DOCSLIB.ORG

How Iran Regime Cheated the World Tehran’S Systematic Efforts to Cover up Its Nuclear Weapons Program

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
How Iran Regime Cheated the World Tehran’S Systematic Efforts to Cover up Its Nuclear Weapons Program How Iran Regime Cheated the World Tehran’s Systematic Efforts to Cover Up its Nuclear Weapons Program National Council of Resistance of Iran US Representative Office June 2014 HOW IRAN REGIME CHEATED THE WORLD; Tehran’s Systematic Eforts to Cover Up its Nuclear Weapons Program Copyright © National Council of Resistance of Iran - U.S. Representative Ofce, 2014. All rights reserved. No part of this monograph may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in articles or reviews. First published in 2014 by National Council of Resistance of Iran - U.S. Representative Ofce 1747 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Suite 1125, Washington, DC 20006 ISBN-13: 978-0-9904327-0-8 ISBN-10: 0-9904327-0-8 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data National Council of Resistance of Iran - U.S. Representative Ofce. HOW IRAN REGIME CHEATED THE WORLD; Tehran’s Systematic Eforts to Cover Up its Nuclear Weapons Program 1. Iran-Military policy. 2. Nuclear weapons-Iran. 3. Iran-Foreign relations. 4. Security, International. 5. Rouhani, Hassan. First Edition: June 2014 Printed in the United States of America _____________________________________________________ Tese materials are being distributed by the National Council of Resistance of Iran-U.S. Representative Ofce. Additional information is on fle with the Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. How Iran Regime Cheated the World Tehran’s Systematic Efforts to Cover Up its Nuclear Weapons Program National Council of Resistance of Iran US Representative Office June 2014 Table of Contents Demanding Iran to accept the Additional Protocol, indispensable to any viable nuclear accord. ....................................... 7 Concealing aspects of the nuclear program through the use of conventional military sites, and barring access to the IAEA. 9 Disclosure of the sites and Tehran’s refusal to provide further information to the IAEA. .. 17 “Transparency”: Two examples of Tehran’s attitude toward IAEA inspections . .. 21 Regime ofcials confess. .. 27 Te latest status of the military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program. 33 Conclusion. ..................................................... 41 Endnotes. ....................................................... 43 Annex I. ........................................................ 44 Annex II. .. 45 How Iran Cheated the World 7 Introduction Demanding Iran to Accept the Additional Protocol, Indispensable to Any Viable Nuclear Accord ne of the most fundamental challenges that goes to the heart of the dispute Oregarding the Iranian regime’s ambitious nuclear weapons program is for the international community to ascertain with confdence that Tehran will not pursue a nuclear bomb. Such an assurance can only be obtained through specifc steps taken by Tehran in response to the international community’s concerns. Tis white paper discusses the Iranian regime’s lack of transparency when addressing the international community’s concerns about the true nature and the ultimate purpose of its nuclear program. Te analysis relies on credible intelligence and information obtained and collected by sources afliated with the main Iranian opposition group, the Mujahedin-e Khalq (PMOI/MEK). Specifcally, it looks at the information obtained by the organization’s network that has infltrated the ruling regime, specifcally over the past 12 years. Despite Tehran’s insistence that it has adequately responded to all outstanding concerns raised by the UN nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an impartial study of Tehran’s tangible actions and corresponding attitude suggests a diferent account and casts serious doubts on Tehran’s claims of transparency. June 2014 ” We halted the nuclear program? We were the ones who completed it! Hassan Rouhani on Iranian State ”TV, May 2013 How Iran Cheated the World 9 1 Concealing Aspects of The Nuclear Program Through The Use of Conventional Military Sites, And Barring Access to The IAEA discernible aspect of the Iranian nuclear program consists of a substantial Anumber of sites, workshops, and labs utilized in the nuclear program that have actually been set up in conventional military sites. As part of Tehran’s overall strategy, this approach ofers a number of advantages, including the following: • Tese sites are cordoned of (a typical and reasonable measure for military locations); • Military personnel and ofcials have the freedom and the rationale to visit these sites on a regular basis; • Rejecting IAEA access to these sites may be perceived as defensible under the pretext of national security concerns. Background Te existence and extent of Tehran’s nuclear program was publicly revealed for the frst time by the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) at a press conference in August 2002 in Washington, DC. Te disclosures focused on two locations: a uranium enrichment site located near the town of Natanz and a heavy water reactor located in the city of Arak (both in central Iran). Tis high-profle revelation, triggered IAEA inquiry, and eventual inspection of the sites for the frst time in February 2003. Tese revelations were followed by another disclosure about a facility known as Kala- Electric in February 2003. In May of that year, the NCRI also revealed in Washington, DC, the existence of the Lavizan-Shian site that functioned as the command center of Tehran’s nuclear program. Te IAEA inspected the site in June 2004, but by that time June 2014 10 How Iran Cheated the World the Iranian regime had already razed the buildings, even hauling away soil as deep as 20 meters in the area. Subsequent to these disclosures and inspections, the IAEA and major European powers (France, Britain, and Germany also referred to as the EU-3) engaged Iranian ofcials in 2004 and 2005. As a result, Tehran agreed to suspend its uranium enrichment. Iran’s current president Hassan Rouhani was Tehran’s lead