Masaryk University Faculty of Arts

Department of English and American Studies

English Language and Literature

Anders Heger

UKIP and British Politics

Bachelor‟s Diploma Thesis

Supervisor: Stephen Paul Hardy, Ph.D.

2015

I declare that I have worked on this thesis independently, using only the primary and secondary sources listed in the bibliography.

...... Author‟s signature

Acknowledgement

I would like to express my thanks towards the Masaryk University and the Czech Republic for providing me with free education and I would also like to thank my supervisor, Mr. Hardy, for his support and much appreciated counsel.

Table of Contents

Introduction ...... 5

The History of UKIP ...... 8

Allan Sked and the First Years ...... 8

Change of Leadership and Becoming the Fourth Largest Party ...... 12

Becoming a Political Party ...... 16

The Beginning of a New Era ...... 21

Analysing the Party‟s Policies ...... 25

Leaving the European Union ...... 25

Immigration ...... 34

UKIP and the BNP ...... 40

Explaining the Support for UKIP ...... 42

The Social Profile of UKIP Voters ...... 47

Conclusion ...... 52

Bibliography ...... 56

Résumé (English) ...... 62

Résumé (Czech) ...... 63

Introduction

―Challenger parties are like bees . . . once they have stung the system, they quickly die‘‘ (Hofstadter qtd. in Ford and Goodwin: 8).

This citation alludes to the problem that new political parties face in British politics – the difficulty in establishing themselves in the first-past-the-post electoral system. British politics have been dominated by the competition between the two major parties in the last hundred years – Conservative party and Labour – with the Liberal

Democrats making an appearance on the political scene in late 1980s.

The latest contender for the British voters – the United Kingdom Independence

Party – started its campaigning in 1990s and has since then become a highly scrutinized and significant political party in the United Kingdom, winning the 2014 European elections.

However, the party, its members and policies have been controversial and the party has been accused of populism and scaremongering. It has met with ridicule and outright refusal from the other political parties, which see it as a dangerous contender and many voters see the party as outright racist and prejudiced against immigration and multiculturalism – something which the party itself has been trying to deny.

However, even though the party has been in existence since the early 1990s, it gained prominence and media spotlight only in the last few years after a few electoral successes. Before that the party was largely ignored and not assigned any significance.

It might then not come as a surprise that relatively few studies and analyses have been made to try and understand the party, where its support comes from, what issues the party proposes to address and what its ultimate goals are.

The importance of answering these three questions and understanding the party‟s policies and arguments are the reasons for my writing this paper. Shedding light on the

- 5 - history of UKIP‟s development from a single-issue pressure group to a political party might serve as a to-do (or not to-do) manual for future political party-hopefuls, as overcoming the entry-barrier has proven fatal for new political movements in the past.

It further provides an analysis of the party‟s policies on the two key issues that it has been building its campaigning on – namely leaving the European Union and immigration – and attempts to answer the question of whether the party‟s policies have any substance to them or are just pure populist rhetoric and what their place in British politics is – that means comparing them with those of Tories and Labour. The last question it explains is where and from whom UKIP gets its support in the United

Kingdom and why these people support the party in the first place.

The first chapter focuses on the development of the party and provides a chronological evolution of the party and its policies. It describes how UKIP‟s leaders shaped the party and provides analyses of UKIP‟s electoral successes and failures. This chapter relies chiefly on the information collected by Ford and Goodwin in their analysis of UKIP Revolt on the Right and various media articles and statistical data. It does not provide an analysis of the development of the party‟s policies.

The second chapter provides an analysis of UKIP‟s policies on immigration and their arguments for leaving the European Union. It puts the data and suggestions provided by the party under scrutiny for accuracy and offers an analysis of the data based on critique and collected statistical information. The chapter also provides a brief comparison between UKIP and the BNP. The sources for this chapter are the manifestos of UKIP, BNP, Tories and Labour from various years, UKIP party Constitution, various studies conducted on the issues and analyses and comments in media articles, especially

Roland Rudd‟s No power, no influence and we would still have to pay the bill, a report by Oxford Economics: An Indispensable Relationship: Economic Linkages between the

- 6 - UK and the rest of the European Union – all of which provide useful data on the economic and legal ties between Britain and the European Union.

The third chapter explains where UKIP gets its support and why the voters support the party. The main sources for this research were relevant chapters from Ford and Goodwin‟s Revolt on the Right and Lord Ashcroft‟s ―They‘re thinking what we‘re thinking‖ research into the topic.

- 7 - The History of UKIP

Allan Sked and the First Years

The history of UKIP begins with Dr. Allan Sked and the founding of a single-issue cross-party political movement – the Anti-Federalist League. Sked was a former Liberal candidate in Paisley, Scotland, who had first started to be politically active when he was fourteen years old. He found and deepened his Euroscepticism as a lecturer at the

London School of Economics, where he later became a head of the European studies department (Hodges: Singular man of sceptical faith).

―I decided the whole idea was mad. I became so sick of Europe after ten years

and it did seem so fatuous supporting all the myths about Europe - that it was a

cure-all and a great ideal for the future whereas in fact in practice it was a kind

of sotto governo of corrupt bureaucrats who are a danger to democracy‖

(Hodges: Singular man of sceptical faith).

He also joined the Bruges Group*, from which he was, however, later dismissed after founding the Anti-Federalist League in 1991 (Ford and Goodwin: 22). The

Leagues main point of programme was opposing the Maastricht Treaty**. However, the group attracted only limited attention and wasn‟t really taken seriously. Their run up against the Conservatives in the 1992 General election proved to be a disaster. In Bath

Sked polled only 0.2% of the vote (Farage: 73) and the group soon called for a change in the Leagues policies. The ensuing result was the founding of the United Kingdom

*,,The Bruges Group is an independent all-party think tank . . . Set up in February 1989, its aim was to promote the idea of a less centralised European structure than that emerging in Brussels.‗‗

(brugesgroup.com: The Bruges Group)

** A founding treaty of the EU that entered into force in 1993 and deepened the European integration, enhanced the powers of the European parliament and introduced the economic and monetary union

(EMU) (europa.eu: Treaty of Maastricht on European Union)

- 8 - Independence Party on the 3rd of September 1993 at a conference at the London School of Economics (Ford and Goodwin: 22).

Even though the name was not the most favoured among the members of the

League, it was chosen in the end because having British in the name was perceived as giving a bad, nationalistic name to the group because of the ultra-right BNP* (Farage:

79).

It was not even a year until the newly formed party met its first challenge – the by-election and the European election of 1994. Even though the party was only a few months old at the time when people went to the polls, the members and candidates of the party were quite optimistic about their prospects. However, many factors at that time did not speak in UKIP‟s favour.

As it is the case with many new parties, UKIP had a big financial problem.

Having no firm and permanent source of income, they struggled to even field a convincing campaign, so each candidate had to pay their own expenses. The personnel and candidates of the party were recruited from largely politically inexperienced ranks and many had different ideas about the approach the party should take.

Another problem was Sked himself. The founder and leader of UKIP was blamed for failing to provide a strong leadership to the party, which was plagued by lack of direction. As a consequence, the party won only about 1% of the vote and failed to gain a significant foothold anywhere in Britain (Ford and Goodwin: 24).

After the 1994 elections, UKIP entered a period of identity crisis characterized by arguments and infighting about the direction the party should take and what it stands for. One source of the infighting was the discussion about where the party stands in relation to the Tories. Some members of UKIP thought that they should not stand against Conservative candidates who are openly Eurosceptic.

- 9 - While not winning a seat themselves, a Eurosceptic could still have been elected with the indirect support of UKIP. It was argued, however, that this plan would undermine the image of the party and make it look like ―an awkward Conservative offshoot with no real identity of their own‖ (Ford and Goodwin: 25).

At this time, UKIP was still largely a single-issue party* with the goal of withdrawing the UK from the EU. However, not many voters were interested that much in the European question at the time. Indeed according to the public opinion polls conducted by Ipsos MORI on The Most Important Issues Facing Britain Today an average of only 10.5% of Britons in 1991 thought Common Market/EU/Europe/Single

European Currency to be a pressing concern. This trend, however, would soar over the years leading up to the general election in April 1997 to 43% (ipsos-mori.com: Issues

Index: Trends 1988-1997).

The reason for this is that in the years after the Maastricht treaty entered into force, topics such as the European Common Market, a single currency and increasing centralization came up much more often in the public debate (Ford and Goodwin: 28).

As a consequence, not long after the 1994 European election the Referendum party was formed by Sir James Goldsmith. The single purpose of this party was to hold a referendum on whether Britain should stay a member of the EU. Like UKIP, the

Referendum Party had just a single issue on the agenda. However, RP‟s members claimed they intended to resign their mandates after fulfilling their election pledge.

This meant a new political challenge for UKIP, as suddenly there were two single-issue parties battling for the votes using the European question. However, in stark contrast to UKIP, whose personnel were largely amateurs without any previous political experience and whose party coffers were empty, the Referendum Party was

* Mudde defines a single-issue party as, among other things, one that ―is supported predominantly on the basis of one single issue.‘‘ and that ―does not present an ideological programme.‘‘ (Mudde: 184)

- 10 - much better organized due to the previous political experience of its leadership and much better financed. Indeed, Sir James Goldsmith proclaimed he would spend at least

£10 million in order: ―. . . to ensure that his party was funded to the same extent as the main parties‖ (Ford and Goodwin: 26).

