Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique French Journal of British Studies
XXV-2 | 2020 Revisiting the UK’s North-South Divide: The Changing Face of the North Au delà du clivage Nord-Sud: Quelles perspectives pour le Nord britannique?
Mark Bailoni and Corinne Nativel (dir.)
Electronic version URL: http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/5246 DOI: 10.4000/rfcb.5246 ISSN: 2429-4373
Publisher CRECIB - Centre de recherche et d'études en civilisation britannique
Electronic reference Mark Bailoni and Corinne Nativel (dir.), Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XXV-2 | 2020, « Revisiting the UK’s North-South Divide: The Changing Face of the North » [Online], Online since 01 April 2020, connection on 09 June 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/5246 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/rfcb.5246
This text was automatically generated on 9 June 2020.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction : Entre fractures territoriales, représentations et identités culturelles: Comment appréhender le Nord britannique? Mark Bailoni and Corinne Nativel
Making Sense of the Northern Powerhouse Danny MacKinnon
Two Nations Under the Same Roof? Housing and the North-South Divide in the UK David Fée
Towards a New Health Deal for the North of England? Louise Dalingwater
Versions of the North in Contemporary Poetry Claire Hélie
(De)Constructing the Myth of the North in British Cinema (1959-2019) Anne-Lise Marin-Lamellet
Reinventing and Promoting Northern Industrial Heritage: Regeneration in the Textile Sites of Ancoats and Saltaire Aurore Caignet
Divided by Values: Jeremy Corbyn, the Labour Party and England’s ‘North-South Divide’ Matt Beech and Kevin Hickson
Les Députés du Nord de l’Angleterre et la question constitutionnelle écossaise : entre crainte et résignation Edwige Camp-Pietrain
Book reviews
Compte-rendu de Beyond Brexit: Towards a British Constitution (2019), Vernon Bogdanor Stéphanie Bory
Review of The Battle for Christian Britain: Sex, Humanists and Secularisation, 1945-1980 by Callum G. Brown Arielle Flodrops
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Introduction : Entre fractures territoriales, représentations et identités culturelles: Comment appréhender le Nord britannique? Spatial Divides, Cultural Representations and Identities: Exploring the Meaning of the North in Great Britain
Mark Bailoni et Corinne Nativel
1 Le clivage Nord-Sud est une image très souvent utilisée pour schématiser la géographie économique, sociale ou même culturelle, et pour modéliser les dynamismes territoriaux du Royaume-Uni. Cette représentation oppose un Nord postindustriel, soumis à des difficultés économiques et sociales, à un Sud tertiaire, riche et puissant. Il oppose un centre ancré dans la mondialisation (le Sud) à une périphérie marginalisée (le Nord). L’objectif de ce numéro de la Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique est de revenir sur cette image du clivage Nord-Sud, pour s’interroger sur sa pertinence après la crise de 2008, l’austérité et les mutations économiques récentes du pays et dans le contexte du Brexit, mais également pour analyser les éléments spatiaux, économiques, sociaux, culturels ou identitaires qui caractérisent le Nord comme un territoire particulier au sein du Royaume-Uni.
Retour sur le clivage Nord-Sud, une représentation géopolitique1
2 L’image du clivage Nord-Sud est apparue dès le XIXe siècle dans des romans et des écrits politiques (Gaskell, Disraeli, etc.), singularisant le Nord comme un territoire spécifique, marqué par les mines et l’industrie, mais aussi célébré pour la beauté de ses paysages naturels. De ces représentations, les premières revendications régionalistes et décentralisatrices apparurent au tout début du XXe siècle, portées par différents cercles politiques (comme la Fabian Society) et intellectuels. Ainsi, en 1919, le géographe
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C.B. Fawcett, originaire du comté de Durham, estimait que « L’unité du Pays du Nord [North Country], et par conséquent le bien-fondé d’en faire une province distincte, reposent sur deux groupes de considérations, les unes économiques et les autres traditionnelles, chacune d’entre elles s’appuyant sur des faits géographiques. (…) Les traditions d’indépendance et d’initiatives du Pays du Nord se sont perpétuées jusqu’à nos jours, et soutiennent son aspiration à une autonomie gouvernementale provinciale »2. Ses travaux, comme ceux d’E.M. Coulthard (From Tweed to Tees, 1934) ou de Cuthbert Headlam (The Three Northern Counties of England, 1939), décrivent tous le Nord à partir d’éléments économiques, historiques, culturels, folkloriques, patrimoniaux, géomorphologiques ou biogéographiques – tombant souvent dans une forme de déterminisme – qui, ensemble, permettent de définir une région « naturelle » et harmonieuse. Ils justifient également des revendications politiques, réclamant une meilleure considération politique de ce territoire.
3 Si le clivage Nord-Sud serait apparu au moment de l’industrialisation et de l’urbanisation du pays3, il aurait pris une dimension sociale dès l’entre-deux-guerres et les premières difficultés économiques des territoires industriels britanniques4. L’épisode célébré et mythifié de la Jarrow Crusade (1936) 5 demeure le symbole des problèmes sociaux très profonds que le Nord a connus à cette époque. D’ailleurs, les premières mesures gouvernementales d’assistance aux régions du Nord datent des années 1930, ouvrant la voie à une longue série de politiques publiques imaginées par les gouvernements successifs6. Les disparités sociales, en matière d’emploi, de richesse, d’éducation, de santé, d’espérance de vie, etc., se sont renforcées par la suite, avec le déclin des bassins miniers et la désindustrialisation de villes du Nord telles que Newcastle, Liverpool, Sheffield, Leeds, Manchester, Glasgow ou même Belfast, depuis la fin des années 1970.
4 La représentation du clivage Nord-Sud devient politique dans les années 1980, alors que les politiques économiques du gouvernement Thatcher sont particulièrement contestées dans le Nord. Une véritable fracture politique dans le pays apparait et isole un Nord majoritairement travailliste d’un Sud (en dehors du Grand Londres) conservateur. Se propage alors le sentiment que le Nord de l’Angleterre, l’Ecosse et le pays de Galles seraient victimes d’un déficit démocratique, subissant la politique d’un gouvernement conservateur que ces territoires travaillistes n’ont pas élu. Un nombre croissant de travaux universitaires7 montrent à quel point le thatchérisme a aggravé les disparités socio-économiques et le clivage Nord-Sud, mais le gouvernement nie toute réalité de cette fracture. Ces débats conduisent à un rapprochement entre élus travaillistes, universitaires et acteurs économiques locaux pour créer des courants régionalistes dans le Nord de l’Angleterre, réclamant une autre politique territoriale dans le pays, une meilleure prise en compte des spécificités régionales et surtout une décentralisation des pouvoirs.
5 L’arrivée au pouvoir du New Labour de Tony Blair et Gordon Brown et la mise en œuvre d’une dévolution à géométrie variable coïncide avec une période plus favorable pour l’économie britannique. Si Londres et son espace métropolitain sont les premiers bénéficiaires de cette période de croissance économique soutenue, le reste du pays en profite également, notamment certaines grandes villes du Nord comme Manchester ou Leeds. Dans ce contexte économique et politique – le sentiment de déficit démocratique n’a plus lieu d’être – la question du clivage Nord-Sud devient très secondaire dans les débats politiques, de même que les revendications de décentralisation. L’échec du
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référendum pour la création d’une assemblée régionale élue, et donc d’une vraie régionalisation politique, dans le Nord-Est en 2004 en témoigne.
6 Toutefois, le changement de cycle avec la crise économique de 2008 puis l’arrivée au pouvoir du gouvernement de coalition de David Cameron, qui engage le pays dans une politique d’austérité dès 2010, réveillent les débats autour des disparités territoriales au Royaume-Uni8. Les enjeux constitutionnels et identitaires sont également relancés par les progrès électoraux du SNP en Ecosse et bien entendu par le référendum sur l’indépendance de 2014. Dans ce contexte, de nouvelles revendications décentralisatrices et régionalistes apparaissent dans le Nord de l’Angleterre9. Alors que la récession et l’austérité ont été particulièrement douloureuses pour les régions du Nord à l’économie toujours fragile10, les gouvernements Cameron ont lancé des programmes spécifiques censés renforcer l’économie du Nord et réduire les disparités territoriales (Northern Powerhouse, prolongement de la ligne à grande vitesse HS2, création d’une HS3 entre les villes du Nord, etc.) et répondre aux aspirations de décentralisation (créations des Local Enterprise Partnerships, City Deals, Combined Authorities, etc.)11. Le gouvernement de Theresa May a maintenu ces différents dispositifs sans pour autant les doter des pouvoirs et des moyens financiers réclamés par les élus du Nord, laissant ainsi place à la critique et au doute. Ainsi, en visite dans le Yorkshire dans le cadre de sa campagne électorale, Boris Johnson jugeait bon de réaffirmer l’engagement gouvernemental en faveur du Nord en déclarant : « nous allons maximiser le pouvoir du Nord. Et nous allons faire en sorte que les personnes qui vivent ici soient celles qui contrôlent ce qui leur tient à cœur »12.
7 Dans ce numéro, Danny McKinnon revient sur la stratégie de la Northern Powerhouse. Il montre que bien qu’ayant rallié un grand nombre d’acteurs économiques du Nord de l’Angleterre, celle-ci constitue essentiellement un outil de rhétorique gouvernementale sur l’économie spatiale et la nécessité d’un rééquilibrage. La cohérence et la concrétisation de ce projet ont été mises à mal par un manque d’engagement et de leadership des gouvernements britanniques depuis 2016.
8 Si l’importance et l’évolution du clivage Nord-Sud restent sujets à débats et à interprétations contradictoires selon les rapports et leurs commanditaires, la réalité des disparités territoriales au Royaume-Uni n’est plus contestée et tous les partis entendent trouver des solutions pour y répondre. Reste cependant à savoir à quelle échelle ces disparités sont les plus fortes et à quel niveau mettre en place des mesures pour les réduire.
Qu’est-ce que le Nord ?
9 Le Nord apparait comme un concept spatial mouvant depuis l’origine de l’image du clivage Nord-Sud. En effet, selon les représentations, le Nord peut être défini à partir de plusieurs limites. Parfois, l’axe entre les estuaires de la Severn et de l’Humber (ou le Wash) marque la limite entre le Nord et le Sud. Certains auteurs utilisent la limite géologique s’étendant de l’estuaire de l’Exe dans le Devon à celui de la Tees dans le Nord-Est, qui sépare les uplands – caractérisés par des roches dures magmatiques et métamorphiques – au Nord-Ouest, des lowlands – caractérisés par des roches tendres sédimentaires – au Sud-Est13. Selon cette interprétation, le clivage Nord-Sud serait alors le résultat d’un déterminisme géologique et géographique. D’autres auteurs, comme Danny Dorling14, tracent plus précisément la limite Nord-Sud, également sur un axe
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Sud-Ouest/Nord-Est, à partir de données socioéconomiques. Le Watford Gap dans le Northamptonshire, où convergent des axes majeurs reliant Londres et le Nord, des voies romaines aux actuelles autoroute M1 et ligne de chemin de fer West Coast Main Line, symbolise parfois à lui seul la limite entre le Sud et le Nord (voir carte 1).
10 Parfois, le Nord ne s’étend qu’aux régions les plus septentrionales de l’Angleterre (soit un territoire regroupant le Northumberland, le comté de Durham et la Cumbria, soit l’ensemble des trois régions North-East/North-West/Yorkshire-and-the-Humber). Parfois, il comprend aussi les (West) Midlands, voire surtout les « nations périphériques » : l’Ecosse, le pays de Galles et même l’Irlande du Nord. Cette dimension très large d’un Nord britannique ne se définit alors pas à partir de critères historiques, culturels, politiques et identitaires, mais essentiellement sociaux et économiques. En effet, le Nord anglais partage avec l’Ecosse et le pays de Galles un riche passé industriel et minier, et une même expérience douloureuse de la désindustrialisation, d’une difficile reconversion et de problèmes sociaux persistants. Des ressentiments comparables vis-à-vis de Londres, de la City ou plus précisément des gouvernements conservateurs ont émergé simultanément dans ces trois territoires, les plaçant en position de défiance face à l’Etat central.
11 Dans sa contribution sur l’Ecosse, Edwige Camp-Pietrain met en évidence les tensions qui se cristallisent autour de la question constitutionnelle depuis les années 1970. En analysant les débats sur la dévolution ou le référendum sur l’indépendance écossaise menés au sein de la Chambre des Communes, l’article montre les dissensions grandissantes entre les députés du Nord de l’Angleterre et leurs homologues écossais. Ainsi, les réformes constitutionnelles aboutissent à un éloignement, pour ne pas dire un éclatement politique, où la proximité fondée sur des similitudes socio-économiques laisse place à des divergences et une hostilité grandissante. La perte d’une identité ouvrière commune, les rivalités fiscales et budgétaires et les préoccupations indépendantistes sont autant d’éléments qui fragilisent les alliances au sein du Nord britannique.
12 La définition spatiale du Nord pose en effet la question de son unité et de sa diversité. Peut-on considérer le Nord comme une seule et même périphérie d'un noyau métropolitain constitué par le grand Sud-Est et polarisé par Londres (voire la City) ou est-il, comme certains géographes l'affirment, un archipel dénué d'unité15 ? Derrière l’idée d’un Nord divers et multiple, apparait aussi la question de l’échelle d’analyse des disparités territoriales et des phénomènes spatiaux comme la métropolisation. En effet, s’il est clair que les indicateurs sociaux et économiques montrent des disparités claires entre le Nord et le Sud à une échelle régionale, les inégalités apparaissent parfois beaucoup plus nettes et plus profondes à une échelle locale. Il existe des poches de forte précarité au Sud, comme des espaces de prospérité au Nord16.
13 Ainsi dans son article, David Fée montre qu’au-delà des discours politiques et des préjugés, il n’est pas évident d’évoquer un réel clivage Nord-Sud à propos du logement. Les disparités en matière de nature et de qualité des logements, comme à propos de l’évolution du marché et des prix, doivent se lire à d’autres échelles, souvent selon d’autres axes de rupture qu’un simple clivage Nord-Sud.
14 Dans le domaine de la santé, la question du fossé Nord-Sud se pose de manière criante : les inégalités entre les régions du Nord et du Sud britanniques sont extrêmes ainsi que le révèlent de nombreux indicateurs tels que l’espérance de vie, les maladies chroniques ou l’état de santé psychique. Dans son article consacré à ce sujet, Louise
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Dalingwater souligne le lien avec l’échelon national où en dépit des principes d’égalité d’accès aux soins et de couverture universelle des services de santé, les réformes dans le champ de la protection sociale n’ont pas permis d’éradiquer la fracture Nord-Sud, bien au contraire.
Carte 1 : Définitions territoriales du Nord
15 Au-delà d’une approche purement spatiale, le Nord se définit également par son identité et ses particularismes culturels. Le passé industriel reste à ce titre incontournable et contribue encore aujourd’hui à définir ce territoire. Si les clichés de l’industrie lourde, des mines et des cités ouvrières en déliquescence ont parfois été considérés comme des fardeaux pour le Nord, notamment dans des stratégies de reconversion économique et d’attractivité, l’histoire industrielle et minière et la mémoire ouvrière de ces territoires sont aujourd’hui célébrées et mises en valeur. La prise de conscience a été précoce au Royaume-Uni17 et le patrimoine industriel est désormais protégé et préservé, devenant même source d’une véritable attractivité touristique et moteur de renouveau urbain. Comme le montre Aurore Caignet à travers une étude comparative de deux anciens sites de l’industrie du textile à Bradford et à Manchester, ces stratégies peuvent prendre des formes très différentes. Dans ces deux villes post-industrielles, les pouvoirs publics ont choisi dans un cas de mettre en valeur le passé industriel à des fins touristiques et dans l’autre d'innover en proposant à la population locale un projet de renouveau urbain intégrant les dimensions culturelles, commerciales et résidentielles.
16 Le Nord se révèle également à travers ses représentations esthétiques. Les œuvres poétiques et cinématographiques soulignent à quel point le langage et l’image sont essentiels pour saisir l’essence et la pluralité de ce territoire à la fois réel et imaginé. Claire Hélie s’intéresse aux représentations du Nord de l’Angleterre dans la poésie
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contemporaine. Sous la plume de Steve Ely ou de Peter Riley, le Nord apparaît sous différentes facettes. Qu’il s’agisse de son passé industriel marqué par des violences multiformes ou des nouvelles lignes d’horizon qui se dessinent, la forme poétique construit une contre-culture esthétique qui affirme son identité propre tout en offrant la possibilité d’un rapprochement plutôt que d’un creusement du fossé Nord-Sud.
17 Anne-Lise Marin-Lamellet montre que depuis les années 1960, le cinéma britannique a opéré des dynamiques de mythification, de démythification et de remythification de la figure du Northerner et de son territoire. Cette figure, fortement genrée, se forge dans un contexte de désindustrialisation et de marasme économique mais aussi, et c’est le fil conducteur, dans une aversion commune pour le Sud et en particulier pour Londres qui exerce à la fois un pouvoir de fascination et de répulsion. À travers cette tension, le cinéma diffuse dans l’imaginaire collectif une identité régionale empreinte de sentiments de fierté et de dignité humaine.
Quelle place pour le Nord dans le Royaume-Uni du Brexit ?
18 Si les résultats électoraux montrent classiquement une fracture Nord-Sud, les résultats du référendum sur le Brexit font ressortir des clivages beaucoup plus complexes, conséquences du caractère multifactoriel du vote leave. L’article de Matt Beech et de Kevin Hickson analyse le fossé socio-culturel révélé par le Brexit en Angleterre. Ici, le “Nord” et le “Sud” servent de métaphores pour appréhender ce clivage : sur le plan culturel, le Nord apparaît comme plus conservateur qu’un Sud plus cosmopolite. En s’appuyant sur un ensemble de données comprenant les résultats des élections partielles, locales et législatives ainsi que des statistiques issues du référendum de 2016 sur l’appartenance à l’Union européenne, les auteurs mettent en évidence le rôle fondamental joué par le Parti Travailliste de Jeremy Corbyn dont les valeurs se sont éloignées de ses traditionnels bastions électoraux du Nord.
19 Quelles pourraient être les conséquences du Brexit sur le Nord ? Les visions libérales et conservatrices dressent des scénarios très optimistes selon lesquels celui-ci pourrait redynamiser son industrie exportatrice par de nouveaux accords commerciaux avec, entre autres, les régions du Commonwealth. Les villes côtières pourraient quant à elles bénéficier d’un regain de contrôle sur les zones de pêche. Mais ces dynamiques pourraient bien rester illusoires sans rééquilibrage fiscal en faveur du Nord18. Bien que la géographie électorale du Brexit démente une interprétation hâtive en termes de fracture Nord-Sud, celle-ci est fortement corrélée avec sa trajectoire économique, notamment avec l’évolution du PIB par habitant sur le long cours. La fragilité et la dépendance économiques constituent des facteurs décisifs, faisant du Brexit un paradoxe pour le Nord : les régions et localités s’étant majoritairement exprimées en faveur du « leave » sont celles qui seront le plus fortement impactées par la réduction des échanges commerciaux avec les pays membres de l’Union Européenne ainsi que par le retrait des subventions que celle-ci leur accordait19. Une grande partie des fonds structurels européens (Fonds Social Européen, Fonds Européen de Développement Régional, etc.) représentant 10,6 milliards d’euros sur la période 2014-2020, revenait aux régions post-industrielles du Nord anglais, à l’Ecosse ainsi qu’au Pays de Galles et aux régions rurales du Sud-Ouest. La programmation pluriannuelle permettait de planifier et de mettre en œuvre de nombreux projets de développement économique et
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de rénovation urbaine20. De Cameron à Johnson, les gouvernements conservateurs sont restés évasifs sur la manière dont leur « nouvelle stratégie industrielle » permettrait de compenser ce gouffre financier. Le UK Shared Prosperity Fund, censé prendre le relais à compter de 2021 est essentiellement axé sur le capital humain et sur l’échelon local ce qui compromettra la capacité d’impulser d’importantes dynamiques régionales, avec une inévitable recentralisation des pouvoirs budgétaires vers Westminster.
20 À ces difficultés s’ajoutent les conséquences de la pandémie mondiale du Covid-19 qui au tournant des années 2020, remet un coup de projecteur sur la question des déséquilibres socio-économiques, tout particulièrement en milieu urbain. En pleine crise sanitaire, le Nord-Ouest était particulièrement touché et devançait Londres en tant qu’épicentre de la pandémie21. À l’argument d’un effet égalisateur de la crise sanitaire (leveller), on peut en effet opposer celui d’un effet « révélateur » du sous- investissement chronique dont souffre ce territoire. À Salford et Liverpool, qui sont parmi les villes les plus impactées par les coupes budgétaires depuis 2010, les décès liés au Covid-19 sont deux à trois fois plus élevés que la moyenne nationale22. Par ailleurs, les différences structurelles sur le marché du travail accentueront très vraisemblablement le chômage, la pauvreté et la dépendance aux aides sociales dans les villes du Nord où l’on trouve davantage d’emplois précaires et une moindre proportion d’emplois stables dans le secteur des services à haute valeur ajoutée pouvant être maintenus via le télétravail23.
21 En somme, le Nord britannique constitue un objet de recherche d’une grande richesse qui ne se limite pas à l’étude du fossé Nord-Sud. Il se définit à la fois par son territoire et par les représentations qu’il véhicule. Ainsi dans la période post-Brexit et post-Covid qui s’ouvre en ce début de la décennie 2020, le Nord ne trouvera plus à la périphérie mais bien au centre des discussions et des évolutions que connaîtra le Royaume-Uni.
22 Ce numéro de la Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique est le prolongement du colloque interdisciplinaire « Revisiting the North-South Divide: The Changing Face of the North », organisé du 4 au 6 novembre 2016 à Nancy, par le CRECIB et les laboratoires CREW (Université Paris 3 Sorbonne Nouvelle), IDEA (Université de Lorraine) et LOTERR (Université de Lorraine). Il rassemble des articles issus de communications et nourris des échanges et des débats pendant ce colloque.
23 Ce numero a été mis en page et préparé pour la publication en ligne par Anne Cousson, Shirley Doulière et John Mullen.
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MARTIN Ron, “The Political Economy of Britain’s North-South Divide”, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 13:4 (1988), pp. 389-418.
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PIDD Helen, BARR Caelainn et MOHDIN Aamma « Calls for health funding as poor bear brunt of Covid-19 », The Guardian, 1 mai 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/01/ covid-19-deaths-twice-as-high-in-poorest-areas-in-england-and-wales [consulté le 4 mai 2020]
PIKE Andy, MACKINNON Danny, COOMBES Mike, CHAMPION Tony, BRADLEY David, CUMBERS Andy, ROBSON Liz et WYMER Colin, Uneven Growth: Tackling City Decline (York, Joseph Rowntree Foundation).
PROCTOR, Kate, PARVEEN, Nazoa et PIDD, Helen « North-West overtakes London for number of Covid Hospital Cases », The Guardian, 3 mai 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/ may/03/north-west-overtakes-london-for-number-of-covid-19-hospital-cases-coronavirus [consulté le 4 mai 2020].
SCOTT Peter, Triumph of the South: A Regional History of early Twentieth Century Britain (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2007).
TAYLOR, Peter, “The Meaning of the North: England’s ‘foreign country’ within”, Political Geography 12:2 (1993), pp. 136-155.
TOMANEY John, “Governing the Region Past, Present and Future”, Conférence St Cuthbert Day, 20 mars 2003 à l’Université de Newcastle.
NOTES
1. Mark Bailoni, « Le Nord de l’Angleterre : l’affirmation d’un territoire politique et identitaire », Hérodote n°137, p. 70-92, DOI : 10.3917/her.137.0070 2. « The unity of the North Country, and hence its claim to be a distinct province, rests upon two groups of considerations, the one economic and the other traditional, both of which arise from its geographic position and relations (…) The North Country traditions of independence and initiative have been carried on to our own days, and well support its claim to provincial self- government ». Charles Bungay Fawcett, Provinces of England, A Study of Some Geographical Aspects of Devolution (Londres, Hutchinson & Co., [1919] 1960) pp. 87-88. 3. Ron Martin, “The Political Economy of Britain’s North-South Divide”, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 13:4 (1988), pp. 389-418; Peter Scott, Triumph of the South: A Regional History of early Twentieth Century Britain (Alderhot, Ashgate, 2007). 4. John Tomaney, “Governing the Region Past, Present and Future”, Conférence St Cuthbert Day, 20 mars 2003 à l’Université de Newcastle. 5. Du 5 au 31 octobre 1936, quelque 200 chômeurs avaient marché depuis la ville de Jarrow (Tyneside) jusqu’à Londres pour délivrer une pétition contestant le chômage et la pauvreté suite à la fermeture du chantier naval de Palmer. 6. Peter Hall, Urban and Regional Planning (Londres, Routledge, 1992). 7. Ron Martin, Op.cit. ; Ron Martin et Bob Rowthorn, The Geography of De-Industrialisation (Londres, Macmillan, 1986) ; Peter L. Garside et Hebbert M. (dir.) British Regionalism 1900-2000 (Londres, Mansell Publishing, 1989) ; Anne E. Green, “The North-South Divide in Great Britain: An Examination of the Evidence”, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 13:2 (1988), pp. 179-198 ; Jim Lewis et Alan Townsend (dir.) The North South Divide, Regional Change in Britain in the
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1980s (Londres, Paul Chapman Publishing, 1989) ; Peter Taylor “The Meaning of the North : England’s ‘foreign country’ within”, Political Geography 12:2 (1993), pp. 136-155. 8. David Fée et Anémone Kober-Smith (dir.), Inequalities in the UK – New Discourses, Evolutions and Actions, (Bingley, Emerald, 2017). 9. Ed Cox, “Devolution in England – Is the Genie out of the Lamp?”, The Political Quarterly 87:4 (2016), pp. 565-571; Adrianna Giovannini, ‘Towards a “New English Regionalism” in the North? The Case of Yorkshire First”, The Political Quarterly 87:4 (2016), pp. 590-600. 10. Matt Kitson, Ron Martin, & Peter Tyler, “The Geographies of Austerity”, Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 4:3 (2011), pp. 289-302; Ben Gardiner, Ron Martin, Peter Sunley et Peter Tyler, “Spatially Unbalanced Growth in the British Economy”, Journal of Economic Geography, 13:6 (2013), pp. 889-928; Andy Pike, Danny MacKinnon, Mike Coombes, Tony Champion, David Bradley, Andy Cumbers, Liz Robson et Colin Wymer, Uneven Growth: Tackling City Decline (York, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2016). 11. Mark Bailoni, « Le Nord de l’Angleterre : enjeux géopolitiques d’un territoire périphérique », Outre-Terre n°49 (2017), pp. 99-111. 12. « We are going to maximise the power of the North. And we are going to make sure that it is people here who are in control over the things that matter to them.” https://www.itv.com/ news/calendar/2019-09-13/pm-boris-johnson-gets-mixed-reaction-as-he-promises-to-revitalise- northern-powerhouse-on-visit-to-yorkshire/ [consulté le 26 avril 2020]. 13. Jewell Helen M., The North-South Divide, the Origins of the Northern Consciousness in England (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1994). 14. Danny Dorling « Persistent North-South divides » in Neil M. Coe et Andrew Jones (dir.), The Economic Geography of the UK (London, Sage, 2010), pp. 12-28. 15. Danny Dorling et Bethan Thomas, People and Place - A 2001 Census Atlas of the UK (Bristol, The Policy Press, 2004); Michael Dunford, “Metropolitan Polarization, the North-South Divide and Socio-Spatial Inequality in Britain”, European Urban and Regional Studies 2:2 (1995), pp. 145-170. 16. Mark Bailoni, 2010, op. cit. ; Mark Bailoni, “Inequalities in England : Regional Differences and New Perspectives on a Geopolitical Issue”, in David Fée et Anémone Kober-Smith (dir.), Inequalities in the UK – New Discourses, Evolutions and Actions (Bingley, Emerald, 2017), pp. 59-75. 17. Simon Edelblutte, Paysages et territoires du patrimoine industriel au Royaume-Uni, Revue Géographique de l’Est n°1-2/48 (2009), https://journals.openedition.org/rge/1165. 18. John S.L. McCombie et Marta R.M. Spreafico, « Brexit and its possible implications for the UK and its regions: a post-Keynesian perspective », Papers in Regional Science 97:1 (2018), pp. 133-149. 19. Bart Los, Philip McCann, John Springford et Mark Thissen, « The mismatch between local voting and the local economic consequences of Brexit », Regional Studies 51:5 (2017), pp. 786-799. 20. John F. Bachtler et Iain Begg, « Cohesion Policy After Brexit: the Economic, Social and Institutional Challenges », Journal of Social Policy 46:4 (2017), pp. 1-19. 21. Kate Proctor, Nazia Parveen et Helen Pidd, « North-West overtakes London for number of Covid Hospital Cases », The Guardian, 3 mai 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/ may/03/north-west-overtakes-london-for-number-of-covid-19-hospital-cases-coronavirus [consulté le 4 mai 2020]. 22. Helen Pidd, Caelainn Barr et Aamma Mohdin, « Calls for health funding as poor bear brunt of Covid-19, The Guardian, 1 mai 2020, ; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/01/ covid-19-deaths-twice-as-high-in-poorest-areas-in-england-and-wales [consulté le 4 mai 2020]. 23. Elena Magrini, « How will Coronavirus affect jobs in different parts of the country ? », Centre for Cities Blog, 17 mars 2020, https://www.centreforcities.org/blog/how-will-coronavirus-affect- jobs-in-different-parts-of-the-country/ [consulté le 4 mai 2020]
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AUTEURS
MARK BAILONI Géographe, maître de conférences, Université de Lorraine / LOTERR (EA 7304)
CORINNE NATIVEL Angliciste, maîtresse de conférences, Université Paris-Est Créteil / IMAGER (EA 3958)
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Making Sense of the Northern Powerhouse Donner du sens à la Northern Powerhouse
Danny MacKinnon
Introduction
1 On 23 June 2014, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer in the UK government, George Osborne MP, gave a speech at the Museum of Science and Industry in Manchester, in which he called for the creation of a Northern Powerhouse (NPh). According to Osborne, ‘modern economics’ meant that great Northern cities like Manchester, Leeds and Liverpool were too small to compete individually on the world stage with London and other world cities, resulting in the economy of the North lagging behind the rest of the UK. This prompted his assertion that: … if we can bring our northern cities closer together – not physically, or in some artificial political construct – but by providing modern transport connections, supporting great science and our universities here, giving more power and control to civic government; then we can create a northern powerhouse with the size, the population, the political and economic clout, to be as strong as any global city.1
2 Launched in response to widening regional inequalities in the UK, the NPh agenda gathered particular momentum in 2015-2016. Essentially a rather ‘sizeist’ economic narrative closely informed by the new urban economics and the importance of agglomeration and urban scale and density in fostering competitiveness, it sought to pool the strengths of the Northern core cites, principally Manchester, Leeds, Liverpool and Sheffield, as a kind of transformative urban counter-weight to London. As well as attracting widespread political and public attention, the NPh has also triggered ‘copycat’ initiatives from other regions, most notably the ‘Midlands Engine’.2
3 The prominence of the NPh agenda reflects the re-emergence of regional inequality as a major political issue in Britain as the effects of the post-2008 economic crisis and associated austerity measures have exposed stark regional disparities, particularly between London and the South East and the former industrial areas in the North and
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Midlands of England.3 The NPh gained traction in the context of the wider spatial rebalancing discourse advanced by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government between 2010 and 2015, which sought to promote growth in post- industrial regions outside south east England.4 Yet regional divisions have been further highlighted by the Brexit vote of 23 June 2016, with many disadvantaged former industrial areas voting ‘leave’, pointing to a widespread sense of political disenchantment and abandonment, while the core cities of the North voted to remain in the European Union. The Brexit vote also led to the diminution of the NPh, as its leading champion, Osborne, was dismissed as Chancellor by the new Prime Minster, Theresa May.
4 This article aims to assess the nature and wider significance of the NPh concept, considering its evolution and impact since 2014. Whilst of relatively recent origin, it has had a particularly turbulent career, defined by a change of Prime Ministers, the sacking of Osborne, the momentous Brexit vote of 2016 and the subsequent General Election of 2017. The article attempts to make sense of this rather diffuse and fast- moving initiative by asking what the NPh is and how it should be best understood, as well as examining the effects itis having. It argues that the NPh is a spatial economic narrative or ‘imaginary’ which has gained the support of a wide range of Northern stakeholders, but that its coherence and implementation has been undermined by a lack of national government commitment and leadership since 2016. The research which underpins the article is based on the analysis of over 200 documentary sources, including government policy statement and strategies, policy reviews and consultancy reports, organisational strategies and position papers, over 100 national and regional press articles and blogs, supplemented by 18 semi-structured interviews with key actors from central and local government, Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs), business organisations and thinks tanks conducted between March and October 2017.
5 The remainder of the article is divided into four sections. The next section positions the NPh within the wider governance of uneven development in England. This is followed by an analysis of origins of the NPh and its political evolution since 2014. The article then discusses the effects of the NPh initiative, focusing on three policy areas where it plays a major role: transport, inward investment promotion and devolution. The final section concludes the article.
Governing Uneven Development in England
6 Britain now has one of the highest levels of regional inequality of any major European economy (Table 1). According to data from Eurostat, the gap in GDP per head between the richest and poorest regions in the United Kingdom ranked fourth in a sample of 20 EU countries in 2014.5 While levels of regional inequality fell somewhat in the post- second world war period, they have grown since the late 1970s. Regional inequalities accelerated in the 1980s and continued to widen throughout the sustained growth phase of the 1990s and early-to-mid 2000s. By contrast, levels of regional inequality have fallen in several European countries (Table 1).
7 Table 1: Regional imbalance in selected European Union countries: coefficient of variation in regional Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (purchasing power standard (PPS), NUTS-2 regions)
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1980 2001 2011
UK 0.31 0.36 0.45
Belgium 0.43 0.44 0.37
Germany 0.35 0.23 0.23
Italy 0.32 0.28 0.22
Netherlands 0.17 0.20 0.21
France 0.15 0.18 0.19
Spain 0.14 0.19 0.15
Greece 0.35 0.21 0.14
EU-15 0.32 0.28 0.33
8 Source: Martin, R., Pike, A., Tyler P and Gardiner, B. Spatially rebalancing the UK economy: towards a new policy model? Regional Studies 50:2, (2016) pp 342-357. From Cambridge Econometrics, European Union Data Base.
9 The magnitude of regional inequalities in Britain is evident in the levels of nominal GDP per head in 2014. GDP per head is some 2.4 times higher, at £45,000, in the richest region (London) than in the poorest regions (Wales and North East England), where it is around £18,000 per head. These regional differences in living standards are underpinned by differences in innovation and skills. Here, the most R&D intensive region, the East of England, has levels of investment that are four times those of the lowest R&D intensive region, the North East.6 There are also clear regional differences in skills, with the proportion of the workforce with higher-level qualifications being 20 per cent higher in London than Northern Ireland, Yorkshire & Humber and the North East. These figures demonstrate that the notion of the North-South divide is well grounded in broad regional patterns of inequality, but it should also be noted that such a characterisation is somewhat crude, given that inequalities within regions are often greater than those between them, with London having the highest levels of inequality.7
10 The post-2008 ‘great recession’ and subsequent partial recovery has also had an uneven regional impact, largely reinforcing and widening existing disparities. While all regions experienced a sharp drop in output, this was greatest in poorer regions such as Northern Ireland, Yorkshire & Humber and the West Midlands (Figure 1). Many of the cities and regions hit hardest were those still affected by the legacy of industrial restructuring and previous recessions, mainly located in the North and Midlands.
11 Figure 1. UK Regions 2011 Gross Value Added (GVA) Per Capita as a Percentage of Their 2007 GVA
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12 Source: Johnson, Diana “Introduction: tackling Britain’s regional inequalities” in Unions 21 Rebalancing the Economy: New Thinking on Tackling Britain’s Regional Inequalities. (2015) p.7.
13 Moreover, the regions have experienced uneven rates of recovery since 2010-2011, with London enjoying the highest rate of growth. The London region experienced a particularly strong economic rebound in 2010-2012, with full-time equivalent employment growing by more than three times the national average.8 Growth in private sector employment did resume after 2011 in older industrial parts of Britain, although at lower rate than in London and the South East.9 Many of these older industrial areas recorded high ‘leave’ votes in the Brexit referendum, reflecting a sense of being left behind by globalisation, deindustrialisation and neoliberal economic policies. They are also highly exposed to the consequences of Brexit, however, both in terms of the loss of European regional funding and their dependence upon access to European markets for manufactured goods in particular.10
14 The scale and severity of the regional problem in Britain has been reflected in the introduction of successive policy initiatives designed to address regional inequalities in prosperity and income. The Labour government adopted a new growth-oriented regional policy from 1997, seeking to harness the ‘endogenous’ potential of all regions, not only the lagging northern ones, but also the prosperous core regions of London and the South East.11 The key initiative here was the establishment of Regional Development Agencies (RDAs). The supply-side approach they embodied, however, made little impression on entrenched regional disparities, which widened in the period of sustained national economic growth from the mid-1990s to 2007-2008.12
15 Following the general election of 2010, the new Coalition Government set out its new local growth agenda in its Local Growth White Paper of 2010, which announced the abolition of the RDAs and the establishment of new local growth structures and initiatives. Foremost among these are LEPs, requiring close collaboration between local authorities and business leaders. The creation of 39 LEPs by the end of 2011 created a localised and fragmented geography, and they have been characterised as under-
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resourced and under-powered, despite the allocation of additional finance through the Local Growth Fund from 2015.13
16 The establishment of LEPs and abolition of RDAs was linked to a broader discourse of sectoral and regional rebalancing. This discourse emphasised the need to foster the growth of manufacturing in all regions of the UK so as to counter the over-reliance on financial services in South East England, and sought to promote exports and private investment in areas that had become overly dependent on the public sector.14 The key instrument for promoting spatial rebalancing was the Regional Growth Fund (RGF), which aimed to support private sector investment and job creation in areas that were over-dependent on the public sector.15 Yet the £3.5 billion allocated by the RGF between 2011 and 2015 has had little impact on entrenched regional disparities, echoing the RDA experience. Despite the political discourse of regional rebalancing, this lack of impact reflects the continued gap between the scale of the problem of regional inequality in the UK, and the limited level of public resources available to address it. 16
The Origins and Evolution of the Northern Powerhouse Initiative
17 In contrast to the localist focus of LEPs, the NPh represents a pan-regional approach for the North, echoing earlier initiatives such as the Northern Way.17 While it has been described as both an economic development strategy and a brand or label deployed to “rebadge” existing policies,18 this article contends that it is fundamentally a spatial economic narrative or ‘imaginary’ that constructs the North as a distinct region characterised by economic under-performance relative to London and the South East, political neglect and organisational fragmentation through multiple local authorities and LEPs. The rationale of the NPh is that concentrated investment in transport infrastructure, science and innovation, and skills, together with political empowerment through the devolution of powers to city regions, can address economic under- performance and close the productivity and employment gaps with the rest of the UK.19 Reflecting the underlying idea of agglomeration, the NPh is about increasing connections between the core cities of Manchester, Leeds, Liverpool and Sheffield, with recognition of the more geographically distant centres of Hull and Newcastle.
18 The thinking behind the NPh concept has been influenced by the ‘new urban economics’ (NUEs) as espoused by economists at the London School of Economics in particular and the Centre for Cities think tank. Exemplified by the writings of the US economist Ed Glaeser, the NUE is part of what Brendan Gleeson calls the ‘new urbanology’, emanating from North America, which celebrates the economic and social vitality and potential of cities, with a particular focus on urban entrepreneurialism.20 In particular, it emphasises the economic benefits generated by the scale and density of economic activity and wealth within cities – agglomeration. In its British variant, the NUEs argues that the geographical agglomeration of economic activity in core cities and region increases national economic growth, as increasing returns and knowledge spill-overs enhance innovation and productivity. Based upon the argument that regional imbalance in the UK is not a reflection of London being too big, but the secondary cities being too small. The solution is to counter-balance London by better integrating and empowering the group of Northern cities, enabling them to act as single agglomeration.21 The Royal Society for the encouragement of Arts, Manufactures
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and Science’s (RSA) City Growth Commission, was a key source of the NPh concept, espousing agglomeration and recommending a suite of measures to enhance connectivity between Northern cities, boost skills and promote decentralisation.22 This thinking fed into Osborne’s Manchester speeches which introduced the NPh term.23 The RSA Growth Commission was chaired by the former Goldman Sachs investment banker, (Lord) Jim O’Neill, later appointed by Osborne as Commercial Secretary to the Treasury with particular responsibility for the NPh.
19 While agglomeration and the NUE provided the intellectual rationale for the NPh initiative, what of its political rationale? Most obviously, Osborne was a northern Conservative MP, representing the affluent suburban constituency of Tatton outside Manchester, giving him a direct political and electoral interest in the region. Second, the Conservatives felt the need to develop a regional ‘offer’ and make electoral gains in the North at the 2015 General Election, with the NPh becoming a central feature of the campaign.24 Third, and closely related, it was part of a concerted effort by Osborne and then Prime Minster David Cameron to seize the political centre ground to achieve Conservative hegemony through the appropriation of traditionally Labour issues, thereby wrong footing the opposition.25 Fourth, the launch of the NPh initiative can be seen as a response to the widening of regional inequalities that occurred in 2010-2014 as London and the South East recovered faster from the recession, contradicting the government’s spatial rebalancing discourse.26 The establishment of a new high-profile rebalancing initiative in 2014 should be viewed in the context of the limited impact of existing instruments such as the RGF27. Fifth, based on disputed figures produced by the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) North, disparities in infrastructure spending have been widely cited in the media and by Northern political and business leaders, indicating that between 2011-21 and 2015-16, transport spending in London averaged £725 per head compared to £286 per head in the North.28 This has fed into the case for the NPh with its emphasis on transport investment and connectivity.
20 Following its establishment in the second half of 2014, the most prominent phase of the NPh project was between early 2015 and June 2016, reflecting the agreement of devolution deals with core cities, its centrality to the Conservative’s 2015 election campaign and a succession of spending announcements on transport, science and innovation and culture.29 After the Brexit vote and the fall of Osborne, however, there was real concern over the future of the NPh initiative in view of the new Prime Minister’s criticism of the pre-occupation with Manchester and comment on the need to development all of Britain’s ‘great cities’.30 In September 2016, Jim O’Neill, resigned from the government, having felt sidelined by the May government after the dismissal of Osborne.31 An NPh Minister has remained in place, although this post has had three different occupants since May 2015.
21 After considerable pressure, the May government publicly affirmed its commitment to the NPh strategy in autumn 2016. It committed itself to building on existing work, with a renewed objective of raising productivity and growth across the North, reflecting suggestions of a more geographically inclusive approach in the wake of Brexit, with more concern for smaller urban centres and rural areas in addition to the core cities, although this more inclusive approach has struggled to gain policy traction in an unstable post-Brexit vote political environment. The Government published a Northern Powerhouse Strategy to coincide with the Autumn Statement of 2016, with a renewed objective of raising productivity and growth across the North, although this is a rather
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low-key and unheralded document that lacks the political profile of earlier statements under Osborne.32
Unpacking the Northern Powerhouse: Key Policy Areas
22 According to the Autumn Statement of 2014, the NPh initiative had four main elements. 33 The first, and by far the most significant, is transport.34 The second key component is science and innovation, including the new Sir Henry Royce Materials Research Institute (based in Manchester but with branches in Leeds, Liverpool and Sheffield) as well as investments such as a National Innovation Centre for Ageing in Newcastle. The third component is devolution, which in most cases requires the election of so-called ‘metro mayors’ (see below). The fourth and least significant is culture, which includes a Great Exhibition of the North and funding for a new theatre and exhibition space in Manchester. In what follows, the article focuses on transport, inward investment promotion and devolution as the three most significant areas of on-going impact compared to the rather one-off nature of the science investments announced by Osborne.
