Supporting the SecretWar
CIAAirOperations in Laos,1955-1974
William M. Leary
Thelargestparamilitaryoperations successfulphotoreconnaissance pro everundertaken by the CIAtook gram, and engaged in numerous place in the smallSoutheastAsian clandestinemissionst~singnight- Kingdom ofLaos. For morethan 13 visiongiasses and state-of-the-art years, the Agencydirectednative electron,icequipment.Without Air forces that foughtmajorNorthViet America spresence, the CIA seffort
nameseunits to a standstill. in Laoscould not hav~been Although the countryeventually fell sustained. to the Communists, the CIA remainedproud of its accomplish
ments in Laos. As Director of A DistortedView CentralIntelligence(DCI)Richard Air America, Helms laterobserved: This was a for the It AirAmerica s has fared an airlinesecretly majoroperation Agency... . publicimage tookmanpower; it tookspecially poorly. The 1990movieAirAmer owned by theCIA, qualifiedmanpower; it was danger ica is largelyresponsib~e for this. It difficult. The he was a vital ous; it was CIA, featured, a cynical CIA~officerwho contended, did a superbjob. arranged for the airline to fly opium component in to the ac~lministrativecapital of Vien the tiane for a corrupt general Agency s AirAmerica, an airlinesecretly Asi~n looselymodeled on VangPao, a mili operations owned by the CIA, was a vitalcom taryleader of the mountain-region- ponent in the Agency soperations in in Laos. basedH,mongethnicgroup. The Laos. By the summer of 1970, the film depicts the CIA as having airlinehad some two dozentwin- r~ian the opiI~mprocessed intoheroin in a 9 enginetransports,another two dozen down the from the short-takeoff-and-landing(STOL) factoryjust ~treet favorite ,bar ofAir pilots. aircraft, andsome 30 helicoptersded America s TheAsiangeneral, in return, sup icated to operations in Laos. There pliedm~n to fight the war, plus a weremorethan 300 pilots,copilots, financialkickback to the CIA. Ulti flightmechanics, and air-freightspe mately, ~we learnthat the Communist cialistsflying out of Laos an4 anti-Communist in Laos Thailand.During1970, Air America versus war was mer1ely a facade for the real war, airdropped or landed 46 million which was fought for c~ontro1 of the pounds of foodstuffs mainlyrice area sopiumfields. in Laos. Helicopterflighttime
reachedmorethan4,000hours a
month in the sameyear. AirAmer AirAmericapilots in this film are ica of crewstransported tens portraye~J as skilled at landingdam thousands of and troops refug~s, agedairplanes, but basically as a flewemergencymedevacmissiqns wildlyu~iprofessionalmenagerie of and rescueddownedairmen through partyan~mals,including a few bor out Laos,inserted and extractedroad- derlinepsychotics. These ill watch flew teams, nighttimeairdrop disciplin~edairmen are not the vil missionsover the Ho Chi Minh lains of the story; they are merely William M. Leary is a Professor of monitored infil Trail, sensorsalong pawns ir~ a druggamethattheyeither History at the University of Georgia. trationroutes,conducted a highly disdain or opposeoutright.
71 Air Operations
Thestory ofthe realAirAmerica begins in 1950,when A Bum of CAT it Rap the CIAdecided Incorporated, provided airplanes and crews for secretintelli that it required an genceoperations.7 The connectionamongAir America, the CIA, and the drugtrade in Laos air transport lingers in the publicmind. Thefilm, In the 1950s, the CIA s air propri to conduct capability as it was known in the lexicon according to the credits, was based on etary, ChristopherRobbins sbookabout covertoperations of intelligence, was used for a variety the first in of covertmissions. During the airline, published 1979 in Asia in under the titleAirAmerica.2 support Koreanwar, for example, it made AlthoughRobbinslaterclaimedthat ofUS policy morethan 100 hazardousoverflights of mainlandChina,airdropping the moviedistorted his book,3 it objectives. closelyfollowed the book stheme if agents andsupplies. not its details. Bothmovie and book 9 contend that the CIAcondoned a drugtradeconducted by a Laotian Supportingthe French client; bothagree thatAirAmerica betweenChina and the Gulfof provided the essentialtransportation Siam. 5 CATalsobecameinvolved in the French for the trade; and both the portray war againstCommunistinsurgents in pilotssympathetically. Indochina. In the French litheCIAwas not involved in the April 1953, drugtrade, it did knowabout it. As appealed to PresidentEisenhower for Robbinsprovidesfactualdetails that formerDCIWilliamColbyacknowl the use of US Air Force C-i 19 trans the movielacks. CitingAlfred W. edged, the Agency did littleabout it ports and crews to fly tanks and heavy McCoy s 1972study, ThePolitics of during the 1960s, but latertook equipment to theirhard-pressedforces in Laos. such the Heroin in SoutheastAsia, he relates actionagainst the traders as drugs Having equipment, French the howAirAmericahelicopters col became a problemamongAmerican emphasized, mightmean lected the opiumharvests of 1970 troops in Vietnam. The CIA smain differencebetweenholding and losing 8 and 1971,thenflew the crop to Vang focus in Laosremained on fighting Laos. Pao s base at LongTieng in the the war, not on policing the drug mountains of northern where it trade.6 Laos, Whilereluctant to commitAmerican turnedintoheroin at the was gen militarypersonnel to the war in eral sdruglaboratory.4 Indochina, the Eisenhoweradminis How It Began tration was anxious to assist the
French. This led decision to use My nearly two decades of research to a CAT to an airlift in US Air indicate thatAirAmerica was not Thestory of the real Air America pilots fly involved in the drugtrade. As Joseph begins in 1950,when the CIA Force-supplied C-i19s. In early of CAT Westermeyer,whospent the years decided that it required an air trans May, a group personnel arrived at ClarkAir ForceBase in the 1965 to 1975 in Laos as a physician, portcapability to conductcovert for 72 hours of concen publichealthworker, and researcher, operations in Asia in support of US Philippines trated and school wrote in Poppies,Pipes, andPeople: policyobjectives. In August1950, ground flight on the unfamiliar C-i19s. On 5 American-ownedairlinesnever the Agencysecretlypurchased the May, flew six of the now knowinglytransportedopium in or assets of Civil Air Transport(CAT), they transports, the tricoloredroundels of the out of Laos, nor did theirAmerican an airlinethat had beenstarted in bearing French Air Force, to Gia Lam air pilots everprofitfrom its transport. ChinaafterWorldWar II by Gen. base,outsideHanoi. Yet everyplane in Laosundoubtedly Claire L. Chennault and Whiting carriedopium at sometime, Willauer. CATwouldcontinue to fly unknown to the pilot and his superi commercialroutesthroughoutAsia, OperationSQUAWbegan the next ors just as hadvirtuallyevery acting in everyway as a privately day. It continueduntil 16 July,with pedicab,everyMekongRiversam ownedcommercialairline. At the CATpilotsmakingnumerous air pan, and everymissionaryjeep sametime,under the corporateguise drops to Frenchtroops in Laos.