This posed a problem to UKIP, who in comparison to the Referendum party remained more or less unknown and obscure, while their political rivals gained increasing attention in the media (Ford and Goodwin: 26-28). Also, even though their views on Europe could turn them into natural allies, no attempts were officially made to this end, even though some members of UKIP urged Sked to reach out to the

Referendum party. The UKIP leader later claimed he tried to contact Goldsmith, but that: ―. . . his letters to Goldsmith were never delivered‖ (Ford and Goodwin: 28).

Next up on the agenda was the 1997 General election. UKIP entered the race with more or less the same problems and prospects as was the case with the European election of 1994. Their programme concentrated only on the European question, while their policies on tacking domestic issues were either underdeveloped or might have appeared to be too far right in the eyes of the voters, as apart from the EU, UKIP‟s main agenda was reducing immigration, promoting British values and battling political correctness. Naturally, this put UKIP in a difficult position, as they were often branded right-wing extremists and racists – an image the party would try to dispel with various degrees of success over the years to come (Ford and Goodwin: 29).

The 1997 General election would rewrite the British political history. The incumbent Conservative government led by the PM John Major suffered a staggering defeat by the so called New Labour under the leadership of Tony Blair, who won a landslide victory for his party, winning 419 seats – the greatest Labour victory in the party‟s history (bbc.co.uk: 1 May 1997).

- 11 - UKIP, however, failed to deliver significant results. Fielding 194 candidates, facing numerous issues both on the inside and on the outside, UKIP went to the election with relatively small chances of a breakthrough. The party got 0.38% of the vote – well behind the Referendum party which averaged 2.59% (election.demon.co.uk: 1997

General Election Result).

Change of Leadership and Becoming the Fourth Largest Party

The times were looking up for the Referendum party, while UKIP descended once again into an after election chaos. However, the good days were not to last for the RP, as the party‟s founder, Sir James Goldsmith, died only a few months after the elections had ended. With their leader gone, the party soon entered a series of infighting among the party‟s leftover leadership, which would soon disband and reform into splinter groups – a shadow of the former charm and charismatic leadership of Sir James Goldsmith

(Etherden: The Goldsmith Agenda).

As far as UKIP was concerned, the chaos on the Eurosceptic right that commenced with the disbanding of the Referendum party presented a big opportunity to the party, which could now try to bring the experienced candidates of the RP into the fold. First, however, the party had to unify and restore order in its own ranks. In order for that to be done, a chief issue had to be resolved: what to do with Alan Sked?

Sked had been the leader of UKIP since the party‟s founding, however, over the years more and more members saw him more a liability than an asset, many voicing concerns about ―his dictatorial leadership style, intellectual persona, his failure to strike a deal with Goldsmith and rumours of infiltration by right-wing extremists‖ (Ford and Goodwin, 33).

- 12 - A fraction was formed inside of UKIP lead by Nigel Farage, David Lott and

Michael Holmes, who managed to oust Sked. Holmes would then go on to become the new party leader, while Farage became the party chairman, focusing on uniting the

Eurosceptic right (Ford and Goodwin, 33).

With a new leadership, the party started preparing for the coming 1999 European elections. These elections presented new chances as well as new challenges. Among the challenges was the new Conservative party of William Hague, who replaced John Major as the leader of Tories, after the party under Major‟s leadership scored the worst general elections result in the party‟s history (bbc.co.uk: John Major: A life in politics). Even though not being in favour of Britain seceding from the EU, Hague reformed the Tory stance towards the EU.

―The new Conservative leader opposed Britain‘s entry into the single currency,

opposed a common European immigration policy, pledged to reduce Britain‘s

contribution to the EU budget, and promised to stamp down on corruption

within European institutions‖ (Ford and Goodwin: 34).

This new position of the Conservative party did not make UKIP‟s chances of success better at all. However, there were other facts that would influence the ultimate outcome of the elections. Among them was the fact that around 40% of the British public now ranked Europe as a pressing concern, thus improving the chances of a single-issue party such as UKIP to get with their policies in the spotlight.

The party had also won 11.6% of the vote the previous year in a Yorkshire

European by-election. More importantly, however, the 1999 European elections were to be the first in British history to take place using the proportional representation electoral system rather than the for Britain typical first-past-the-post system.

- 13 - The turnout for the 1999 European elections was astonishingly low, as only 23% of the electorate cast their votes (with the exception of Northern Ireland, where the turnout was over 50%). The result saw Labour replaced as the strongest British party in the European parliament by the Conservatives (bbc.co.uk: Tories celebrate Euro poll success). For UKIP the elections meant a minor victory as its first representatives ever got elected into the Strasbourg parliament. Winning 7% of the vote and finishing fourth meant that three mandates went to UKIP. These were for Nigel Farage, Jeffrey Titford and Michael Holmes (Ford and Goodwin: 33-34).

Just as was the case in the previous elections, UKIP drew most of their support from the South East (Farage, 9.7%), the South West (Holmes, 10.6%) and also the East

(Titford, 8.9%). However, they did not manage to win any significant gain anywhere else in the country (bbc.co.uk: Success for smaller parties).

Immediately after the election was over, UKIP turned to by now a very typical thing for the party – a series of infighting. This time was no different than the last, as the source of the discontent among the party was the person at the very head. ―Holmes‘ authoritarian style, his paranoia about potential rivals and positive statements about the EU had eroded confidence in his leadership‖ (Ford and Goodwin: 35).

Holmes‟ rival in this crisis was Nigel Farage, who led the opposition against him. The infighting got so serious that the party nearly tore itself apart with many members complaining or leaving altogether. It was at the general meeting of the party in

Westminster at the beginning of the year 2000 that the party nearly disintegrated and it was Farage himself who in the end held the party together.

The crisis was ended after Holmes was forced to resign the leadership and left the party. After his departure the party voted in a new leader, one of the present MEP‟s

– Jeffrey Titford.

- 14 - Titford was a stabilizing agent for UKIP, as he tried to negotiate peace among the various factions in the party. However, in the run up to the 2001 general election,

UKIP still had not learned their lesson because the party changed only very little from being a single-issue pressure group to being a full-fledged political party with a programme encompassing multiple issues.

Just as it was the case with the Referendum party in the 1997 General election and with the Conservatives in the 1999 European elections, another party threatened the

Eurosceptic monopoly of the UK Independence party. This time round it was again the

Tories: ―William Hague framed the general election as the last chance for voters to save the pound and promised that he would veto the transfer of further power from

Westminster to Brussels, oppose a European army and end EU fraud‖ (Ford and

Goodwin: 38).

The decisive and radical Eurosceptic approach that the Tories chose presented a problem to UKIP. Added to that, the party was fighting the usual financial and organisational problems with the campaign, without which the party did not have a realistic chance at succeeding against the already established parties. Even then UKIP entered the 2001 general election with high hopes.

When the ballots came in, however, UKIP were in for a surprise. The party polled only 1.5% of the vote, much less than even the Referendum party won in 1997, with only Nigel Farage winning a larger number of votes than in the 1997 election.

However, there was one silver lining. Even though the party did not manage to get a significant share of the vote, it was enough to formally establish them as the fourth largest national party, after the Tories, Labour and the Liberal Democrats. Also, even though the support UKIP enjoyed was again the strongest in the Southern England, for the first time in their history UKIP managed to get the message across also in the

- 15 - northern parts of the UK, as the share of vote that UKIP candidates won in the North-

West and Yorkshire increasing six times (Ford and Goodwin: 35-41). It was clear that if the party were to succeed, they would need to revise their elections strategies and programme in order to appeal to more voters.

2001 general elections results

Party Votes Percent Change % Candidates Seats Labour 9,056,824 41.41 - 2.14 529 323 Conservative 7,705,870 35.23 + 1.54 529 165 Lib. Dem. 4,246,853 19.42 + 1.47 528 40 UKIP 375,122 1.72 + 1.32 393 - Source: http://www.election.demon.co.uk/ge2001.html

Becoming a Political Party

Even though he had led UKIP only for a little more than a year, in 2002 Jeffrey Titford stood down as the leader of the party. UKIP owed its retiring leader the period of relative inner stability since he had been elected. Now, however, a new leader would come in the persona of Roger Knapman – a former Conservative MP who was known for his outspoken Euroscepticism. Among other things, he brought much needed experience to the party that consisted mostly of enthusiasts and amateurs.

Knapman immediately started reforming the party and broadening the horizons.

For one, UKIP would no longer concentrate only on England, but would reach out to other parts of the UK as well. He was also very aware of the awareness problem that the party faced and hired Dick Morris – former adviser of Bill Clinton, who helped the latter become the Governor of Arkansas. Morris‟ advice would help transform UKIP‟s electoral campaigning and make the party visible. As much as 70% of the party‟s expenses would go on campaigning.

However, UKIP would get an arguably much better boost of image when Robert

Kilroy-Silk was convinced to stand for the party as a candidate in the East Midlands.

- 16 - Apart from bringing his experience in politics and television to the party, Kilroy* inevitably started UKIP‟s populist agenda, blaming the EU and unrestricted immigration for some of Britain‟s problems.

UKIP was suddenly much more visible, causing the party membership and

UKIP‟s prospects according to polls to surge and also to make other parties worried.

UKIP was even endorsed by four Tory members of the House of Lords. By the time the

European election of 2004 came around, UKIP was an obscure movement on the fringes of the political debate no more (Ford and Goodwin, 42-47).

All in all the election was a major success. UKIP finished third after the

Conservatives and Labour, but before the Liberal Democrats. The campaigning and the support of Kilroy-Silk, who got elected as one out of twelve UKIP MEPs, seemed to have paid off.