Transport Infrastructure Investment
23 The overarching NPh vision of bringing the Northern core cities close together into some kind of larger pan-regional agglomeration focuses attention on the need for large-scale transport investment. According to the then Secretary of State for Transport and the Chair of Transport for the North Partnership Board, “a world class transport system must better link up the individual cities and towns in the North, to allow them to function as a single economy and be stronger than the sum of their parts”.35 The case for transport investment also reflects decades of under-investment in East-West rail links across the Pennines, manifested in basic infrastructure and dated rolling stock, with the notorious ‘pacer’ trains still in service on some routes. This weakness of these East-West links has been highlighted by the successive government’s commitment to the new HS2 link between London, the Midlands, and the North, with Phase 2 consisting of extensions to Manchester and Leeds. A report by the HS2 Chairman, Sir David Higgins, emphasised the scope for improved East-West connections to complement and support HS2.36 At the same time, the IPPR figures outlined earlier drew further attention to disparities in infrastructure expenditure between London and the South East and the North. In response, the government announced investments in transport links, including enhanced road capacity, better rail connections and new trains. In total, Neil Lee estimates that around £6.7 billion of the £7.8 billion he calculates was allocated to NPh schemes between the Autumn Statement of 2014 and the March 2016 Budget was focused on transport.37 Not all of this was new money, however, incorporating funds focused from other spending and existing commitments rebadged as part of the Powerhouse. In any case, the identified £6.7 billion is less than half of the £14.8 spent on the Crossrail Scheme in London.38
24 Transport is the one policy area in which the NPh has generated institutional change through the establishment of Transport for the North. TFN emerged out of the government’s response to the One North report produced by the leaders of the northern cities in July 2014 in the wake of Osborne’s Manchester speech.39 As
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chancellor, George Osborne made a commitment in June 2015 to the establishment of TfN as a statutory transport body for the region by 2017, giving it budget of £10 million a year until 2020. Its remit is to develop a transport strategy for the north, decide on key priorities and to represent the region to government as a kind of ‘single voice’. It is supported by a partnership between Northern local authorities and LEPs, representatives of which sit on its partnership board, with national government and national transport agencies. TfN published its Draft Strategic Transport Plan for public consultation in January 2018 with the final version scheduled for publication later in 2018.40 This identifies seven strategic development corridors as the focus for future investment. TfN gained statutory status on 1 at April 2018, which essentially means that government ministers are required to take account of its regional priorities in making national investment decisions. As such, it is not an executive body akin to Transport for London or Transport Scotland, lacking borrowing powers of its own.41
25 The concept of the new line between Manchester and Leeds, dubbed HS3 or Northern Powerhouse Rail, has become central to the broader NPh initiative, following on from HS2 and TfN’s work on East-West links. As part of its strategic vision, TfN has developed plans for a new Trans Pennine line between Leeds and Manchester via Bradford, as well as significant upgrades to other parts of the regional rail network.42 Yet growing concerns about the government’s continued commitment to this project were crystallised by the apparent cancellation of the electrification of the existing trans- Pennine line by Transport Secretary Chris Grayling in July 2017, along with other schemes in the Midlands and Wales, in response to escalating costs of the work being undertaken by Network Rail. This was quickly followed by an expression of support for the Crossrail 2 project in London.43 This infuriated Northern leaders, who convened a Northern transport summit in Leeds to demand a rethink. Business leaders also wrote to the government requesting transport investment, whilst a public petition lunched by IPPR gathered 86,431 signatures by 12 September 2017.44 This hostile public response prompted hurried visits by the Prime Minster and Chancellor to the region to reassure local leaders of their continued commitment, with the latter meeting with the metro mayors of Greater Manchester, Liverpool and the Tees Valley.45
Inward Investment Promotion
26 The NPh offers scale in the context of increased international competition for investment, allowing the region to pool its strengths to match more closely the scale of sub-regions in continental Europe or Asia. In particular, the scale of the region is considered to be broadly comparable to a Chinese mega-region or mega-city at around 15 million residents, giving it the necessary weight and critical mass in international markets. Here, the name itself is seen as highly attractive to international investors, evoking a sense of large-scale opportunity, based upon the region’s long history of innovation, entrepreneurship and commercialisation, stretching back to the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century.46
27 Investment opportunities in the NPh region have been aggregated and packaged in the form of a Northern Powerhouse ‘pitchbook’ containing some twenty projects seeking capital investment. This ‘pitchbook’ was first put together in September 2015 in conjunction with a trade mission to Chengdu, China by George Osborne and Jim O’Neill, accompanied by a group of northern core city local leaders.47 The trade mission to
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China represents a key moment in the formation of the NPh brand, particularly in term of the receptiveness of the Chinese audience who ‘got’ the idea straight away, reflecting their own thinking in terms of mega-cities and shifting economic geographies.48 From a UK government, the NPh capital investment portfolio represents part of a wider regional rebalancing agenda, with the UK Trade and Investment (UKTI) Regeneration Investment Organisation given the remit of attracting such investment into Northern projects from 2013.49 Manchester has been successful in attracting overseas investment, most notably through the Beijing Construction Engineering Groups’ investment in the Airport City’ joint investment and the agreement between Manchester city council and the Abu Dhabi United groups – the owners of Manchester City Football Club – to build 6000 new homes in East Manchester.
28 The emergence of the NPh brand has restored intermediate regional-level inward investment promotion in the North of England following the abolition of the RDAs in 2011, rescaling this from the regional to the pan-regional level. While it remains centralised within the newly created Department for International Trade, inward investment promotion has been coordinated by a dedicated NPh team based in Manchester since 2016. In addition to the attraction of inward investment into the region, this team also encourages Northern firms to move into overseas export markets, undertaking eighteen NPh export missions in 2016.50 There is some evidence that the NPh brand is associated with an increasing volume of inward investment as the NPh region and the Midlands Engine attracted double the number of projects in 2016 that they did in 2007, while the rest of England continues to attract roughly the same number.51
Devolution
29 The devolution of power and responsibilities to local areas within England has become a major priority for government since 2014, reflecting the wider regional rebalancing agenda and representing a somewhat overdue corrective to the entrenched centralism of the UK state.52 Part of the context for this was the Scottish independence referendum of September 2014 which highlighted the glaring gap in devolved powers between Scotland and English localities and regions.53 Devolution has subsequently become one of the major components of the NPh initiative, based on the widespread belief that devolution would strengthen the economic performance of Northern city regions.54 Combined authorities, established by neighbouring local authorities to address cross- cutting issues such as transport and economic development, became the key receiving bodies for devolved powers. Six of the nine combined authorities set up in England by June 2017 were in the North, following the formation of the ‘trailblazer’ Greater Manchester authority in 2011.55 Manchester has also led the way on devolution through the Greater Manchester agreement of November 2014. This grants the city-region extensive powers over transport, planning, housing, police, skills, health and social care. Subsequently, another five devolution deals were agreed with Northern city- regions, namely, Liverpool, Sheffield, Tees Valley and the North East, typically involving more limited powers over skills, employment, transport and housing, in addition to five deals with other parts of the country.56
30 With the curious exception of Cornwall, the government has insisted on the establishment of directly elected mayors as a condition of devolution deals. Elections
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for these directly elected ‘metro mayors’ were held in six areas on 4 May 2017, including Greater Manchester, the Liverpool City Region and Tees Valley. The devolution process ran into difficulties in other areas, however, particularly the North East and Yorkshire. In the North East, the devolution deal collapsed after four of seven local authorities rejected it, although a reduced ‘North of the Tyne deal’ was announced in November 2017 for the three authorities that supported devolution. In Yorkshire, 18 local authorities and the key business organisations have come together in support of a ‘One Yorkshire’ deal for the region as whole. This reflects the political difficulties encountered by the government’s preferred city-regional approach in the Leeds and Sheffield city regions, with the latter electing a Labour mayor without agreed powers or budget in May 2018.57 The ‘One Yorkshire’ proposal had not at the time of writing (May 2018) gained the support of the Government, although discussions are on-going.58
31 The wider devolution agenda has lost momentum since 2016 with the government focusing only on those areas where devolution has stalled (the North East and Yorkshire), whilst supporting the areas with elected mayors with additional funding. For example, half of the new £1.7 billion Transforming Cities Fund for investment in transport has been devolved to the six areas with Mayors, who have the freedom to invest in their own priorities, leaving the government to allocate the remainder of the fund between all other city-regions on a competitive basis.59
Conclusions
32 This article has assessed the NPh as the latest in a series of state policy reasons to the entrenched problem of uneven regional development in the UK and England more specifically. Much of the political and economic potency of the term is derived from the way it maps on to the most popular representation of regional inequality, the North- South divide, aiming to boost the economic performance and competitiveness of the North. Despite the increasing focus on agglomeration economies and infrastructure investment in London and the South East over the past decade, the NPh initiative is testament to the fact that regional inequalities in England remain a political problem for the national state, generating pressures for politicians to respond. These pressures have arguably been exacerbated by the spatial unevenness of the 2008-2009 recession and subsequent recovery, and the high levels of ‘leave’ votes recorded in former industrial areas of the North and Midlands in the Brexit referendum. The NPh represents an important political response to the political problem of regional inequality, framed by the broader spatial rebalancing discourse developed by the Coalition Government. Driven by the former Chancellor, George Osborne, the NPh acquired strong political momentum in 2015-206 as part of a broader ‘one nation’ Conservative strategy to claim the middle ground of British politics and appropriate traditional Labour Party issues.
33 This article has argued that the NPh is principally a powerful spatial economic narrative that constructs the North as an economically under-performing and neglected region in need of transformation through concentrated investment in infrastructure, innovation and skills and devolution to its principal city-regions. The establishment of TfN is a key institutional expression of the NPh agenda, focusing on the development of a Northern transport strategy to link these dispersed economic capabilities. Yet TfN is a statutory advisory body rather than an executive one, leaving
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the region dependent on expenditure decisions made in Westminster. Another important effect of the NPh has been the creation of a compelling regional brand for investment attraction and trade promotion. The devolution of powers to city-regions has been folded into the NPh initiative, with the government making this conditional on local leaders’ acceptance of elected ‘metro mayors’. The process has proved highly uneven across the region, proceeding rapidly in Greater Manchester, Liverpool and Tees Valley, whilst it has generated prolonged political wrangling in Yorkshire and the North East. Rural areas and smaller cities and towns beyond the core city regions have been largely by-passed by the devolution process, leaving pronounced holes in the NPh. 60
34 The power of the NPh narrative is evident in its widespread adoption and use by regional actors and institutions, including local government leaders, LEPs, businesses and business organisations, universities and the regional media. Yet the initiative has lost political momentum and weight as an indirect result of the Brexit vote through the dismissal of Osborne and the subsequent resignation of Jim O’Neill. While the May government has periodically re-affirmed its commitment to the NPH agenda, it lacks the political prominence and leadership it enjoyed under Osborne. This is reflected in recurring criticisms of a lack of government commitment and lobbying by regional actors, for example in response to the Transport Secretary’s apparent cancellation of the Trans-Pennine electrification scheme in July 2017. As such, the NPh provides a unifying, rallying call for regional interests. This helps to explain the persistence and appeal of the NPh narrative, despite reduced government commitment, alongside a lack of alternative policies from either the Conservative or Labour parties.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Pike, Andy and Tomaney, John, “State and economy: governing uneven development in the UK” in Neil. M Coe and Andrew Jones (eds) The Economic Geography of the UK (London, Sage, 2010), pp. 91-109.
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Transport for the North, Strategic Transport Plan: Draft for Public Consultation, January 2018.
Wakefield, Keith, Anderson, Joe, Leese, Sir Richard, Forbes Nick and Dore, Julie, One North: A Proposition for an Interconnected North, July 2014.
NOTES
1. George Osborne ‘We need a Northern Powerhouse.’ Speech at the Museum of Science and Industry, Manchester, 23 June 2014. 2. Department for Communities and Local Government. Midlands Engine Strategy 2017, DCLG, London. 3. Industrial Communities Alliance, Whose Recovery? How the Upturn in Economic Growth is leaving Older Industrial Britain Behind (Barnsley, Industrial Communities Alliance, 2015). 4. Ron Martin, “Rebalancing the spatial economy: the challenge for regional theory”, Territory, Politics, Governance 3:3 (2015), pp. 235-272. 5. Andy Haldane, ‘One car, two car, red car, blue car’, Speech given at Materials Processing Institute Redcar, 2 December 2016 (London, Bank of England, 2016). 6. Ibid. 7. Doreen Massey, World City (Cambridge, Polity, 2007). 8. Alan Townsend and Tony Champion, ‘The Impact of Recession on City Regions: The British Experience, 2008-2013’, Local Economy 29:1-2 (2014), pp. 38-51. 9. Industrial Communities Alliance, Whose Recovery? How the Upturn in Economic Growth is leaving Older Industrial Britain Behind (Barnsley, Industrial Communities Alliance, 2015). 10. Bas Los, Philip McCann, John Springford and Mark Thisse, “The mismatch between local voting and the local economic consequences of Brexit”, Regional Studies 51:5 (2017), pp. 786-799. 11. Andy Pike and John Tomaney, “State and economy: governing uneven development in the UK”. In Neil M. Coe and Andrew Jones (eds.) The Economic Geography of the UK (London, Sage, 2010), pp. 91-109. 12. Ron Martin, “Rebalancing the spatial economy: the challenge for regional theory”, Territory, Politics, Governance 3:3 (2015), p.253. 13. A. Pike, D. Marlow, A. McCarthy, P. O’Brien and J. Tomaney, “Local institutions and local economic development: the Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) in England, 2010-”, Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economies and Societies 8:1 (2015), pp. 184-204. 14. Quoted in HM Government, Local Growth: Realising Every Place’s Potential. Cm 7691. (London : H M Government, 2010), p.10. 15. A. Pike, D. Marlow, A. McCarthy, P. O’Brien and J. Tomaney, op cit. 16. Ben Gardiner, Ron Martin, Peter Sunley and Peter Tyler, “Spatially Unbalanced Growth in the British economy”, Journal of Economic Geography 13:6 (2013), pp. 889-928. 17. This was a pan-regional collaborative initiative between the three Northern RDAs – the North West Development Agency, One North East and Yorkshire forward - instigated by the then Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott, which ran from 2004 to 2010. See Joyce Liddle and Christianne Ormston, “The Legacy of the Northern Way”, Local Government Studies 41:4 (2015), pp. 553-570. 18. Neil Lee, “Powerhouse of Cards? Understanding the 'Northern Powerhouse”, Regional Studies, 51:3 (2016), pp. 478-489. 19. SQW Ltd and Cambridge Econometrics Ltd, The Northern Powerhouse Independent Economic Review. Final Executive Summary Report, 24 June 2016; HM Government, Northern Powerhouse
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Strategy. November 2016; Northern Powerhouse Partnership: First Report. 2017. Northern Powerhouse Partnership, Manchester. 20. Brendan Gleeson, “The Urban Age: paradox and prospect”, Urban Studies 49:5 (2012), pp. 931-942. 21. Henry Overman, “It’s not that London is too big, but that other large UK cities are too small”, 6 June 2017. http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2017/06/09/its-not-that-london-is-too-big- but-that-other-large-uk-cities-are-too-small/ Last accessed 18 June 2017. 22. RSA City Growth Commission. Unleashing Metro Growth: Final Recommendations of the City Growth Commission. 2014, p. 9. 23. George Osborne ‘We need a Northern Powerhouse.’ Speech at the Museum of Science and Industry, Manchester, 23 June 2014; George Osborne ‘Chancellor on the path to a Northern Powerhouse.’ Speech at Beetham Tower, Manchester, 5 August 2014. 24. George Parker, “Cameron set to relaunch ‘northern powerhouse’ initiative”, The Financial Times, 8 January 2015. 25. George Parker, “Summer budget: George Osborne is a ‘mix of Lawson and Heseltine’”, The Financial Times, 8 July 2015. 26. Alan Townsend and Tony Champion, op. cit. 27. Ben Gardiner, Ron Martin, Peter Sunley and Peter Tyler, op. cit. 28. Grace Blakely, Paying for Our Progress: How Will the Northern Powerhouse be Financed and Funded? (IPPR North, 2017), p. 16-17. 29. Ibid. 30. George Parker, “Theresa May sets out vision for business”, The Financial Times, 11 July 2016. 31. Jim Pickard and George Parker, “Jim O’Neill resigns as Treasury minister”, The Financial Times, 23 September 2016. 32. HM Government, Northern Powerhouse Strategy, November 2016. 33. George Osborne, “A rebooted Northern Powerhouse fits Theresa May’s objectives”, The Financial Times, 21st August 2017. 34. Neil Lee, op. cit. 35. Patrick McLoughlin and Sir Richard Leese, foreword, The Northern Powerhouse: One Agenda, One Economy, One North, March 2015, p. 2. 36. David Higgins, HS2 Plus: A Report by David Higgins, London, Department for Transport, p. 10, 17 March 2014. 37. Neil Lee, op. cit, p. 8-9. 38. Ibid. 39. Keith Wakefield, Joe Anderson, Sir Richard Leese, Nick Forbes and Julie Dore, One North: A Proposition for an Interconnected North, July 2014. 40. Transport for the North, Strategic Transport Plan: Draft for Public Consultation. January 2018. 41. Ed Cox, “Reflections on nine years of putting the North on the political map”, Infrastructure Intelligence, 2018. 42. Transport for the North, op. cit. 43. Peter Hetherington, “How northern rail connections have hit the buffers”, The Guardian, 1 August 2017; Gwyn Topham, “Fury as rail electrification is scrapped by minister, but train builders roll on”, The Observer, 23 July 2017. 44. https://you.38degrees.org.uk/petitions/crossrail-north-now 45. Andy Bounds, “Hammond hints at new money for Northern Powerhouse”, The Financial Times, 4 September 2017. 46. Department for International Trade, Northern Powerhouse Investment Opportunities, undated, p. 6.
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47. Peter O’Brien, Andy Pike and John Tomaney, “Beyond the Northern Pitchbook” in Mike Raco (ed.), Britain for Sale? Perspectives on the costs and benefits of foreign ownership (London, The Smith Institute, 2016). 48. Senior policy-maker, author’s interviews, September 2017. 49. Peter O’Brien, Andy Pike and John Tomaney, op. cit. 50. Government official, author’s interviews, September 2017. 51. Ernst and Young, Attractiveness Survey UK, 2017, p.14. 52. Andy Pike, Louise Kempton, David Marlow, Peter O’Brien and John Tomaney, Decentralisation: Issues, Principles and Practice, (Newcastle, CURDS, Newcastle University, 2016). 53. House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee, Devolution in England: the Case for Local Government. First Report of Session 2014-15. HC 503 (London, The Stationery Office. 2014). 54. Neil Lee, op. cit, p. 5. 55. National Audit Office, Progress in Setting up Combined Authorities. HC 240 (London, NAO, 3 July 2017). 56. National Audit Office, English Devolution Deals. HC948 (London, NAO, 30 April 2016). 57. Akash Paun and Maddy Thimon Jack, Devolution to Yorkshire: the Hole in the Northern Powerhouse? (London, Institute for Government, 2017); Frances Perraudin, “No agreed power, no agreed budget: Dan Jarvis on his fight to be Sheffield mayor”, The Guardian, 23 April 2018. 58. Arj Singh, “Brokenshire must respond to pleas for Yorkshire-wide devolution”, Yorkshire Post, 6 May 2018. 59. Department for Transport, Transforming Cities Fund: Call for Proposals (London, Department for Transport, 2018). 60. Paun and Jack, op. cit; Simin Davoudi, Roger Turner and Guy Garrod, A New Deal for the North: A Briefing Paper of the British Academy (London, The British Academy, 2017).
ABSTRACTS
The Northern Powerhouse (NPh) is a UK government initiative for increasing the economic competiveness of the North of England launched by the former Chancellor, George Osborne in 2014. Informed by the new urban economics and the importance of agglomeration and urban scale and density in fostering competitiveness, the NPh sought to pool the strengths of the Northern core cites, principally Manchester, Leeds, Liverpool and Sheffield, as a kind of transformative urban counter-weight to London. This article aims to assess the nature and wider significance of the NPh, considering its evolution and impact since 2014. It argues that the NPh is a spatial economic narrative that has gained the support of a wide range of Northern interests, but that its coherence and implementation has been undermined by a lack of national government commitment and leadership since 2016.
La Northern Powerhouse est une initiative du gouvernement britannique visant à accroître la compétitivité économique du nord de l’Angleterre. Lancée par l’ancien Ministre des finances, George Osborne en 2014, elle se base sur les principes de la Nouvelle Economie Urbaine et donc sur l’importance des effets d’agglomération, d’échelle et de densité urbaine en vue de promouvoir la compétitivité. En mettant en commun les forces des villes clés du Nord (principalement Manchester, Leeds, Liverpool et Sheffield), la Northern Powerhouse a cherché à
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susciter une dynamique urbaine transformatrice en mesure de contrebalancer le poids de Londres. L’article analyse en quoi consiste la Northern Powerhouse, en considérant son évolution et son impact depuis 2014. Il avance que la Northern Powerhouse constitue avant tout un discours sur l’économie spatiale ayant rallié le soutien d’un grand nombre d’intêrêts au nord de l’Angleterre mais dont la cohérence et la mise en oeuvre ont été mises à mal par un manque d’engagement et de leadership du gouvernement britannique depuis 2016.
INDEX
Mots-clés: Northern Powerhouse, inégalités régionales, agglomération, rééquilibrage spatial, transport, dévolution Keywords: Northern Powerhouse, regional inequality, agglomeration, spatial rebalancing, transport, devolution
AUTHOR
DANNY MACKINNON Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies (CURDS), Newcastle University
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Two Nations Under the Same Roof? Housing and the North-South Divide in the UK Deux nations sous le même toit? Le logement et le fossé Nord-Sud au Royaume- Uni
David Fée
1 Following ‘the severe slowdown in the northern half of the country’, it became ‘financially safer’ for developers ‘to build below a line drawn from Cheltenham in the west to Cambridge in the east.1
2 The perception of the United Kingdom by its inhabitants has long been influenced by geography. Prior to 1914, British political observers noted a core-periphery cleavage separating the Liberals from the Conservatives,2 and in 1930s England, contemporary observers such as George Orwell and J.B. Priestley contrasted a modern South with an industrial North (plus a rural heritage England).3 As illustrated by the quote above, this perception of a divided kingdom has given rise in the field of housing to the belief that two nations divided by some invisible line running from the Severn to the Wash are living side by side. To a prosperous booming South is often opposed an ailing North where house prices are increasingly lagging behind.
3 Paradoxically, the North-South divide has been poorly researched by housing specialists. Indeed, housing is usually approached in the UK from a public policy perspective4 or an economic one5 but more rarely from a geographical one.6 The main publications have rarely focused on the spatial dimension of housing and when they do, they tend to focus on the inner city measures taken from the 1930s onwards (slum clearance), or the place-based programmes designed in the 1960s and revived in the 1990s to tackle spatial inequalities. When they broach the topic of regional variations, they usually focus on differences between the four nations of the UK7 or the consequences of the 1990s reforms of the governance of the UK8 but rarely deal with the sub-regional differences.9
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4 The purpose of this paper is to explore the existence of a North-South divide in the field of housing (a concept that simply ignores the existence of the Midlands!), not from a public policy perspective but from a housing markets perspective. I shall try to determine whether there is any substance to the slippery concept of a North-South divide in housing, and whether it is still useful to understanding the housing situation in a post-devolution UK. Indeed, it can be argued that this concept reflects popular understandings of the housing market above all but may not really stand up to scrutiny. These beliefs are themselves fueled and shaped by property sections in the media (see the Sunday Times or the Observer for instance) or even monthly house prices bulletins like Savills’, Halifax’s or Nationwide’s that often convey the notion of a binary housing market.10
5 Firstly, I shall briefly analyse the official discourse with regard to a North-South divide in housing. Then, I shall examine the issue of the rescaling of housing and the growing importance given to the sub-regional level in England. Then, I shall examine the relevance of the North-South divide in housing in the UK on the basis of four indicators (physical aspect, state of repair, tenure, prices). Thirdly, I shall raise the question of the emergence of new and more relevant housing divides in England. Finally, I shall explore the question of housing policy divergence in a post-devolution UK.
6 Note of caution:
7 I will be using the administrative regions used in 1994 to host the Government Offices. Due to the 2014 Secretary of State’s decision to end DCLG’s provision of regional statistics and the post-2010 abolition of regional governance, it has been difficult to get up-to-date figures and, as a result, statistics often do not cover recent years. It is also difficult to get figures for the whole of the UK as housing is a devolved policy and the Office for National Statistics reports do not always look at the whole of the UK. Another issue is that the four nations use four different methodologies for their four separate surveys of housing: the English authorities conduct a yearly English Housing Survey that focuses on households, physical conditions samples and desk-based market values; the Northern Ireland House Conditions Survey is based on a smaller sample covering the first two items but not on an annual basis; the Scottish House Condition Survey is an annual sample survey on the same items and was merged with the Scottish Household Survey in 2012; the Living in Wales annual sample Survey covered the same items but was replaced in 2009 by the National Survey for Wales.11
Housing, the North-South divide and public policy
8 Perhaps because the North-South divide is a slippery and contested concept and is politically loaded, too, it has rarely been used by policy-makers in the field of housing. Thus, the 1977 Housing Green Paper that signaled the then Labour government’s intention to give more recognition to varying housing circumstances in England and Wales (see below) and move away from national blanket housing programmes, simply underscored the end of a national housing policy and stated: “But the key to the success of national housing policy now lies in the development of effective local housing strategies”12.
9 Likewise, 18 years later, under the Conservatives, the Housing White Paper avoided any references to the concept although it devoted a separate chapter to housing in Wales
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stating “Housing in Wales has some distinctive characteristics which in turn generate particular needs”, on the grounds that it had more older and unfit homes.13
10 The New Labour Party’s approach to housing policy marked a break as the party came back to power in 1997 with a robust devolution agenda for the UK. Regional governance (see below) was to be at the heart of devolution in England as it would reduce the existing democratic deficit and make local politicians more accountable; it would also make it easier to tailor regional policies addressing regional variations and it would enable collaboration beyond the mere local authority level.14 The move towards devolution-based public policy during the New Labour years accounts for the greater prominence given to regional differences in housing official literature in England. Although New Labour never referred to the North-South concept in housing, the 2000 Housing Green Paper, the first one in 23 years, contrasted the housing situation in the North with that in the South, stating: “There are however areas of declining housing demand, particularly in parts of our Northern cities (….) In London and many Southern urban and rural areas, high demand for housing coupled with high house prices has placed acute demand on the social housing stock (…)”15
11 Five years later, this new approach to housing governance in England led to the announcement of a major attempt to rebalance northern and southern housing markets. The government’s 2003 housing programme contrasted a greater South East region stretching to Milton Keynes with a North starting around Birmingham.16 While the former was allocated “growth areas” to increase housing supply, the latter was imposed areas called “housing market renewal areas” to tackle “housing abandonment” through demolitions and “changes to the housing stock and tenure, in order to encourage income mix and choice”.17 The publication of the Northern Way in 2004, a growth strategy for the three northern regions spearheaded by John Prescott and mostly devoted to housing, reinforced the feeling that the New Labour government had a binary vision of housing in England18 (the Midlands were often referred to although the document was supposed to focus on the three Northern regions only as if the North started at Birmingham in the housing field). Interestingly, the following 2007 Housing Green Paper, published under Tony Blair’s successor, Gordon Brown, sought to downplay the divide by announcing growth areas in northern authorities on the basis of deteriorating affordability in the North, although the emphasis was still predominantly on southern housing markets.19
12 In 2017, the Conservative Party’s Housing White Paper built on the devolution agenda of the Labour years (although the Coalition had previously abolished the regional governance it had inherited), but recast it in localist terms and shied away from drawing a clear North-South dividing line across England’s housing markets. Instead, it stated: “At the heart of the White Paper is the acknowledgement that the housing market is very different in different parts of the country”.20 However, by explicitly referring to the on- going Northern Powerhouse and Midlands Engine strategies (the latter one being published in March 2017 and a belated recognition that the economy of England did not boil down to a North-South division), the government implied that the housing market in England could be divided into three clear-cut contrasting blocs.
13 As can be seen from the foregoing, although government rhetoric rarely refers to the concept of a North-South divide in housing, the policies formulated at a national level appear to be based on a tacit belief in the divide. This contrasts with the growing
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importance given to local housing markets and the recognition of local, sub-regional differences by policy-makers.
The North-South divide and the rescaling of housing
14 Since the 1990s, housing policy-making has undergone what some academics have described as a ‘rescaling process’.21 This has helped move away from a simplistic North- South divide or inner cities/rest of the country vision and focus on the boundaries and specificities of individual housing markets. This initially took the form of an increasingly formal government push towards the regional governance of housing, before giving way to a more local approach to housing policy-making. Both stages in this evolution have helped highlight variations in local housing markets and idiosyncrasies within regions.
15 Greater attention by national authorities to local housing situations across the country (apart from inner cities problems) was first given in the late 1970s, as explained above. Whereas national economic inequalities were addressed in the interwar years, the initial signs of the recognition by the public authorities of the spatial dimension of the housing question in the UK only came in 1969 with the Cullingworth Report. The report on Council Housing: Purposes, Procedures and Priorities insisted on the fact that there was not one national housing problem but many different local housing problems that required a reform of the governance of housing and the formulation of local policies.22 These recommendations first fed into the work of the Scottish Housing Advisory Committee that examined ways of measuring local housing need and then finally led to a change in the national system in 1977. Local authorities were asked to formulate a Housing plan in Scotland and a Housing Strategy and Investment Programme in England and Wales that would reflect their own housing needs and they would receive a block allocation from the government. Whereas housing programmes and policies used to be centrally driven, they were now to be locally determined and, in theory, centrally funded.
16 However, gradually, policy-making in the field of housing came to be seen as too local, narrowly focused and parochial. As a consequence, a regional governance of housing emerged in the early 1990s when the then Department for the Environment published a document demanding that each administrative region should have an up-to-date regional guidance covering issues of regional importance, including “the scale and distribution of provision for new housing”.23 Once issued by the Secretary of State, local authorities were required to have regard to it when preparing their plans. In 1994, the creation of nine Government Offices for the Regions tasked with delivering government policy at a sub-national level, managing spending programmes and linking departmental policies across boundaries further institutionalized the evolution of policy-making in housing.24
17 The New Labour government came to power on a greater regional ownership and devolution agenda in 1997 and altered the system along the lines announced in a DETR 1998 publication.25 As a result, in 1999 the New Labour government created indirectly elected Regional Assemblies that became responsible for producing a statutory Regional Spatial Strategy (covering a number of related issues including assessment of new housing requirements and land availability) after the passing of the Planning and Compulsory Act 2004. As of 2003, in order to address the question of household growth,
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and following the rediscovery of the issue of housing supply,26 each region was to have a Regional Housing Board in charge of formulating a Regional Housing Strategy reflecting the housing priorities of the region. All planning authorities (at the local and regional level) were strongly encouraged to conduct local housing market assessments in order “to inform the development of spatial housing strategies”.27
18 Further developments reinforced the rescaling of housing policy-making to a regional level and underscored the importance of regional housing markets and their differences. In 2006, the then Labour government altered the philosophy and operation of the planning system fundamentally following the Barker Review and the 2004 final report (recommendation 5). A new body -the National Housing and Planning Advice Unit- was set up and charged with setting national and regional affordability targets that Regional Planning Bodies (ie the Regional Assemblies) were to achieve by determining the “numerical trajectories for new housing supply”.28 Affordability targets were calculated in terms of the ratio of lower quartile house prices to earnings and house prices became the key drivers of the regional planning bodies’ housing policies.
19 Following a number of publications,29 the Labour government became increasingly nervous about the potential misfit between economic performance and housing markets. Housing policies became framed in a broader competitiveness agenda.30 After the 2007 Sub-national Review, this led to a number of reforms designed to integrate housing and economic policies into single regional strategies. Above all, it led to a strong drive on the part of the government to make sure local authorities collaborated at a sub-regional level, ideally at city-region level: new guidelines were published on how to identify sub-regional housing market areas31 or to form Multi-Areas Agreements between local authorities32, and late, in 2007, 13 sub-regions working towards a MAA were announced.
20 Although the whole of the regional governance in England was dismantled by the incoming Coalition Government after 2010, this sub-regional approach was retained. Local Authorities were left to their own devices again, in the name of localism, and given the freedom to determine their own housing needs. However, they were submitted to a duty to cooperate enshrined in the Localism Act 2011 when preparing their local plan on cross boundaries strategic priorities and to demonstrate they have complied with the duty. Likewise, a requirement to prepare a Strategic Housing Market Assessment and to assess local housing needs in conjunction with neighbouring authorities when housing markets cross local boundaries was set out in the 2012 National Planning Policy Framework33 and the Planning Practice Guidance 2014 (Duty to cooperate).
21 Finally, following the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016, recent devolution developments under the Conservative government seem to strengthen the initial city-region agenda of their predecessors and appear as a return to strategic planning at a sub-national level. In May 2017, powers, budgets and responsibilities were transferred from Westminster to new combined authority mayors in 6 regions across England (Greater Manchester, Cambridge and Peterborough, Liverpool City Region, Tees Valley, West Midlands and West of England). In Manchester, this new stage in the devolution agenda initiated in 1997 by Labour will make the new Mayor responsible for preparing a spatial development strategy that will show how he intends to meet local housing needs in order to support the local economy.34
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22 All these developments have reinforced the growing interest for local housing markets that has been building since the late 1970s as well as the degree of sophistication of housing analysis at the expense of a simplistic North-South perspective. Defined in some government documents as “geographical areas defined by household demand and preference for housing on the basis of house prices, household migration and search patterns as well as contextual data”,35 housing market areas (whether local or sub-regional) are seen today as the most appropriate spatial level for housing analysis and increasingly for policy-making, too.
23 Having explored government discourse and policy-making with regard to the North- South divide in the field of housing, we shall now look at four different indicators (type of homes, state of repair, tenure, prices) that together further show that the concept needs qualifying.
A North-South divide in UK housing?
Types of homes
24 We should start by examining something that may seem trivial but that does undermine popular beliefs, namely the built environment. Indeed, it is often assumed that, due to its strong industrial past, northern England is a land of back to backs, two up two down homes while the south England is a land of pleasant suburban homes. On the basis of statistics, how do regional housing stocks compare?
25 The Land Registry data for England and Wales36 provide some elements of answers about the type of property sold and so an insight into the physical aspect of the built environment since homeownership is dominant in the UK.37 They show that there is no clear North-South divide but rather multiple divides along industrial versus non industrial settlements lines, interwar semis versus post-1945 detached lines or urban renaissance inner city versus suburban homes lines. At a UK level, the four nations share similar features but display well-known differences, too: semi-detached homes and detached homes, often the legacy of the interwar private housing building boom, are the most prevalent types of dwellings in the UK (44.3% in England, 39.3% in Northern Ireland and 48% in Wales) except in Scotland where flats (whether high or low rises) account for 36% of all dwellings, far ahead of England (17.9%). Terraces, the legacy of the industrial era, are the second most frequent type of dwellings in all nations (between 28 and 31%) except in Scotland where the percentage is lower (20%). Northern Ireland has twice the proportion of bungalows (21%) as the other nations.38
The state of repair
26 Contrary to expectations, there is no perfect North-South divide either when it comes to the state of repair of regional housing stocks. British people in the North are not necessarily more poorly housed. In July 2011, the region with the highest rate of non- decent homes was the South West with close to 40% of the stock, whereas the region with the lowest was the North East with less than 25%.39 London stood in the middle and the Midlands were divided between East and West, with a higher proportion in the latter. Interestingly, the few reports and statistics there are on the sub-national situation show that there is no clear link between poverty and non-decent living
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conditions. This disconnection is due to the major renovation programmes that took place in the late 1990s and 2000s (the Decent Homes programme) at the behest of the central Labour government after Public Sector Agreements were defined and targets set.40 These have had a massive impact41 on the state of social housing (much present in inner cities and in the North in particular) and have reinforced the gap with a poorly regulated and little renovated private rented sector often more frequent in the South.
27 At the UK level, statistics show significant differences between the four nations again: dwellings displayed a low incidence of damp in Northern Ireland (4.1%) compared to Wales and Scotland (over 12%) with England in the middle (7.6%).42 Since the four nations define poor housing on a different basis (England and Wales use the Decent Homes Standard, Scotland the Tolerable Standard and Northern Ireland the Fitness for Habitation Standard) comparisons are difficult in this area, too, and surveys have often used the Housing Health and Safety Rating system instead. This is used in the UK (except in Scotland) to identify and assess problems in dwellings and rank them on the basis of their severity (minor to potential lethal). Welsh dwellings come out worse when it comes to category 1 hazard (28.7% of them) against 22.2% for England and 18.3% for Northern Ireland, as well as excessive cold.43
Tenure
28 Seen from a tenure perspective, the sub-regional picture of housing is equally surprising and challenges the concept of a North-South divide. In 2011, rates of home ownership varied across England between 62% and 70%, with two Northern regions (North East and Yorkshire and the Humber) below the national average of 64% but not much.44 The three regions with the highest percentages were in the South, but London stood out as the one region at odds with all the others. Despite decades of national policies in favour of home ownership, the home ownership rate of the capital remained far below the national average at 50%, reflecting the soaring house price of the capital (see below). Rates in the private rented sector were even more similar with a 3% difference only between the regions with the lowest percentage (North East and West Midlands at 15%) and the one with the highest (Yorkshire and the Humber at 18%). Once more, the main divide was between London (26%) and the rest of the country, reflecting the greater financialisation of housing in the capital and investment in buy- to-let programmes. The clearest divide indication of a North-South divide could be seen in the social housing sector where there was a 10% gap between the percentage of social dwellings in the North East (23%) and the South East (13%), reflecting the widely different outcomes of the Right-to-Buy policies since 1980. Again, London had a profile much closer to that of the Northern regions with a 24% percentage.
29 At UK level, the four nations display marked differences in tenures: although home- ownership is predominant in each of them, statistics show variations from 63% in Scotland to 73% in Wales. The private sector that has experienced a revival in the UK since the 1980s, is far more present in Northern Ireland (17.9%) than in the other nations, with Scotland and Wales showing an equally low percentage (around 9% of all dwellings). Finally, the social sector occupies a similar place in England, Wales and Northern Ireland (between 15 and 17%) but with important differences in the balance between local authorities and housing associations, and still represents a much higher percentage in Scotland (27.5%).45
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House prices
30 As seen in the introduction, the media (and developers) tend to focus on house prices and have helped give credence to the concept of a North-South divide in housing, running across the middle of the UK. The UK media’s obsession with housing is fuelled by ever wider regional variations and a growing North-South divide in house prices that is three times higher than in 2005.46 House prices, unlike the previously mentioned indicators, are strongly influenced by the economic geography of the country. Between 2015 and 2016, the closer a house was from London, the steeper the price increase: while prices had increased by 11.5% in London and 8.3% in the South East, they “only” went up by 5.8% in East of England and the South West, 4.1% in the West Midlands, 1.7% in Wales, 0.5% in the North West and even declined by 0.2% in Scotland and 1.1% in the North East47.
31 Furthermore, since the 2008 recession, regional markets have displayed wide differences in terms of recovery. While all southern regions enjoyed in 2014 higher house prices than their pre-crisis index peaks (ranging from +12.9% for the South East to +2.2% in the South West), the Midlands and Scotland had just recovered from the recession (from +1.1% in the West Midlands to +0.7% in Scotland) and northern and Welsh prices remained below (between -0.8% in Wales and a hefty -46.7% in Northern Ireland).48 Over a 20 year period (1995-2015), most towns and cities in the North and Midlands of England saw a price increase between 150% and 250%, against 250% to 350% in the South.49 These differences can be accounted for by different regional inward investment, jobs growth and employment rates as well as migration levels and housing shortages.
32 At city level, a study of house prices in towns and cities in England and Wales on the basis of house prices statistics for small areas (HPSSAS) confirms a broad North-South divide.50 In the South, 29 out of 45 towns and cities above 75,000 inhabitants had a median house price above £200,000 in 2015 but only 3 out 64 cities in the North and Midlands did. In the South, between 2010 and 2015, 26 out of 45 towns and cities had experienced median house price growth of over 20% or so, while nine out of 64 had in the North and the Midlands.51
33 The growing regional gap in house prices along a North-South line is not new and was first diagnosed in the 1960s when it started opening. It is sometimes said to be part of a cycle that evens out differences over the long term.52 According to those researchers, during periods of growth, there is great diversity between regions but in recession, these differences reduce and over the long term (1973-1998) there was similar overall growth across the country. As a result, no North-South divide, as measured according to this analysis, could be highlighted before 1998. However, in a context of growing financialisation in southern markets, it remains to be seen whether these past trends will be repeated and whether over the long term the current North-South divide in house prices will even out.
34 So although the expression ‘North-South divide’ rightly illustrates the growing differences in house prices across the UK, it fails to reflect the state and profile of the national housing stock accurately. It is also too simplistic when studying today’s housing markets.
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New geographies of housing inequalities?
35 Indeed, since the 1990s, housing inequalities have morphed into a simpler divide at the national level as well as an increasingly complex picture at the level below the regional. London increasingly stands out from the rest of the country and local variations have become wider.
The new divide: London strikes out
36 The London housing market has indeed become unlike any other in the country. In the past, London house prices moved ahead of the rest of the country at the beginning of an upturn in house market cycles53 but this is no longer the case, it seems (although a new trend may be emerging, see conclusion). Although there has been no national upturn in the housing market since the recession of 2008, London has already fully recovered. By 2015, property prices in the capital were 10% above their 2007 peak while nationally they were still 6% below. House prices had increased by 49% there since the 2009 trough compared to 19% nationally and the average London house price was 90% above the UK average.54 In the private rented sector, rents are also far higher: the median monthly rent was £1,300 in the capital in 2014 against £595 in the UK.55 As a result, affordability56 has declined much faster in the capital than in the rest of the country: in 2014, private sector tenants in London spent 36% of their gross income on housing costs,57 and as a whole, between 2008 and 2014, Londoners’ disposable income after housing costs fell by 4% and that of private renters by 28% between 2001 and 2011. 58 Another indication of the unique trajectory of the capital is that while in 1999 five out of the ten least affordable local authorities in England and Wales were in London, there were seven out of ten in 2016.59 Although the South East housing market displays similar features and is fuelled by Londoners relocating in the region, it remains significantly cheaper. By 2014, house prices had risen fastest than in any other region but significantly more slowly than in London (+12.9% and +39.7% respectively).60 In September 2017, average house prices stood at £484,000 in London but £324,000 in the South East, higher than in any other region.61
37 The capital also stands apart from other regions for its unique tenure system: in 2014-15, owner occupiers represented only 50% of all households (against 66% nationally), whereas 27% of them were in the private rented sector (up from 15% in 1996) against 18% nationally.62 Furthermore, 23% of households were in social housing, well above the national percentage of 16%. Outright home ownership is lowest in the capital at 23% compared to 33% of all households in England.63 However, the tenure system in the capital is uneven, with a marked divide between inner and outer London: while in the former the home ownership rate was 36% in 2016, in outer London it was 58%.64
38 These unique features can be accounted for by the extreme financialisation of the London property market (visible in the amount of foreign investment and the development of Buy-To-Let programmes that amount to 24% of the English total),65 its rapid demographic growth (double the rate of the UK, at 14% between 2004 and 2014)66 and, as a result, the short-fall of homes and declining affordability (see above). To these must be added the widening economic gap with rest of the country, the London economy outperforming all other UK regions and growing by 20% between 2009 and
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2013 compared with the UK at 13.9%.67 Despite the 2008 recession, total employment today is higher than before the 2008 peak and 0.7 million jobs were created between 2009 and 2014.68
39 However, beyond the growing divide between the capital and the rest of the country, there are signs that the national housing market picture has become increasingly complex and fragmented. In a country where home ownership is the be all and end all of housing policy, other crises appear to be in the making in parts of northern England, traditionally thought to be unaffected by the housing affordability crisis.
40 First, it should be noted that regional averages for the Midlands and the North conceal pockets of wealth and areas of high house prices: for instance, in 2015, Harrogate, Solihull and Sutton Coldfield had median house prices above £200,000, higher than many cities and towns in the South.69 Besides, variations are almost as wide within regions as between regions: in 2015 median house prices in the North and Midlands reached £237,000 in Sutton Coldfield but only £78,000 in Burnley. In the South, median house prices in Peterborough were only £148,000 but £390,000 in St Albans.70
41 Another telling sign is that some Northern cities (similar to housing bubbles in their region) saw a rapid rise in house prices when the economy started recovering. One of them was Durham, which was the town with the seventh biggest rise in average house prices in 2011-12 (12.6%) just below six southern towns and cities.71 A more worrying sign is that many northern cities have experienced a double digit fall in home ownership rates, similar to that of outer London and well above the national average of 7% since the peak of home ownership in 2003. The sharpest decrease in England is found in Manchester: while 72% of households were homeowners in 2003, there were 58% in 2015. Double digits falls have also occurred over the same period in the West Midlands (-11.2%), South Yorkshire (-9.8%) and West Yorkshire (-10.6%) metropolitan areas and all core northern cities except Tyne and Wear and Merseyside.72
42 Finally, the annual rate of house price inflation in some northern core cities appears to be accelerating: the year-on-year growth rate in Manchester reached 8.4% between July 2015 and July 2016, very similar to that of London the previous year. House price inflation was not far behind at 7.6% in Birmingham and 7.7% in Liverpool, outstripping southern cities like Bournemouth (+6.6%).73
43 Manchester is a case in point. Indeed, the local context displays similar features to the London one. The city is suffering from a growing shortfall of 10,000 homes although it has attracted thousands of Buy to Let schemes for the last two decades that have transformed the face of the city centre. The short-fall is partly due to the fact that Manchester has gained thousands of international migrants between 2007 and 2012 (36,000) who have fuelled the city’s net demographic gain (20,000). It is also due to the rapid growth in the number of professional jobs in the past decade (+50%)74 that have caused the city centre’s population to triple between 2001 and 2011.75
44 As can be seen, housing market trends in some northern core cities are increasingly at odds with the rest of their surrounding region and have more in common with those in the South of the country. They invalidate the notion of a simple North-South divide in housing. What is more, the national picture has been made more complicated by the New Labour national devolution agenda implemented since 1997.