72 Air Operations Laotianindependence suitedthe policy of theUnitedStates, With the waning of the Vietminh Laotianindependencesuited the pol so long as the offensive,which was due more to the icy of the UnitedStates, so long as weatherthan to Frenchresistance, the governmentremained the governmentremainednon-Corn withdrawn.9 of the CATcrewswere non-Conununist. munist.~ Laosrepresented one dominds in SoutheastAsia that con cernedPresidentEisenhower and The war in Indochina,however, con 9~ of State FosterDulles. tinued to go badly for the French. In Secretafr John the had little November1953,Frenchparatroop Although country intrinsic its ers occupiedDienBien Phu in value, geographicalposi northwesternVietnam, 10 milesfrom tion placed it in the center of the CAToperationscontinued in and established ColdWar in SoutheastAsia. If Laos the Laosborder, an Indochinaafter the fall of DienBien airhead. Gen. Henri the fell to the Communists,Thailand Navarre, Phu. Betweenmid-Mayand mid- Frenchmilitarycommander,wanted might be next,according to the dom August, C-i19s droppedsupplies to ino And the of to lure the Vietminh into a setpiece theory. collapse isolatedFrenchoutposts and deliv battle in whichsuperiorFrench fire Thailandwouldlead to Communist eredloadsthroughout the country. could be used to effect. domination of SoutheastAsia and power good CAT also supplied 12 C-46s for Among the manymistakesmade by perhapsbeyond. 2 OperationCOGNAC, the evacua the French in their placing troops tion of civiliansfromNorthVietnam 220 milesfromHanoi was theirmis to SouthVietnamfollowing the sign calculation of the air transport US Aid ing of the GenevaAgreement on 21 resourcesneeded to keeptheir iso July 1954.Between 22 August and 4 latedforcessupplied. Col.Jean-Louis Under an agreementsigned in 1950, October,CATflew 19,808men, Nicot,head of the French Air Trans the UnitedStates had beensupply women, and children out ofNorth portCommand in Indochina,lacked ing and military aid to Vietnam. It also carriedmembers of ecoflomic sufficientaircrews to meet theArmy s Laos. Following the GenevaConfer the CIA sSaigonMilitaryMission demands.Unlessadditionalassis ence,Washingtondecided to expand north of the 17thparallel.Attempts tancecould be obtained, the French this program. In January1955, it by the CIA to establishstaybehind garrisoncould not be kept established the UnitedStatesOpera 10 paramilitarynetworks in the north, supplied. tionsMission(USOM) in Vientiane however, futile. 1 proved to administereconomicassistance. At In earlyJanuary1954,Washington the en4 of the year, the Programs Office alertedCAT for a possiblereturn to Evaluat~ion (PEO) staffed by officers and Indochina. Under a contractsigned ConcernAboutLaos reserve or retiredmilitary with Frenchauthorities on 3 March, akin to~ a MilitaryAssistanceAdvi CATwouldsupply 24 pilots to oper soryGroup was set up within The GenevaConference of 1954, in ate 12 C-i 19s thatwould be USOM to handlemilitaryaid.13 addition to Vietnam at the maintained by US Air Forceperson dividing 17th confirmed the status of nel. OperationsfromHanoi s Cat Bi parallel, CATsoonbecameinvolved in Laos as state. The airfield to DienBien Phu got under an independent USOM s aid program. In July 1955, nationwould be ruled the wayjust as the Vietminhbegantheir by Royal USOMofficialslearnedthat a rice Lao GovernmentfromVientiane on assault on the Frenchposition. failure~hreatenedfamine in several the River. Members of the Between 13 March and the fall of Mekong provin~es in Laos. Because a num Pathet Lao would DienBien Phu on 7 May,CAT pro-Communist ber of theseareaswere in remote, in the northern of pilots flew 682 airdropmissions to regroup provinces mountainousregions,airdropswould SamNeua and the beleagueredFrenchtroops. One PhongSalypending be the onlyfeasiblemeans to deliver into the central plane was shot down in earlyMay, integration regime. ing ess~ntialsupplies of rice and salt. and the two pilotswerekilled;many The Frenchwereallowed to main ThreecATC-46sarrived at the other C-i 19s sufferedheavyflak tain a smallmilitarypresence in the northeasternrailhead of Udorn, damage, and one pilotwas severely country to train the Royal Lao Army Thailaiuid, on ii September to begin wounded. (FAR). the airlift. By the end of the month,
73 AirOperations
PRE-1975INDOCHINA
G u/f
of
Tonkin
South
China Thail Sea
Gulf of
Thai/and
1~O Kilometers
74 Air Operations ByJune1960, it hadbecomeclear thathelicopters CAT had flownmorethan 200 mis fling of a majorrotary-wingoperation wouldform a sions to 25 receptionareas,delivering in Laos.18 1,000 tons of emergencyfood. Con permanentpart of ducted and this smoothly efficiently, AirAmerica s Eventually, four CATpilotswere relief marked the airdrop operation trained on US Air ForceH-19Aheli of CAT s andlaterAir in Laos. beginning operations copters in Japan and the Philippines. of US assistance America s support The CATcontingent did not reach in Laos.14 programs 9~ Laosun~tilMarch1960. Due to the operatinglimitations of the H-19s, CAT spermanentpresence in Laos the underpoweredhelicopterscould whenCAT began on 1 July 1957, officerwho had arrived in October fly on1y~atlowerelevations in the pilotBruce B. Blevinsbrought a C- were used 1958 andwho was assigned to sup country.Generally, they 47 to Vientiane to service a newcon CIA officers to port neutralistCapt.Kong Le s to carry1 case meetings Blevins tractwith the US Embassy. in areas and to distribute parachutebattalion. The case officer out1~ing foundflyingconditionsprimitive in leaflets elections.19 frequentlycalled on Blevins to carry during Laos. At leastVientiane had a personnel and supplies. piercedsteelplankrunwayand the By June 1960, it had becomeclear onlycontroltower in Laos. Else Thesummer of 1959 saw the intro that helicopterswouldform