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Exploitation, Unequal Exchange and Dependency: a Philosophical Analysis

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Exploitation, Unequal Exchange and Dependency: a Philosophical Analysis Loyola University Chicago Loyola eCommons Dissertations Theses and Dissertations 1987 Exploitation, Unequal Exchange and Dependency: A Philosophical Analysis Paul Olabisi Otubusin Loyola University Chicago Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Otubusin, Paul Olabisi, "Exploitation, Unequal Exchange and Dependency: A Philosophical Analysis" (1987). Dissertations. 2486. https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/2486 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. Copyright © 1987 Paul Olabisi Otubusin EXPLOITATION, UNEQUAL EXCHANGE AND DEPENDENCY: A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS by Paul Olabisi Otubusin A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy January 1987 Copyright 1987 by Paul o. Otubusin ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This work has finally taken shape and seen the light of the day through the efforts of various people, many of whom I cannot acknowledge here due to lack of space. The author owes a great gratitude to all those who have contributed directly or indirectly towards the realization of this work and his educational goal. I am specially grateful to my dissertation director, Dr. David Schweickart who nurtured the preliminary idea in my mind and like the Socratic midwife, through his direction, comments and helpful suggestions, saw to the delivery of the idea in its present final stage. I am grateful to the other members of the dissertation committee, Dr. Thomas Donaldson and Dr. David Czar, whose expertise, incisive comments and care for details added the refinement, accuracy and sophistication I have always desired in my work. To Dr. Hillel Steiner (Professor of Government) of Manches ter University, United Kingdom, Dr. Valerie Simms (Professor of Comparative Politics), Dr. Kusel Varophas (Professor of International Political Economy) and Dr. Assad Hussain (Professor of International Relations), all of Northeastern Illinois University, I owe deep gratitude for their different viewpoints, constructive criticisms and ii helpful suggestions. My work has been facilitated through my worry-free comfortable stay at Holy Angels' Parish. To the celebrated Chicago priest and pastor, Very Rev. Father George Clements and the closely knit family of Holy Angels, I say, thank you all for your hospitality and friendliness. I thank the Federal Government of Nigeria for the award of the Overseas Postgraduate Scholarship which helped me through my graduate studies in the United States. Also, I thank the directors of the Arthur J. Schmitt Foundation for the award of the Doctoral Fellowship which enabled me to complete my dissertation research. While thanking my father, Mr. Coker Abiodun Otubusin, my uncle, Mr. Gregory Izokpu, my brother, Rev. Father Peter otubusin and my sister, Mrs. Mary (Otubusin) Fawole, I appreciate the many letters of encouragement, love and concern from my dear mother, Mrs. Martina Agboneboaye (Izokpu) Otubusin. She has always been the strong motivating force in my life propelling me to great heights of success. Finally, I am highly indebted to Most Rev. Dr. Felix Alaba Adeosin Job, (the Catholic Bishop of Ibadan, Nigeria) for his support, encouragement and prayers throughout the course of my studies in the United states. iii VITA The author, Paul Olabisi Otubusin, is the son of Coker Abiodun Otubusin and Martina Agboneboaye (Izokpu) Otubusin. He was born March 8, 1955, in Ubiaja, Bendel State, Nigeria. His elementary education was obtained in the schools of Ubiaja, Bendel State and Ibadan, Oyo State. His secondary education was completed in 1966 at St. Teresa's Minor Seminary, Ibadan. In January 1971, he entered the catholic Major Seminary where he studied for the Catholic Priesthood and graduated with the Diploma in Religious Studies from the University of Ibadan and a Bachelor of Divinity from the Pontifical Urban University, Rome. In September 1981, he entered the University of Lagos, Nigeria, having been awarded a Postgraduate Scholarship by the Federal Government of Nigeria. In June, 1983, he received the degree of Master of Arts in Political Philosophy. In May, 1983, he was awarded an Overseas Postgraduate Scholarship by the Federal Government of Nigeria to study in the United States of America. In August 1983, he entered Loyola University of Chicago for the doctoral program. While at Loyola, in August, 1984, he enrolled concurrently in another graduate program at Northeastern iv Illinois University. In December, 1985, he