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The North South divide in post-devolution UK
45 In the UK, the rolling out of the devolution agenda has entailed the transfer of housing powers and competences to new institutions in different stages in the three devolved nations. As a result, the new administrations have sometimes been able to make different choices from the English authorities. This has and will increase the diversity of housing markets across the UK.
46 In Scotland, the power to make housing legislation was devolved to the Scottish Parliament although some powers remain reserved (for example, housing benefit, taxation powers, mortgage market regulation).76 In Wales, the power to make primary legislation in housing was only devolved in 2011 to the Welsh Assembly following a referendum. Later, the Wales Act 2014 devolved land stamp duty and landfill tax.77 In Northern Ireland, a Northern Ireland Housing Executive was set up in 1969 and tasked with depoliticizing housing policy. It survived the devolution agenda of New Labour and became accountable to the new Northern Ireland Assembly that inherited housing among its domain of competence.78
47 As a result of devolution and different political administrations in the three devolved nations since 1997, housing policies display marked divergences. In Scotland, they have increasingly displayed the hallmark of egalitarianism and social justice.79 Council tenants and council stocks have remained more protected from liberal policies than in England: council and registered social landlord tenants were given secure tenancies by the Housing (Scotland) Act 2001.80 Stock transfer from councils to housing associations expanded rapidly in the 2000s but declined following the election of the Scottish National Party in 2011. The SNP also abolished the Right to Buy for new council and housing associations tenants in 2010 and all tenants in 2016. Likewise, the affordable rents policy introduced in England following the October 2010 Spending Review and the 2011 Localism Act (encouraging social housing providers to charge 80% of market rents on new lettings) was not pursued in Scotland.81 In the private rented sector, under the Antisocial Behaviour (Scotland) Act 2004, almost all private landlords had to be licensed and rent increases were severely limited by the Private Housing Tenancies (Scotland) 2016. Finally, protection for homeless people was reinforced in the Homeless (Scotland) Act 2003.82
48 In Wales, housing policies were similar to the ones in England before the 2011 referendum on further devolution. They have increasingly diverged since then. In 2014, the Housing Wales Act placed a stronger duty on local authorities to prevent homelessness and non-priority households were brought within the remit of rehousing duties.83 After restricting the Right to Buy in 2015, the Welsh administration introduced a bill to abolish it in March 2017. Just like in Scotland, the private rented sector has become more tightly regulated than in England following compulsory registration under the Housing Wales Act 2014 and long-term empty homes have been taxed twice more.84
49 Finally, in Northern Ireland, “policy has tended to reflect English policy…power sharing has tended to produce the ‘lowest common denominator’”85 and as a result some policies-such as stock transfer-have been shelved.
50 Although their scope is limited by money transfers from Westminster, devolved governments can make policies that impact the financialisation of local housing and its
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production. As a result, it is likely that the distribution of housing tenures will increasingly diverge from that in England in the future. These variations could in turn have an effect on the evolution of sub-national and regional house prices. For instance, the Scottish Government announced in 2011 that it aimed to provide an affordable home for all by 2020. To do so, it is looking at new ways of financing housebuilding and aimed to provide 18,000 new affordable homes by 2014.86 Likewise, the Welsh Government is committed to building 20,000 affordable homes and supporting housing associations to build more homes.87 Different housing policies from England’s and a greater supply of affordable homes are likely to have an impact on house prices in those two nations.
Conclusion
51 In the field of housing, paraphrasing the Hills report on inequalities, one could say that “looking across the English regions does not suggest a simple ‘North-South divide’ … but there are often differences between London and the South East and other regions”88 and even more so between London and the rest of the country. London’s housing market and system (and to some extent the South East’s) are becoming so unlike the rest of the country that it would be better to speak of the London (South East)-UK divide.
52 The national picture is further complicated by the fact that looking at housing markets at the regional level is not enough. Regional differences in housing markets conceal and play down variations within regions between local authorities or cities and their surrounding region. This sub-regional level is often more useful to understanding variations across the country.
53 Differences in regional housing markets matter: since housing is the most widely distributed form of wealth in the UK population, it has the biggest impact on wealth inequalities in the UK. This means that aside from having an impact on living conditions housing also accounts for a predominant part of wealth inequalities between regions. This explains why in 2010 the Hills committee noted that: “Median total household wealth is £288,000 in the South East, 1.7 times that in the North West. Wealth inequality is very high in all regions, but especially in London, with a tenth of households with little or no wealth, and a tenth having more than £934,000”.89 However, between January 2017 and January 2018, London and the South East experienced some of the lowest annual rises in house prices, well below other regions. 90As for it, the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors is predicting a fall in 2018 in these two regions,91 raising the prospect of a possible return to a former housing prices pattern (see section on London).
54 Beyond the geographical divide, a growing divide is to be found in the growing generational gap, too. As a result of rising house prices, following the Great Recession of 2008 and the withdrawal of many loans and the need to have a higher deposit, the percentage of young people between 25 and 34 who are private rented sector tenants has gone from 24% in 2004-5 to 46% in 2014-15.92 The rise of a ‘Generation Rent’ will undoubtedly have major consequences on inter-generational wealth distribution and will reinforce geographical differences in housing.
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WILSON David and GAME Chris, Local Government in the UK (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2006).
NOTES
1. David Richie, Chief Executive of Bovis building firm, 2012 in Danny Dorling, All that is Solid (London, Penguin, 2015), p. 11. 2. William Field, Regional Dynamics: The Basis of Electoral Support in Britain (London, Franck Cass Publishers, 1997), p. 3. 3. Peter Scott, Triumph of the South: A Regional Economic History of Early Twentieth Century Britain (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2007), p. 3. 4. See Peter Malpass and Alan Murie, Housing Policy and Practice (Basingstoke, Routledge, 1999). 5. See Tony O’Sullivan and Kenneth Gibb, Housing Economics and Public Policy (Oxford, Blackwell, 2003). 6. See Glen Bramley, “The Sudden Rediscovery of Housing Supply as a Key Policy Challenge”, Housing Studies 22:2 (2007), pp. 221-241. 7. Paul Balchin, Housing Policy: an Introduction (London, Routledge, 1995), p. 88-89. 8. David Mullins and Alan Murie, Housing Policy in the UK (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2006). 9. With the exception of Alan Holmans, see Alan Holmans, Past and Current trends in House Prices and Incomes and Access to Home Ownership (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001).
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10. Some divide their statistics between London, ‘wider South of England’ and ‘the Midlands and the North’, see SAVILLS RESEARCH, Spotlight: Prime Residential Markets beyond London, London, Savills, 2015, retrieved on 2 April 2018, from http://www.savills.co.uk/research_articles/ 186866/187207-0. Others focus on the very divide: see NATIONWIDE, Price Index Press Release, March 2018, https://www.nationwide.co.uk/-/media/MainSite/documents/about/house-price-index/ 2018/Mar_Q1_2018.pdf. 11. Justine Piddington, Helen Garrett and Tad Nowak, Housing in the UK: National Comparisons in Typology, Condition and Costs of Poor Housing (Watford, IHS BRE Press, 2013), pp. 1-2. 12. DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT, Housing Policy: A Consultative Document (London, The Stationery Office, 1977), p. 12. 13. DOE, Our Future Homes: Opportunities, Choice, Responsibility (London, HMSO, 1995), p. 50. 14. ODPM, Your Region, Your Choice (London, HMSO, 2002). 15. DETR, Quality and Choice: A Decent Homes for All (London, DETR, 2000), p. 49; p. 71. 16. ODPM, Sustainable Communities: Building the Future (London, ODPM, 2003). 17. Peter Lee, “Competitiveness and Social Exclusion”, p. 195, in Peter Malpass and Rob Rowlands (eds), Housing, Markets and Policy (Abingdon, Routledge, 2010), pp. 184-202. 18. ODPM, Making it Happen: The Northern Way (London, ODPM, 2004). 19. DCLG, Homes for the Future: More Affordable, More Sustainable (London, DCLG, 2007), p. 17. 20. DCLG, Fixing our Broken Housing Market, Cm 9352 (London, DCLG, 2017), p. 19; p. 22. 21. Peter Lee, op. cit., p. 184. 22. Peter Malpass and Rob Rowlands, Housing, Markets and Policy (Abingdon, Routledge, 2010). 23. DOE, Planning Policy Guidance 12: Development Plans and Regional Planning Guidance, (London, HMSO, 1992), p. 3. 24. David Wilson and Chris Game, Local Government in the UK (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2006), p. 182. 25. DETR, The Future of Regional Planning Guidance: Consultation Paper (London, The Stationery Office, 1998). 26. Glen Bramley, “The Sudden Rediscovery of Housing Supply as a Key Policy Challenge”, Housing Studies 22: 2 (2006), pp. 221-241. 27. DCLG, Strategic Housing Market Assessment, Practice Guidance, Planning, London: DCLG, 2007, p. 7. 28. Glen Bramley, “Meeting Demand” in Peter Malpass and Rob Rowlands, op. cit., p. 170. 29. ODPM, Competitive European Cities: where do the Core Cities Stand? (London, ODPM, 2004); Kate Barker, Delivering Stability: Securing our Future Housing needs, Final Report (London, HM Treasury, 2004). 30. Peter Lee, op. cit., p. 184. 31. DCLG, Identifying Sub-regional Housing Market Areas (London, DCLG, 2007). 32. DCLG, Taking Forward the Review of Sub-national Economic Development and Regeneration (London, DCLG, 2007), p. 8. 33. DCLG, National Planning Policy Framework, (London, DCLG, 2012), § 159. 34. DCLG, Devolution: A Mayor for Greater Manchester (London, DCLG, 2017). 35. DCLG, Identifying Sub-regional Housing Market Areas, op. cit., p. 6. 36. Official statistics are presented by Middle Layer Super Output Areas, of which there are 7,201 in England and Wales. 37. Office for National Statistics, House Price Statistics for small areas: year ending December 1995 to year ending March 2016 (London, ONS, 2016), p. 7. 38. Justine Piddington et al., op. cit., p. 7. 39. THE POVERTY SITE, Poverty indicators: Non-decent homes, by region, retrieved from the Poverty Site on September 13th 2016, on www.poverty.org.uk/78/index.shtml
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40. The Decent Homes standard was introduced by the government in 2001 as a minimum standard for social landlords. A decent home is a home that meets the current statutory minimum standard for housing: it is in a reasonable state of repair, has reasonably modern facilities, provides a degree of thermal comfort. All social homes were to be refurbished by 2010. By 2014, 0.9% of the social stock did not meet the standard. 41. New kitchens and bathrooms were installed, buildings were insulated and windows changed. 42. Justine Piddington et al., op.cit. 43. Ibid. 44. Office for National Statistics, Table 109, Dwelling Stock by Tenure and Region from 1991, 2014, retrieved from www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/live-tables-on-dwelling-stock- including-vacants 45. Justine Piddington et al., op.cit., p. 34. 46. Russell Lynch, “North-South divide in house prices is highest ever”, The Independent, 30/12/2015, retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/north-south-divide- in-house-prices-is-highest-ever-a6791326.html 47. Brian Miligan, “North South House Price Divide Hits Record High”, BBCNews, 1 April 2016, retrieved from www.bbc.com/news/business-35941503 48. Office for National Statistics, Trends in the United Kingdom Housing Market (London, ONS, 2014), p. 16. 49. Office for National Statistics, Towns and Cities Analysis, England and Wales (London, ONS, March 2016), pp. 6-7. 50. Ibid., p. 4-5. 51. Ibid., p. 7. 52. Yolande Barnes, “Population Change:-the Market Impacts”, in R. Bate, R. Best and A. Holmans (eds), On the Move: The Housing Consequences of Migration (York, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2000), p. 35. 53. Steve Wilcox and John Perry, UK Housing Review, Briefing Paper (York, CHP, 2013), p. 12. 54. HALIFAX, London thrives-widening the divide between the capital and the rest of the country, press release, 15/01/2015. Retrieved from https://static.halifax.co.uk/assets/pdf/mortgages/pdf/ London-thrives-widening-the-divide-between-the-capital-and-the-rest-of-the-country-15th- January-2015-Housing-Release.pdf. 55. Mayor of London, Homes for London, the Mayor’s Housing Strategy (London, GLA, 2014), p. 16. 56. Although the definition of affordability is open to controversy, it is often accepted that unaffordability starts when a household spends more than 30% of their income on housing. 57. Mayor of London, op.cit. 58. The Economist, Living in London: the grip tightens (30th April 2016). 59. ONS, Housing Affordability in England and Wales: 1997 to 2016 (London, ONS, 2017), p. 6. 60. Office for National Statistics, Trends in the UK Housing Market, op.cit. 61. Office for National Statistics, UK House Prices Index: September 2017 (London, ONS, 2017), p. 7. 62. DCLG, English Housing Survey, Headline Report 2014-15 (London, ONS, 2016), p. 8. 63. Ibid., p. 2. 64. Resolution Foundation, Home Ownership struggle hits Coronation Street, 2 August 2016, http:// www.resolutionfoundation.org/media/press-releases/home-ownership-struggle-hits- coronation-street 65. Paul Watt and Anna Minton, “London’s Housing Crisis and its Activism”, City 20:2 (2016), p. 205. 66. Office for National Statistics, Overview of the UK population (London, ONS, 2016), p. 13. 67. HALIFAX, Press Release, op.cit.
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68. Mayor of London, Equal Life Chances for All (London, GLA, 2014), pp. 29-31. 69. Office for National Statistics, Towns and Cities Analysis, England and Wales, op. cit., p. 4. 70. Ibid., p. 5. 71. Tom Lloyd, “Figures reveal scale of regional house price divide”, Inside Housing, 2 January 2016. 72. Resolution Foundation, op. cit. 73. HOMETRACK, UK Cities House Price Index released (July 2016), retrieved https://www.hometrack.com/uk/insight/uk-cities-house-price-index/july-2016-cities- index 74. The Economist, “Housing in British Cities: Little Londons”, 24th September 2016. 75. Elli Thomas, Ilona Serwicka and Paul Swinney, Urban Demographics: Why people live where they do (London, Centre for Cities, 2015), p. 17. 76. Brian Lund, Housing Politics in the UK: Power, Planning and Protest (Bristol, Policy Press, 2016), p. 242. 77. Ibid., p. 247. 78. Ibid. 79. Ibid. 80. Ibid. 81. Ibid. pp. 243-44. 82. Distinction between priority and non-priority need was abolished and settled accommodation guaranteed, Ibid., p. 245. 83. Ibid., p. 250. 84. Ibid., p. 251. 85. Ibid., p. 255. 86. Scottish Government, Homes Fit for the 21st Century, The Scottish Government Strategy and Action Plan for Housing in the Next Decade, 2011-2020 (Edinburgh, Scottish Government, 2011), p. 8. 87. See http://gov.wales/newsroom/housing-and-regeneration/2018/180313-first-residents- throw-open-their-doors-in-42m-land-for-housing-scheme/?lang=en, accessed 2 April 2018. 88. John Hills et al., An Anatomy of Economic Inequality in the UK: Report of the National Equality Panel (London, Government Equalities Office, 2010), p. 247. 89. Ibid., p. 258. 90. ONS, UK House Prices Index, op. cit. 91. Larry Elliott, “House Prices to fall in London and South East, say Surveyors”, The Guardian, 20 December 2017. 92. Dawn Foster, “More families are renting and fewer people expect to ever own a home”, The Guardian, 25 February 2016, retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/housing-network/ 2016/feb/25/families-renting-2016-english-housing-survey
RÉSUMÉS
Héritages de la révolution industrielle, les différences en matière de logement et d’urbanisme entre le Nord et le Sud du Royaume-Uni sont fréquemment invoquées pour donner corps au fossé Nord-Sud. Cependant, une analyse des marchés immobiliers et des conditions de logement contribue à nuancer, voire infirmer ce concept. Cet article examinera donc le fossé Nord-Sud au
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prisme du logement, non pas dans une perspective de politiques publiques mais d’analyse des marchés immobiliers et des conditions de vie. Il commencera par se pencher sur le discours des pouvoirs publics dans le domaine du logement, avant d’expliquer l’importance croissante donnée au niveau infrarégional. Les différences de logement seront étudiées sur la base de quatre indicateurs (aspect physique, état, statut d’occupation, prix). Nous montrerons qu’il est nécessaire de dépasser la grille de lecture Nord-Sud afin de mesurer les inégalités de logement contemporaines. Enfin, la question de la divergence des politiques de logement dans un contexte post-dévolution sera posée.
As a legacy of the industrial revolution, housing differences in the UK are frequently referred to in order to exemplify the so-called North-South divide. However, a closer analysis at UK housing markets shows that it is necessary to qualify if not debunk that concept. This article will examine the North-South divide not so much from a public policy perspective as from a housing markets and housing conditions perspective. Firstly, I shall briefly analyse the official discourse with regard to a North-South divide in housing. Next, I shall examine the issue of the rescaling of housing and the growing importance given to the sub-regional level in England. Secondly, I shall examine the relevance of the North-South divide in housing in the UK on the basis of four indicators (physical aspect, state of repair, tenure, prices). Thirdly, I shall raise the question of the emergence of new and more relevant housing divides in England. Finally, I shall explore the question of housing policy divergence in a post-devolution UK.
INDEX
Mots-clés : Logement, fossé Nord-Sud, marchés immobiliers, Royaume-Uni post-dévolution Keywords : Housing, North-South divide, housing markets, post-devolution UK
AUTEUR
DAVID FÉE CREW (EA 4399), Université Sorbonne Nouvelle
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Towards a New Health Deal for the North of England? Santé : Vers un New Deal pour le Nord de l’Angleterre ?
Louise Dalingwater
Introduction
1 Tackling health inequalities has become one of the key focuses of public health policy over recent years. According to the 2010 Marmot review, not only is there a strong social justice case for reducing health inequalities, but also an economic one, since these disparities are estimated to cost over £30 billion a year in lost productivity and welfare costs.1 Health inequalities refer to differences between people or groups due to social, geographical, biological or other factors. Health coverage is universal in England and close to full coverage in many areas of public health. The founding principles of the NHS are that public health services should be free at the point of use and that health inequalities are undesirable because they are unfair or unjust. Yet, despite universal coverage of health services and the equity principles behind public health in the UK, nowhere is the North-South divide more apparent than in the area of health.
2 Since the 1960s, the South has consistently outperformed the North in terms of health outcomes in all areas (life expectancy, ill health, chronic disease…). Poor health is associated with socio-economic status, which is one of the main reasons why the North of England is at a disadvantage, with a higher number of 130s suffering from multiple deprivation. This paper will thus compare health inequalities between the North and South and review the literature on predictors of health inequalities in England. It will then review policy since the late 1970s to improve health service delivery in the North of England. In particular, it will consider to what extent public policy has mitigated health inequalities in across England in the age of austerity, and whether there is a difference in performance between health care providers depending on the locality.2
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Equality, Equity and Health Services
3 When considering the differences in health performance across regions and formulating policy for the North, it is important to take into consideration equity of supply for allocating resources to the region. This is all the more so the case in health because equity is a guiding principle of health policy in Britain and this is also true of most other health care systems in the world. It is however very difficult to measure health equity, especially to distinguish between equity and equality. The essential difference is that equity is equivalent to fairness in the distribution of health care among the population, which is different from equality whereby everybody has a fair share of health care services irrespective of need. There are however different interpretations of equity. Equity may be described as equal use of health services for equal need, equal use of health services according to willingness to pay for that use, equal health outcomes for equal merit, equal health care payment by people according to ability to pay for that health care.3 Equity is therefore very much open to interpretation. Other principles may go against the notion of equity. Indeed, the utilitarian principle states that one should maximise society’s welfare even if that means creating inequalities. The laissez-faire principle on the other hand considers that there is equity if there are fair-trading regimes, even though this may produce significant inequalities. There is therefore significant conflict between equity, equality principles and economic theory that overrides these principles because the conceptualisation of both notions is essentially normative, based on individual or collective value judgments. There are however three main areas in which the principle of equity is often considered: funding of health care, distribution of health care and distribution of health. The guiding principles of the NHS have generally been that equity should be upheld in these three areas and equity within this institution is interpreted as equal use of health services for equal need irrespective of the ability to pay: “The NHS is a great national institution. The principles it was founded on are as important now as they were then: free at the point of use and available to everyone based on need, not ability to pay.”4
4 After evaluating general inequalities in the regions, this paper will focus particularly on equity in terms of health care distribution. Equity, fairness and social justice are promoted as the founding principles of the NHS, but the question is whether the organisation achieves equity in practice, especially among those socio-economic groups in the North of England that suffer from significant health inequalities. It is first, however, important to consider inequalities in health outcomes between the North and South before considering whether policy can mitigate these disparities.
Inequalities in health outcomes between the North and South
5 Inequalities in health outcomes emerged with the rise and fall of industry in the Northern regions. During the industrial revolution, mining and heavy industry was predominantly located in the north. Ill health, which was prevalent in these industries in the North, continued to persist in the local population even after the closure of many mines and factories from the 1960s onwards.
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6 The former industrialised areas of the North still have a lower life expectancy than elsewhere: lower than three years on average.5 Research has shown that premature mortality continues to be more prevalent in the North. According to Buchan et al., from 1965 to 2010, premature mortality (deaths per 10 000 aged 75 years or under) fell sharply from 64 to 28 in southern England compared with 72 to 35 in northern England. While for most age groups, excess mortality remained consistent for the period 1965 to 2015 in the North, the 25–34 and 35–44 age groups experienced a sharp increase in excess mortality here, especially between the latter period of the study from 1995 to 2015: an increase from 2.2% (95% CI6 –3.2% to 7.6%) to 29.3% (95% CI 21.0% to 37.6%); and 3.3% (95% CI –1.0% to 7.6%) to 49.4% (95% CI 42.8% to 55.9%), respectively. The Northern mortality rate increased for the (ages 25–34) or plateaued (ages 35–44) from the mid-1990s while the mortality rate in the South declined on the whole.7
7 In 2016, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) published a report which also drew a rather gloomy outlook for the North of England. Since the national statistics body started to collect data on local area life expectancy in the 1840s, little has changed. Southern areas still outperform northern areas in life expectancy. In 1991-1993, East Dorset (South West) reported the highest male and female life expectancy and Blackpool (North West), the lowest. In 2017, Kensington and Chelsea (in the South-East) were reported to have the highest life expectancy (83.3 years for newborn baby boys and 86.7 years for baby girls), whereas Blackpool and Middlesbrough (in the North) had the lowest life expectancies for boys (Blackpool, 74.7 years) and for girls (Middlesbrough, 79.8 years). While all local areas have experienced an increase in life expectancy, inequalities between performance for the lowest and highest life expectancy have widened, with the majority of local areas in England with the lowest life expectancy to be found in the North East and North West.8 Not only does the North fare badly in terms of life expectancy compared to the Southern regions, but it also reports a reduced number of years living in good health as the table below shows.9
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8 Moreover, according to research carried out by researchers at the University of Liverpool, there are 1.5 million more premature deaths in the North.10 The gap between the North of England and the rest of the country in terms of health inequalities has thus continued to widen for the last four decades and over successive governments.
Determinants of health inequalities
9 Substantial research has been carried out to determine health disparities between the regions in an attempt to reduce these inequalities. One of the key determinants identified by researchers in the field over several decades is the influence of low income on health. However, other predictors are also relevant.
Socio-economic status
10 Richard Wilkinson (1986, 1991, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2003, 2005, 2008)11 clearly established links between income inequality and life expectancy. His research reveals how serious health inequalities are due to low social status. This has been supported by a number of other studies on the subject. Michael Marmot’s work12 also shows that those with low status jobs are more at risk from ill health. Growing inequality in income has thus produced growing inequalities in health. The least deprived can expect to lead 80% of their lives in good health compared to 70% for the most deprived.13
11 Bartley and Blane established four major models to explain how social class can lead to inequalities in health14:
12 The Behavioural model: Social class will determine whether an individual’s way of life is health damaging or health promoting according to dietary choices, consumption of drugs, alcohol and tobacco, active leisure time pursuits, and use of immunisation, contraception and antenatal services. Nevertheless, long-term studies (such as the Whitehall study)15 have found that these differences can only account for one-third of social class differences in mortality. A study by Law and Morris16 looking at the factors responsible for differences in mortality between the North and South concluded that while deprivation was the overriding factor, excess mortality was also linked to heavy smoking (in 85% of cases) and heavy alcohol consumption (but only in 6% of cases).
13 The Materialist model: Poverty leads to greater health hazards. Those suffering from multiple deprivation will most likely be living in polluted environments: that is in inner cities, with greater air pollution and damp housing. The Black Report17 argued that this was the most important reason for social class differences in health.
14 The Psycho-social model: In the more disadvantaged groups, stress may be caused by social stigma or by imbalance between effort and reward; those in these groups may work in jobs where demands are high and control is low. Such stressful working conditions have been linked to high blood pressure, fibrinogen and a more adverse blood fat profile.
15 The Life-course model: Health is a reflection of the patterns of social, psycho-social and biological advantages and disadvantages experienced by an individual over time. Disadvantages often accumulate through childhood and adulthood. More than ever before, individuals coming from a poor background are likely to experience occupational disadvantage.
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16 In 2007, a UNICEF study found that the UK had the second worst child mortality rate in Western Europe. Children born to disadvantaged families in the UK are more likely to die in the first year of life, be born small, be bottle fed, be passive smokers, have weight problems, have children young, be out of work, live in poor housing, suffer from poor health, and die earlier.18 As the Marmot review of health inequalities in England concluded: “Disadvantage starts before birth and accumulates throughout life. Action to reduce health inequalities must start before birth and be followed through the life of the child. Only then can the close links between early disadvantage and poor outcomes throughout life be broken.”19
17 Thus these studies tend to conclude that the reason why the North suffers more from poor health is that there is a greater concentration of poverty, with 50% of the poorest neighbourhoods located here. Danny Dorling of the University of Oxford deplored that in the North, there are “islands of affluence in a sea of poverty” and that “in the South, the sea is of affluence”20. Since 2008, these inequalities have worsened. The financial crisis and the loss of jobs, welfare reforms and housing reforms have impacted on widening inequalities and in parallel inequalities in health. The biggest welfare effects on health have been for individuals on incapacity benefit and for those already suffering from ill health. Individuals on these benefits lost an average £3,500 with the switch from Disability Living Allowance to Personal Independence Payments.21 The North on the whole has been disproportionately affected by the welfare cuts, such as housing benefit, child allowance, because the number of people on these benefits is higher in the North of England. Indeed, the charity Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG) noted 42 massive benefit changes including the Bedroom Tax (taxing inhabitants of social housing that has a spare bedroom because children have left the household), the household welfare cap, and the abolition of council tax benefit, amounting to a loss of £2.3bn for some of Britain's poorest households in 2013-14 alone, adding to the initial 2010/11 cuts to housing benefit and child allowances. Austerity measures have hit children the hardest, due to changes to the welfare and benefits system, such as the abolition of the education maintenance allowance, health in pregnancy grants and child trust funds.22
18 Child benefits have been frozen since 2015 and it is estimated that as many as 1000 child centres have been closed by local governments across the country since 2009.23 These centres offered support for children from disadvantaged backgrounds. Given that the North has a higher concentration of children living in poverty, the Northern regions are likely to be particularly affected by these measures.
Industrialisation and deindustrialisation
19 While there is a consensus on the link between ill health and deprivation, the link is not necessarily so straightforward. A study carried out by Law and Morris in 1998 investigated why mortality was higher in poorer areas and more so in Northern areas of England and Wales.24 It built on previous research which had demonstrated that areas in general with similar levels of deprivation and socio-economic characteristics report similar health outcomes. Law and Morris found that rural areas and prosperous English authorities had the lowest deprivation and highest life expectancies, urban fringe and coast and service local authorities reported average performance, but mining, manufacturing and industry (or former mining and manufacturing areas) had
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the lowest life expectancies and highest levels of deprivation. London was an exception with high and low life expectancies. The most deprived areas with the lowest life expectancy could be found in the North, North East, but also in London, particularly in East London. While the link between deprivation and ill health was clearly demonstrated, those living in inner cities and particularly manual workers or former manual workers in manufacturing and mining sectors, seemed to be particularly predisposed towards poor health. The North West was reported to have by far the lowest life expectancy. While it fits the socio-economic model, having some very deprived neighbourhoods, it is not the least deprived region in the country. In fact, mining, manufacturing and industry authorities report lower life expectancies than predicted by their levels of deprivation. Research has shown that there may be a direct link between the social conditions in which an individual’s parents or grandparents lived and their own heath. Therefore, exposure to pollution in industrial areas might have a significant effect on subsequent generations.25
A New Health Deal for the North?
20 Considering the wealth of research on the issue of health inequalities and their causes, the State has been slow to address the problem.
Government policy to mitigate health inequalities
21 The very first government publication on health inequalities was the Black Report, commissioned by James Callaghan’s Labour government in 1977 and published just after the election of the Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher in 1980 looking at cohorts from the 1950s to the 1970s and taken from different environmental settings. It showed that health inequalities were widening and it pointed to the link between social deprivation and health inequalities. However, no action was taken by the Conservative government on these issues. It was only in 1998 with the publication of the Acheson report that health inequalities were given real attention.26
22 New Labour developed a health inequality strategy which was heralded as one of the first, most highly developed and well-funded strategies among European countries to deal with health inequalities. It was a far-reaching strategy which went beyond the realm of health and included raising living standards, improving school nutrition and housing insulation, higher benefits and pensions, more spending on education and urban generation as well as increased spending on health care. Targets were set to reduce infant mortality and life expectancy inequalities by 10% by 2010.27 A total of 20 billion pounds was allocated to reduce health inequalities, an area approach was taken to deal with disparities and a spearhead group created comprising 70 local authority areas reporting the worst health and deprivation in the country. Higher budgets and targets were established. These areas were primarily in the North, the West Midlands and parts of London. While there is no doubt that New Labour’s specific focus on health inequalities for the first time in the history of England was a sound initiative, and specifically targeting Northern areas suffering from deprivation and ill health, there were a number of weaknesses in the policy approach. While there were targets for reducing inequalities in life expectancy and infant mortality, no policies directly addressed income inequality, working conditions or excessive alcohol consumption.
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Many of the policies were aimed at improving access to treatment but not inequalities in access to healthcare. A number of the policies were interlinked with other areas indirectly influencing health such as education, but for which it was impossible to establish the impact on health when considering policy effectiveness. Targets were chosen without first taking into consideration the policies which would help achieve such targets. Unfortunately, they were not met. All areas, including the spearhead groups, did see life expectancy rise and infant mortality decrease; however, levels of inequalities in health were not reduced because the spearhead groups simply improved in line with the general population.28
23 The strategy came to an end in 2010 under the Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition government. Nevertheless, the Marmot review published in 2010, following the implementation of the biggest austerity cuts by the government since the Second World War, underlined that reducing health inequalities remained an important issue, not only to uphold the public good (what the report refers to as a strong social justice case) but also economically, with health costing over 30 billion a year in lost productivity and welfare/health costs29 Following the 2012 Health and Social Care Act, the government allocated a ring-fenced public health budget to local authorities to devote to poverty-related health needs, totaling 3% of local government expenditure. However, at the same time, the core local budget was cut by 30%. This was therefore insufficient to tackle health inequalities. Welfare reform, with cuts to local budgets totalling 5.2 billion pounds, has also led to a large financial loss for local economies.30
24 Given the links between health and deprivation, the proposal to boost economic growth in the North of England by the 2010-15 coalition government and 2015-20 Conservative government under the framework of the “Northern Powerhouse” has been seen as a way of indirectly improving health by promoting economic and social wellbeing. The aim is to develop the "Core Cities" of Manchester, Liverpool, Leeds, Sheffield and Newcastle and reposition the UK economy away from London and the South East by strengthening transport links, investment in science and innovation and devolution. More specifically, devolving power to these regions is expected to help Northern regions to manage health care at the local level. In April 2016, Greater Manchester was the first English region to take control of health care spending. Indeed, 10 boroughs, 15 NHS trusts and 12 Clinical Commissioning Groups became jointly responsible for a £6 billion a year health and social care budget in this region.31 The outcomes of such policies are yet to be seen, but cuts to the local authority budgets that manage some areas of primary care and the lower rise in health expenditure means that the budget of 28 billion pounds is unlikely to be sufficient to tackle the complex health challenges in the region. Nevertheless, the role of health care providers remains crucial to address the problems of ill health in the Northern regions.
The role of the National Health Service (NHS)
25 The disbandment of government-led initiatives to mitigate health inequalities and the inability to create a real health policy for the North despite the rhetoric, has meant that the NHS is under increasing pressure to fight against health inequalities. In terms of poverty reduction, the distributive effects of public transfers for health are massive. According to Buck and Jabbal, without the provision of free health care, England would be second only to Spain on income inequality. By making health payments in kind, income inequalities are reduced by 13%, which means that England ranks above Ireland
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and Italy, where rationing of health services has been much more significant.32 The Acheson report underlined how equity – the principle of matching needs and services – was a founding principle of the NHS 33. The NHS also plays a role as a major regional employer and is, in fact, the biggest employer in Europe. It counters poverty by employing not only medical and related staff but also one million non-medical staff. An increasing number of NHS trusts are signing up to pay the living wage: Wiltshire Ambulance Trust, Barts Health NHS Trust, the Royal College of Midwives, Derbyshire Community Health Services, and the Chartered Society of Physiotherapy. There are many schemes in the NHS to take on the disadvantaged and long-term unemployed. Guy’s and St Thomas’s Foundation Trust, for example, runs a range of programmes, including a “get into work with the NHS” scheme with the Prince’s Trust, which targets Not in Employment, Education or Training (NEETs) aged 16-to-24.34 Social determinants of health inequalities are important to understand and act on through employment and social schemes.
26 There have been increasing efforts to understand health inequalities and develop a strategy and policies to narrow the gap in health performance within the NHS. It is generally accepted that Britain’s National Health Service provides universal coverage and upholds the notion of equal access to health care. However, the impact on overall inequality reduction of health care is not as significant as might be hoped. Researchers at the Centre for Health Economics, University of York, carried out a longitudinal study for the period 2004/5 to 2011/12 and measured slope indices of inequality in four indicators: patients per family doctor, primary care quality, preventable emergency, hospital admissions and mortality from conditions considered amenable to health care. They noted larger absolute improvements on all indicators in more-deprived neighbourhoods (which we have established are particularly concentrated in Northern England). By 2011/2012 inequalities in primary care supply and quality were almost eliminated, but socio-economic inequality was still associated with 158,396 preventable hospitalisations and 37,983 deaths amenable to health care. The authors concluded that the NHS did substantially reduce socio-economic inequalities in primary care access and quality but only made modest reductions to health care outcome inequalities.35 Other research has shown that between 2001 and 2011, the government’s health inequalities policy to increase resources allocated to deprived areas did reduce absolute health inequalities from causes amenable to health care. It has been estimated that each additional £10m of resources allocated to deprived areas led to a reduction of 4 deaths in males per 100,000 (3.1 to 4.9) and 1.8 deaths of females per 100,000 (1.1 to 2.4). 36
27 Unfortunately, as we mentioned previously, such initiatives and investment have been recently axed. Inequalities in health care remain because there is a so-called “inverse- care law”37 with good medical care in areas where there is less need. More affluent groups tend to use specialist hospital services more than lower income groups. Moreover, since the implementation of austerity measures in 2010, the rise in health expenditure has slowed down and NHS resources allocated to health inequalities policy abolished, hitting the poorest areas of the North hardest. The transfer of a certain number of public health responsibilities to local government has reduced the role of the NHS in tackling health inequalities. Transferring responsibilities from Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) to Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs)38 has also meant that health inequalities are not necessarily focused on in the same way. Under this new framework,
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quality of health services seems to be of major importance. Integrating health and social care services has also been their priority rather than targeting certain populations.
28 Yet recent figures released by NHS England support early findings by the Black report which showed that intraregional differences in health care provision may be stronger than regional divides39. NHS CCG figures showed for example that patients with dementia, diabetes and learning disabilities received variable care depending on the locality in which they lived. More than half (57%) of CCGs in England were found to be not performing well enough on dementia, with 71% classed as “needs improvement” for diabetes care and 92% for people with learning disabilities. A total of 149 out of 209 CCGs were reported as needing to improve care for diabetes patients.40 The Centre of Health Economics at the University of York has argued that health service provision does not necessarily conform to a clear North-South divide. Researchers at this centre analysed the performance of CCGs, establishing indicators focused on emergency hospitalisation for patients with long-term conditions such as dementia, diabetes, respiratory and cardiovascular diseases, which previous research has shown can be reduced by more effective primary care and outpatient care. The researchers contend that some Clinical Commissioning Groups are better at tackling health inequalities irrespective of whether they are based in the North or South. The Liverpool CCG appears on the worst list but so does Islington. On the other hand, both Portsmouth and Stoke-on-Trent CCGs are seen as the best performers. All these belong to the most deprived neighbourhoods in the country. South Cheshire, a wealthy area, performs badly, while East Surrey performs well.41 While the picture is far from clear, it is however worth noting that 8 of the 10 worst performing CCGs in this study are located in the North. The best performing CCGs are still largely located in the South such as City and Hackney in London, followed by Fareham and Gosport, East Surrey, Crawley and the Isle of Wight. Tower Hamlets in London was seventh.42
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Source: House of Commons, 201443
29 Policy to allocate resources to CCGs does however take deprivation into account. When looking at allocations per head across England for 2014/15, it is clear that CCGs in more deprived areas of the North do receive more funding per head (see map).
30 However, the House of Commons contends that this funding is below what is required if full needs are taken into consideration. Moreover, despite efforts to continue to take into account deprivation in resource allocation, CCGs lack capacity and population- based data on socio-economic indicators and morbidity which undermines their ability to achieve equity of access through commissioning.
Conclusion
31 The evidence suggests therefore that, in the second decade of the 21st century there is still a clear North-South divide in health outcomes. There appears to be a definite albeit complicated link between deprivation and poor health performance. Nevertheless, higher funding is granted to those regions that suffer from poorer health outcomes in the North. Yet, significant interregional and intraregional differences in the provision of health care are apparent. The levelling of such disparities is a challenge that health care providers will have to face in the future to ensure the sustainability of the current health system in England.
32 Socio-economic inequalities in preventable hospitalisation and amenable mortality are not only the result of inequalities in the supply of primary and hospital care, they are also due to socio-economic-related differences and lifestyle. In sum, public health care provision is important to reduce inequalities but there are many other wider social factors and institutional factors to take into consideration.
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33 Despite the fact that £136 billion worth of public money is spent in the North each year44, more funds should be strategically invested to mitigate health inequalities. Greater investment in education, skills, health, housing and infrastructure is needed and this clearly does not seem to be a priority for central government faced with the current climate of austerity. The fact that health is related to economic growth and wealth in the regions suggests that the economy of the North needs to grow faster than the rest of the country and greater investment should be made in infrastructure, investment in research, investment in Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs), etc. to achieve equal health outcomes. The lack of investment in infrastructure in the North is a barrier to growth. In addition, to ensure that health inequalities are reduced, strong leadership to target these problems is required.
34 Amartya Sen45 suggests that health inequalities are due to the powerlessness of less privileged groups and the lack of capabilities. He puts much emphasis on empowerment in communities. The power of individuals and communities is indeed central to reducing health inequalities. The Nobel Prizewinning economist James Heckman46 also shows how early investment can significantly increase the rate of economic return, which will have a knock-on effect on health and wellbeing. It is not just about providing financial support but investing in early years, in terms of education, health and support for children that will make a difference to the health of the North in years to come.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Acheson, David, Public Health in England: The Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Future Development of the Public Health Function (London, HMSO 1998).
Asaria, Miqdad et al., “How a universal health system reduces inequalities: lessons from England”, Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 70:7 (2016), pp. 637–43.
Bartley, Mel, Health Inequality: An Introduction to Theories, Concepts and Methods (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004).
Barr, Ben, “The impact of NHS resource allocation policy on health inequalities in England 2001-11: longitudinal ecological study”, British Medical Journal 348 (2014), Available at:
Bartley, Mel and Blane David, “Inequality and social class” in Graham Scambler (ed.) Sociology as Applied to Medicine (Elsevier Limited, 2008), pp.115-33.
Black, David, Inequalities in Health: Black Report (London, Pelican Series, Penguin Books, 1982).
Buchan, Iain, Evangelos Kontopantelis, Matthew Sperrin, Tarani Chandola and Tim Doran, “ North-South disparities in English mortality 1965–2015: longitudinal population study”, Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health 71:9 (2017), pp. 928-936.
Buck, David and Jabbal, Joni, Tackling poverty: Making more of the NHS in England, (London, King’s Trust, 2013).
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Department of Health, Tackling Health Inequalities: Ten Years On (London, HMSO, 2009).
Dorling, Danny, Unequal Health: The Scandal of our Times (Bristol, The Policy Press, 2013).
Gregory, Ian R. “Comparisons between geographies of mortality and deprivation from the 1900s and 2001: spatial analysis of census and mortality statistics”, British Medical Journal (10 September 2009), p. 339.
Heckman, James, Giving Kids a Fair Chance (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2012).
Inquiry Panel on Health Equity for the North of England, Due North: The Report of the Inquiry on Health Equity for the North (Liverpool, University of Liverpool and Centre for Local Economic Strategies, 2014).
Law, Malcom and Morris, Joan, “Why is mortality higher in poorer areas and in more northern areas of England and Wales?”, Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 52:6 (1998), pp. 344˗352 .
Le Grand, Julian, The Distribution of Public Expenditure: the Case of Health Care (Paris, Economica, 1978).
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, "The Whitehall Study archive collection". LSHTM Archives. August 2011, available at: < http://calmview.lshtm.ac.uk/calmview/>.
Marmot, Michael, Fair Society, Healthy Lives Marmot Review, Strategic Review of Health Inequalities, (London, Department for International Development, 2010).
Morris, Stephen, Devlin, Nancy and Parkin, David, Economic Analysis in Healthcare (Chichester, John Wiley & Sons, 2009).
Pidd, Helen, “Greater Manchester begins £6bn 'devo health' experiment,” The Guardian, 1 April 2016.
Sen, Amartya, Inequality Reexamined. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
The Sutton Trust, “1,000 Children’s centres lost since 2009”. Available at:
Wilkinson, Richard G. and Pickett, Kate E., Health and Inequality: Major Themes in Health and Social Welfare (Abingdon, Oxon, UK, New York, New York, Routledge, 2008).
Wilkinson, Richard G., The Impact of Inequality: How to Make Sick Societies Healthier (London, Routledge, 2005).
Wilkinson, Richard G. and Marmot, Michael, The Solid Facts (Copenhagen, World Health Organization, Regional Office for Europe, 2003).
Wilkinson, Richard G. Kawachi, Ichirō and Kennedy, Bruce P., The Society and Population Health Reader, Vol. 1 (New York, New Press, Distributed by W.W. Norton, 1999).
Wilkinson, Richard, G., Unhealthy Societies: The Afflictions of Inequality (London; New York, Routledge, 1996).
Wilkinson, Richard, G., Unfair Shares: The Effects of Widening Income Differences on the Welfare of the Young (Ilford, Barnardos, 1994).
Wilkinson, Richard G. and Quick, Allison, Income and Health (London, Socialist Health Association, 1991).
Wilkinson, Richard G., Class and Health: Research and Longitudinal Data (London, New York, Tavistock Publications, 1986).