a perma where, he landed on dirt usually of America s duction into Laos of a US nentpart Air operations that had beenbuilt Special strips to support that ForcesGroup,codenamedHotfoot, in Laos.1 It was equallyapparent JapanesefightersduringWorldWar under the command of Lt. Col. neither the underpoweredH-19s nor II. Therewere no aeronauticalcharts Arthur Bull Simons. Twelve the inexperienced Air Americarotary available, so he had to use French Mobile Teams took wingpilotscould do the job. Both The radio Training up topographicalmaps. only and the CIA duties at Vientiane,Luan~Prabang, Roussel~t recognized aid to navigation in the countrywas a Savannekhet, and Pakse. The thatbetterequipment and properly 25-wattnondirectionalbeacon at trained needed appearance of the Americanscoin pilotswere to accom Vientiane thatwas operated by cidedwith the outbreak offighting plish mission.Rousselothired employees ofAir Laos, the country s th~ between the FAR and PathetLao. In fourexperienced US MarineCorps commercialairline,who turned it on of these CIAoffi helicopterpilotswhoobtainedtheir when it suitedthem.15 light developments, cials in Laosrequestedadditional air discharges in Okinawa to fly the H 19s. Later in the the CIA transportresources. year, Between 1957 and 1959, the unsta arrange~I for the MarineCorps to ble politicalsituation in Laos led to a transfer~fourUH-34helicopters to American in the growing presence AirAm~rica the H-19s.20 IncreasingAir Support to replace country as the UnitedStates increased its support of the FAR. Air America thenamechanged on 26 In August1959, CIAheadquarters TheHelloCourier March 1959,primarily to avoidcon ordered its air proprietary to send two fusionabout the air proprietary s pilots to Japan for helicoptertrain operations in Japan provided ing. Robert E. Rousselot, vice At the sametime that Air America essentialtransportation for the president for operations,remembers was trying to develop,arotary-wing expandingAmericaneffort in Laos. beingcalled into PresidentHugh L. capability in Laos, the company also The airline sC-47s and C-46spassed Grundy soffice in Taipei and shown was takingsteps to introduceSTOL morefrequentlythroughVientiane to the message. The requirement had aircraft~into the country. Maj. Harry fulfillurgentairdroprequests. come out of the blue. He assumed C. Ade~holt, a US Air Forcedetailee Blevins also was keptbusy,landing that the CIAhad a specialoperation with th~ CIA, had supervised the throughout the countryand making in mind that called for the use of a develop~ment of the HelioCourier air numerousairdrops to isolatedFAR helicopter and that it would be a whiles~rvingwith the Agency s posts. He developed an especially one-timedeal. Little did Rousselot branch)Convinced that the aircraft closerelationshipwith a CIA case realize that this would be the begin- coulds~irvive the short,rugged
75 AirOperations
airstripsoft~nfound in remoteareas, he became the foremostadvocate for AirAmerica sadoption of the Helio Courier.2
Air Americaobtained a Helio for tri als in Laos in the fall of 1959. The STOLprogram got off to a poor start. TheHelio senginesproved temperamental,frequentlydevelop ing vaporlocks on starting. Mud, rocks, and graveltended to block the aircraft scrosswindlandinggear. The rudderneededmodification so that it would not jam. Also, the first pilots who flew the airplanewereused to multienginetransports and did not receiveadequatetraining on an air plane thatdemandedspecialhandling Air AmericaUH-34s at SamThong,Laos, 1961. Theshirtlessman at the left is Edgar Pop techniques. Buell,seniorUSAIDofficial at SamThong. Photocourtesy of E.C. Eckholdt.
Air Americacameclose to abandon Le and rightwingGen.Phoumi Le out ofVientiane. By the end of ing the Helio. It was saved by Nosavan. The CommunistPathet the year, KongLe nowreceiving Aderholt, who believed in the air Lao Le, while the US supportedKong supportfrom a Sovietairlift had craft scapability andwas determined military and CIAlined up behind retreatednorth the Plaine des and who to to see it work, by Rousselot, Adm. Phoumi. As Harry D. Felt, the vital air feared that the CIAwould the Jarres(PDJ),securing give Commander in Chief of the Pacific fieldcomplex in that area.23 STOLmission to a rivalcompany Fleet,explained: Phoumi is no Bird & Son ifAir America proved GeorgeWashington.However, he is incapable of the job. Early in doing anti-Communist,which is what The appearance of the Soviets 1960,RousselotassignedRonald J. countsmost in the sad Laos alarmedAmericanmilitaryauthori Sutphin, a talentedlight-planepilot, situation. 22 ties. Admiral Felt cabled the Joint to the project. BothAderholt and Chiefs of Staff on 29 December: Rousselotagree that it was Sutphin s As Phoumiprepared to march on With full realization of the serious skillfuldemonstration of the extraor Vientianefrom his base in Savanna of the decision I dinarycapability of the STOLaircraft ness to intervene, US assistance to the khet, rightwing believe that we mustinter that led the CIA to greatlyexpand the strongly generalincreasedsharply. Special vene now or give up northernLaos. program. Forces conductedinten personnel Chief of NavalOperationsAdm. sive training of Phoumi stroops, ArleighBurkeagreed. Ifwe lose while Air Americatransportflew in Laos, he told the JointChiefs on Supportingthe Anti suppliesfromBangkok.Phoumi also Communists 31 December, we will probablylose obtainedsupportfrom his close Thailand and the of Southeast friend,ThaiPrimeMinisterMarshal rest Asia. We will havedemonstrated to In August1960,PresidentEisen SarjtThanarat,who sent teamsfrom the elite PoliceAerialReinforcement the worldthat we cannot or will not howercomplained at a press Unit to workwithPhoumi ssoldiers. standwhen The effect, conference that Laos is a verycon challenged.
