Habitus, Field Theory and the ‘Bridge’: Using a Bourdieusian Approach to Examine and Explain Cold War Continuities in Britain’S Post-Cold War Foreign Policy

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2016 Habitus, Field Theory and the ‘Bridge’: Using a Bourdieusian Approach to Examine and Explain Cold War Continuities in Britain’s Post-Cold War Foreign Policy

Smythe, Jason A

Smythe, J. A. (2016). Habitus, Field Theory and the ‘Bridge’: Using a Bourdieusian Approach to Examine and Explain Cold War Continuities in Britain’s Post-Cold War Foreign Policy (Unpublished master's thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/26335 http://hdl.handle.net/11023/3475 master thesis

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Habitus, Field Theory and the ‘Bridge’: Using a Bourdieusian Approach to Examine and

Explain Cold War Continuities in Britain’s Post-Cold War Foreign Policy

Jason A. Smythe

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

GRADUATE PROGRAM IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

CALGARY, ALBERTA

DECEMBER, 2016

This thesis examines the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ and the ‘bridge’ role the United Kingdom has played within it since 1945, with the British seeing it as an important part of what Tate calls the post-war Anglo-American “hegemonic division of labour.” Playing this ‘bridge’ role made sense given the logic of Cold War bipolarity, but the post-Cold War shift to unipolarity has significantly decreased the need for ‘bridges’ in the international system, yet successive post-Cold War British governments remained committed to playing this role. This paper asks why this occurred and if the British are still playing this role. By applying a Bourdieusian approach the need to examine microstructures when studying British foreign policy is revealed, with the concepts of field theory and habitus highlighting the important role the unique individual experiences and beliefs of the prime minister play in the crafting of British foreign policy.

ii Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Terry Terriff, for all his helpful edits and other suggestions. I would also like to thanks my parents, Howard and Violet Smythe, for their emotional and financial support.

iii Dedication

To the Calgary winter, for forcing me to stay indoors.

iv Table of Contents Abstract  ii

Acknowledgments  iii

Dedication  iv

Table of Contents  v

List of Abbreviations  viii

Epigraph  ix

Chapter 1: Introducing the ‘Special Relationship’ and the ‘Bridge’  1

Chapter 2: Discussing Unipolarity, Structural and Neoclassical Realism, Decision-

Making Theory, Practice Theory, and Bourdieu  13

2.1: Introduction  13

2.2: Unipolarity, Structural Realism, and Alliances  17

2.3: Neoclassical Realism and Practice Theory  30

2.4: Conclusion  50

Chapter 3: The Bourdieusian Approach  53

3.1: Introduction  53

3.2: The Bourdieusian Approach Explained  54

3.3: The Bourdieusian Literature on IR and Foreign Policy  84

3.4: Methods  94

v 3.5: Conclusion  98

Chapter 4: The Cold War  101

4.1: Introduction  101

4.2: 1945 to Suez  104

4.3: The End of Empire  117

4.4: Post-Imperial Reconstruction  129

4.5: Conclusion  144

Chapter 5: Post-Cold War  146

5.1: Introduction  146

5.2: John Major  147

5.3: New Labour  160

5.4: David Cameron  177

5.5: Conclusion  188

Chapter 6: Conclusion  190

Bibliography  197

1: Books  197

2: Chapter or Other Part of Book  202

3: Journal Articles  205

vi 4: Speeches  214

5: Government Documents  219

6: Reports  219

7: Online Resources  220

vii List of Abbreviations

European Economic Community  EEC

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  FCO

International Relations  IR

Lord Mayor’s Banquet  LMB

Member of Parliament  MP

Multilateral Force  MLF

National Security Council  NSC

National Security Strategy  NSS

Prime Minister  PM

United Kingdom  UK

viii Epigraph

For we must make no mistake about ourselves: we are as much automaton as mind. As a result, demonstration alone is not the only instrument for convincing us. How few things can be demonstrated! Proofs only convince the mind; habit provides the strongest proofs and those that are most believed. It inclines the automation, which leads the mind unconsciously along with it. Who ever provided that it will dawn tomorrow, and that we shall die? And what is more widely believed? It is, then, habit that convinces us and makes so many Christians. It is habit that makes Turks, heathen, trade, soldiers, etc… In short, we must resort to habit once the mind has seen where the truth lies, in order to steep and sustain ourselves in that belief which constantly eludes us, for it is too much trouble to have proofs always present before us. We must acquire an easier belief, which is that of habit. With no violence, art or argument it makes us believe things, and so inclines all our faculties to this belief that our soul falls naturally into it. When we believe only by the strength of our conviction and the automaton is inclined to believe the opposite, that is not enough. We must therefore make both parts of us believe: the mind by reasons, which need to be seen only once in a lifetime, and the automaton by habit, and not allowing it any inclination to the contrary.

– Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice.1

1 Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, trans. Richard Nice (Redwood City: Stanford University Press, 1990), 48-49.

ix Chapter 1: Introducing the ‘Special Relationship’ and the ‘Bridge’

Making sense of a country’s foreign policy can be challenging. Not only must one

make sense of the external factors (i.e. the international system) which influence a

nation-state’s decision making, but you must also consider the domestic system in

which the state’s foreign policymakers operate and are situated in. Adding a further

wrinkle to the already stressed brow of the foreign policy scholar is the fact that the

foreign policymakers being studied are, despite what many conspiracy theorists may

like to believe,1 real human beings with complex emotions and beliefs who are often

forced to make difficult decisions without access to all the pertinent information.

Discussions regarding the decision-making process and the impediments to pure

rationality will occur later in this thesis,2 but for now this author wants to make one thing abundantly clear: to justify one of the key assumptions of this paper, we will start with the work of Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin,3 since they provide us with

an analytical scheme designed to capture the complex determinants of state behaviour.

This scheme divides the world into two settings, external and internal, and SBS argue

that the myriad ways in which these two settings interact with one another influences

the state’s decision-makers, who then decide which action their country should take.4

To restate in a slightly different manner, a state’s foreign policy is determined by both

1 See: The Reptilian conspiracy. Author’s note: only Google this conspiracy if you are in the mood for a good laugh. 2 See: chapter two. 3 From hereon out I will refer to them as SBS. 4 Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1962), 60-74. In regards to defining what is meant by internal and external settings, they are described as follows: the external setting refers to “factors and conditions beyond the territorial boundaries of the state,” while the internal setting refers to “the way a state’s society is organized and functions” and looks at factors like ‘domestic politics’ and the overall ‘social structure and behaviour of the state’, with the authors defining the latter as consisting of factors like “morale, attitudes, national power, [and] party politics” (Ibid 60-74).

1 internal and external settings, thus it is imperative to study both. Later discussion of

theories like institutional-liberalism, neoclassical realism and practice theory will, among

other things, justify this paper’s adoption of SBS’s scheme, but for now we just need to

be aware that we must study both the internal and external to understand foreign policy.

This scheme, however, does not answer everything one must know to properly

grasp or study a state’s foreign policy, so further questions abound – like how do we

make sense of a country’s political system or the international system, or how do we

study social structures and behaviour? It would appear that the wisest route would be to

utilize theoretical approaches that not only attempt to answer such questions but also

recognize the need to study both the internal and external settings in which decision-

makers operate, and which theory or theories are best equipped to do this will be

discussed later.5 However, what is of critical importance at this point in the paper is to

lay out (1) the subject of this paper’s investigation, and (2) the research question it will

attempt to answer. In regards to the former, the title page makes it rather obvious – this

thesis examines UK foreign policy, but more specifically the existence of Cold War continuities in its post-Cold War foreign policy, and right away it should be obvious to

the reader that this author has chosen a rather ambitious topic. Because of this, if this

paper lacks a clear sense of direction, and the author is unable to admit that a master’s

thesis cannot examine every nook and cranny of the UK’s government and recent

history, then the likely outcome is that both the author and the reader will find

themselves hopelessly lost in some figurative labyrinth housing Minotaurs or, potentially

5 Again, see chapter two.

2 worse, David Bowie and a gaggle of Jim Henson’s puppets.6 To avoid these pitfalls we

must first recognize that the scheme provided by SBS lays out the process in which

foreign policies are made, but it fails to answer country specific questions like “what are

these Cold War continuities the author is speaking of?,” so we must look elsewhere. To

determine these Cold War continuities, we must ask the following question: what did UK

foreign policy look like during the Cold War, and what does it look like now? If we can

answer this then we can determine what these Cold War continuities are, allowing us to

finally reveal and discuss this paper’s research question.

An excellent place to start is with K.J. Holsti, writer of a seminal article on

national role conceptions. In said seminal article, Holsti examined speeches made by

key political figures between 1966 to 1968 inclusive, and showed that UK foreign

policymakers viewed their country as playing five major roles in the international

system: regional protector, mediator/integrator, regional subsystem collaborator,

developer, and faithful ally.7 This is of critical importance because it presents empirical

evidence that shows how the British viewed themselves during the middle of the roughly

forty-five years long Cold War, giving us a fantastic reference point to make sense of the changes the country’s foreign policy underwent from the end of the Second World

War to 1968. The end of the Second World War is highlighted because (1) it marks the

6 Which is worse is entirely subjective, but I suspect the answer hinges on whether you prefer Greek mythology or 80s pop culture. 7 K.J. Holsti, “National Role Conception in the Study of Foreign Policy,” International Studies Quarterly 14.3 (1970): 276. Note: Holsti ultimately assigns six roles to the UK, with other being the last role. However, since other is defined as “national role conceptions [that] appeared in the sources, but their frequency was not great enough to include them in the taxonomy” (Ibid 271), this paper will omit this role from future discussion due to a lack of specificity as to what it entails.

3 beginning of the Cold War,8 and (2) when the UK entered the war it was a hegemonic

power that possessed one of the largest empires in history, but by 1962 it had become

a shadow of its former self, with Dean Acheson famously stating that the country had

“lost an empire and not yet found a role.”9 This suggests that if Acheson’s claim was

correct then the UK found a role(s) relatively quickly, a testament to the country’s ability

to either break or adjust imperial-era habits in the face of postcolonial and postwar

realities.

If Holsti gives us a sense of the UK’s national role conceptions during the Cold

War era, then we now need to determine what roles Britain plays in the post-Cold War

era. For this we turn to Alex Macleod, who, by examining the speeches of key UK

foreign policymakers between the years of 1989 and 1993 inclusive, argues that during

this period the country played four main roles in international system: contributor to the

international system, promotor of defence and security, regional subsystem

collaborator, and international broker.10 This paper will argue that not only are these

roles still guiding UK foreign policy but that developments since the publishing of

Macleod’s article, like the New Labour years or speeches made by John Major and his

government from 1994 to 1997, means it would be a mistake to omit faithful ally from this list of roles, given the importance the Major, Blair, Brown and Cameron governments placed on the country’s ‘special relationship’ with the US.11 However, what

8 The exact time-period used for the Cold War, among other things, will be explained at the beginning of chapter four. 9 See: Douglas Brinkley, “Dean Acheson and the ‘Special Relationship’: The West Point Speech of December 1962,” The Historical Journal 33.3 (1990): 599. 10 Alex Macleod, “Great Britain: Still Searching for Status?,” in Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era, ed. Philippe G. Le Prestre (McGIll-Queen’s University Press: Montreal & Kingston, 1997), 171. Note: how Macleod’s work builds off of Holsti’s will be discussed in detail later in this chapter. 11 This will be explored in greater detail in chapter 5.

4 is important for the reader to understand at this point is that Holsti sets the scene for the middle of the Cold War, while Macleod gives us a sense of how UK foreign policymakers viewed their country and its role in the international system at the beginning of the post-Cold War era, and we must now go about understanding where these national role conceptions overlap, and where (or how) they potentially differ. It seems obvious that faithful ally is one such area where said overlap occurs, but we must still investigate the other roles in the name of due diligence.

To find these elusive Cold War continuities, two questions must be examined.

The first, and perhaps most obvious one, is ‘how do Macleod and Holsti define each of their roles?’, with the other being ‘what is the ‘special relationship’ with the US?’ Starting with the perhaps more ‘obvious’ first question, we begin with Holsti, who defines regional protector as “[implying] special leadership responsibilities on a regional or issue-area basis [and] places emphasis on the function of providing protection for adjacent regions;”12 mediator-integrator as “capable of, or responsible for, fulfilling or undertaking special tasks to reconcile conflicts between other states or groups of states;”13 regional-subsystem collaborator as “[differing] from…the mediator-integrator in that they do not merely envisage occasional interposition into areas or issues of conflict; they indicate, rather, far-reaching commitments to cooperative efforts with other states to build wider communities, or to cross-cutting subsystems such as the

Communist movement;”14 developer as “a special duty to assist underdeveloped

12 Holsti, “National Role Conception in the Study of Foreign Policy,” 261-262. 13 Ibid 265. 14 Ibid 265.

5 countries;”15 and faithful ally as “where a government makes a specific commitment to

support the policies of another government.”16 Not all role conceptions, however, are

created equal, and in Holsti’s case his data shows that the roles of regional protector,

regional-subsystem collaborator and faithful ally appear the most frequently.17 Critically,

these three roles were also the main roles played by the UK from 1945 to 1965

inclusive, and in chapter four evidence supporting this claim will be provided. For now,

however, this paper will advance the following argument: that of these three roles,

faithful ally (and to be more specific, faithful ally to the US) was the most important role

played by the UK during the Cold War, and this has remained constant throughout the

post-Cold War era. Thus, this role concept of faithful ally, and more specifically the US-

UK ‘special relationship’ that emerges from this, is where this paper will focus most of its energy.

But what is this ‘special relationship’ between the US and UK? Since this paper is interested in the UK’s perspective and, more generally, UK foreign policy, focus must turn to the period between the end of the Second World War and the Suez Crisis – a period when a narrative slowly began to take hold amongst UK foreign policymakers;

one that argued that the country was a ‘bridge’ between three circles – the US, Europe

and the Commonwealth – and playing this role was one way for it to maintain its

traditional role as a great power.18 Of particular importance was the ‘US circle’ and the

belief that a ‘special relationship’ existed between the US and UK. From the UK’s

15 Ibid 266 16 Ibid 267. 17 See: Ibid 276 for data. 18 The term ‘great power’ will be defined in chapter three, and more specifically during discussion of Justin Morris’ article.

6 perspective, this relationship was based on several key assumptions. First, this ‘special

relationship’ was not only born out of the two countries having a shared culture and

history but was “rooted in the experiences and consequences of World War II.”19 Steve

Marsh and John Baylis note that since 1945 British officials have constantly reminded

their American counterparts of their countries’ “like values, shared experience, [and]

common language,”20 and appear to be particularly fond of employing “Churchillian

rhetoric of ‘fraternal association’ and ‘kindred systems of society’.”21 Second, that it was

of vital importance for the UK to “‘pay the price’ of staying close to Washington,”22 which

entailed supporting American war efforts through various means of military cooperation.

Third, that due to the existence of a post-war “hegemonic division of labour”23 the UK

provided value to the US by being a ‘bridge’ between the three circles. Finally, within the

US-led international system the UK played the role of ‘Greeks’ while the US were cast

as the ‘Romans’. To clarify, the UK perceived themselves as ‘Greeks’ because they

considered themselves wiser in regards to diplomacy and other foreign policy matters

due to their long history of being a great power. The ‘Romans’ (US) were seen as

lacking that history and as being more ‘barbaric’ or ‘naïve’ and thus in need of guidance

19 Steve Marsh and John Baylis, “The Anglo-American Special Relationship: The Lazarus of International Relations,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 17:1 (2006): 174. 20 Ibid 183. 21 Ibid 173. 22 Ibid 186. 23 This term is borrowed from Simon Tate, who offers the following explanation: “[Post-war] British governments appear to have viewed the special relationship as the product of what we can term here an unwritten and somewhat ad hoc Anglo-American ‘hegemonic division of labour’, capable of leading most of the geopolitically important parts of the post-war world….a division between the coercive strength of the US administrators — a function of other ‘western governments’ reliance upon American military and economic force — and British governments’ ability to use their European ties and imperial fraternity to better guide and influence European and Commonwealth governments to support Anglo-American foreign policy objectives” (Simon Tate, A Special Relationship? British Foreign Policy in the Era of American Hegemony (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), 10-11).

7 from the more sophisticated ‘Greeks’.24 Therefore, UK policymakers believed exerting

influence over US foreign policy was vital to not only protect their national interests, but

at a more general level to ensure that the post-war international system ran smoothly.25

This alleged ability to influence the US, in addition to its role as a ‘bridge’, would

guarantee what Thomas Hennessey dubs “power-by-proxy,”26 while Helen Parr uses

slightly different language and calls it “interests by proxy,”27 with both highlighting the

UK government’s ultimate desire: to maintain its great power status. In other words,

being a faithful ally to the US was the key to maintaining the country’s great power status and contributing to the ‘hegemonic division of labour’, and this was achieved in large part by playing a ‘bridge’ role between the US and the other ‘circles’.

