The Roshomon effect is fundamental to his claim about knowledge. The important point of the Roshomon effect is that there can be no knowledge which is separate from a knower and, thus, the observer is a participant inextricably woven into every event upon which he focuses his research efforts. Knowledge, for Beittel, permits of not only the external world but also of ourselves as beings apart from and immersed in that world.

Descartes changed the nature of the classical and medieval relation between imagination and will, between freedom and will, by his systematic doubt. By this doubt, he imagines the world away and affirms consciousness. The doubt, itself, is an assertion of freedom and will for Descartes. As Barrett describes Descartes, the doubt is a strenuous and overwhelming effort, for our natural tendency is to drift back into our everyday world because we desire to believe in the illusion of the everyday. To allow this is "to assent to the overriding convictions of our everyday world as these manifestly and powerfully press upon us from all sides. Instead, the Will in its freedom must choose to force us, against all natural inclination, into another path: that of the doubt. And what lies at the end of 206 the doubt? The discovery of a method that will enable us to wrest natures' secrets from it." The will in its freedom, Barrett says, chooses to go against nature in order to conquer it.®® But, at the point of effecting the doubt, the world opens up to us. Barrett states:

At the moment when consciousness imagines itself hovering outside of its world, ready to abolish that world in doubt, just then does the whole multifarious data of that world lie spread before it. 81

At this point Phenomenology enters as a method for examining these things suspended in doubt. For Sartre, this Phenomenology is

Existential, and what he can glean with it from Descartes is that as a consciousness man is also a nothingness. His freedom lies in that he is free to say. No; and by this No he brings nothingness into being. By his freedom man transcends nature; he can create his world.

But here Sartre goes beyond Descartes, for the latter would never have attributed these god-like powers to m a n . 8 2 For Sartre, man's freedom is the will to action and the power that lies at the heart of this freedom of will is the power of Imagination, which itself is a negation.

Freedom of will and imagination, for Sartre, are not the same as for Augustine; perhaps because for Augustine man could never have taken the place of God. Though man's capacity to Imagine was con­ nected to his freedom of will, for Augustine this capacity was

Irrevocably tied to the world. Sartre's belief that through the power of imagination man is free to create reality and to comprehend meaning implicit in the structure of the world is a view opposite from Augustine's. From this point of view it is by the vital and 207

not the rational that man comprehends truth, and by which he comes

to know reality. Truth, from this point of view, is no longer an

intellectual concept only, but one of faith also. This is a complete

turn from the classical and medieval thinkers we have considered who,

wanting to be rational above all, convinced themselves that "the

objects of [their] reasoning, the Ideas, were more real than [their]

own individual person or the particular objects which made up [their]

world."83

The reoccuring emphasis that we find in Bundy's study of imagination

- that imagination is defined in light of its relation to reason and

that it must always be under control of reason - is based in what

Barrett describes as the Greek concept of the self, - "that one's

rational self is one's real self,"^^ It is the concept of the self

which Sartre abolishes by his theory of imagination. The negation which is imagination is the very thing by which man is himself - it

is his freedom.

It is imperative again to stress that which lies at the heart

of the Existential attack on rationalism and abstractness, \diich

attack we have seen to result in Sartre's concept of imagination as

man's freedom. Barrett describes this:

But the essence of the existential protest is that rationalism can pervade a whole civization, to the point where the indivi­ duals in that civilization do less and less thinking, and perhaps wind up doing none at all. It can bring this about by dictating the fundamental ways and routines by which life itself moves. Technology is one material incarnation of rationalism, since it derives from science; bureaucracy is another, since it aims at the rational control and ordering of social life; and the two, - technology and bureaucracy - have come more and more to rule our lives. 208

It is no longer by rationalism that man can believe himself to be in touch with his own being and with the world; it is by rationality

that he flees from himself and from this world to escape and avoid it.

To add to what Barrett has said, not only does man do less and less

thinking but less and less feeling as well. From this situation

Existentialism erupted. And with it comes a concept of imagination

that supervenes rationalism. Imagination no longer means as it once did, the false and the illusory; it means the true and the concrete.

Existentialism allows for a concept of imagination not dependent upon either the concepts of knowledge or emotion. With this new philosophy both knowledge and emotion are excessible to being through imagination.

It is both knowledge and emotion which Beittel wants to account for by the Roshomon effect, and by effecting this synthesis, he provides for an important role for imagination in art education research.