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NOTES
1. Michael Marmot, Fair Society, Healthy Lives Marmot Review, Strategic Review of Health Inequalities (London, Department for International Development, 2010). 2. When we refer to the North, we are referring to the Northern regions of England: Yorkshire and the Humber, the North West and the North East. 3. Stephen Morris, Nancy Devlin and David Parking, Economic Analysis in Healthcare (Chichester, John Wiley & Sons, 2009). 4. Department of Health, Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS, Cm 7881 (London, HMSO, 2010). 5. ONS, “Health state life expectancies, UK: 2013 to 2015”, 2016, available at
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Mel Bartley, Health Inequality: An Introduction to Theories, Concepts and Methods (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2004). 15. London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, "The Whitehall Study archive collection". LSHTM Archives. August 2011, available at:
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40. The Guardian, “'Postcode lottery' revealed in NHS care”, Guardian Online, 8 September 2016. Available at < https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/sep/08/ postcode-lottery-revealed-in-nhs-care>. 41. Centre For Health Economics, “NHS adopts Centre for Health Economics Clinical Commissioning Group health inequality indicators.” University of York, Centre for Health Economics, 16 August 2016. Available at < https://www.york.ac.uk/che/news/ 2016/nhs-adopts-che-ccg-indicators/>. 42. Ibid. 43. House of Commons, “New CCG funding allocations –mapped”, 27 January 2014. Available at:
ABSTRACTS
Tackling health inequalities has become one of the key focuses of government health policy over recent years. Health inequalities refer to differences between people or groups due to social, geographical, biological or other factors in terms of life expectancy and healthy life expectancy According to the 2010 Marmot review, not only is there a strong social justice case for reducing health inequalities, but also an economic one, since it is estimated to cost over £30 billion a year in lost productivity and welfare costs. Health coverage is universal in England and close to full coverage in many areas of public health. The founding principles of the NHS are that public health services should be free at the point of use and that health inequalities are undesirable because they are unfair or unjust. Yet, despite universal coverage of health services and the equity principles behind public health in the UK, nowhere is the North-South divide more apparent than in the area of health. Since the 1960s, the South has consistently outperformed the North in terms of health outcomes in all areas (life expectancy, ill health, chronic disease…). Poor health is associated with socio- economic status, which is one of the main reasons why the North is at a disadvantage, with a higher number of neighbourhoods suffering from multiple deprivation. This paper considers health inequalities between the North and South and reviews policy implemented since the late 1970s to improve health service delivery in the North of England. In particular, it considers to what extent public policy has mitigated health inequities there.
La lutte contre les inégalités en matière de santé est devenue l'un des axes majeurs de la politique de santé du gouvernement britannique au cours des dernières années. Ces inégalités marquent des différences entre des personnes ou des groupes en raison de facteurs sociaux, géographiques, biologiques ou autre. Selon le rapport Marmot de 2010, il est non seulement nécessaire de réduire les inégalités de santé pour défendre le bien public (ce que le rapport dénomme « la justice sociale »), mais aussi pour des raisons économiques. La santé coûte plus de 30 milliards de livres sterling par an en perte de productivité et en coûts sociaux. La couverture de santé est universelle en Angleterre. Selon les principes fondateurs du NHS, les services de santé publique
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doivent être gratuits au point d'utilisation et les inégalités de santé sont indésirables parce qu'elles sont injustes. Pourtant, malgré une couverture universelle des services de santé et les principes d'équité de la santé publique au Royaume-Uni, la fracture Nord-Sud est nulle part ailleurs plus évidente que dans le domaine de la santé. Depuis les années 1960, les indicateurs de santé sont meilleurs dans le Sud que le Nord, et ceci dans tous les domaines (espérance de vie, état de santé, maladies chroniques, ...). Les problèmes de santé tendent à dépendre fortement des conditions socio- économiques, ce qui constitue l'une des principales raisons pour lesquelles le Nord, avec un nombre important de localités pauvres, est désavantagé par rapport au sud. Cet article compare les inégalités de santé entre le Nord et le Sud et analyse la politique de santé mise en place depuis la fin des années 1970. En particulier, il tente d’évaluer l’efficacité des politiques publiques en matière de lutte contre les inégalités dans le Nord de l'Angleterre.
INDEX
Mots-clés: Nord de l'Angleterre, inégalités de santé, pauvreté, prestation des services de santé Keywords: North of England, health inequalities, deprivation, health service delivery
AUTHOR
LOUISE DALINGWATER HDEA (EA 4086), Sorbonne-Université. Louise Dalingwater est professeur en civilisation britannique et anglais économique au département de Langues Etrangères Appliquées à Sorbonne-Université, Paris. Ses recherches portent sur la contribution des services à l’économique britannique. Elle est auteur de plusieurs ouvrages dont « Les services britanniques au 21e siècle : une étude interdisciplinaire (Presses Universitaires de Nancy, 2015), avec Catherine Coron de « Wellbeing: Challenging the Anglo- Saxon Hegemony » (Presses Sorbonne Nouvelle, 2017) et de nombreux articles sur les services publics.
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Versions of the North in Contemporary Poetry Versions du Nord dans la poésie contemporaine
Claire Hélie
Introduction
1 A question that is central to any analysis of the North-South Divide in poetry is that of the location of the divide itself. In 1947, W. H. Auden confessed: “To this day Crewe Junction marks the wildly exciting frontier where the alien South ends and the North, my world, begins.”1 In 1970, Tony Harrison moved the frontier further north (and east) when he wrote: “The rot sets in at Retford and the stations beyond.” 2 More recently, for Jacob Polley, there seems to be nothing south of Manchester but water.3 Joined together, the three dots described by the poets delineate a curve starting at Manchester, running below the Peak District and probably going back up to Grimsby. Yet the frontier is not a fixed one: it is both mobile, seen from a train, and moving (“my world”). So much so that W. H. Auden and Louis MacNeice, on their trip to Iceland, claimed “The North begins inside.”4 Indeed, the North in poetry, as opposed to other forms of cultural production,5 is first and foremost an experiential place, based on personal experience and historical observation.
2 This raises another important question, in the phrasing of Danny Dorling: “When was the North-South Divide?”6 or in the words of Helen Jewell, what are “ the origins of Northern consciousness”?7 The Roman settlement, the Danish invasions, the Harrying of the North, the War of the Roses, the Pilgrimage of Grace, the Industrial Revolution, the Miners’ Strike all seem to be valid starting points. Along the North / South Divide run many other historical divisions (Angles / French, Protestant / Christian, working-class / bourgeois to name but a few). In this myth of a Britain divided into two parts, the North is coterminous with periphery and margin whereas the South is a synonym for centre and power. Hence a suspicion that national history and definitions of the North are all written from a Southern perspective, through which the North is reduced to “a
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collage of brass band music, flat cap wearing chaps and looming pitheads”.8 This is what Katie Wales calls “austrocentrism”9, that is to say a strong bias in histories towards a southern perspective. Therefore, Northern poetry can often be analysed in the light of postcolonial theories: it “writes back”10 and proposes alternative histories of England. To give but one technical example which is, however, not typical of its author, Ted Hughes, in his essay “Myths, Metres, Rhythms” (1994), fantasizes the history of English poetry as the failed union between a bride, the alliterative verse found in popular verse, in keeping with autochthonous traditions, and a groom, the metre extolled at the Court, and imported from France.
3 In poetry in particular, the North is indeed a soundscape seeking to have its voices and accents heard. Given the diversity of accents in England, one may wonder what the North actually sounds like. Does it have William Wordsworth’s Cumbrian accent, which William Hazlitt deemed impossible to understand? Does it show evidence of Basil Bunting’s Northumbrian Burr? Is Geordie more northern than Scouse? Besides, in a country where dialects can still be considered as debased versions of Standard English and not as valid linguistic systems, as Katie Wales has shown in Northern English, accents are at the very heart of conceptions of Englishness. A poet like Tony Harrison will make the reader feel the political weight of accents. In a poem entitled “The Rhubarbarians”, he quotes the exact words used by William Horsfall, a mill-owner who wanted to crush a Luddite rebellion in Marsden, as quoted in E.P. Thompson’s The Making of the English Working-Class (1963): Horsfall of Ottiwells, if the bugger could ‘d’ve liked to (exact words recorded) ride up to my saddle-girths in Luddite blood.11
4 If the readers choose to use the Standard English the mill-owner most probably spoke, then they fail to keep up the abab rhyme that is characteristic of the poem: the readers’ side with those who have power but destroy the vehicle that is usually associated with their values. If they want to keep the rhyming going, then they have to pronounce “ blood” as /blud/, that is to say, with a Northern sound, which will place them on the side of the victims. The poetical choice is a political one.
5 As a “cultural artefact”, raising questions of belonging, to the region and to the nation, the North is an “imagined community”, as Benedict Anderson terms it, which has benefited from thorough academic investigation, most notably in the 1990s and early 2000s (see bibliography). The expectation is commonly, and as suggested above, that Northern poetry has to be political. Today though still present, this feature is less prominent and it seems the North has entered a new era, in which it is a place to rethink not only England but humanity as a whole. Focusing on a few recent collections of essays and anthologies (2006-2017), the place and definition of the North in poetry nowadays will be assessed, before two collections dedicated to the North, Steve Ely’s Oswald’s Book of Hours (2013) and Peter Riley’s Due North (2015), are examined.
The poetic North in some collections of poems and essays (2006-2017)
6 Anthologies, as the etymology goes, make a bouquet out of a selection of flowers, and therefore show both commonality and diversity. In the study of anthologies, more interesting than individual poems which give diverse interpretations of the North, are
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the paratextual elements – preface, postface, endnotes – in which the anthologists painstakingly try to explain what is commonly “northern” about them. Two fairly recent collections, Versions of the North (2013) and North by North-East (2006), 12 though focusing on two regions within the North which they claim to be The North, namely Yorkshire and the North-East, emphasize common conceptions.
7 First, that being born or living in the North is not sufficient to earn the label “Northern writer” – “strong connections”, a sense of organicity or “a history of involvement in the communities in which they live” are more important than birthplace (only ¼ of the poets in North by North-East were actually born in the region). Hence “a sense of shared history, landscape and character” and “a feeling of belonging, an understanding of shared loyalties”. Second, regional poetry cannot be reduced to clichés, though it inevitably deals with them – “dialect verse recited by men in flat caps with whippets at their feet” and “the Geordie Nation” whose identity is “based on a shared heavy-industrial past and an uncertain economic future”, are neither exclusive of nor excluded from Northern poetry. The other side of a sense of “remoteness from the centre and seats of power” and “historic distance from the metropolitan centres of authority”, namely Westminster government, London media and Oxbridge, is “an awareness of otherness and dissent” and a “participation in the same broken political narrative”. Third, northern poets can boast of a few famous poetic forebears: Ted Hughes, Philip Larkin and Donald Davie for Yorkshire and Basil Bunting for the North East where the poet has reached a cult status. Most importantly, they argue that the poems are “from the North East, of the North East, for the North East, but not necessarily ‘about’ the North East”, that they are “versions” of a place, that is to say dependent on a point of view.
8 Yet, an important distinction can be made between the two collections. Versions of the North insists on the fact that boundaries are political constructs - they are arbitrary – and that “Yorkshire is a discrete entity, coexisting with, influencing and being influenced by the mainstream”. Consequently, it seems that the aim is to put these poems on a par with mainstream English poetry, that is to say with poetry published by the main publishing houses like Faber and Penguin Modern, to see Yorkshire as a part of England. On the contrary, North by North-East insists on a divide that is both geographical and political: most poets are from the political left and together, they write a “poetry of the ‘imaginary republic’ of the North East, confidently facing South without deferring to London.” The poems are either “experimental” or “traditional” but most of them are written in “non-Mandarin English”. Consequently, it seems that the aim here is to say that the North East is apart from the rest of England. No matter what the agenda is though, anthologies of northern poems fulfil a double role: they preserve the works of local poets who might not be read otherwise alongside more established poets and they create a canon of Northern poems, in other words, they participate in creating a Northern poetry.
9 Both collections claim that Northern poetry is made possible by a change in publishing patterns and give a whole list of local publications, past anthologies, presses, magazines and cultural structures to prove their assertion that publishing poetry in the North has become a vibrant activity. The North-South Divide in poetry was often played out along the lines of small presses and provincial publishers (like The North and Bloodaxe) circulating experimental poetry versus The Poetry Society and London or Southern publishers (Anvill, Faber, OUP) circulating mainstream poetry. Therefore, whereas in the 1960s, many poets deplored the fact that they could not get published by London- based publishing houses because they were deemed northern, a quick look at the
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presses listed on the Poetry Library website13 shows that today things have taken a turn for a better representation of poetry in every British region. Indeed, some 65 publishing houses are located in the South and the Midlands, 25 in the North and 25 elsewhere. Considering that the North is actually made up of three regions (Yorkshire and the Humber, the North East and the North West) out of nine, a sense of balance emerges.
10 The two collections stress how important this change has been. For Versions of the North, it is “the breakup of the Oxford-Cambridge-London axis which dominated poetry publishing in the UK for so long, and the subsequent emergence of magazines and presses in the North, many of which based in Yorkshire”, which explain the important amount of poetry produced in the region. The statement is confirmed in North by North-East, in the sense that “poets in the North-East no longer need to look to London publishers for their work to be validated.” The change started in the 1960s in a context of urban regeneration in which the Arts played an important role. Hence the fact that the label “Northern poetry” usually refers to different sets of poets working together, more or less tightly, within a particular city. For instance, Jon Silkin’s Stand was founded in London in the 1950s, but when the poet gained a Gregory fellowship from the University of Leeds in 1960, he based his magazine in the North and ran it without any subsidy until 1965. Numerous poets who were on a Leeds university fellowship, like Tony Harrison, contributed to the magazine, at a time when fiery discussion over the political nature of poetry fuelled the British Poetry Revival. The then North-East Association for the Arts invited Silkin to relocate into Newcastle, another such poetic hubbub: Tom and Connie Pickard’s Mordern Tower, Bloodaxe, which was founded so as to publish and publicize Basil Bunting’s Briggflatts (1965), a long epic poem on the North that all London-based presses had turned down according to its author, as well as a pro-active policy of funding the Arts, for instance through Northern Arts fellowships, which Harrison and Bunting also benefited from, were gaining the city international recognition on the poetic scene. After the 1987 elections, which saw the return of the conservatives to power due to the rise of unemployment in the aftermath of the 1984-1985 Miners’ Strike and the wave of deindustrialisation that submerged the North, the Regional Arts association invested in community arts activity in areas of high unemployment, which explains the poetry revival of the 1990s. In 1999, the editorial offices of Stand, by then a reputed magazine, moved back to Leeds, that is to say, stayed in the North.
11 A look at a few collections of essays on contemporary poetry shows the story is not that simple though. The Cambridge Introduction to British Poetry, 1945-2010, edited by Eric Falci in 2015, has one chapter on “The North” (pp. 126-154) whose title is misleading for the purpose of this article since it deals with Northern Irish poetry since 1968. Elsewhere in the book, apart from Basil Bunting whose northerness is alluded to, poets who are traditionally associated with the North are analysed along different lines: Ted Hughes for his modern primitivism; Tony Harrison because of the class struggle he testifies to; and Simon Armitage as a performer. The Cambridge Companion to British Poetry, 1945-2010, edited by Edward Larissy in 2016, does not allegedly have a chapter on Northern poets but one on “Poetry and Class” (pp.116-129) by Sandie Byrne, who proposes a survey “of some poetry in English on the subject of social inequality”14. Though claiming that her study is not attached to one particular region, Byrne spends some time on Leeds and lists Blake Morrison, Tony Harrison, Ken Smith and Tom Pickard, all born and bred in the North, as example of poets who tackle the issue of class in their poetry. When she
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moves on to her analysis of Sean O’Brien’s poetry, she writes “also intransigently northern, though born in London” (p.122), most probably a slip of the pen, given her initial caveat. Yet, while explaining the social nature of Cousin Coat, she uses the phrases “ northerness conceived as…”, in “O’Brien’s North”, and finally “northern working-class popular culture” (p. 123), a phrase that definitely associates the North and the working- class. She then moves further North with a series of Scottish poets, namely Don Paterson, Douglas Dunn, and Tom Leonard. Finally, The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary British and Irish Poetry, edited by Peter Robinson in 2013, has one chapter by David Wheatley entitled “‘Dafter than we care to own’: Some Poets of the North of England” (pp. 407-423). Wheatley’s own Contemporary British Poetry, published in London in 2015, had no chapter and no reference to a northern trend in poetry. Yet his contribution to Robinson’s collection of essays hardly makes up for it since it is actually not so much about the North as it is about Hull and its vibrant poetic scene since Larkin started working there as a librarian. Two conclusions that can be drawn are that the North, when mentioned, is still considered in social terms as opposed to aesthetic ones, and that it is difficult, because of the diversity of the region, to go beyond the local towards the regional level when analysing it. It is hard though to draw definite conclusions as to why the North is not theorised or represented at all: is it because the purpose of the book does not encompass the issue of the North? Or because northerness is deemed a 1980s issue? Or simply because it does not deserve to be tackled at all? There is no definite reason for this lack of comprehensive analysis.
Steve Ely’s Oswald’s Book of Hours (2013)15
12 Steve Ely was born and bred in Yorkshire. On his website16, he describes himself as a “ poacher, preacher: poet” and indeed, hunting, Catholicism and language are his main concerns, together with local history and literature. He is a Ted Hughes scholar and has inherited his elder’s poetics of violence as a natural process that penetrates all layers of existence. In his 2013 biography, he demonstrated that the time the Poet Laureate spent in Mexborough, a once heavily industrial town, was at least as formative as the years he spent in the natural landscapes of the Calder Valley, which most critics point out as his primary poetical influence. This debatable assertion about Ted Hughes tells us one important thing about Ely himself: he is a staunch supporter of the working- class and of mining communities. For instance, Arthur Scargill, the NUM leader of the 1984-85 UK Miners’ strike, who had already been turned into a poetic icon by Tony Harrison in his controversial v. (1987), appears in the section “Memorials of the Saints”, and in a sonnet no less. In other words, Steve Ely writes a “Ted Hughes meet Tony Harrison” kind of poetry and the least to be said is that the result is not for the faint at heart.
13 The central figure is King Oswald, who reigned over Northumbria from 635 to 642 AD and spread Christianity across England against pagan and foreign forces. Ely describes him as: a key and neglected figure in English history and a touchstone for many of the issues and themes that pre-occupy me – the role of the North in the larger polity of England, the English propensity for violence, the Catholic roots of England, hunting with dogs, natural history, landscape, class, race, resistance and rebellion, the relationship of England the gaeltacht [sic] – and others17.
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14 If some of these items are shared by quite a few northern poets, others are really specific to Ely’s own poetics (hunting for instance). Oswald’s story is one of defeat in battle against the Mercians, of usurpation of posterity, since George became patron saint of England, and of neglect, as he is only mentioned passim in history books. His fighting spirit and destiny are to be found in other northern figures in the collection: Richard Rolle, a 14th century hermit, Robert Aske, a Catholic rebel who was executed after participating in the Pilgrimage of Grace in 1536, John Nevison, a 17th century highwayman who ended up hanged, or Stewart MacLaughlin, a paratrooper who was killed aged 27 during the Falklands War. He also appropriates figures whose Northerness is either disputed, like Robin Hood, or plain non-existent, like Wat Tyler, the Canterbury leader of the Peasants’ Revolt in 1381. Such a pantheon indicates that for Ely, class allegiance is more important than geographical location and therefore that Northern stands for rebels who pay the high price when repression strikes. This is actually a recurring feature in Northern culture: the phrase “Rebellious North” is found in The Tears of Cambria, an 18th century poem, in a 1961 letter from the Selected Letters of William Empson (2006), and it is the title of an animation funded by the Arts Council in 2015. The connection is actually so strong that it conflates other identities, as in Lemn Sissay’s Rebel Without Applause (1992), in which the poet presents himself as a Black rebel of the North.
15 In Ely’s “exploration of radical, pre-industrial and pre-reformation traditions”18, eulogies and laments have nothing nostalgic or melancholy about them. Such feelings are kept at bay by the many references to hunting, deemed a regulated though cruel practice. For instance, the very first poem is a calendar of hunting trips filled with gory details (“the boar’s blood smeared / on beardless cheeks”, p.11; “man and dogge / had of his flesh their share and even the corbyn / had their bone”, p.12; “we left the meat for scavenging corbyn, ligged in reddening snow”, p.13). This violence (but whose violence? The violence of hounds? Of individual men? Of history? Of political and social structures? Of the North?), this violence reverberates in the other poems and forces us to beg the question: does the poet endorse the violence his personae stand for? Knowing Steve Ely’s self-proclaimed affiliation with revolutionary socialism, there is little doubt that Wat Tyler’s words are also his: 15. Sainted King Oswald, heed well my lesson. When your moment arrives, seize it: lead the fyrd of your people to palace of Westminster and hesitate not to treat it with fire; 16. And no doubt that your people, should you ever oppress them or lead them astray, will turn upon your Northumbrian tower, with springhole and trebuchet, block, scaffold and hatchet. (pp. 20-21)
16 Indeed, I would argue that the violence described in his book, the contempt he shows for the weak in spirit and body, the deliberate violation of delicate sensibility, sentiment and softness, his rejection of charity works, compassion and pity, all have a unique target: the middle class, who live in a luxury the workers have always paid for with their own lives, who exert control over the arts, who have usurped and are despoiling England. The question of who the land belongs to is actually a recurring one (p.15, pp. 45-46). The rhetoric here is one of sheer evidence: it belongs to the people.
17 Violence and destruction are also a linguistic matter. Standard English, Northern dialect, Old English, Latin, foreign languages are mixed, which could make us think either that the North is a melting pot, or that historicising and locating the language is a way to create a linear history of the region, but that would be too simple a story. In
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fact, there is no consistency in the spelling at all. For instance, in the first poem, “sin” is spelt “synne” (p.11), “sinne” (p.12), “sinn” (p.14). Some forms are even plain wrong. Peter Riley notes that the collection is fraught with mock archaic language that constantly arrests the eye and the ear with impossible forms such as the –eth suffix which is normally used for a verb in the 3rd person singular but which is used here for an infinitive or a past participle.19 Jacques Rancière, who can be deemed a radical thinker working in the same vein as Terry Eagleton or Raymond Williams, in The Politics of Literature, argues that “literature does politics simply by being literature”20 and it does so by introducing misunderstandings that reconfigure the relationships between words and things. “Metathesis” (p.83)21, a current linguistic process which alters the shape of words and which is mentioned in the last poem of the collection is not a smooth process but an act of linguistic destruction. Revolution through fighting has come to a dead end (all the personae in the collection speak from the dead and no contemporary hero or even villain is mentioned), so only language and literature can be revolutionary today. Yet Steve Ely’s distorting of poetic forms and language is as political an act as can be. This is his own personal way of reviving the spirit of the rebellious North.
Peter Riley’s Due North (2015)22
18 Peter Riley was born in Stockport, near Manchester, in 1940, in a rather modest family, and “found [his] way into a university”, Cambridge University no less. He “never settled”23 but spent most of his adult life in the South and abroad. He is associated with different movements of experimental poetry (the Cambridge poets and the American L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E poets) which, in the wake of Ezra Pound and other Modernists, promoted a form of cosmopolitan writing. And yet, most of his collections focus on one specific British place: Alstonefield (2003) on Staffordshire, The Llyn Writings (2007) on Wales, The Derbyshire Poems (2010) on Derbyshire. Due North (2015) is his second full- fledged collection to deal with the matter of the North. The first one, Distant Points: Excavations Part One Books One and Two, published in 1995, contained a series of meditative prose poems on the prehistorical burial mounds that had been found in the Yorkshire Wolds in the 19th century and described in J. R. Mortimer’s Forty Years’ Researches in British and Saxon Burial Mounds in East Yorkshire (1905). Pennine Tales, a pamphlet published in 2016, is a series of loco-descriptive poems that home in on the Calder Valley, an area celebrated by many poets from and around the region such as former Poet Laureate Ted Hughes and current Professor of Poetry at Oxford Simon Armitage.
19 Even though Due North was begun the day before Riley moved back from Cambridge to Yorkshire after almost a whole life time away, the collection contains few elements of his personal coming back story to the North. Instead, there are countless patterns and modes of migration to the North, which is not construed, at the onset, as a place of hope for a better life or of return to a golden age, but as a place where there may just be a slim hope of survival. Indeed, the reasons for taking to the road are many, be it traditional migration, like the pastoral nomadic hunter gatherers of the first section, 19th and 20th century larger migratory fluxes, like the ones induced by the Industrial Revolution, wars (as in section four) and climate change, or even forms of walking against power, such as the ascent of Kinder Scout in section 11. Therefore, each of the 12 sections takes us on a journey “from far” (the very first words of the collection) to “
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somewhere under the terminus” (its very last words) (p.96). Consequently, Due North is both cosmopolitan and northern. For instance, section five recounts the experience of an “artistic vertigo from Stockport to Anarchy and Surrealism” (p.38) and back from Surrealism to the Stockport of death, the great brick viaduct still striding across the town in 27 arches like letters of the alphabet spelling p o é s i e24
20 In other words, the physical movement forward and / or back to the North is also a poetic movement that originates and terminates in the poetic North.
21 The journeys are filled with the unknown and the hopes crashing on the way seem as important as the reality of arrival with its disillusions. There is a drive forward though, which recalls Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s work on the “lines of flight”, “rhizomes” and “war machines” in A Thousand Plateaus (1987), or more precisely their analysis in the realm of poetics by Pierre Joris in his A Nomad Poetics (2013). Indeed, Joris argues that “ the days of everything static – form, content, state – are over. The past century has shown that anything not involved in continuous transformation hardens and dies”25. The journeys to the North are indeed not direct trajectories to the North but continual experiments with place and poetry. How can a long poem, entitled “Due North” which exhibits its northerness through its cover picture (a photograph of Heights Road, Hebden Bridge, by Richard Gascoigne) and deictic contents (place names, dialecticisms, historical realia…) be reconciled with deterritorialisation and nomad poetics?
22 Joris further describes nomadic poetics as “a war machine, always on the move, always changing, morphing, moving through languages, cultures, terrains, times without stopping. Refuelling halts are called poases, they last a night or a day, the time of a poem, & then move on”.26 The reader is made to feel the defamiliarisation the nomad or migrant is faced with. For instance, the use of northernisms stands in sharp contrast with languages from all over Europe (Latin, German, Spanish, French, Italian, Polish…). As for the line length, the layout, the multiple typefaces (capital letters, italics, inter letter space, bold type…), they destabilize the reading so much that the eye feels like it is always on the move in some sort of chaotic way. Joris’s poasis (pl. poases) is a neologism that refers to “a poem-oasis, i.e. a stop in the moving along the nomad line- of-flight”.27 The idea is that the North provides such a refuelling halt, that it is a poasis that makes “a movement-in-rest” possible. Therefore, even located in the North, the poem is still on the move because it points to elsewheres.
23 Section 12 is of particular interest because it deals with Angel Meadow, a once affluent area turned into slums during the Industrial Revolution and rehabilitated into a park in the early 2000s. The first part opens with the line “The future sucks in the victims of a demographic disaster” and goes on to name other victims: “destitute Irish fleeing the famine, those who survived the crossing, / Ashkenazi Jews fleeing central European pogroms”. Angel Meadow offered no bright future but “mass graves with tombstones” (p.87) for those “who escaped rural destitution to die of typhoid or cholera in the darkness” (p.88). Even though the text hints at different reasons why Meadow Angel was turned into a nightmare in the 19th century (“a constant refusal to act, Tory spite, corporate disdain, coterie verse”, “cholera, people dying into / the success and obsolescence of the entire structure ”), in the endnote, the poet refuses to put the blame on the local industry: “It is not then a matter of the building of the textile industry of the Industrial Revolution but rather of the inability at a somewhat larger stage to cope with trade fluctuations and demographical disasters
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elsewhere” (p. 101). The rhetoric of approximation at work here (“somewhat”, “elsewhere ”) allows to name no culprit for stories of painful uprooting, to leave interpretations open and to show that the North is but a halt in an extended and constantly moving network. In other words, the local structures and organisations and events that cause – not to say thrive on – migration are not important. Migration escapes any kind of attachment to a grid.
24 The view is not pessimistic though because something can be done. In 2000, Peter Riley detailed what could be called his moral compass: The east-west tensions concern living and dying, beginning, continuing and ending, settlement and economy, whereas the north-south tensions concern something else, like possibility and impossibility, comfort and hurt, politics, science, hope and despair… and these cardinal tensions are still there, translate them as you will.28
25 The dialectics of hope and despair is indeed at the heart of Due North, because what matters, more than the structures themselves, is the people who run these structures, or are run by these structures, or run by these structures without even casting a compassionate glance. Hence the search for a “we” throughout the collection, a “we” that would not entail a universal lyricism of humankind since the people and peoples mentioned are always acted on by a specific history and geography. Peter Riley gives a very generous reading of the whole poem for free on Soundcloud29 and all the “uses” are pronounced the northern way as [uz] and not [ᴧs]. This [uz] is one of inclusion, of welcoming, of the human warmth associated with Northerners, it is both “loving and funny” as Tony Harrison claims in his “Them & [uz]”. Due North is a quest for some kind of choral “we” that would help us connect emotionally with what is happening around us, that would teach us empathy. That point is illustrated in: Turn, speak to me if you can, whisper in earth tone remind me of the optimism of the infant and how it will grow, if not arrested, into an extended speech, a moral vocabulary to defend the civic concept, the width of society crowded with dialects freed from comedy / we do not steal.30
26 Here, an “I” speaks to an unnamed “you” begging for a language of the earth, a language that is unspoken as the etymology of the word “infant” suggests, a language that will go beyond any linguistic territory. “Turn”, the very first word of the stanza, comes from the Latin “verso”, which also gave the word “verse”, meaning that in poetry and in empathy lies our hope for a better future.
Conclusion
27 This article has tried to show that the North was still an imagined community, or, more precisely, that its constant mapping in poetry imagined communities, be they of the past, of the present, or of the future. From the local to the national to the universal, the scale changes but the sentiment does not – up North is the route to alternative, countercultural, oppositional representations of the nation and of humanity. Yet, as opposed to some Scottish poets, Northern poets do not write for a political devolution, but through an aesthetical independence. In other words, they are looking for a form of writing that would tip the balance and renew the dialogue with the other half of England.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities (London, Verso, [1983] 1991).
Ashcroft, Bill, Griffiths, Gareth, and Tiffin, Helen, The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-Colonial Literatures (London, Routledge, 1989).
Auden, W.H, “I Like It Cold”, House and Garden, December 1947.
--- and MacNeice, Louis, Letters from Iceland (London, Faber, 1937).
Baker, Alan R.H. and Billinge, Mark (eds), Geographies of England: The North-South Divide, Material and Imagined (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004).
Byrne Sandie, “Poetry and Class”, in Edward Larissy (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to British Poetry, 1945-2010 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 116-129.
Croft, Andy and Fuller, Cynthia (eds), North by North-East: The Region’s Contemporary Poetry, Northumberland, Iron Press, 2006).
Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Felix, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, transl. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota, 2005).
Ely, Steve, Oswald’s Book of Hours (Middlesbrough, Smokestack Books, 2013).
Falci, Eric (ed.), The Cambridge Introduction to British Poetry, 1945-2010 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015).
Harrison, Tony, Collected Poems (London, Penguin, 2016).
Hughes, Ted, Winter Pollen: Occasional Prose (London, Faber, 1994).
Jewell, Helen, The North-South Divide: The Origins of Northern Consciousness in England (Manchester, Manchester University Press,1994).
Joris, Pierre, A Nomad Poetics: Essays (Connecticut, Wesleyan University Press, 2003).
Larissy, Edward (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to British Poetry, 1945-2010 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2016).
Macmillan, Ian, « A Poetic Approach to Life in the North », Yorkshire Post, 19 April 2013, URL: http://www.yorkshirepost.co.uk/lifestyle/books/a-poetic-approach-to-life-in-the- north-1-5592467.
Parks, Ian (ed.), Versions of the North: Contemporary Yorkshire Poetry (Nottingham, Five Leaves Publications, 2013).
Polley, Jacob, The Brink (London, Picador, 2003).
Rancière, Jacques, The Politics of Literature, transl. Julie Rose (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2011).
Riley, Peter, Due North (Bristol, Shearsman Books, 2015).
Robinson, Peter (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary British and Irish Poetry (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013).
Russell, Dave, Looking North: Northern England and the National Imagination (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2004).
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Thompson, Edward Palmer, The Making of the English Working Class (Harmondsworth, Penguin, [1963] 1991).
Wales, Katie, Northern English: A Cultural and Social History (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006).
Wheatley, David, Contemporary British Poetry (London, Palgrave, 2015).
NOTES
1. W.H. Auden, “I Like It Cold”, House and Garden, December 1947, p. 110. 2. Tony Harrison, “The Death of the PWD Man”, Collected Poems (London, Penguin, 2016), p. 48. 3. Jacob Polley, “The North-South Divide”, The Brink (London, Picador, 2003). 4. Louis MacNeice, “Epilogue for W.H. Auden”, Letters from Iceland (London, Faber, 1937), p. 251. 5. Dave Russell in Looking North: Northern England and the National Imagination writes: “Most people outside the North and many within it have come to know the region not through personal experience but via the versions they encounter in the field of culture.” Dave RUSSELL, Looking North: Northern England and the National Imagination (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2004), p. 4. 6. Danny Dorling, “Distressed Times and Areas: Poverty, Polarisation and Politics in England, 1918-1971”, in Alan R.H. Baker and Mark Billinge eds., Geographies of England: The North-South Divide, Material and Imagined (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 46. 7. Helen Jewell, The North-South Divide: The Origins of Northern Consciousness in England (Manchester, Manchester University Press), 1994. 8. Ian Macmillan, “A Poetic Approach to Life in the North”, Yorkshire Post, 19 April 2013. URL : http://www.yorkshirepost.co.uk/lifestyle/books/a-poetic-approach-to-life-in-the- north-1-5592467. Last accessed 15.05.2017. 9. Katie Wales, Northern English: A Cultural and Social History (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 2. 10. Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin, The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-Colonial Literatures (London, Routledge, 1989). 11. Tony Harrison, “The Rhubarbarians”, op.cit., pp. 123-124. 12. Ian Parks (ed.), Versions of the North: Contemporary Yorkshire Poetry (Nottingham, Five Leaves Publications, 2013), pp. IX-XIII. Andy Croft and Cynthia Fuller (eds), North by North-East: The Region’s Contemporary Poetry (Northumberland, Iron Press, 2006), pp. 3-9. 13. http://www.poetrylibrary.org.uk/publishers/poetrybook/ 14. Sandie Byrne, “Poetry and Class”, in Edward Larissy (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to British Poetry, 1945-2010 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 116-129. 15. Steve Ely, Oswald’s Book of Hours (Middlesbrough, Smokestack Books, 2013). 16. https://steveely.wordpress.com/. Last accessed 15.05.2017. The blog is no longer edited. 17. http://www.forwardartsfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/Steve-Ely-talking-points.pdf. Last accessed 15.05.2017. 18. Steve Ely, op.cit. backcover. 19. http://fortnightlyreview.co.uk/2015/01/northern-poets/
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20. Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Literature, transl. Julie Rose, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2011), p. 3. 21. Steve Ely, op.cit. 22. Peter Riley, Due North (Bristol, Shearsman Books, 2015). 23. http://www.aprileye.co.uk/biography.html 24. Peter Riley, op. cit., p. 39. 25. Pierre Joris, A Nomad Poetics: Essays (Connecticut, Wesleyan University Press, 2003), p. 6. 26. Ibid., p. 26 27. Ibid., p. 47. 28. http://jacketmagazine.com/11/riley-iv-by-tuma.html 29. https://soundcloud.com/peterriley-duenorth 30. Peter Riley, op.cit., p. 39.
ABSTRACTS
Based on a range of anthologies and collections mostly published since 2013, this paper analyses different faces of the North in poetry, from a heavily industrial place filled with the violence of history to a land of opportunity for a brighter future. In doing so, it tries to elucidate what the North means in poetry and what poetry does to representations of the North. A paper on poetry in a journal devoted to British social studies, even though tackling the theme of the issue, namely the North-South Divide today, might come as a surprise to most readers. Hopefully, the present article will prove that verse is not adverse to a reflection on the state of Britain and that the divide between the two fields of study can be bridged and help further research.
A partir d’un ensemble d’anthologies et de recueils, pour la plupart publiés depuis 2013, cet article se propose d’analyser les différentes facettes du Nord en poésie, d’un espace industrialisé où la violence règne, à une terre des possibles tournée vers des lendemains qui chantent. Ce faisant, il essaiera d’élucider ce que le Nord signifie en poésie et ce que la poésie fait au Nord. Un article sur la poésie dans une revue consacrée à la civilisation britannique, quand bien même il aborde le sujet du numéro, peut surprendre plus d’un lecteur. Nous espérons cependant que cet article montrera que la forme poétique n’exclut pas une réflexion profonde sur l’état de la nation britannique et que l’écart entre les deux champs disciplinaires peut être résorbé et participer à faire avancer la recherche.
INDEX
Mots-clés: Nord de l’Angleterre, poésie, anthologies, Steve Ely, Peter Riley Keywords: Northern England, poetry, anthologies, Steve Ely, Peter Riley
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AUTHOR
CLAIRE HÉLIE CECILLE (EA 4074), Université de Lille
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(De)Constructing the Myth of the North in British Cinema (1959-2019) Le Nord à l’écran : édification et démythification (1959-2019)
Anne-Lise Marin-Lamellet
Introduction
1 One may say the British New Wave1 gave birth to the screen representation of the North in 1959.2 Before that date, few films were set in the North, probably because of the lack of adequate technology to shoot on location. The adaptations of literary classics set in the north of England were entirely shot in American studios (e.g. Wuthering Heights, 1939; Pride and Prejudice, 1940; Jane Eyre, 1943). Some films with a more contemporary setting were partially shot on location (e.g. The Stars Look Down, 1940 in Cumbria, The Proud Valley, 1940 in Wales, Love on the Dole, 1941 in Blackpool), and this was used as a major promotional argument. In the late 1950s, a new generation of directors put forward another reason, a political one, to explain the relative absence of the North in films. Lindsay Anderson, the leading figure of Free Cinema and the British New Wave, wrote in a 1957 essay: “What sort of cinema have we got in Britain? First of all it is necessary to point out that it is an English cinema (and Southern English at that), metropolitan in attitude, and entirely middle-class”.3 Anderson strongly opposed the increasingly irrelevant image of imperial or war heroism and advocated a radical change in the British cinema of the time. He wished to give a more accurate and contemporary representation of British society, and the North would prove a weapon of choice to achieve that goal. “Going north in Britain is always like a trip into another country […] a real escape from the middlebrow, middle-class vacuum of the West End”,4 he added, holding the view that the North was undeniably associated with authenticity and the working class. To do away with films allegedly filled with class contempt and conveying a stereotypical image of common people, the British New Wave soon offered its own view of a humanist cinema wishing to reinvent the post-war national identity, relying on the image of an urban and industrial North, home of the working class hero as the main character.5 It thereby started a major trend in British cinema that has
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continued to this day. Even though the rural North is also present on screen, it is the urban, industrial and then deindustrialised North which has prevailed since 1959.6 Over sixty years, the political and ideological representation of the North has therefore been closely connected to national identity, popular culture and cultural myths. The cinematic image of the North seems to be at the heart of two seemingly conflicting yet concurrent tendencies: the myth-making and unmaking of what still is, despite its evolution, a key component of the national imagination.
Constructing the Myth of the North
2 Although the British New Wave claimed its belief in social realism, the representation of the North on screen has given birth to a two-pronged mythical construction over sixty years. The first is a geographical one: as the cradle of the Industrial Revolution, the North has been used in films, both in times of prosperity and crisis, its natural settings outstretching its English borders to include all British industrial regions. Besides the North East and North West, the Midlands are thus fully part of the North (confirmed by Somers Town) just like the other three nations whose representation does not fundamentally differ from that of the English North.7 Films hence display a remarkable variety of large industrial and mining centres. Yet, since 1959, the North has always been a grey, urban, masculine, working-class monolith. British New Wave films invariably start with, and regularly include a long shot on terraces (Look Back in Anger) as the camera pans over potholed cobbled streets (A Taste of Honey) lined with identical houses overlooked by the nearby factory and its chimney belching dust and fumes (Saturday Night and Sunday Morning, A Kind of Loving, The Leather Boys, In Celebration). All the walls are covered with this dirt, and the sky is full of crisscrossing cables and wires as far as the eye can see. The station and gasworks are never far away (Room at the Top, This Sporting Life, Look Back in Anger). This traditional view of the North is also found in the sepia images recalling Jimmy’s childhood (When Saturday Comes) or in the 1950s to 1980s period pieces (Brothers in Trouble, The Terence Davies Trilogy, Distant Voices, Still Lives, The Long Day Closes, Small Faces, Anita and Me, The Damned United, The Red Riding Trilogy, Control, ‘71, Believe, Pride). Other than signalling the evolution of mentalities, which led the working class to find its rightful place on screen, the rising number of period pieces about a working-class past may also signal how difficult it is for films to dispel this archetypal image of the North.8 Interestingly enough, the deindustrialisation process initiated in the 1980s has not fundamentally changed these items which have now become generic tropes. Films thus perpetuate the image of an eternal North created in the 19th century, even though factories and mines are now closed.9
3 The North on screen thus encompasses a rather blurred geographical area10 but one thing remains certain: going up North is like entering another country11 with its own way of life and rules according to The Red Riding Trilogy. Its imaginary borders are nonetheless clearly signposted on British motorways (In Celebration, Charlie Bubbles, For Queen and Country, The Damned United) or by the tonal change in the photography of the film, suddenly turning grey. This arguably echoes the famous expression “it’s grim up north”, a feeling conveyed by the Chelsea hooligan firm arriving in the outskirts of Liverpool (The Football Factory). The hero’s train journey at the beginning of Get Carter is reminiscent of Orwell’s and shows the changing landscapes as he goes from London to
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Newcastle, opposing an industrial and working-class North and a more rural and bourgeois/aristocratic South. The hero often seems to associate the South with stately homes (Shooting Fish, Billy Elliot, Greenfingers), so much so that Benjamin Disraeli’s theory of the two nations comes to mind.12 The spatial and social distinctions tend to merge in the hero’s mind, and regularly spur his proletarian consciousness over sixty years pitting the North/us vs the South/them.
4 The second mythical construction is a psychoanalytical or gendered one since the North, in direct link with its industrial past, asserts its masculine character whereas the South appeals through its feminine side.13 This myth had already been noticed by George Orwell in The Road to Wigan Pier which he called the cult of Northernness, a land where workers are all he-men and look down on their effeminate Southern counterparts.14 Landscapes look like they are built on that dichotomy: the North is covered with phallic chimneys and furnaces which are sometimes superimposed on the hero’s face to better emphasise his virile omnipotence (Room at the Top) while the South reveals its curvy hills and dales. Because of this cult of rough and stubborn Northern authenticity, the Northerner was the embodiment of hyper-masculinity until the mid-1960s whereas the Southern workers seen in films looked more androgynous, effeminate or were homosexual (The L-Shaped Room, Smashing Time, Otley, Term of Trial, and more recently, Blow Dry).15 In times of crisis, the Northerner laments over the possible extinction of his species owing to the feminisation/Southernification of the country even though he supposedly remains manlier than his Southern counterpart (The Full Monty, This Year’s Love ). Films consistently present a frontal opposition between Northerners and Southerners, e.g. between the London choreographer and Emma’s motorcycle champion father (Dream) or between the advertiser or BBC director and the Beatles (A Hard Day’s Night). The hero’s masculinity seems proportional to the latitude of his hometown. The evidently humorous introduction of The Battle of the Sexes describes Scotland as “one of the last bastions of man’s supremacy, a man’s world”; by virtue of their virility, Scotsmen are shown as the only men who can get away with wearing “ the shortest skirts” aka kilts and perform folk dances reminiscent of the cancan without their sexual identity or orientation being questioned. Old MacPherson bitterly regrets sending his son to an English school whose methods he thinks are far too soft. A few decades later, Scottish Jimmy (Once Upon a Time in the Midlands) is still the most masculine-looking male around and attracts the heroine in spite of his blatant machismo whereas the other men living in the suburb of Nottingham seem by comparison so kind and gentle that they become asexual.