An issue immediately emerges from this, which is that Holsti, despite listing bridge as a possible role conception, finds no evidence of the UK playing this role in his

24 John Dumbrell writes: “Former British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan (1957-63) famously once told future Labour cabinet minister Richard Crossman in 1943 that “[w]e, my dear Crossman, are Greeks in the American empire.” Britain would fulfill the role of the “Greek slaves” who “ran the operations of the Emperor Claudius” …As latter-day Greeks, the British would smooth the hard edges, temper the impetuosity, and heighten the compromising negotiating skills of American foreign policy” (John Dumbrell, “Working with Allies: The United States, The United Kingdom, and the War on Terror,” Politics & Policy 34.2 (2006): 463). 25 This belief has always been an illusion, as well as historically inaccurate. In regards to it being an illusion see: William Wallace, “The Collapse of British Foreign Policy,” International Affairs 82.1 (2005): 55-56; and John Dumbrell, “The US–UK Special Relationship: Taking the 21st-Century Temperature,” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 11 (2009): 72. Dumbrell writes: “The special relationship was born out of relative British international decline and American international rise. The whole notion of ‘Greeks and Romans’ was developed as a way for British elites to cope with this shift in roles” (Ibid 72). In regards to its historical inaccuracy Alex Danchev writes: “Historically, it makes no sense…‘not only did they speak different languages [but the] Romans acquired their eastern provinces by defeating the Greeks in war; and then went on to pillage the immense riches of the Greek world on a vast scale.’ Moreover, it is inescapably patronizing. The analogy assumes that the Greeks (that is, the British) know best” (Alex Danchev, “On Specialness,” International Affairs 72.4 (1996): 742. 26 Thomas Hennessey, Britain’s Korean War: Cold War Diplomacy, Strategy and Security 1950-53 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 3. 27 Helen Parr, Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community: Harold Wilson and Britain’s World Role, 1964- 1967 (London: Routledge, 2006), 193.

8 data.28 In order to reconcile this, we must turn to Macleod and the definitions for his four

roles, allowing us to properly understand this amorphous concept of ‘bridge’.29 As the

evidence will show in chapter four, terms like ‘privileged interlocutor’, ‘honest broker’

and ‘transatlantic bridge’ are used throughout the Cold War but are ultimately all

relatively vague concepts that mean largely the same thing, with the usage of terms

varying based on who was PM. In terms of defining what UK policymakers are trying to

convey, this paper turns to Macleod’s role of international broker, which he defines as “a

role of linkage between states or groups of states that are separated either

geographically or politically. It involves taking an active part either by bringing the

different parties together or by acting as an intermediary to facilitate diplomatic or

commercial relations.”30 Based on this definition, it appears that international broker subsumes Holsti’s role concepts of mediator/integrator and bridge, and based on the evidence presented in later chapters it will be argued that when UK foreign policymakers use the term ‘bridge’ or ‘privileged interlocutor’ what they are actually referring to is something along the lines of Macleod’s international broker. Thus, unless otherwise specified, when this paper refers to the UK’s ‘bridge’ or intermediary role it should be viewed as shorthand for international broker,31 with the focus always on

linking the US with the other ‘circles’.

28 See: Holsti, “National Role Conception in the Study of Foreign Policy,” 276. Note: Holsti defines bridge as “ephemeral” and “imply[ing] a communication function, that is, acting as a “translator” or conveyor of messages and information between peoples of different cultures” (Ibid 266-267). 29 When the term bridge is used it is referring to term as understood by Holsti, but ‘bridge’ represents something slightly different, and will be defined shortly. 30 Macleod, “Great Britain: Still Searing for Status?,” 174. 31 In terms of Macleod’s other roles: regional-subsystem collaborator is borrowed from Holsti; contributor to the international system “refers not only to a general sense of Britain’s responsibilities for global affairs and the feeling it can still participate in them, but also to more specific tasks…[like] to act as an important defender of the principle of free trade”; and promotor of defence and security refers to the UK’s belief that “it can act positively to

9 Shifting focus to the post-Cold War era, it is evident that the US-UK ‘special relationship’ still lies at the heart of UK foreign policy; that the ‘bridge’ role continued to significantly influence foreign policy during at least the John Major and New Labour

years; and that the Major and New Labour governments believed that being a ‘bridge’

between the US and Europe was still critical to maintaining the ‘special relationship’ and the UK’s great power status. Thus the research question guiding this thesis breaks down as follows: (1) why did the ‘bridge’ survive the end of the Cold War, and (2) did the

Cameron government continue to view the UK as a ‘bridge’?32 As will be discussed in

greater detail, if, according to structural realism, the central tendency of unipolarity is for

states to bandwagon rather than to balance, and the unipole’s preference is for ad hoc

coalitions, it would appear that the UK’s ‘bridge’ role provides it and the US with less

value than in the past. In order to explain why this role conception remained influential,

this paper will adopt a Bourdieusian approach and will argue that this approach is best

equipped to understand this particular phenomenon.33

In terms of what this paper offers to the study of political science, it offers what

appears to be the first attempt at using a Bourdieusian approach to explain UK foreign

policy – placing it within the growing movement towards applying both practice theory and its Bourdieusian strand to the study of IR and foreign policy. In terms of the analysis

reduce the threats to global and regional security” (Ibid 173). Critical to note is that contributor to the international system absorbs Holsti’s role conception of developer and replaces the role of regional protector (Ibid 171). 32 The Theresa May government will not be examined because it has only been in power since July, so there is a lack of academic research available on this government in terms of how it operates, how power is distributed within the government, May’s leadership style and personal preferences etc. Because of this I would be unable to contribute anything more than mere speculation on what her government might do, so the analysis will end with David Cameron. However, what Brexit might mean for the ‘special relationship’ will still be discussed in chapter six, since it fits within a broader foreign policy theme that has been evident since Gordon Brown’s time as PM. 33 The terms ‘Bourdieusian approach’ and ‘Bourdieu’s theory of practice’ will be used interchangeably throughout this paper because they mean the same thing.

10 and overall structure of this thesis, the remaining chapters each serve a distinct purpose, with chapter two providing a mostly structural realist discussion of unipolarity and alliances. The limits of structural realism will be discussed, which opens the door for discussion on neoclassical realism and practice theory generally, ultimately allowing us to place Bourdieu within the larger IR and foreign policy theoretical framework, and an argument will be advanced that neoclassical realists should perhaps adopt the

Bourdieusian approach when examining unit-level variables. Chapter three will examine the finer points of both the Bourdieusian and strategic culture approach;34 will explain why the former is superior to the latter; and will also examine the existing Bourdieusian literature on IR and foreign policy, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of the literature. It will also include a discussion on the methods used to study UK foreign policy during the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, giving the reader an idea of the sources that will be used in the coming chapters. In chapter four, the UK’s Cold War foreign policy will be examined to show how the UK’s ‘bridge’ role became ingrained in the minds of UK foreign policymakers and thus elevated to the status of “habit.” The key areas of focus will be the repetition of the UK as ‘bridge’, showing how it was elevated to “habit” status, as well as charting the increasing predominance of the PM within what

Bourdieu would call the UK’s political field – a critical development since for Bourdieu power is relational, meaning we must understand how power is wielded within the country’s political field to understand how its foreign policy is made. In chapter five, focus will shift to the post-Cold War era, where evidence of this ‘bridge’ role’s continued influence will be shown by examining both the rhetoric and actions of the John Major

34 There is a good reason why discussion on strategic culture is being saved until chapter three. Such an approach is necessary and the reasons will be made clear later in chapter two.

11 and New Labour governments. The chapter will conclude with an examination of David

Cameron’s time in office and will ask the following question: did the UK still see itself as

a ‘bridge’ between the US and Europe? Finally, chapter six serves as the conclusion,

offering thoughts on the future of the ‘special relationship’ as well as highlighting

exciting new possibilities that Bourdieu’s theory of practice holds for the study of IR and

foreign policy.

12 Chapter 2: Discussing Unipolarity, Structural and Neoclassical Realism, Decision-

Making Theory, Practice Theory, and Bourdieu

2.1: Introduction

This chapter reviews much of the IR and foreign policy literature, giving us a sense of where the Bourdieusian approach not only fits in relative to other theories but how it improves upon them. Perhaps a bit frustratingly, of the central concepts of the

Bourdieusian approach – habitus, field theory, practice – only practice will be defined in this chapter, with habitus and field theory not being defined until chapter three. The reason for this is because this author believes it is more important to first provide a road

map that guides the reader through some of the more commonly used IR and foreign

policy theories, allowing said reader to eventually understand how the Bourdieusian

approach overlaps with these theories, and how his approach improves upon them.

These ‘overlaps’ will be flagged as the discussion gradually progresses towards practice

theory, which eventually gives way to discussion of its Bourdieusian strand (i.e.

Bourdieu’s theory of practice). However, despite saving the ‘heavy lifting’ on Bourdieu

until chapter three we can still say a few things about some of the basic assumptions

that drive his approach right here, but said discussion will be limited to things that exist

at a more general and accessible level instead of attempting to explain more specific

and complex concepts.

Firstly, we must note that the Bourdieusian approach accepts the need to study

the external and internal settings that agents operate in, so it obviously overlaps with

the scheme provided by SBS. The second is that it accepts the existence of an

13 objective reality. A quote by Peter Jackson will be provided to help clarify what this means:

Bourdieu’s theoretical approach is in large part an attempt to illustrate how what people say and do is something other than either just a reflection of what is going on in their heads or a product of social and material structures. His approach is to focus on the strategies of social actors and to show how these are produced by the interplay of their individual habitus and the structure of the particular field… Bourdieu believes that objective structures exist. But he also believes that our comprehension of these structures and our orientation toward them is mediated through our ‘habitus’.1

Admittedly this quote discusses more than just Bourdieu’s acceptance of an objective reality with objective structures, but it is important because it gives the reader a sense of the discussion to come in chapter three and serves as another reminder to the reader that the concepts of field and habitus are going to be of critical importance, even if they have no idea what a field or habitus is. However, for now we will limit our focus to the fact that Bourdieu accepts the existence of an objective reality governed by objective structures, and that it is of the utmost importance, when studying the internal and external settings that influence the decisions of foreign policymakers, to understand what those structures are.

For the particularly keen reader this serves as a clear sign of compatibility between Bourdieu and structural realism, and thus this chapter will begin with a discussion of the latter. We know that structural realism does not examine factors at the internal level, but what it can do is provide us with (1) the objective structure of the international system, and (2) a model for how states should act if they acted in a

1 Peter Jackson, “Pierre Bourdieu, the ‘Cultural Turn’ and the Practice of International History,” Review of International Studies 34 (2008): 164.

14 perfectly rational manner and made foreign policy decisions based solely on the

objective conditions (i.e. structure) of the international system. Therefore, when

discussing the logic of the international system and how states should behave under

unipolarity this chapter will utilize structural realism,2 but at the same time it will still

provide an argument against adopting purely structural approaches to the study of IR

and foreign policy. We know that the problem with structural realism is that it ignores the

‘internal setting’, but it is still important to look at theories that justify the need for

studying the ‘internal’ because relying solely on the scheme provided by SBS until we

get to neoclassical realism or Bourdieu is simply not good enough. Thus, works by

authors like Katzenstein and Holsti will be briefly discussed; the use of SBS’s scheme

will be sufficiently justified; and the limits of structural realism will once again be made

obvious. However, despite these limits the analysis will continue to be of a mostly structural realist bend, as it is still able to explain the logic of unipolarity, but once our

2 Structural realism also has the most literature about unipolarity, and, to make something that has already been implied perfectly clear, its proponents correctly argue that the structure of the international system affects foreign policy and state behaviour in general. It must also be noted that Bourdieu never published anything on the study of IR, thus Bourdieusian scholars must look to theories with similar emphasises on structure (like structural realism) to explain how the international system as a whole works under conditions of unipolarity etc. Further proof of the compatibility between the two approaches can be found in the work of Vincent Pouliot, who writes that both the Bourdieusian approach and structural realism agree that one’s “position in [the structure] determines behaviour” (Vincent Pouliot, International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 249). Anna Leander also writes that for Bourdieu the “starting point of empirical research ought to be structure,” (Anna Leander, “Review: Pierre Bourdieu on Economics,” Review of International Political Economy 8.2 (2001): 347) and when we get to neoclassical realism this will overlap nicely with its argument that the analytical starting point must be the international system and the state’s position within it (i.e. how is the international system structured and where does the state in question ‘sit’ relative to others?). Wacquant notes that Bourdieu labels his work as both “structuralist constructivism” and “constructivist structuralism,” while Ansart labels it “genetic structuralism” (See: Pierre Bourdieu and Loic J.D. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992),11), while Frederic Merand notes that the Bourdieusian approach acts a bridge between structural realism and constructivism (see: Frederic Merand, “Pierre Bourdieu and the Birth of European Defence”, Security Studies 19 (2010): 342-374). We will also see that the Bourdieusian approach overlaps with critical theory to an extent, but said overlap, and the idea of ‘constructivist structuralism’ etc., will be discussed later in this paper. For now, the only thing the reader should concern themselves with is that the literature shows that structural realism and the Bourdieusian approach overlap in the importance they place on studying structure.

15 discussion of the international system is finished this chapter will switch to discussing

theories that look at both systemic and domestic/ideational forces, like neoclassical

realism and Bourdieu’s theory of practice. In this section of the chapter, many important

Bourdieusian concepts like field theory, habitus and hysteresis will be discussed, but

only in regards to how they either improve upon or overlap with neoclassical realism.

At times, it may seem frustrating to the reader that such a discussion is

occurring, since Bourdieu’s concepts are not being defined but again, the purpose of

this chapter is to show how the Bourdieusian approach fits into, and ultimately improves

upon, existing IR and foreign policy theories, not how habitus or field theory work. The

Bourdieusian approach, and practice theory in general, is not a competing theory to

structural realism or neoclassical realism, but rather it overlaps in many interesting ways

and adds insights that strengthen both, but particularly neoclassical realism. Thus,

Bourdieu must be discussed alongside such theories so we can see said overlaps and

insights, even if the meaning of some of his concepts are not fully explained to the

reader until chapter three. However, at the very least, by including these concepts in

this chapter it will help the reader become more familiar with Bourdieu, making it easier

for them to survive the head-first dive into the Bourdieusian pool in chapter three, so

small victories.3 Returning to our chapter road map, some strands of decision-making

theory will also be discussed, and the chapter will conclude with a discussion of practice

theory and why Bourdieu and his theory of practice is being chosen over neoclassical realism. It will be noted here that Bourdieu’s theory of practice is just one of many

3 The alternative would be a belly-flop into Bourdieu, but this author prefers to subject the reader to as little pain as possible.

16 various strands of practice theory, so the basic assumptions guiding practice theory will

be discussed before finally explaining how Bourdieu’s approach is different, allowing us

to finally move into an in-depth discussion of the Bourdieusian approach. With the road map to this chapter now provided, the attention now shifts to discussion of unipolarity and structural realism. How alliances behave under conditions of unipolarity is of importance here because of (1) the important role that NATO plays in the US-UK

‘special relationship’, and (2) because a thorough discussion of how alliances behave

under unipolarity also reveals the overall logic that governs a unipolar system in

general.

2.2 Unipolarity, Structural Realism, and Alliances

Before beginning an in-depth discussion of unipolarity a few issues must be

addressed, with the first being how to define the concept. A useful definition comes from

William Wohlforth: “A structure in which one state’s capabilities are too great to be

counterbalanced.”4 Secondly, the difficulties inherent in the study of alliances in

unipolarity must be noted, and they appear to stem largely from two causes. First, the

phenomenon is relatively new. As Stephen M. Walt wrote in 2009 there is “only fifteen

or so years of which to base any evaluation of our conjectures,”5 while Robert Jervis

echoes similar sentiments, stating that “it is therefore no accident…that we do not have

4 William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security 24.1 (1999): 9. Note: Wohlforth focuses on material rather than nonmaterial (ideational) elements of power, writing: “The United States enjoys a much larger margin of superiority over the next most powerful state or, indeed, all other great powers combined than any leading state in the last two centuries. Moreover, the United States is the first leading state in modern international history with decisive preponderance in all the underlying components of power: economic, military, technological, and geopolitical” (Ibid 7). This paper takes issue with him ignoring the ideational aspect of power, and the reasons why will be explained in greater detail in chapter 3. 5 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” World Politics 61.1 (2009): 87.