2004 European elections results

Party Votes Percent Change % Seats Conservative 4,397,090 26.7 - 9.0 27 Labour 3,718,683 22.6 - 5.4 19 UKIP 2,650,768 16.1 + 9.2 12 Lib. Dem. 2,452,327 14.9 + 2.3 12 Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/vote2004/euro_uk/html/front.st

However, even though the party achieved the first major electoral success, it failed to consolidate and build on it. First of all the intensive campaigning drained the party‟s financial reserves. Another factor was that the party‟s activists started to sleep on the laurels after the election battle had ended. But most important of all, Kilroy-Silk, to whom the party owed much of its success in the elections, got ambitious and tried to take over UKIP.

* ―A former academic and Labour MP who had become a national celebrity after hosting his own daytime television chat show‖ (Ford and Goodwin, 44)

- 17 - He urged the party to get rid of the present leader, Roger Knapman, and to take a harder stance against the Conservative party. Kilroy claimed: ―The Conservative party is dying . . . Why would you want to give it the kiss of life? What we have to do is to kill it and replace it‖ (qtd. in Ford and Goodwin: 50). He demanded that UKIP candidates stand even against openly Eurosceptic Tory candidates – a strategy that many in UKIP refused.

However, Kilroy‟s attempted coup ultimately failed, as many in the party stood up against him. Having won the argument at one point, Kilroy still did not enjoy a majority support of the party in all issues and he soon realized that he was not as influential as he had imagined himself to be. Even though he helped the party become visible and attracted many voters (especially socialists), Kilroy-Silk left the party less than a year after agreeing to stand in elections for it (Ford and Goodwin: 48-53).

However, along with Kilroy, UKIP also lost a great number of activists and members, as in the wake of his departure and of the severe infighting that preceded it, the party membership shrunk by almost a third and having depleted their coffers in the last European election, the party could not afford sustained campaigning. Added to that, just as the case had been with the previous general elections, UKIP were still a single- issue party. One that was better known, but just as single-minded as before. Its lack of policies in domestic affairs combined with the decline of interest in the EU topic that followed each European election obviously lowered the prospects of succeeding at the coming 2005 general elections (Ford and Goodwin: 61-63).

The party polled 2.2% – a slight increase from the last general election of 1999.

A result, however, that was much lower than the one that the party achieved in the

European elections of the previous year. It was clear, that in order to appeal to the

- 18 - voters not only on the European issue, but also on the domestic level, the party would have to work on its so far mostly with Europe concerned policies.

But there was again one silver lining. Even though the support for UKIP was the strongest in South England, for the first time the party also scored over 3% in the

Midlands and between 2% and 3% in the North-West, North-East and Yorkshire, suggesting that potential voters were to be found also in the north (Ford and Goodwin:

65-66).

While the general election of 2005 was by far not the success that most UKIP members might have imagined, the party still won about 200.000 votes more than in the last general election. When it comes to winning new votes, however, the winner among smaller parties was the British National Party (Rallings and Thrasher: The 2005 general election: analysis of the results, 4).

The BNP would over the coming years become a problem for UKIP, as the

Eurosceptic party would become increasingly associated with the far-right extremists, not only because many BNP voters would identify UKIP as their second choice.

Another factor was a subtle infiltration of UKIP by BNP supporters and former activists, who would advocate that the two parties enter an alliance.

Even though UKIP tried hard to disassociate themselves from the extremists, their public image would suffer. Both parties would also over the years appeal to the electorate through addressing some similar issues (Ford and Goodwin: 67), though the actual differences between the parties are profound*.

By 2006 Knapman had been the head of the party for a full term and was ready to step down and leave the position open for a successor (Brant: UKIP hungry for change). From the handful of hopefuls, it was Nigel Farage who now became the leader.

* More on the policies of UKIP and the BNP in chapter 2

- 19 - Having played an influential role in the party‟s hitherto development, his term as the party leader would not be different. Immediately after assuming the position, Farage started reforming the party. Among the most important changes was the much needed broadening of the party‟s programme. In the past, UKIP‟s policies were mostly about leaving the EU and the party had very little to say to other issues. Things were about to change.

―Alongside withdrawal from the EU, [UKIP] activists now began making a

series of new policy proposals designed to appeal to the Conservatives‘ right

flank: shard reductions in immigration` tax cuts` the restoration of grammar

schools` and opposition to Cameron‘s new climate change agenda‖ (Ford and

Goodwin: 72).

Another important thing on the agenda for Farage was to get rid of the BNP sympathizers inside of UKIP. The decisive moment came at the party conference of

September 2008 when Buster Mottram – a UKIP member himself – advocated a pact between the BNP and UKIP proposed by the BNP leader Griffin for the coming

European election of 2009.

Even though there was some kind of support for a pact with the BNP, in the end only two members of UKIP‟s National Executive Committee ―expressed some form of support‖ (Ford and Goodwin: 73). The supporters of BNP were asked to leave the party and so they did. Setting themselves free from the BNP infiltrators was a very important moment for UKIP, because it cleansed the party of many extremists and allowed it to put some space between them and the BNP. UKIP was now free to fully concentrate their efforts on the 2009 European elections (Ford and Goodwin: 71-75).

Having worked hard since being elected the party leader, Farage managed to transform UKIP from a single-issue movement to a serious political party with policies

- 20 - on multiple national and transnational issues. Those included the for UKIP typical

Euroscepticism, upon which the party was formed, anti-immigration and a number of other policies. Even then, according to pre-election polls, UKIP‟s prospects were not encouraging.

The results, however, were heartening. For the first time in their history the

United Kingdom Independence Party finished second in the European elections, beating

Labour to the second place behind Tories. The party polled again the best in the South,

However, as was the case with the General elections of 2005, UKIP won yet more votes in the North-East, North-West and Yorkshire (Ford and Goodwin: 75-77).

2009 European elections results

Party Votes Percent Change % Seats Conservative 4,198,394 27.7 + 1.0 26 UKIP 2,498,226 16.5 + 0.3 13 Labour 2,381,760 15.7 - 6.9 13 Lib. Dem. 2,080,613 13.7 - 1.2 11 Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/elections/euro/09/html/ukregion_999999.stm

The Beginning of a New Era

The last European election was undoubtedly a success for the party thanks in no small part to its leader, Nigel Farage. It came then as a surprise to many that shortly after the election Farage announced his intention to step down as a leader, wanting to concentrate his efforts on running in Buckingham against the Speaker of the House of Commons in the next election.

Farage‟s successor would be Lord Pearson of Rannoch, a former Conservative member of the House of Lords – an establishment politician, who has never in his life been elected to any office, safe one prefecture – which made some UKIP voters disgruntled. However, that was not the only issue. Pearson soon made himself

- 21 - controversial by secretly offering a deal to David Cameron that UKIP would not put up any candidates. In exchange, Pearson wanted Cameron to promise to hold a referendum on the UK membership of European Union. Added to that, he apparently committed a tax fraud, was openly against Islam and supported a similarly anti-Muslim oriented

Dutch right-wing politician, Geert Wilders. While it could have been said about Kilroy-

Silk that he had started the populist rhetoric of UKIP, Pearson made it worse.

While some of the criticism that UKIP under Pearson delivered was undoubtedly justified, the new leader‟s comments on Islam moved the party in the eyes of many observers even further right on the political spectrum. Moreover, the party put immigration at the centre of their agenda and promised, among others:

―A flat-tax to help the lowest paid workers, investment in the manufacturing

sector, new jobs for manual workers, more police on the streets, stronger prison

sentences for criminals, grammar schools, an end to political correctness, Swiss-

style referenda, a more proportional election system and the restoration of

British values‖(Ford and Goodwin: 84-85).

With his approach, Pearson alienated many UKIP activists and potential voters, as many disagreed with his arguments, strategy and the direction in which he was taking the party. As a result, the pre-election campaign was once again an organisational disaster. With his intention not to field any candidates against Eurosceptic candidates of the Tories, Pearson ordered many in UKIP to stand down from the election – an order which many of them refused. In the end, Pearson was consciously battling his own party

(Ford and Goodwin: 78-87). The resulting chaos diminished the chances that the party might have had in the elections and UKIP would once again need to do some soul searching to get back on track.

- 22 - When the results arrived, the party had once again failed to break through to the

House of Commons. However, all things considered, 3.1% of the vote, an increase of

0.9% since the last general elections, was something to be grateful for. The party now also had a better voter support across the entire country. At one seat, in Buckingham,

Nigel Farage even got as much as 17% of the vote, which, however, still was not enough to break through into Westminster (Ford and Goodwin: 88).

Less than a year after he was elected to lead UKIP, Lord Pearson was standing down as a leader of the party in August 2010. His resignation being voluntary, he also announced his full support for his successor. Speculations immediately started to circulate about who might replace Pearson and the attention turned once again to Nigel

Farage (Gabbatt: Lord Pearson stands down as Ukip leader because he is 'not much good').

Polling 60.5%, Farage was decisively re-elected as the leader of the party, beating two other candidates (bbc.co.uk: Nigel Farage re-elected to lead UK

Independece Party). Again, he set about to reform the party, concentrating this time much more inner organisational structures and on getting the party message across through media or talking to people on the street. His tactics seemed to have worked, since UKIP scored better and better over time in various public opinion polls conducted between 2010 and 2013 (Ford and Goodwin: 89-94).

The first major success of the reborn UKIP came in the local elections of 2013.

Boasting a revised, full programme, the party went into the elections with high hopes. In the end about 25% of the electorate gave UKIP their support and the party won 139 councillors, bringing the total to 147. The support for the party was the strongest in the

South East and South West of England, as usual (bbc.co.uk: Local elections: Nigel

- 23 - Farage hails results as a „game changer‟). With their morale bolstered after the local elections, UKIP made themselves ready for the European elections of 2014.