fusedsituation. Civil war had Burkewarned,wouldsoon be felt broken out between the neutralist Heavyfightingtookplace in Decem throughoutAsia,LatinAmerica, and forces commander of paratroop Kong bet as GeneralPhoumidroveKong Africa.24
76 Air Operations
PresidentEisenhower
waslooking forways to stabilize the In for US mili closeassociationwith the preparation possible situation in Laos previous taryintervention in Laos, the Joint French. Encouraged: by General Chiefsordered the emergencymobili withouthavingto Phoumi and assisted by a US Special Forces he to a zation of a taskforce at Subic Bay in introduceAmerican team, began organize the Philippines. On NewYear sDay, Hmongstaybehindforce on the the Americanwarships left port and troopsinto the southeasternedge of the PDJ. If the headednorth. At the the Plaine, sametime, conflict. He therefore Comn~unistsoccupied PresidentEisenhowerwas looking for Vang Pao intended t~ relocate the viewedwithfavor a ways to stabilize the situation in Laos Hmong to sevenstrategicmountain without to introduceAmeri surrounding the PDJ and having CIAproposal to arm tops carry can troops into the conflict. He on the fight.26 and thereforeviewedwithfavor a CIA trainHmong proposal to arm and trainHmong tribesmen. Aware thatVang Pao was seeking tribesmen. GeneralPhoumi sassistance, Lair decided to lookinto the possibility of an expandedprogramwith the ThePARUProgram Hmongcommander. In late Decem ber l9~9, Lair metwithVang Pao. in southThailand a trainingcamp he known the Ameri The Hmongproject was primarily VP, as was to and initiated a rigorousprogram to the work of CIAparamilitaryspecial cans, said that he either had to fight elite force. create an paramilitary At the leave the ist James W. (Bill) Lair. A veteran of Communists or coun one point, the PARU was in WorldWar II, Lair hadjoined the program try; if the UnitedSta~tessupplied the danger of losingCIAsupport. It was CIA at the outbreak of the Korean Vang Pao said that he saved the of weapops, through intervention would and that he could war. Assigned to Thailand, he had fight easily Desmond chiefofthe Far FitzGerald, raise worked as a civilianinstructorwith an army of 10,000. East Division in the Clandestine Ser the ThaiPoliceDepartment in a vice. By 1960, the PARUforce CIA-sponsoredprogram to enhance Impressedwith the Hmongcom numberedmorethan 400 highly the organization sability to dealwith mander, Lair returned to Vientiane trainedindividuals. threatsfromCommunistinsurgents. and reported the contact to station Attached to the BorderPolice, Lair chiefGordon L. Jorgensen. As it soonencountered the problem of happened,DesmondFitzGerald was Enter Pao assistingremoteborderoutposts. yang passingthroughVientiane en route to that Whenpoliceunits in outlyingareas Vietn~m.Jorgensensuggested The the of Thailandwereattacked by Com key to Hmongprogram was he and Lair get togetherwith leader munistguerrillas, it oftentook a week VangPao, a Hmongmilitary FitzGe rald for dinner. FitzGerald whocommanded the FAR s 10th told assistance to get reinforcements to the stations. L~iir that the PARU s Battalion the A tal Lairargued that it would be better to Infantry on PDJ. to Ger~eralPhoumiduring his cam ented and ambitious had been have a parachute-trained unit for officer,Vang paignagainstKong Le suchemergencies.Although the Thai Pao had earliercome to the attention wortheverything that the CIA had ofAmericans in Laos. In Armywas not happyabout the April 1957, spent on the program. Lair then out the PEO had selectedhim to attend a the appearance of a paramilitarypolice lined ~ program to support six-month organization,Thailand sgovernment counterinsurgencytrain Hmong.FitzGeraldaskedhim to approved its creation. Aware of the ing program at the ScoutRangerBase write t~p the ~roposal and send it to in Manila. ~ Army ssensitivity, Lairselected an Washington. innocuousname for the neworgani zation:PoliceAerialReinforcement Whenfightingbroke out in Laos at Although Lair neverthoughtthey Unit(PARU).25 the end of 1959,Vang Pao had would do it, he quicklydispatched grownconcernedthat the Hmong an 18-pagecable. A positiveanswer, Lairwas proud of his role in develop werelikely to sufferreprisalsfrom the he recalled,cameback surprisingly ing the PARUprogram. He selected Communistsbecause of the Hmongs soon. ~Lair sproposal alsogained the
77 Air Operations
As the Hmongforce grew, so did AirAmerica s support ofAdmiral Feltand the State As the Hmongforce so did Air presence in Laos. grew, Department.PresidentEisenhower, America spresence in Laos. To con looking for ways to avoiddirect nect the scatteredHmongoutposts Americaninvolvement in Laos, was 9~ thatwereseparated by mountainous willing to go alongwith the CIA s terrain, Lairordered the construction scheme.28 of a chain of airstrips,labeledVictor roadjunction and threatenedVien Sites (latercalledLimaSites), that could be used AirAmerica s tiane and the royalcapital at Luang by STOL Wi! Backingthe Resistance Prabang.Kennedyagainplaced US airplanes. In April 1961, ham R. Andersevicarrived in militaryforces in the region on alert, and he also authorized the transfer of Vientiane to takecharge ofAirAmer Withauthorization to arm and train 14 UH-34helicoptersfrom the ica s Helioprogram. Under his 1,000 as a test of the con Hmong direction, the number of STOLsites MarineCorps to AirAmerica to be cept, LairagainvisitedVang Pao and flown by Marine,Army, and Navy expandedrapidly.Andersevicwould arranged for an armsdrop at Pa volunteers. 30 locatesuitableareas,thenarrange for Dong, a mountaintop basesouth of localpeople to cut downtrees and the PDJ. In January1961, AirAmer level the ground as best theycould ica delivered to the first 300 weapons On 29 March 1961,pilotClarence J. withtheirprimitiveequipment. By The off trainees. programnearly got Abadie led a of 16 UH-34s flight the summer of 1961,Andersevic had disastrous when Air to a start an fromBangkok to AirAmerica s new given Lair a firmfoundationupon Americahelicopter,carryingLairand forward base at Udorn in operating which to buildwhatwouldbecome the PARUtrainingteam,crashed northeasternThailand, 40 miles an extensivenetwork of STOLfields after to clear a when of failing ridgeline south Vientiane. Thehelicopter throughoutnorthernLaos.33 the For approaching Hmongcamp. forcessoonbecameinvolved in sup there tunately, were no injuries.29 portingHmongforcesengaged in a AirAmericatransportswere also the fiercebattlewith the Pathet Lao at Pa key to feeding the people in the The PARU conducted three- Dong. On 30 May, the first Air team a Hmongvillageswhere the men had for the Americahelicopterpilotsdied in daytrainingprogram Hmong, gone off to fight. Lairhad enlisted Laos,whenCharlesMateer and involving the use of theirweapons the assistance of Edgar M. ( Pop ) and basicambush Lair WalterWizbowskicrashed in bad techniques. Buell to dealwith this program. An weatherwhile to land also askedVang Pao to select 20 men trying supplies Indianafarmerwho had arrived in of the for radio to the besiegedHmong.31 out 300 training as Laos in June 1960 to workwith the operators. Theseindividualswere InternationalvolunteerService,Buell to the PARU in sent trainingcamp Drivenfrom Pa Dong,Vang Pao proved an inspiredchoice for the southThailand for instruction. task. After two-month trek around moved his headquarters to Pha Khao, a the of the Buell 10 miles to the southwest. In July, perimeter PDJ, Lair for AirAmer With the Hmongscattered on moun Brig. Gen.Edward C. Lansdale at arrangedthrough ica to makescheduled of rice tainousterrainsurrounding the PDJ, that time a US securityadviser airdrops the Lair recognizedfrom the beginning reported to Gen.Maxwell D. Taylor, to Hmongvillages.