negotiator at the time. However, when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took ofce as the new president in mid- 2005, Tehran efectively rescinded the agreement during the second half of 2005. Besides resuming enrichment at Natanz and installing centrifuges, the regime stepped up constructing additional sites for its nuclear activities. It was critical for the regime that these sites remain out of view and inaccessible to the IAEA. Te sites had the following characteristics: • Tey were all eventually placed under the supervision of the command center for production of nuclear weapons known as the “Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research” (known by its Farsi acronym SPND), which is headed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Brigadier General Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Mahabadi (a key fgure in the nuclear program and a Defense Minister Deputy who directly reports to the Defense Minister); • Te sites were constructed in tunnels that could shield them from potential air strikes; • Tey were built in conventional military locations that would ofer an added layer of intelligence protection to conceal their existence; and • Te regime could stonewall IAEA requests for inspection by falling back on the limitations specifed in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Te NCRI has identifed and disclosed several of such sites as follows: i. Fordow In a press conference in Paris on December 20, 2005, , NCRI’s Foreign Afairs Committee Chair Mohammad Mohaddessin made public the regime’s strategy for the construction of tunnels for its nuclear activities. He revealed for the frst time the existence of Fordow facility as an underground complex under construction near the city of Qom. Subsequently, on December 25, 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama, French June 2014 How Iran Cheated the World 11 President Nicolas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown acknowledged the existence of Fordow on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. On October 1, 2009, afer Fordow had been built and was about to become operational, the NCRI disclosed further details during a press conference. Among other things, it revealed that: Fordow Site; Imagery source: Digital Globe Te construction and progress of Fordow in Qom was directly supervised by Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Mahabadi. A number of experts directly involved in executing the project were tied to the “Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research” (known as Mojdeh at the time), which was under the command of Fakhrizadeh. Additional information on a number of fgures working directly with Fakhrizadeh during the construction of Fordow is provided in Annex 1. In order to conceal its location in Qom, this site was built inside an IRGC military base. As such, requests for access or disclosure of the site’s activities, not to mention IAEA requests for inspection, could be stonewalled under the pretext of the military nature of the location. Te site’s name (Fordow) was borrowed from the name of a village situated near Qom. By choosing “Fordow” to identify the site, the regime essentially sought to shield it so that in the event that information about it was revealed, intelligence agencies would focus on June 2014 12 How Iran Cheated the World Fordow village, almost 80 km away, where they would fnd nothing of interest. Te Fordow site is situated 30 kilometers north of the city of Qom, south of a seasonal lake called Hoz-e Soltan and to the east of the Tehran-Qom Highway. Two deserted villages of Aminabad and Sadrabad are roughly 10 km from this site. Te Fordow village, however, is on the other side of the city 50 km south of Qom; it has no geographical links to the nuclear site. Once the existence of Fordow was disclosed, Tehran initially claimed that it had already reported the site to the IAEA. But the IAEA wrote in Article 30 of the annex to its November 2011 report: “In addition, although now declared and currently under safeguards, a number of facilities dedicated to uranium enrichment (the Fuel Enrichment Plant and the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz and the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant near Qom) were covertly built by Iran and only declared once the Agency was made aware of their existence by sources other than Iran.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Iran Dossier
    30 November 2010 Last updated at 14:48 GMT Iran and EU agree new nuclear talks Iran's nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili is to travel to Geneva for the talks Iran has agreed to hold talks on its controversial nuclear programme, the European Union has said. The talks are to take place in Geneva on 6 and 7 December, said the EU's foreign policy chief, Baroness Ashton. They will be the first high-level direct talks with Iran on the nuclear issue since October 2009. Western powers fear Iran is seeking to develop nuclear weapons, but Tehran insists its uranium enrichment programme is peaceful and legal. Baroness Ashton's office said that meetings with Iranian chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili next week see the EU's foreign policy chief would lead a delegation of officials from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council - US, Russia, China, France and Britain - as well as Germany. "We've now received a response from the Iranian authorities in which they have said that Dr Jalili has accepted Catherine Ashton's proposal to meet in Geneva", a spokesman said on Tuesday. Western countries have called on Iran to stop all enrichment of uranium amid accusations that the country is pursuing a secret nuclear weapons programme. Iran's defiance has led to sanctions on the country, which says it uses nuclear technology only for peaceful purposes. As a member state of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran says it has the right to enrich uranium to produce nuclear fuel. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad vowed on Tuesday that his country would not make "one iota" of concessions over its nuclear rights at the meetings in Geneva.