The last European elections to date could be described as a game changer in

British politics. For the first time in history, UKIP unseated both main parties and finished first, boasting 27.49% of the vote.

The political revolution that the party had been fighting for since its founding finally seemed to have arrived. The Conservatives and Labour were forced to concede defeat and it was clear that both parties would have to implement radical changes in their approach if future results of this kind were to be averted. As if that was not enough, the Liberal Democrats dropped down and made way for the Green party, which came in fourth. Moreover, the Lib. Dem. leader, Nick Clegg, was asked by his party to step down (Grice and Morris: European elections results 2014: Farage and Ukip top poll as Europe swings to the right).

A few months after the European elections, a by-election in Clacton would once again steal the spotlight for UKIP. Mr. Carswell, a former Conservative MP, was at the time the latest Tory defector to desert his old party in favour of UKIP. The significance of the by-election in Clacton lies in the fact, that it has to this date been the first ever election to see a UKIP member elected into the House of Commons (bbc.co.uk: UKIP gains first elected MP with Clacton win).

2014 European Election Results

Party Votes Percent Change % Seats UKIP 4,376,632 27.49 + 11 24 Labour 4,020,646 25.40 +7 20 Conservative 3,792,549 23.93 - 7 19 Green 1,255,573 7.87 + 1 3 Source: http://www.bbc.com/news/events/vote2014/eu-uk-results

- 24 - Analysing the Party’s Policies

Leaving the European Union

The first objective of the United Kingdom Independence Party is outlined in the party‟s constitution as follows:

―The Party believes that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern

Ireland (hereinafter ―The United Kingdom‖) should only be governed by her

own citizens and that its governance shall at all times be conducted first and

foremost in the interests of the United Kingdom and its peoples and that the only

laws that should apply within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom are those

wholly made by the Parliament of the United Kingdom‖ (ukip.org: The

Constitution).

Staying true to their name and the grounds on which UKIP was founded, the party will not accept anything less than a complete withdrawal from an increasingly federalized European Union which it sees as a threat to democracy. The party‟s leader

Nigel Farage indeed claimed that as much as 75% of British laws were supposedly made in Brussels. Farage was apparently quoting the now former European

Comissioner for Justice Viviane Reding, who herself claimed it to be between 75% and

80% (ukip.org: 75% of Our Laws Are Made by EU Institutions Says Senior European

Commissioner Viviane Reding).

This figure has since become a highly debated topic and new figures have since made an appearance. Among others: Business for Britain concluded 64.7% and leader of the Liberal Democrats Nick Clegg argued for 7% (Silvera: Nigel Farage and Nick

Clegg were both wrong on EU‟s influence over UK law).

This issue, however, is not easy to resolve. In her research paper from the House of Commons Library, Miller found out following:

- 25 - “. . .from 1997 to 2009 6.8% of primary legislation (Statutes) and 14.1% of

secondary legislation (Statutory Instruments) had a role in implementing EU

obligations, although the degree of involvement varied from passing reference to

explicit implementation. . . . The British Government estimates that around 50%

of UK legislation with a significant economic impact originates from EU

legislation‖ (Miller, 5).

Furthermore, Miller found out that estimates from other EU member states very significantly, providing figures suggesting that laws influenced by the EU legislation may account for as little as 6.3% or as much as 84% of national legislation. She adds, however, that: ―. . . there is no totally accurate, rational or useful way of calculating the percentage of national laws based on or influenced by the EU‖ (Miller, 5).

The arguments of both UKIP and its opponents might therefore be based on more or less arbitrary criteria that are impossible to completely verify. However, the

75% provided by UKIP might very well strike a nerve of some Britons, as such a figure might arguably be perceived by some as too high. These people might then resort to supporting UKIP out of fear of losing British sovereignty to Brussels and playing right into the party‟s hands.

However, even though UKIP advocate withdrawal from the EU as a political entity, the party still insists on wanting to cooperate with the Union, especially when it comes to trading and ―being good neighbours‖ (qtd. in Perring: 'I don't want EU flag, I don't want European anthem' Nigel Farage blasts political union). Indeed, arguments related to economy form a significant part of UKIP‟s agenda.

According to UKIP leaving the EU does not pose a significant economic threat at all. Farage argues that with Britain out, the country would be free to pursue its own economic interests outside of the EU, which he sees as an obstacle in the way to British

- 26 - economic growth and world trade. The United Kingdom should, according to UKIP, concentrate more on the Commonwealth, instead of being bound to Europe.

According to Farage, among the immediate benefits of the UK withdrawal should be getting back of quite a lot of money: ―At the most basic level, we will get back £55 million a day. For readers trapped in the deutsch-euro zone, that is €72m. It adds up. It‘s £20 billion, €26 billion, a year‖ (Farage: Cut the String). This money could then immediately be put to good use, as UKIP would reduce corporation tax and income tax for minimum wage workers. He further claims that trading with the EU would not be put at risk, arguing that: ―the Lisbon Treaty has three articles which lay a legal obligation on the EU to negotiate free trade with any member state which wants to leave‖ (Farage: Cut the String).

Moreover, both Farage and other members of UKIP argue that Britain should definitely withdraw from the EU, but at the same time make a deal with the organization on a similar basis as Norway, Iceland or Switzerland have.

This is a reference to the EEA*. They argue that since Britain has been a member of the EEA since 1994, just as the other above mentioned countries have, it would be much easier for the UK to get a good deal as a member of the EEA with the other member states while leaving the EU. The economic risks posed by a possible UK exit are supposedly overstated.

* EEA – European Economic Area – ―provides for the inclusion of EU legislation covering the four freedoms — the free movement of goods, services, persons and capital — throughout the 31 EEA States

(EU States + Iceland, Lichtenstein and Norway). In addition, the Agreement covers cooperation in other important areas such as research and development, education, social policy, the environment, consumer protection, tourism and culture, collectively known as ―flanking and horizontal‖ policies. The Agreement guarantees equal rights and obligations within the Internal Market for citizens and economic operators in the EEA‖ (efta.int: EEA Agreement).

- 27 - These three countries supposedly do not take part in the common agricultural policy, the fisheries policy (an issue which UKIP have been using extensively to make their argument) or foreign policy affairs, while having to contribute to the EU budget only a comparatively little amount of money, according to Farage in 2011 this was

―about a seventh per capita of what we (UK) pay‖ (ukipmeps.org: Farage`s response to

Cameron: The European Economic Area).

Paul Nuttall, the Deputy Leader of UKIP, also argues that since Britain exports more into the EU than it imports, it would be in the EU‟s interest to try and keep Britain as a trading partner. He also puts forward the case of the City of London, which according to Nuttall suffers from EU regulation without which it could bring in new businesses. All in all Nuttall does not suppose that Britain‟s leaving the EU would cause more than ―a bit of fluctuation in the short term‖ (qtd. in theguardian.com: This way to the Brexit: what would happen if Britain left the EU).

Furthermore, a study conducted by the UKIP MEP Gerard Batten in 2008 concluded that the direct and indirect costs of the UK‟s membership of the EU amounted to as much as £65.675 billion in 2008 alone, as shown in the following table:

2007 2008 Gross Contributions to Budget £13.06 bn £14.6 bn Other Payments to EU £3 bn £3 bn Common Agricultural Policy £16.8 bn £16.8 bn Common Fisheries Policy £3.275 bn £3.275 bn EU Over-Regulation £28 bn £28 bn Total £64. 135 bn £65.675 bn Source: http://www.brugesgroup.com/CostOfTheEU2008.pdf

In his study, Batten also does not shy away from populist attacks on the EU: ―It must never be forgotten that although the EU spends money in the UK it is the taxpayers own money that is being spent. The EU uses UK taxpayers‘ money to promote itself for propaganda purposes‖ (Batten: 11).

- 28 - All in all, Batten concludes that the EU has become too much of a financial and economic hindrance for the UK, which would be better off outside of the union. Batten argues that the benefits that come with EU membership could very well be achieved by treaties that the UK could make with independent governments, not with the EU as a whole (Batten: 31-32).

In an updated version of the above showed figure from 2012, another UKIP member, Tim Congdon, came to the conclusion that because of the UK‟s membership of the European Union Britain is as much as 10% of its GDP or £150 billion worse-off

(Congdon: 51). Added to that, in his debate with Nick Clegg from March 2014, Farage again claimed that the EU cost the British taxpayer as much as £55 million a day

(lbc.co.uk: The LBC Leaders' Debate: Nick Clegg v Nigel Farage).

The prognoses and data provided by UKIP might come across as ominous or too much to many and listening to UKIP, leaving the EU might indeed come across as the only viable solution. However, the opponents of Britain‟s leaving the EU are much more sceptical. UKIP‟s arguments about leaving the EU and re-negotiating trade agreements on similar basis as Norway or Switzerland fall on deaf ears with some, who do not share the party‟s optimistic views and argue that Britain stands to lose much if it should secede. Apart from that, the numbers provided by the party, as we shall see, are not always accurate.

Even though he admits that net contributions to the EU budget could fall by as much as a half should the UK leave the EU and make a similar deal like Norway did,

Roland Rudd, chairman of Business for New Europe*, argues that such a deal would not be worth UK‟s while.

* ―BNE is a coalition of business leaders articulating a positive case for reform in Europe. We provide a platform for debate on European issues to business leaders and policy makers at the highest level. We . . . seek to ensure that a reasoned, pro-European voice is heard in the UK‖ (bnegroup.org: Abous Us).