~4 thatgoodcommunicationswould be PresidentKennedy smilitaryadviser, crucial for effectiveoperations, and that 13 PARUteams (99 men)were he turned to Air America. In the workingwith the Hmong,assisted by TheDiplomaticTrack earlymonths of 1961, AirAmerica nine US SpecialForcespersonnel. had only a handful ofhelicopters and NineCIAcase officerswereassigned While the Hmongprogram was STOLaircraftavailable to support to the Hmongprogram,with two expanding,PresidentKennedyhad CIAoperations in Laos. This backups in Vientiane.Morethan beenseeking a diplomaticsolution to changed in earlyMarch,when the 9,000Hmonghad beenequipped for the situation in Laos. At a meeting in newadministration of President guerrillaoperations,with the possibil Vienna in June 1961,Kennedyand KennedybecamealarmedafterKong ity ofsecuring4,000additional SovietPremierNikitaKhrushchev Le and the Pathet Lao captured a key recruits.32 issued a jointstatement ofsupport for
78 Air Operations
try. In fact, the NVAwas expanding its areas of control,attackingboth neutralist and Hmongpositions throug~ioutLaos. As Hmongammu nitionstoresdwindled,William
Colby,~who was head of the CIA s Far East Division,pleaded to Harri man to allow the resumption of air shipments. Myargumentsbecame moreforceful, Colbyrecalled, reflectingtheintensecables I was receivingfrom the two CIAofficers whowere still up in the hills observ ing and reporting on what was happening. Harrimanreluctantly approved an AirAm ricaarms drop ~-alongwithin~tructions that it be used for purelydefensepurposes. Furthe~rshipmentsfollowed. As Colby pointed out, however,Harri manpersonallyapproved each and everyc~landestinesupplyflight and its -28 beingrefueled by buckets at a mountainairstrip in northernLaos, 1963. Photocourtesy of E.C. Eckholdt. cargo.
ConflictIntensffies a neutralandindependentLaos. At resupply to the Hmong,whichaver the sametime,negotiators met in aged 40 tons a month by summer, As Ha~oisentadditionaltroops into Geneva to try to work out a settle the airline laid offpeople and moth- Laosduring1963, the Kennedy ment to the problem. balledairplanes. By May 1963, the administrationauthorized the CIA to number ofUH-34sassigned to the size of the Hmongarmy, Udorn had droppedfrom 18 to six. increa~e On 23 July 1962, a formal Declara in the of Flighthours,which had averaged nowh~adquartered valley tion on the Neutrality of Laos was Long By the end.of the year, 2,000 per monthbefore the Geneva ~ieng. in Geneva. It provided for a signed a reported20,000Hmongwere accords,dropped to 600. As helicop coalitiongovernment and the with armed. acted Casterlin his They as guerrillas, drawal of all from the ter pilotHarry wrote to foreigntroops up NVAsupplydepots, parents: There are 37 of us over blowir~ig country by 7 October. TheUnited trucks,miningroads, and here and not enoughwork.... We are ambu~hing Statespulled out its 666 military the in Laos generallyharassing stronger advisers and staff, and Air doingvirtually no flying support anymore. 36 enem~force. Air Americaagaintook Americastoppeddroppingweapons a greater role in the slowlyexpanding to the AssistantSecretary of Hmong. conflict. The war is goinggreat StateAverillHarriman, who was gunsnow, helicopterpilotCasterlin intent on US compliance A Broken ensuring Agreement informed his parents in November with the Genevaaccords,allowed the 1963.~ Don t be misled by new CIA to retainonly two men in Laos ReportsreachingCIAHeadquarters reports] that I am onlycarrying rice to monitorCommunistcompliance from its two officers in Laossug on as warsaren twon by with the agreemeni.35 m~missions gested that the apparentquiet was rice. deceptive. It soonbecameclear that AirAmerica soperationsdeclined 7,000NorthVietnameseArmy Full-scalefightingbroke out in Laos sharply in 1963. Restricted to food (NVA)troops had not left the coun in M~rch1964,whenNorth
79 Air Operations
TheCIAwaslargely responsible for conductingmilitary Vietnamese and Pathet Lao forces informed. As formerCIADirector operations in Laos,but attackedacross the PDJ. By mid- RichardHelms has pointed out, the May, the Communists had taken the US Ambassador Appropriationssubcommittees that control of the strategicregion,bring provided the funds for the warwere was the man in charge. ing an end to the alreadyshaky briefedregularly. Also,SenatorStu coalitiongovernment. art Symington and other 9~ CongressmenvisitedLaos and gave everyindication of approvingwhat SearchandRescue was happening. Theybelieved, Helmsnoted, that It was a much in Laos, he visited Air Forcebases and better WhilecontemplatingdirectAmeri and US Navycarriers,spreading the cheaper way to fight a war in SoutheastAsia than to commit can militaryintervention,President word thatairmenwhowere shot Americantroops. 4~ JohnsonorderedNavy and Air Force downoverLaos did not have to reconnaissanceflightsover the PDJ to worryaboutbeingpicked up: Air The CIA for provideintelligence and to send America spilotswould be there to get was largelyresponsible in Hanoi a message ofAmerican them out, competing for the $1,500 conductingmilitaryoperations but the US Ambassador the resolve. On 6 June, a navalrecon bonus.41 Laos, was in The in naissanceaircraftwas shotdownover man charge. secretwar the As the Laos,authorCharlesStevenson has PDJ. militaryservices When the storyreached AirAmerica, lacked search-and-rescue emphasized, wasWilliamSullivan s a capability it created a gooddeal of resentment. in AirAmericaundertook the war. AmbassadorfromDecember Laos, In June 1965, after an especiallyhaz March responsibility.39 ardouslong-rangemissionintoNorth 1964 to 1969,Sullivan insisted on an efficient, con Vietnam in which two helicopters closely trolledcountryteam. Therewasn t Thisunsuccessfulattempt to rescue werebadlyshot up and a local Lao a of rice in Laos that he Lt. Charles E. Klusmann who later commanderkilled in whatturned out bag dropped didn tknowabout, observedAssis escapedfrom his captors40 marked to be a successfulrescue of two Air tant Secretary of StateWilliam the beginning ofwhatwas perhaps Forceofficersfrom a downedF-4C, Bundy. Sullivanimposed two condi the mostdemandingand hazardous one of the Air Americahelicopter tions his subordinates. First, ofAirAmerica soperations in Laos. pilotswrote: The AF doesn t, I m upon the thinfiction of the Genevaaccords The airline spilotswereneither sure,appreciatewhat we are doing for had to be maintained to avoidpossi trained nor properlyequipped for the them at great risk to ourselves... ble embarrassment to the Lao and dangeroussearch-and-rescuetask, but Whatmakes us mad is that the AF SovietGovernments;militaryopera there was no one else to do the job. thinks we get $1,500 for a pickup. tions,therefore, had to be carried out Thismissionbecameevenmorediffi We get nothing butulcers. 