Summary

In this chapter we have discussed two art educators with an

Existential Phenomenological philosophy. Both individuals have been seen to differ in the way in which they hold this philosophy. This, it has been said, is an inherent aspect of Existential Phenomenology.

Of the two art educators, only Beittel attempts a systematic account of man and his world. His account is embedded in his theory of research. The theory of imagination in Beittel's Existential

Phenomenology consists of three areas of consideration; (1) imagina­ tion as a focus for research, in that it is a component of the 209

expressive situation; (2) imagination as a tool for research, both

as the means whereby the participant-observer has access to the

expressive situation by imagining himself within it, access to the

artist's stream of consciousness by the same effort, and as the means whereby the expressive situation is reconstructed (Beittel has called

this imaginative reconstruction); (3) imagination which functions

to effect a blend of understanding and knowledge. In the research situation the latter is the use of concrete imagination to describe events in such a way their meanings emerge. For Beittel, this not only is a matter of the researcher's capacity to observe events but also to participate in them. The participation-observation paradox is explained by the Roshomon effect wherein the intuitive, insightful and emotional join with thought to constitute knowledge of events.

For Sartre, this is the human capacity to look at things in such a way that they reveal significance to imaginatively transcend our common sense perceptions of them, and by this action to grasp these

things as they might be, revealing a world structure. This action is never a bracketing-out of the world, away from oneself, in order to describe it. Rather, it is an action by which the individual participates in the world and describes it from a point of view within the world which also includes his being.

In Madenfort's work we found a place for imagination in the expression or descriptive experience of the sensuous immediate and the enhancement of such experience. Madenfort's excessive emphasis on perception brought to the force certain problems. In general. 210

emphasis on one mental act over others tends to obscure functions

of the other mental acts. Much of what Madenfort attributes to per­

ception may be functions of imagination. Conversely, much of what we find in Madenfort's writing might commonly be thought of as an

exercise of imagination. But this is perhaps only a notion created by confusing imaginative modes of writing or teaching with what is actually being said. It appears that part of the nature of the problem of imagination is that where our common conceptions of it would lead us to expect a constructive theory there is, in fact, very little theory at all. In these instances, the concept is thin.

Bundy notes that the most pervasive philosophical tradition effecting the theory of imagination is that in which imagination associated with the appetite, passions and emotions is subject to and controlled by reason. He states:

This glorification of reason, this basic rationalism of much of classical and medieval thought, must ever be kept in mind in studying the evolution of theories of imagination: it operated against constructive appreciation... . It is sometimes dif­ ficult for us to evaluate this contrast of reason and phantasy, always at the expense of the latter, perhaps the most persistent commonplace in the history of our terms. We are prone to think of Blake's identification of imagination with the divine and his depreciation of reason, of Shelley's contrast of imagination and reason as respectively the synthetic and analytical princi­ ples in human thought, or of Wordworth's characteristic of the imagination as 'reason in her most exalted mood'. But those views were to come as the result of a long and fascinating evolution; and to appreciate that evolution one must remember that from Plato to Dante phantasy was defined in the light of a belief predominately rationalistic. It is sometimes the ideal of the supremacy of nous, sometimes of the mystic's intelligenia, which is, indeed, above reason, and sometimes merely of intellectus or ratio, but it is always some aspect of rational mind or of suprasensible mind which furnishes the criterion of the imagination.86 211

It is not surprising, given what Bundy has said, that we would

find in Existential Phenomenology, with its attack on rationalism,

a theory of imagination posed as man's freedom and greatest capacity; it is the capacity by which he is Man, a free being. Sartre, we have seen, provides us this extreme because he is adamant that such a mental act is neither dependent upon nor determined by other mental acts; it is autonomous. Whether he is correct in this assertion has not been of concern here. Its philosophical significance is to relieve man of his rational bind; to indicate to him "what has always been true" - that he is free to choose. That he has imagination is both means and evidence for this. 212

Footnotes

1. Mary Warnock, Existentialism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970). William Barrett also provides an extensive discussion of the history and concerns of Existential Phllosphy. However, Warnock's discussion, as It focuses on the ethical and methodo­ logical traditions of this philosophy Is more appropriate to this paper. See: William Barrett, Irrational Man, A Study In Existential Philosophy, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Com­ pany, Inc., 1962). Originally published, 1958.

2. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

3. Ibid., p. 3.

4. Ibid., p. 133.

5. Ibid., p. 135.

6 . Ibid., p. 54.

7. Ralph Harper, "Significance of Existence and Recognition for Education," In Modern Philosophies of Education; NSSE, Fifty- Fourth Yearbook, 1955, p. 227.

8. George Kneller, Existentialism and Education, (New York: Science Editions, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958).

9. Van Cleve Morris, Existentialism In Education, (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1966).

10. An example of the writing on Existential and/or Phenomenology In general education at this time see: Phllosphy of Education: 1966 Proceedings of the Twnety-Second Annual Meeting, Francis T. Vlllemaln, ed. (Edwardsvllle Illinois: Philosophy of Education Society, 1966).

William Olivier Martaln, "A Phenomenological Analysis of the Teaching/Learning Activity," pp. 82-86.

LeRoy F, Troutner, "What Can the Educator Learn From the Existential Philosopher?" pp. 98-105.

Donald Vandenberg, "Existential Educating and Pedagogic Authority," pp. 106-111.

11. Eugene F. Kaelln, "Aesthetics and the Teaching of Art," In Reading In Art Education, eds. Elliott W. Eisner and David W. Ecker, (Waltham Massachusetts: Blalnsdale Publishing Company, 1966). 213

'Aesthetic Education; A Role for Aesthetics Proper" in Aesthetics and Problems of Education, ed., Ralph A. Smith, (Urbana, Chicago, London: University of Illinois Press, 1971).

12. David W. Ecker, Thomas J. Johnson, and Eugene F. Kaelin, "Aesthetic Inquiry," Review of Educational Research, Vol. 39, No. 5, (1969) p. 577.

David W. Ecker and Eugene F. Kaelin, "The Limits of Aesthetic Inquiry: A Guide to Educational Research," in Philosophical Redirection of Educational Research, Seventy-First Yearbook, Part I, (Chicago: National Society for the Study of Education, 1972).

13. Merle E. Flannery, "Research Methods in Phenomenological Aesthe­ tics," Review of Research in Visual Arts Education, No. 12, (Fall, 1980) p. 26.

Elmer Day, "Toward a Phenomenology of Dream Imagery, and Metaphor," Art Education, Vol. 30, No. 7, (Nov., 1979), p. 15.

_, "The Phenomenology of Visual Imagery and Metaphor," OAEA Journal, Vol., 20 No. 1, (Spring, 1981), p. 11.

_, "Dreaming, Visual Creating and Pheno­ menological Describing," Art Education, Vol. 35. No. 3, (May, 1982) p. 4.

14. For an example of this writing see the complete issue of Art Education, Vol. 32, No. 7, (November, 1979).

15. Wellington Madenfort, "A Phenomenology of the Esthetic and Art Education," Ph.D. Dissertaion, Pennsylvania State University, 1965.

16.______, "Aesthetic Education, Sex, Armoring and Death," Art Education, Vol. 34, No. 1. (January, 1981) p. 8.

17. , "The Arts and Relating to One Another in Sensuous Immediacy," Art Education, Vol. 28, No.4, (July, 1975) p. 22.

18. , "The Work of Art, Integrity and Teach­ ing," Art Education, Vol. 30, No. 6, (October, 1977), p. 36.

19. Ibid., p. 37. 214

20. Ibid., p. 33.

21. David E. Denton, Existential Reflections on Teaching, (North Quincey, Mass: Christopher Publishing House, 1972), p. 45.

22. , "That Mode of Being Called Teaching," in Existentialism and Phenomenology in Education, ed., David E. Denton, (New York: Teachers College Press, 1974), p. 104.

23. Warnock, op. cit., p. 73.

24. Madenfort, "The Arts and Relating to One Another in Sensuous Immediacy," p. 22.

25. Edward Casey, Imagining: A Phenomenological Study, (Bloomington, Indiana: University of Indiana Press, 1976), pp. 140-141.

26. Madenfort, "The Work of Art, Integrity and Teaching," p. 31.

27. Casey, Imagining: A Phenomenological Study, pp. 44-45.

28. Ibid., p. 46.

29. Kenneth Beittel, Alternatives for Art Education Research: Inquiry into the Making of Art, (Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown Company Publishers, 1973).