    [Show full text]
  • Eastern Mediterranean La Revue De Santé De La Health Journal Méditerranée Orientale
    EMHJ – Vol. 24 No. 5 – 2018 Eastern Mediterranean La Revue de Santé de la Editorial Health Journal Méditerranée orientale World No Tobacco Day 2018: towards a sustainable campaign involving the cardiovascular community Fatimah El-Awa, Nizal Sarrafzadegan, Slim Slama and Asmus Hammerich .............................................................................................409 Research articles Smoking behaviour among male students in a Saudi University Guoping Jiang, Shafi Aldamer and Ahmed Bendania .........................................................................................................................................411 Tobacco cessation: attitude and practice of dentists in Northern United Arab Emirates Danavanthi Bangera, Mohamed Takana and Jayakumary Muttappallymyalil .........................................................................................419 Comparative analysis of essential medicines for cardiovascular diseases in countries of the WHO Eastern Mediterranean Region Hedieh Mehrtash, Richard Laing and Veronika J. Wirtz ...................................................................................................................................427 Hypertension and associated cardiovascular risk factors among urban slum dwellers in Egypt: a population-based survey Mohsen Gadallah, Soad Abdel Megid, Amira Mohsen and Sahar Kandil ...................................................................................................435 Practice and enforcement of national Hospital Waste Management
    [Show full text]
  • The European Position on the Nuclear Agreement: Its Significance and Future Scenarios
    STUDY The European Position on the Nuclear Agreement: Its Significance and Future Scenarios ٢٠٢٠ July ١٦ Sulaiman Hussain Alwadai a researcher at the International Insti- (tute for Iranian Studies (Rasanah Contents Introduction ...........................................................................................................3 I. European and Iranian Motives for Signing the Nuclear Deal ...............5 II. The US Withdrawal and the European Pledges to Maintain the Nuclear Deal .......................................................................... 10 III. The Factors Causing a Shift in the European Position on Iran ....... 14 IV. The Diminishing Importance of the Nuclear Deal ...............................17 V. The European Position and the Future of the Nuclear Deal ..............19 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 22 Introduction The nuclear deal has been a turning point in the course of Iranian-European relations. The governments of the European Troika (France, Germany and the UK) and their Iranian counterpart contributed significantly to concluding the agreement and reaching common ground. This was done in order for both parties to reap the political and economic benefits from lifting the UN sanctions on Iran. This was in addition to monitoring Iran’s nuclear program. When the Trump administration decided to pull out of the nuclear deal, the European parties clung to the deal and adopted a neutral position with regard to the recriminations between the two parties (the United States and Iran) to prevent the total collapse of the deal. The policies of Russia and China clash with those of the United States. As a result, they denounced the US pullout from the deal and rejected the sanctions imposed on Iran. Along with Iranian diplomatic efforts, the three The European Position on the Nuclear Agreement: Its Significance and Future Scenarios 3 parties seek to persuade the European countries to adopt a position which is in opposition to Trump’s unilateral policies.