42 in relative cult during the firsthalf of 1965, secrecy. Second, no regu lar US groundtroopswere to become when the air war expandedinto the involved. In Ambassador northwesternportion of North NotVerySecret general, Sullivan and his G. Vietnam. successor, McMurtrieGodley,successfully car Theyear 1965marked the beginning ried out this policy.44 As Air Americacrews in helicopters, of majormilitaryactivity in what transports, and T-28sriskedtheir becameknown as the secretwar in lives to save downed US airmen, Laos. Although the full extent of the at Udorn rumorsgrew that the civilianpilots conflict was not revealed to the Activity werereceiving a bounty of $1,500 for Americanpeopleuntil 1969-70, the eachrescue. Thisstoryapparently warwas not all thatsecret. News of TheAmbassador in Vientianedele originatedwith a US Air Forcecap the fightingfrequentlyfound its way gatedresponsibility for the tactical tain in the air attache soffice in into the pages of TheBangkokPost, conduct of the war to his CIA Vientiane.Chargedwithbriefing TheNew York Times, and othernews stationchief. Theprimaryheadquar militarypilots on rescuecapabilities papers. Congress was keptwell ters for supervising the war, however,
80 Air Operations
was in Udorn,Thailand.Located adjacent to the Air Americaparking ramp at UdornRoyalThai Air Force Base, the 4802ndJointLiaison
Detachment was the CIA scom
mandcenter for militaryoperations in Laos. Lair was in charge of the
4802nduntil the summer of 1968,
when he was replaced by his long timedeputy,Lloyd( Pat )Landry.
Both Lair and Landryhad excellent rapportwithGen.VitoonYasawatdi, commander of Headquarters333 at Udorn, the Thaiorganization in charge of thatcountry sforces in Laos. TheThaigeneral,who had direct,privateaccess to both the Lao
and Thai had been at 1970. Photo of D. ~~iIliams. primeministers, Air AmericaC-123 on ramp LongTieng, c~ourtesy identified by one seniorCIAofficer as thesinglemost player im~ortant~ in the Laosprogram. ahead suffered by Air Americadur IntelligenceEstimate(SNIE) to top- ing 1965,1966, and 1967. Despite a level policymakers in Washington on rapidgrowth in personnel, Air Amer Commt~nistIntentions in Laos.
andtheWar ica lost 11 crewmembers in Weather only Despite the presence of 35,000NVA Laos thesethree five of during years, troops in the country, CIAanalysts took whichwere due to action. The earlyyears of the war on a enemy concluded that Hanoi was mainly seasonalaspect.During the dry interested in protecting its supply whichlastedfromOctober to period, routes jo SouthVietnam and did not the NorthVietnamese and NorthVietnamesePressure May, wish to destroy the generalframe Pathet Lao went on the offensive, work of the 1962Geneva applyingpressure on the Hmong in Thecharacter of the war began to settlem~ent.46 northernLaos and on government change in 1968. TheNorth forcesthroughout the country. Dur Vietnamese,impatientwith the intro ing the monsoon,lastingfromJune progress of the Pathet Lao, Eventssoonproved the SNIE to be to September, the anti-Communists ducedmajor newcombatforces into correct. TheNVAoffensiveended of tookcontrol of the tookadvantage the mobilitypro Laos and year s with the onset of themonsoon in AirAmerica and struck offensive. mid-March, vided by deep dry season By May. The Hmong,however, had into enemy-occupiedterritory. The theyhad captured a strategicvalley sufferedheavycasualties,losingmore situation was a mirrorimage ofViet north of LuangPrabang,successfully than 1,000 mensinceJanuary, nam. In Laos, the Communistsacted assaulted a key navigationalfacility A includingmany top commanders. as a conventionalmilitaryforce and thatwas used by the US Air Force for recruit~entdriveturned 300 threat up only were tied to fixedsupplylines. The bombingNorthVietnam, and replacements: 30 percentwere Hmong, at least at first, countered ened to push the Hmong out of their between the of 10 and 14, 30 withguerrillatactics. mountaintopstrongholdssurround ages while the ing the PDJ. percen~twere 15 and 16, 40 were all over The limitednature of the war was remair~ing percent those reflected in the modestlosses that On 21 March1968, CIAHeadquar 35. Aècording to Pop Buell, National those were all dead.47 is, modest in comparison to what was ters issued a Special betwe~n ages
81 AirOperations
Offensiveand LosingGround monthshaveproduced an appalling Counteroffensive toll in lives and seriousinjuries, he The monsoonseason of 1971 saw the urged all flightcrews and supervisors last majoroffensiveoperations by the to reappraise the factors whichmake As the strength ofthe Hmongwaned, Hmong, nowassisted by growing flying in our operations a particularly the UnitedStatestried to redress the numbers ofThaivolunteerbattal unforgivingprofession. We are called imbalance of forces in the growing ions,trained and paid by the CIA. upon to performunderpossibly the fieldthroughincreased use of air- Vang Pao againcaptured the PDJ in mostdifficultenvironmentalcondi power. Between 1965 and 1968, the Julyandestablished a network of tions in the worldconsidering the combination of rate of sorties in Laos had remained artillerystrongpoints,manned by remote,mountain Thai Pao s of ous terrain,absence of modern fairlyconstant at 10 to 20 a day. In gunners. Vang hope retaining the PDJ during the dry sea navigational/communications and air 1969, the rate reached 300 per day.48 son wentunfulfilled. In December trafficcontrolfacilities,activepres 1971, the NorthVietnamese ence ofhostilearmedforces,absence
During the rainyseason of 1969, launched a coordinatedassault ofadequatemeans of reporting and the variedseasonal Vang Pao abandoned the use ofguer against the artillerybases. Using forecasting tanks and 130-mm thatout- weather andwinds, and air rilla tactics and launched a major guns marginal fields and offensiveagainst the NVA/Pathet Lao ranged the Thaiartillery, the NVA landingzones, to name a the PDJ.5 fewexamples. Everyone, he warned, forces,using the increasedairpower quicklyrecaptured shouldexerciseextremecautionwhen to support a driveagainstenemy The last days of 1971 and conductingflightoperations in the early positions on PDJ. Operation Laos. months of 1972 saw increasedenemy AboutFace was a hugesuccess. The pressure on the mainHmong base at Hmongreclaimed the entirePDJ for LongTieng. Air Americasuffered the first timesince 1960, losses this capturing heavy during period. In ClosingDown 1,700 tons of food,2,500 tons of Decemberalone, 24 aircraftwere hit fire and three shot ammunition, 640 heavyweapons, by ground were At the sametime thatAir