17 a large body of work on unipolarity.”6 The second cause is disagreement over the

effects of unipolarity. Focusing on the structural realist literature regarding unipolarity,

Walt perhaps sums it up best with the following:

Some writers believe unipolarity heralds the dissolution of nato (sic) and other cold war–era alliances, whereas others predict that the other major powers are likely to draw closer together in an effort to contain the overwhelming power of the United States. Another view suggests that the remaining medium powers lack the capacity to balance the overwhelming power of the United States and that any attempt to construct an anti-U.S. coalition would face insurmountable dilemmas of collective action. This last group of authors suggests that other states, instead of balancing U.S. power, are more likely to bandwagon with it. Yet another line of argument maintains that today’s medium and lesser powers will align with the United States not because they fear U.S. power but because they are primarily concerned with regional threats and want to use U.S. power to deal with them.7

From the above quote, we are presented with three ‘views’: (1) that without a balancing

function alliances fall apart; (2) that the dominant tendency of the other major powers

will be to balance to the US; and (3) that the dominant tendency of unipolarity is

bandwagoning. It is optimal to examine each of these ‘views’, which in turn will help

reveal what the dominant tendency of the current unipolar system is. What will

ultimately be revealed is that (1) a purely structural approach is ineffective at predicting

alliance continuation, but is still capable of providing us with insights about unipolarity,

and (2) that the dominant tendency is bandwagoning.

In regards to Walt’s first ‘view’, academics who adopted a purely structural realist

approach predicted that the USSR’s demise and the subsequent end of the Cold War

6 Robert Jervis, “Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective,” World Politics 61.1 (2009): 189. 7 Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” 87-88.

18 would lead to the dissolution of NATO and other Cold War alliances. As Fred Chernoff

notes, structural realism argues that “on theoretical grounds [alliances] are formed to

protect members against a specific threat or set of threats. When those threats cease to

exist there is no adhesive to hold the allies together and, in fact, alliances split apart

when they reach that point.”8 Similar sentiments are echoed by Charles-Phillipe David,

who states that “in the structural realist [view]…without a “balancing” function NATO has

no raison d’etre.”9 However, rather than collapsing alongside the Berlin Wall, NATO has

instead transformed itself into a more globally minded military alliance, with missions in

Afghanistan and Libya being two examples of this more global outlook. This evolution

buttresses Walt’s claim that when studying alliances there are “limits [to] purely

structural explanations,”10 meaning that researchers must explore other theories to see

the complete picture.11

One such theory to consider is institutional-liberalism, which like structural

realism recognizes that states do take threats into account and engage in balancing and

bandwagoning behaviour. It also recognizes that domestic and institutional factors must

be accounted for, meaning one “cannot look solely at power balances but [must also

take] into account ideological and cultural affinities”12 and the influence of domestic and

international institutions. Turning to Benjamin C. Schwarz, the institutional-liberal view is

8 Fred Chernoff, “Can NATO Outlive the USSR?,” International Relations 11:1 (1992): 1. 9 Charles-Phillipe David, “Fountain of Youth or Cure Worse Than Disease? NATO Enlargement: A Conceptual Deadlock,” in The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia, and European Security, eds. Charles-Philippe David and Jacques Levesque, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), 14. 10 Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” 119. 11 This sentiment is also echoed by Valerie Hudson, who writes that in general, “it is impossible to explain or predict system change on the basis of systems-level variables alone” (Valerie M. Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory 2nd Edition (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 32). 12 Chernoff, “Can NATO Outlive the USSR?,” 10.

19 more in line with the tradition of innenpolitik, which “argues that internal pressures

mainly determine foreign policy.”13 So while structural realists are correct to place

importance on the influence of the international system itself, it cannot be emphasized

to the point where domestic and cultural factors are drowned out.14 This is in line with

the work of Thomas Risse-Kaplan, who argues that structural or functionalist explanations for the end of the Cold War, regardless of whether they are realist or liberal, must be complemented “by approaches that emphasize the interaction of international and domestic influences on state behaviour and take the role of ideas –

knowledge, values, and strategic concepts – seriously.”15 Granted, the subject of this

discussion is alliance continuation rather than explaining the end of the Cold War, but

the overall message still applies: study both the structure of the international system

and the “values and norms embedded in [domestic] political culture[s].”16 Peter J.

Katzenstein echoes this sentiment, stating that “the international and domestic societies

in which states are embedded shape their identities in powerful ways.”17

In terms of where the emphasis should be placed, Holsti argues that when states

are attempting to determine their role in the international system the ‘self’ (domestic

13 Benjamin C Schwarz, “‘Cold War’ Continuities: US Economic and Security Strategy Towards Europe,” Journal of Strategic Studies 17:4 (1994):83. 14 Neorealism/structural realism falls under what Schwarz calls the tradition of aussenpolitik, which “views relations among states as a realm apart from domestic politics and holds that a state’s foreign policy is determined mostly by the pressures of the international system” (Ibid 83). 15 Thomas Riise-Kappen, “Ideas do not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War,” International Organization (48.2) 1994: 186. 16 Ibid 187. 17 Peter J. Katzenstein, “Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 23.

20 considerations) takes precedence over the ‘alter’ (external environment),18 and moving

forward this paper will adopt a similar view: when crafting foreign policy states consider

how the international system is structured, but how they react to said structure is

determined largely by domestic and cultural considerations. This view expands upon the

scheme provided by SBS because it tells us that when studying foreign policy we

should place the bulk of our focus on the internal setting, since it is factors at this level

that will explain why a state’s foreign policy followed a route counter to that predicted by

structural realism.19 Later discussion of neoclassical realism and practice theory will

expand upon this line of thinking and will explain how to make sense of these domestic

and cultural variables, but for now we shall focus on the following point: that the

evidence strongly suggests that any theory that looks exclusively at the structure of the

international system can still be helpful in asking strong questions, like why did the UK

as ‘bridge’ role survive the Cold War, but it will lack explanatory value because it

ignores the obvious importance of domestic and cultural considerations on state

behaviour.

In regards to Stephen M. Walt’s second ‘view’, the current international system

does not support this argument, but there is evidence of “major powers” engaging in

efforts to contain or balance against the US. China and Russia, for example, have in

18 Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” 237-244. For a full list of the sources of ‘self’ and ‘alter’ in the international context see: Ibid 245. Some of the sources for ‘self’ include “national values, ideology, traditional roles, personality, political needs” (Ibid 245). 19 To clarify, this does not mean that we cannot use the external environment as an analytical starting point, or that in the long-term an agent’s beliefs or actions won’t line up with the objective conditions of the structure (see: structural realism, neoclassical realism, and Bourdieu). Rather, what this means is that when studying foreign policy we must recognize that the external is interpreted through the internal, and thus we must focus more attention on the internal – especially when aspects of foreign policy do not line up with the objective conditions of the external. How we look at the internal setting will be revealed in our upcoming discussion on neoclassical realism and practice theory.

21 recent years increased the sizes of their militaries and appear to be more than willing to

flex their figurative muscles to protect their perceived spheres of influence (the South

China Sea and the Crimea, respectively). This appears, however, to be more a case of

“issue-specific balancing” rather than “symmetrical great power balancing” as seen

during the Cold War.20 To elaborate these terms further, Russia and China seem to

‘pick their spots’ when trying to contain or balance against US power and do not

consistently balance against or attempt to contain the “overwhelming power of the

United States”. According to Birthe Hansen, this occurs because under conditions of unipolarity the system is defined by its asymmetry and thus the option for states to engage in symmetrical balancing is ruled out.21 Nigel R. Thalakada lends further

credence to this logic, stating that “Russia and China [broadly] identify their interests

with the US-led international order even if they sometimes diverge from Washington on

specifics. Though they sometimes choose rhetoric associated with balancing, the reality

of their behaviour is usually very different.”22 The reality of this “behaviour” is that it is best described as regional or second-tier competition, and as Wohlforth states, “regional

and second-tier competition should not be confused with balancing to restructure the

system towards multipolarity.”23 Furthermore, other potential great powers such as

France, UK, Germany, India and Brazil are increasingly working with the US and appear

more concerned with Russia or the rise of China than with the US’s preponderance of

power. One such example of this is noted by Hylke Dijkstra, who writes: “The United

20 Birthe Hansen, Unipolarity and World Politics: A Theory and its Implications (London: Routledge, 2011), 27. 21 Ibid 28. 22 Nigel R. Thalakada, Unipolarity and the Evolution of America’s Cold War Alliances (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 129. 23 Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” 36.

22 States has a credible alternative, namely unilateral action. If other states had not

(partially) given in to the demands of the United States…it would have meant the end of

NATO.”24 In other words, these countries are cooperating with the US more so than

they are trying to balance/compete against it due to power asymmetries inherent in the

unipolar system. When balancing does occur it tends to be in the form of “soft balancing,” which Walt defines as “conscious coordination of diplomatic action in order to obtain outcomes contrary to U.S. preferences, outcomes that could not be gained if the balancers did not give each other some degree of mutual support.”25

That last point brings us to Walt’s third ‘view’, and the literature combined with logical observations of the post-Cold War era suggests that the dominant tendency of a unipolar system is bandwagoning.26 However, if bandwagoning is the dominant

tendency of unipolarity then the next issue to consider is how states bandwagon in a

unipolar system, and, according to Hansen, the choice is between “flocking” and “free-

riding.”27 Flocking occurs when weaker states choose to closely align their policies and

interests with the unipole’s,28 while free-riding is defined as “the evasion of costs regarding individual and collective security.”29 In regards to the latter, Hansen claims

that free-riding is a particularly tempting strategy under conditions of unipolarity and

provides two reasons: “first, the general stability of the system and the lack of great

24 Hylke Dijkstra, “Functionalism, Multiple Principals and the Reform of the NATO Secretariat after the Cold War,” Cooperation and Conflict 50:1 (2015): 130. 25 Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” 104. Note: Walt provides the example of the Bush administration’s failure to achieve the authorization of the UN Security Council to invade Iraq in 2003 as a text-book example of soft balancing. 26 See: Thalakada, Unipolarity and the Evolution of American’s Cold War Alliances, 12 and 128; Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” 8; Hansen, Unipolarity and World Politics, 19. 27 Hansen, Unipolarity and World Politics, 19. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid 33.

23 power wars and tensions; and second, the strong international involvement of the superpower, which produces security whether or not the state in question participates.”30 Ultimately, this creates a situation where the international system is dominated by the flocking-free-riding dilemma rather than the balancing-bandwagoning dilemma that vexed states during the Cold War due to the current lack of a peer competitor to the United States.31

The next issue to consider is how these circumstances affect the nature of alliances. From the unipole’s standpoint, the expectation that alliances will behave the same way under unipolarity as they did during bipolarity is an erroneous one. As Walt states:

[During the Cold War the US’s] need to keep Europe out of Soviet hands…forced Washington to devote considerable effort to consensus building and coordination with its weaker partners. Today, by contrast, the United States has no great power rivals, less need for allied support, and thus greater capacity to go it alone. To the extent that allies are needed (to legitimate a particular course of action or to provide overseas facilities, for example), the unipole has a greater ability to pick and choose among different alliance partners.32

This statement raises two important points. First, that the UK playing a ‘bridge’ role during the Cold War made sense because in a bipolar system there is a greater need for consensus building, and since the US was so focused on keeping Europe out of

Soviet hands then in theory it would have appreciated the UK being an Atlantic ‘bridge’.

In fact, as we will see in chapter four the US clearly expected the UK to play this ‘bridge’ role, and this will be become quite clear during our examination of Edward Heath’s time

30 Ibid 33. 31 Thalakada, Unipolarity and the Evolution of America’s Cold War Alliances, 5. 32 Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” 94

24 in power. In regards to the second point, this “greater ability to pick and choose” that

Walt speaks of is in line with Thalakada’s discussions of the US and “alliance bonds,” in which he states that due to “the gross disparities between the superpower and its allies under unipolarity would weaken the superpower’s interest in maintaining alliance

bonds.”33 In other words, the unipole is capable of relying on its own internal resources

when responding to international security threats and thus needs allies primarily for

purposes of legitimation and for use of their overseas facilities.34 Given these

circumstances, the international system has witnessed an increasing emphasis on ad

hoc coalitions rather than permanent alliances, since given the nature of unipolarity the

“unipole would allow its strategy to drive its alignments, not the other way around.”35

This logic was echoed by former Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, who famously

stated that “the mission needs to define the coalition and we ought not to think that a

coalition should define the mission.”36

Given the increasingly ad hoc nature of alliances in the post-Cold War era and

the central dilemma facing states as being whether to flock or free-ride, the UK has

unsurprisingly adopted a foreign policy that places an emphasis on flocking thanks to its

long-standing ‘special relationship’ with the US, but its insistence on pursing policies

33 Thalakada, Unipolarity and the Evolution of America’s Cold War Alliances, 12. 34 One important consequence of receiving such legitimation is an increase in, or preservation of, the unipole’s soft power. Soft power is defined by Joseph S. Nye as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments” (Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy,” Political Science Quarterly 119:2 (2004): 256), and in a later paper writes that it stems from a country’s “culture (where it is attractive to others); its values (where they are attractive and not undercut by inconsistent practices) and its policies (where they are seen as inclusive and legitimate in the eyes of others)” (Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616 (2008): 96). 35 Thalakada, Unipolarity and World Politics, 12. 36 Anonymous, “Text: Rumsfeld Defense Department Briefing,” Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/rumsfeld_092601.html. (Accessed August 11, 2015.)

25 and engaging in rhetoric that cements the belief that it provides value to (and thus gains greater influence over) the US by being a ‘bridge’ seems to be of questionable value.

The US has no peer competitors it needs to balance against and thus has greater freedom of action on the international stage. In fact, this greater freedom of action applies to all states, since every state has the choice between flocking and free-riding based on the issue at hand. As Hansen notes, “with the exception of protracted local or regional conflict, the other states have little reason to bind themselves unnecessarily, choosing instead to maintain their room for manoeuvre. They may choose to flock for other reasons and if threatened, but by entering loose alignments, they preserve room for manoeuvre as well as the benefits of alignment.”37

Assuming that states act partly out of self-interest, and that this (along with the issue or ‘mission’ at hand) helps determine whether they flock or free-ride, this appears to further damage any arguments in favour of the UK maintaining its great power status through its role as a ‘bridge’. The US has more freedom and power than it did during the

Cold War by virtue of it being the unipole; the other states (but especially the US) are likely to prefer loose alignments to fixed alliances – given these circumstances it appears to be sub-optimal for a state to try and provide value or gain influence by being a ‘bridge’. If anything allies currently have limited influence (at best) over US foreign policy, since as Thalakada writes, “the United States will seek to consult allies and dole out benefits sufficient to keep some or most allies on board, but will be reluctant to radically alter its strategy in order to suit allied interests.”38

37 Hansen, Unipolarity and World Politics, 49. 38 Thalakada, Unipolarity and the Evolution of America’s Cold War Alliances, 130.

26 There are, however, some benefits to being an intermediary in a unipolar system,

so arguments that the UK maintaining its ‘bridge’ role is sub-optimal may be false. One

clear benefit is that if a state convinces other states to flock (even if only temporarily) to

the unipole then it may reward said state with greater influence or prestige since it will

appreciate the decrease in free-riders. However, in the UK’s case the dominant view

since the end of ‘East of Suez’ has been to view itself as a ‘bridge’ between the US and

Europe,39 and such a role is only necessary if these actors feel they need the UK to play

said role. For this to be the case two things must be true: (1) the UK is unique among its

European neighbours in possessing a ‘special relationship’ with the US; and (2) the UK

has significant influence in Europe. In regards to the first statement, William Wallace

and Christopher Phillips note that this is not the case, writing that “the relationship with

Washington remains Britain’s most important bilateral relationship; but that is also the

case for…Germany, France, Italy and Spain.”40 Considering the US’s long history of

working closely with all four countries, it stands to reason that the US does not require

the UK’s help when dealing with any of them since said states will make the decision to

free-ride or flock based on (1) the issue (or “mission”) at hand, and (2) their own

dealings with the US.

In regards to the second statement, the influence would have to be significant

enough that the UK could consistently rally its European neighbours to action when the

US requires allies for military engagements. The evidence shows that this influence is

limited at best, and that when European countries do decide to join the US in military

39 This shift from ‘three circles’ to ‘two circles’ will be explored in chapter 4. 40 William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, “Reassessing the Special Relationship,” International Affairs 85.2 (2009): 282.

27 engagements it has much less to do with any UK influence and more to do with the personal preferences of leaders and domestic/cultural reasons. Evidence of this comes to us from David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman’s study of NATO involvement in Afghanistan, as it reveals a link between institutional type, the governing party/parties’ ideology and the number of caveats placed on the use of their militaries. Listing the different institutional types as coalition parliament, majority parliament, minority parliament, premier-presidential and presidential, they found that the weaker the governing coalition, and the less right-leaning it was, the tighter the caveats on their national militaries tended to be.41 NATO members with stronger governing coalitions

(i.e. majority parliaments or presidential systems) or governments that were more right- leaning tended to have the loosest/least strict caveats. In other words, how NATO members acted in Afghanistan appears to rely more on domestic factors than on UK influence.