5 The cult of Northernness is strongly upheld by the South which uses it to assert its superiority, more so than by the North itself.16 The Northerner’s hyper-masculinity goes hand in hand with the backward image of his region (The Battle of the Sexes, Smashing Time), all the more so as it often includes all those half-civilised peoples living in the nations formerly known as the Celtic Fringe. A proof of the anchoring of this pseudo historical myth and the deep-seated fear it generates is the pervasive threatening aspect associated with Northerners that crosses over film genres. Many British sword-and-sandal films as well as science-fiction films are based on the legendary savagery of Northerners, notably the Scots and their Pict ancestors who allegedly gave Roman legions and Vikings a hard time (The Last Legion, The Eagle of the Ninth, Valhalla Rising, Northmen – a Viking Saga). Hadrian’s Wall remains a strong symbol of liminality between civilisation and ancient unchartered territory or post-apocalyptic barbarian land (Centurion, Doomsday).17 In thrillers or horror films, Celtic lands are those
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of heathen cults that are always unsettling and often prone to the human sacrifice of strangers to the community (A Lonely Place to Die, The Wicker Man, The Wicker Tree). The uncanny atmosphere of the North can be felt in the number of werewolves one can meet there (An American Werewolf in London, Dogsoldiers, Wild Country). Based on true stories (the Moors Murders, the Yorkshire Ripper) and in keeping with the Gothic tradition, the moors around northern industrial cities hide the graves of the victims of numerous sordid affairs (The Red Riding Trilogy, See No Evil: the Moors Murders). In a more social realist genre, the xenophobic commentaries heard from the upper-class and upper-middle-class characters about the (Northern) Irish bear witness to the troubled relationship between the South and its former colonies (The Boxer, Hidden Agenda). To sum up, the further up north people live, the more virile they appear to Northerners, and the more archaic to Southerners (Twin Town, The Damned United, Pride, North v South, Grimsby). Paradoxically, feeling superior has not led the South to despise this traditional image of the North, which symbolises purity and authenticity. However, it does not hesitate to exaggerate, overestimate or distort Northern values to feed the myth, as shown by the commodification of the cult of Northernness (A Hard Day’s Night, Prick Up Your Ears, Smashing Time, Dream, Morvern Callar).18
Depicting the Reality of the North
6 Cinema is a myth and identity maker19 but it is also a medium that has reflected the socioeconomic evolutions of the North since the late 1950s, which it uses to construct its representation. Between the late 1950s and early 1980s, the North was synonymous with relative prosperity and modernity. Whether set in actual or imaginary cities – in fact composites made of real locations – these films present an urban North that was still in keeping with the glorious past of the Industrial Revolution, as shown by the crowds of workers walking out of factories. These workers symbolise the dynamism and economic power of northern cities as well as the very strong links established within the traditional working-class community (Room at the Top, A Kind of Loving). It was also the time of post-war reconstruction as old Victorian slums were demolished by caterpillars to make way for more spacious and comfortable housing (Billy Liar).20 Streets were filled with the rumbling of machines and the laughs of building workers. The few vacant lots where children played between two building sites were soon to welcome new estates in cities looking like they were bombed because of all the roadworks, which fed the hero’s fertile imagination (Billy Liar). Ingrid (A Kind of Loving) already lives in one of these new semis surrounded by a nice little garden, opening on a broad street with well cared for pavements. The sun that shines over Jenny’s flowered and green estate (The Family Way) proves that one can live in an industrial town and pleasant surroundings. Films of that time testify to the development of boomtowns around regional economic hubs following the 1946 New Town Act that created about 29 new towns to alleviate overcrowded old urban areas. The process now seems complete as suggested by the long shots over working-class residential areas (Gregory’s Girl, Rita, Sue and Bob Too, Twin Town, The James Gang, A Room for Romeo Brass, Once Upon a Time in the Midlands, Ae Fond Kiss, Looking for Eric, Ratcatcher, Dream, Mischief Night, Le Donk & Scor-zay-zee, 1 Day), or over old empty terraces and tower blocks before their final destruction (Ratcatcher, Looks and Smiles, The Long Good Friday, Streetlife, A Very British Gangster, Citadel, T2 Trainspotting) in more recent films.
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7 In the 1980s, the North was hit hard by deindustrialisation and has never quite recovered ever since. It appears like a decomposing body affected by the repeated attacks of unemployment, like a recurring cancer or growing gangrene that must be cured quickly if it is to survive (Stormy Monday). Apart from very few exceptions (Twin Town, Girls’ Night, Human Traffic), the deep socioeconomic changes that followed Thatcher’s reforms resulted in the final collapse of that giant with feet of clay, depriving it of what made its strength and identity. Silence now reigns in deserted warehouses and in factories that are either closed down or up for sale (Business as Usual, Among Giants, The Navigators, Brassed Off, The Big Man, The Full Monty, My Son the Fanatic). Shipyards and terraces that already looked bleak enough in Get Carter are gloomier in Stormy Monday. Some working-class neighbourhoods are even close to shantytowns (Purely Belter, The Selfish Giant, Tyrannosaur, Grimsby, Wild Rose). The terraces in Cardiff and Glasgow have turned into dumps and well-known drug dens (A Way of Life, My Name is Joe, Sweet Sixteen), just like the areas ignored by tourists in Edinburgh (Trainspotting).21 Liverpool is compared to the Third World (Ladybird, Ladybird) and Grimsby said to be twinned with Chernobyl (Grimsby). Slums keep being pulled down but they are not replaced with more modern buildings and remaining wastelands further stress the end- of-the-world atmosphere the hero feels (Looks and Smiles). The greyness that bathes all these towns and cities reflecting a post-industrial Britain is to be understood both in a literal and figurative sense. The dim, misty, blurred light as well as the numerous fades to black symbolise the uncertain future, the dusk or the autumn of life of the region (Letter to Brezhnev, Stormy Monday, The Full Monty, Brassed Off, Among Giants). Some films that were deliberately shot in black and white further stress this mortiferous atmosphere (Looks and Smiles, TwentyFourSeven). The imminent death of the North is symbolised by the wreath laid on the Grimley road-sign and reinforced by Danny’s silicosis (Brassed Off). The scrapheaps in Streetlife are already history and the pit in Billy Elliot is living its final hours (see also Among Giants). Time is now suspended like the fixed pit wheels in Brassed Off and the huge container cranes in Purely Belter. The North turns into a vast ghost-like region. Industrial cities are still haunted by a few disoriented heroes (Pontypridd in Streetlife, Crossmaheart in Divorcing Jack) but only those who cannot afford to move away stay there, like Phil (Brassed Off) who remains stuck with a mortgage in a dying town (see also My Name is Joe, TwentyFourSeven). They must face eviction and repossession once they are ruined (The Full Monty). The post- industrial North only seems to offer low-skilled jobs to the working poor (Wild Rose) and queues in front of food banks lengthen (I, Daniel Blake).
8 Relics of a past that no longer exists, the coalmines and factories are there to symbolise the sort of stasis affecting the North. Maybe the films shot in black and white not only symbolise the destitution of the area but also its more or less conscious museumisation. 22 Although the British press regularly features articles about how some northern cities wish to get rid of that image thanks to big regeneration campaigns, applications for various sport and cultural events (Manchester and the Commonwealth Games in 2002, Liverpool as the European capital of culture in 2008) and even the financing of films presenting another image of their city,23 the cinematic representation of the North appears unchanged. However, it thus offers the perspective of those who most suffered from this brutal transformation and still exist although they are often overlooked by other media, people whose age-old way of life was swept away in less than two decades. Seeing all these crafts and class culture disappear or fall into oblivion fills them with melancholy and anxiety, like taxi-driver Parvez (My Son the Fanatic) and the miners in
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Brassed Off who play on with their brass band to keep all this alive and leave a trace in history (see also The Big Man, T2 Trainspotting). Hence perhaps the aforementioned period pieces that can be then seen as sort of homage – possibly tainted with guilt – to a seriously undermined culture.
Deconstructing the Myth of the North
9 Alongside its social realist ambition, cinema likes to play with the myths it creates or contributes to maintain. Many films turn out to be attempts at deconstructing both the archetypal North – which ends up being geographically and socioeconomically more diverse than it first seems to be – and the figure of the Northerner – who takes the image he gives himself or that the South seeks to give him with a pinch of salt.
10 The contemporary and working-class North is not only synonymous with an urban and industrial world. The counterexamples set in the country or in the Lake District are rare enough (Whistle Down the Wind, Local Hero, This Filthy Earth, My Summer of Love, White Settlers, God’s Own Country) but the films featuring the working class hero almost always include a scene in a more rural area. The hero’s presence in this kind of environment may seem bizarre since the bucolic North is so associated in viewers’ minds with heritage films – among which the famous adaptations of literary classics with the numerous versions of North and South, Pride and Prejudice, Jane Eyre, Wuthering Heights but also Women in Love, Love and Friendship – a genre that is often deemed conservative and always set in a more distant past, focusing on the lives of higher social classes. A working-class rural counterpoint is a way of showing a multifaceted North as well as placing the working class hero within a literary tradition, making him the heir of the pastoral and romanticism. Far from distorting his representation, this connection rather expresses his response to the alienation he feels due to his social condition and his fears of a potential erosion of his identity. Rural scenes often tainted with nostalgia for a preindustrial North signal the hero’s unconscious fantasy over the image of a pastoral England symbolising feudal society. Forgetting his status for a moment, the Northerner becomes just a man in his natural habitat. Over sixty years, his love of nature reveals he thinks he can escape first from his harsh working conditions (Saturday Night and Sunday Morning, Kes) then the harmful effects of unemployment (TwentyFourSeven, The Angels’ Share) but these rural breaks are short and ambivalent. While expressing the hero’s deepest desires, they reveal personal, socioeconomic and existential tension. The only time Mrs Hammond (This Sporting Life) looks happy with Machin and her children is when they play football in front of the ruins of an old abbey. However, Machin has to go back to the city and endure the rough shocks of rugby if he wants to be able to pay for his costly Rolls-Royce trips to the country. The editing further reinforces the transience of the moment since the scene is inserted as a flash- back between the party scene during which the hero suffers from broken teeth and a rugby match (see also Room at the Top, The Loneliness of the Long Distance Runner, A Taste of Honey, Kes, My Son the Fanatic, T2 Trainspotting). Nature as a form of escapism thus remains an illusion because it always sends the hero back to his condition as a worker in the end.
11 The return to nature is even more illusory since its days are numbered. The criticism of industrialisation is certainly not new and Romantic poets were the first to lament over the consequences of the Industrial Revolution on the British landscape.24 But their
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complaints find an echo in those of the Northerner faced with the contemporary problem of urban sprawl. The evolution towards suburbia is felt like the destruction of his physical and social environment because gentrification and the suburbanisation of the soul seem to be inextricably linked in his mind.25 In times of relative prosperity, the changing North was not perceived positively because it was increasingly subjected to the ill-effects of its economic development (Saturday Night and Sunday Morning, A Kind of Loving). The hero remained fond of an older image of his native North with a clear separation between city and country as he saw his region look more and more like the South with pretty little residential suburbs fit for lower-middle-class workers.26 Things just got worse with time (Dead Man’s Shoes). Moreover, these cheap buildings did not age well and quickly deteriorated in times of crisis turning into shabby-looking estates that cannot be redeemed by a few patches of yellow grass (Rita, Sue and Bob Too, A Room for Romeo Brass, Yasmin, Mischief Night, This is England, The Selfish Giant, Grimsby, I, Daniel Blake). Aesthetic concerns aside, this phenomenon blurring the city/country dichotomy in the hero’s mind also represented his fear of embourgeoisement before symbolising his loss of social position, in other words his working-class identity.27 Yet the few films set in more rural areas show that life is just as hard there (The Holding, God’s Own Country) because a beautiful landscape is not enough to feed on and locals are therefore ready to sell their acres of land to American oil executives to start a new life elsewhere (Local Hero).
12 The diversity of the North is also socioeconomic. In spite of the undesirable effects of the crisis that has reinforced the age-old North/South divide, the representation of a pauperising working-class North in more recent films (and an economically booming South) is only a global, even though largely spread, image, and some exceptions can of course be found.28 The same place can sometimes convey very different impressions: the suburbs of Nottingham in Shane Meadows’s films (Small Time, A Room for Romeo Brass, Once Upon a Time in the Midlands), Edinburgh in Danny Boyle’s films (Shallow Grave, Trainspotting, T2 Trainspotting) (see also Restless Natives, 16 Years of Alcohol, The Angels’ Share, The Marker, I, Daniel Blake).29 There is a dichotomy between postcard images of a prosperous and touristy North (Restless Natives), like the Scottish castle overlooking a loch in Four Weddings and a Funeral, the hiking trail near Loch Lomond in Burn, Burn, Burn, the Ceilidh celebrations in the Aberdeen county in Local Hero or even small port towns like Oban in Morvern Callar, and the sink estates of Glasgow, although sometimes one just needs to cross the Clyde to find much more residential areas (Sweet Sixteen, Red Road, The Angels’ Share). Wales is not merely a succession of mining valleys as shown by the region of Snowdonia (The James Gang), just like some Yorkshire towns show that coalmines or factories did not always encroach on the moor (Hebden Bridge in Fanny and Elvis, Huddersfield in Resurrected, York in Burn, Burn, Burn, Todmorden in My Summer of Love). Posh villas in the suburbs of Warnley, Manchester, Leeds, Newcastle, Sheffield or Glasgow are just as lavish as their Southern counterparts (Life at the Top, Heart, 24 Hour Party People, The Red Riding Trilogy, Get Carter, Journeyman, Wild Rose). Diversity in the North is not only a question of class struggle though: there are also interregional rivalries, reinforced by history (Boys from the Blackstuff) and football (The Damned United).
13 The main deconstruction of the myth of the North comes from the irony found in these films and the Northerner himself who seems aware of this mythical construction in British society and enjoys making fun of the various images the North, whether bucolic and touristy (My Name is Joe, Trainspotting) or urban and industrial (A Taste of Honey, Billy
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Liar). The cult of Northernness is gently debunked with a sense of humour sometimes verging on satire or self-derision (Love Thy Neighbour, A Hard Day’s Night). Charlie Bubbles plays with clichés. The Northerner who gives his name to the film is a successful novelist but also a depressive alcoholic whose brief return to his native place is above all an attempt at deconstructing the archetypal image of the industrial North seen as a relic in this swinging decade. The gasworks, the coalmine, the soon-to-be demolished terraces, the canal, the brass band, in other words all the generic tropes that the British New Wave helped launch, emphasise the feeling of terminal decline for the imagery inherited from the Industrial Revolution. Locals are not welcoming and the sequence shot at dawn conveys a very dreary image of a region trying to reinvent itself. Northern cities clearly wish to get rid of their working-class image and compete with the capital, as shown by the luxury hotel where Charlie stays. The rural North is also seen sardonically, whether it is through the cottage used as a model-farm by Charlie’s estranged wife or the pan-shot on the green hills the hero gazes at in an iconoclastic way while shaving with an electrical razor plugged in the cigarette-lighter of his car. As the final escape in a hot-air balloon implies, the North is multifaceted and does not lend itself to any pigeonholing. Some more recent films seem to continue this regenerative trend by trying to convey a new, younger, more contemporary and vibrant image of the North. Without ignoring the contingencies of the film industry and a potential Trainspotting effect,30 films regularly focus on the club and rave scenes some big northern cities have been associated with. Through the portrayal of these 1990s and 2000s subcultures, they seek to show working-class youths that unemployment or casual work do not prevent from “having it large” – though their drug use which is supposed to be recreational and hedonistic could be interpreted as a way to get away from problems and depression. Night life in these cities whose frenzy is sometimes symbolised by fast-motion sequences of constant fluxes of cars, people and shimmering lights expresses the quest for a new identity even though these subcultures are by definition not mainstream enough to represent all the Northern population (Human Traffic, Twin Town, The Acid House, 24 Hour Party People, Ecstasy, Weekender, T2 Trainspotting). Glasgow in Late Night Shopping – that focuses on the lives of young night workers – nevertheless compares favourably to London since the way it is filmed can maintain the illusion the film is set in the capital, which shows the increasing cosmopolitanism and internationalisation of some northern cities as global cities.31
Conclusion: Reconstructing the Myth of the North
14 The North can thus be more diverse than its myth would have people believe but one thing unites all Northerners on screen: their aversion towards the South and everything it stands for is deeply rooted, and the rocky relationship is quite often a love-hate one. The South is always ready to deride a mythical North but the latter is just as happy to denigrate and despise its neighbour. Being a Londoner or a Sassenach is not well perceived (Withnail & I, An American Werewolf in London, Love, Honour and Obey, Twin Town, Trainspotting, Restless Natives). “Southerner” even becomes an insult used by Ringo (A Hard Day’s Night) and Brian Clough (The Damned United) for whom Brighton is “ almost in France”. The Northerner also has a stereotypical view of the South that is generally considered to be sly, arrogant and decadent. All the films presenting a Northerner’s point of view on the capital underline its artificiality whether it is
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through political (Dockers), media or advertising circles (Smashing Time, The Knack…and How to Get it, 24 Hour Party People). The South is dangerous for the physical and moral integrity of the Northerner. It is seen as a giant den of iniquity or a new Babylon (Naked, Somers Town), which explains the hero’s reluctance to venture down South out of fear of the unknown, disinterest (Billy Elliot) or because he knows he cannot survive long out of his depth without irredeemably changing his nature. “A man can lose himself in London”, Fisher (Billy Liar) likes repeating in one of his imitation games. That is why Northerners try to proudly resist the call of the capital (The Loneliness of the Long Distance Runner, When Saturday Comes) which above all wins over the hearts of Northern women, like Liz (Billy Liar), Annie (Alfie), Cathy (Cathy Come Home) or Louise (Naked). However, London turns out to be a lethal trap for these women, which reinforces the decadent image of a corrupt South (The Knack…and How to Get it, Smashing Time, Otley, Dream).32
15 Yet the Northerner’s latent desire to go South remains significant, although his experience is ambivalent: it reveals his fascination for a place that, in the end, also undergoes a mythical (de)construction at socioeconomic and psychoanalytical levels, as a perfect counterpoint to that of the North. Over sixty years, the South is seen as a land of opportunities although it quickly turns into a fake Eldorado. This happens not only in times of prosperity, e.g. in the not so Swinging London era (A Hard Day’s Night, The Knack…and How to Get it, Smashing Time, Life at the Top, Prick Up Your Ears, The Red Riding Trilogy), but also in times of crisis, when job vacancies are synonymous with working poverty, exploitation and disillusionment (Trainspotting, Naked, Riff Raff, This Year’s Love, Janice Beard, 45wpm)33 and when more or less political collective trips are ignored or despised by Southern representatives (Dockers, Brassed Off, Billy Elliot). The South is also seen as a place that jeopardises the Northerner’s hypermasculinity, whether it is through the meeting of women compared to praying mantises (Georgy Girl, Life at the Top, Family Life),34 the discovery of blatant homosexuality or, more generally, its supposedly devirilising customs and mores (Prick Up Your Ears, This Year’s Love).
16 The move down South generally proving a failure, the North eventually appears like a shelter, although once again an ambivalent one.35 The northern retreat is sometimes felt like a symbolical death, the loss of all hopes (Riff Raff, This Year’s Love) or points out the thwarted plans of young ambitious men (The Red Riding Trilogy). It can nonetheless be felt more positively like a return to one’s roots or the community the hero should have never left (Life at the Top, Smashing Time, Wild Rose). Over sixty years, the North is always praised for its people’s warmth and hospitality (Love Thy Neighbour, Naked)36 while the South stands for loneliness and a constant rush that does not allow people to forge meaningful relationships (Wonderland, This Year’s Love). Besides, Southerners seem to talk a lot without saying much, which disturbs Northerners whose reputation as laconic people is just a cover for their raw sensitivity (Brassed Off, God’s Own Country). Disenchanted southern experiences thus paradoxically lead Northerners to reconstruct the myth of their native North. Interestingly, the image of the North as a shelter crosses over genres since British post-apocalyptic films show that survivors often choose to settle up north whereas the threat comes from London (28 Days Later, Reign of Fire, Doomsday).
17 Over the decades, the North on screen has remained proud of its history and the imagery it has generated, mostly a grim but dignified industrial North and a beautiful but threatening rural North. With its will to construct and deconstruct the myth of the
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North since 1959, British cinema has clearly exploited the North/South rivalry which has become a source of creative tension. It thus keeps fuelling the debate about the North/South divide but clearly seems to have chosen its side by having firmly anchored – and popularised – a certain Northern identity at the heart of the British national culture and imagination.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adonis, Andrew and Pollard, Stephen, A Class Act: the Myth of Britain’s Classless Society (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1997).
Ashby, Justine and Higson, Andrew (eds.), British Cinema: Past and Present (London, Routledge, 2000).
Bourke, Joanna, Working Class Cultures in Britain 1890-1960: Gender, Class and Ethnicity (London, Routledge, 1994).
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Davidson, Alex, Looks and Smiles, 2003-2014, available at
Disraeli, Benjamin, Sybil or the Two Nations (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1954 [1845]).
Frodon, Jean-Michel, La Projection nationale (Paris, Odile Jacob, 1998).
Higson, Andrew, Waving the Flag: Constructing a National Cinema in Britain (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995).
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Hjort, Mette and Petrie, Duncan (eds.), The Cinema of Small Nations (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2007).
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Laing, Stuart, Representations of Working Class Life 1957-1964 (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1986).
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Marin-Lamellet, Anne-Lise, ‘Le Working Class Hero ou la figure ouvrière à travers le cinéma britannique de 1956 à nos jours’, (PhD dissertation, University of Grenoble, 2011).
Maschler, Tom (ed.), Declaration (London, MacGibbon & Kee, 1957).
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McKnight, George (ed.), Agent of Challenge and Defiance, The Films of Ken Loach (Westport, Praeger, 1997).
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NOTES
1. For further details on the cycle of films made between 1959 and 1963 which focused on the lives of northern working-class people, see for example, Stephen Lacey, British Realist Theatre: The New Wave in its Context (1956-1965) (London, Routledge, 1995), pp. 163-189, and Jim Leach, British Film (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 52-58. 2. “Screen” is understood herein as feature films since, of course, there have been short newsreels or documentaries set in the North since 1896. 3. Lindsay Anderson, ‘Get Out and Push’ in Tom Maschler (ed.), Declaration (London, MacGibbon & Kee, 1957), pp. 157-160. 4. Stuart Laing, Representations of Working Class Life 1957-1964 (Basingstroke, Macmillan, 1986), p. 89. 5. The hyphenless expression is a tribute to John Lennon who invented the compound in his eponymous song. For a comprehensive definition of the phrase in the context of British cinema, see Anne-Lise Marin-Lamellet, ‘Le Working Class Hero ou la figure ouvrière à travers le cinéma britannique de 1956 à nos jours’ (PhD dissertation, University of Grenoble, 2011), pp. 19-33. 6. See Dave Russell, Looking North: Northern England and the National Imagination (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2004), p. 24. 7. The fact that these nations have had difficulties in maintaining a domestic film industry may partly explain their blending in with the rest of the British film production, which is evidently dominated by English finance as well as artistic and technical staff and thus tends to offer a metropolitan view of the country. For more details about Northern Irish and Scottish cinema, see Mette Hjort and Duncan Petrie (eds.), The Cinema of Small Nations (Edinburgh, Edinburgh
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University Press, 2007), pp. 60-92, and Duncan Petrie, Screening Scotland (London, BFI Publishing, 2000), pp. 1-31. 8. George Orwell, The Road to Wigan Pier (London, Penguin, 1967 [1937]), p. 101, had noticed that, whatever the evolution of the region that may make its image anachronistic, “traditions are never killed by facts”. Andrew Adonis and Stephen Pollard, A Class Act: the Myth of Britain’s Classless Society (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1997), pp. 184-185, mention the impact of the heritage industry that seeks to maintain the working-class history of the North and may thus explain the outdated or stereotypical image the South has about it. 9. “The recurrent image of steam trains, cobbled backstreets, gasometers and railway viaducts gave the films the feeling of taking place at the fag-end of the nineteenth century” according to Jeffrey Richards in Bart Moore-Gilbert and John Seed (eds.), Cultural Revolution? The Challenge of the Arts in the 1960s (London, Routledge, 1992), p. 220. Russell, Looking North, pp. 5 and 269, points out the fact that this traditional view of the North dates back to historians’ observations of the mid to late 19th century. He stresses the constancy of the representation of the North as “urban and industrial, grim and bleak, harsh and uncultured” over 150 years which is “remarkably similar to the pattern that was in place by about 1840”. 10. Many specialists have vainly tried to delimit the North. See Dave Russell, op.cit., p. xii, and Andrew Adonis and Stephen Pollard, op.cit., p. 183. 11. See Lindsay Anderson’s aforementioned quote and George Orwell, The Road to Wigan Pier, p. 98. 12. Benjamin Disraeli, Sybil or the Two Nations (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1954 [1845]), pp. 72-73. 13. This does not mean there are no strong northern women but films with a female lead role are quite rare (A Taste of Honey, Smashing Time, Letter to Brezhnev, Ladybird, Ladybird, Red Road, Wild Rose). 14. George Orwell, op.cit., p. 98. 15. One recent exception is God’s Own Country that introduces a rugged homosexual Yorkshire farmer. 16. Orwell explains: “The cult is often adopted by people who are not by birth Northerners themselves”. Ibid., p. 99. That may explain this mythical construction of the North on screen since most directors in the British New Wave were Southerners. 17. This symbol was used by Sun columnist Kelvin MacKenzie in 2008 following the release of a report by the Policy Exchange think-tank about the difficulties of Northern cities to regenerate. “ If it were up to me I’d get those Israeli builders to make a wall from The Wash to Bristol. They’d have it up in a jiffy”, he explained so that the South could be protected from a region seen as a subsidy junkie. Media Monkey, Kelvin risks northern boycott of Sun, 14 August 2008,
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University of Minnesota Press, 1993), pp.59-69, the North can be seen as a myth of the nation and even a mytheme on which cinema feeds. For detailed discussions about the role of cinema in shaping, sustaining or challenging cultural identity or national myths, see Andrew Higson, Waving the Flag: Constructing a National Cinema in Britain (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 4-9, 272-279; Andrew Higson, ‘The Instability of the National’ in Justine Ashby and Andrew Higson, (eds.), British Cinema: Past and Present (London, Routledge, 2000), pp. 35-47; Jean-Michel Frodon, La Projection nationale (Paris, Odile Jacob, 1998), pp. 19-20, 137-145; John Hill, ‘The Issue of National Cinema and British Film Production’ in Duncan Petrie (ed.), New Questions of British Cinema (London, British Film Institute, 1992), pp. 10-21, and Jim Leach, British Film (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 1-17. 20. Joanna Bourke, Working Class Cultures in Britain 1890-1960: Gender, Class and Ethnicity (London, Routledge, 1994), pp. 155-156, recalls the number of rebuilding campaigns between 1945 and 1964. Adonis and Pollard, A Class Act, op.cit., pp. 200-202, list the various promises made about slum clearance throughout the 20th century. However, there were still over 1.5 million insalubrious houses left in the mid-1990s. 21. In My Name is Joe, the used location was G12, which was initially meant to be the film title, a destitute area in Glasgow where life expectancy never exceeds 50 according to its lead actor Peter Mullan. Danel, Isabelle, ‘Mon nom est Peter !’, Télérama n° 2544 (1998), p. 32. 22. The phrase was coined by famous architectural historian and conservationist James Lees- Milne in his Diaries, 1942-1954 (London, John Murray, 2006), although he used it in a rather disparaging way, conservation not being synonymous with freezing time. The deliberate choice to shoot a film in black and white today can obviously be interpreted in several ways but it always makes a political or aesthetic point. The homage to earlier films or the distancing effect immediately gives a vintage or even historical aspect to the photography. Ken Loach who directed Looks and Smiles said he wanted something simple, more truthful, not pretty and strong but now thinks of it as too arty (McKnight, George (ed.), Agent of Challenge and Defiance, The Films of Ken Loach (Westport, Praeger, 1997), p.162) while critics praise it for its romanticising effect “ transforming bleak industrial backdrops into a hauntingly lyrical cityscape” (Davidson, Alex, Looks and Smiles, 2003-2014,
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agglomeration”. This town planning scheme had an impact on people’s minds: “They are all suburban, pseudo-cottagy, and not one of them knows how to be truly urban”. 26. Adonis and Pollard, A Class Act, pp. 188-189, beyond a Southernification of the North, mention the Americanisation of the UK that imitates its urban sprawl model. 27. For more details about how the evolution of housing has reflected and symbolised the working class hero’s embourgeoisement or proletarisation over sixty years, see Marin-Lamellet, Anne-Lise, op.cit., pp. 438, 480-505. 28. Adonis and Pollard, A Class Act, p. 183, concur about the stereotypical image of a purely working-class North. 29. See Morgan-James, Annie, ‘Myth and Reality: Filmic Images of Scotland’, Revue française de civilisation britannique XI-2 (2001), p. 30. 30. The commercial success of that film has generated a whole batch of more or less inspired imitations, a type of formulaic cinema based on a “new sophisticated urban aesthetic, the combination of a young cast, edgy subject-matter, vibrant colours, visual pyrotechnics and a pounding soundtrack”. For more details, see Petrie, Duncan, Screening Scotland, pp. 196-199. 31. The fact that Glasgow was chosen as a city double by several Hollywood majors in films such as Cloud Atlas (2012), World War Z (2013) and Fast & Furious 6 (2013) seems to corroborate its new status. Iannone, Pasquale, 10 Great Films Set in Glasgow, 17 February 2015,
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ABSTRACTS
The British North has featured regularly on screen since 1959. The representation of its industrial and urban features has given birth to a two-pronged mythical construction over sixty years: a geographical and a psychoanalytical/gendered one using the figure of the Northerner. Cinema is a myth and identity maker but it is also a medium which has reflected the socioeconomic evolutions of the North, first synonymous with relative prosperity and modernity until the 1980s, then decline and recession owing to deindustrialisation. Simultaneously, films try to deconstruct both the archetypal North – which ends up being geographically and socioeconomically more diverse than it first seems to be – and the figure of the Northerner – who takes his self-proclaimed image or the one that the South seeks to give him with a pinch of salt. The common identity of Northerners mostly channelled through their common aversion towards the South nonetheless leads them to reconstruct the myth of their native North.
Depuis 1959, le Nord apparaît de manière récurrente dans le cinéma britannique. À travers sa dimension industrielle et urbaine, il subit sur soixante ans une double édification mythologique d’ordre géographique et psychanalytique ou sexuel/genré en mettant en avant la figure du Northerner. Si le cinéma est un forgeur de mythe et d’identité, il ne méconnaît pas pour autant les évolutions socioéconomiques de cette région d’abord synonyme de relative prospérité et de modernité puis, à partir des années 1980, de déclin et de marasme en raison de la désindustrialisation. Parallèlement, le cinéma cherche aussi à démythifier ce Nord archétypal, finalement assez pluriel du point de vue démographique et économique, et cette figure du Northerner, peu dupe de l’image qu’il se donne ou que le Sud cherche à lui donner. Toutefois l’identité commune aux Northerners qui s’exprime par leur aversion pour le Sud conduit in fine à une forme de remythification de la région.
INDEX
Mots-clés: cinéma, classe ouvrière, Nord de l’Angleterre, homme du Nord, masculinité, mythe, désindustrialisation Keywords: cinema, working class, Northerner, masculinity, North of England, deindustrialisation
AUTHOR
ANNE-LISE MARIN-LAMELLET Université Jean Monnet, Saint-Étienne
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Reinventing and Promoting Northern Industrial Heritage: Regeneration in the Textile Sites of Ancoats and Saltaire Réinventer et promouvoir l’héritage industriel du Nord de l’Angleterre: La reconversion des sites de l’industrie textile d’Ancoats et de Saltaire
Aurore Caignet
Introduction
1 This article seeks to explore and compare the promotion of heritage and culture-led regeneration in the conservation areas of Ancoats and Saltaire, which lie outside the city centres of Manchester and Bradford respectively. Ancoats and Saltaire have an exceptional collection of buildings which are representative of the powerful and innovative textile industry of Manchester and Bradford: whilst the former was the world leader of the cotton industry – hence the nickname “Cottonopolis” – the latter was referred to as “Wool City”. 1 In July 1989, a 50-acre conservation area was designated in Ancoats, that is, almost two decades after Saltaire. 2A conservationareacan be defined as an area “ofspecial architecturalorhistoric interest, the characterorappearanceof which it isdesirabletopreserveorenhance”;3 any new development or the demolition of existing buildings must comply with heritage conservation regulations and get the consent of the local planning authorities. 4Despite this official – albeit late – recognition of the historic significance of Ancoats as the world’s first industrial suburb,5
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in the early 1990s, Ancoats was one of Manchester’s “undervalued peripheral areas ” where it was nonetheless possible to find “ cohesive sections of Manchester’s archaeological and architectural heritage”.6 Yet, some of the remaining industrial buildings were in a state of dereliction due to a lack of maintenance and acts of vandalism, whilst others had to be pulled down following arson attacks. 7The demolition of old industrial buildings was carried out “ in a piecemeal and unplanned fashion”,8 hence the loss of parts of Ancoats’ industrial landscape. In comparison, Saltaire’s industrial landscape has been well preserved despite deindustrialisation, 9 for it was built later than Ancoats and textile production only ceased in the mid-1980s, and also because it was recognised as heritage and protected accordingly before Salts Mill had to close its doors. We shall highlight the valuable role played by culture and heritage in the regeneration of the historic built environment, particularly that of industrial vestiges, and how both urban regeneration and industrial heritage are depicted in the local press, visitor guides, policy documents as well as official websites dedicated to tourism. Regeneration is understood as a process aiming at the positive transformation of a place that bears 2 the marks of decline, 10 such as a deindustrialised area which needs to be redeveloped; it often refers to urban revitalisation following a period of “de -generation”.11 It relies on different strategies that can be combined, including the restoration and reuse of historic buildings and the introduction of new ones, such as in Ancoats 12, in order to enhance an area. Our focus will be on industrial heritage in relation to the revitalisation of deindustrialised places as well as on the promotional strategies that are used to sell the conservation areas of Ancoats and Saltaire to visitors, future residents or investors. It will be essential to look at initiatives resorting to culture and heritage as tools for the reuse and renaissance of historic buildings in deindustrialised areas seeking to enhance their image. Cultural activity can be “ the catalyst and engine of regeneration”13 , such as when it generates interest in neglected historic buildings and participates in their reinvention by investing them with new meanings and giving them a new function in line with contemporary needs. Moreover, as a form of tangible culture, industrial buildings can be considered as cultural heritage: “ heritage is a part of culture […], but it also supports and transmits culture […]”.14 This article thus deals with a tangible heritage which is subjected to a conservation process – because it has been given value and constructed as heritage – and which can help maintain a sense of place in relation to the past in the present. 15
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I will examine the reinvention of Salts Mill in Saltaire, a model village within Bradford’s 3 metropolitan district, West Yorkshire. In 2001, Saltaire became a UNESCO World Heritage Site, which corresponds to an area of approximately 20 hectares covering the size of the land its founder Sir Titus Salt had initially purchased.16 Salt’s goal was to move his textile production to a rural setting on the outskirts of Bradford, where public buildings and workers' housing could be built next to integrated mills and form a homogeneous architectural whole 17 . Saltaire’s development started with the completion of Salts Mill in 1853 and the subsequent construction of New Mill, which were built on opposite sides of the Leeds and Liverpool canal 18.Salts Mill’s cultural reuse and the “heritagization”19 of Saltaire from the end of the 1980s onwards will be counterbalanced by the examination of more ambivalent attitudes towards heritage and its role in the regeneration of Ancoats. Whilst Saltaire is characterised by a formal gridiron layout and architectural uniformity, Ancoats developed in a more disorganised fashion around the mills; it is a palimpsest of architectural styles also reflecting evolutions in functions. Ancoats’ concentration of urban steam-driven mills constituted “ the first industrial landscape based on steam-power”.20Symbolising “theurbanisation of the factory system”,21the transformation of rural Ancoats into a“ space of industrial production created by and for industry”22 started towards the end of the 18th century with the construction of the Rochdale canal, textile mills, housing, churches, pubs, schools as well as premises for hat making and glassworks. 23After decades of deindustrialisation in the 20th century, Ancoats became largely forgotten . In 1993, industrial archaeologist Steve Little declared: “ Ancoats remains on the margins of Manchester’s consciousness. Indeed, even historians dealing with the city have generally neglected Ancoats ”.24It became an “urban renewal area” as part of Manchester City Council’s 1998 Unitary Development Plan for the City,25 a decision which might have been influenced by the setting up of Urban Regeneration Companies and Regional Development Agencies – such as the North West Development Agency – following the election of a Labour government in 1997. 26 This article will explore planning and promotional documents about Ancoats which oscillate between the acknowledgment of past glories and the will to move forward. If increasing interest has been directed towards the protection and reinvention of the listed historic buildings 27 of Ancoats, they are mainly promoted for the revitalising potentialities of adaptive reuse.
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After shedding light on the role of industrial heritage in the regeneration of Saltaire 4 and Ancoats, and on shifting perceptions towards the industrial past,this article will examine the image of two northern post-industrial cities, Manchester and Bradford, in relation to tourism, through their promotional discourse.
The role of industrial heritage in Saltaire’s culture-led reinvention
2015 was a crucial year for industrial heritage since as it was designated by the Council 5 of Europe as the “ European Industrial and Technical Heritage Year ”, thereby demonstrating a lasting interest towards industrial heritage. InOctober 2015, the first ever World Heritage UK Conference was held in Saltaire,28 which is often cited as an example of Victorian philanthropic paternalism29 and which might have influenced other industrial settlements . Yet, only thirty years ago, the future of Saltaire’s main mill was uncertain. According to a local journalist, Saltaire seemed to be a “ ghost village”30 in the early 1980s, when the demise of industry was becoming inevitable. The local community and authorities had to start thinking about an alternative economy. According to Kenneth Powell, a British architecture critic and a campaigner of SAVE Britain’s Heritage, 31Salts Mill was to be considered as “ the centerpiece – indeed the raison d’être – of Sir Titus Salt’s world famous model village”.32 Not only was it the defining feature of Saltaire’s identity, but it was also one of Bradford’s industrial – and architectural – gems (see ill.1).
6 In spite of its significance, there were no definite redevelopment plans33 when Salts Mill ceased its production in February 1986,34 after over 130 consecutive years of industrial activity. The general mood was tainted with pessimism. Experts in architectural heritage and conservationists made alarming comments, as a statement found in a report by SAVE Britain’s Heritage suggests: “ […] the future of Salts Mill looks bleak, and the prospect of its standing empty at the heart of the village is horrifying ”.35 There were already redundant mills all over the country which were becoming derelict and facing demolition: in 1983, West Yorkshire had over 10 million square feet of vacant industrial space. 36 Not every single industrial building could be saved, and those that remained standing would have to be given a new relevant purpose in order to survive.
7 Illustration 1:Salts Mill, Saltaire
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8 Source: Aurore Caignet, 10 November 2015. Two months after closing its doors, the future of Salts Mill was discussed amongst experts in the field of industrial heritage and conservation who stressed its exceptional 9 architectural and historical significance. 37There were talks of turning the mill into a museum,38 as it was hoped a cultural conversion might catalyse the revitalisation of Saltaire. The potential transfer of the National Indian Collection of ethnic art from the Victoria & Albert Museum to Salts Mill 39 was one of several projects discussed to give it a viable role that would also induce a heritage-led conversion. As Powell argued, “ […] new museums are symbols of regional and national pride and often provide a focus for the revival of whole areas ”.40 However, the re-use of the mill as a museum – whether it was to be dedicated to industry in general or to textile in particular – would have been another example of what Kevin Walsh calls “ the heritagization of space”,41 that is, the instrumental use of heritage as a resource and a commodity, which can lead to the dilution of the heritage product. Plans to convert Salts Mill into a museum were eventually abandoned: it proved to be a safe move, especially when considering the number of museums across England which were already wholly or partly dedicated to industry. 42
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If Saltaire is the result of an industrialist’s comprehensive vision, the rebirth of Salts Mill in 1987 is attributable to another visionary called Jonathan Silver. The local entrepreneur who bought the mill embarked on a journey of cultural and heritage-led regeneration, which helped kick-start the revival of the Saltaire conservation area, which was designated in 1971. For example, New Mill, which was built between the River Aire and the canal, just opposite Salts Mill, was given a new lease of life in 1992: offices were created for Bradford’s Health Authority whilst other parts of the building 10 were converted into luxury apartments. 43This regeneration came about after a period of neglect, when New Mill was a “ derelict shell”44 and shops and food outlets on Victoria Road – Saltaire’s commercial artery – were closing down. And since the reopening of Salts Mill, as well as the World Heritage Site designation in 2001, virtually all the buildings within the conservation area – such as the mills, shops, workers’ homes, and hospital – have been in use. Instead of dwelling on Salts Mill’s past, Silver chose to renew its purpose by inserting contemporary art into this former space of industrial production, which became a place of cultural consumption. The mill would thus have the potential to attract a larger audience than if it had been converted into an industrial museum. However, the original layout of the mill was preserved as much as possible as its vast open space was particularly suited to the opening of an art gallery, which has been exhibiting the works of Bradford-born artist David Hockney since 1987. His reputation has helped the 11 mill gain visibility: an article from The Guardianeven went as far as to call it a “cultural emporium”.45 Yet, Silver did not take a leap of faith as such, as he had already taken part, alongside with Sir Ernest Hall, in the conservation and adaptive re-use of Dean Clough Mills in Halifax, West Yorkshire. In an English Heritage Conservation Bulletin, both conversions were praised for being “[…] among the first sets of buildings to demonstrate how the determination of visionary individuals could transform negative perceptions of the industrial past ”.46 This is not to say that industrial heritage is systematically perceived in a more positive way once it changes function, or that once an industrial building is re-used, its industrial past can still be read by new users and its industrial character be universally appreciated. Casella and Symonds contend that there still exists “ a prevalent perception that industrial heritage is backward looking, whilst regeneration is forward looking ”.47 Yet, in the case of Salts Mill, despite its stately appearance, one can hardly fail to identify it as a former textile factory, and anyone visiting the mill and Saltaire is bound to realise that industrial heritage and regeneration are not incompatible, even if conflicts may occur. The artworks adorning the walls of the building also play a part in altering the public perception of this industrial space, the latter being seen in a new light (see ill.2). In the 1990s, Salts Mill would benefit from multiple positive reassessments thanks to its 12 successful cultural reinvention. An article published in the Telegraph and Argus
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, a local newspaper, offers a retrospective vision of the mill and its environment as it was in the 1980s, describing them as “ an uninhabited shell at the foot of a quaint but slightly shabby village”48 before shedding light on its art-led renaissance, which is evocatively suggested in the title: “ How the arts can give city a kick up the pants ”. It is as if a clear-cut dichotomy between past and present was created – and exaggerated, perhaps – by giving a depressing picture of Saltaire to Salts Mill’s cultural makeover, so as to accentuate the idea of a renaissance. This article gives the impression that the successful cultural reuse of this centerpiece of industrial heritage played a role in the resurrection both of the building and of the whole area. However, Salts Mill is more likely to be associated with its current function rather than with its industrial past since the new artistic content of the building is foregrounded at the expense of its historical and architectural value.
13 Illustration 2:The 1853 Gallery, Salts Mill, Saltaire
14 Source: Aurore Caignet, 10 November 2015. One may wonder whether Saltaire is more famous now for its industrial past or for its connection with Hockney, as corroborated by the European Route of Industrial 15 Heritage’s website. It provides an ambivalent description of Saltaire beginning with “ David Hockney painted Salts Mill in warm ochre tones. Today both the painter and the place are world-famous ”,49 which implies that Saltaire owes its status to Hockney’s representation, without which it might not have become renowned. It ends with the following statements: “ The largest attraction is an exhibition of the work of David Hockney. In 2001 Saltaire Village was inscribed into the United Nations list of World Cultural Heritage sites.
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”50 In addition to the fact that the juxtaposition is odd, it is also misleading: it seems to suggest that the UNESCO label was attributed as a result of the permanent art exhibition held at Salts Mill. If this inscription was an acknowledgment of the successful revitalisation of Saltaire and its mill and if it aimed at promoting the outstanding conservation of industrial heritage, the latter is nonetheless overshadowed by a cultural conversion mostly dedicated to art.
16 Salts Mill’s cultural rebirth corroborates the idea that “ industrial production sites in the western world have acquired a new aura as they have been incorporated into art and popular culture ”.51 Not only is it used by the city of Bradford as a promotional tool to highlight a city-wide regeneration, 52but Jonathan Silver’s “philosophy of regeneration through the arts”53 also appears to have been instrumental in the increasingly positive perception of the mill by residents, visitors and investors. Indeed, an article from Telegraph Weekend Magazineabout Silver and the mill used the pun “mills and boom”54 for its title, signalling a departure from the traditional association between mills and decline. Far from putting Salts Mill on a par with “ satanic mills”55 , an article published in a local magazine in 2008 compares it to the pyramids of Egypt.56 This slightly hyperbolical statement hints at the fact that the regeneration of the mill has generated civic pride, mainly as a result of its heritagisation. In many ways, Hockney’s playful painting of Saltaire, which was painted in 1997 as a 17 tribute to Salts Mill’s late owner Jonathan Silver, 57 confirmed a radical departure from previous negative depictions of industrial landscapes and industrial scenes in general. His highly colourful representation of Saltaire’s industrial landscape breaks away from derogatory clichés about grim and derelict Northern industrial cities. These had been circulating with the start of the de- industrialisation process in the post-war years and in response to its calamitous effects in the last decades of the twentieth century. In the late 1990s – ten years after its rebirth – Salts Mill and its model village were already starting to illustrate the benefits of regenerating industrial heritage by using culture as a tool to transform, without reinventing ex nihilo , the image of a post-industrial area. Yet, if the regeneration process in Saltaire was respectful of the historic environment and sought to shed light on industrial heritage, the emphasis on Salts Mill’s cultural reuse and its contribution towards the shaping of a positive image prevails over the cultural heritage of the industrial past and its numerous physical inscriptions in Saltaire.
