How Iran Regime Cheated the World Tehran’s Systematic Efforts to Cover Up its Nuclear Weapons Program National Council of Resistance of Iran US Representative Office June 2014 HOW IRAN REGIME CHEATED THE WORLD; Tehran’s Systematic Eforts to Cover Up its Nuclear Weapons Program Copyright © National Council of Resistance of Iran - U.S. Representative Ofce, 2014. All rights reserved. No part of this monograph may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in articles or reviews. First published in 2014 by National Council of Resistance of Iran - U.S. Representative Ofce 1747 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Suite 1125, Washington, DC 20006 ISBN-13: 978-0-9904327-0-8 ISBN-10: 0-9904327-0-8 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data National Council of Resistance of Iran - U.S. Representative Ofce. HOW IRAN REGIME CHEATED THE WORLD; Tehran’s Systematic Eforts to Cover Up its Nuclear Weapons Program 1. Iran-Military policy. 2. Nuclear weapons-Iran. 3. Iran-Foreign relations. 4. Security, International. 5. Rouhani, Hassan. First Edition: June 2014 Printed in the United States of America _____________________________________________________ Tese materials are being distributed by the National Council of Resistance of Iran-U.S. Representative Ofce. Additional information is on fle with the Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. How Iran Regime Cheated the World Tehran’s Systematic Efforts to Cover Up its Nuclear Weapons Program National Council of Resistance of Iran US Representative Office June 2014 Table of Contents Demanding Iran to accept the Additional Protocol, indispensable to any viable nuclear accord. ....................................... 7 Concealing aspects of the nuclear program through the use of conventional military sites, and barring access to the IAEA. 9 Disclosure of the sites and Tehran’s refusal to provide further information to the IAEA. .. 17 “Transparency”: Two examples of Tehran’s attitude toward IAEA inspections . .. 21 Regime ofcials confess. .. 27 Te latest status of the military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program. 33 Conclusion. ..................................................... 41 Endnotes. ....................................................... 43 Annex I. ........................................................ 44 Annex II. .. 45 How Iran Cheated the World 7 Introduction Demanding Iran to Accept the Additional Protocol, Indispensable to Any Viable Nuclear Accord ne of the most fundamental challenges that goes to the heart of the dispute Oregarding the Iranian regime’s ambitious nuclear weapons program is for the international community to ascertain with confdence that Tehran will not pursue a nuclear bomb. Such an assurance can only be obtained through specifc steps taken by Tehran in response to the international community’s concerns. Tis white paper discusses the Iranian regime’s lack of transparency when addressing the international community’s concerns about the true nature and the ultimate purpose of its nuclear program. Te analysis relies on credible intelligence and information obtained and collected by sources afliated with the main Iranian opposition group, the Mujahedin-e Khalq (PMOI/MEK). Specifcally, it looks at the information obtained by the organization’s network that has infltrated the ruling regime, specifcally over the past 12 years. Despite Tehran’s insistence that it has adequately responded to all outstanding concerns raised by the UN nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an impartial study of Tehran’s tangible actions and corresponding attitude suggests a diferent account and casts serious doubts on Tehran’s claims of transparency. June 2014 ” We halted the nuclear program? We were the ones who completed it! Hassan Rouhani on Iranian State ”TV, May 2013 How Iran Cheated the World 9 1 Concealing Aspects of The Nuclear Program Through The Use of Conventional Military Sites, And Barring Access to The IAEA discernible aspect of the Iranian nuclear program consists of a substantial Anumber of sites, workshops, and labs utilized in the nuclear program that have actually been set up in conventional military sites. As part of Tehran’s overall strategy, this approach ofers a number of advantages, including the following: • Tese sites are cordoned of (a typical and reasonable measure for military locations); • Military personnel and ofcials have the freedom and the rationale to visit these sites on a regular basis; • Rejecting IAEA access to these sites may be perceived as defensible under the pretext of national security concerns. Background Te existence and extent of Tehran’s nuclear program was publicly revealed for the frst time by the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) at a press conference in August 2002 in Washington, DC. Te disclosures focused on two locations: a uranium enrichment site located near the town of Natanz and a heavy water reactor located in the city of Arak (both in central Iran). Tis high-profle revelation, triggered IAEA inquiry, and eventual inspection of the sites for the frst time in February 2003. Tese revelations were followed