America and 25 SovietPT-76tanks.49 down. BetweenDecember andApril, crewswerebeingremindedabout the six AirAmericacrewmembersdied hazardous of in in Laos.52 nature operations Laos,DCIHelms was the But the victorywas short-lived. In deciding fate of the 1970, the NVA in air proprietary. On 21 January brought Thewaralso wentbadly in southern April 1972, he ended a lengthy two divisionsthatquicklyregained all Laos,where the CIArecruited, debatewithin the CIAover the con the lost ground and threatened the trained,advised, and paidindigenous tinuedneed for a covertairlift who into majorHmongbase at LongTieng. personnel wereorganized capability, andordered the Agency to SpecialGuerrillaUnits. Heavyfight For the first time,B-52swereused to divestitselfof ownership and control ing erupted in 1971 for control ofthe blunt the enemydrive. ofAirAmerica and related strategicBolovensPlateau,with Air compa nies. AirAmericawould be retained Americaproviding the essential air onlyuntil the end of the war in NVAstrength in Laos had reached for the CIA-ledforces. By transport SoutheastAsia.55 67,000men, but CIAanalysts the end of the year,however, the NVA held the hand fol continued to arguethat the enemy clearly upper the of 25 On 27 January1973, the Parisagree did not want to risk a decisiveaction. lowing capture Paksong, miles of the River ment on Vietnam was concluded, TheCommunistsbelieve thatwhen east Mekong town of Pakse, on 28 December.53 providing for the withdrawal of theyobtaintheirobjectives in South Americantroops. Thefollowing Vietnam, the CIA sOffice of cease-fire On 24 April1972, AirAmerica svice month, a agreementwas NationalEstimatespredicted in April in Vientiane, to the president for flightoperationssent a signed leading 1970, Laoswill fall into their formation of a coalition telexmessageaddressed to all crew government hands. 50 for Laos. the end of the members. Notingthat the past few Although
82 AirOperations
Air Americacomplex at Udorn,Thailand, 1973. Photocourtesy ofJudyPorter.
war was clearly in sight, Air America On 3 June 1974, the lastAirAmer and dead in Laos and regret that they continued to lose people. Indeed, it ica aircraftcrossed the borderfrom too could not haveenjoyedtoday. is somewhatironicthat Air America Laos intoThailand. The end went In all, 100 AirAmericapersonnel had died in Laos.56 suffered its heaviestlosses in the two well, Air America soperationsoffice yearsfollowing the CIA sdecision to in VientianeinformedWashington terminate the Between .and the ofAAMfrom company. departure Thebase at Udorn was shutdown at April1972,whenHelmsissued his Laos was withoutincident,although the end ofJune. Operations in Viet when orders, andJune 1974, Air somelumps are visible in the throats namcontinueduntil the fall of America left the country, 23 crew of thosewho put so much of them Saigon in April 1975. Whenplans in membersdied in flightoperations selves into the operationover the for a newstay-behindcompany in Laos. years.... We grieve for thosemissing Thailand,staffed by a contingent of
83 AirOperations
selecthelicopterand transportpilots, of air transport, one thatdeserves bet andCIA CovertOperations in Asia ofAlabama fell through, all Air Americaperson ter than a misleading,mediocre (University Press,1984). nel weredischarged. Thecompany movie. 8. See of United finallyclosed its doors on 30 June Department Defense, States-VietnamRelations,1945-1967, 1976,returningmorethan $20 mil 12 books(Washington:Government lion to the US Treasury.57 NOTES PrintingOffice,1971),Book 9, p. 38.
1. TedGittinger,interviewwithRich 9. Leary,PerilousMissions, pp. 164-67. A DistinguishedRecord ard Helms, 16 September1981, Oral HistoryProgram,LyndonBaines 10. BernardFall, Hell in a Small JohnsonPresidentialLibrary,Austin, Very CAT/AirAmericaperformed Place: The ofDienBienPhu TX. For recentstudies of the war in Siege for the CIA. Theskilled air- (Philadelphia:Lippincort,1966). superbly Laos, see Timothy N. Castle, At War Thisremains the standardaccount of crews andgroundpersonnel of the air in the Shadow ofVietnam: US. Mili the battle. proprietaryhad givenCIA the air taryAid to the RoyalLao Government York:Columbia transportcapabilityrequired for a (New University Press,1993); Jan Hamilton-Merritt, 11. Leary,PerilousMissions, pp. 18 1-92. variety of covertoperations in Asia. Mountains: The The Although this air complex 58 had Tragic Hmong, Americans, andSecretWarsforLaos, 12. In US toward Arthur causedlegalproblems for the CIA s policy Laos, see 1942-1992(Bloomington:Indiana J. Dommen,Conflict in Laos: The Directorate ofAdministration,there UniversityPress, 1993);Kenneth Policy ofNeutralization,revisededi that is no question personnel in the Conboy andJamesMorrison,Shadow tion (NewYork:Praeger,1971), and Directorate of Operationsconsidered War: The CIA ~r SecretWar in Laos Charles A. Stevenson, TheEnd of (Boulder,GO:PaladinPress, CAT/AirAmerica as an essential tool 1995); Nowhere:AmericanPolicyToward for theirwork. and RogerWarner,Shooting at the LaosSince1954(Boston:Beacon Moon: TheStoryofAmerica s Clandes Press, 1973). tine War in Laos(SouthRoyalton, During the war in Laos, AirAmerica VT: SteerforthPress, 1996),which is 13. Castle, At War in the Shadow ofViet was calledupon to performparamili the revisededition of BackFire: The nam, 16-17. CIA s Secret War Laosand Links pp. tarytasks at great risk to the aircrews in Its involved.Althoughlacking the disci to the War in Vietnam(NewYork: Simon and Schuster,1995). 14. RiceDropOverLaos, CATBulletin plinefound in a militaryorganization, 8 (December1955), pp. 4-5. the personnel of the air proprietary 2. ChristopherRobbins,AirAmerica: continued to placetheirlives at hazard TheStory ofthe CIA sSecretAirlines 15. LearyinterviewwithBlevins, 11 July for SomeAirAmerica flew years. pilots (NewYork: G. P. Putnam sSons, 1987. in Laos for more than a decade,brav 1979). fire and ing enemy surmounting 16. See Minutes ofMeeting on Name challengingoperationalconditionswith 3. See Robbins, AirAmerica Doesn t Change, 4 April 1959, in microfilm collection ofAirAmerica rare skill and determination. As Fly Right, TheNew York Times, 28 legal 1990. records, in the author s pointed out by a seniorAgencyofficial August possession. during the dedication of a plaque to Air 4. Robbins,Air 138. 17. See Conboyand Morrison,Shadow Americapersonnel at CIAHeadquar America, p. War, pp. 20-21. ters in May 1988: Theaircrew, maintenance, and otherprofessional 5. JosephWestermeyer,Poppies,Pipes, andPeople:Opium and Its Use in Laos 18. LearyinterviewwithRousselot, 10 aviationskillstheyapplied on our (Berkeley:University of California August1987. behalfwereextraordinary. But, above Press,1982), p. 51. all, theybrought a dedication to our 19. LearyinterviewwithDale D. Will mission and the standards of highest 6. Ted Gittinger,interviewwithWill iamson,chiefpilot of the first in the conduct of that personalcourage iam Colby, 2 June 1981,OralHistory helicoptercontingent to Laos, 13 July mission. 59 Program, LBJ Library. 1987.