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Revaluing and reusing industrial buildings: the regeneration of Ancoats, Manchester
The ongoing regeneration of the conservation area of Ancoats has been slow and 18 limited to a number of listed buildings. Whilst the Daily Express Building 58 – a 1930s art deco building housing print works and offices – was listed by English Heritage in 1974, 59 the pioneering cotton spinning mills of Ancoats were only considered for listing two decades later. It was property speculation rather than their historic value which would later attract attention. Manchester’s bid for the 2000 Olympics resulted in speculators buying some of the mills, which were left empty and started to quickly deteriorate once the bid failed. 60Although in 1999 Ancoats was described in a Mancunian newspaper as “ a little time-warp waiting to be discovered”,61 four years later, another article referred to its cotton mills as empty “brick carcasses”62 waiting to be brought back to life.W hen conservations measures were implemented and regeneration schemes started to materialise, the poor appearance of Ancoats, with derelict buildings seen as eyesores, kept putting people off from living, working and investing in the area.
19 Therefore, regeneration was impeded by the area’s uninviting appearance and, most importantly, by the fact that there were multiple private owners until the acquisition by the North West Development Agency (NWDA) of some of the land and buildings thanks to a Compulsory Purchase Order undertaken in September 2002. 63 Urban regeneration agencies set up to plan the revival of Ancoats from the 1990s onwards continued to collaborate with preservation bodies concerned with conservation issues in relation to the preservation of Ancoats’ urban industrial character. Industrial archaeologists were involved in conservation-led regeneration strategies, in Heritage Lottery bids, and in safeguarding what remained of the industrial heritage of Ancoats for posterity (ill.3). Unforeseen circumstances in connection with the 2008 economic crisis slowed down the regeneration process as the residential conversion of Grade II* listed Murrays’ Mills following their restoration had to be put on hold for several years. 64 However, the election of the Coalition government in 2010 coincided with the expiration of area-based regeneration programmes, 65 which had an impact on the level of funding dedicated to the restoration and redevelopment of historic buildings in Ancoats.
20 Illustration 3: Textile mills in Ancoats
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21 Source: Aurore Caignet, 25 October 2015. It does not mean that the regeneration process suddenly came to a halt, as the 22 inclusion of Ancoats 66 on the UK tentative list for World Heritage status in 1999 had previously highlighted its universal significance as the first industrial suburb. 67 It had thus contributed to putting Ancoats back on the heritage map and to attracting renewed interest. Interestingly, the bid was subsequently withdrawn, a move which could have been linked to suspicions towards regulations imposed by UNESCO in regards to future developments. 68According to Lyn Fenton, former head of the Ancoats Urban Village Company69 (AUVC was responsible for the regeneration of Ancoats), it could have impeded the regeneration of the conservation area and the wider historic area. 70 For example, the New Islington development facing the group of preserved mills would have been much more scrutinised. However, fewer restrictions can also lead to a greater focus on new architectural inscriptions rather than on the historic environment, regardless of the detrimental effects they may have on the conservation of an industrial character and on the development of heritage tourism within the conservation area.
23 A forward-looking stance stems from the NWDA’s 2008Annual Review of Ancoats, which provides an overview of the degree of regeneration achieved. This document puts to the fore the transformation of “ Manchester’s proud industrial heritage into a vibrant commercial future”,71a perfect “ business location” with “
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stylish premises that combine rich historic character with a contemporary feel and modern, urban vitality ”.72 Former industrial buildings were therefore revalued for their re-use potential allowing them to become desirable office and residential spaces characterised by an “authentic” historic aura. In this respect, Rosemary Mellor argues that “ […] the accreditation of the artifacts of the city’s past with value was a total reversal of the previous policy of demolishing ‘Cottonopolis’. ”73 Whilst being, in some ways, respectful of the industrial past, the regeneration of Ancoats is future-oriented, and its main concern lies in making the district an extension to Manchester city centre and especially the culturally vibrant Northern Quarter. The planning guidance published in 1999 made clear that Ancoats should move forward and “ become more than a monument to its past”,74 without altogether shunning its industrial heritage, even though the role of industrial heritage in urban renewal has been limited to the reuse of a handful of significant historic buildings as a means of highlighting the area’s idiosyncratic identity. Nevertheless, the restoration and reuse of industrial vestiges such as Murrays’ Mills and the Ice Plant Building 75 – formerly used as an ice-storage warehouse – showed how conservation-led regeneration could be achieved so that heritage assets get to make a positive and substantial contribution towards the reinvention of a historic district, even if the final outcome consists of securing future local investments and attracting residents and businesses rather than giving visibility to industrial heritage per se. The fact that regeneration initiatives incorporate industrial heritage by rejuvenating and converting industrial vestiges indicates an increasing recognition of the value of this heritage – be it historical, cultural, architectural – and demonstrates the sense of place these buildings can help to convey. Although the demolition of industrial vestiges still occurs, the potentialities of industrial heritage tend to be taken into account when regenerating post-industrial areas. The NWDA considers historic buildings, including 24 industrial ones, as “ assets that, in addition to their intrinsic merit can, in the majority of cases, contribute to the vitality and economic life of the surrounding area ”76 once they are put to new uses. If conservation-led regeneration schemes are encouraged for what can be gained from them economically speaking, such discourse also highlights a fundamental change in the way the industrial built environment is perceived. The fourth Annual Review about the progress of regeneration in Ancoats claims that it celebrates its industrial heritage. 77
25 Illustration 4: Public Art in Cutting Room Square, Ancoats
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26 Source:Aurore Caignet, 26 September 2016. If the promotion of heritage in Ancoats is often linked to residential and commercial conversions, efforts have been made to incorporate culture into several revitalising 27 projects. For example, a “ cultural masterplanner ” was appointed to remake the public realm by providing urban art that combines old and new and reminds one of Manchester’s spirit of innovation. 78 Artist Dan Dubowitz created spy-holes inserted in exterior walls of several buildings all around Ancoats, in order to reveal historic walled-up objects, whilst five contemporary commemorative sculptures were set up on the main public square, displaying evocative photographs of the once derelict area. 79(ill.4)Moreover, cultural and creative industries80 have progressively relocated to some of the mills. The conversion of Beehive Mill was seen in the mid-1990s as the first step towards the renaissance of Ancoats. The cultural reuse of this Grade II* listed cotton mill built in 1824 took place in 1996, 81 resulting in the creation of workspace accommodation, music rehearsal studios, as well as a renowned nightclub based on the ground floor. 82
28 According to an article published inMCR Magazinein 2010, “ [a]s Manchester became invigorated by other pursuits, namely music and pop culture, [...] its post-industrial landscape offered a breeding ground for artists looking for escapism. The Beehive Mill is no exception in this story ”.83
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As mills are given a new purpose and as their value is reassessed, their industrial and “edgy” character makes them ideal spaces for the expression and celebration of a fertile Northern culture. Recycling industrial buildings through culture also participates in the reshaping of the image of the industrial fabric as much as it is likely to modify new users’ perceptions towards the presence of former factories and warehouses in the cityscape. Even though negative stereotypes about Ancoats still need to be tackled, the industrial built environment is regarded more as an asset than as a liability, as “ an opportunity, not simply a disaster.”84 Reshaping the image of northern post-industrial cities: promoting the city as a 29 tourist destination If heritage and culture-led regeneration can help post-industrial cities attract new residents and businesses by transforming deindustrialised areas and encouraging the reclaiming of former industrial spaces by the creative industries for instance, they can also rely on these processes to enhance their image and develop tourism. Yet, 30 industrial heritage is not systematically included in the city’s image, nor does it necessarily play a significant role in tourism promotion. In this regard, industrial heritage is less prominent in Manchester’s image and tourism promotion than in Bradford’s.
31 The goal of AUVC was to turn Ancoats into an urban village “ that would attract and welcome visitors as opposed to a tourist attraction”.85 Back in the early 1990s, Manchester’s Conservation Areas and Historic Buildings Panel was against the “ museumification”86of the historic fabric as it believed that Ancoats “could be promoted as a development area on the back of its wealth of assets”.87 The regeneration of Ancoats relied on the residential and commercial re-use of industrial buildings – whilst culture-led conversions remained an exception – rather than on a tourist-oriented redevelopment. Moreover, the slogan for Ancoats Urban Village was “ live, work and play”88or “live, work and visit”,89 which suggests an order of priority implying that it was not to be promoted primarily as a destination for industrial heritage tourism. Indeed, Ancoats remains mostly absent from the tourist map: it is excluded from maps inserted in many visitor guides published between 2000 and 2010, even though, interestingly, it is mentioned in the latest official leaflet advertising guided walks in Manchester. (ill.5)
32 Illustration 5: “Live, Work, Visit”, Jersey Street, Ancoats
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33 Source:Aurore Caignet, 25 October 2015.
34 As suggested by industrial archaeologists Casella and Symonds, “ [...] Manchester is being transformed by regeneration, shaking off many of the negative connotations associated with factory-based industrial production, and remaking itself as a 21 stcentury city [...]”.90The promotion of a new cosmopolitan and vibrant city image is alluded to on the website for Visit Manchester, the tourist board for Greater Manchester. 91Its main objective is “ to attract visitors to the destination through the effective promotion of Greater Manchester as both a leisure and business destination ”.92Although Ancoats featured as the first industrial heritage attraction in January 2016 93on the page dedicated to “the best of Visit Manchester’s top 5 guides ”, industrial heritage attractions only come 13 out of a list of 15 guides, far behind guides advertising restaurants, pubs, music venues, nightclubs, and so on. 94 According to the “what to do” page, favourite activities include: drinking, eating, shopping, theatre-going and museum visiting. 95 The promotion of tourism in Manchester capitalizes less on industrial heritage than on entertainment, nightlife, sporting events, shopping or the arts. However, efforts were made in the past in order to promote the industrial heritage of 35 the Northwest in general, thanks to marketing campaigns – “ Industrial Powerhouse” was created in 2004, followed by “Modern History ” in 2010 – which led to print advertisement inMCR Magazine . In 2008, one advertisement displayed the catchphrase “ over 230 years of industrial history on your doorstep: discover Manchester, the revolutionary heart of England’s northwest
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”96 alongside with an image of a man dressed in attire hinting at the past and the present. This advert thus seems to focus on people rather than on the historic environment 97 and promotes a dynamic and personal experience of history, yet it is not visually compelling and fails to highlight what there is to do and see in the city which pertains to its industrial past. Similarly, none of the city’s industrial vestiges were visually represented in the double pages promoting industrial heritage in the same magazine: the illustrations do not represent Manchester per se, but industrial vestiges found in the region.98 The same could be said about another “Industrial Powerhouse” advert found in MCR Magazinein 2010:99if this “collage-style advertisement”100 offers a visual summary of industrial heritage in the North West of England, Liverpool’s architectural fabric is given centre stage. The incorporation of two factory chimneys and a mill might hint at Manchester’s textile heritage, but their anonymity allows them to stand for any of the region’s former industrial towns. In contrast to Manchester, Bradford decided to build upon its most remarkable industrial vestiges – including Saltaire – as early as 1980, hoping it would succeed in enhancing its image and in attracting visitors. Indeed, it was arguably the first post- 36 industrial city in Britain to use industrial heritage for tourism purposes. 101 The marketing section of Bradford’s Economic Development Unit would regularly advertise industrial heritage weekend breaks 102 featuring industrial sites, including Saltaire and Salts Mill. Maria Glot, Bradford’s first appointed Tourism Officer, admitted that the task was a difficult one: “ We said Bradford was on the holiday market and everybody was laughing, because Bradford was seen as a backwards northern industrial town where even the pigeons fly backwards to keep the soot out of their eyes .”103 Against all odds, industrial heritage sites like Saltaire are still used to sell Bradford as a tourist destination, and they get to play a positive role in the redefinition of Bradford’s image. Far from turning its back on its industrial legacy, Bradford has embraced it: the year Saltaire became a World Heritage Site, Bradford’s conference guide gave prominence to 37 representations of Salts Mill on the cover and inside the brochure. 104 In 2016, depictions of Saltaire’s industrial buildings also appeared on the cover of Bradford and District Visitor Guide and in four inside pages. 105 Despite the persistence of negative perceptions of Bradford in relation to the demise of the textile industry, the city has been partly relying on industrial heritage sites to try and distinguish itself from other urban tourist destinations. Whilst Saltaire has become one of Bradford’s main attractions – due to its UNESCO affiliation – the development of tourism in the former industrial village seems to have been instrumental in its long- term regeneration.
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Conclusion
38 If Bradford seems to capitalise on its industrial heritage – and therefore on Saltaire – in order to sell itself as a tourist destination, the development of heritage tourism is far from being a priority in Manchester. Ancoats remains largely off the beaten track despite efforts to make it more attractive , and the revitalisation of its industrial vestiges mainly revolves around their residential, commercial and, to a lesser extent, cultural reuse. However, given its proximity to the city centre, Ancoats could be on the verge of becoming Manchester’s new Northern Quarter, as it is being turned into an “edgy” urban district prone to attract a creative population looking to live, work and play in spaces with an industrial character. In this respect, Bradford and Manchester have come to recognise the instrumental role that the reinvention and promotion of historically significant industrial vestiges can play in kick-starting the regeneration and the re-imaging of a deindustrialised area. This, in turn, helps attract positive attention by shifting perceptions, especially when this regeneration incorporates a certain level of cultural activity and provides access to art, the latter being suited to the enhancement of an area and the celebration of its idiosyncratic identity, such as the Peeps in Ancoats. Whether one considers Saltaire’s lasting rebirth – which results primarily from Salts Mill’s cultural conversion, followed by its becoming a World Heritage Site – or the regeneration of Ancoats – which seeks to celebrate industrial heritage without preserving it in aspic – the conservation of industrial heritage is compatible with the permanence or the re-creation of a living community. Once given a new purpose, this 39 form of tangible “lived heritage”, 106 experienced on a daily basis instead of being simply visited, can serve to promote an image of northern industrial heritage as having its rightful place in 21 stcentury post-industrial cities, as opposed to being considered as a relic of the past.
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NOTES
1. Michael Hickling, “The Rise and Fall of Wool City”, Yorkshire Post, 21 November 2007,
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8. “[…] this process of demolition, if continued in a piecemeal and unplanned fashion, will mean that the remaining fabric of this historic area must reach a point of no return”, Steve Little, “Ancoats: Protecting the Unprotectable?”, Manchester Region History Review, vol. 7 (1993), p. 103. 9. Despite the loss of 1% of the original buildings and the insertion of modern windows and doors on some houses, major buildings and groups of houses remain unaltered and were thus listed as buildings of special architectural or historic interest in 1985; Saltaire, UNESCO World Heritage Centre Nomination Documentation, 2001,
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31. This organisation has been campaigning for the protection of the historic environment since its creation in 1975, John Pendlebury, “Conservation of the historic environment”, p. 326. 32. Kenneth Powell, “Mill into Museum”, The Daily Telegraph, July 1987. 33. Kathy Myers, “End of a 133 Year Era at Salts Mill”, Telegraph and Argus, 10 August 1986. 34. Bradford Historical and Antiquarian Society, “Crisis at Saltaire”, 1987, [accessed 5 May 2019].
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60. Lyn Fenton, interview by the author, 3 October 2016, Manchester. 61. Deborah Haile, “Ancoats Hailed as ‘New Castlefield’”, Manchester Evening News, 28 October 1999. 62. Jane Lavender, “More than Cotton Mills and Canals”, Metro magazine, 15 August 2003. 63. Ancoats Urban Village, Annual Report, North West Development Agency, 2007. 64. Heritage Lottery Fund, “HLF Major Grants – The first 100”, June 2015, < https:// www.heritagefund.org.uk/sites/default/files/media/research/hlf_major_grants_- _the_first_100.pdf >, [accessed 23 March 2019]. 65. Andrew Tallon, Urban Regeneration in the UK (Abingdon, Routledge, [2010], 2013), p. 5. 66. The succession of mills by the Rochdale canal was included in the bid, Robina McNeil, David George (eds.), Manchester – Archetype City of the Industrial Revolution: A Proposed World Heritage Site (Manchester, University of Manchester Field Archaeology Centre, 2002), p. 13. 67. Michael E. Rose et al., op. cit., p. 82. 68. Liverpool City Council and UNESCO clashed over the Liverpool Waters regeneration scheme as it could affect the character of the historic waterfront which received World Heritage status in 2004, Denis Rodwell, “Heritage and development – Bridging the gap?”, in Heike Oeverman and Harald A. Mieg (eds.), Industrial Heritage Sites in Transformation: Clash of Discourses (New York, Routledge, 2015), p. 29. 69. It was set up in 1996, Ancoats Annual Review, North West Development Agency, 2008-2009, p. 4. 70. Lyn Fenton, interview by the author, 3 October 2016, Manchester. 71. Ancoats Annual Review, North West Development Agency, 2008-2009. 72. Ibid., p.5. 73. Rosemary Mellor, “Cool times for a changing city”, in Nick Jewson and Susanne Macgregor (eds.), Transforming Cities: Contested Governance and New Spatial Divisions (London, Routledge, 1997), p. 57. 74. Supplementary Planning Guidance – Ancoats Urban Village, foreword. 75. Ancoats Urban Village Heritage Lottery funding bid. 76. Regeneration Prospectus: To Further Economic Development and Regeneration, North West Development Agency, March 2002, p. 29. 77. Ancoats Annual Review, North West Development Agency, 2009-2010. 78. Ancoats Peeps,
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86. Octave Debary, “Deindustrialisation and museumification: from exhibited memory to forgotten history”, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science vol. 595 (2004), p. 122. 87. Annual Report 1993, p. 4. 88. Ancoats – An Archaeological Perspective, Oxford Archaeology North, Ancoats Buildings Preservation Trust, Manchester Central Library: Special Collections, GB127.MISC/1281/2/2/5 89. Supplementary Planning Guidance – Ancoats Urban Village, p. 6. 90. Casella, Industrial Archaeology: Future Directions, p. xi. 91. Visit Manchester is a division of Marketing Manchester, an agency which promotes the city both nationally and internationally. 92. Visit Manchester Brief: Public Relations for Modern History, Visit Manchester, September 2010, p. 4,
ABSTRACTS
T he promotion of heritage and culture-led regeneration in Ancoats and Saltaire, two formerly industrial districts of Manchester and Bradford, are comparatively examined in this article.
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It seeks to analyse the role of industrial heritage amidst initiatives aiming at the regeneration and reuse of the historic built environment, in a context suggesting a positive reassessment of industrial vestiges in the North of England. If both northern post-industrial cities are determined to improve their image and to promote themselves as tourist destinations, they strongly differ with regard to the use of industrial heritage as a promotional tool, thereby implying a swaying between the acknowledgment of the industrial past and the will to move forward.
Cet article propose une étude comparative de la promotion de la régénération par le patrimoine et la culture à Ancoats et Saltaire, deux zones anciennement industrielles de Manchester et de Bradford. Il s’agit d’analyser le rôle du patrimoine industriel en relation avec des initiatives qui visent la régénération et le réemploi du bâti historique, dans un contexte suggérant une réévaluation positive des vestiges industriels dans le Nord de l’Angleterre. Si ces villes post- industrielles sont toutes deux déterminées à améliorer leur image et à s’auto-promouvoir en tant que destinations touristiques, elles diffèrent considérablement en ce qui concerne l’utilisation du patrimoine industriel comme outil promotionnel, laissant ainsi deviner une oscillation entre la reconnaissance du passé industriel et la volonté d’aller de l’avant.
INDEX
Mots-clés: Nord de l’Angleterre, patrimoine, industriel, régénération, promotion Keywords: Northern England, industrial, heritage, regeneration, promotion
AUTHOR
AURORE CAIGNET ACE, EA 1796, Université Rennes 2
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Divided by Values: Jeremy Corbyn, the Labour Party and England’s ‘North-South Divide’ La Division par les valeurs: Jeremy Corbyn, le Parti travailliste et le fossé Nord- Sud
Matt Beech and Kevin Hickson
Introduction
Brexit has bifurcated English culture and identity. Two nations exist. One more cosmopolitan, the other more conservative. Whilst it is not true that all cosmopolitans live in the South nor that all conservatives dwell in the North, the terms ‘North’ and 1 ‘South’ can be used as metaphors for these conflicting cultures. The idea of the North-South divide is established in the English mind. It is better understood in sociocultural terms rather than as a rigid geographical entity. The historian, Helen M. Jewell, argues in her study The North-south Divide: The Origins of Northern Consciousness inEnglandthat: The divide is well rooted in history, it has in certain times and circumstances undoubted reality, and it should be relished as an aspect of that individualism and eccentricity which the English used to be proud to stand up for in themselves and to tolerate in others, and which they stand at risk of losing if they choose to conform to standardisations and stereotyping imposed to suit bureaucracy .1
2 But the first problem in theNorth-South divide is where to draw the line. One generally accepted demarcation runs from the Bristol Channel to the Wash. Adapting this model, Danny Dorling and colleagues at the Social and Spatial Inequalities Group at the University of Sheffield considered social and educational data and drew their dividing line from the Bristol Channel to south of the River Humber in Lincolnshire. 2
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Another line runs from the Bristol Channel to the mouth of the River Trent as it flows into the Humber Estuary. These projections of the North-South divide exhibit an interesting cartography. Here the Marches, the West Midlands and part of the East Midlands (usually Nottingham) are Northern. The remainder of the East Midlands (usually Leicester) and East Anglia are southern. For any English native, in cultural as well as geographical terms, this is an unusual discrimination.
3 Leaving lines of demarcation aside, the traditional understanding of aNorth-South divide contained elements of truth amid a raft of inaccuracies. The harshness of life and work, since the industrial revolution, in towns and cities of the North is one such correct point. But fallacious ones coexist, perhaps chief of which was the blindness to the Northern English countryside replete with stunning natural beauty of dale, moor, fell, wold, vale and coastline. Of great houses, aristocratic estates and countless family farms and fishing vessels. It was, and is not, all ‘grim up North’. Secondly, in political studies, the North-South divide came to be understood as a Labour-dominated North and a Conservative South. This delineation counted the political communities either side of the divide. Due to history and social class, these urban centres, and ‘the North’ itself, had been seen as Labour England. One could make an argument that this view remains broadly sound. However, the following coda needs to be applied; the Conservative Party has long had a strong presence in the rural North. For example, in the East Riding of Yorkshire the three parliamentary constituencies of Kingston-Upon-Hull are resolutely Labour whilst the remaining constituencies in the county, Beverley and Holderness, Haltemprice and Howden, and East Yorkshire are true blue seats. 3 Thirdly is the conceptual cultural error, which occludes Northern contributions to English literature. The North of England birthed great poets (Andrew Marvell, William Wordsworth, Lewis Carroll, W.H. Auden, Ted Hughes and shaped Philip Larkin), novelists and playwrights (Emily Bronte, J.B. Priestley, John Braine and Alan Bennett). Our approach is to use the Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn as a barometer of values. Labour traditionally has had heartlands in the North of England, parts of the Midlands and in London. However, as we go on to discuss, recent elections have shown Labour losing support in some of its traditional areas and gaining support where it was previously limited. The article uses a range of data including by-election, local and general election results and statistics from the 2016 referendum on the United Kingdom’s continued membership of the European Union. What this article does not 4 address is the North-South divide in Great Britain. Therefore Scotland and Wales are excluded. We acknowledge that our findings are tentative as a more definitive examination of the North-South divide in England would require a large quantitative and qualitative study. Nonetheless, a case study of the Labour Party under Corbyn across England is valuable as it reveals the changing sociocultural differences of the largest nation of the United Kingdom.
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England – A Nation Divided by Values
England is a nation that has experienced, and continues to experience, sharp divisions between citizens. Historically the divisions have been those of class. Speaking of class 5 in the aftermath of the Great War, Alan J.P. Taylor asserts: Since creeds had ceased to divide, class stood out the more sharply. England had always been class conscious, perhaps more than most European communities. English was the only language where accent was determined more by class than by region. 4
Nearly a century on class still matters, but there is a large academic literature on how, since the early 1970s, British politics has undergone a process of partisan class 6 dealignment. David Denver makes this point: Large sections of the electorate could stop identifying with one party and start to identify with another; some social group as a whole might switch its party allegiance…What largely explains the electoral turmoil of recent years, however, is a sort of half-way house between alignment and realignment, namely dealignment. This refers to a weakening of previously existing alignments. 5
In contemporary British politics, and particularly in England, it is sociocultural values that increasingly determine political dividing lines. By sociocultural values we mean ethics, behaviour and customs. In one sense, given globalisation, religious pluralism and mass immigration sociocultural divisions are to be expected in a large, heterogeneous, capitalist society. Why the case of England is interesting lies with the nature of the sociocultural divide and the pace of change since the 1960s and 1970s. The ideas and values of a variety of pressure groups, interest groups and influential individuals have played significant parts in affecting and reforming English culture. Nonetheless, it is the Labour Party that has been the primary agent of sociocultural change. This is because when in government, and occasionally in Opposition, it has utilised its position as the preeminent progressive party of Britain to form legislation and whip its MPs to ensure the passage of bills through both Houses of Parliament. Successful bills become Acts of Parliament from which statute law contributes to 7 shaping English culture. This is the reason for the article’s focus on the Labour Party. Furthermore, to 8 understand contemporary England’s North-South divide, a sensible place to begin is the Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn. In the aftermath of the Great War, Christian observance waned and certainly by the beginnings of the post-war era, one could speak of Britain (not the United Kingdom given the case of Northern Ireland) as a secular country. In place of the foundationalism of Christianity – to inform Labour’s culture and social ethics – first 9 liberalism and later Cultural Marxism 6 expanded to fill the vacuum. The Labour Party, and its socially progressive MPs, challenged the prevailing sociocultural orthodoxy. For the first sixty years of its life, the Labour Party was a culturally conservative organisation. The emergence of the widely discussed concept of the Permissive Society corresponded with Roy Jenkins’ tenure as Home Secretary (1965-1967). Jenkins entitles this chapter of his memoirs, ‘The Liberal Hour’.
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7 This period of the Labour government is perhaps the chief example of the step-change from conservatism to liberalism. This step-change was transformative for the Labour Party and for British society. Jenkins was not its inspiration nor its sole actor, but he was unquestionably an essential player, as the holder of one of the four great offices of State. Jenkins’ power was to permit parliamentary time and give encouragement to socially progressive Members of Parliament such as Sydney Silverman, Leo Abse and David Steel to introduce Private Members’ Bills. Liberal reforms which gave the individual greater rights vis-à-vis the abolition of the death penalty, homosexual relations between men, and abortion can in hindsight be seen as a period of cultural transition from a loosely Christian ethic to a liberal then a Cultural Marxist worldview. Liberalism was the steppingstone from the modern to post-modern era where absolute truth is an oxymoron; where one is ‘liberated’ from the ‘oppression’ of traditional culture; and where society is shaped by equality understood as sameness of thought. If this seems a little far-fetched one needs only survey the worldview of the 1945 Labour government which to this day is ‘high and lifted up’ by most Labour members. Whilst Clement Attlee’s cabinet was largely irreligious, its social ethics and culture were essentially Christian. This is evidenced by its attitude towards marriage, family, sex, abortion, crime and punishment and patriotism. By the 1970s, the level of authentic Christianity and Christian socialism within the Labour Party was negligible. The modern had given way to the post-modern era. Post-modern intellectuals, largely French in origin, were captivating much of the Left especially in the universities. When Labour was finally returned to power, its agenda focused less on the fundamental questions of British macroeconomics and more on sociocultural issues. Here the primacy of the politics of identity emerged. Cultural Marxism had left its imprimatur on the Labour Party. The most significant political rupture in a generation, grounded as much in a divide over sociocultural values as it was about anything else, was the Brexit vote. As Clarke, 10 Goodwin and Whiteley argue: …despite being confronted with an avalanche of advice from national and international figures to vote to remain, and apocalyptic warnings about the consequences that would follow Brexit, a majority voted to leave the EU. 8
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The referendum on the United Kingdom’s continued membership of the European 11 Union on 23 rd June 2016 exposed England as a nation divided on questions of sociocultural values. Of the 31.5 million or, put another way, the 72.2% of eligible voters, those who were richer and better educated generally voted Remain. Citizens who were more socially progressive and who live in metropolitan areas were overwhelmingly supportive of the United Kingdom’s continued membership of the European Union. Less wealthy and more modestly educated citizens, those living in provincial England and who hold more traditional values, were natural Leave voters. Those citizens deeply wedded to nation (the idea of England) and to nation-state (the United Kingdom), be they from a Conservative or Labourist tradition, tend to dislike the project of European federalism. Labour’s former industrial heartlands in the North of England marched to a similar tune as much of the Conservative lowlands of the South of England. Whilst progressives of all parties (Labour, Liberal Democrats, Greens and Conservative) see a virtuous partnership between the European Union with its internationalism and rights-based liberalism as a bulwark against ‘Little Englanders’. Whether one is sanguine or sceptical about the strength of the UK, patriotism, sovereignty, nationalism and the traditions of English liberty – consciously or unconsciously – it marks one either a ‘Leaver’ or a ‘Remainer’.
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The Emergence of Jeremy Corbyn as Leader of the Labour Party
Since 1980, the Labour Party has struggled to find a suitable electoral system for choosing its leaders. Prior to that, leaders were elected solely by the Members of Parliament with the runner up becoming the Deputy Leader. This system elected Clement Attlee in 1935, Hugh Gaitskell in 1955, Harold Wilson in 1963, James Callaghan in 1976 and Michael Foot in 1980. There was by that stage growing pressure for internal party reform, orchestrated mainly by the radical left of the party, to allow members a greater say. Hence in the early 1980s, the ‘electoral college’ was established in which MPs were reduced to having 30 per cent of the vote, constituencies the same and the largest share for trade unions. Under this system, Neil Kinnock was elected in 1983 and John Smith in 1992. The presence of block voting by the trade unions was seen as a further embarrassment and a system of ‘one member one vote’ was introduced by Smith and under which Tony Blair was elected Leader in 1994. Gordon Brown was unopposed in 2007 when the left-wing challengers Michael Meacher and John McDonnell failed to secure sufficient nominations from their parliamentary colleagues. Hence, the system that Smith had introduced was used to elect Brown’s successor. However, this system too proved embarrassing for the party when it emerged that several members had a plurality of votes if they were also members of trade unions or other affiliated socialist societies. The result was that Ed Miliband defeated his elder brother on the votes of affiliates despite David Miliband coming first among MPs and party members. In response, the rules were again changed under Ed Miliband’s leadership to avoid the situation where one person had multiple votes. However, in an attempt to encourage wider public involvement in the party and to placate the trade unions, a new system was introduced which would include members, affiliated supporters (i.e. trade unions and other affiliated society members) and registered 12 supporters, who in return for paying £3 could vote for the next Leader. The problems with this system are widely documented in the various biographies of 13 Jeremy Corbyn 9 and need not detain us here. The measures were passed with little opposition at the time by the party conference and some on the right of the party actually supported the measures because they believed it would dilute the influence of the members who would be to the left of supporters who in turn were closer to the floating voter. This cautious attitude towards the members by the party’s establishment during the New Labour years is a crucial factor in explaining the triumph of Corbyn’s campaign in 2015, something which members of that establishment failed to recognise during the campaign when their television appearances bolstered Corbyn. In the run up to the 2016 leadership challenge, the National Executive Committee decided to revisit the rules for conducting the ballot resulting in a much higher fee for 14 registered supporters of £25. 10 This was designed to discourage many of those who had paid the £3 fee in 2015 from voting in 2016. In fact, there appears to have been only a limited impact of this change with 183,000 people applying to be registered supporters and 50,000 of those being rejected.
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11 Registered supporters grew substantially in number before the cut-off date for the 2016 contest. The results of both the leadership contests in which Corbyn has stood are emphatic. He won in all three sections of the ballot in both contests as shown in Tables 1 and 2 below. His lead among the registered supporters was highest, but he also has clear support among the affiliated supporters and the membership. In the latter category there is some polling evidence to suggest that his support is actually much stronger among 15 those who joined the party since the 2015 General Election defeat. 12 Not all of those joined in order to support Corbyn but it is clear that the majority did. Equally, there has been a falling away of members since Corbyn’s election among those who do not support him.
16 Table 1: Labour Party Leadership Contest 2015 Results
Registered Members (%) Affiliated supporters (%) Supporters (%)
Jeremy Corbyn 49.6 57.6 83.8
Andy Burnham 22.7 26.0 5.8
Yvette Cooper 22.2 12.6 8.0
Liz Kendall 5.5 3.7 2.4
17 Source: BBC News (2015)
18 Table 2: Labour Party Leadership Contest 2016 Results
Members (%) Affiliated supporters (%) Registered supporters (%)
Jeremy Corbyn 59 60.2 69.9
Owen Smith 41 39.8 30.1
19 Source: Sparrow (2016a) In short, his support within the party is very strong outside of Parliament. Trends in membership show that his dominance of the party is becoming more emphatic. There 20 has been a major shift in the control of the party towards the left. From the most unlikely of starting points, Corbyn now has overwhelming support from Labour members and supporters as demonstrated in the two leadership contests within which he has stood and the fact that Labour gained thirty parliamentary seats and a 40% vote share in the 2017 general election. However, polling data has repeatedly shown that the Labour Party under his leadership has failed to dominate British politics.
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Labour’s electoral strategy and the‘North-South divide’
Following Labour’s surprising General Election defeat in 1992, party analysts have argued that the only way for their party to secure an electoral majority is to appeal to voters in the South of England. Population movements mean that more people are living in the South-East. Labour’s traditional heartlands in the North of England have seen depopulation, to an extent that means that there are not enough seats in those areas to win a parliamentary majority, even when adding seats from Scotland and Wales. This was stressed most famously in the Southern Discomfort pamphlet of Giles 21 Radice. 13 The southern voter was generally more affluent and therefore tended to be more right- wing on economic and social issues according to the Southern Discomfort thesis. Labour had to embrace their concerns in order to win General Elections in the future. The triumph of New Labour at the polls in 1997 and 2001 appeared to justify this argument. Following Labour’s return to the Opposition benches in 2010, Radice made 22 the same arguments alongside Blair’s former senior policy advisor, Patrick Diamond. 14 Thus emerged the idea that the party must maintain its position on the centre ground of British politics against attempts by the new Leader and those close to him to adopt more radical positions on issues such as austerity. Ed Miliband’s defeat in 2015 justified, so the moderates argued, their thesis that for the party to win it must occupy the centre ground. 15 This position was articulated most clearly by Liz Kendall in the 2015 leadership contest. An alternative analysis to the model presented by Radice and Diamond is that of the 23 ‘missing five million’ by Paul Hunter of the Smith Institute. 16 He argued that the issue was not one of appealing primarily to southern voters. Far more votes had been lost in the Midlands and in suburbs across Britain. Rather than target certain voters, therefore, what this meant was that Labour had to offer a more ideological appeal. His thesis became part of the call for a return to a more egalitarian social democracy advocated by those who were closer to Ed Miliband’s politics. 17
Rather than seeing the 2015 General Election defeat as proof of the centre-ground hypothesis, the left has argued that what is needed is a much clearer delineation between the two major parties. What was offered in 2015 was seen as ‘austerity-lite’; faced with limited choice, the voters decided to accept the status quo or to vote for a more radical alternative where they could. So Labour lost support in England to a combination of the United Kingdom Independence Party, the Green Party and 24 abstentions. 18
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Corbyn’s electoral strategy therefore sought to regain support from these disparate elements. This meant that the Labour Party should not seek to accommodate ideological ground set by the Tories but rather set out a radical alternative capable of positioning Labour to the left of the Liberal Democrats and the Greens, regaining the support of those who felt alienated from mainstream politics and voted UKIP and enthusing those, particularly the young, who had effectively dropped out of mainstream party politics. What is now required is an examination of Labour’s electoral 25 performance since September 2015.
Labour’s Electoral Performance under Corbyn
In the period since Corbyn’s election as Leader there have been numerous elections, the EU referendum and consistent opinion poll data with which to test out the early signs of Corbyn’s electoral strategy. These results must only be tentative but, we argue, offer 26 sufficient evidence to question his electoral strategy as the cultural gap has widened.
By-elections
There were ten by-elections between the 2015 and 2017 General Elections all occurring since Corbyn’s election as Leader of the Labour Party. By-elections are notoriously difficult to extrapolate a sense of the wider electoral picture. On the one hand, they are local but they also allow voters to express opinions about national politics. The extent to which they can be deemed to show wider national trends is, however, questionable. Liberal/Liberal Democrat by-election victories have often not translated into success at the subsequent General Election. As with local elections, voters often cast their vote as a reflection on the state of national politics. Protest voting at local elections about national political issues explains why by-election results frequently do not translate 27 into success at the subsequent General Election. 19
Of the contested by-elections only two have resulted in a change in incumbency. The 28 first was at Richmond Park by-election held on 1 st December 2016 caused by the resignation of Conservative MP, Zac Goldsmith over the Conservative government’s decision to allow for an additional runway at Heathrow Airport. Goldsmith stood as an Independent and was not challenged by his old party, nor by UKIP. He lost to the Liberal Democrats, in a contest that became more focussed on Brexit in an area which recorded a strong level of support for Remain in the 2016 referendum. Labour came a long way third with a fall in its vote share of 8.67 per cent and obtained fewer votes than it had members, although this may have had more to do with the election being seen as a direct contest between Goldsmith and the Liberal Democrats. 20
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The second was in Copeland (Cumbria) following the resignation of Labour MP Jamie Reed. This resulted in a Conservative gain. Both of these by-elections say something about the North-South divide in British politics. Richmond is a predominantly affluent urban area on the edge of cosmopolitan London. In contrast, Copeland was a relatively poorer area which was previously the seat of Whitehaven. Here more socially conservative views abound, and it was estimated that 60 per cent of Labour voters supported leaving the European Union. 21
29 The first by-election was in Oldham West and Royton on 3rd December 2015 following the death of Michael Meacher MP. The selection was won by the local council leader, Jim McMahon who saw off a challenge from candidates more sympathetic to Corbyn and the Leader rarely featured in the campaign. McMahon won with an increased vote share of 7.3 per cent. 22
30 Two by-elections were held on 5th May 2016. One in Sheffield Brightside and Hillsborough following the death of incumbent Harry Harpham, where his widow won the contest for Labour with an increased vote share of 5.9 per cent. The other was in the Welsh constituency of Ogmore following the resignation of Huw Irranca-Davies and was retained by Labour, with a narrow fall in its share of the vote by 0.3 per cent. 23
31 On 16th June, there was a further by-election in Tooting, following the successful London Mayoral campaign of Sadiq Khan. This seat had been a strong Labour one but the majority had fallen to just 2,842 in the 2015 General Election, albeit still securing 47.2 per cent of the vote. Labour won the by-election with an increased vote share of 8.7 per cent. 24
32 On 20th October 2016, there were two further by-elections. The first of these in Batley and Spen had been caused by the tragic murder of Jo Cox MP and the other major parties declined to put up a candidate against Labour in this seat, resulting in a vote share of 85.8 per cent, with the rest of the vote split between various far right candidates and independents. The other contest that day was in Whitney following the resignation of former Prime Minister David Cameron as a Member of Parliament and witnessed a dramatic fall in the Conservative majority from 25,155 to 5,702 with the main beneficiary being the Liberal Democrats and Labour’s vote falling by 2.2 per cent albeit in a seat where Labour has little support. 25
33 The final contest in Sleaford and North Hykeham on 8th December came following the resignation of Conservative MP, Stephen Phillips following a disagreement with his party over Brexit. The seat is safely Conservative. The main focus was therefore on who would come second. Labour had secured second place in the 2015 General Election but slipped into fourth place with a fall in vote share of 7.1 per cent and being overtaken by both UKIP and the Liberal Democrats (Mason and Weaver, 2016).
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The final by-elections before the 2017 General Election were caused by two Labour resignations. Copeland was discussed above and the other by-election was in Stoke on Trent Central, where prominent Labour progressive, Tristram Hunt resigned. This seat had recorded a large leave vote in the referendum and was tipped to be a good UKIP target constituency, as seen by the fact that its then Leader Paul Nuttall stood. However, UKIP's position nationally as well as doubts over Nuttall as a candidate 34 ensured that Labour held the seat. Since the 2017 General Election there have, at the time of writing, been two by- elections. While one (West Tyrone) took place in the different political setting of Northern Ireland, the other reveals more about the cultural gap we have been discussing. In Lewisham East, Labour’s Heidi Alexander resigned in order to become Deputy Mayor of London. Although Labour held the seat, its vote share was cut by 17.7% by the Liberal Democrats who campaigned against Corbyn’s indecisiveness over Brexit. Vince Cable, Liberal Democrat Leader saying that ‘it cannot take pro-European 35 voters for granted.’ 26 Recognising that Labour would be damaged in the North by pledging a second referendum, but hemmed in by a largely pro-European activist base, Corbyn has lost support support in both Southern Remain areas and Northern Leave areas.
Local Elections
36 On 5th May 2016, local elections were held in England. Of the 353 councils in England there were elections in 124. On the projected national vote Labour topped the poll with 31 per cent of the vote, 30 per cent for the Conservatives and 15 per cent and 12 per cent respectively for the Liberal Democrats and UKIP (Prosser, 2020). Corbyn claimed victory on this basis but the results were held as disappointing for Labour overall. The Conservative Party was at this time divided over the EU referendum and its support in opinion polls had declined. Labour had a net loss of vote share (from 42.9 per cent to 38.6 per cent) and council seats (from 1,344 to 1,326) although it remained the largest party in local politics (BBC News, 2016). At the end of the counting Labour held the same number of councils as previously. There were some notable successes, particularly in terms of elected mayors. As already mentioned, Sadiq Khan won the contest for London Mayor but he was noticeably hostile towards Corbyn who, he felt, was on a different wing of the party from himself and was an electoral liability (Khan, 2016). Following the election of Labour’s candidate, Marvin Rees in Bristol, Corbyn attended his victory celebrations rather than Khan’s. 37 These two victories were the most notable Labour successes in the spring elections. In terms of the elections for Police and Crime Commissioners Labour did have some successes taking Cheshire, Gwent, Humberside and Leicestershire while also losing 38 Bedfordshire.
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Some had predicted that Labour may do badly in the first national contest which Corbyn faced as Leader. The results were therefore better for Labour than these predictions, but equally there was no significant breakthrough to show that Corbyn’s electoral strategy was working. Labour’s biggest successes were the mayoral elections 39 in London (with an anti-Corbyn candidate) and Bristol. The 2017 local elections were held on 5th May and were deemed to be a key indicator of how the parties were faring nationally ahead of the General Election. In England, the results showed clear gains for the Conservatives gaining 319 councillors and Labour losing 142. Whereas the Tories gained control of 10 councils, Labour lost one. Several of these Conservative gains were in the South of England but not all, notably Derbyshire which witnessed 19 seats changing hands direct from Labour to the Conservatives in one of the most notable results nationally. In Lancashire, Labour lost 10 and the Conservatives gained 11 to take control of the council. Labour made further losses in Scotland and in Wales which means that they performed badly across Great Britain. There were also a number of newly elected mayors with Labour taking Merseyside and Greater Manchester as widely expected but losing West Midlands, and even more 40 strikingly in terms of the North-South divideTees Valley in the North-East of England. In the 2018 local elections Labour and the Conservatives both had a projected national vote share of 35%. Labour also gained 79 seats, while the Conservatives lost 35. However, within this national picture there was considerable variation, which again 41 shows the North-South divide in action. In London, Labour gained 67 seats, but outside of the capital they secured just 12 seats compared to the Conservatives’ 57. Labour lost control of two councils where there is a large working-class vote including Derby, and Nuneaton and Bedworth. Both of these areas recorded significant Leave votes in the referendum.
EU Referendum
The official position of the Labour Party towards the EU referendum was to campaign to ‘Remain’ and local parties received a very strong steer in this direction as well as the overwhelming majority of MPs supporting continued membership. Prior to becoming Leader, Corbyn had expressed Eurosceptic sentiments, but he accepted the party position on this issue and campaigned – albeit, some thought, half-heartedly – in favour of ‘Remain’. It was his somewhat lacklustre performance as Leader during the 42 referendum campaign which finally precipitated the leadership challenge.