    [Show full text]
  • Examining 10 Warning Signs of Iran Nuclear Weapons
    International Committee In Search of Justice (ISJ) President: Dr. Alejo Vidal-Quadras Rue d’Arlon 63, B-1040 Brussels Belgium Tel : +32 2 400 1071 [email protected] www.isjcommittee.com EXAMINING 10 WARNING SIGNS OF IRAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT NOVEMBER 20,2014 Dr. Alejo Vidal Quadras, Former Vice‐President of European Parliament, Professor of Atomic and Nuclear Physics: “An objective, thoroughly researched report on the core issue of the nature of Iranian nuclear program and its status”. Bob Jospeh, Former US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Senior White House Security Council staff on weapons of mass destruction: “A critically important report at a critically important time”. John Bolton, former US Ambassador to the UN, former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security: "A timely and well document report with alarming findings on Iran's nuclear program." Contents Executive summary Chapter 1: SPND (organ in charge of weaponization) Chapter 2: Procurement of dual purpose equipment and its possible use for military dimensions of nuclear program Chapter 3: Secret enrichment of uranium Chapter 4: Enrichment using laser technology Chapter 5: High explosives tests and trigger mechanism Chapter 6: Neutron initiator Chapter 7: Manufacturing uranium metal (uranium hemisphere) Chapter 8: Hydro-dynamic tests and explosion vessels at Parchin site Chapter 9: Research on nuclear warhead Chapter 10: Key scientists and researchers engaged in possible military dimensions of nuclear program International Committee In Search of Justice (ISJ) was initially formed in 2008 as an informal group of EU parliamentarians to seek justice for the Iranian democratic opposition.
    [Show full text]
  • Examining 10 Warning Signs of Iran Nuclear Weapons Development
    International Committee In Search of Justice (ISJ) President: Dr. Alejo Vidal-Quadras Rue d’Arlon 63, B-1040 Brussels Belgium Tel : +32 2 400 1071 [email protected] www.isjcommittee.com EXAMINING 10 WARNING SIGNS OF IRAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT NOVEMBER 20,2014 Dr. Alejo Vidal Quadras, Former Vice‐President of European Parliament, Professor of Atomic and Nuclear Physics: “An objective, thoroughly researched report on the core issue of the nature of Iranian nuclear program and its status”. Bob Jospeh, Former US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Senior White House Security Council staff on weapons of mass destruction: “A critically important report at a critically important time”. John Bolton, former US Ambassador to the UN, former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security: "A timely and well document report with alarming findings on Iran's nuclear program." Contents Executive summary Chapter 1: SPND (organ in charge of weaponization) Chapter 2: Procurement of dual purpose equipment and its possible use for military dimensions of nuclear program Chapter 3: Secret enrichment of uranium Chapter 4: Enrichment using laser technology Chapter 5: High explosives tests and trigger mechanism Chapter 6: Neutron initiator Chapter 7: Manufacturing uranium metal (uranium hemisphere) Chapter 8: Hydro-dynamic tests and explosion vessels at Parchin site Chapter 9: Research on nuclear warhead Chapter 10: Key scientists and researchers engaged in possible military dimensions of nuclear program International Committee In Search of Justice (ISJ) was initially formed in 2008 as an informal group of EU parliamentarians to seek justice for the Iranian democratic opposition.
    [Show full text]
  • Attacks Against the Iranian Nuclear Program
    OEA Team Threat Report G-2 G-2 Title Attacks Against the Iranian Date Nuclear Program 15 February 2012 US Army TRADOC G2 TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) – Threats Dr. Majid Shahriari’s car after the attack1 Publication Date: 15 February 2012 US Army TRADOC G2 Information Cut-Off Date: 25 January 2012 TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) – Threats 1 U.S. UNCLASSIFIED U.S. UNCLASSIFIED OEA Team Threat Report G-2 Purpose To inform readers of the locations of Iran’s six major nuclear sites To inform deploying units, trainers, and scenario writers of the attacks and accidents that have plagued the Iranian nuclear program over the past 12 years To identify the various tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used to assassinate scientists associated with the Iranian nuclear program To identify other methods used to damage the Iranian nuclear program over the past 12 years Product Caveat: This presentation has been developed from multiple unclassified sources and is primarily intended for use as a training product for the Department of Army. This briefing should not be considered a finished intelligence product, nor used in such a manner. 2 U.S. UNCLASSIFIED OEA Team Threat Report G-2 Executive Summary Provides a map of the location of Iran’s 6 major nuclear sites Presents a timeline of the accidents, attacks, and assassinations associated with the Iranian nuclear programs since 2001 Provides information on the assassination or the attempts on the lives of scientists and other negative incidents associated with the Iranian nuclear program Includes civilian experts’ speculation about the actor or actors involved with the attempts to derail the Iranian nuclear program Provides additional negative events in Iran that may or may not be associated with its nuclear program 3 U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Spatial Analysis of Urban Inequality in Qazvin Province