- 29 - The reason for that is especially the fact that Britain would have to give up its voting power within the trade block and accept rules that would be agreed on without the UK‟s say-so. Losing the right to vote on the relevant legislation is a price too high to pay, especially considering that the UK would have to implement the EU‟s laws anyway, as was the case with Norway: ―Norway has had to implement about three- quarters of all EU legislation, including the working time directive . . . (and) became by far the most closely integrated non-EU country, but with no say whatever‖ (Rudd: No power, no influence and we would still have to pay the bill).

In their 2009 report for the BNE, Oxford Economics described in great detail the economic links between Britain and the EU. Rudd, who commissioned Oxford

Economics to do the research, outlined the purpose of the study as follows: ―We hope that this report serves as a statistical resource and an economic blueprint for anyone wishing to discover more about the UK‘s relationship with the rest of the EU‖ (Oxford

Economics: 3). As a consequence, the study does not draw any conclusion. However, the data shows the significance and benefits that the membership in the EU brought to the United Kingdom.

Among the aspects mentioned are economic integration on the level of the EU single market, the benefits of which include increased productivity or creating space for investment, and for example coordination with other member states in the area of economic policies. It also allows the country in question to specialize in production of goods in areas where its production is of a higher standard than in the other member states, as it can invest more funds in its main exporting areas and import goods that it cannot produce in the same quality as its trading partners. The EU is also the UK‟s main trading partner, accounting for as much as 52% of UK‟s trade in goods and services.

- 30 - It is further mentioned that compared to the trade with the EU, Britain‟s trade with single non-EU states was comparatively smaller, as shown on the example of

China (4.2% of conducted trade) and India (1.3% of conducted trade) (Oxford

Economics: 8-9).

While it is UKIP‟s intention to conduct more trade with countries outside of the

EU, the above shown statistic clearly demonstrates that the EU is Britain‟s most important trading partner. Oxford Economics also mention the products themselves that the United Kingdom trades with the EU:

The nature of products that the UK trades with the EU is very different from the

products it trades with non-EU countries. For instance, the main imports from

outside the EU are ―Mineral Fuels and Oils‖, whereas those from the EU are

―Vehicles and Parts‖. Therefore, the UK could not easily substitute its trade

with the EU by trading with non-EU countries‖ (Oxford Economics: 9).

The impact of a possible secession of Britain from the EU or failure to negotiate a new trade deal with the EEA member states could then arguably be more severe than the bit of fluctuation that Nuttall mentioned.

Going back to Farage‟s claim that the UK contributes as much as £55 million a day to the EU, it appears that the reality is not that simple. In his short analysis of the

UK‟s contributions to the EU, O‟Leary found out that the aforementioned £55 million

(roughly £20 billion a year) actually represent only the gross contribution to the EU. As the UK gets some of its contributions back through the UK rebate* and the Agricultural

Guarantee Fund, which in 2012 accounted for about £8 billion, UK‟s net contributions

* ―The British budget rebate was negotiated by Margaret Thatcher in 1984 . . . It was intended to make up the shortfall between what the UK paid into the EU and what it got back. The UK tended to get back less than other countries because of its relatively small farming industry – and the fact that so much of

EU spending was on farm subsidies‖ (bbc.co.uk, Q&A: Britain‟s EU rebate).

- 31 - stood at more or less £12 billion a year, which amounts to £33 million a day.

He further adds that the net figures that the Treasury provides are yet different:

―. . . the Treasury‘s estimates are just for central government ‗official‘ transactions relating to the EU budget and don‘t include direct transactions involving households‖

(O‟Leary: Is our EU membership fee £55 million?).

Referring to the data provided by the Treasury, O‟Leary found out that the gross contributions to the EU in 2013 were roughly £14 billion, while the net contributions amounted roughly to £8.6 billion which is about £24 million a day (O‟Leary: Is our EU membership fee £55 million?).

O‟Leary further points out that the above mentioned Congdon‟s claim that the

UK is 10% of its GDP or £150 billion worse-off because of the EU was also reached using the £55 million estimate. However, according to O‟Leary, this money ―. . . is only one part of what they [UKIP] see as the overall cost of the EU, factoring in the likes of regulation costs, lost jobs and the Common Agricultural Policy‖ (O‟Leary: Is our EU membership fee £55 million?).

From the data provided it can be concluded that the estimates provided by UKIP are not always accurate, containing only a part of the truth, as was the case with the cost of the EU‟s membership, or being too optimistic, concentrating only on the perceived positives of the deal and ignoring possible negative aspects, as was the case with

Nuttall‟s optimism over leaving the EU and the ensuing stability of the British economy. It should be noted that I found no contra arguments to Batten‟s claim about the direct and indirect costs of Britain‟s membership in the European Union.

However, the role that the party has played with its anti-EU programme is not to be underestimated. Indeed it could be argued that it were UKIP‟s successes in the

- 32 - European elections that first made the other British parties take the issue of the EU membership more into consideration.

The Conservative party‟s 2010 election manifesto claimed: ―We will promote our national interest with an active foreign policy. We will work constructively with the

EU, but we will not hand over any more areas of power and we will never join the

Euro‖ (Invitation to Join the Government of Britain: 103).

The Tories also rejected any further integration of Britain into a possible political union and promised to negotiate a return of some powers back to the United

Kingdom, especially in areas such as justice or employment legislation (Invitation to

Join the Government of Britain: 113-114).

While the Conservative party already took a distinctive stance towards the

European Union in the 2010 General election, the Union was not really among the chief points on the Tory agenda. Indeed in the more or less 120 pages long manifesto, policies regarding the EU are put together on only two pages.

In the 2015 party manifesto, the Conservative policies did not change much, staying more or less the same as in 2010. The party still proposes to cooperate with the

EU, seeks to reform it in some respects and to get some powers back from Brussels.

However, one important addition did make it through. The Tories now promise, if elected, to hold an in-or-our referendum on Britain‟s membership of the European

Union (The Conservative Party Manifesto 2015: 72-73).

However, since UKIP have been stealing the spotlight when it comes to the

European Union, since the Conservatives have failed to deliver on their promises on for example getting powers back from Brussels to the UK and since Cameron already promised a referendum on the UK‟s EU membership in the past (Mason: David

Cameron: in-out referendum on EU by 2017 is cast-iron pledge), it might not be

- 33 - difficult to understand why some people come to see UKIP as the better alternative to the Tory promises. Negotiating a return of powers and reforming the EU does not seem to be the solution that more and more Britons come to identify with and thus choose

UKIP over the Conservatives. This problem, however, does not affect only the Tories.

While the Conservatives at least try to appear somewhat Eurosceptic, Labour is anything but that. The party‟s manifesto openly acknowledges that: ―. . . our membership of the European Union is central to our prosperity and security‖ (The

Labour Party Manifesto 2015: 76). Labour also very carefully criticises some aspects of the EU, it professes to negotiate reforms in some areas of the EU such as Common

Agricultural Policy or immigration (The Labour Party Manifesto 2015: 76-77).

However, while Labour opposes the Conservative intention to hold an in-out- referendum by the end of 2017, arguing that such a step should be considered only if more powers were to be transferred to Brussels (bbc.com: EU referendum 'unlikely' under Labour, says Ed Miliband), there are very few significant differences to be found between Labour and Tory policies about Britain‟s relationship with the European

Union. The overlapping consensus of the parties in the EU question and the lack of enticing proposals to tackle the worries of the electorate is only one of the reasons for the increasing support of the UK Independence Party.

Immigration

As it was already mentioned in chapter I, immigration has been one of the key issues with which the party has been trying to appeal to the voters for some time now. Indeed a research conducted by YouGov into the motivations of voters‟ desire to support a particular party revealed that as many as 76% of potential UKIP voters expressed their support to the party because they wished for immigration to Britain to be cut down.

- 34 - Immigration policies have thus become the biggest source of voters for the party, as the wish to see Britain outside of the EU was cited only by 59% of respondents (Jordan:

Immigration and Europe key to UKIP success).

According to a research conducted by NatCen and published in January 2014, as many as 77% of Britons want a reduction in immigration and 56% ―want immigration reduced ―a lot‖‖ (natcen.ac.uk: More than 3 in 4 want reduction in immigration). The potential for UKIP to find sympathetic voters in Britain is thus arguably high and the party has made sure to work out an elaborate set of immigration policies to offer to the voters. While some of the policies might appear to be draconic, it should be noted that the party‟s immigration programme is actually more detailed and sophisticated than the respective programmes of Labour and Conservatives.

In a section of the party‟s programme called Controlling and Managing our borders, the party embraces ―limited, controlled immigration‖ (ukip.org: Policies for

People). It is the policy of the party, after leaving the EU, to introduce work permits in order ―to fill skill gaps in the UK jobs market‖ (ukip.org: Policies for People).

A new set of rules is also to be introduced for foreign workers: ―Those coming to work in the UK must have a job to go to, must speak English, must have accommodation agreed prior to their arrival, and must have NHS-approved health insurance‖ (ukip.org: Policies for People). It is also the policy of the party to make benefits available to incoming migrants only after having paid taxes and National

Insurance for a period of five years. Moreover, a period of ten years would be required for a migrant to be entitled to permanent residence in the UK.

The party also claims to ―return to the principles of the UN Convention of

Refugees which serves to protect the most vulnerable‖ (ukip.org: Policies for People).

This might be a reference to the fact that the UK government has so far preferred

- 35 - offering humanitarian aid to Syrian refugees by helping finance refugee camps in the neighbouring countries of Syria, rather than actually housing refugees in Britain. The country has so far granted asylum only to a handful of Syrian refugees (Smith and

Gower: 1-7).