received the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science. In August, 1984, he was awarded the Graduate Merit Tuition Waiver by Northeastern University which enabled him to complete the Masters program. In August, 1985, he was appointed a lecturer in Political Science at Northeastern University. At Loyola University, in August, 1984, he was granted an assistantship in Philosophy and in April, 1985, he was awarded the Arthur Schmitt Doctoral Fellowship enabling him to complete the Doctoral studies. In May, 1985, he was elected President of Loyola Graduate Philosophy Association, elected a member of Phi Sigma Tau, National Honor Society in Philosophy and in April, 1986, he was inducted into Alpha Sigma Nu, National Jesuit Honor Society. In June, 1985, at Northeastern, he was also elected a member of Phi Sigma Alpha, National Political Science Honor Society. v TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS • ii VITA. • . iv INTRODUCTION 1 Chapter I. THE CONCEPT OF EXPLOITATION 8 A. Review of Literature • • 8 B. Some Characterizations of Exploitation • 28 c. Why do we need a Theory of Exploitation? • • 36 1. Comparison with Rawls's Theory of Justice 36 2. Competing Theories of Exploitation • • • 40 II. A LIBERAL THEORY OF EXPLOITATION 48 A. Brief Historical Survey 48 B. Hillel Steiner • . • • . • • . • • • . 63 1. The Theory Explained • • • • . • • • 63 2. Moral Assumptions . • . • • • • • • 69 3. Critical cases Considered • • . • • . 72 4. Problems with the Theory 74 III. THE MARXIAN THEORY OF EXPLOITATION 94 A. Exposition • • • 94 B. Moral Assumption and Arguments • 112 vi TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) IV. AGHIRI EMMANUEL: UNEQUAL EXCHANGE . 130 A. Exposition 130 B. Moral Assumptions and Arguments • 144 v. JOHN ROEMER: MARXIAN GAME THEORY 152 A. Exposition • . • . • 152 1. Withdrawal Condition 154 2. Dominance Condition 159 B. Moral Assumptions 161 c. Problems with the Theory 169 D. Significance of the Theory 171 VI. DEVELOPMENTALISM AND DEPENDENCY . 176 A. Preliminary Considerations . 176 B. Developmental ism . 182 c. Dependency Theory . 190 D. Implications and Conclusions . 201 VII. THE GHANAIAN ECONOMY AS A TEST CASE: AN APPLICATION OF COMPETING THEORIES 207 A. Developmentalism and the Ghanaian Economy . 209 B. Dependency Theory and the Ghanaian Economy. 214 1. Its Appeal .•.•. 214 2. Its Implementation 218 3. Its Results ••• 227 c. Implications and Conclusions 234 vii TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION • 245 BIBLIOGRAPHY • • . • • • 248 viii• INTRODUCTION This dissertation is a treatise on the concept of exploitation both as an ethical and a technical concept. 1 It examines and critiques different theories of exploitation to highlight their ethical and methodological assumptions, with a view to understanding a particular problem: the relation between First and Third World countries. These different theories fall into two broad categories: the liberal and the Marxian traditions. Hillel Steiner's theory2, which is paradigmatic of the liberal tradition, is shown to be quite problematic as a theory of exploitation in terms of both its internal coherence and its moral assumption. The underlying liberal moral assumption - that there can be no exploitation so long as there is free exchange devoid of an interference by a third party - is suspect and is challenged by the theories in the Marxian tradition. This series of theories - Marx's classical theory, Arghiri Emmanuel's "unequal exchange," John Roemer' s game theory and Latin American based dependency theory - are shown to constitute different significant moments in the single, general Marxian theory of exploitation. These 1 • 2 different moments, however, do seem to have different moral assumptions. I have tried to draw out what these moral assumptions are, and how the theories themselves relate to each other as different moments of a general theory. The basis for these conceptions of exploitation is the classical technical usage of the concept deriving from Karl Marx's "labor theory of value": workers in a capitalist society are "exploited" in that they expend more labor in production process than is embodied in the products they consume. 3 But Marx's classical theory is found to be inadequate because it does not treat First and Third World relations. Marx's model is developed strictly in the context of capital-labor relations. Emmanuel confronts this difficulty squarely. In his theory of "unequal exchange," Emmanuel applies the Marxian categories to First and Third World relations. Against the classical liberal stance deriving from the Ricardian "theory of comparative advantage," which advocates free trade as a
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