    © 2013, Scienceline Publication Journal of Civil Engineering and Urbanism Volume 3, Issue 5: 300-309 (2013) (Received: May 18, 2013; Accepted: September 10, 2013; Published: September 30, 2013) ISSN-2252-0430 Spatial Analysis of Urban Inequality in Qazvin Province Mahdi Salehi1*and Budaq Budaqov2 1PhD Student in Geography and Urban Planning, Azarbijan National Academy of Science 2Full Professor in Geography, Member of Azarbijan National Academy of Science *Corresponding author’s Email address: [email protected] ABSTRACT: As a descriptive-analytical study, this paper aims to investigate and analyze spatial inequalities among different cities of Qazvin province during 1976-2006, using statistical models and software. Regarding population, social, economic, health, cultural, infrastructural, transportation and communicational indicators in 25 cities of Qazvin province, Qazvin, Abgarm, Narje are most developed, and KhakAli, Sagez Abad, Aavaj, Abgarm, Zia Abad, and Sirdan, are deprived cities, respectively. Coefficient of variance model indicates the most inequality belongs to cultural indicator and the least belong to social indicators. Based on the results of the study, economical factor is more effective on spatial structure of all cities in Qazvin. Moreover, infrastructural and cultural factors are influential in cities of the province. Keywords: Spatial Analysis, Statistical Analysis, Urban Inequality, Qazvin Province INTRODUCTION study aims to reach a balanced regional development in Qazvin province and to find out situation and distribution
    [Show full text]
  • Drug Literacy in Iran: the Experience of Using “The Single Item Health Literacy Screening (SILS) Tool”
    Iranian Journal of Pharmaceutical Research (2014),13 (supplement): 217-224 Copyright © 2014 by School of Pharmacy Received: November 2013 Shaheed Beheshti University of Medical Sciences and Health Services Accepted: December 2013 Original Article Drug Literacy in Iran: the Experience of Using “The Single Item Health Literacy Screening (SILS) Tool” Farzad Peiraviana*, Hamid Reza Rasekha, Hasan Jahani Hashemib, Navid Mohammadic, Nahid Jafarid and Kianoosh Fardie aDepartment of Phamacoeconomics and Pharmaceutical Management, School of Pharmacy, Shahid Beheshti University of Medical Sciences, Tehran, Iran. bDepartment of Biostatistics, School of Medicine, Qazvin University of Medical Sciences, Qazvin, Iran. cDepartment of Community Medicine, Faculty of Medicine, Tehran University of Medical Sciences, Tehran, Iran. dHealth Management Network Center, Ministry of Health and Medical Education, Iran. eDeputy of Food and Drug, Shahid Beheshti University of Medical Sciences, Tehran, Iran. Abstract Drug and health literacy is a key determinant of health outcomes. There are several tools to assess drug and health literacy. The objective of this article is to determine drug literacy level and its relationships with other factors using a single item screening tool. A cross- sectional survey was conducted among 1104 people in Qazvin province, Iran. Based on the proportional-to-size method, participants over 15 years old with ability to read were recruited randomly from 6 counties in Qazvin province and were interviewed directly. To determine drug literacy
    [Show full text]
  • IRGC Gets 112 Missile-Launching Speed Boats Russian Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova Said on Thursday the U.S
    WWW.TEHRANTIMES.COM I N T E R N A T I O N A L D A I L Y 12 Pages Price 50,000 Rials 1.00 EURO 4.00 AED 42nd year No.13675 Saturday MAY 30, 2020 Khordad 10, 1399 Shawwal 7, 1441 EU, Russia condemn EU designates Rock climber Alipour Film Museum of Iran U.S. for ending Naghsh-e Jahan Sq. as looks to win reopens after 3-month nuclear waivers 2 World Heritage asset 8 Olympics gold 11 coronavirus closure 12 Over $7.3b allocated for See page 2 development projects TEHRAN — Head of Iran’s Planning and accelerating the implementation of prior- Budget Organization (PBO) has announced itized national and provincial development an over 310 trillion rials (about $7.38 bil- projects and to fulfill the current year’s slogan lion) budget allocation for development which is “surge in production”. projects across the country in the current The resources allocated to the national Iranian calendar year (started on March development projects are going to be 218 20), IRNA reported. trillion rials ($5.19 billion), while special According to a PBO statement, the provincial projects will be given 16.74 tril- mentioned budget has been allocated for lion rials ($398.5 million), 4 U.S. move to end nuclear sanction waivers are symbolic: Shireen Hunter By Javad Heirannia real. The ending of waivers are in the same TEHRAN — Shireen Tahmaasb Hunter, vein,” Hunter comments. a professor of political science at George- She also says the goal behind such a town University, tells the Tehran Times move “is not to rescue JCPOA or even to that the new U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Operation “Olympic Games” Securing Memory Sharing