A potential saving grace for the UK comes from Timo Noetzel and Benjamin

Schreer, who argue that in the post-Cold War era NATO has evolved into a multi-tier alliance with “at least three constitutive tiers.”42 The three tiers they mention are

‘reformist’, ‘status quo’, and ‘neo-traditionalist’, and they are described as follows:

A ‘reformist’ tier whose members understand NATO’s future as being a global strategic actor. For advocates of Global NATO a core function of the alliance is value driven, to serve as an extension of US Grand strategic vision and to support the promotion of democracy and liberal internationalism. The United States is the core member of this tier; other parties involved include allies such as Great Britain, Canada, Denmark and the Netherlands…A ‘status quo’ tier whose members are unwilling to

41 David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 218-219. 42 Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, “NATO’s Vietnam? Afghanistan and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance,” Contemporary Security Policy 30:3 (2009):540.

28 question NATO’s strategic and doctrinal foundations. This camp still perceives the primary role of the alliance to be an instrument of European stability and a mechanism to secure continued American engagement in European security…Apart from France and Germany, countries such as Spain, Italy and Belgium can be seen as belonging to [this] tier…A ‘neo- traditionalist’ tier that advocates for NATO to refocus on the classical task of collective defence. From their perspective, the traditional Cold War role of providing protection against Russia is still critical to NATO’s future…This tier is [centred] on Central and East European allies such as Poland, the Baltic States and the Czech Republic [and increasingly Norway].43

It is important to recognize that although each of these tiers shares a belief in the enduring importance of NATO, their assumptions regarding the role NATO must play in

the international system obviously differ. In regards to the UK, this means that while it

has limited influence over the ‘status quo’ or ‘neo-traditionalist’ tiers it can influence the

other ‘reformists’, but such influence is only of value if the US needs the UK to be a

‘bridge’ between it and the other ‘reformists’, and such a need appears to be lacking.

‘Reformists’ such as the Netherlands or Denmark share numerous important

assumptions with the US regarding the role of NATO, meaning these countries appear

to be more inclined to flock rather than free-ride. For the UK, this means it does not

appear to be needed in the capacity as a ‘bridge’ between the US and the ‘reformists’,

which brings everything back to the same central question: why has this ‘bridge’ role

continued to be so influential in its post-Cold War thinking? The answer, ultimately, is

because of habit, but structural realism cannot explain this because it fails to consider

ideational and domestic factors. It can, however, explain aspects of its post-Cold War

thinking, like continuing the ‘special relationship’ because of the need to bandwagon.

Ultimately, we must shift focus from structural realism to theories that engage with both

43 Ibid 540.

29 structural and ideational factors, thus bringing us to neoclassical realism, practice theory, and the Bourdieusian approach.

2.3 Neoclassical Realism and Practice Theory

Starting with neoclassical realism, Gideon Rose describes the theory as

“occupying a middle ground between pure structural theorists and constructivists,”44 and lays out the theory as follows:

It explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables, updating and systematizing certain insights drawn from classical realist thought. Its adherents argue that the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative power capabilities. This is why they are realist. They argue further, however, that the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level. This is why they are neoclassical. Neoclassical realists argue that relative material power establishes the basic parameters of a country’s foreign policy…Yet they point out that there is no immediate or perfect transmission belt linking material capabilities to foreign policy behaviour. Foreign policy choices are made by actual political leaders and elites, and so it is their perceptions of relative power that matter, not simply relative quantities of physical resources or forces in being. This means that over the short to medium term countries’ foreign policies may not necessarily track objective material power trends closely or continuously. Furthermore, those leaders and elites do not always have complete freedom to extract and direct national resources as they might wish. Power analysis must therefore also examine the strength and structure of states relative to their societies, because these affect the proportion of national resources that can be allocated to foreign policy…For all these reasons, the neoclassical realists believe, understanding the links between power and policy requires close examination of the contexts within which foreign policies are formulated and implemented.45

44 Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”, World Politics 51 (1998): 152. 45 Ibid 146-147.

30 To sum up this approach – if neoclassical realism where presented as a math equation it would look like this: systemic incentives (independent variable) + internal factors

(intervening variables) = foreign policy.46 To further clarify out of fear that this author has been away from the study of mathematics for too long: a state’s position in the international system (which is determined by relative power capabilities) must be our intellectual starting point, but then an examination of domestic considerations must follow since the “international distribution of power can drive countries’ behaviour only by influencing the decisions of flesh and blood officials…[meaning we] have no alternative but to explore in detail how each country’s policymakers actually understand the situation.”47 To do this we must examine the unit-level and the intervening variables that translate systemic pressures, and some of these pressures have already been mentioned by Rose, like the different ways political leaders perceive relative power and the strength and structure of states relative to their societies. What he fails to provide is a clear enough sense of how to study the unit-level (although you get the sense that you must look at domestic politics and ideas), and because of this we must turn to other neoclassical realist writers to see if they have succeeded in doing so. In other words, do these other writers provide a clear sense of which intervening variables to study? And if we must look at domestic politics and ideas how do we study these concepts? To re- word this second question to make it perhaps a bit clearer: (1) how do you study domestic politics? and (2) where (or how) do ideas intervene at the unit level? The answer appears to be by providing a clear model for studying political systems, one that is general enough to be applied across the board like SBS’s scheme for understanding

46 Ibid 154. 47 Ibid 158.

31 state behaviour, and to identify and study the parts of the state where ideas are

contained.

The other question is whether these authors successfully address and resolve an

important issue raised by Rose in his conclusion, which is that neoclassical realists

have failed thus far is showing the link between “objective material power capabilities

and policymakers’ subjective assessment of them… [And that] precise theoretical

development in this area would be helpful, explicating just how various psychological,

ideational, and cultural factors may affect how political actors perceive their own and

others’ capabilities and how such perceptions are translated into foreign policy.”48 The

need to investigate the ideational was addressed in the last paragraph, but now there is

the additional need for neoclassical realists to consider the cultural and psychological as well. We will see that Nicholas Kitchen comes close to providing what Rose asks for,

but in the end the need for greater clarity means we must begin to look at practice

theory, which will ultimately bring us to Bourdieu’s theory of practice.

Sticking with neoclassical realism, we begin with Brain Rathburn, and he makes

the compelling argument that neoclassical realism is a logical extension of structural

realism, since it adopts structural realism’s views towards the international system but

then turns to the unit level (i.e. internal setting) to explain when a state’s foreign policy

does not reflect the objective conditions of the international system.49 He also argues

that systemic pressures are translated by two intervening variables at the unit-level:

domestic politics and ideas (i.e. subjective perception), which clears up any residual

48 Ibid 168. 49 Brian Rathburn, “A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism,” Security Studies 17 (2008): 294-321.

32 confusion potentially left over from the Rose article. However, although Rathburn is absolutely correct to highlight these variables, the issue is that he fails to provide the

reader with (1) an explicitly stated model that explains where ideas may intervene at the

unit-level, and (2) a general model that explains how one should study domestic politics.

We can infer that if domestic politics is one of the intervening variables then that means

ideas have an obvious influence at the governmental level, and since the government is

made up of individuals then we can infer that ideas have an influence at the individual

level, but can ideas intervene at other parts of the unit-level? In fact, if we look back to

Rose’s article and his statement on the need for certain “links” we see that there is a

third level – the cultural – and Rathburn fails to adequately explore this level, as he

makes no more than a brief mention of how “ideas that resonate with local cultural are

useful as well.”50 Numerous questions are left unanswered, like does culture impose

limits on which ideas are even considered? For this we need to turn to other

neoclassical realist authors, and then eventually to Bourdieu.

However, before we proceed to discussions of Nicholas Kitchen’s insightful

article and how it eventually leads us to Bourdieu, it is critical to take a second and

explain to the reader just how neoclassical realism and the Bourdieusian approach have

overlapped thus far. One is rather obvious – they both either explicitly (in the case of

neoclassical realism) or implicitly (in the case of the Bourdieusian approach) accept

structural realist explanations of how the international system works, since they both

agree that one’s actions will eventually reflect their position in the structure under

investigation (i.e., the international system). Writing about neoclassical realism,

50 Ibid 303.

33 Nicholas Kitchen states that “[intervening] variables are considered analytically

subordinate to systemic factors, the limits and opportunities of which states cannot

escape in the long-run,”51 and when we come to the Bourdieusian concept of hysteresis

in chapter three we will see that it overlaps beautifully with neoclassical realism’s belief

that in the long-term a country’s foreign policy will eventually reflect the objective

conditions of the international system (i.e. the state’s relative position), but in the short

and medium term there is often a disconnect between leaders’ perceptions of their

relative position within said system. The other obvious overlap is that both neoclassical

realism and the Bourdieusian approach look at the internal and external settings, with

Frederic Merand even describing the Bourdieusian approach as a bridge between

structural realism and constructivism,52 meaning that like neoclassical realism it plays

the same bridge role between the same schools of thought. Bourdieu was by no means

inspired by structural realism nor looking to solve the debate between structural realists

and constructivists over how the international system operates or how foreign policy is

shaped, but since, as Jackson writes, he was attempting to transcend “the opposition

between objectivist and subjectivist approaches to knowledge,”53 then it is only natural

that we would find overlaps between his approach and neoclassical realism since he

recognizes, among other things, that both objective structures and social constructs

must be studied.

51 Nicholas Kitchen, “Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation,” Review of International Studies 36 (2010): 118. 52 See footnote 2, chapter two. 53 Jackson, “Pierre Bourdieu, the ‘Cultural Turn’ and the Practice of International History.” 163.

34 Placing Bourdieu aside and returning to neoclassical realism, Nicholas Kitchen

argues that neoclassical realism needs a common intervening variable, and that said

variable is the “the role of strategic ideas” within “the process of grand strategy formation.”54 Grand strategy, he argues, is the level where systemic and unit level

converge, and he defines the term as follows: “the considered set of national policies in

peace and war that both set out the goals of the state in international politics and

prescribe how a broad range of national resources should be utilised in pursuit of those

goals.”55 In other words: a state’s grand strategy represents its vision, its sense of ‘self’

in the international system, and, in terms of foreign policy, will indicate how it respond to

the actions of others. It is, as Jeffrey Grey describes, the “higher direction”56 that guides

state decision-making in regards to war (or, in our case, foreign policy),57 which like

Kitchen’s definition suggests the importance of being able to identify the strategic idea

(or ideas) that underlies a state’s actions in the international system. A country’s grand

strategy becomes of particular importance to the foreign policy scholar if they do not

reflect the objective conditions of the international system – like if the state in question

continues to see itself as a superpower despite no longer possessing the necessary

capabilities to play such a role.

However, perhaps of most interest to us is that Kitchen provides the reader with

an explicitly stated model that explains where ideas may intervene at the unit-level:

“through the specific individuals that hold them; through institutions in which they may

54 Kitchen, “Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation,” 119-121. 55 Ibid 121. 56 Jeffrey Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War: An Alliance Study (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), 6. 57 What the “higher direction” is for the UK’s foreign policy will be discussed in chapter four

35 become embedded; and through the broader culture of the state.”58 To simplify a bit:

they intervene at the individual, institutional and cultural levels. However, despite

clarifying how ideas intervene at the unit-level, three issues ultimately emerge with his

article. The first is that like Rathburn he also fails to provide us with a general model that

explains how one should study domestic politics, which opens the door for using the

Bourdieusian approach because through its use of field theory it provides us with an

analytical tool-kit to recognize how domestic politics are structured. who the dominant

players are, and why they are dominant. Secondly, his explanations for the ways in

which ideas intervene at the individual, institutional, and cultural level are incredibly

similar to that of practice theory and its Bourdieusian strand, but the Bourdieusian

approach does a better job of explaining the individual and institutional levels. For the

cultural level, it is exactly in-line with practice theory, with its Bourdieusian strand and its

concept of class (or group) habitus doing perhaps a slightly better job at explaining the

relationship between culturally embedded assumptions and individual beliefs, but it feels

a bit like splitting hairs. What is of real importance here is that when it comes to

explaining ideas that exist within the broader cultural context neoclassical realism and

practice theory overlap perfectly. In terms of the third and final issue, Kitchen just

misses out on providing a proper explanation for how people make decisions, thus he is

unable to provide that missing “link” that Rose highlighted.59 This opens the door for us

to finally examine and then apply practice theory, which eventually leads us to Bourdieu.

58 Kitchen, “Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation,” 130. 59 Admittedly Kitchen comes incredibly close, but practice theory does a better job of spelling things out in regards to the ideational, cultural and psychological, with Bourdieu then providing us with a general model that explains how to study domestic politics.

36 In regards to the first of these ‘issues’, Kitchen does provide a sense of where

this general model would focus its attention, writing that “Neoclassical realism

understands that ideas held by powerful actors within the state matter… [thus] the ideas

that will impact most upon foreign policy are those held by those in decision-making

positions in the state and those who directly advise them.”60 Admittedly, it captures the

need to study the dominant actors of what Bourdieu would call the political field, but it

fails to provide an explanation for why they are dominant, or which of these actors is the

most dominant etc. As we will see in chapter three this is where discussion of ‘capital’

becomes of utmost importance. Ultimately, what Bourdieu’s field theory gives us is way

to map out the state in question, allowing us to see how power is held in a society. This

concept will obviously be fleshed out properly next chapter but for now we see that

neoclassical realism and the Bourdieusian approach both argue that the focus must be

on the dominant political actors, but the latter improves upon the former by providing a

way to map this out.

The keen reader would also have noticed that our discussion of dominant actors

overlaps with the second ‘issue’ since it also deals with the individual level. We are

already aware of Kitchen’s argument that the ideas held by individual decision-makers

have the most power in terms of shaping foreign policy, but what was not discussed last

paragraph is that exogeneous factors like public support or public opinion play a role as

well.61 However, in the end Kitchen says it is just as much, if not more so, about who

60 Kitchen, “Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation,” 130. 61 Ibid 130

37 holds the particular idea than “anything intrinsic to the idea itself,”62 noting that who is in

power matters and cites Walter Russell Mead’s example of how differently America would have reacted to the outbreak of World War One if Theodore Roosevelt, and not

Woodrow Wilson, had been president.63 Skipping ahead to Bourdieu, his approach

allows us to understand why a certain actor is dominant but, through the concept of

individual habitus, helps us study these individual differences that cause leaders like

Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson to react differently to similar/ identical

situations.

In regards to the institutional level, Kitchen and Bourdieu overlap quite nicely.

Beginning with Kitchen, he notes that ideas that are embedded in institutions possess a

greater power than ones that do not, and says that institutions can act as couriers of

ideas in three ways: through the formation and existence of epistemic communities; by

encasing the ideas within the rules and procedures that govern the institution; and

through institutional structure.64 Once again, Kitchen points to the right factors but he

fails to provide us the sorts of tools that the Bourdieusian approach does. In terms of

overlap, Kitchen’s discussion of ideas being encased in rules and procedures is almost

identical to the “taken-for-granted” rules of Bourdieu’s fields, while in terms of how

institutional structure limits access to ideas, Kitchen notes that “‘strategic culture’ may

provide a useful guide,”65 which opens the door for discussion on the strategic culture

literature and its insights into state behaviour. However, discussion of this literature will

62 Ibid 130. 63 Ibid 131. 64 Ibid 131 65 Ibid 131.

38 be saved for chapter three since strategic culture and Bourdieu’s concept of habitus share a great deal of similarities, so discussion of these similarities and how the

Bourdieusian approach ultimately improves upon the strategic culture approach will be saved until then.

Finally, we come to the cultural level, and as Kitchen writes:

Ideas that are embedded in social norms, patterns of discourse and collective identities become accepted, ‘instinctual’ parts of the social world and are experienced as part of a natural objective reality. In this way, cultural variables subconsciously set the limits and terms of debate for both individuals and institutions, and so have ‘a profound effect on the strategic behaviour of states.’ Mediated through institutions and individuals who are blinded to potential alternatives, ideas embedded in national culture therefore have the potential to explain ‘why some states act contrary to the structural imperatives of the international system.’66

In terms of how Kitchen’s understanding of the power of culture is in line with both practice theory and its Bourdieusian strand, the above quote overlaps with Bourdieusian concepts like habitus and hysteresis, and appears to also be discussing the power of confirmation bias, which Bourdieu also discusses. In terms of the cultural context in general, Kitchen’s neoclassical realism and practice theory overlap fantastically. How the Bourdieusian approach improves upon Kitchen’s observations regarding the individual and institutional level have been noted, as has its ability to provide a general model for studying domestic politics, but in terms of the cultural context neither

Bourdieu’s theory of practice nor practice theory generally have much more to add, except that in chapter three we will see that Bourdieu’s insights “provide a more rigorous and systematic-approach to understanding the cultural roots of policy

66 Ibid 131-132.

39 formulation and decision-making.”67 Admittedly Jackson was referring to cultural

approaches rather than neoclassical realism, but in chapter three we will see that his

statement does in fact apply to neoclassical realism, with discussion on how field theory

and habitus interact being of crucial importance here.