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However, the results showed that a large proportion of Labour voters did not accept the party position on the issue of EU membership). In total, 37 per cent of Labour voters supported Britain leaving the EU, roughly the same proportion as SNP voters (36 per 43 cent) which had also campaigned strongly to Remain. . 27 UKIP voters were predictably the strongest Leave backers (96 per cent) while the Greens were the most pro-European with 75 per cent voting to Remain. All electoral regions of the UK recorded a Leave vote with the exceptions of Scotland (62 per cent remain), London (59.9 per cent) and Northern Ireland (55.8 per cent). Given that votes were counted at local authority level and then added together to get regional totals, it is somewhat problematic calculating the referendum results by constituency but there are several Labour constituencies which recorded strong Leave votes including Bolsover (70.8 per cent), Hartlepool (69.6 per cent), Stoke on Trent (69.4 per cent) and Doncaster (69 per cent) which were among the 16 areas to vote Leave by 69 per cent or more. Many of these constituencies were in the North and Midlands of England which had seen economic decline and widespread poverty. Labour-held constituencies with large Remain votes tended to be in London, which tended to be more cosmopolitan and had larger proportions of younger people. Turning to the social grade classification system, the majority of AB voters voted remain (57 per cent), but the majority among C1 voters was for leave (51 per cent) and 44 that vote was even higher in the D and E categories (64 per cent in both classes). On the issue of Brexit, it would seem that Corbyn’s position is closer to those of voters overall than were those of his leadership rival in 2016, Owen Smith, who adopted a strongly pro-EU stance. Corbyn clearly lacked room for manoeuvre on this issue, not only because of the strength of EU support in his own party but also the fact that one of Corbyn’s key support bases, the young, were the demographic with the largest support 45 for Remain (73 per cent of 18-24 year olds).
2017 General Election
There was no clear victor in the 2017 UK general election. The Conservative Party were the largest party with 318 seats but no overall majority. They secured 42.4 per cent of the vote share and 13.66 million votes. This was a disaster for Prime Minister Theresa May who had called a snap election because the Conservative Party had a massive lead in the opinion polls over the Labour Party under Corbyn. Moreover, May’s confidence was high going into the campaign with her personal ratings much higher than Corbyn’s. May performed very poorly in the campaign and Corbyn, with no pressure or expectations, came across as calm, sincere and generally well prepared. Labour won 262 parliamentary seats an increase of 30. They gained 40% of the share of the vote an increase of 9.5 per cent on the 2015 figure. In total, 12.87 million votes were cast for Labour under Corbyn compared with 9.34 million cast for Labour under Miliband in 46 2015. This was an increase of 3.53 million votes.
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Further evidence of the changing North-South dynamics can be gleaned from further analysis of individual seats. Canterbury, in the south of England, since the creation of the single-member constituency in 1885 has been a Conservative seat but was won by Labour for the first time in 2017 by 187 on a swing of 9.3 per cent. Canterbury is a generally wealthy constituency with a large student population. The result was largely due to Corbyn's ability to enthuse younger voters and the increased registration of 47 student voters in the constituency. In contrast, Stoke on Trent South is a much poorer constituency which has been held by Labour since its creation in 1950. Since the decline of its traditional industries, such as pottery and coal, Stoke on Trent has been a city with comparatively high rates of unemployment. As a city it recorded a high Leave vote of 69% compared to 30.6% for 48 Remain in the 2016 referendum on a turnout of 65.7%. If voting was still primarily conducted on economic lines then the results of these two seats would have been reversed and would have continued to follow their historic pattern. The fact that they did not shows the changing cultural politics. Predominantly working-class Stoke South became Conservative having recorded a large Leave vote whereas the much more middle-class Canterbury went Labour. There is a clear cultural, educational and generational divide in these two seats with the Conservatives appealing to socially conservative working-class voters and Labour to a more cosmopolitan electorate. Further evidence of this can be found in seats such as Kensington in London which went Labour for the first time having been an overwhelming Remain voting area and some seats which Labour held in the North but which recorded bigger swings to the Conservatives having previously registered larger 49 Leave votes.
Conclusion
50 We have argued that theNorth-South divide in England is increasingly one of socio-culture. Economics and the perceived political economy of political parties remains a key factor in how citizens choose to vote but its importance is diminishing. In an era of competing worldviews and a clash of cultures, the fine details of whether the economy should be welfare capitalist or liberal capitalist is lost on most voters. Some will always argue for more state activity and others less intervention in the market. Some will maintain that public services should be provided by the state while others see the benefit of private providers in the allocation of public services. At root, most English citizens value the market economy and the welfare state. The first decades of the twenty-first century have been characterised in England by social change and economic uncertainty. In this period, the Conservative Party platform has become much more socially liberal with many of its leading politicians holding views indistinguishable to Labour, Liberal Democrat, and Green Party MPs. Under New Labour, the following issues came to the fore of public discussion: equality and diversity, patriarchy, multiculturalism and LGBTQI rights. Through legislation, 51 New Labour altered the social ethics of the country on these issues.
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This has been nothing short of a cultural transformation. A majority of young people – Generation Y or Millennials – born between the early 1980s and the early 2000s have been taught that such values are good; that in terms of social ethics this is the ‘new normal’. Some citizens hold a contrary view about the state of England’s socio-culture. They are best described as social and cultural conservatives. England has therefore 52 become a nation divided by socio-cultural values which makes The North-South divide an insufficient explanation. The divide is between cosmopolitans and conservatives. A significant minority of Labour-inclined voters are conservatives (in a social and cultural sense). They struggle with socially progressive perspectives of the New Labourites or the socialist Corbynistas. The Labour Party under Corbyn is a large political party which contains many younger activists and it struggles to speak, let alone to break spiritual bread, with those of a conservative culture. As the Labour Party under Corbyn exceeds expectations, albeit relatively low expectations, and continues to attract new members it increasingly fails to represent countless thousands of conservative Labourites. British politics is not broken. However, the English nation is divided by values in a manner that has been unknown in the post-war era. The 1940s and 1950s retained the social separation of class. The 1960s legislative reforms saw Parliament out of step with public opinion and angry student protests over foreign wars. The hallmark of the 1970s was industrial unrest and the fears of governability. The 1980s set people with contrasting economic prescriptions to remedy the British economy against each other. The 1990s continued Thatcherism in a period of globalisation; the new millennium brought England, the United Kingdom and her allies a deadly new enemy. But in its newness and pluralism it gave birth in policy and attitude to old ideas rooted in discredited doctrines. Cultural Marxist assumptions and, chief among its goals, identity politics gradually set the English against one another. Debates about the level of state and market persist as do the proper time and place to cross borders to secure human rights. But in England, disagreement over culture is now more pronounced as the divisions over Brexit have shown. Citizens who may look and sound the same and live similar lives disagree on sociocultural matters (including ethics, behaviour and 53 custom). The future of a united England is something that cannot be taken for granted.
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Mason, Rowena And Matthew Weaver, “Sleaford By-election: Caroline Johnson Holds Seat for Conservatives”, TheGuardian,9 December 2016.
Merrick, Rob, “Labour Leadership: Jeremy Corbyn’s support stronger outside London, YouGov poll suggests”, TheIndependent,24 September 2016.
Pidd, Helen, “Jeremy Corbyn Hails “Vote of Confidence” After Labour Win Oldham By-election” The Guardian,4 December 2015.
Prince, Rosa, Comrade Corbyn: A Very Unlikely Coup – How Jeremy Corbyn Stormed to the Labour Leadership (London, Biteback, 2016).
Prosser, Chris, “What Do the 2016 Local Elections Tell Us About What Might Happen in 2020”, British Election Study, 2016.
Radice, Giles,Southern Discomfort(London, Fabian Society, 1992).
Radice, Giles and Stephen Pollard,More Southern Discomfort(London, Fabian Society, 1993).
Seymour, Richard,Corbyn: The Strange Rebirth of Radical Politics(London, Verso, 2016).
Singh, Matt, “Copeland By-election: Is a "once in a blue moon" result on the cards?” Number Cruncher Politics, 21 December 2016, https://www.ncpolitics.uk/2016/12/copeland-by- election.html/ [last accessed 7 February 2019]
Sparrow, Andrew, “Jeremy Corbyn Sweeps to Victory Increasing His Mandate as Leader”, The Guardian,24 September 2016.
Sparrow, Andrew, “Liberal Democrats Win Richmond Park By-election, Overturning Zac Goldsmith’s 23,000 Majority”, The Guardian,2 December 2016.
Swinford, Steven, “Len McClusky: Ed Miliband Lost Because He Was Not Left-wing Enough”,The Telegraph,13 May 2015.
Taylor, Alan J.P,English History 1914-1945(London, Pelican Books, 1970).
UK Polling Report, “ICM Polling”, 2016,http://ukpollingreport.co.uk/voting-intention-2/icm [last accessed 7 February 2019]
Wainwright, Hilary,A Tale of Two Parties(London, Hogarth, 1987).
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NOTES
1. Helen M. Jewell, The North-South Divide: The Origins of Northern Consciousness in England (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1994), p. 7. 2. Danny Dorling, “The North-South Divide – Where is the line?”, Social and Spatial Inequalities Group, University of Sheffield, 2007, http://www.sasi.group.shef.ac.uk/ maps/nsdivide/ 3. The constituency of Brigg and Goole contains parts of the ceremonial counties of the East Riding of Yorkshire and Lincolnshire. 4. Alan J.P. Taylor, English History 1914-1945 (London, Pelican Books, 1970), pp. 224-225. 5. David Denver, Elections and Voting Behaviour in Britain, 2nd edition (Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), p. 53. 6. Cultural Marxism is a form of non-economic neo-Marxism which emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. Its purpose is to change the socioculture and ethics of Western liberal society. Its chief architects were Michel Foucault, Jean Francois Lyotard and Jacques Derrida. It has evolved since the era of the New Left and today includes ideas such as intersectionality and the hierarchy of oppression. For more on the impact of Cultural Marxism on the Labour Party see the essay by Matt Beech, ‘The Progressives’, in Matt Beech, Kevin Hickson and Raymond Plant (eds.) The Struggle for Labour’s Soul: Understanding Labour’s Political Thought Since 1945, second edition (London, Routledge, 2018). For a history of the rise of Cultural Marxism in Britain see Dennis Dworkin, Cultural Marxism in Postwar Britain: History, the New Left, and the Origins of Cultural Studies (Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1997). 7. Roy Jenkins, 1994: pp. 199-213. 8. Harold D. Clarke, Matthew Goodwin and Paul Whiteley, Brexit: Why Britain Voted to Leave the European Union (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 4. 9. See for example, Nigel Cawthorne, Jeremy Corbyn: Leading from the Left (London: CreateSpace, 2015); Rosa Prince, Comrade Corbyn: A Very Unlikely Coup – How Jeremy Corbyn Stormed to the Labour Leadership (London, Biteback, 2016); ; W. Stephen Gilbert, Jeremy Corbyn: Accidental Hero (London, Eyewear, 2016) Richard Seymour, Corbyn: The Strange Rebirth of Radical Politics (London, Verso, 2016). 10. Kirsty Major, “A Vote for the Labour Leader? That will cost you £25 – even if you’re already a member”, The Independent, 17 July 2016. 11. Sarah Marsh, “Meet the 180,000”, The Guardian, 21 July 2016. 12. Rob Merrick, “Labour Leadership: Jeremy Corbyn’s support stronger outside London, YouGov poll suggests”, The Independent, 24 September 2016. 13. Giles Radice, Southern Discomfort (London: Fabian Society, 1992); Giles Radice and S. Pollard, More Southern Discomfort (London: Fabian Society, 1993). 14. Patrick Diamond and Giles Radice, Southern Discomfort Again (London, Policy Network, 2010). 15. Andrew Grice, “Labour Figures Admit Underestimating UKIP Threat Cost Them Seats in the General Election”, The Independent, 12 May 2015. 16. Paul Hunter, Winning Back the 5 million: Understanding the Fragmentation of Labour’s Vote (London, The Smith Institute, 2011). 17. Roy Hattersley and Kevin Hickson (eds.), The Socialist Way (London, IB Tauris, 2013). 18. Steven Swinford, “Len McClusky: Ed Miliband Lost Because He Was Not Left-wing Enough”, The Telegraph 13 May 2015
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19. Of all of the by-elections discussed, the only constituency which was not held by the by-election victor in the 2017 General Election was Richmond due to the return of Zak Goldsmith to the Conservatives. 20. Andrew Sparrow, “Liberal Democrats Win Richmond Park By-election, Overturning Zac Goldsmith’s 23,000 Majority”, The Guardian, 2 December 2016. 21. Matt Singh, “Copeland By-election: Is a "once in a blue moon" result on the cards?” Number Cruncher Politics, 21 December 2016. 22. Helen Pidd, “Jeremy Corbyn Hails “Vote of Confidence” After Labour Win Oldham By- election” The Guardian, 4 December 2015. 23. Siobhan Fenton, “Elections 2016: Labour Wins By-elections in Safe Seats Ogmore and Sheffield Brightside and Hillsborough”, The Independent, 6 May 2016. 24. David Hughes and Jemma Crew, “Tooting By-election Labour Candidate Rosena Allen-Kahn Wins Seat and Pays Tribute to MP Jo Cox”, The Independent, 17 June 2016. 25. Jessica Elgot, “Witney By-election: Liberal Democrats Resurgent as Tories Hold On With Slashed Majority”; The Guardian, 21 October 2016. 26. Staff Writer, New Labour MP Janet Daby: ‘I will oppose hard Brexit’, BT News, 15 June 2018 https://home.bt.com/news/uk-news/new-labour-mp-janet-daby-i-will-oppose-hard- brexit-11364278055989 (last accessed 7 February 2019) 27. All figures are taken from Ashcroft (2016). Ashcroft, Michael, “How the UK Voted on Thursday and Why”, 24 June 2016.
ABSTRACTS
This article explores the sociocultural divide in England exposed by Brexit. The metaphors of ‘North’ and ‘South’ are used to explain this, where the former is seen as more culturally conservative and the latter as more cosmopolitan. We examine the Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn and show how its values have shifted away from its Northern heartlands. The article uses a range of data including by-elections, local and general election results and statistics from the 2016 referendum on the United Kingdom’s continued membership of the European Union.
L’article examine le fossé socio-culturel révélé par le Brexit en Angleterre. Ici, le “Nord” et le “Sud” servent de métaphores pour appréhender ce fossé : le Nord tend à être considéré comme conservateur sur le plan culturel et le Sud plus cosmopolite. En s’appuyant sur un ensemble de données comprenant les résultats des élections partielles, locales et législatives ainsi que des statistiques issues du Référendum de 2016 sur l’appartenance à l’Union européenne, les auteurs mettent en évidence le rôle fondamental joué par le Parti Travailliste de Jeremy Corbyn dont les valeurs se sont éloignées de ses traditionnels bastions électoraux du nord.
INDEX
Mots-clés: Jeremy Corbyn, Parti Travailliste, Angleterre, fossé Nord-Sud Keywords: Jeremy Corbyn, Labour Party, England, North-South Divide
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AUTHORS
MATT BEECH University of Hull
KEVIN HICKSON University of Liverpool
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Les Députés du Nord de l’Angleterre et la question constitutionnelle écossaise : entre crainte et résignation MPs from the North of England and the Scottish Constitutional Issue: between Fear and Resignation
Edwige Camp-Pietrain
Introduction
Depuis les années soixante-dix, la question constitutionnelle écossaise constitue un enjeu politique. Jusqu'à la fin des années quatre-vingt-dix, le principe de dévolution du pouvoir à l'Écosse était discuté. Depuis la création d'institutions dévolues en 1999, les controverses sont centrées sur le périmètre de leurs compétences. Les députés du Nord de l'Angleterre à la Chambre des Communes, particulièrement vigilants, ont critiqué ces réformes, même si les souhaits de la majorité de leurs collègues écossais, censés refléter les désirs de la population locale, ont finalement prévalu. Avec l'arrivée au pouvoir du SNP en 2007, est venu se superposer un autre débat, autour de l'accession de l'Écosse à l'indépendance, source de nouvelles polémiques. Cette étude repose principalement sur l'analyse de débats à la Chambre des Communes (tableau 9). Les premiers, entre 1976 et 1978, ont porté sur un Scotland and Wales Bill, abandonné en février 1977 sous la pression du Parlement, puis sur un Scotland Bill. Celui-ci, qui devait devenir le Scotland Act de 1978, n'entra pas en vigueur car il ne fut pas endossé par un seuil minimal de 40 % des électeurs inscrits lors du référendum du 1er mars 1979. La dévolution apparaissait alors comme un compromis destiné à endiguer la percée du SNP, indépendantiste, aux élections de février et surtout d'octobre 1974. Le deuxième groupe de débats, préalables au Scotland Act de 1998, fut bref car il avait été précédé, le 11 septembre 1997, d'un référendum fondé sur un projet
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plus représentatif de la volonté du peuple, élaboré par une Convention constitutionnelle écossaise (associant Travaillistes, Libéraux-démocrates et société civile) entre 1989 et 1995. La troisième série eut lieu entre 2009 et 2012, à partir du rapport de la Commission Calman (rassemblant Travaillistes, Libéraux-démocrates et Conservateurs), pour aboutir au Scotland Act de 2012. La quatrième série, entre 2012 et 2014, a concerné les conséquences du référendum d'autodétermination du 18 septembre 2014 voulu par le SNP arrivé au pouvoir au sein des institutions dévolues et concédé par le Premier ministre David Cameron. À l'issue de cette consultation s'est engagé un débat de deux ans, autour des conclusions de la Commission Smith (comprenant Travaillistes, Libéraux-démocrates et Conservateurs, mais aussi le SNP et les Verts), qui furent à l'origine du Scotland Act de 2016. Les résultats du référendum britannique du 23 juin 2016, en faveur du Brexit, ont ouvert une nouvelle étape, contre la volonté des élus écossais cette fois. Cet article vise à mettre en évidence, au-delà des réticences des députés du Nord1 à l'égard des réformes constitutionnelles écossaises, l'évolution de leurs arguments tant à l'égard de ces dernières que de leurs répercussions sur le reste du royaume, ainsi que les craintes particulières dans le voisinage immédiat de la frontière.
Un regard critique sur les réformes écossaises
Les députés du Nord de l'Angleterre portent un regard critique sur les réformes constitutionnelles écossaises, pour des raisons économiques non dénuées d'émotion.
Le primat de l'économie
Lors de chaque débat relatif à la dévolution, les députés du Nord de l'Angleterre de tous bords ont fustigé les conséquences économiques des réformes sur leurs propres circonscriptions. Dans les années soixante-dix, ils perçurent la dévolution comme un moyen de contrer le déclin des industries lourdes. Or, l'Écosse semblait déjà privilégiée s'agissant de la répartition des dépenses publiques au sein du Royaume-Uni, comme le fit valoir Richard Wainwright (libéral, Colne Valley), dès 1976 (tableau 1)2. Cela lui paraissait d'autant plus injuste que les taux de chômage au Nord-Ouest de l'Angleterre et en Écosse étaient comparables. Selon Leon Brittan (conservateur, Cleveland & Whitby), l'Assemblée écossaise, financée par une dotation britannique préservant ces privilèges, pourrait mener des politiques économiques adaptées aux besoins locaux3. Le Nord de l'Angleterre risquait d'être délaissé par les investisseurs, ce qui justifiait l'intervention de députés anglais dans les débats selon Eric Ogden (Liverpool, West Derby)4. En raison de l'impact potentiel de la dévolution sur leurs propres administrés, ces élus ne pouvaient souscrire aux arguments de George Reid (SNP), qui, sans nier les similitudes entre les difficultés des régions septentrionales, prétendait que l'Écosse devait disposer de ses institutions pour les traiter parce qu'elle constituait une nation5. Le gouvernement travailliste de James Callaghan répondit à ces craintes en confiant au secrétaire d'État à l'Écosse un droit de regard sur les quelques compétences économiques devant être dévolues à l'Assemblée, telle la tutelle de la Scottish Development Agency, afin d'éviter une application divergente des politiques britanniques, en particulier la politique régionale à laquelle les élus étaient attachés (William Elliott, Newcastle)6. L'Assemblée écossaise serait dépourvue de tout pouvoir
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fiscal, même sur les impôts locaux (prélevés par les collectivités territoriales). Mais la progression de sa dotation annuelle, indexée sur les dépenses publiques anglaises, serait garantie par la formule Barnett7. Le Parlement écossais finalement créé en 1999 était doté de pouvoirs fiscaux très réduits (sur la fiscalité locale). Les Scotland Act de 2012 et 2016 ont étendu ceux-ci, en particulier à l'impôt sur le revenu8, ce qui a fait réagir les députés du Nord. David Mowat (conservateur, Warrington South) dénonça le maintien de la formule Barnett qui fige l'avantage de l'Écosse (tableaux 2 et 3)9. Or, son PIB par habitant, autrefois proche du Nord du Royaume-Uni, avait progressé pour se rapprocher de la moyenne britannique (tableau 4). Le taux d'activité et les salaires moyens dépassaient également celle-ci (tableau 5). L'avantage accordé à l'Écosse relevait davantage de considérations politiques que de justifications économiques. De plus, certains députés s'inquiétèrent des conséquences de ces pouvoirs fiscaux pour leur région. En effet, le gouvernement écossais du SNP ayant l'intention d'abaisser la taxe aéroportuaire avant de la supprimer, Kevan Jones (travailliste, North Durham) estima que cela nuirait à l'aéroport de Newcastle, générateur de 8000 emplois10. De plus, des Travaillistes mirent en avant une critique les distinguant de leurs adversaires conservateurs, la menace de la dévolution pour l'unité de la classe ouvrière. Comme le souligna Eric Heffer (Liverpool, Walton) en 1977, les Écossais disposeraient de moyens de concevoir leurs propres politiques, alors qu'ils ne pouvaient évoquer une quelconque oppression à leur détriment, justifiant un traitement particulier11. John Mendelson en voulait pour preuve le manque d'enthousiasme des syndicats12. Cependant, ces arguments, qui n'avaient jamais été prééminents dans des débats parlementaires plus axés sur les conséquences concrètes des réformes, se sont estompés après 2010 face aux politiques britanniques d'austérité. En 2015, parmi les Travaillistes, seul Ian Lavery (Wansbeck) se risqua encore à évoquer la classe ouvrière mais Eilidh Whiteford (SNP) lui rétorqua que le STUC était désormais partisan de la dévolution du droit du travail13. La perspective de l'accession à l'indépendance ne rassurait pas pour autant les élus du Nord14. Guy Opperman (conservateur, Hexham) se fit l'écho de l'inquiétude des acteurs économiques du Nord-Est. Phil Wilson (travailliste, Sedgefield) évoqua l'impôt sur les sociétés, que le gouvernement SNP promettait de réduire afin de créer un avantage comparatif15. Mais il ajouta que les effets délétères seraient également ressentis en Écosse car les sites de Dalyell et Clydebank transformaient de l'acier provenant de Scunthorpe, tandis que les plateformes installées en mer du Nord étaient construites au Nord-Est16. Néanmoins, dans ces débats, certains députés du Nord de l'Angleterre soulignèrent, non sans soulagement, qu'avec de nouveaux pouvoirs fiscaux (dans le cadre de la dévolution ou de l'indépendance), le Parlement écossais serait davantage responsable de ses décisions. Or, le SNP entendait augmenter les dépenses publiques, en les finançant par une hausse d'activité générée par les baisses d'impôts. Mais les députés anglais, tels Phil Wilson et John Stevenson (conservateur, Carlisle)17, qui doutaient de la crédibilité de ce raisonnement, anticipaient des hausses d'impôts peu populaires.
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La montée en puissance de l'émotion
Les députés du Nord de l'Angleterre ont également manifesté de l'émotion à la perspective de réformes constitutionnelles les éloignant de leur voisin. D'une part, ils ont exprimé leurs craintes pour le Royaume-Uni et l'identité britannique, élément fédérateur au-delà des particularismes nationaux. Dès 1976, Eric Heffer estimait que la dévolution du pouvoir constituerait une première étape vers le démantèlement du Royaume-Uni. Il s'appuyait pour cela sur l'optimisme des députés nationalistes18. Selon John Mendelson (travailliste, Pennistone), le SNP n'aurait de cesse de dénoncer les dysfonctionnements de la dévolution pour justifier l'indépendance19. Les députés du Nord se sentaient britanniques et souhaitaient continuer à s'établir librement en divers endroits du royaume, une faculté prisée par Kenneth Tomas (travailliste, Huddersfield West)20. Par la suite, ces arguments se raréfièrent à propos de la dévolution. En 1997, le conservateur Stephen Day (Cheadle) se trouva isolé lorsqu'il s'insurgea contre la possibilité laissée à une composante de bouleverser l'ensemble21. Les polémiques se cristallisèrent alors autour de l'indépendance. Pour les députés du Nord, cette dernière signifierait l'apparition d'une frontière, mettant fin, selon Phil Wilson, à une histoire économique et sociale commune, à une identité politique distincte (hostile aux Conservateurs)22. Les milliers de personnes devant franchir cette frontière quotidiennement pour raisons professionnelles seraient pénalisées. D'autre part, les députés du Nord de l'Angleterre se sont indignés d'être mis devant le fait accompli par les gouvernements britanniques successifs. En 1975, le gouvernement de Harold Wilson tentait de contenir la percée électorale du SNP, en proposant un projet de dévolution qui n'avait pas été formellement approuvé par le Congrès du Parti travailliste, ce que regrettait Heffer23. Cela engendra, chez lui comme chez ses collègues, un conflit de loyauté24. Certains fustigèrent des réponses hâtives et peu convaincantes, ne relevant pas du socialisme, voire même allant à l'encontre de cette idéologie en suscitant des divisions. Ce fut le cas de Kenneth Lomas (Huddersfield West) en 197725, ou d’Eric Ogden (Liverpool, West Derby) un an plus tard26. En février 1977, les députés du Nord coordonnèrent leur rébellion pour faciliter le rejet de la motion de guillotine, laquelle devait entraîner l'abandon du Scotland and Wales Bill. Alors qu'ils ne représentaient que 9 % de leur groupe, ils constituèrent 18 % des travaillistes votant contre le texte, et 25 % des abstentionnistes27. Cependant, les députés travaillistes hostiles à la dévolution étant parvenus à imposer un référendum post-législatif, une première dans l'histoire britannique, Lomas indiqua en février 1978 qu'il souhaitait l'adoption du projet, afin de laisser le peuple trancher28. Nombre d'élus avaient l'intention de cautionner le texte gouvernemental, avant de mener campagne contre la dévolution dans un deuxième temps. Au cours des décennies suivantes, les députés du Nord de l'Angleterre furent dans l'incapacité de s'opposer aux projets de loi à l'origine des Scotland Act de 1998, 2012 et 2016, ou même de les amender. Fondés sur des recommandations de commissions écossaises multipartites, avec le soutien des partis britanniques, ces textes recueillirent un assentiment unanime en dernière lecture. Cela n'empêcha par certains élus travaillistes de manifester des mouvements d'humeur, critiquant tantôt le serment29 à l'origine de la Commission Smith, prêté quelques jours avant le référendum d'autodétermination, par des dirigeants britanniques aux abois, en raison de sondages
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indiquant une possible victoire de l'indépendance (David Anderson, Blaydon)30, tantôt la dévolution de compétences ne figurant pas dans le rapport Smith, telle la gestion de l'avortement (Yvette Cooper, Normanton, craignant de ce fait une régression des droits des femmes)31. Ils accordaient peu de crédit à la promesse de Cameron selon laquelle cette nouvelle étape de la dévolution ne s'effectuerait pas aux dépens du Nord32. De même, les députés anglais n'avaient pu faire obstacle au référendum d'autodétermination à cause de l'accord signé par Cameron et Alex Salmond, First Minister écossais, le 15 octobre 2012. Ils furent invités à endosser le règlement autorisant cette consultation, sans pouvoir l'amender. Néanmoins, Rory Stewart (conservateur, Penrith & the Border), s'étonna de l'absence de cadre juridique fixant une majorité qualifiée33. Cette impuissance a donné lieu à une volonté de rééquilibrage.
Une volonté de rééquilibrage
Certains députés, à la recherche d'un rééquilibrage sur le plan institutionnel, se font entendre depuis le référendum d'autodétermination. Mais ils doivent veiller à ne pas aliéner les Écossais parce qu'ils demeurent attachés à l'unité du royaume.
Les tentatives de décentralisation en faveur du Nord de l'Angleterre
Dans les années soixante-dix, l'autonomie du Nord n'était pas à l'ordre du jour. La Commission Kilbrandon, chargée par le gouvernement Wilson d'examiner les questions constitutionnelles, réservait à l'Écosse une modalité avancée de dévolution (législative) ; les régions anglaises (fixées à cinq) pourraient au mieux (selon le rapport minoritaire) bénéficier d'une dévolution exécutive, leur permettant d'adapter aux besoins locaux les lois votées au Parlement britannique34. Ainsi, lors des débats consacrés à la dévolution, rares étaient les députés travaillistes s'intéressant au sort des régions anglaises, tels l'Écossais John Mackintosh (Berwick & East Lothian) qui envisageait sept conseils régionaux en Angleterre et des assemblées dans les nations35, ou l'Anglais Arthur Blenkinshop (South Shields), partisan d'organismes régionaux élus et d'agences de développement36. En 1978, seuls deux députés prirent part à un congrès sur ce sujet à Manchester, Austin Mitchell (travailliste, Grimsby) et Richard Wainwright (libéral, Colne Valley)37. Leur position évolua à la fin des années quatre-vingt, en réaction aux politiques néolibérales et centralisatrices de Margaret Thatcher. À l'issue des élections à la Chambre des Communes de 1987, les Travaillistes, forts d'un total de 156 députés dans les trois régions septentrionales anglaises et en Écosse, contre 64 aux Conservateurs, portèrent des aspirations décentralisatrices. Giles Radice (Durham North) publia une proposition de loi visant à instaurer une assemblée régionale et une northern development agency38. Comme le reconnut son collègue Jack Thompson (Wansbeck), les revendications des Écossais ne leur paraissaient plus antagonistes mais complémentaires de leurs préoccupations. Certains furent même tentés par une Campaign for a North-East Assembly sur le modèle de la campagne écossaise éponyme qui avait donné naissance à la Convention constitutionnelle39. Mais le gouvernement de John Major se contenta de déconcentrer le pouvoir (en instaurant des government offices dans les régions), tout en rattachant Cumbria au Nord-Ouest, contre la volonté des élus locaux.
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Dans les années 2000, Tony Blair (Sedgefield), Premier ministre, et John Prescott (Hull), numéro deux du gouvernement, projetaient une extension de la dévolution, diversement accueillie. Les députés travaillistes du Nord de l'Angleterre approuvèrent la mise en place de Regional Development Agencies (RDA), les agences galloise et écossaise (rebaptisée Scottish Entreprise) ayant prouvé leur efficacité pour compenser le déclin des industries lourdes par une action proactive. Ces RDA étaient supervisées par des organes composés de membres nommés, peu démocratiques. Pourtant, les députés du Nord se méfièrent de l'Assemblée conçue pour le Nord-Est, car ses compétences, limitées, n'étaient pas articulées à celles des collectivités territoriales 40. Ils s'impliquèrent peu dans la campagne référendaire de novembre 2004, hésitant à coopérer avec d'autres partis et avec la société civile. Ils ne s'offusquèrent pas du rejet sans appel de l'électorat. À partir de 2010, le gouvernement Cameron abolit les RDA, au grand dam des élus travaillistes, au profit de Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEP) centrés sur les besoins locaux et les acteurs privés. Il entendait confier certaines compétences à des maires élus dans des grandes métropoles et à des groupes de collectivités territoriales travaillant avec les LEP pour attirer les investisseurs, étendant ainsi des processus engagés par Blair. L'un des objectifs, l'émergence progressive d'une « Northern Powerhouse », permit aux députés du Nord d'accepter plus facilement les deux Scotland Bills en discussion. Cependant, si John Stevenson (conservateur, Carlisle) avait toute confiance dans son gouvernement pour développer ces projets41, les Travaillistes dénoncèrent une réforme imposée par le pouvoir central (David Anderson, député de Blaydon, appelant à une concertation sur le modèle écossais), ainsi qu'une dévolution axée sur les grandes villes (Sue Hajman, députée de Workington, soulignant que l'ouest de Cumbria avait peu d'affinités avec Manchester)42. Mais, en 2016, les sept collectivités territoriales du Nord- Est, réunies au sein d'une « combined authority » pour gérer le transport et la formation, durent renoncer à la dévolution d'autres compétences, faute d'accord entre elles.
La réévaluation de la représentation de l'Écosse au sein des institutions centrales
Le rééquilibrage affecte également les institutions centrales. La question dite de West Lothian était la plus controversée depuis 1977. Soulevée à maintes reprises par Tam Dalyell (député de la circonscription éponyme), elle portait sur le sort des députés écossais à la Chambre des Communes après la dévolution. Tout en conservant les mêmes pouvoirs que les autres députés, ils n'auraient plus à connaître des domaines dévolus. Dans les années soixante-dix, les élus du Nord redoutaient cet affaiblissement de leurs collègues travaillistes (Ogden, Liverpool, West Derby43). Dans les années 2000, les députés anglais étaient plutôt enclins à dénoncer l'anomalie permettant aux Écossais de continuer à se prononcer sur tous les sujets anglais. La suppression de 13 des 72 députés écossais, entrée en vigueur en 2005, ne leur suffit pas. Au lendemain du référendum de 2014, Cameron se vanta de proposer une véritable réponse, en réduisant l'influence des députés écossais sur les projets de loi anglais discutés à la Chambre des Communes. Il s'agissait d'atténuer la voix de l'Écosse, mais aussi de ses élus, majoritairement travaillistes (puis SNP à partir de 2015). C'est ce que dénoncèrent les députés travaillistes du Nord lors des débats sur la modification du règlement de la Chambre des Communes. Nic Dakin (Scunthorpe) anticipait l'apparition de deux catégories de députés, susceptible de transformer le Parlement britannique, socle
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commun, en Parlement anglais44, peu sensible aux intérêts de sa région. Ed Miliband (Doncaster North) s'accorda avec Salmond -fait exceptionnel- pour souligner la difficulté à identifier des textes anglais45. Mais ces élus se préoccupaient surtout de l'avenir de leur parti, privé du soutien des députés écossais. Inversement, les Conservateurs appuyèrent leur gouvernement. Selon Paul Maynard (Blackpool North & Cleveleys), les citoyens anglais devaient s'assurer de l'approbation, par leurs députés, des textes de loi les concernant, même si, en dernière lecture, ces derniers devraient recueillir une double majorité, de députés anglais et de députés britanniques46. Sur ce sujet, la solidarité partisane l'emporta sur toute solidarité régionale. La place de la voix écossaise à la Chambre des Communes se pose avec une nouvelle acuité à la suite du référendum du 23 juin 2016 qui a engendré des résultats opposés en Écosse et en Angleterre. Les députés du Nord-est de l'Angleterre ont pris acte du vote en faveur de la sortie de l'UE de la quasi-totalité de leurs circonscriptions, tout en s'inquiétant pour leur avenir économique. En effet, comme ils l'ont fait valoir en octobre 2016, près de 60 % des exportations du Nord-est sont destinées à l'UE (une proportion nettement plus élevée que la moyenne britannique), leur région était la seule à enregistrer un excédent commercial. Deux députés SNP ont pris part à ce débat, affichant une solidarité47 qui n'était pas désintéressée. L'Écosse ayant voté contre le Brexit, le SNP pressait le gouvernement de Theresa May de maintenir des relations étroites avec l'UE, au moins pour certains secteurs (l'industrie automobile du Nord) et certaines nations (l'Écosse). Cette revendication s'est faite plus insistante quelques jours plus tard, Nissan ayant reçu des garanties du gouvernement britannique48. Cependant, cette unité semble avoir été de courte durée. En janvier 2017, May a opté pour un hard Brexit impliquant une sortie du marché unique et de l'union douanière pour l'ensemble du Royaume-Uni, en promettant de consulter les gouvernements des nations. Catherine McKinnell (travailliste, Newcastle) a alors sollicité un dialogue associant toutes les parties du royaume, même celles qui sont dépourvues de représentations institutionnelles49. Mais Joanna Cherry (SNP) a préféré se focaliser sur le projet détaillé du gouvernement écossais de Nicola Sturgeon, lequel proposait notamment un maintien de l'Écosse dans le marché unique50. Or, en mars, cette dernière, confrontée à la fin de non-recevoir du gouvernement britannique, a affirmé n'avoir d'autre choix que de réclamer un second référendum d'autodétermination, les institutions centrales devenant incapables de représenter sa nation. Les évolutions constitutionnelles écossaises sont particulièrement sensibles autour de la frontière.
La peur d'une frontière aux abords du mur d'Hadrien
Les territoires frontaliers présentant de nombreuses convergences, leurs élus ont des réactions plus vives à la perspective de réformes écossaises.
Une grande proximité politique et socio-économique
Les députés anglais des circonscriptions frontalières ont la même étiquette partisane que leurs voisins écossais : ils sont conservateurs ou libéraux-démocrates, ce qui facilite le dialogue. Penrith and the Border et Hexham sont fidèles aux premiers depuis 1945-1950. Berwick-upon-Tweed, fief libéral/libéral-démocrate, est devenu conservateur en 2015. Côté écossais, Berwickshire, Roxburgh & Selkirk (anciennement
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Roxburgh), à l'est, était libéral-démocrate (après avoir intégré Berwick & East Lothian, siège travailliste). Il a eu un député SNP en 2015, moins par adhésion à ce parti, peu prisé dans la région51, qu'en signe de protestation contre les politiques britanniques d'austérité, avant d'être conquis par les conservateurs en 2017. Dumfriesshire, Clydesdale & Tweeddale (ex-Dumfries), à l'ouest, est conservateur ; il n'a été représenté par un travailliste qu'entre 1997 et 2005, dans une période d'impopularité d'un parti perçu comme anglais. Qui plus est, l'électorat de ces députés souhaite maintenir des liens étroits. Les Écossais du sud se sont montrés peu enthousiastes à l'égard des réformes institutionnelles (tableau 6). Ils ont repoussé la dévolution en 1979 et l'indépendance en 2014 dans des proportions supérieures à la moyenne écossaise. En 1997, leur approbation de la dévolution était mitigée, Dumfries & Galloway rejetant même les pouvoirs fiscaux du Parlement écossais. Par ailleurs, sur la question européenne, les électeurs frontaliers ont évolué de concert : si, en 1975, ils étaient plus europhiles que ceux de leurs nations respectives, en 2016, ils étaient devenus plus eurosceptiques que ces dernières. Cette proximité se retrouve sur le plan socio-économique, tout au long de la période étudiée (tableaux 7 et 8)52. Les territoires frontaliers ont un taux de chômage inférieur à la moyenne britannique, mais ils offrent des salaires plus faibles et comptent davantage de retraités. Les collectivités et circonscriptions anglaises sont toutefois plus dynamiques, en particulier à l'ouest.
Une sensibilité particulière aux réformes écossaises
S'agissant de la dévolution, les élus ont veillé à rassurer les frontaliers. Les Libéraux- démocrates, qui avaient plébiscité les projets53, tentèrent de prévenir les tensions. En 1998, lors de l'adoption définitive du Scotland Bill, Archy Kirkwood (Tweeddale), Michael Moore (Roxburgh) et Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) organisèrent un bref débat pour appeler à faire cause commune auprès du gouvernement britannique afin de traiter les difficultés socio-économiques54. Cependant, dès qu'il fut question d'accorder des pouvoirs fiscaux substantiels au Parlement écossais, Beith, fustigea le maintien de la formule Barnett55. Ils se préoccupèrent aussi de la frontière entre Angleterre et Écosse. Le tracé terrestre n'étant plus contesté depuis le XVe siècle, il n'a pas constitué un enjeu. Seule la ville de Berwick, qui a changé treize fois de nationalité, aurait quelque raison de solliciter son rattachement à l'Écosse, en raison de la négligence de l'Angleterre, comme l'avait suggéré John Mackintosh (travailliste, Berwick & East Lothian)56. En revanche, la frontière maritime était une source potentielle de conflit, en raison de la dévolution du secteur de la pêche. En mars 1999, les députés endossèrent la délimitation conçue par le gouvernement britannique. Cependant, comme celle-ci dérogeait aux règles du droit international à deux endroits, pour des raisons pratiques, rompant ainsi avec la pratique coutumière de l'application du droit écossais, Beith invita à la prudence, estimant que ce précédent pourrait être contesté par le SNP57. Celui-ci a effectivement protesté au Parlement écossais, sans résultat, mais à son arrivée au pouvoir, il a évité toute polémique58. En ce qui concerne l'indépendance de l'Écosse, les élus frontaliers ont manifesté leur opposition viscérale de diverses manières.
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Tout d'abord, appuyés par leurs collègues du sud de l'Écosse, Moore et David Mundell (Dumfriesshire), ministres au Scottish Office dans le gouvernement de coalition de Cameron, ils ont dénoncé le retour d'une frontière. Guy Oppernam (conservateur, Hexham) évoqua les problèmes de devise et d'immigration59. Rory Stewart, Écossais installé en Angleterre, laissa libre cours à son émotion, soulignant que la moitié des appels téléphoniques passés depuis la ville de Carlisle était à destination de l'Écosse60. Faute d'institutions communes, ces liens se distendraient de manière irrémédiable. Par ailleurs, ces députés saluèrent l'initiative des cinq conseils frontaliers en faveur d'une stratégie transfrontalière, réaliste (tourisme, transports) destinée à consolider les liens. Lors des auditions par la commission des Affaires écossaises à la Chambre des Communes, Beith appela à surmonter les problèmes administratifs, John Stevenson (Carlisle) proposant même une agence de développement commune61. Ensuite, Rory Stewart, frustré par l'inertie de ses collègues, lança un appel au peuple, incité à manifester son rejet d'une indépendance qui ne réglerait nullement la perception de l'indifférence de Londres (commune aux Anglais du Nord et aux Écossais) et d'Édimbourg62. Il invita les citoyens à former, le 19 juillet, une chaîne humaine le long du mur d'Hadrien marquant la limite septentrionale de l'avancée des Romains. Celui-ci, tout comme la frontière actuelle entre Angleterre et Écosse, qui constituaient des créations humaines, ne pouvaient occulter un passé commun. Il espérait réunir 100 000 personnes. Il opta finalement pour un pique-nique destiné à poser les fondations d'une construction en pierre (cairn) près de Gretna, matérialisant le respect et l'affection entre les deux peuples. Chacun pouvait apporter sa contribution et la personnaliser. Stewart visait un édifice de trois mètres, mais, avec ses 130 000 pierres, il ne dépassa pas le tiers de cet objectif63. Enfin, les élus résistèrent aux tentatives de séduction des dirigeants SNP qui cherchaient à positionner l'Écosse comme un centre de pouvoir concurrent de celui de Londres. George Reid avait amorcé cette approche en 197664. Depuis lors, la capitale avait affirmé sa domination sur le plan économique et financier. Salmond assura que la croissance économique résultant de l'indépendance de sa nation profiterait à ses voisins, en faisant émerger un pôle septentrional dynamique65. Fin connaisseur de la Chambre des Communes, où il était entré en 1988, il s'afficha aux côtés de Peter Kilfoyle, ancien député travailliste de Liverpool et fit valoir le changement d'attitude de Heffer, mais ne put trouver d'autres exemples66. Lors des élections à la Chambre des Communes de mai 2015, Sturgeon, qui avait succédé à Salmond, poursuivit dans cette voie. Se targuant d'une grand-mère issue d'une famille ouvrière du Nord de l'Angleterre, elle s'engagea à lutter contre les politiques d'austérité afin de rééquilibrer le Royaume-Uni67. Son volontarisme poussa 50 000 habitants du Nord à signer une pétition (« Take us with you Scotland »), appelant à une révision de la frontière, selon un tracé allant de la rivière Dee au nord de la rivière Humber, afin de se soustraire à un gouvernement dirigé par des anciens élèves d'Eton. Mais ce type d'initiatives, ainsi que les discours offensifs du SNP, n'étaient pas du goût des députés du Nord, volontiers méprisants à l'égard du nationalisme, certains y voyant une manœuvre destinée à fragiliser les Travaillistes68.