    OPERATION “OLYMPIC GAMES” SECURING MEMORY SHARING FOR CLOUD TENANTS Kshitij Yadav Associate Sales Engineer Analyst Dell EMC [email protected] Abhiram T.S. Associate Sales Engineer Analyst Dell EMC [email protected] Knowledge Sharing Article © 2020 Dell Inc. or its subsidiaries. The Dell Technologies Proven Professional Certification program validates a wide range of skills and competencies across multiple technologies and products. From Associate, entry-level courses to Expert-level, experience-based exams, all professionals in or looking to begin a career in IT benefit from industry-leading training and certification paths from one of the world’s most trusted technology partners. Proven Professional certifications include: • Cloud • Converged/Hyperconverged Infrastructure • Data Protection • Data Science • Networking • Security • Servers • Storage • Enterprise Architect Courses are offered to meet different learning styles and schedules, including self-paced On Demand, remote-based Virtual Instructor-Led and in-person Classrooms. Whether you are an experienced IT professional or just getting started, Dell Technologies Proven Professional certifications are designed to clearly signal proficiency to colleagues and employers. Learn more at www.dell.com/certification 2020 Dell Technologies Proven Professional Knowledge Sharing 2 Table of Contents Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 4 Stuxnet .....................................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Iran Case File (May 2019)
    IRAN CASE FILE May 2020 RASANAH International Institute for Iranian Studies, Al-Takhassusi St. Sahafah, Riyadh Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. P.O. Box: 12275 | Zip code: 11473 Contact us [email protected] +966112166696 The Executive Summary ........................................................................ 4 Internal Affairs .................................................................................... 7 The Ideological File ......................................................................................8 I- Officially Reopening Mosques and Shrines ....................................................... 8 II- Resuming Religious Seminary Lessons ........................................................... 9 III- Pressures on Iraq .........................................................................................10 The Political File ........................................................................................ 12 I- The Makeup of the New Parliament: Conservative Domination and Reformist Decline ............................................... 12 II- The Conservatives Contest Among Themselves for the Speakership ............... 13 III- Ghalibaf’s Criticism of the Government Forebodes a Possible Standoff Between Rouhani and the Parliament .................................. 14 The Economic File ...................................................................................... 16 I- The Economic Developments Between Iran and Venezuela .............................16 II- The Iranian Objectives and Messages of
    [Show full text]
  • A Prioritization Model for the Immunization of Accident Prone Using Multi-Criteria Decision Methods and Fuzzy Hierarchy Algorithm
    Computational Research Progress in Applied Science & Engineering ©PEARL publication, 2017 ISSN 2423-4591 CRPASE Vol. 03(03), 123-131, September 2017 A Prioritization Model for the Immunization of Accident Prone Using Multi-criteria Decision Methods and Fuzzy Hierarchy Algorithm Hasan Ziari, Amir Amini, Amir Saadatjoo, Sayyed Mohsen Hosseini, Vahid Najafi Moghaddam Gilani School of Civil Engineering, Iran University of Science and Technology (IUST), Tehran, 16846-13114, Iran Keywords Abstract Immunization, Suburban accidents are more significant than intercity accidents in terms of both material Correction potential, and spiritual damages due to the vehicle’s high velocity. Based on the statistics, the mortality Accidents intensity index, rate in suburban routes accounts for more than 69% of total casualties caused by accidents Multi-criteria decision in Iran. In this study, it has been attempted to determine a model for assessing and making, prioritizing the immunization of accident prone sections of Qazvin-Abyek-Zanjan highway Fuzzy hierarchy algorithm. using various methods such as economic analysis, accidents intensity (RSI), Bayesian probability in accident prediction, AHP-GIS and AHP-Fuzzy. The results showed that the ranking of the accident prone sections’ correction is affected by the type of pattern and indicators used to assess the safety of the sections. Finally, with the implementation of fuzzy hierarchy algorithm, using the survey of safty specialists and determining the weights of input factors to the model by the expert choice (EC) software and fuzzy function, a comprehensive model is presented for assessing and prioritizing the correction of incidental events. According to the model’s acheivements, Buin Zahra-Rahim Abad three way with BSIP index of 0.596 meets the highest correction prioritization among the different sections, while Qazvin-Buin Zahra section has the lowest one with the BSIP index value of 0.148.
    [Show full text]