by another disclosure about a facility known as Kala- Electric in February 2003. In May of that year, the NCRI also revealed in Washington, DC, the existence of the Lavizan-Shian site that functioned as the command center of Tehran’s nuclear program. Te IAEA inspected the site in June 2004, but by that time June 2014 10 How Iran Cheated the World the Iranian regime had already razed the buildings, even hauling away soil as deep as 20 meters in the area. Subsequent to these disclosures and inspections, the IAEA and major European powers (France, Britain, and Germany also referred to as the EU-3) engaged Iranian ofcials in 2004 and 2005. As a result, Tehran agreed to suspend its uranium enrichment. Iran’s current president Hassan Rouhani was Tehran’s lead negotiator at the time. However, when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took ofce as the new president in mid- 2005, Tehran efectively rescinded the agreement during the second half of 2005. Besides resuming enrichment at Natanz and installing centrifuges, the regime stepped up constructing additional sites for its nuclear activities. It was critical for the regime that these sites remain out of view and inaccessible to the IAEA. Te sites had the following characteristics: • Tey were all eventually placed under the supervision of the command center for production of nuclear weapons known as the “Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research” (known by its Farsi acronym SPND), which is headed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Brigadier General Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Mahabadi (a key fgure in the nuclear program and a Defense Minister Deputy who directly reports to the Defense Minister); • Te sites were constructed in tunnels that could shield them from potential air strikes; • Tey were built in conventional military locations that would ofer an added layer of intelligence protection to conceal their existence; and • Te regime could stonewall IAEA requests for inspection by falling back on the limitations specifed in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Te NCRI has identifed and disclosed several of such sites as follows: i. Fordow In a press conference in Paris on December 20, 2005, , NCRI’s Foreign Afairs Committee Chair Mohammad Mohaddessin made public the regime’s strategy for the construction of tunnels for its nuclear activities. He revealed for the frst time the existence of Fordow facility as an underground complex under construction near the city of Qom. Subsequently, on December 25, 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama, French June 2014 How Iran Cheated the World 11 President Nicolas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown acknowledged the existence of Fordow on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. On October 1, 2009, afer Fordow had been built and was about to become operational, the NCRI disclosed further details during a press conference. Among other things, it revealed that: Fordow Site; Imagery source: Digital Globe Te construction and progress of Fordow in Qom was directly supervised by Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Mahabadi. A number of experts directly involved in executing the project were tied to the “Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research” (known as Mojdeh at the time), which was under the command of Fakhrizadeh. Additional information on a number of fgures working directly with Fakhrizadeh during the construction of Fordow is provided in Annex 1. In order to conceal its location in Qom, this site was built inside an IRGC military base. As such, requests for access or disclosure of the site’s activities, not to mention IAEA requests for inspection, could be stonewalled under the pretext of the military nature of the location. Te site’s name (Fordow) was borrowed from the name of a village situated near Qom. By choosing “Fordow” to identify the site, the regime essentially sought to shield it so that in the event that information about it was revealed, intelligence agencies would focus on June 2014 12 How Iran Cheated the World Fordow village, almost 80 km away, where they would fnd nothing of interest. Te Fordow site is situated 30 kilometers north of the city of Qom, south of a seasonal lake called Hoz-e Soltan and to the east of the Tehran-Qom Highway. Two deserted villages of Aminabad and Sadrabad are roughly 10 km from this site. Te Fordow village, however, is on the other side of the city 50 km south of Qom; it has no geographical links to the nuclear site. Once the existence of Fordow was disclosed, Tehran initially claimed that it had already reported the site to the IAEA. But the IAEA wrote in Article 30 of the annex to its November 2011 report: “In addition, although now declared and currently under safeguards, a number of facilities dedicated to uranium enrichment (the Fuel Enrichment Plant and the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz and the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant near Qom) were covertly built by Iran and only declared once the Agency was made aware of their existence by sources other than Iran.