Moving now to the third and final issue, Kitchen is ultimately unable to provide

the ‘link’ that Rose asked for. Kitchen comes close, and there are no doubts that he

does an excellent job of explaining how cultural and ideational factors fit into neoclassical realism and influence decision-makers at the unit level – which in turn affects their perceptions of their own and others’ capabilities, as well as their position or role in the international system – but at the end of the day the Bourdieusian approach offers a more systematic and rigorous approach to understanding how power is distributed domestically or how to make sense of political institutions. However, Rose

does also mention that psychological factors may affect perceptions, and thus far we have not spent any time discussing this. Our discussion of Kitchen and his understanding of the cultural level touch on the psychological just a tad, since it mentioned that ideas embedded in national culture take root in the subconscious, become instinctual, and blind people to potential alternatives. What Kitchen is ultimately arguing is that people are experiential rather more so than they are rational, but he fails to adequately spell this out to the reader. It’s visible if you know what to look for, but again, it is not fully developed. Thus, we must now turn to practice theory, which adopts

67 Peter Jackson, “Pierre Bourdieu, the ‘Cultural Turn’ and the Practice of International History”, 156.

40 the experiential approach but offers greater insights into this than Kitchen and

neoclassical realism.

However, before discussing experiential modes of thought, it is imperative that

we first discuss practice theory and its Bourdieusian strand in greater depth, and the

reasons are two-fold. Firstly, this paper argues that between the two of them we can

find that elusive “link” Rose spoke of. Secondly, and perhaps most controversially, since

the Bourdieusian approach is also a bridge between structural realism and

constructivism this paper will argue that when studying IR and foreign policy academics should perhaps apply a Bourdieusian approach instead of neoclassical realism because it does everything the latter does and more. The rest of this chapter will unfold as follows: the terms ‘practice theory’ and ‘practice’ will be defined, and what some academics have dubbed the ‘practice turn’ in IR will be discussed. Then, attention will shift to the psychological insights of Seymour Epstein – insights that practice theorists

such as Vincent Pouliot have rightly used to buttress their claims that we must move

past approaches that favour representational knowledge over background knowledge,68

with the importance of concepts like ‘routines’ (or ‘habits’, as this paper’s opening

epigraph called them) finally coming to the fore. Finally, the chapter will end by spelling

out Bourdieu’s theory of practice, with chapter three being dedicated wholly to

explaining what a Bourdieusian approach looks like and how it manages to explain why

the UK continued to play a ‘bridge’ role post-Cold War.

68 See: Vincent Pouliot, International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 14-27.

41 Beginning with an introduction to the basics of practice theory, Sherry B. Ortner defines it as a theory that “seeks to explain the relationship(s) that obtain between human action, on the one hand, and some global entity which we may call "the system," on the other. Questions concerning these relationships may go in either direction – the

impact of the system on practice, and the impact of practice on the system.”69 For this

paper, “the system” is both the international system but also the UK’s political system,

since we must look at both when studying how foreign policy gets made. In regards to

the term ‘practice’, we will remain with Ortner, who writes:

In principle, the answer to this question is almost unlimited: anything people do. Given the centrality of domination in the model, however, the most significant forms of practice are those with intentional or unintentional political implications. Then again, almost anything people do has such implications. So the study of practice is after all the study of all forms of human action, but from a particular-political-angle.70

Ultimately, what practice theory argues is that to understand “the system” we must

study the actions of the individuals or agents who make up said “system”, with the focus being on those who are in dominant positions. It recognizes that “the system” influences

agents’ practices and vice versa. The dominant actors are the ones who are most likely

to influence “the system”, and in this regard practice theory is very much compatible

with neoclassical realism. To use neoclassical realist language, the position a state

69 Sherry B. Ortner, “Theory in Anthropology Since the Sixties”, Comparative Studies in Society and History 26.1 (1984): 148. 70 Ibid 149. This definition was chosen because it is perhaps simplest for the reader to understand. For a more advanced definition of practices look to Adler and Pouliot, who define practice as “socially meaningful patterns of action, which, in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world…[Practices] are not merely descriptive ‘arrows’ that connect structure to agency and back, but rather the dynamic material and ideational processes that enable structure to be stable or to evolve, and agents to reproduce or transform structure” (Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, “International Practices”, International Theory 3.1 (2011): 4-5). Note: the term “background knowledge” will be defined later in this chapter.

42 holds in the international system affects its foreign policymakers’ decision making, and,

after being refracted through various unit-level variables like culture or domestic political

institutions, the decisions made by foreign policymakers may affect the international

system because how they perceive, and decide to use, their material capabilities may

change the structure of the international system, like by deciding to build up enough material capabilities to turn a bipolar world into a multipolar one. However, the question now becomes what guides practice, and for that we must begin to unravel the insights practice theory, and its Bourdieusian strand, brings in regards to the various

psychological, ideational and cultural factors that shape foreign policy.

In terms of the psychological, we turn to Seymour Epstein, who argues that when

trying to understand human thought we must begin with a concept that he and other

psychoanalysts call the “cognitive unconscious”, which holds that “unlike the thinking of

Freud, who assumed that all information (other than that acquired during a preverbal period) would be conscious in the absence of repression, the [cognitive unconscious] holds that most information processing occurs automatically and effortlessly outside of awareness because that is its natural mode of operation, a mode that is far more efficient than conscious, deliberative thinking.”71 Thus, the conclusion is a rather simple

one: “most human information processing occurs out of awareness and is governed by

a different set of principles [than that of] conscious, rational thinking.”72 To make sense

of this, Epstein advocates for the use of cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST), which

emphasizes two interactive modes of information processing, rational and experiential,

71 Seymour Epstein, “Integration of the Cognitive and the Psychodynamic Unconscious”, American Psychologist 49.8 (1994): 710. 72 Ibid 710.

43 and argues that the latter is an “automatic, intuitive mode of information processing that

operates by different rules from that of a rational mode.”73

To get a better sense of these differences, Epstein lays out the attributes of each

system, and beginning with the experiential it is described in the following ways:

“holistic”; “behaviour mediated by “vibes” from past experiences”; “encodes reality in

concrete images, metaphors, and narratives”; “slower to change: changes with

repetitive or intense experience”; and “self-evidently valid: “experiencing is believing”.”74

Turning now to the rational system, it is described as being, among other things,

“analytic”; “behaviour mediated by conscious appraisal of events”; “encodes reality in

abstract symbols, words, and numbers”; “changes more rapidly: changes with speed of

thought”; and “requires justification via logic and evidence.”75 Ultimately, Epstein argues

that we as humans are “inherently experiential” by nature, and that failure to recognize

this means any attempts at rationality are destined to be undermined.76 To give an

example, Epstein writes that the results of socialization are an example of the lower to

moderate reaches of the experiential system77 and that in order to engage in truly

rational thought we must be aware that socialization is something that continuously

biases rational processing. Epstein notes that even when “subjects know the appropriate rational response”78 the experiential system often overrides the rational

system, and that this is most likely to occur the more something has been practiced

73 Ibid 710. 74 Ibid 711. 75 Ibid 711. 76 Ibid 721. 77 Ibid 719 78 Ibid 718.

44 since “emotional arousal and relevant experience [are likely to] shift the balance of

influence in the direction of the experiential system.”79

This assertion that the experiential comes before (and guides) the rational is not

only an astute one, but it also overlaps with, and helps strengthen, other existing

theories on human decision-making. However, the decision-making theory literature,

like practice theory, is full of myriad strands and it is not the purpose of this paper to

attempt to compile some sort of comprehensive review of this literature. However, there

are a few commonly used decision-making theories or concepts that come to mind almost immediately, and so those will be discussed. For starters, Epstein’s research is

perfectly compatible with bounded rationality and local search. Bounded rationality,

which represents a rejection of “economic man,”80 assumes that decision-makers have

limited information, time and intellectual ability, and thus pursue satisficing rather than

optimizing strategies because in the real-world optimization does not exist, so decision- makers are forced to choose alternatives that are simply ‘good enough’ and do so under constraints.81 Where recognition of the experiential over the rational helps bounded

rationality is in the problem definition stage. If, according to bounded rationality, the

“problem [at hand] primarily reflects the decision maker’s interest, understanding, and

needs,”82 then by recognizing the experiential mode of thought we see that an agent’s

interest, understanding and needs are understood through the prism of one’s previous

experiences – the automatic rather than the rational. Therefore, decision makers are not

79 Ibid 715. 80 The “economic man” possesses three properties: (1) he is completely informed; (2) he is infinitely sensitive; (3) He is rational. See: Ward Edwards, “The Theory of Decision Making,” Psychological Bulletin 51.4 (1954): 381. 81 See: Anwar Ahmed, Henry Bwisa, Romanus Ottieno and Kabare Karanja, “Strategic Decision Making: Processes, Models, and Theories”, Business Management and Strategy 5.1 (2014): 86. 82 Ibid 104.

45 just constrained by a lack of information or time, but by their previous experiences and

ingrained biases that automatically inform their decision-making process. In terms of

local search, this is rather straight-forward: people are already constrained by their

previous experiences at the subconscious, automatic level before considering their

options, so if they are bound in this manner then it is unsurprising that they will also be

inclined to look to past experiences/historical experience, and not the universe of

possible options, to guide their decision making.83

Where the clearest overlap between Epstein’s research and decision-making

theory appears to be is with the belief systems and schema theory literature. A.L.

George, in his work on the operational code of Bolshevik leaders, highlights the

necessity of understanding the belief systems of political leaders before studying their

actions. Beliefs come before decision-making, and said beliefs serve as a prism which

“influences the actor’s perceptions and diagnoses of political events…[and] provide

norms, standards, and guidelines that influence the actor’s choice of strategy and

tactics, his structuring and weighing of alternative courses of action.”84 The lesson from

George is clear: the subjective perceptions and beliefs of leaders is of key importance

when studying decision-making, and these beliefs, which are gained through

experience, are internalized and shape how they view the world and make strategic

decisions.

83 For local search, see: Toby E. Stuart and Joel M. Podolny, “Local Search and the Evolution of Technological Capabilities,” Strategic Management Journal 17 (1996): 21-38. 84 Alexander L. George, “The “Operational Code”: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making,” International Studies Quarterly 13.2 (1969): 191.

46 In terms of the schema literature, Larson notes that schemas, in comparison to

belief systems, are “more inclusive, individualistic, and clearly linked to complex

cognitive processes”, although like beliefs systems they are based on past

experiences.85 They “include specific instances, exemplars, and analogies as well as

the more abstract knowledge found in belief systems,”86 and are ultimately more

comprehensive than a belief system, serving as a “metaconstruct” that is capable of

filling in gaps in conceptualization and other phenomena that “were either ignored or

uninterpretable from the standpoint of belief systems theory.”87 In regards to Epstein,

the fact that schemas are based on experience and utilize “specific instances,

exemplars and analogies” clearly place aspects of schema theory within the experiential

realm, but also appears to serve as a bridge between the rational and experiential ways

of knowing. In fact, schemas may also serve as a useful “metaconstruct” that further

illuminates how the experiential affects the rational, but such an investigation is beyond

the scope of this paper.

Now that our discussion of Epstein and decision-making is complete we must make sense of how it relates to and strengthens practice theory. Pouliot has already been discussed, since he uses Epstein to strengthen his claim that we must move away from representational knowledge (i.e. rational choice) and towards an approach that brings background knowledge to the forefront. But what is ‘background knowledge’?

Pouliot defines it as the inarticulate know-how from which reflexive and intentional

85 Deborah Welch Larson, “The Role of Belief Systems and Schemas in Foreign Policy Decision-Making,” Political Psychology 13.1 (1994): 19-20. 86 Ibid 20. 87 Ibid 21.

47 deliberation becomes possible,88 which is in line with Epstein’s work on the experiential

system, and argues that what practice theory brings to the table is forcing people to

examine not just what agents think about but also where agents think from.89 Jennifer

Mitzen, another practice theorist, argues along the same lines as Pouliot, writing that

“ends are constitutive of identity,”90 with identity being “a dynamic process from which

action flows and in turn sustains identity.”91 This ties into one of the more critical insights

of her paper, which will be presented in three parts: (1) that rational agency is an effect

of practice; (2) practice is shaped by identity; (3) identity is not held in mind on a day-to-

day basis but rather is reflected in routines, which she defines as “internally

programmed cognitive and behavioural responses to information or stimuli.”92 The

importance of maintaining these routines gives light to the most important insight of her

paper, which is that states pursue both physical and ontological security and that the

latter is achieved in part through maintaining routines, even when said routines are

long-standing conflicts between states or ethnic groups, and cites the US and USSR

during the Cold War or the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These conflicts were/are

maintained because “individuals fear uncertainty as an identity threat and suppress fear

through routines to which they become attached.”93 This further strengthens Pouliot’s

point that when studying IR we must understand where people are thinking from, and

where they are thinking from is influenced by identity, which in turn falls under Epstein’s

88 Pouliot, International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy, 14. 89 Ibid 14. 90 Jennifer Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma”, European Journal of International Relations 12.3 (2006): 342 91 Ibid 344. 92 Ibid 345-246. 93 Ibid 349.

48 experiential system since it is something that is “automatic,” “self-evidently valid,” and reliant on “past experiences”. In terms of identities shaping foreign policy, Mitzen writes that when internally held role identities no longer correspond with externally recognized roles then they become fantasy identities which, since they are hard to sustain, eventually collapse.94 This overlaps with Bourdieu’s concept of ‘hysteresis’, and his

insights on the importance of understanding the individual beliefs and preferences of the

dominant political actors helps explain why some fantasy identities last longer than

others, but again, this will be discussed in greater detail next chapter. But this overlap

with Bourdieu does present an opportune time to start shifting our gaze towards the

Bourdieusian strand of practice theory.

However, to first conclude our general discussion on practice theory, the ‘practice

turn’ in IR that Pouliot speaks of is certainly in full swing,95 with Neumann and Heikka

criticizing the literature on strategic culture from a practice standpoint,96 and Schindler

and Wille, giving us a sense of the debate within the growing practice community, argue

that the Bourdieusian strand of practice theory, which “stresses the patterned and

repetitive nature of practice and emphasizes the unconscious reproduction of the social

order,” struggles with the problem of change, and that since this is the dominant strand

of practice theory in IR this is problematic.97 Discussing all the existing strands of

practice theory is beyond the scope of this paper, since as Ortner writes, “the practice

94 Ibid 359. 95 See: Pouliot, International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy. 96 Iver B. Neumann and Henrikki Heikka, “Grand Strategy, Strategic Culture, Practice: The Social Roots of Nordic Defence”, Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association 40.1 (2005): 5-23. See also: Iver B. Neumann, “Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy”, Millennium Journal of International Studies 31.3 (2002): 627-651. 97 Sebastian Schindler and Tobias Wille, “Change In and Through Practice: Pierre Bourdieu, Vincent Pouliot, and the End of the Cold War”, International Theory 7.2 (2015): 331.

49 approach is [so] diverse”98 that discussing every strand was simply beyond the scope of ever her paper. However, what this paper can do is follow in Ortner’s footsteps and focus on a strand or strands of practice theory and proceed from there. Thus, since it is the dominant strand of practice theory in IR, the focus will be on the Bourdieusian strand and criticisms of its inability to address the problem of change will be addressed in chapter six after all the evidence has been considered. But why is the Bourdieusian strand the dominant strand of practice theory in IR? Pouliot argues that it is because it is the best developed, at least in terms of possessing analytical concepts (like field theory and habitus) that capture the relationship between background knowledge and social action, as well being perhaps the easiest of the myriad strands of practice theory to systematically apply to various empirical investigations, including IR.99 Now that we have successfully situated Bourdieu within IR and foreign policy literature, and examined the insights his approach brings to their study, it is now time to explore his writings and finally define, and properly explore, the Bourdieusian approach, which can be best described as follows: habitus + field = practice. We obviously already know the definition of practice, but concepts like habitus and field will finally be defined and explored in the upcoming chapter.

2.4: Conclusion

This chapter attempted to accomplish a lot, so a recap would appear to be wise.

The Bourdieusian approach, like neoclassical realism, is a bridge between structural realism and constructivism. Bourdieu never presented us with an actual theory of

98 Ortner, “Theory in Anthropology Since the Sixties”, 146. 99 See: Pouliot, International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy, 26-27.