30. Ibid., p. 21.

31. In "Phenomenology and Educational Research," Donald Vandenberg discusses a continuum of modes of phenomenological description which Strasser has distinguished. These modes are generic and are represented on one end by description which is termed "impressionistic" and on the other by description which is termed "dialogical." Though a direct comparison between this continuum and Beittel's modes of research cannot be made, Vandenberg*s discussion does serve to illuminate the range of phenomenological description which Beittel attempts to accomodate by his alternative modes of research. In Existentialism and Phenomenology in Education: Collected Essays, ed., David Denton, (New York: Teachers College Press, 1974), p. 183.

32. Beittel, op. cit., p. 21.

33. Ibid., pp. 19-20.

34. Ibid., p. 7.

35. Ibid., p. 9. 215

36. Ibid. p. 54.

37. Ibid. P- 76.

38. Ibid. PP . 11-12.

39. Ibid. P- 13.

40. Ibid. p. 15.

41. Ibid. p. 34.

42. Ibid. p. 127.

43. Ibid. P- 125.

44. Warnock, Existentialism, p. 138.

45. Much has been written about Sartre's theory of Imagination: Mary Warnock, "The Concrete Imagination," Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 1, No. 2, (May, 1970), p. 6.

______, "Imagination In Sartre," British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 10, No. 4, (Oct., 1970), p. 323.

R.G. Blair, "Imagination and Freedom," Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 1, No.2, (May, 1970), p. 13.

R. Grlmsley, "Sartre and the Phenomenology of Imagination," Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 3, No. 1, (January, 1972), p. 58.

Ross McKenna, "The Imagination: A Central Sartrean Theme," Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 5, No. 1, (January, 1974), p. 63.

46. Warnock, "The Concrete Imagination," p. 6.

47. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomen­ ological Ontology, Trans, by Hazel E. Barnes, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), pp. 63-64.

48. Ibid., pp. 86-112.

49. Warnock, Existentialism, p. 106.

50. Warnock, "The Concrete Imagination," p. 6.

51. Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea, (New York: New Directions, 1964) pp. 126-127. 216

52. Warnock, "The Concrete Imagination," p. 12.

53. Jean-Paul Sartre, Psychology of Imagination, (Secaucus, New Jersey: Citadel Press, Inc., 1972) pp. 134; 171-174.

______, Being and Nothingness, p. 765.

54. Sartre, Psychology of Imagination, p. 265.

55. Ibid., p. 266.

56. Ibid., p. 267.

57. Ibid., p. 269.

58. Ibid., pp. 269-270.

59. Ibid., p. 270.

60. Ibid., p. 271.

61. Ibid., pp. 272-273.

62. Â contemporary phenomenologist, Gaston Bachelard, writes about the relationship of will and imagination. He believes that imagination and will are both aspects of the same force. Will or desire realizes that which is imagined and this results in the creation of new realities. See: Gaston Bachelard, The Psychoanalysis of Fire, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).

______, The Poetics of Reverie, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969).

63. Migne, "Patrol. Lat.," 33.67 (Epistola vi) trans. in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, ed. Philip Schaff, 14 vols., (New York: 1886-1890) 1. 223, in Murray Wright Bundy, The Theory of Imagin­ ation in Classical and Medieval Thought, University of Illinois Studies in Language and Literature, Vol. 12, Nos. 2-3, (May- August, 1927) (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1927), p . 156.

64. The relations of imagination to sensation, memory and thought are found in analysis of De Trinitate.

65. Bundy, The Theory of Imagination in Classical and Medieval Thought, pp. 157-158. 217

66. Ibid., p. 162.

67. Ibid., p. 163.

68. Schaff, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, 3.152, In Bundy, pp. 162-163.

69. Bundy, The Theory of Imagination in Classical and Medieval Thought, p. 165.

70. Ibid., PP . 166-168.

71. Ibid., p. 169.

72. Ibid., p. 171.

73. Ibid., P- 211.

74. Ibid., p. 212.

75. Ibid., PP . 212-213.

76. Barrett, Irrational

77. Ibid., P' 77.

78. Ibid., p. 70.

79. Beittel, Alternatives for Art Education Research, p. vii.

80. William Barrett, The Illusion of Technique (Garden City, New York: Anchor Press, 1978), pp. 127-128.

81. Ibid., p. 129.

82. Barrett discusses the reasons for this. See: Irrational M a n , A Study in Existential Philosophy, pp. 242-244. He says: As a modern man Sartre remains in that anguish of nothingness in which Descartes floated before the miraculous light of God shone to lead him out of it. p. 244.