Even though he and his party have spoken out against immigration into Britain,

Farage sees a difference between people who move into Britain because of economical reasons and refugees whose lives are in danger: ―I think refugees are a very different thing to economic migration . . . and I think, actually, there is a responsibility on all of us in the free West to try and help some of those people fleeing Syria, literally in fear of their lives‖ (qtd. in bbc.co.uk: Nigel Farage calls for Syrian refugees to be allowed into

UK).

It would seem then that the party has at least in this respect an arguably more humane policy on refugees than the governing parties, who have preferred to offer financial support so far, rather than to actually house a greater number of refugees.

However, some UKIPers were determined not to let this stand. According to

Shipman‟s article in the Daily Mail: ―[Farage] was attacked online by UKIP supporters - who said the country was already ‗full up‘ and warned they would no longer vote for UKIP unless he changes his mind‖ (Shipman: Anger of UKIP supporters after leader Nigel Farage says Britain SHOULD accept refugees from Syria).

Furthermore, not one week after making his statement, Mr. Farage allegedly somewhat shifted his opinion. While religion played no part in his previous statement, speaking on BBC‟s Radio 2 he apparently suggested that it should only be some

Christians that should be allowed into the UK: ―It's bad enough for Sunni and Shia, at least there are neighbouring countries that will take them . . . Where on earth are the

Christians going to go?‖ (qtd. in Mason: Nigel Farage rows back on call to grant

- 36 - asylum to Syrian refugees). It remains to be seen whether the party actually delivers on these promises or backs down to appease its electorate.

Even then, UKIP might presently be the only British political party with believable immigration policies, as both the past Labour and the present Conservative governments seem to have failed to deliver on their promises on immigration.

For example, the present Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron actually promised to his voters that his party would see the yearly immigration to Britain cut down to 100.000 migrants a year. However, in 2014 the net immigration to Britain stood at 298.000 migrants, almost three times as many as the Conservatives promised.

Even more interesting is the fact that the net immigration to Britain is actually higher than when the government of David Cameron took office – by more or less 54.000 migrants (Whitehead: David Cameron immigration pledge in tatters as net immigration stands at 298,000).

The official Conservative list of policies taken from the Tory website (only three short paragraphs) does not actually offer many specific suggestions on how to tackle immigration. Among others it mentions:

―Cracking down on abuse of the immigration system by closing bogus colleges

and making it much tougher for illegal immigrants to remain in the UK by

restricting access to work, housing, benefits, healthcare, bank accounts and

driving licences . . . Introducing a new citizen test with British values at its

heart‖ (conservatives.com: Capping welfare and working to control

immigration).

And Labour, while admitting that the party got its immigration policy wrong in the past, does not really offer any clear statements on this topic. According to the official Labour immigration policy on the party‟s webpage, only vague policies such as

- 37 - ―stronger border controls‖ or a ―smarter system of controls‖ are mentioned with next to none specific suggestions on how to tackle the problem (labour.org.uk: A Labour government will control immigration with fair rules).

A far cry from the suggestions on specific policies and suggested solutions made by the UK Independence Party, it might be easy to understand why more and more

Britons view UKIP as the solution to the immigration question.

That is not to say, however, that UKIP‟s immigration policies made the headlines without any kind of criticism. Indeed some of the party‟s claims about central and eastern European migrants coming to the UK to claim benefits were refuted:

―In 2009 the Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration (CReAM) at

University College London found that migrants from the A8 countries of central

and eastern Europe who joined the EU in 2004 were 60 per cent less likely than

native-born Brits to claim benefits, and 58 per cent less likely to live in council

housing‖ (Worrall: FactCheck: do immigrants pay their way?).

Owen Paterson, a Tory MP, thinks that UKIP‟s way of handling immigration would only lead to an increase in illegal immigration, citing as an example the situation in the United States of America where according to Paterson almost half of the illegal immigrants enter the country as tourists. With millions of people visiting the UK every year, the situation could be similar.

Paterson further argues that the UKIP‟s intention to leave the EU and negotiate a new trade deal with the Union is incompatible with the party‟s immigration policies, because the EU would most probably not negotiate a trade agreement without some kind of freedom of movement clause being included. He also argues that UKIP‟s intention to introduce a skills-based points system after the Australian example might actually prove contra-productive to UKIP‟s intentions of decreasing immigration, as the

- 38 - Australian foreign-born population has reached 27% under this system* (Paterson: Why

UKIP is wrong about immigration).

A curious view is that of Jonathan Lindsell who suggests in his article that introducing the Australian points system might actually lead to an increase in migration, rather than the opposite. According to Lindsell, one of the reasons for that is that the points based system allows in people with occupations such as plumbing. Electricians and doctors are also allowed entrance. The influx of migrants coming to work to the UK for these reasons might then not be dampened.

Moreover, the points based system is only a part of the Australian immigration policies, as there are more legal ways to get to Australia, such as an intention to study there. For these reasons every year a limit is set to regulate how many immigrants may enter the country.

―In 2013-14 this cap was 190,000 . . . If this was scaled according to UK population, a British PBS cap would be about 513,900 gross entries‖ (Lindsell: The

Australian points system would boost UK migration). Lindsell further points out the fact that this estimate refers only to the points based system and if the UK were to copy the system in its entirety, then the net number of migrants, using the same scaling formula, could reach a number as high as 665.000 immigrants a year.

However, Lindsell also praises some aspects of the points based system: ―By creating higher entry barriers in paperwork and planning terms, it might encourage applicants more committed to settling long term and integrating. Overall, it should mean a highly skilled, language proficient, professional workforce‖ (Lindsell: The

Australian points system would boost UK migration).

* According to a 2010 report from the Australian Bureau of Statistics 73.5% of Australian population were indeed born in Australia, making the number of foreign-born Australians 26.5% (Australian Bureau of Statistics, Overseas Born Population).

- 39 - While UKIP provides voters with an arguably well structured programme about the immigration issue, it has hardly avoided criticism. It seems then, that its actual effectiveness would have to first be tried out in praxis. It might also be argued that since

UKIP have not taken part in any government yet, then the party has not yet failed its electorate on any of its key issues – simply because it has not yet had the opportunity to implement any of its policies – and the voters might thus be inclined more to support a new enterprise, rather than believe the Tories and Labour again on these issues, as many perceive them as having failed.

UKIP and the BNP

While neither party likes to be associated with the other, the UK Independence Party and the British National Party have been compared extensively. Indeed, for more than ten years now UKIP has often been described as “BNP in blazers” by the party‟s critics, hinting at the possibility that the parties have a lot in common, with UKIP just enjoying a better image.

Indeed, there are similarities to be found in the parties‟ programmes. However, after a closer examination it seems that the BNP takes its policies to the extreme (much more so than UKIP). The BNP for example, just as UKIP, advocates a complete withdrawal from the EU (bnp.org.uk: Foreign Affairs). However, while UKIP advocates close economic ties with the EU, free market and reducing regulation for businesses, the

BNP proposes to nationalise some British companies and introduce legislation to actively support British business against foreign imports and raise ―taxes on companies which outsource work abroad‖(bnp.org.uk: Economics). Such policies have arguably very little to do with the free trade in the EEA.

- 40 - In regard to immigration, UKIP, as was mentioned earlier in this chapter, plans to significantly reduce the influx of newcomers who want to stay in Britain. The BNP, however, plans to stop all immigration outright. Among others, the BNP also proposes that Britain should, among others: ―Deport all those who commit crimes and whose original nationality was not British . . . Offer generous grants to those of foreign descent resident here who wish to leave permanently‖ (bnp.org.uk: Immigration).

While some of UKIP‟s immigration policies might be seen as draconic, nowhere in the party‟s manifesto is anything to be found that would come close to deporting

British citizens who committed crime, based only on their ethnic background or encouraging Britons to leave Britain, again based only on their ethnicity.

Furthermore, when it comes to minorities in Britain, the BNP proposes arguably very undemocratic and racist legislation for which UKIP does not seem to stand at all.

The following is one of the BNP‟s goals, cited from its official programme on the party‟s web:

―. . . a BNP government will: . . . Reach an accord with the Muslim world

whereby they will agree to take back their excess population which is currently

colonising this country, in exchange for an ironclad guarantee that Britain will

never again interfere in the political affairs of the Middle East or try to dictate

to any Arab or Muslim country as to what their internal government form should

be‖ (bnp.org.uk: Foreign Affairs).

However, apart from the intention to withdraw Britain from the EU and some agreement over immigration policies, BNP and UKIP do have a similarity in the intention to abolish the Human Rights Act (bnp.org.uk: Democracy; UKIP Manifesto

2015: 53).

* The Human Rights Act from the year 1998 which aligned Britain‟s justice system with the European

Convention on Human Rights (Equality and Human Rights Commission: The Human Rights Act).

- 41 - Explaining the Support for UKIP

As chapter one showed, UKIP have gone from a brand new party with a debatable amount of success throughout its twenty-two year history to winning the European election in 2014, gaining more and more voters for their cause. But who are these voters and where do they come from?

Back in 2006 David Cameron described the UK Independence Party as follows:

―Ukip is sort of a bunch of ... fruitcakes and loonies and closet racists mostly‖ (qtd. in

Taylor: Cameron refuses to apologise to Ukip). While his remarks did not go unnoticed by the party, the issue was not extensively debated. However, if Mr. Cameron had known back then, that it would be his Conservative party that would supply a large portion of the popular support for UKIP, he might have reconsidered his comments.