50 international relations or unipolarity, so we need to look to structural realism to explain

the external setting (international system). This is fine because structural realism and

Bourdieu’s theory of practice share some key assumptions, particularly the role that

one’s position in a structure or system has in determining your behaviour. However,

where they differ is that Bourdieu also tells you to study social variables, which means

you must also look at the internal setting (domestic and cultural considerations) to make

sense of a state’s foreign policy.

The Bourdieusian approach and neoclassical realism overlap in several ways,

but where Bourdieu improves upon it is by presenting what is ultimately a more

systematic approach to studying the unit-level, thus the argument that neoclassical

realists should perhaps adopt this approach when looking at the internal setting was

advanced. The concepts of field theory and capital provide greater clarity on how to

study dominance generally, while the concepts of individual and class (or group) habitus

help to make sense of cultural and ideational variables. As a strand of practice theory, it

(1) accepts the importance of the experiential over the rational, and (2) says we must

study background knowledge – the inarticulate know-how that makes reflexive and rational thought possible – in order to understand why agents act the way they do.

However, it is the dominant strand of practice theory in IR because it is the best developed and appears to be the easiest to apply to various empirical investigations.

Some of the Bourdieusian literature on IR and foreign policy will be discussed next chapter, which will underline its overall usefulness to the study of both and show that the Bourdieusian literature on foreign policy is underdeveloped. Finally, Rose’s call for scholars to show the link between “objective material power capabilities and

51 policymakers’ subjective assessment of them… [And that] precise theoretical development in this area would be helpful, explicating just how various psychological, ideational, and cultural factors may affect how political actors perceive their own and others’ capabilities and how such perceptions are translated into foreign policy,” can be answered by the Bourdieusian approach, since it provides the theoretical development that Rose calls for. Essentially, if we can understand the habitus of the actors and their positions in their respective fields then we can see this “link” Rose calls for.

In terms of the upcoming chapter, all of Bourdieu’s concepts will be defined and the approach will be laid out in a manner understandable to all. Admittedly, it can be a bit complex at times, but this author will do his best to go over everything thoroughly, assuming no prior knowledge by the reader, despite having mentioned numerous

Bourdieusian concepts throughout this chapter. We will apply the approach to the British political system, thus beginning our attempt at understanding why the UK continued to play a ‘bridge’ role despite the international systems shift to unipolarity. The strategic culture literature will also be discussed, since it shares a great deal of similarities with the Bourdieusian approach, making it better to discuss it once most of Bourdieu’s concepts have been defined. Again, this approach was not taken with the structural realist, neoclassical realist or practice theory literature because we needed to understand where Bourdieu stood in relation to others before discussing his concepts in full. Thus, it was best to work towards Bourdieu, rather than working away from him. To put it another way, it is best to be moving forwards, not backwards.

52 Chapter 3: The Bourdieusian Approach

3.1: Introduction

At long last, Bourdieu’s key concepts of habitus and field theory will be defined at

discussed in proper detail. This chapter will start by expanding upon the ‘habitus + field

= practice’ equation that was provided in the previous chapter, which will lead to a detailed discussion of habitus and field theory. Critical to understanding the concept of

habitus is recognizing that it is divided along two lines: class (or group) and individual.

The class (or group) habituses that this section will analyze are the British national habitus (or, to use a term that will be elaborated upon later, the “national self”) and the habitus of the UK’s political field. Bourdieu’s concept of “admission fee” will show that to

be a member of the UK political field and rise to the position of PM your personal beliefs

(individual habitus) must be sufficiently in-line with the national habitus,1 and that the

ideas that are embedded within the political field’s habitus (like the UK as ‘bridge’) are

also reflective of the national habitus.

The individuals that this study will focus most of its energies on are the UK PMs,

with the reasoning being that (1) field theory points us towards the “dominant” members

of fields, and (2) the literature on the UK’s government and foreign policy highlights the

predominance of the PM within the UK’s political field, and this literature will be

discussed at length. What said discussion will reveal is that because of this

predominance it becomes vital to study their (the PMs) individual habituses, since they

1 This is very much in line with the literature on “national syndrome”, with Hudson noting that “a nation’s leaders rise in part because they articulate a vision of the nation’s role in world affairs that corresponds to deep cultural beliefs about the nation” (Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory 2nd Edition, 130).

53 are among the few actors within the UK political field who are powerful enough to shape policy based on their personal preferences and beliefs – beliefs that may differ from those embedded within the UK’s political field, or even differ from those embedded within the national habitus. With this established, the need to study the individual habituses of the post-Cold War PMs becomes evident, but that will be saved until chapter five when we discuss the post-Cold War period. The chapter will also include discussion of strategic culture, arguing that although it shares a great deal in common with Bourdieu’s concept of habitus it fails to investigate the personal beliefs and preferences of the “dominant” actors, choosing instead to focus only on collectively-held beliefs (i.e. class (or group) habitus). With the Bourdieusian approach fully understood, we will then discuss some of the Bourdieusian literature on IR and foreign policy, showing how the approach has been applied by others and where improvements can be made. With these improvements in mind, the chapter will lay out the methods that this paper will use during its investigation of the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, explaining which sources will be used and why they were chosen. The chapter will end with a concluding section that wraps up any loose ends that may still be hanging around from chapters two and three, allowing us to shift attention to the Cold War and post-

Cold War eras.

3.2: The Bourdieusian Approach Explained

To begin, we will repeat what a Bourdieusian approach looks like, but this time in more detail. To do this, we will turn to Michael Grenfell, who describes it as consisting of three distinct steps:

1 analyse the position of the field vis-à-vis the field of power;

54 2 map out the objective structure of relations between the positions occupied by agents who compete for the legitimate forms of specific authority of which the field is a site; 3 analyse the habitus of agents.2

To understand steps one and two we must turn to field theory, which David McCourt

states is “one of a body of concepts developed by Bourdieu to understand the social

world,”3 and consists of dividing the social world into different ‘fields’. A field, according to Pierre Bourdieu, may be defined “as a network, or a configuration, of objective

relations between positions,”4 while Vincent Pouliot writes that “a field is a social

configuration structured along three main dimensions: relations of power, objects of

struggle and taken-for-granted rules.”5 Returning to Bourdieu, he notes that in a highly

differentiated society (i.e. the UK), “the social cosmos is made up of a number of such relatively autonomous social microcosms”6 and each field “[is] the site of a logic and a

necessity that [is] specific and irreducible to those that regulate other fields.”7 In regards

to the third step, Grenfell defines habitus as “the systems of dispositions they [the

agents] have acquired by internalizing a deterministic type of social and economic

condition.”8

2 Michael Grenfell, “Working With Habitus and Field: The Logic of Bourdieu’s Practice,” in Cultural Analysis and Bourdieu’s Legacy: Settling Accounts and Developing Alternatives,” eds. Elizabeth Silva and Alan Warde (London: Routledge, 2010), 20. 3 David M. McCourt, “Rethinking Britain’s Role in the World for a New Decade: The Limits of Discursive Therapy and the Promise of Field Theory”, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 13 (2011): 156. 4 Pierre Bourdieu and Loic J.D. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 97. 5 Vincent Pouliot, International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2010), 33. 6 Bourdieu and Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, 97. 7 Ibid 97. 8 Michael Grenfell, “Working With Habitus and Field: The Logic of Bourdieu’s Practice,” 20.

55 At this point, the author would like to remind the reader of a quote from the

beginning of chapter two: “Bourdieu’s theoretical approach is in large part an attempt to

illustrate how what people say and do is something other than either just a reflection of

what is going on in their heads or a product of social and material structures. His

approach is to focus on the strategies of social actors and to show how these are

produced by the interplay of their individual habitus and the structure of the particular

field.” We know what habitus and fields are; Jackson tells us that the interplay between

the two of them creates the strategies of social actors; but it would still be wise to put

this together in a more explicitly stated manner. The best way to do this is as follows:

habitus exists at the experiential level, is acquired through unconscious and conscious

learned experience, and is the “engine of cultural action” since it provides the agent with

an “ingrained set of orientations that influence not only the intellect but also in the

physical relationship of the social actor to the external world.”9 In other words, it

conditions how people respond to external problems.10 Fields provide the arena in

which actors and their different habituses interact, with the structures of the field

(agents’ positions, the written and unwritten rules of the field) and the field’s own habitus

determining the parameters of what is considered acceptable behaviour, while field

9 Jackson, Pierre Bourdieu, the ‘Cultural Turn’ and the Practice of International History, 164. 10 Thus, it is incredibly similar to local search – beliefs become ingrained, thus becoming automatic or ingrained (i.e. something they are) and then acts as an overall set of parameters on rational thought, saying only certain decisions are valid rather than all ideas are on the table. In other words, we know the experiential comes before the rational, thus the unreflective, automatic, experiential mode – because it is where people think from – sets the parameters for rational thought, and said rational thought is incredibly bounded/limited. When the experiential is challenged then we see an opening for pure rationality, and how such openings may occur will be discussed later in this chapter.

56 theory provides us with the means to study these fields, telling us to look at how capital is distributed within the field and how to determine who the dominant players are.11

With the concepts of fields, field theory and habitus now understood, we can finally start to apply the Bourdieusian approach. The first of Grenfell’s step refers to the

“structural positioning of the field [within] a network of fields”12 and asks the researchers to determine how much power the field in question wields over others. For our purposes, the fields in question are the international system, which we have already studied, and the UK’s political field, which contains the political institutions that constitute the British state.13 Focusing exclusively on the latter field, the power wielded by the state is immense and all-encompassing, and thus the political field is the dominant field in the UK.14

In regards to the second step we turn to the agents who inhabit a field. Again, the field in question is the political field, but the agents this paper will be focusing on are the foreign policymakers. A line, however, must be drawn somewhere in regards to which foreign policymakers are considered, since an examination of every nook and cranny of the UK government is too expansive for a master’s thesis. To draw this line, this paper turns to the previously mentioned “three main dimensions” of fields. In regards to

“relations of power,” one must recognize that at its most basic level the agents within a field fall into one of two groups: dominant or dominated.15 Applying this logic to the UK

11 This concept of capital will be defined shortly. 12 Michael Grenfell, “Working With Habitus and Field: The Logic of Bourdieu’s Practice,” 21. 13 For more on the ‘political field’ in general, see: Bourdieu and Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, 105; Loic Wacquant, “Pointers on Pierre Bourdieu and Democratic Politics,” Constellations 11.1 (2004): 6. 14 Again, the idea of dominance is central to Bourdieu’s work and field theory. This will be elaborated upon shortly. 15 See: Bourdieu and Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, 104-105. See also: Rogers Brubaker, “Social Theory as Habitus,” in Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives, eds. Craig Calhoun, Edward LiPuma, and Moishe Postone

57 political field, we see that the dominant agents are the members of the executive

branch, which consists of the PM and cabinet ministers, while the dominated agents are

the other MPs (legislative branch) and civil servants.16 Drawing such a distinction is of

critical importance, since the works of both Sam C. Sarkesian and James M. Goldgeier

note that in the political field the more powerful the agent the more likely it is that

personal/individual beliefs and preferences (rather than job title) are shaping their

decision making.17 In other words, the relevance of the bureaucratic model decreases

(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 221, for mention of the other fundamental binary oppositions that structure the social world. 16 This paper recognizes that the works of an author like Mancur Olson – who points to the existence of policy coalitions outside of government/the political field that are capable of exerting significant influence on government policy, even though the policies they support have turned unserviceable or the original purpose of said coalition has disappeared – are likely to be of help to the foreign policy scholar. (See: Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagnations, and Social Rigidities (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).) It is an American example, but Mearsheimer and Walt point to the influence the Israeli lobby has on its foreign policymaking (see: Rathburn, “A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism,” 321), and a look at similarly organized groups in the UK – and by ‘similarly organized’ this author means groups that focus on influencing foreign policy or a particular aspect of foreign policy – and how they potentially exert influence over its foreign policymaking process would be fruitful. This paper also admits that Olson’s work can probably overlap nicely with the class (or group) aspect of the Bourdieusian approach, since it is clearly looking at the beliefs within a particular class (or group). However, such an investigation cannot happen here because like this author has stated, we cannot examine every nook and cranny of the UK’s government, nor every possible influence on the country’s national habitus, the political field’s habitus, or the individual habituses of the agents who make up the political field. Thus, a line must be drawn somewhere, and that line prevents us from looking at the types of policy coalitions that Olson’s research focuses on. The remainder of this paragraph will discuss concepts that we have yet to examine or discuss in-depth, but in order to lay potential criticisms of my decision to ignore Olson to rest they must be mentioned. Ultimately, we must maintain our focus on the dominant actors within the UK’s political field, and the PM in particular because of his or her predominance within the UK’s political field, because again, unless a line is drawn somewhere we will then be forced to look at every ‘nook and cranny’ and that is simply impossible. No master’s thesis, or book for that matter, can explain everything about a particular topic. However, this author does believe that a Bourdieusian inspired examination of the influence of such groups on the political field would probably be grounds for exciting future research. In fact, even though we are jumping ahead a bit in terms our overall understanding of Bourdieu, but if such groups are able to exert influence over the foreign policymaking process it is probably because the ideas they are advocating for line-up with the national habitus, or, because of how the UK’s political field is structured, they line-up with some or all of the dominant foreign policymakers individual habituses, and thus they are able to maintain influence. If anything, this further highlights the need to understand how a country’s political field is structured and what the most dominant actor or actors believe, which actually further strengthens this paper’s decision to focus on the role of the PM in UK foreign policymaking. 17 Sam C. Sarkesian, U.S. National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995); James M. Goldgeier, Not Whether But When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999). Note: although the subject of both their studies is the US national security policymaking process, as the upcoming discussion on the role the UK PM plays within their government means the

58 the higher you climb in the political field, meaning that those in dominant positions have

the most freedom of choice.18

Within the UK’s executive branch, the literature on the UK government suggests

that a further division must be made, with the PM being dominant and the cabinet

ministers as being dominated. Members of the core executive like the Foreign

Secretary, as well as certain advisors and civil servants, obviously play an important

role in the formation of UK foreign policy,19 but the structure of the UK political field

makes the PM the most powerful agent in terms of crafting foreign policy. Ultimately, no

major change in FP is likely to happen unless he or she either initiates it or approves of

it. In regards to how the PM achieves dominance generally, it is achieved due to the

special powers that come along with being the PM. Beginning with discussion of the

PM’s roles, Bernard Donoghue notes that among them is that of (1) national image-

maker; (2) a “repository of some vaguely defined national interest”; and (3) a “policy

strategy role, being the only Minister with the authority to co-ordinate the policies of all other Cabinet ministers.”20 When considered together these three roles show that the

PM’s thinking can be best described as national rather than departmental, while for

authors’ findings on the relationship between position in government and levels of freedom of choice certainly apply. 18 This latter point is of critical importance in this paper’s later discussion on individual habitus and the power of the PM. 19 Bourdieu and the concept of policy entrepreneurs will be discussed in subsection 3.3, but for now see: Goldgeier, Not Whether But When, or Toby Lauterbach, “Constructivism, Strategic Culture, and the Iraq War,” Air & Space Power Journal –Africa and Francophonie 2.4 (2011). 20 Bernard Donoghue, Prime Minister: The Conduct of Policy under Harold Wilson and James Callaghan (London: Jonathan Cape, 1987), 3.

59 cabinet ministers Donoghue implies that the opposite is true.21 In regards to special

powers he highlights the following:

[The Prime Minister] appoints (and dismisses) Ministers; he chairs the Cabinet and influences the agenda; he can issue instructions to the civil service; he leads the governing party; he has a wide spread of patronage; he has virtually automatic access to the media; he has [usually] received the blessing and authority of a recent general election mandate; and, less tangibly but very importantly, he has inherited, however briefly, the impressive charisma of his mighty office.22

Of particular importance here is what Donoghue refers to as the PM’s “hiring and firing”

powers.23 Although this power is constrained in a variety of ways, it is important to note

that within those limitations “it is still a factor encouraging the obedience of colleagues

and thus reinforcing the authority of the man at top.”24

Richard Heffernan also discusses the powers held by the PM, helpfully dividing

them into two categories: personal power resources and institutional power resources.

The latter has already been discussed by Donoghue,25 but in regards to the former

Heffernan lists four: “reputation, skill and ability; association with actual or anticipated political success; public popularity; and high standing in his or her party.”26 Where

Heffernan is perhaps most helpful is his clarification on how to view PM dominance,

which he says should viewed as predominant rather than presidential. What Heffernan

means by the concept of ‘prime ministerial predominance’ is the idea that the PM has

21 Ibid 6. 22 Ibid 5. 23 Ibid 14. 24 Ibid 14. 25 For Heffernan’s full list of institutional power resources, see: Richard Heffernan, “Prime Ministerial Predominance? Core Executive Politics in the UK,” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 3.3 (2003): 357. 26 Ibid 351.