83. Ibid., p. 85.

84. Ibid., p. 89.

85. Ibid., p. 269.

86. Bundy, The Theory of Imagination in Classical and Medieval Thought, p. 269. SUMMARY

In the foregoing chapters, art education beliefs and assumptions were analyzed for their philosophical characteristics. Key concepts pivotal to each art education philosophy were identified and dis­ cussed. The theory of imagination in each philosophy was explicated and characteristics and assumptions about imagination were identified.

In summary, in Feldman's Realist/Idealist philosophy imagination is the connection between ethics and aesthetics because by imagination we are able to posit possible outcomes to confrontations with reality and to envision the consequences of our behavior. In these capaci­ ties, imagination is a rational process; a process of constructive, creative thought.

In Dewey and Ecker's Pragmatic philosophy, imagination is both the perception of meaning in situations and that which acts upon perception, adjusting past experience with present "raw" experience.

In these roles, imagination is a mediary process which has charac­ teristics of memory, anticipation, thought and perception.

Imagination takes the form of specific behavior called pretend­ ing in Lowenfeld's psychology. Pretending is thought to be a creative capacity found in children, diminishing with the onset of adolescence and adulthood. Lowenfeld also believes that, in its

218 219

Image-making capacity, imagination may account for certain imagery

in the child's artwork. Collingwood, in his theory of Idealist

aesthetics, describes imagination as that level of consciousness

where emotion is expressed. It is in imagination that the work of

art proper is created.

For the Existential Phenomenologists, imagination is that

capacity by which man is free to create the world as he believes

it should be. Madenfort sees this creation as aesthetic experience

consisting in one's immersion in the Immediately sensuous qualities

of the lived world. For Beittel this creation is best described by

the Roshomon effect wherein the experiences of both artist and

researcher go to describe the artistic event. The researcher recon­

structs this event by imagining himself to be in it. Sartre believes

that imagination is a uniquely autonomous mental act. To Imagine is

to posit a nothingness; by this act man collapses the world, and

creates another. For Sartre, imagination is evidence of man's

freedom.

Though some art education authors use the word "imagination"

they have not advanced theories of imagination. The task of this paper has been to reconstruct theories of imagination by analyzing

art education philosophies. In this effort, Bundy's history of theories

of imagination in ancient thought has played a great role. I have used his history as a way to examine art education philosophies and thereby

to show ways in which this history of imagination is played out in art education. 220

The nature of this study has led to an inevitable focus on the

differences among art education philosophies and theories of imagin­

ation. However, by explicating theories of imagination certain

important points of agreement among art education philosophies

have emerged. There is consensus among art education philosophies

that art is moral activity and art education is a moral endeavor.

Both these are so by way of the role of imagination. Art education

then is not just making and creation, or appreciation, history and

criticism. The importance of imagination for art education is not

in these areas only, for inextricably woven into all these is a

moral dimension which necessarily accompanies the play of imagination.

It should not be concluded from the above that the cultivation

of imagination will make students more moral. Ancient thinkers have

shown that this doesn't follow, for an "imaginative" individual,

even one who cultivates virtue, may not be moral. Rather what can be gleaned from what the ancients have said about imagination in the moral realm is that the moral life is autonomous, i.e., it exists

quite apart from those things like religion and education which have

a moral dimension. Goodness, when it is taken into life from religion

or education is done so by choice and not by authority. For this

reason the ancients feared as well as praised imagination in the moral realm. 221

Imagination posits possibilities beyond the given, and this role is perhaps most formidable in art and morality because the nature of both these is autonomous. For by imagination man acts freely.

Man's doing of things himself is most prominent in art and morality.

For this reason the cultivation of imagination should be a primary endeavor for art education. Students must understand that to be free and to do things themselves is also a moral responsibility; it is to be human. It is also to think of the world in terms of possibilities and not as a place wherein one is made to act and think in prescribed ways. To allow students to believe that they are creatures of neces­ sity in a static world is to deprive them of imagination, and in turn, to deprive them of a moral life.

Students should be taught to use imagination and also to reflect upon how they use it; this last is in itself an imaginative endeavor.

It requires that students have some time alone, to do things them­ selves, to see the possibilities in what it is they are making or studying, so that in their making and studying they surpass what is given; "to collapse the world," as Sartre said it, and to create another. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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