Indeed, a recent poll conducted by Populus in January 2015 found out that as many as 45% of people who intend to vote UKIP in the General Election in May 2015 voted Conservative in the 2010 General Election* (Stellings: The UKIP Index: Who‟s

Voting UKIP?). Naturally, this has been a reason for concern among the Conservatives, with Cameron trying to appease the lost voters by expressing his understanding for their decision to back UKIP because of key issues such as immigration or the EU and urging the defectors to ―come back home‖ (qtd. in Watt: David Cameron urges Conservative defectors to Ukip to vote for Tories).

However, the dissatisfaction with the Tories and their policies is by far not the only reason and not even the main reason for the influx of voters that UKIP has seen in the past months and years.

* The poll also suggested that only 14% of the respondents backed UKIP in the 2010 General Election and 12% did not vote at all, thus hinting that the support for the party does not only come from people disillusioned with the established parties, but also from those who did not previously feel that there is any party that would address the concerns that plague them the most

- 42 - In his study published in December 2012, Lord Ashcroft found out the following:

―UKIP considerers are most likely to say that the party‘s ―heart is in the right

place‖, that it is ―on the side of people like me‖, ―shares my values‖, ―stands

for fairness‖ and – especially – that it ―says things that need to be said but

others are scared to say‖ (Ashcroft: 18).

The interesting thing about Lord Ashcroft‟s findings is the fact that UKIP‟s supporters apparently support the party not so much because of specific policies (though per the findings in chapter II, certain policies such as immigration do rank high among the reasons why people chose to support UKIP), but rather, as Ashcroft argues: ―. . . it is much more to do with outlook‖ (Ashcroft: 5).

Ashcroft lists some of the grievances that UKIP voters apparently see as things that are going wrong with Britain:

―. . . schools . . . can‘t hold nativity plays or harvest festivals any more; you

can‘t fly a flag of St George any more . . . you won‘t be promoted in the police

force unless you‘re from a minority; you can‘t wear an England shirt on the bus

. . . you can‘t speak up about these things because you‘ll be called a racist; you

can‘t even smack your children‖ (Ashcroft: 5).

From this list of (whether imagined or real) grievances it is clear that the UKIP voters (or at least the 20.000 who participated in Lord Ashcroft‟s research) do not approve of multicultural Britain, immigration, political correctness and they resent the fact that English patriotism (or perhaps nationalism) is in today‟s Britain apparently something to be shunned, rather than to be proud of.

When it comes to the concept of Britishness for example, Ford and Goodwin argue that UKIP gathers support especially from people who see the British national

- 43 - identity as something conditioned by ethnic criteria (aka British forebears and tradition) rather than civic criteria*.

The ethnic concept of nationhood is then much more likely to be supported by the elderly, people without education and the working class voters – a fact that is frequently exploited by radical right parties, such as UKIP, who have supposedly, at least according to Ford and Goodwin, highlighted these ideas of Britishness in their campaigns** (Ford and Goodwin: 120-123).

Indeed, as Jones argues in his article, because of the recent developments in the society, where the working classes have had to fight for their identity and indeed place in the society, a sense of community or national pride has been a safe haven to many in the face of the many changes. According to Jones, these national sentiments in England have been influenced and sped up by a similar development of national identity in

Scotland.

Jones also talks about the notion of estrangement of British politicians from the

Britons. He notes that only 4% of the MP‟s had a past job as manual workers, while the majority of the MP‟s in the House of Commons were white, middle class professionals, which is not representative of the British population. Politics has also over the years become increasingly professionalized, as the number of career politicians has been growing since 1979.

* ―Anyone can be British if they choose to adopt the identity, and express loyalty to the legal and political institutions of Britain‖ (Ford and Goodwin, 120-121).

** It should be mentioned in UKIP‟s defence that at least according to the party‟s official programme taken from their website, the party identifies with the civic rather than the ethnic concept of Britishness:

―UKIP recognises and values an overarching, unifying British culture, which is open and inclusive to anyone who wishes to identify with Britain and British values, regardless of their ethnic or religious background‖ (ukip.org: Policies for People).

- 44 - Jones sums up the general sentiment towards the British political elite as follows: ―They don‘t look like us . . . they don‘t understand us; and secretly, they probably have contempt for us and sneer at us‖ (Jones: Rochester byelection: beliefs of

UKIP voters are soaked in leftwing populism).

This feeling of estrangement is also mentioned and elaborated on by Ashcroft in his study, where he concludes the following:

―These voters think Britain is changing for the worse. They are pessimistic, even

fearful, and they want someone and something to blame. They do not think

mainstream politicians are willing or able to keep their promises or change

things for the better. UKIP, with its single unifying theory of what is wrong and

how to put it right, has obvious attractions for them‖ (Ashcroft: 6).

UKIP has indeed been presenting itself as the People‘s Army, standing up to curb the excessive immigration that harms the working classes, to defend the Judaeo-

Christian heritage (Odone: Nigel Farage: We must defend Christian heritage). The party would also reduce regulations for small businesses, reduce fuel duties, ban prisoners from voting (UKIP Manifesto 2014: 7), modify the smoking ban in order to give pub and restaurant services the possibility to have an open a room for smokers or indeed to allow businesses to give preference to and hire Britons over foreign nationals (ukip.org:

Policies for People).

Furthermore, the direct contact with voters that began with Dick Morris (as described in chapter I) that UKIP started to practise might just put the party and its candidates in a different light with the electorate and make the members of the party look like somebody who is genuinely interested in the voters‟ plight and make them seem like normal people. After all, seeing pictures of Nigel Farage with a pint in

English pubs and talking to voters is something that readers of any British newspapers

- 45 - must have encountered at one point or another, while seeing David Cameron or Ed

Miliband in a similar situation is something that does not happen very often.

This goes hand in hand with another finding that Ashcroft made about why people changed allegiances from one of the established parties to UKIP: ―70% of potential UKIP voters who voted Conservative in 2010 agreed that ―the party that I used to vote for has lost touch with its traditional supporters like me‖. This compared to

65% of those who voted Lib Dem and 52% of those who voted Labour‖ (Ashcroft: 22).

However, Ashcroft also found out the following:

―Unlike voters as a whole, UKIP considerers put the Conservatives ahead as the

best party to get the economy growing and create jobs. They also give the Tories

a bigger lead on cutting the deficit and managing the economy overall than the

population generally‖ (Ashcroft: 19).

It would seem then that while attracting voters from across the political spectrum on immigration and EU policies, plus the aforementioned general discontent, UKIP backers do not have complete faith in the party when it comes to economy, which might be considered something of a paradox, considering the fact that some voters back UKIP, among others, because the party apparently understands the plight of the normal people, while trusting a different party more when it comes to wealth, which is arguably to varying degrees an important factor in the lives of all people.

As it was already mentioned in chapter II, as many as 76% of UKIP supporters back the party chiefly because they wish to see a decrease in immigration. Ford and

Goodwin argue that support for this policy comes among others from people who are working class, economically challenged and who feel threatened by the influx of migrants, because they see immigration as ―a serious economic and social threat‖

(Ford and Goodwin: 122).

- 46 - The Social Profile of UKIP Voters

The fact that UKIP garners its support for its immigration policies from the lower classes is actually very telling. While UKIP has been attracting more and more voters in the past few years, the voters do not actually come from all strata of the British society. Indeed, the party has seen influx of supporters especially from working class voters, just as it is the case with other radical right parties across Europe. These voters in the past used to be staunch social democrats before switching allegiances to the radical right. This has been the case for example in France (Front National), Austria

(Freedom Part) or Denmark (People‟s Party).

The reason for this has been the general development of the western societies after the Industrial revolution, especially in the 20th century. As the middle class grew and generally became more educated, the working class declined in numbers. Originally founded to fight for the rights of the workers, leftist parties, such as social democrats, found it increasingly difficult to win elections by standing up for the values of only the lower classes alone.

In order to survive, many of these parties chose to adapt, reforming their values and party policies so as to appeal to a larger electorate in societies dominated by the middle classes. This, however, lead to an alienation of the original electorate, as the lower classes found it more and more difficult to find a party that would represent their views and address their concerns.

As a consequence, not being satisfied with the policies that their original parties of choice offered, more and more voters were pushed (or indeed are being pushed) to more radical camps where issues important for the working classes (but less so for the middle classes) are being debated. Ford and Goodwin list a few of these issues:

- 47 - ―immigration; national identity; the perceived threat from the EU; and rapid social change‖ (Ford and Goodwin: 114).

However, it is curious to notice, as Ford and Goodwin note, that while these trends of increasing popularity of far-right parties were underway all across Europe,

Britain seemed to have been exempt from this development. Among the reasons for this is for example the British first-past-the-post electoral system that prevents small parties from gaining a foothold in the House of Commons. As such, they argue, Britons were generally disinterested in the radical-right agenda. However, with the coming of UKIP, things changed (Ford and Goodwin, 112-14).

However, belonging to the working class and struggling economically in today‟s

Britain is not the only characteristic of the typical UKIP voter. According to surveys conducted to determine who supports UKIP, Populus found out that there the factor age is an important criterion for the party‟s support as well.

Populus found out that the most likely age group to provide UKIP with their support are people who are older than 65, followed up closely by the groups 45-54 and

55-64. In a stark opposition to that are the age groups 18-24 and 25-34, who are least likely to provide the party with their vote (Stellings: The Ukip Index: Who‟s Voting

Ukip?). It would seem that age is an important factor in determining who supports the party, with UKIP getting most of its votes from the older generation.

The reasons for the big difference between the attitudes of the mentioned age groups towards UKIP have to do with different sets of values that the people in question consider to be important. Indeed, the older voters, some of whom grew up amid economic tensions or strife during or after the Second World War are much more likely to prefer economic stability, material security and stability in the society.