60 more authority and power than other actors in the core executive, possessing

“considerable, but never overwhelming, intra-executive influence,”27 and thus ultimately rejects the presidentialisation argument advanced by Michael Foley because the PM does not “dominate the executive in ways a directly elected president can,”28 causing

Foley’s argument, in his opinion, to confuse more than it illuminates. This is, however, not a complete rejection of Foley’s argument on Heffernan’s part, since he does admit that the concept of presidentialisation “may illuminate…because it embraces recent changes in political leadership in Britain,”29 such as the increasing personalization of leadership in the UK political field

When Foley’s actual argument is examined it is initially a bit difficult to fathom why Heffernan labels it as confusing, since they appear to be making essentially identical arguments. Turning to Foley, he clarifies his presidentialisation argument with the following:

This is not to suggest that British party leaders are becoming indistinguishable from their American counterparts. The latter’s freedom of manoeuvre to engage in highly individualised campaigns, where personalities are marketed in an uninhibited way, is peculiar to the United States with its looser party structure and separate elections for the presidency. What is clear in Britain, however, is the emergence of a highly publicised matrix of leadership politics, in which leaders compete continuously with each other for public confidence in them as leaders…It has led to a pronounced emphasis upon leaders being their parties, and their parties’ policies, in the public eye. In the past, leaders had always represented their parties’ programme and political outlook. Today, they come almost physically to embody them through the presentation of themselves and their personalities.30

27 Ibid 349. 28 Ibid 349. 29 Ibid 349. 30 Michael Foley, The Rise of the British Presidency (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 272.

61 When considered in this context it appears that what Foley is describing is PM

predominance, which according to him entails an increasing personalisation and

concentration of power in the hands of the UK PM due to increasing personal power

resources, and such an argument is supported by Heffernan. Considering this, it seems

difficult to understand why Heffernan labels Foley’s notion of presidentialisation as

confusing when it appears to differ so little (if at all) from his concept of PM

predominance. Foley re-iterates throughout his work that this presidentialisation is still

happening within the confines of the UK’s political tradition, thus the “structural

differences between the American and British systems” are being respected.31

However, when one considers the work of Richard Neustadt one sees that Heffernan has a point about it being more confusing than illuminating. Turning to Neustadt, he

argues that UK PMs can reach heights that are close to presidential, but the

conventions of the UK system ultimately place constraints on the PM transforming the

system into a presidential one,32 like checks and balances provided by Cabinet or the

fact that senior civil servants answer to their respective ministers rather than the PM,

and Heffernan’s PM predominance argument is very much in line with this. In all

fairness, Foley is making essentially the same argument as Neustadt but this paper

concedes that describing something as say, ‘as close to presidential as the system will

allow’ is different than simply ‘presidentialisation’, since the former is more restrained.

However, it must be noted that Neustadt’s article was published back in 1966, so

certain developments post-1966 are obviously not captured, with the key one being the

31 Ibid 21. 32 Neustadt, “White House and White Hall,” 62.

62 growth of the PM’s Private Office, with Tony Blair and his ‘sofa government’ being

perhaps the best example.33 Neustadt is obviously correct to note that these Private

Offices were still quite small during the Macmillan and Wilson governments, and that

this is especially evident when one compares them to the private offices of President

Kennedy or Johnson,34 but these Private Offices have clearly grown in size and are

among the many reasons why the UK has witnessed a shift towards greater PM

predominance within the country’s political field. This shift is captured by Peter

Hennessey, who argues that since Harold Macmillan the UK has mutated from a

cabinet government to a PM-dominated one,35 and this mutation will be evident as we

work our ways through the later Cold War years, and Post-Cold War years, in,

respectively, chapters four and five. To be clear, this development does not weaken

Neustadt’s key findings, but in fact bolsters them since as we will see not even Tony

Blair exceeded the ‘close to presidential’ threshold. Thus, to conclude, this discussion

on how to properly view the PM within the UK’s political field, this paper will adopt

Heffernan’s argument that the PM should be seen viewed as predominant, and that we

are probably best served by avoiding the term like ‘presidential’ or ‘presidentialisation’

when describing the PM and his or her role in the UK’s political field.

Returning to Pierre Bourdieu, this predominance argument is very much in line with his dominant-dominated binary, since for him the term dominant merely refers to those holding the highest positions in a particular field. Dominance exists on a

33 Blair’s ‘sofa government’ will be discussed in chapter five. 34 Neustandt, “White House and White Hall”, 64. 35 Peter Hennessey, The Prime Minister: The Office and its Holders since 1945 (Palgrave: New York, 2000), 54-56. Note: This ‘shift’ will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 4, but for now the important thing is that Hennessey describes ways in which the PM is predominant in terms of foreign policymaking, with the PM’s role in representing the UK at summits and powers to declare war among the best examples (Ibid 89-103).

63 spectrum, and an agent’s level of dominance is determined by how much capital they

possess, which, according to Bourdieu, exists at an economic, social and cultural

level.36 Those in positions of power have the most capital, and since Bourdieu argues

that power is relational that means agents in positions of dominance possess the most

capital, allowing them to exert the most influence within their respective field.37 Agents

who inhabit certain roles also inherit high levels of capital, and being PM is one such

role. Although they do not mention it directly, Donoghue, Foley and Heffernan all

highlight the importance of capital when they discuss the personal and institutional

power resources of the PM.

Turning now to the foreign policymaking process, this is where the PM is perhaps

most predominant. From a more general governmental standpoint, Heffernan notes that

the downgrading of the full cabinet as a “forum within which government business is

despatched is widely acknowledged”38 and has been on display since the 1940s, and

also highlights the increasing power of the “Downing Street centre.”39 Foley also

mentions the progression of PM power during the Cold War era, starting with Harold

Macmillan and ending with Margaret Thatcher.40 In regards to foreign policy specifically,

Macleod argues that the PM has achieved increasing control over UK foreign policy

36 See: Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, trans. Richard Nice (London: Routledge, 1984); Bourdieu and Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology; Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice. 37 Note: In each field, certain types of capital are more important than others. For the political field, it is more about the social and cultural than the economic, since the PM’s personal and institutional power resources fall more under the realm of social and cultural than the economic. In other words, the PM does is not predominate because they have the most money, but because the position itself is imbued with “special powers” like the ability to hire and fire cabinet ministers or roles like ‘national-imagemaker’, and these are in no way reliant on the PM having access to economic resources. See: previous discussion of Donoghue. 38 Heffernan, “Prime Ministerial Predominance? Core Executive Politics in the UK,” 358. 39 Ibid 362. Note: greater discussion of the “Downing Street centre” will occur in the chapter on the Cold War. 40 See: Foley, The Rise of the British Presidency, 11.

64 post-1945 thanks not only to the “personality of the prime minister, but much of it can be

explained by objective factors, such as the growth of summit diplomacy and the greater

salience of multilateral organization.”41 John Dickie also highlights the importance of

summit diplomacy42 and helpfully adds the importance of intelligence, which goes to the

PM first (a tradition since the first Churchill government) and then to the Foreign

Secretary and the Permanent Under-Secretary, and then possibly to other relevant

cabinet ministers such as the Chancellor of the Exchequer or Defence Secretary.43 This latter point adds to the argument of PM predominance in the creation of foreign policy because if the PM receives this intelligence first that means they receive a first movers advantage – allowing them to further dominate and shape the policy discussion to match their personal preferences and beliefs.

But perhaps the clearest example of PM predominance in foreign policy comes

from James Strong and his discussion of the royal prerogative, which is defined as “the

residue of discretionary or arbitrary authority, which at any given time is legally left in the

hands of the Crown… [And] is not subject to parliamentary approval, or open to judicial

review.”44 Due to the royal prerogative predating British democracy, and the fact that the

country has an unwritten constitution, unless a concession has been made “the ancient

prerogative remains in place.”45 Given how the UK government is currently structured,

the power to exercise said prerogative lies mostly in the hands of the PM. Strong also

claims that under the traditionally dominant Westminster model of government, where

41 Macleod, “Great Britain: Still Searching for Status?,”163. 42 John Dickie, The New Mandarins: How British Foreign Policy Works (London: IB Tauris, 2004), 131. 43 Ibid 103. 44 James Strong, “Why Parliament Now Decides on War: Tracing the Growth of the Parliamentary Prerogative through Syria, Libya and Iraq,” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 17 (2015): 607. 45 Ibid 607.

65 “foreign policy is determined in top-down fashion, and parliament is a minor player,”46 the royal prerogative gives the PM legal authority to direct the armed forces without the support of parliament. This argument is further bolstered when one remembers that the

UK “has no comparable War Powers Act.”47 Strong also notes that although parliament can still act as a restraint by defeating the government on a confidence motion, on “no occasion between the debate on the Korean War in 1950 and that on Iraq in 2003 did parliament vote directly to approve a military deployment,”48 thus underscoring PM

predominance in the UK political field. His argument, however, that the debate on Iraq in

2003 marks the end of royal prerogative over the use of military force, and that a

parliamentary prerogative power has emerged in its place,49 will be discussed in chapter

five. But for now it is most important to note that the mere existence of the royal

prerogative further strengthens the usefulness of applying field theory to the UK political

system (and particularly to the foreign policymaking process),50 since, as Schindler and

Wille write, Bourdieu’s thought is “at its core a theory of domination.”51

Returning now to Vincent Pouliot, in regards to “objects of struggle” the struggle in this context is over who will shape foreign policy. Those who possess the most capital

46 Ibid 606. 47 Ibid 607. 48 Ibid 608. 49 Ibid 606. 50 Strong’s overall argument is that the Westminster model best describes UK foreign and military policymaking until 2003, and since then it has shifted to a differentiated polity model, at least when it comes to declaring war. The Westminster model is incredibly similar to field theory, in that adopts a similar top-down, dominant- dominated approach to power. The hallmarks of the Westminster model have already been laid out in past discussions on the works of Donoghue and Heffernan etc., but a field theory approach will be maintained because while the Westminster model may describe how the UK government works/is structured a field theory approach asks far more questions, like “how close is the political field to the field of power” and “how does one acquire power”? In sum, the Westminster model shares much of the logic of field theory, but field theory asks more questions and thus provides a better sense of the UK political system/field as a whole. 51 Schindler and Wille, “Change In and Thrrough Practice: Pierre Bourdieu, Vincent Pouliot, and the End of the Cold War”, 332.

66 are the most likely to win such “struggles,” but this paper focuses more on the policies

themselves rather than the inner machinations of Westminster, so the issue of ‘struggle’ is not of much importance here.52 Plus it has already been mentioned that the PM is the

dominant actor in this process. But the third dimension (“taken-for-granted rules”) is of

the utmost importance because these rules help shape the structure of the field, namely

who gets to dominate and who is dominated, and the position one holds within their

respective field also helps shape their habitus, bringing us to the third step in the

Bourdieusian approach: habitus.

The term habitus was defined earlier this chapter by Grenfell as “the systems of

dispositions they [the agents] have acquired by internalizing a deterministic type of

social and economic condition,” while Martin defines it as “a cultural unconscious, a

matrix of dispositions that serves to affectively organize perceptions.”53 According to

Bourdieu, these habits are what shape our core beliefs, and his argument regarding the

power and role of habit were mentioned in this paper’s opening epigraph. With said

epigraph in mind, the following statement becomes all the more powerful: “The habitus

– embodied history, internalized as a second nature and so forgotten as history – is the

active presence of the whole past of which it is the product. As such, it is what gives

practices their relative autonomy with respect to external determinations of the

immediate present.”54 The habitus, therefore, is rooted in history, and it harmonizes

actions (which are often out of sync with present conditions) on an individual and class

52 For an in-depth discussion on the “objects of struggle” see: Bourdieu and Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology and John Levi Martin, “What is Field Theory?,” American Journal of Sociology 109.1 (2003): 1-49. 53 Martin, “What is Field Theory?,” 23. 54 Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, 56.

67 (or group) level. To better understand this concept, the following discussion will be divided thusly: (1) an examination of individual and class (or group) habitus, and (2) the role of confirmation bias and internalized history.

First, it is important to distinguish the differences between individual and class (or group) habitus. In the case of the latter, Bourdieu writes that it is both “practice-unifying and practice-generating” and which class (or group) an agent belongs to is the

“observable social condition” that shapes how they perceive the world.55 The important thing to note is this: one may belong to myriad classes (or groups), and such examples include nationality, economic class, ethnicity, profession and religious denomination.

Because every agent is a member of so many groups it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the effects of each class (or group) in which each PM may have belonged, so a line must be drawn. Armed with (1) the fact that we are studying the

UK’s political field, and (2) Bourdieu’s concept of “admission fee,”56 we can narrow our focus for class (or group) influences to just the effects of nationality and profession, which in this case means looking at the UK’s national habitus and the habitus of the

UK’s political field. Ultimately, we will be looking at how the national habitus (i.e. the belief that the UK is a great power) influences the UK’s political field, and how in response to change in the post-World War Two international system the dominant actors in the political field created the role of ‘bridge’, which then became ingrained within the habitus of the political field, thus becoming internalized history or habit rather than an example of conscious deliberation.

55 Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, 95. 56 This term will be defined shortly.

68 Turning now to individual habitus, this concept refers to the “schemes of perception, apprehension and thought”57 of an agent, and according to Brubaker it is dominated by one’s earliest experiences and upbringing (with the most important of these factors being family and schooling), and is modified by subsequent experiences.58

Individual habitus, however, cannot be considered in isolation of class (or group) habitus, and to elaborate Bourdieu writes the following:

To define the relationship between class habitus and individual habitus (which is inseparable from the organic individuality that is immediately given to immediate perception – intuitus personae — and socially designated and recognized— name, legal identity, etc.), class (or group) habitus, that is, the individual habitus in so far as it expresses or reflects the class (or group), could be regarded as a subjective but non-individual system of internalized structures, common schemes of perception, conception and action, which are the precondition of all objectification and apperception…In fact, the singular habitus of members of the same class are united in a relationship of homology, that is, of diversity within homogeneity reflecting the diversity within homogeneity characteristic of their social conditions of production.59

With this in mind, it is important to note that Brubaker highlights the key role that transcendence plays in Bourdieu’s theory, writing that the structures that structure practice or habit at either the individual or class (or group) level can be changed by identifying the habitus – that resocialization and rational thought are possible if one can regulate the “unconscious workings of the habitus.”60 However, later discussion will show that this generally only occurs during moments of crisis, and even in the wake of crisis one’s individual habitus is usually a reflection of homology rather than a complete

57 Brubaker, “Social Theory as Habitus,” 228. 58 Ibid 226. 59 Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, 60. 60 Brubaker, “Social Theory as Habitus,” 216.

69 deviation or break from the conditions they were socialized in.61 Also of importance is

Grenfell, who clarifies that although the idea of transcendence plays a role in Bourdieu’s

work his focus is more on creating “an objectification of the social conditions of the

thinking which set the limits on thought” than transcending the habitus.62 Thus, one

would obviously be mistaken to view the Bourdieusian approach as being best classified

as an example of critical theory,63 where the emphasis is on emancipation from the

current paradigm.64 Bourdieu states how this emancipation can occur, but said

emancipation is not his primary concern.

Returning to the UK’s political field, its “taken-for-granted rules” help to structure how its members act and think, and thus each member’s habitus is shaped by it. What these “taken-for-granted rules” are will not be examined in-depth due to the overall scope of this paper, but these “rules” are part of what David Marsh calls the “British political tradition” that “underpins the institutions of the British government.”65 This

“political tradition” informs the “taken-for-granted rules” of the political field, which in turn

become internalized by its members and thus part of their habitus. This re-emphasizes

the importance of internalized history since these “rules” become second nature and

61 Building off this idea of homology (rather than a complete deviation) being the norm, Mark Bevir, Oliver Daddow and Ian Hall provide further clarity in their discussion of “tradition,” which as they describe it is a similar concept to habitus: “People are not autonomous, so their agency is always situated against an inherited web of beliefs and practices. Their beliefs and practices draw on an inherited tradition…Here, tradition is defined as a set of understandings someone receives during socialisation. So conceived, tradition is unavoidable only as a starting point, not as something that determines later performances. Later performances are products of creative, situated agency in the setting of tradition” (Mark Bevir, Oliver Daddow and Ian Hall, “Introduction: Interpreting British Foreign Policy,” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 15 (2013): 167). 62 Grenfell, “Working with Habitus and Field: The Logic of Bourdieu’s Practice,” 23. 63 But we already knew this. 64 For greater discussion of Bourdieu from a critical perspective, see: Frederic Vandenberghe, What’s Critical About Critical Realism? Essays in Reconstructive Social Theory (London: Routledge, 2014), 198-245. 65 David Marsh, “Understanding British Government: Analysing Competing Models,” The British Journal of Political and International Relations 10.2 (2008): 263.