Theexploits of CAT/AirAmerica 7. For a detailedaccount of CAT, see 20. LearyinterviewwithRousselot, 10 PerilousMissions:CivilAir 1987. form a uniquechapter in the history Transport August
84 Air Operations
21. LearyinterviewwithAderholt, 28 1970), and Warner,Shooting at the Laos, see Conboyand Morrison, August1990. Moon,passim. Shadow War.
22. Public thePresidents the 35. William HonorableMen: Papers of of Colby, My 47. RobertShaplen, Time Out ofHand. UnitedStates, D. Eisenhower, in the CIA York:Simon and Dwight Lift (New Revolution andReaction in Southeast 1960-61 DC: Govern Schuster,1978), 191-93. (Washington, pp. Asia(NewYork:Harper and Row, mentPrintingOffice,1961), p. 641; 1969), pp. 347-48. Felt is in Edward Marolda quoted J. 36. Casterlin to his parents, 24 January and Oscar P. The United Fitzgerald, 1963,copyprovided to the author by StatesNavyandthe VietnamConflict: CaptainCasterlin. 48. RaphaelLirtauerand NormanUphoff FromMilitaryAssistance to Combat (eds.). TheAir War in Indochina, (Washington, DC: Government revis~dedition(Boston:BeaconPress, 37. Colby,HonorableMen, pp. 192-95. PrintingOffice,1986), pp. 24-25. 1972), p. 79. 38. Hamilton-Merritt,TragicMountains, 23. Stevenson,End ofNowhere, pp. 110- 113-26;Casterlin to his 49. CIA,SNIE14.3-1-70,North Viet 120. pp. parents, 11 November1963. nameseIntentions:Indochina, 3 June 1970,DDRS 1980: 324. 24. Felt and Burke are quoted in Marolda 39. Marolda and Fitzgerald,UnitedStates and Fitzgerald,UnitedStatesNavy, p. Navy, 378. 55. p. 50. CIA,Office of NationalEstimates, Stocfrtaking in Indochina, 17 April 40. For Klusmann saccount ofhis DDRS 25. LearyinterviewwithLair, 3 July escape, 1970, 1977:270C. see his ThePrice of Freedom, Air 1993. Lair sstory is best told in AmericaLog 14 (October-December at theMoon. Warner,Shooting 51. TheCIAand the SecretWar 1997), pp. 12-15. Leary, in Iiaos: The Battle for SkylineRidge, 26. Jack F. Mathews to the author, 15 1971-1972, TheJournal 41. LearyinterviewwithJames L. Mullen, ofMilitary February1998. 59 (July1995):505-18. whoworked in Air America sFlight History InformationCenter in 1965, 13 July 27. LearyinterviewwithLair, 3 July 1987. 52. The Post, 21 1993. Washington January 1972. 42. Casterlin, ForPosterity, 21 June 28. Ibid. 1965. 53. On the war in the south, see Soutchay 29. Hamilton-Merritt, Mountains, Voñgsavanh, RLGMilitaryOpera Tragic 43. interviewwithHelms, 16 Gittiriger tioñs andActivities in the Laotian pp. 86-94. September1981. Pai~handle, IndochinaMonographs DC:ArmyCenter of 30. Castle, At War in the Shadow ofViet (W~shington, 44. Stevenson, End ofNowhere, pp. 208- Mi~itaryHistory,1981); and Conboy nam, pp. 29-30,43-44. 18. and Morrison,Shadow War.
31.AbadietoLeary,lOJune1990; 45. See the informativestaffreport of a Hamilton-Merritt,TragicMountains, 54. AVPFO/DFDTPE to All Chief visit to Laos by James G. Lowenstein 108. Pilots, 27 1972, the of p. and Richard M. Moose: US Senate April papers David H, Hickler, AirAmerica Subcommittee on US SecurityAgree 32. Lansdale to Resources for Archives,University of Texas at Taylor, ments and CommitmentsAbroad of UnconventionalWarfare in S. E. Dallas. the Committee on ForeignRelations, Asia, 19611, in The July Pentagon Laos:April1971, 92ndCong., ist sess., Papers - New York TimesEdition(New 1971;LearyinterviewwithLandry, 3 55. UnitedStatesSenate,SelectCommit York:BantamBooks,1971), pp. 130- 1993. July tee to StudyGovernmental 38. OperationswithRespect to Intelli 46. CIA,SpecialNationalIntelligence genceOperations the Church with 33. Learyinterview Andresevic, 19 Estimate(SNIE)58-60,Communist Committee],Fore~gnandMilitary June 1987. Intentions in Laos, 21 March1968, In~elligence - Book I - FinalReport DeclassifiedDocumentsReference No. 94-755], 94th Cong., 2nd sess. On Don A. Mis 34. Buell, see Schanche, System(DDRS), 1989: 1865. For a (washington, DC: Government York:David ter Pop (New McKay, detailedaccount of the groundwar in PrintingOffice,1976), p. 241.
85 Air Operations
56. Telex,VP-NTDUTH to ChiefExec utiveOffice, 3 June 1974,Hickler Papers.
57. UnitedStatesSenate,Foreign andMi! itaryIntelligence, p. 239.
58. An oft-usedterm at the time,encom passing all of the variouselements of CIA s air proprietary in Laos.
59. Remarks by James N. Glerum at the annualceremony for CIAemployees whodied in the line of duty, 31 May 1988.
86