- 48 - However, their descendants, who were already born into a world where they were provided for and did not suffer from material deprivation, are today more likely to value freedom and protection of human rights over material security (Ford and

Goodwin: 117-118). Furthermore, there are substantial differences to be observed in approach to social values between the age groups as well:

―Younger voters, who have grown up and prospered in a more mobile and

interconnected world, tend to have weaker attachments to their nation of birth, a

thinner and more instrumental sense of what national identity means, a greater

openness to immigration, and a greater acceptance of ethnic diversity‖ (Ford

and Goodwin: 117-118).

The reason for the surge in support for UKIP among the older voters is quite clear now, as the party might be seen by the younger generation as too backward when it comes to immigration and ethnic tolerance, while the older generation might find these policies to their liking, as they tend to be: ―socially conservative; threatened by immigration; suspicious of diversity; attached to traditional, material values; and angry about perceived breakdown of respect for authority and institutions‖ (Ford and

Goodwin: 157).

The ethnic criterion is also telling as, according to Populus, UKIP gathers their support especially from white males, while non-white voters are very unlikely to vote for the party (Stellings: The Ukip Index: Who‟s Voting Ukip?). Indeed, the party has not spoken very fondly of multiculturalism thus far, with Nigel Farage going as far as to declare that promoting multiculturalism was ―the biggest mistake the governments have made‖ (qtd. in Bordelon, UKIP‟s Farage: Multiculturalism Creating „Fifth Column‟ in

West).

- 49 - Another interesting thing is the fact that female voters are much less likely to vote UKIP than men (Stellings: The Ukip Index: Who‟s Voting Ukip?). Ford and

Goodwin argue that the gender aspect of UKIP support has to do with the fact that women are generally less interested in politics than men and tend to vote parties that have already established themselves in the past and have since become familiar to the voters, rather than risk voting for a newcomer (Ford and Goodwin: 155).

Populus further found out that when it comes to education, UKIP gathers support rather from people with only secondary education (Stellings: The Ukip Index: Who‟s

Voting Ukip?) while Ford and Goodwin add that as many as 55% of UKIP‟s voters broke off their education at or before their sixteenth birthday and not even one quarter of them attended university. They explain the relatively low levels of achieved education among the UKIP supporters as follows:

―Education, particularly at the university level, is associated with a more liberal

and tolerant outlook towards minorities, including immigrants, ethnic minorities

and homosexuals. UKIP . . . may be appealing most strongly to the least

educated in society, as they are also the most likely to share the social values

associated with these parties [UKIP and BNP]‖ (Ford and Goodwin: 154).

Geographically, as it was already mentioned in Chapter I, UKIP gathers most supporters in England. Populus pinpointed these regions and identified that the highest probability that a person will vote UKIP is in Eastern England, followed by Yorkshire

& Humberside, East Midlands and West Midlands. Support for the party is by far the lowest in Scotland, followed by London and Wales (Stellings: The Ukip Index: Who‟s

Voting Ukip?).

- 50 - As a summary we can conclude that the UKIP supporters are predominantly older, not well educated, white, working-class males from South-East, South-West and

East and West of England.

- 51 - Conclusion

The way from founding a new party to becoming a party recognised as a serious contender by the other established parties can be long and tiresome. The United

Kingdom Independence Party made many mistakes on its way to its first electoral successes, mainly in failing to uphold unity and order among the party‟s activists and in inefficient campaigning, proving that among the most important things in politics is an effective organisation. The party further proved that actually speaking to the electorate in person and presenting its members as ordinary citizens is a very effective way of attracting voters.

UKIP shows that it is possible to rise to prominence even today in a political system that does not let in newcomers easily. The success in achieving this level of recognition throughout its fifteen years of existence could serve as a guideline to other potential political parties that seek to find themselves a spot among the already established parties (not only) in British politics.

However, while the party‟s main goal since its founding has been to withdraw the United Kingdom from the European Union, its arguments do not always appear to be based on solid evidence and offer the voters half-truths rather than the full picture, as witnessed by the argument around the cost of the UK membership.

The party has concentrated more on smearing the EU institutions and the perceived notion that the United Kingdom is not being ruled by the British people anymore and that UKIP are the only ones who can get the power back to the British voters. With this in mind, it is not difficult to imagine why some people might see UKIP as a populist party, preying on the fears of the electorate, rather than offering objective criticism based on facts.

- 52 - It also appears that UKIP has, for whatever reason, managed to develop their immigration policies to such an extent that voters flock to the party chiefly because of this issue. It might not be difficult to see why, as other parties have preferred to avoid this issue or failed to deliver on their promises when it comes to curbing down immigration, at least in the eyes of the voters.

Whether the Australian approach to immigration proposed by UKIP would work or not is a hypothetical question that cannot be answered and would have to be tested in praxis, as there are compelling arguments both for and against the suggested approach.

However, the fact remains that UKIP has managed to work out their immigration policies to such an extent that they overshadow those of the other political parties, which, if they wish to battle UKIP on this field, will have to devoid much more attention to this sensitive and thus so far largely ignored issue, that has in between become a big topic in the British society.

However, regardless of whether UKIP is justified in their approach to the

European Union and immigration, the argument could be made that through agitating and openly talking about this topic, thus effectively removing the taboos surrounding these issues, the party has managed to get them at the top of the political agenda, making it harder for the already established parties to ignore these issues and forcing them to also openly talk about them.

The comparison of BNP and UKIP showed that the parties do have similar policies in areas of the EU, advocating complete withdrawal from the political Union, and immigration, suggesting that immigration be halted or significantly reduced at least for the next few years and both also advocate revoking the Human Rights Act.

- 53 - However, BNP takes a few steps further on these policies, advocating not only a withdrawal from the European Union, but also introducing legislation protecting British companies against competition from abroad, thus proposing an interference in the free trade. UKIP, on the other hand, is in favour of keeping the benefits of the free trade with the EU. BNP is also openly hostile to foreign cultures, advocating for example the removal of the British Muslim minority and it also promotes the ethnic concept of

Britishness, while UKIP professes to advocate the civic one.

It can be concluded that UKIP, at least officially, is not BNP in blazers, as

BNP‟s policies are further right on the political spectrum and could be considered extremist. However, even though UKIP underwent a purge of its BNP membership and is today the only party in Britain to explicitly forbid hiring former BNP members, the argument could be made that this policy was introduced exactly because some of

UKIP‟s views border on extremism or may be considered extremist, such as the party‟s stance on immigration, and the party seeks in this way to protect its „everyman‟ image and rid itself of accusations of extremism.

The research into the support of UKIP proves that the party is by far not a platform supported by voters from all strata of the British society, but rather from a minority that does not feel its concerns to be addressed by any other major political party. The supporters also seem to be very patriotic and even nationalistic, wary of immigration, change and progress and coming from the working classes. It might then not come as a surprise that some see the party‟s supporters as somewhat radical.

However, apart from immigration and EU policies, the support for the party seems to at least partially come as a protest vote as the party‟s supporters do not seem to have full confidence in the party‟s policies on key issues such as economics.

- 54 - However, as UKIPs voters are generally older and not very well educated, the potential of a long-term stay on the political scene for the party might arguably be small and UKIP might be forced in the future to expand its policies to attract voters from other strata of the British society, else its support might quite literally die out.

All things considered, the year 2015 may prove to be yet another game-changer in British politics, as UKIP is hopeful in succeeding in the general elections in May. Its policies do seem to attract sufficient support at the moment and the party is determined to make this general election its first election ever to successfully break the entry barrier.

If the party manages to get into the House of Commons, UKIP could start to exercise direct influence on British politics in a more immediate way and help Britain push one or more steps closer to implementing radical changes in the British social and political life. It has already managed to put the European question and immigration on the agenda, however, only time will tell whether the United Kingdom Independence

Party has a long lasting future.

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- 61 - Résumé (English)

The thesis examines the United Kingdom Independence Party, which has been become more and more significant in the years since its founding, especially in the last few years, and its role in British politics. It describes the history and development of the party in selected periods and how its past and present leaders affected it. It further provides an analysis of the party‟s arguments regarding the two most important policies on which the party has been building its campaigning and gathering its support, namely leaving the European Union and immigration, and compares these policies with those of the Conservative and Labour parties in the same area. A short comparison of the party‟s general image and goals and those of the British National Party is also provided. The last point of research in the thesis is the electorate of the party – it explores the social profile of the voters, e.g. what social groups they come from and what level of education they achieved. The geographic distribution of the electorate also features in the thesis.

- 62 - Résumé (Czech)

Tato práce zkoumá politickou stranu United Kingdom Independence Party, která v posledních letech nabírá na důležitosti, a roli, kterou tato strana hraje v britské politice. Práce popisuje historický vývoj strany ve vybraných obdobích od jejího založení a také to, jak její minulí a nynější předsedové ovlivňovali její vývoj. Dalším bodem práce je analýza argumentů a politiky strany v oblastech odchodu z Evropské unie a imigrace, což jsou dvě nejdůležitější oblasti, na kterých strana staví své kampaně a získává veřejnou podporu. Politika strany v těchto oblastech je také porovnána s názory Konzervativní strany a Labouristické strany. Krátké porovnání vzhledu a cílů této strany se stranou British National Party je také součástí práce. Posledním bodem výzkumu jsou voliči strany – jejich společenský profil, tedy např. z jaké sociální třídy pocházejí a jakého dosáhli vzdělání. Práce také zmiňuje, ze kterých oblastí Spojeného

Království tito voliči pocházejí.

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