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Conclusion
Les députés du Nord de l'Angleterre, très actifs contre la dévolution du pouvoir dans les années soixante-dix, ont compris qu'il était devenu impossible de s'opposer aux réformes constitutionnelles écossaises car depuis 1997, elles sont considérées comme des émanations de la volonté du peuple, et non plus comme des calculs politiques. Le référendum d'autodétermination est apparu comme un autre tournant, la poursuite de la dévolution étant moins menaçante que la création d'un État délimité par une véritable frontière. Leurs arguments présentent de nombreuses similitudes, au-delà de leur appartenance partisane et de leur degré de proximité avec l'Écosse. Ils défendent les forces centrifuges qui ont finalement prévalu en 2014. Cependant, ces députés ont dû s'adapter au nouveau contexte politique à l'issue de ce référendum. D'une part, le SNP, arrivé en tête à tous les scrutins, constitue la voix de l'Écosse. Il critique les politiques d'austérité du gouvernement britannique, tout en refusant d'utiliser les nouvelles compétences fiscales dévolues, du moins jusqu'en 2017. « Londres » fait figure de bouc-émissaire. Cette détermination implacable, qui aurait pu susciter l'adhésion des députés du Nord, les éloigne dans la pratique car elle alimente les revendications indépendantistes, jamais éteintes, notamment dans la perspective du Brexit. En effet, en juin 2017, Sturgeon a simplement reporté son projet de second référendum d'autodétermination, sans y renoncer. D'autre part, les branches des partis britanniques tentent d'affirmer leur autonomie. Les Travaillistes, jaloux de leurs prérogatives, dans l'espoir de reconquérir le terrain perdu au SNP, ont peu apprécié, en 2016, la nomination de David Anderson, député du Nord de l'Angleterre, au poste de porte-parole pour l'Écosse au sein du Cabinet fantôme, car il avait appelé à la suppression de la formule Barnett et n'écartait pas un accord avec le SNP. Mais ce mandat a pris fin en juin 2017. Par contre, les Conservateurs écossais, en progression en Écosse pour la première fois depuis 1997, n'hésitent plus à prôner des réformes d'inspiration anglaise, telle l'élection directe de maires ou présidents de collectivités territoriales chargés de dynamiser l'économie69. Majoritaires dans les circonscriptions jouxtant la frontière, ils apportent un soutien sans réserve aux initiatives transfrontalières et demeurent vigilants à l'égard des velléités indépendantistes du SNP70. Cependant, dans le même temps, la gestion du Brexit par le gouvernement britannique incite ces branches écossaises à se focaliser sur les intérêts de leur nation, ce qui ne les rapproche guère des élus du Nord.
Annexes : Tableaux
Tableau 1 : Dépenses publiques par habitant, 1969-1974 (livres sterling)
Nord-Ouest Écosse
Commerce, industrie, emploi 24 39
Capitaux pour industries nationalisées 23 31
Logement 28 44
Éducation, bibliothèques, sciences et arts 60 71
Santé et services sociaux à la personne 49 57
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Source : Richard Wainwright, HC, Hansard, 16 décembre 1976. Tableau 2 : Dépenses publiques identifiables par habitant, 1999-2000 (indices, Royaume- Uni=100)
Nord-Est Nord-Ouest Yorkshire & Humberside Écosse
Logement 57 90 71 176
Santé 102 100 98 119
Éducation 100 101 96 126
Source: ADAMS John, ROBINSON Peter, Devolution in Practice, Londres, IPPR, 2002, p. 158. Tableau 3 : Dépenses publiques identifiables par habitant, 2014-2015 (livres sterling)
Nord-Est Nord-Ouest Yorkshire and the Humber Écosse Royaume-Uni
Logement 169 105 117 337 165
Santé 2152 2145 2012 2160 2069
Éducation 1275 1313 1300 1440 1307
Total 9347 9197 8660 10374 8913
Source: HM TREASURY, Country and Regional Analysis, Londres, Stationery Office, novembre 2015, p. 36. Tableau 4 : Évolution du PIB par habitant, 1966-2012 (indices : Royaume-Uni=100)
Nord puis Nord-Est Nord-Ouest Yorkshire&Humberside Écosse
1966 91 94,5 97,8 91,5
1976 95,6 96,4 94 98,6
1987 89,2 92,1 92,4 93,9
1990 86,9 90,8 91,1 94,2
2012 75,9 85,1 81,6 98,6
Source : SMITH David, North and South, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1994, p. 129. MCCRONE Gavin, Scottish Independence, Édimbourg, Birlinn, 2013, p. 7. Tableau 5 : Comparaison entre régions et nations de quelques indicateurs socio- économiques, 2014-2016
Nord- Nord- Yorkshire and the Royaume- Écosse Est Ouest Humber Uni
Population (millions) 2014 2,619 7,133 5,360 5,328 64,6
PIB par habitant (£) 2014 18 216 21 011 19 863 23 102 24 958
Taux de chômage(%) 2016 6,8 5,1 5,9 4,6 4,9
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Taux d'activité (%) 2016 71,1 72,8 72,9 74 74,5
Salaire hebdomadaire (£) 484,8 492 480,5 527 527,7 2015
Prix des maisons (£, 145 127 000 151 000 152 000 219 000 arrondis) 000
340 Création d'entreprises 136 000 532 000 382 000 5,3 millions 000
Source : RHODES Chris, WARD Matthew, Regional and Country Economic Indicators, Londres, House of Commons briefing paper, 2016, p. 4-5. Tableau 6 : Proportion d'électeurs frontaliers approuvant les questions posées lors des divers référendums
Dumfries & Cumbria Northumberland Angleterre Borders Écosse Galloway
1975, maintien dans la 71,9 69,2 68,7 72,3 68,2 58,4 CEE
2016, maintien dans 39,9 45,9 46,6 58,5 53,1 62 l'UE
1979, dévolution 40,3 40,3 51,6
1997, dévolution 62,8 60,7 74,3
1997, dévolution 50,7 48,8 63,5 (pouvoirs fiscaux)
2014, indépendance 33,4 34,3 44,7
Source : auteur Tableau 7 : Composition socio-économique des circonscriptions frontalières, 1971-2017
Berwick Penrith Berwick- Dumfriesshire, Berwickshire, and and Grande- % Hexham upon- Clydesdale, Roxburgh, East the Bretagne Tweed Tweeddale Selkirk Lothian Border (-1979)
Propriétaires- 1971 49,9 45,2 32,7 33,3 33,8 25,6 50 occupants
1981 58,2 56,5 37,3 42,1 32,7 57
1991 71,9 69,1 54,6 58,7 49,3 66,4
Classe 1971 36,6 40,9 32,7 34,3 33,3 32,8 36 moyenne
1981 45 53,8 39,2 40 37,7 45,1
1991 54,3 62,7 48,9 48,1 42,5 56,4
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Taux chômage 1987 6,3 5,7 9,7 9,4 7,3 9,5 (allocataires)
1997 2,1 2,3 3,8 4 2,3 6,1
2017 1,1 1,4 2,3 1,9 2,6 2,6
Note : Dumfriesshire s'appelait Dumfries jusqu'en 2001 ; Berwickshire était autrefois Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles (1971-1979), puis Roxburgh and Berwickshire (1983-2001).
Sources : BUTLER David & KAVANAGH Dennis, The British General Election of October 1974, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1975, p. 300-322, BUTLER David & KAVANAGH Dennis, The British General Election of 1997, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1997, p. 261-288, WALLER Robert, The Almanach of British Politics, Londres, Routledge, 1991, 718 p., WALLER Robert & CRIDDLE Byron, The Almanach of British Politics (Londres, Routledge, 1996). ; POWELL, Andrew, BROWN, Jennifer, MCGUINNESS, Feargal, People Claiming Unemployment Benefits by Constituency (Londres, House of Commons library, 2017), pp. 14-32. Tableau 8 : Comparaison d'indicateurs socio-économiques autour de la frontière anglo- écossaise (collectivités territoriales), 2013
Scottish Grande- Cumbria Northumberland Dumfries&Galloway Borders Bretagne
61,4 Population 499 800 316 000 148 100 113 200 millions
Taux de chômage (%) 6,1 6,2 8 5,9 7,9
Proportion de retraités 26,5 21,7 25,4 21,7 16,4 (%)
Proportion de personnes sans 10,6 9,5 12,2 9,9 10,6 diplômes
Salaire hebdomadaire 481,4 465,2 419,6 449,5 508 (£)
Proportion d'emplois 12,7 11,6 10,4 8,7 8,2 dans le tourisme (%)
Source: SHAW Keith, BLACKIE Jonathan, ROBINSON Fred, HENDERSON Graeme, Borderlands. Can the North East and Cumbria Benefit from Greater Scottish Autonomy? (Université de Northumbria, St Chad's College Durham, IPPR North, juillet 2013), p. 31. Tableau 9 : Débats à la Chambre des Communes sur des questions constitutionnelles analysés dans cet article
Deuxième Motion de Troisième Lecture Texte examiné Autres débats lecture « guillotine » lecture finale
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Livre blanc Our 19/01/76 Changing Democracy
13 au Scotland and Wales Bill 22/02/77 16/12/76
16/11/77, Scotland Bill 1978 14/11/77 22/02/78 6/07/78 28/03/79
Referendums (Scotland 21/05/97 3-4/06/97 30-31/07/97 and Wales) Bill
Scotland Bill 1998 12-13/01/98 19/05/98 11-12/11/98
Scottish Adjacent Waters 23/03/99 Boundaries Order
Scotland Bill 2012 27/01/11 21/06/11 24/04/12
Scotland Bill 2016 8/06/15 9/11/15
Scotland Bill 1998 (Modification of 15/01/13 Schedule 5) Order 2013
16/12/04, 7, Standing Order 15/07/15, n°24/2015 22/10/15
6/02/14, Indépendance 4/03/14
25, 31/10/16, Brexit 8/02/17
Source : HC, Hansard. Edwige Camp-Pietrain est professeur de civilisation britannique. Ses recherches portent sur la vie politique, les institutions et les politiques publiques dans l'Ecosse contemporaine. Elle est notamment l’auteure de L’Ecosse et la tentation de l’indépendance. Le référendum d’autodétermination de 2014 (Septentrion, 2014) et L’Impossible indépendance écossaise ? (Atlande, 2014).
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Osmond, John, The Divided Kingdom (Londres, Constable, 1988).
Pidd, Helen, « Alex Salmond Tries to Woo Liverpool with Help from a Labour Heavyweight », The Guardian, 18 juillet 2014.
Powell, Andrew, Brown, Jennifer & Mcguinness, Feargal, People Claiming Unemployment Benefits by Constituency, briefing paper n°7947 (Londres, House of Commons library, 2017).
Rhodes, Chris & Ward, Matthew, Regional and Country Economic Indicators, briefing paper n°6924 (Londres, House of Commons library, 24 octobre 2016).
Salmond, Alex, New Statesman lecture, Londres, 5 mars 2014, http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2014/03/alex-salmonds-new-statesman-lecture-full- text, consulté le 26 octobre 2016.
Sandford, Mark & Hetherington, Peter, « The Regions at the Crossroads : the Future for Sub- National Government in England », in Alan Trench (dir.), The Dynamics of Devolution (Exeter, Imprint Acadamic, 2005), pp. 91-116.
Shaw, Keith, « 'Our Friends in the North' : Responses to the Independence Debate in the North East and Cumbria », Scottish Affairs 23:3 (2014), pp. 396-406.
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Shaw, Keith, « 'Take Us With You Scotland' ? Post-Referendum and Post-Election Reflections from the North East of England », Scottish Affairs 24:4 (2015), pp. 452-462.
Shaw, Keith, Blackie, Jonathan, Robinson, Fred & Henderson, Graeme, Borderlands. Can the North East and Cumbria Benefit from Greater Scottish Autonomy ? (Université de Northumbria St Chad's College Durham, IPPR North, juillet 2013).
Smith, David, North and South. Britain's Economic, Social and Political Divide (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1994 (1989)).
Scottish National Party, Stronger for Scotland (Édimbourg, 2015).
Stewart, Rory, The Marches (Londres, Jonathan Cape, 2016).
The Times, « Regional Government Options for the North », 23 mai 1978, p. 3.
Waller, Robert, The Almanach of British Politics (Londres, Routledge, 1991 (1983), 4e edition).
Waller, Robert & Criddle Byron, The Almanach of British Politics (Londres, Routledge, 1996, 5e edition).
NOTES
1. Nous adoptons une définition large du Nord, englobant les régions Nord-Est, Nord-Ouest et Yorkshire, afin d'obtenir un échantillon suffisant de députés prenant part aux débats. 2. HC, Hansard, 16 décembre 1976, col. 1735-1876. 3. Idem. 4. HC, Hansard, 22 février 1978, col. 1445-1605. 5. HC, Hansard, 14 décembre 1976, col. 1249-1486. 6. Office of the Lord President of the Council, Devolution : the English Dimension (Londres, HMSO, 1976), paragraphes 24, 35. HC, Hansard, 13 décembre 1976, col. 974-1150. 7. Cette formule, inventée en 1977 par Joel Barnett, premier secrétaire du Trésor britannique, est en vigueur depuis les débuts de la dévolution en 1999. Lors de chaque hausse, par un ministère britannique, d'une dépense publique en faveur de l'Angleterre, dans un domaine dévolu à l'Écosse, le Parlement écossais reçoit une proportion fixe (environ 10%) de cette hausse. Cette proportion, relativement surestimée au regard de la part de la population écossaise dans la population britannique (moins de 9%), peut ensuite être librement affectée par les élus écossais. 8. En 1998, le Parlement écossais pouvait moduler le seul taux de base de trois points (option jamais activée); en 2012, cette possibilité a été portée à dix points pour les trois taux ; en 2016, les taux et les tranches ont été dévolus. 9. HC, Hansard, 27 janvier 2011, col. 519. 10. HC, Hansard, 8 juin 2015, col. 55. 11. HC, Hansard, 22 février 1977. 12. Idem. 13. HC, Hansard, 9 novembre 2015, col. 145. 14. HC, Hansard, 4 mars 2014, col. 216-218. 15. Idem, col. 218. 16. Idem, col. 216. 17. Idem, col. 218, 9 novembre 2015, col. 142. Stevenson s'était par ailleurs réjoui d'une possible restriction du champ d'action de l'État en Écosse, HC, Hansard, 27 janvier 2011, col. 506. 18. HC, Hansard, 14 décembre 1976. Il redoutait même le soutien de la France, par analogie avec le Québec. HC, Hansard, 14 novembre 1977, col. 43.
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19. HC, Hansard, 22 février 1978. 20. HC, Hansard, 22 février 1977. Par contre, Heffer, tenté par la mise en avant du rejet d'une unité écossaise fondée sur des critères ethniques, dut y renoncer, car le SNP veillait à évoquer le peuple d'Écosse, reposant sur le droit du sol. 21. HC, Hansard, 21 mai 1997. 22. HC, Hansard, 4 mars 2014, col. 213. 23. Eric Heffer, « Devolution and the Labour Party », New Statesman, 19 décembre 1975, p. 778. 24. HC, Hansard, 14 novembre 1977. 25. HC, Hansard, 22 février 1977. 26. HC, Hansard, 22 février 1978. 27. Vernon Bogdanor, Devolution (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 207. 28. HC, Hansard, 22 février 1978. 29. Formulé par Cameron, Nick Clegg et Ed Miliband, il promettait une poursuite de la dévolution en cas de rejet de l'indépendance. Les leaders des principaux partis britanniques s'appuyaient sur des projets déjà élaborés par les branches écossaises de ceux-ci. 30. HC, Hansard, 8 juin 2015, col. 976. 31. HC, Hansard, 9 novembre 2015, col. 137. 32. Kate Devlin, « New 'Carlisle' Principle to Ensure other Parts of the UK do not 'Lose out' by Scottish Devolution », The Herald, 20 avril 2015, p. 6. 33. HC, Hansard, 15 janvier 2013, col. 766. 34. Commission on the Constitution, Report, vol. 1 (Londres, HMSO, 1973), 1188 ; vol. 2, chapitre 6. 35. John Mackintosh, The Devolution of Power (Londres, Penguin, 1968), chapitre 9. 36. HC, Hansard, 22 février 1977, 22 février 1978. Plus modestement, le gouvernement britannique fit bénéficier le Nord de conseils régionaux du National Enterprise Board, du siège social de British shipbuilders et d'une hausse des dépenses publiques. GUTHRIE Roger, MCLEAN Iain, « Another Part of the Periphery : Reactions to Devolution in an English Development Area », Parliamentary Affairs 31:2 (1978), p. 198. 37. The Times, « Regional Government Options for the North », 23 mai 1978, p. 3. 38. John Osmond, The Divided Kingdom (Londres, Constable, 1988), p. 14. 39. Christopher Bryant, The Nations of Britain (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 219. 40. Mark Sandford, HETHERINGTON Peter, « The Regions at the Crossroads : the Future for Sub- National Government in England », in Alan TRENCH (dir.), The Dynamics of Devolution (Exeter, Imprint Acadamic, 2005), p. 96. 41. HC, Hansard, 27 janvier 2011, col. 505. 42. HC, Hansard, 8 juin 2015, col. 976, 990. 43. HC, Hansard, 22 février 1978. 44. HC, Hansard, 15 juillet 2015, col. 1040. 45. HC, Hansard, 7 juillet 2015, col. 223. 46. HC, Hansard, 22 octobre 2015, col. 1123. 47. HC, Hansard, 25 octobre 2016, Hannah Bardell et Tasmina Ahmed-Sheikh, col. 94, 98. 48. HC, Hansard, 31 octobre 2016, col. 583. 49. HC, Hansard, 8 février 2017, col. 508 (examen en commission du EU (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill). 50. Idem, col. 817. 51. Ils ne votent pas non plus pour le UKIP, même en 2015, lorsque 10 % des électeurs des trois sièges frontaliers anglais se sont laissés séduire. Ainsi, David Coburn, unique député écossais de ce parti (au Parlement européen) a eu un impact limité lorsqu'il a tenté de dénoncer le risque
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d'un afflux de migrants à Berwick (par analogie avec Calais) à l'issue du Brexit, si l'Écosse était autorisée à élaborer sa propre politique d'immigration, The Herald, 9 août 2016. 52. Keith Shaw, Jonathan Blackie, Fred Robinson & Graeme Henderson, Borderlands. Can the North East and Cumbria Benefit from Greater Scottish Autonomy ? (Université de Northumbria St Chad's College Durham, IPPR North, juillet 2013), pp. 4.7. 53. David Steel, député de Roxburgh de 1965 à 1983 (il choisit alors Tweddale, Ettrick & Lauderdale) avait co-présidé la Convention constitutionnelle. En tant que président du Parti libéral, il avait eu Beith pour numéro deux de 1985 à 1988. Même chez les conservateurs, Hector Munro, député de Dumfries à partir de 1964, s'était prononcé pour la dévolution jusqu'en décembre 1976, protestant contre la consigne de rejet édictée par Thatcher, avant de s'y conformer jusqu'à son retrait de la Chambre des Communes en 1997. 54. HC, Hansard, 12 novembre 1998, col. 573-579. 55. HC, Hansard, 4 mars 2014, col. 222. 56. John Mackinstosh, op.cit., chapitre 9. Certains sondages réalisés depuis 1999 en mettant en avant les avancées sociales du Parlement écossais vont dans le même sens. HERALD, « People of Berwick Want to be Scottish Again », 18 février 2008, p. 6. 57. HC, Hansard, 23 mars 1999. 58. Scottish Parliament, Official Report, 3 juin 1999, col. 236, Alex Salmond. En 2014, le site indépendantiste Bella Caledonia, a toutefois insinué que les unionistes entendaient ainsi s'emparer d'une partie des ressources pétrolières de l'Écosse. 59. HC, Hansard, 4 mars 2014, col. 219. 60. HC, Hansard, 15 janvier 2013, col. 766 ; 6 février 2014, col. 468. 61. HC, Scottish Affairs Committee, Our Borderlands-Our Future. Final Report, HC 571, 26 mars 2015, 34, 62. 62. HC, Hansard, 6 février 2014, col. 468. 63. Peter Geoghegan, The People's Referendum (Édimbourg, Luath Press, 2015, p. 61). Le nombre de personnes ayant participé est estimé à quelques dizaines de milliers. 64. HC, Hansard, 19 janvier 1976, col. 925-1076. 65. Alex Salmond, New Statesman lecture, Londres, 5 mars 2014, http://www.newstatesman.com/ politics/2014/03/alex-salmonds-new-statesman-lecture-full-text. 66. Anas Sarwar, numéro deux des Travaillistes écossais, s'est rendu dans des villes anglaises. Helen Pidd, « Alex Salmond Tries to Woo Liverpool with Help from a Labour Heavyweight », The Guardian, 18 juillet 2014; Keith Shaw, « 'Our Friends in the North' : Responses to the Independence Debate in the North East and Cumbria », Scottish Affairs, vol. 23, n°3, 2014, p. 404. 67. SCOTTISH NATIONAL PARTY, Stronger for Scotland (Édimbourg, 2015), p. 12. 68. Keith Shaw, « 'Take Us With You Scotland'? Post-Referendum and Post-Election Reflections from the North East of England », Scottish Affairs 24:4 (2015), p. 456. 69. SCOTTISH CONSERVATIVE AND UNIONIST PARTY, Forward, Together (Édimbourg, 2017), p. 27. 70. Voir l'ouvrage de Rory Stewart, The Marches (Londres, Jonathan Cape, 2016), livre 2.
ABSTRACTS
Since the 1970s, Scottish constitutional issues have been on the agenda in the UK, first with the devolutionary process then with the referendum on Scotland's independence. MPs from the
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North of England have criticized these developments while proving unable to stop them. This paper, mostly based on their speeches during parliamentary debates held on these topics, aims at mapping out their changing arguments over four decades.
Depuis les années soixante-dix, les questions constitutionnelles écossaises occupent le devant de la scène au Royaume-Uni, d'abord avec le processus de dévolution, puis avec le référendum sur l'indépendance de l'Écosse. Les députés du Nord de l'Angleterre à la Chambre des Communes critiquent ces perspectives, tout en étant incapables de les empêcher. Cet article, fondé principalement sur l'étude de leurs discours lors de débats parlementaires consacrés à ces sujets, vise à mettre en évidence l'évolution de leurs arguments au cours de quatre décennies.
INDEX
Keywords: North, England, Scotland, devolution, independence Mots-clés: Nord, Angleterre, Ecosse, dévolution, indépendance
AUTHOR
EDWIGE CAMP-PIETRAIN Laboratoire CALHISTE (EA4343), Université de Valenciennes et du Hainaut-Cambrésis
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Book reviews Comptes-rendus
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Compte-rendu de Beyond Brexit: Towards a British Constitution (2019), Vernon Bogdanor
Stéphanie Bory
RÉFÉRENCE
Vernon Bogdanor, Beyond Brexit: Towards a British Constitution, Londres, I.B. Tauris, 2019, 304 pages
1 Né en 1943, diplômé d’Oxford en 1964 en philosophie, économie et politique, Vernon Bogdanor, spécialiste en histoire constitutionnelle, est Professeur au Centre pour la politique et le gouvernement britanniques (Centre for British Politics and Government) de King’s College, à Londres, après avoir enseigné jusqu’en 2010 au Brasenose College à Oxford. Professeur émérite à Gresham College, il donne régulièrement des conférences sur la politique et l’histoire britanniques, conférences disponibles sur le site de l’université. Il a eu, dans sa carrière, des étudiants qui ont par la suite occupé le devant de la scène, comme David Cameron, Premier ministre de 2010 à 2016 qu’il a décrit comme « a moderate and sensible Conservative »1, Camilla Cavendish, ancienne directrice politique de David Cameron et membre de la Chambre des Lords, ou Katherine Allen, directrice depuis 2000 de Amnesty International UK.
2 Régulièrement invité sur les chaînes de radio et de télévision, il est l’auteur de plus d’une dizaine d’ouvrages, tous reconnus, sur le gouvernement et la politique, dont The People and the Party System: The Referendum and Electoral Reforms in British Politics (1981), The Monarchy and the Constitution (1997), Power and the People: A Guide to Constitutional Reform (1997) et The Coalition and the Constitution (2011), ainsi que de très nombreux articles. Il a été et est également conseiller auprès du gouvernement et de plusieurs commissions parlementaires, comme le Select Committee on the European Communities de la Chambre des Lords (1982-1983), ainsi qu’auprès de différents gouvernements étrangers, en République tchèque, Israël, Hongrie ou Slovaquie, sur les réformes
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électorales et constitutionnelles en tant que membre de délégations du Conseil de l’Europe et de la American Bar Association. Vernon Bogdanor est membre de la British Academy et membre honoraire du Institute of Advanced Legal Studies. Il a été nommé Commander of the Order of the British Empire (CBE) en 1998 et Chevalier de la Légion d’Honneur en 2009 par Nicolas Sarkozy pour son travail sur le droit et l’histoire politique de la Grande-Bretagne et de la France. Il est aujourd’hui unanimement considéré comme « l’un des meilleurs experts en droit constitutionnel au Royaume- Uni »2.
3 Vernon Bogdanor s’est récemment beaucoup intéressé au modèle constitutionnel britannique, en particulier dans le contexte de la dévolution et des réformes constitutionnelles introduites par le gouvernement Blair depuis 1997 – sujet de son ouvrage The New British Constitution (2009) – et du vote pour le Brexit en 2016, objet de son dernier ouvrage, Beyond Brexit: Towards a British Constitution, publié en février 2019 chez Bloomsbury. Celui-ci comporte à l’intérieur de l’ouvrage un titre différent, Beyond Brexit: Britain’s Unprotected Constitution. Bogdanor indique dans les Remerciements que le chapitre 5, « Europe and the Rights of the Citizen », reprend largement un pamphlet publié en 2018 pour la Constitution Society, d’où les deux titres. Il ajoute que, selon lui, les débats sur le Brexit ont essentiellement porté sur l’impact économique de la sortie du Royaume-Uni de l’Union européenne, mais ont négligé un aspect pourtant primordial, à savoir l’effet considérable qu’elle aura sur la Constitution britannique, notamment le Parlement, le pouvoir juridique et les droits individuels. Il s’interroge sur la capacité du Royaume-Uni à résister aux forces centrifuges et centripètes libérées par le Brexit. Il explique enfin que le postulat de départ de l’ouvrage lui a été suggéré par Andrew Blick, Directeur du Centre for British Politics and Government et Professeur en politique et histoire contemporaine à King’s College, selon lequel le Brexit constitue l’événement constitutionnel (« a constitutional moment »3) le plus important au Royaume-Uni depuis la Restauration de la monarchie en 1660 qui conduit, moins de 30 ans plus tard, à la Glorieuse Révolution. En effet, pour la première fois, le Parlement britannique est tenu de voter et mettre en œuvre une décision à laquelle il est en majorité opposé, à la suite d’un référendum consultatif que les leaders des principaux partis se sont engagés à respecter. Ce qui est source de conflit entre le principe au cœur de la Constitution britannique, la souveraineté parlementaire, définie notamment par A.V. Dicey au XIXe siècle, et la souveraineté populaire. L’auteur insiste sur le fait qu’une sortie de l’Union européenne ne rendra pas au Parlement sa souveraineté puisqu’il n’y aura clairement pas de retour au cadre politique et constitutionnel de 1972, date de l’adoption par le Parlement du European Communities Act : « Too much will have changed since 1973 ; in any case, the Britain of 2019 is a very different place from the Britain of 1973. »4
4 L’intérêt de cet ouvrage est multiple. Vernon Bogdanor aborde et manipule tout d’abord des concepts politiques et juridique complexes mais en faisant preuve d’une grande pédagogie et une infinie clarté. De plus, la progression des différents chapitres, au nombre de sept, est extrêmement logique et cohérente dans la mesure où il développe un point précis par chapitre, dans une relation de causalité avec le chapitre suivant. Tout comme ses publications précédentes, ce dernier opus constitue une lecture indispensable à quiconque s’intéresse au Brexit et à son impact au Royaume- Uni.
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5 Bogdanor explore dans le premier chapitre intitulé « Britain and Europe: The Poisoned Chalice » les relations difficiles entre le Royaume-Uni et la Communauté économique européenne (CEE), puis l’Union européenne (UE), depuis les années 1950 qui marquent le développement du concept originel d’unité européenne. Il revient sur les différentes étapes de l’entrée chaotique du Royaume-Uni dans la CEE – la première candidature en 1961 et le véto du Général de Gaulle deux ans plus tard, la deuxième candidature en 1967 également rejetée et l’entrée finalement en 1973 – malgré une réelle implication du Royaume-Uni dans les affaires européennes par le biais de signature d’accords économiques et commerciaux et sa contribution majeure dans la création du Conseil de l’Europe. S’appuyant sur les travaux de A.V. Dicey et Sidney Low, il définit la Constitution britannique avant l’entrée dans la CEE, opposant souveraineté parlementaire et souveraineté populaire. Selon Bogdanor, les systèmes constitutionnels britannique et européen étaient bien trop différents pour être totalement compatibles et l’impact de l’appartenance à la CEE sur la souveraineté du Parlement britannique n’a pas suffisamment été débattu au moment de l’adhésion.
6 Dans le chapitre suivant, « Europe and the Sovereignty of Parliament », l’auteur présente plusieurs décisions de justice majeures prises par la Cour européenne depuis les années 1960 qui ont, de façon graduelle, limité la souveraineté du Parlement britannique après 1973 et introduit le principe de « judicial review » par l’adoption de deux principes fondamentaux, la doctrine de l’effet direct et celle de la primauté du droit communautaire sur le droit national des états membres. Bogdanor termine ce deuxième chapitre sur le paradoxe du European Union Act 2011 introduit par David Cameron : tout en statuant que le Parlement est souverain, cette loi oblige tout parlement à venir à consulter les électeurs par référendum pour tout nouveau transfert de pouvoirs à l’UE.
7 Il poursuit son raisonnement en étudiant, dans le chapitre « Europe and the Referendum », comment l’appartenance du Royaume-Uni à la CEE, puis à l’UE, a engendré une révolution constitutionnelle supplémentaire : l’introduction du référendum dans la vie politique britannique, innovation jusqu’alors considérée comme anticonstitutionnelle et jamais utilisée à l’échelle de tout le Royaume-Uni jusqu’en juin 1975, date du référendum organisé par Harold Wilson pour des raisons essentiellement tactiques et politiques. Bogdanor rappelle que cette consultation, qui ne devait constituer un précédent, a pourtant ouvert la voie à de multiples référendums, tant régionaux que nationaux, le dernier étant celui organisé en juin 2016 par David Cameron, pour les mêmes raisons que Wilson plus de quarante ans plus tôt.
8 Cette réflexion sur une telle innovation constitutionnelle conduit l’auteur à se pencher, dans le chapitre suivant « Europe and the Collective Responsibility of Ministers », sur la décision alors prise pour la première fois par un gouvernement majoritaire de suspendre la convention clairement établie depuis le XIXe siècle et définissant le principe de la responsabilité collective des membres du gouvernement. En effet, le Premier ministre Harold Wilson décide en 1975 de lever cette convention le temps de la campagne référendaire, tout comme le gouvernement de coalition entre 2010 et 2015, puis David Cameron pour le référendum sur le Brexit en 2016.
9 Dans le chapitre 5, « Europe and the Rights of the Citizens », mentionné précédemment, Bogdanor considère que le Brexit va profondément réduire les droits des Britanniques qui ne bénéficieront plus de la protection de la Charte européenne des droits fondamentaux, adoptée en 2000 et incluse dans le Traité de Lisbonne de 2008, tout en
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augmentant considérablement le pouvoir non pas du Parlement mais du gouvernement. Pour remédier à cette situation, il encourage l’adoption d’une Bill of Rights britannique.
10 S’interrogeant dans le chapitre 6 « Brexit and Devolution: The Future of the United Kingdom » sur l’avenir de l’Union britannique dans un contexte de tensions renouvelées et accrues entre le pouvoir central et les administrations dévolues, l’auteur revient sur les concepts d’état unitaire et d’état union. Il insiste en préambule sur le fait que, depuis 1998 et l’introduction de la dévolution, le Royaume-Uni est devenu un état multinational. Il étudie le processus de dévolution et l’impact du Brexit pour chaque nation constitutive de l’Union britannique, l’Ecosse, le pays de Galles, l’Irlande du Nord – tout en élargissant sa réflexion à la République d’Irlande – et l’Angleterre, « anomalie »5 selon lui dans les accords de dévolution. Il aborde ainsi dans ce chapitre différents points comme le référendum écossais sur l’indépendance, la question dite EVEL (« English Votes for English Laws »), la convention Sewel et la question épineuse des accords financiers entre Londres et les administrations dévolues post-Brexit. Bogdanor conclue sur l’idée que l’avenir de l’Union britannique est incertain en partie en raison des quatre interprétations différentes de la Constitution qui prévalent aujourd’hui dans chaque nation britannique.
11 C’est la raison pour laquelle il termine son ouvrage par un dernier chapitre, « Brexit: A Constitutional Moment », dans lequel il insiste sur la nécessité pour le Royaume-Uni d’adopter une constitution codifiée, seul moyen, selon lui, de lever les nombreuses incertitudes constitutionnelles engendrées par l’appartenance à l’UE, telles l’utilisation du référendum, la définition claire des droits des citoyens ou la relation entre Westminster et les administrations dévolues. Le Brexit a en effet révélé à quel point la Constitution britannique est sans protection, tout en offrant l’occasion d’y remédier, ce que souligne Bogdanor dans les dernières lignes de son ouvrage : It is just possible that we are now approaching a peaceful constitutional moment, one marked not by revolution or a struggle for independence, but by the concatenation of interconnected constitutional problems, all pressing insistently for resolution. It is just possible that Brexit will prove to be that very break in continuity that will herald our own constitutional moment.6
NOTES
1. Vernon Bogdanor, cité dans Brian Wheeler, « The David Cameron Story », BBC News, 06-12-2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4502656.stm, consulté en avril 2020. 2. Voir Sonia Delesalle-Stolper, « Vernon Bogdanor : ‘Le Parlement est entravé par le peuple’ », Libération, 02-04-2019, https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2019/04/02/vernon-bogdanor-le-parlement-est- entrave-par-le-peuple_1719020, consulté en avril 2020. 3. Vernon Bogdanor, Beyond Brexit: Towards a British Constitution, Londres, I.B. Tauris, 2019, p. vi. 4. Ibid., p. 1. 5. Ibid., p. 198.
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6. Ibid., p. 278.
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Review of The Battle for Christian Britain: Sex, Humanists and Secularisation, 1945-1980 by Callum G. Brown
Arielle Flodrops
RÉFÉRENCE
Callum G. Brown, The Battle for Christian Britain: Sex, Humanists and Secularisation, 1945-1980 , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019, 326p.
Callum G. Brown, historien écossais spécialisé dans les questions de religion et de religiosité au Royaume-Uni, aux Etats-Unis et au Canada contemporains, propose un ouvrage sur les problématiques liées au phénomène de sécularisation au Royaume-Uni. Cet ouvrage paraît être en quelque sorte une suite au très connu The Death of Christian Britain, publié en 2009. Ici, Brown réalise une étude depuis un point de vue très spécifique : The Battle for Christian Britain: Sex, Humanists and Secularisation, 1945-1980 propose une illustration du désintérêt grandissant pour les institutions religieuses traditionnelles par l’observation de la « moral vigilance »,1 dont le pouvoir et l’influence sur les affaires politiques et sociales s’épuisent à mesure que la révolution culturelle des « swinging sixties » s’installe dans la société britannique. Dans la lignée de The Death of Christian Britain, Callum G. Brown se montre disposé à faire usage de termes percutants. Dans le premier livre, l’auteur mettait spécialement en lumière la notion de « mort » (« the death »), suggérant une disparition de la religion institutionnelle associée à la société britannique et sa population. Ici, Brown use particulièrement d’un vocabulaire lié à l’idée de « bataille » (« the battle »), que l’on retrouve dans chacun des chapitres, renforçant un sentiment d’urgence, voire de brutalité dans les faits décrits. Ce choix souligne également une certaine binarité entre,
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d’un côté, le Christianisme conservateur incarné par cette « moral vigilance », et, de l’autre, des petits groupes organisés d’individus nommés les « Humanists », que l’auteur définit comme une catégorie de personnes défendant originellement l’idée que chacun doit avoir le droit de disposer librement de son propre corps.2 Cette approche peut paraître d’un premier abord risqué ; néanmoins le travail de Callum G. Brown ne se contente pas d’explorer cette binarité quasi provocatrice Il articule son travail autour de cinq points clés, qu’il cite explicitement en introduction : 1) la religion conservatrice, la « moral vigilance » et la lutte pour un contrôle strict des questions liées au sexe ; 2) les « licensing authorities », les campagnes menées pour un encadrement soutenu des lieux récréatifs et des loisirs proposés à la population (cinémas, théâtres, pubs, etc.) 3) la question des « Humanists », qui sont présentés comme les opposants principaux de la « moral vigilance » 4) les agitations qui secouent la BBC : le monopole de la morale religieuse sur la corporation, puis sa libéralisation. Enfin, 5) Brown présente le conflit entre l’Eglise d’Angleterre et l’Eglise Catholique comme l’un des moteurs de l’effondrement de la « moral vigilance » au Royaume-Uni. L’auteur fait le choix de concentrer son travail sur plusieurs lieux spécifiques, à savoir Londres, Blackpool, Sheffield, Glasgow, et les Hébrides (spécialement l’Île de Lewis). Ce choix suggère d’une manière très efficace que, d’un territoire à un autre, la « moral vigilance » n’agit pas de façon tout à fait équivalente, puisque les autorités locales ont chacune la charge de mettre en application les lois selon leur volonté. L’auteur explore ces questions en deux parties principales : la première traçant l’âge d’or de la « moral vigilance », « The Heyday of Moral Vigilance 1945-1965 », et la deuxième consacrée à son déclin : « The Sixties Crisis and Its Legacy 1965-1980 ». The Battle for Christian Britain décrit l’évolution de l’organisation principale de la « moral vigilance » au Royaume-Uni : le « Public Morality Council » (PMC). L’auteur expose en premier lieu le fonctionnement de l’organisation, depuis sa structure interne jusqu’aux pratiques qu’elle met en place pour s’assurer de la bonne santé et de la pérennité des valeurs religieuses au sein de la société britannique (partie II, chapitre 2). Le PMC a vu son autorité sérieusement s’étioler à partir du milieu des années soixante, jusqu’à sa disparition totale en 1965 au profit du « Social Morality Council » (SMC), celui-ci géré par des Catholiques, dont la prise de pouvoir a été qualifiée à l’époque de « putsch » contre le PMC qui, malgré une gouvernance œcuménique, était une organisation de l’église anglicane établie (partie III, chapitre 6). Les chapitres 3, 4 et 7 de la partie II s’évertuent à dresser le portrait des campagnes de « licensing » – système qui permettait aux institutions religieuses de garder un contrôle sur les lieux publics et sur ce qu’ils proposaient comme loisirs à la population, adressant des permissions, et préconisant également des interdictions – opérés en collaboration avec le PMC tout au long de son existence, et également, dans une mesure bien moindre, avec le SMC. Ces chapitres (partie II, chapitres 3 et 4) mettent particulièrement en avant les différences visibles entres les localités analysées. Ainsi, quand à Londres les campagnes de « licensing » arrangées en collaboration étroites avec le PMC étaient particulièrement rigoureuses, Brown contraste cette réalité avec celle de Blackpool, où semblait régner un laxisme rare, où une culture du sexe (entretenue par un tourisme
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très important) a pu se développer en avant-garde. De manière un peu moins étayée, Callum G. Brown présente plusieurs autres cas. Sheffield était particulièrement surveillée par le PMC et les pouvoirs locaux, du fait de sa très grande irreligiosité. A travers les écrits de Ted Wickham, représentant de l’Eglise d’Angleterre au sein des industries de Sheffield entre 1944 et 1955, Brown explique que l’irreligiosité de la ville avait conduit les pouvoirs religieux locaux à entreprendre de multiples missions intérieures pour lutter contre l’aliénation des classes ouvrières, que Wickham qualifiait de « croisades morales dans lesquelles les questions d’ordre social étaient noyées dans cette guerre ‘fanatique’ contre les péchés et pécheurs. » Glasgow, où le PMC surveillait attentivement les lieux récréatifs et maintenait une inaccessibilité à la culture populaire et sexuelle – en gardant un contrôle strict sur les débits de boisson, jugés être l’origine de la plupart des affaires de mœurs –, se distinguait par l’importante piété de sa population, qui, comme nous l’apprend l’auteur, n’avait pas toujours été aussi significative. Jusqu’au milieu du XIXème siècle, pour lutter contre la prostitution et l’inceste, qui étaient très répandus, un évangélisme urbain avait su solidement s’enraciner dans la ville et enrayer une culture religieuse pérenne. Les Hébrides et l’Ile de Lewis sont un cas encore à part, car sous l’influence des églises calvinistes puritaines, tout particulièrement préoccupées par les questions de consommation d’alcool. A partir du milieu des années soixante, les campagnes de « licensing » du PMC ont vécu une crise majeure (partie III, chapitre 7). La libéralisation globale de la société britannique a favorisé le développement d’une culture de la jeunesse, un accès facilité à la contraception, aux drogues récréatives et à une sexualité plus libre. On souligne également une révolution culturelle et artistique, particulièrement incarnée par la musique. Tout ceci a entraîné une recrudescence des contrôles et des tentatives de répression policière, qui très vite se sont montrés inefficaces sur les moyens et longs termes. En effet, l’auteur met en évidence le fait qu’une partie du clergé lui-même ne montrait plus une exemplarité attendue par les autorités ; de plus en plus, des prêtres et pasteurs se trouvaient impliqués dans des affaires de possession et consommation de drogues récréatives, et soutenaient les causes libérales défendues par la jeunesse britannique. Brown explique également que cette perte de vitesse des autorités religieuses est le résultat de la volonté croissante des individus de pouvoir bénéficier de leur autonomie, des mouvements de populations à l’origine d’une « migration » culturelle, de l’effondrement du PMC en 1965, couplés à une doctrine religieuse qui perdait en influence, voire en crédibilité. Dans les villes de Blackpool et Sheffield, la libéralisation culturelle s’est installée très rapidement, contrairement à Londres, mais surtout Glasgow et les Hébrides, où cette installation a nécessité plus de temps. L’ouvrage s’attarde sur une observation de la BBC (partie II, chapitre 5 ; partie III, chapitre 9). Callum Brown affirme que la corporation était une alliée puissante du PMC, et plus particulièrement du « Central Religious Advisory Committee » (CRAC) entre 1945 et 1965. Le CRAC s’évertuait à imposer des programmes de nature évangélique, tout en tenant à distance les « Humanists », enclins à défier les autorités religieuses et à diffuser leurs propres idéologies, contraires à celles des institutions religieuses. L’auteur explique qu’une politique « anti-secular » a été menée jusqu’aux années
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soixante, période qui a marqué un tournant dans le rôle que tenait la BBC dans la propagation massive de la morale religieuse. Brown avance alors qu’à partir des années soixante, la BBC diffusait de plus en plus de programmes qui s’autorisaient à ridiculiser la religion. Et, de plus en plus, la parole était donnée aux « Humanists » qui ont amené avec eux un intérêt grandissant pour les sciences humaines et sciences dures, encourageant la BBC à diffuser des programmes scientifiques (basés sur la théorie de l’évolution, et sur les connaissances en astronomie consécutives à la course à l’espace), au grand regret des institutions religieuses (partie III, chapitre 9), qui, comme l’explique Brown, voyaient en cette démocratisation des sciences, la possibilité pour les populations de questionner leur existence, via la méthode scientifique. D’ailleurs, l’auteur met un point d’honneur à légitimer le rôle des « Humanists » dans le déclin de la morale religieuse appliquée à toute la société britannique (partie III, chapitre 8), en remettant en question la traditionnelle (totale) attribution de cette libéralisation à des actes notoires mais peu nombreux du Parti Travailliste et du Christianisme libéral dans les années soixante. Il insiste sur les actions (à caractère progressiste) considérables menées par les « Humanists » pour une libéralisation des individualités, au détriment des idéologies religieuses en place. Cet ouvrage s’applique non pas à révolutionner la vision qu’ont les spécialistes du déclin des religions traditionnelles au Royaume-Uni, mais il offre une perspective nouvelle de certains éléments qui peuvent fournir un éclairage original sur cette problématique. D’ailleurs, Callum G. Brown se montre prudent et souligne que son travail, qui cible des localités très spécifiques, ne reflète pas un état de fait qui peut s’appliquer nationalement (partie IV, chapitre 10). L’ouvrage n’en reste pas moins intéressant, puisqu’il apporte un regard inédit sur le déclin religieux, et enrichit assurément les connaissances et la compréhension de la sécularisation au Royaume- Uni.
NOTES
1. Il est question d’une surveillance morale, qui veille au respect des mœurs établies (dans notre cas, il s’agit de principes moraux d’origine religieuse), instaurée au sein d’une société dans l’objectif d’assurer sa stabilité, ou du moins d’enrayer son potentiel déclin. 2. La description que Brown fait des « Humanists » peut paraître, à certains égards, assez condensée. Il semble se regrouper dans cette catégorie des groupes de personnes (comprenant athéistes, sécularistes, mais également psychologues, médecins, hommes et femmes de loi, défenseurs de la cause féministe et homosexuelle, etc.) ayant comme point commun de partager une conception de la société qui serait plus libérale, où les individus pourraient, de manière égale, jouir d’une liberté individuelle plus marquée qu’elle ne l’était à cette époque.
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AUTEURS
ARIELLE FLODROPS Doctorante, ERIAC, Université de Rouen
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XXV-2 | 2020