70 thus forgotten as history, and at this juncture there are two important points that must be

made. First, a reminder that it would be incorrect to argue that once people are elected

to parliament the structure of the political field, or their position within it, completely

overwhelms the influence that previous experiences have played in shaping their

habitus.66 The conditioning they received prior to entering the political field does not fade away, but their membership and position in the political field is a new influence that builds upon previous unique individual experiences in helping to shape their evolving world view. In other words, this constitutes part of the “subsequent experiences” mentioned by Brubaker, and also strengthens Pouliot’s concept of “positional agency,” which states that one’s practical sense hinges on both your existing habitus and where you are located in your field’s hierarchy.67 The second important point is that in order to

be a politician one must pay what Bourdieu refers to as the “admission fee,” which he

defines as the configuration of properties one must possess to enter a field.68

The “fee” for entering the UK political field (i.e. getting elected) and rising to the

position of PM will be mentioned shortly, but first it must be noted that in regards to the

foreign policymaking process the literature shows that foreign policy is often linked to

national identity, meaning that how a country behaves internationally is often influenced

66 It has been noted that each field is a “relatively autonomous social microcos[m],” meaning that fields are influenced by outside sources. Plus, one cannot forget the previous discussion of personal preference playing a greater role the more dominant one is in the political field. Such preferences would come increasingly from one’s class (or group) and individual habitus rather than being shaped entirely by the rules etc. of their field. 67 See: Vincent Pouliot, International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy, 35, and Vincent Pouliot, “Methodology: Putting Practice Theory into Practice” in New International Relations: Bourdieu in International Relations: Rethinking Key Concepts in IR, ed. Rebecca Adler-Nissen (Florence, GB: Routledge, 2012), 55. 68 Bourdieu and Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, 107.

71 by the historical tropes and clichés that guide national narratives.69 In the UK’s case, the

tropes and clichés in question is the belief that the country is a great power, and that it

maintains this role in part by being a ‘bridge’ between the US and Europe. Turning to

Jack Holland, he notes that foreign policy is often a reflection of the “national Self,” and

when this occurs “foreign policy becomes not something the state does, but rather what

the state is; [and] in such a situation, to contest foreign policy is often to contest a prevalent and popular understanding of the national identity.”70 To use Bourdieusian

terminology, foreign policy is a reflection of the habitus of the nation and to contest

foreign policy often means contesting the deeply held beliefs of said nation. With this in

mind, we return to the question of what “fee” is required to rise to the position of PM,

and the answer is that the person must believe in and embody the national identity or

national habitus, which is in accordance with Donoghue’s previous discussion on the

PM’s roles – in particular the idea that they are a “repository of some vaguely defined

national interest.”

Two further issues must be discussed, with the first being how to define the term

“great power,” and the second being an examination of the similarities and differences

between a Bourdieusian and strategic culture approach. Regarding the definition of

“great power” this paper turns to Justin Morris, who argues the “UK’s great power

credentials are far stronger than is commonly appreciated and that, while the term is no

longer in vogue, within government the idea that Britain is a great power is prevalent

69 See: Jack Holland, “Foreign Policy and Political Possibilities,” European Journal of International Relations 19.1 (2011): 54; William Wallace, “Foreign Policy and National Identity in the United Kingdom,” International Affairs 67.1 (1991): 65. 70 Holland, “Foreign Policy and National Identity in the United Kingdom,” 55.

72 and an influential one.”71 Morris writes that for a state to be considered a great power it

must “first, be one of a group of states of comparable power; second, ‘in the front rank

in terms of military strength’; and finally – and crucially – ‘recognised by others to have,

and conceived by their own leaders and people to have, certain special rights and

duties’.”72 This latter point is crucial because it is a clear rejection of the realist claim

that “great power status is wholly determined by material – and particularly military –

capabilities,”73 and argues instead that great power status involves a “material and

ideational dimension.”74

Morris concludes that although the UK has experienced a relative decline in its

military strength in the post-World War Two era when one “exclud[es] the sui generis

case of the US, it is clear that very few states have a greater ability than Britain to

project military power on a global scale,”75 and that in ideational terms successive

British governments, along with the British people, continue to see the UK as a great

power.76 This sentiment is echoed by Brzezinski, who considers the UK a “major power”

belonging to the next category below that of the two preeminent powers, the US and

China.77 A sequential order of the other “major powers” is not provided, but Brzezinski

considers the UK to be in the same class as Germany, France, Russia, Japan and

India.78 Returning to Morris, this assertion that Cold War and post-Cold War UK

71 Justin Morris, “How Great is Britain? Power, Responsibility and Britain’s Future Global Role,” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 13 (2011): 326. 72 Ibid 328. 73 Ibid 326. 74 Ibid 326. 75 Ibid 341. 76 Ibid 342. 77 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power (New York: Basic Books, 2012), 24. 78 Ibid 24.

73 governments have continued to view the country as a great power will be considered at

length in subsequent chapters, but for now this paper will adopt Morris’ argument that

the UK government possesses sufficient material capabilities to be of international

significance and that “nomenclature concerns” which reflect changed values (thanks in

large part to the country’s relative decline, the emergence of a post-colonial paradigm,

etc.) lead the UK to use terms other than “great power” to express its perceived great

power status.79 And to shift focus briefly to previous discussions of how Bourdieu

overlaps with neoclassical and structural realism, what Morris’s work does is show that

the UK’s claims to great power status are in-line with the objective conditions of the

international system, and, in another overlap with neoclassical realism, points to the

importance of studying material and ideational factors, forcing us to look at both the

international system and the unit level.

Shifting discussion now to strategic culture, Yitzhak Klein defines strategic

culture as "the set of attitudes and beliefs held within a military establishment

concerning the political objective of war and the most effective strategy and operational

method of achieving it,"80 while Kerry Longhurst defines it as “a distinctive body of

beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding the use of force, held by a collective [usually a

nation] and arising gradually over time through a unique protracted historical process.”81

The issue with both Longhurst and Klein’s definitions are their narrow focus on strategic

culture only applying to the use or contemplation of military force, and this is

79 Morris, “How Great is Britain? Power, Responsibility and Britain’s Future Global Role,” 336. 80 Yitzhak Klein, “A Theory of Strategic Culture,” Comparative Strategies 10 (1991): 5. 81 Kerry Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force: The Evolution of German Security Policy, 1990–2003 (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2004), 17.

74 problematic given this paper’s focus on foreign policy. William Wallace provides three

useful definitions of foreign policy which all show that the waging of war or use of

military force does not need to be contemplated in order for something to be considered

foreign policy,82 thus a broader definition of strategic culture must be adopted in order

for it to apply to this paper’s research focus.

Turning to Alastair Johnston, he defines strategic culture as “an integrated

system of symbols (e.g., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors)

which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating

concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by

clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences

seem uniquely realistic and efficacious."83 Although David G. Haglund notes that

Johnston’s definition should not be viewed as a narrowly construed one, as his

reference to considering the “role and efficacy of ‘military force’” entails consideration of all aspects of national power, which include political, economic and military capabilities,84 like Klein the issue is that it is still too narrow since the contemplation of

how to use military force is still a requirement.

82 Wallace writes: “There is a pragmatist’s definition, that foreign policy is whatever governments do in dealing with foreign governments. There is the diplomatic definition, of foreign policy as the general orientation of one government towards other governments: building alliances and coalitions in pursuit of defined national interests and preferred models of international order. And there is the ‘grand strategy’ definition, that foreign policy is about national identity itself: about the sources of national pride, the characteristics which distinguish a country from its neighbours, the core elements of sovereignty it seeks to defend, the values it stands for and seeks to promote abroad” (Wallace, “Foreign Policy and National Identity in the United Kingdom,” 65). Based on arguments made thus far this paper will adopt an approach that simultaneously adopts all three definitions of foreign policy – that it is about governments dealing with other governments, building alliances in pursuit of national interests, and about national identity itself etc. 83 Alastair Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” International Security 19.4 (1995): 46. 84 David G. Haglund, “‘Let’s Call the Whole Thing Off’? Security Culture as Strategic Culture,” Contemporary Security Policy 32.3 (2011): 500

75 Perhaps it would be helpful to define the term ‘strategy.’ Haglund defines it as

“seeking to establish a ‘rational’ link between ends and means” and follows by writing

that “thinking or acting strategically stands for the attempt to correlate, in a manner that

can pass basic cost-benefit muster, one’s goals with the resources at one’s disposal to

meet those goals, and vice versa.”85 This definition allows us to view strategy as

applying to the world of foreign policy as well as that of the military, and thus allows a

strategic culture approach to be applied outside of the military/security realm. In terms

of settling on an appropriate definition for strategic culture this comes to us from Colin

S. Gray, who defines it as “the world of mind, feeling, and habit in behaviour.”86

In order to compare strategic culture to a Bourdieusian approach this paper turns

to Arthur Hoffman and Kerry Longhurst, who write that the strategic culture approach

consists of the following assumptions:

Firstly, a strategic culture approach emphasizes national specific attributes of security approaches and policies as deriving from historical experiences thus cancelling out the notion of a universal assumed rationality. Secondly, strategic culture is about collectives and their shared attitudes and beliefs, whether that be military establishments, policy communities or entire societies. Thirdly, it is continuities and discernible trends across time and contexts rather than change that are focused upon, change is generally portrayed as gradual in the absence of dramatic shocks and trauma. Finally, strategic culture is seen as intimate to behaviour, acting as a milieu through which information is received, mediated and processed into appropriate responses.87

85 Ibid 498. 86 Colin S. Gray, “Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back,” Review of International Studies 25.1 (1999): 58. 87 Arthur Hoffman and Kerry Longhurst, “German Strategic Culture in Action,” Contemporary Security Policy 20.2 (1999): 31.

76 Clearly, there is a great deal of overlap between strategic culture and the concept of

habitus. Within both is a notion of internalized history and a sense of gradualism. In the

case of internalized history, both approaches recognize that history shapes national

identities and that national or group interests are shaped by a collective sense of self-

identity that is often slow to change in response to the objective conditions of the

domestic or international environment,88 thus causing policies to be out of sync with

present conditions.

Concerning habitus and change, Pedro S. Hurtado notes that according to

Bourdieu “only in the case of a crisis will doxa or unconscious assumptions of the

agents in a field have a possibility of rising to awareness, possibly leading to the activity

of change…in a self-reflective rational manner.”89 Crisis, in a Bourdieusian sense,

occurs when “the power structures and symbolic representations of a field – or its

relative importance in what he calls the broader “field of power” – are being severely

undermined.”90 Returning to Hurtado’s statement, this is problematic since he later

states that in Bourdieu’s view “rational reflexivity is possible in modern societies,

especially under crisis conditions,”91 which obviously contradicts his earlier point.

Ultimately it is the second statement that is correct, since Bourdieu notes that in “times

of crises, in which the routine adjustment of subjective and objective structures is

brutally disrupted, constitute a class of circumstances when indeed “rational choice”

88 For strategic culture see: Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 60-61. 89 Pedro S. Hurtado, “On Culture and Strategic Change: Contrasting the Orthodox View with Bourdieu’s Concept of Habitus,” Competition Forum 7.1 (2009): 209. 90 Merand, “Pierre Bourdieu and the Birth of European Defense,” 353-354. 91 Hurtado, “On Culture and Strategic Change: Contrasting the Orthodox View with Bourdieu’s Concept of Habitus,” 211.

77 may take over, at least among those agents who are in a position to be rational.”92 The

key here is that “times of crises…constitute a class of circumstances” where rational choice may take over, which implies that rational choice is possible in times of non-

crisis, since the term “class of circumstances” is used in a general sense. Thus, perfect

rationality is most likely to occur in times of crisis, but it may still occur in times of non-

crisis, and Hurtado’s first statement misses this nuance. In regards to similarities

between habitus and strategic culture, it is stated within Bourdieu’s writings that in the

absence of crisis any changes to class (or group) beliefs tend to occur gradually,93

which is similar to Longhurst’s claim that “change in a strategic culture comes in two principal forms: fine-tuning and frequent, with the former variant being the more frequent.”94 Moving forward, this means researchers need to identify whether or not the

field is in a moment of crisis and the chances that rapid rather than gradual change will

occur.

Another similarity between strategic culture and habitus is their emphasis on the

importance of collective beliefs and the influence these have on the policymaking

process.95 Within the UK political field the ‘bridge’ role is part of its strategic culture and

thus the central research question of this paper could potentially be rewritten as follows:

why, despite the shift to unipolarity, didn’t the UK’s post-Cold War strategic culture

undergo a greater transformation? Despite the obvious similarities between the two, a

Bourdieusian approach will be maintained. While both recognize (1) the importance that

92 Bourdieu and Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, 131. 93 Quotes that appear later in this section will support this statement; like the discussion on confirmation bias. 94 Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force, 18. 95 For greater discussion on strategic culture and behaviour, see: Michael J. Williams, On Mars and Venus: Strategic Culture as an Intervening Variable in US and European Foreign Policy (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 20-28.

78 societal/collective norms and values play in shaping policy and personal beliefs, and (2)

that one’s role (i.e. position) in a community/field allows them greater freedom of choice,

a Bourdieusian approach places greater importance on microstructures, examining

familial and scholastic influences (among other things), while the strategic cultural

approach suffers from an overemphasis on macrostructures like the nation, groups or

organizations.96 In other words, the Bourdieusian approach does a better job of bridging

the micro-macro divide, since it recognizes both the influence of one’s unique individual

experiences that occurred before entering a particular community/field and the influence

of the collective beliefs of said community or field, while strategic culture only examines

beliefs at a collective level. To use Bourdieusian terminology, the strategic culture

approach examines the influence of the class (or group) habitus but fails to do the same

for one’s individual habitus.

Admittedly, the approach adopted by this paper may at times appear to be indistinguishable from a strategic culture one, but, as Stephen Dyson notes in his study

of Margaret Thatcher’s foreign policy, individuals and their personalities matter in

politics,97 and ultimately a Bourdieusian approach appears better suited than strategic

culture at dissecting how those personalities and preferences are formed. Both

approaches recognize the importance of ideational factors but in regards to

understanding the schemes of perception, apprehension and thought applied by agents,

a Bourdieusian approach offers a deeper well to draw from. Peter Winch notes the

importance of this ‘deeper well’ in his seminal text The Idea of a Social Science, and

96 See: Merand, “Pierre Bourdieu and the Birth of European Defense,” 373. 97 Stephen Benedict Dyson, “Cognitive Style and Foreign Policy: Margaret Thatcher’s Black and White Thinking,” International Political Science Review 30.1 (2009): 33.

79 writes that when dealing with issues relating to human society researchers must adopt

approaches that are compatible with the complexity of its subjects.98 It is argued here

that a Bourdieusian approach better captures this complexity than its strategic culture

counterpart. The Bourdieusian approach considers both macro and microstructures,

and considering the emphasis that field theory places on those in dominant positions;

that it provides us with a systematic approach to determining levels of dominance; and

that we have already established that agents in dominant positions enjoy the most

freedom of choice; this makes it all the more vital to adopt an approach that allows for a

deeper understanding of how the preferences of the dominant are formed. Similarly,

since one of the research questions is whether the Cameron government still attempted

to be a ‘bridge’ between the US and Europe, a structural constructivist strand of practice

theory that contains a sprinkle of critical theory like Bourdieu’s seems more appropriate

considering this paper does dive into issues of domination and emancipation.99

Domination in this case being the influence or power of a particular narrative, role

conception and agent(s), and emancipation in this case being from the ‘bridge’

narrative/role.

Shifting attention back to a general discussion of habitus, and specifically to

confirmation bias and the power of internalized history, two conclusions can be drawn.

First, that confirmation bias plays a major part in preserving the existing class or

individual habitus. Secondly, that habitus can continue to exist even though it no longer

98 Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), 71-72. 99 Vandenberghe, What’s Critical About Critical Realism? Essays in Reconstructive Social Theory, 225-226.

80 reflects present conditions. In regards to confirmation bias, Bourdieu states the

following:

The habitus which, at every moment, structures new experiences in accordance with the structures produced by past experiences, which are modified by the new experiences within the limits defined by their power of selection, brings about a unique integration, dominated by the earliest experiences, of the experiences statistically common to members of the same class. Early experiences have particular weight because the habitus tends to ensure its own constancy and its defence against change through the selection it makes within new information by rejecting information capable of calling into question its accumulated information, if exposed to it accidentally or by force, and especially by avoiding exposure to such information.100

Therefore, the habitus, rather than adapting to changing conditions or paradigms,

instead tends to promote its own survival due to it distorting one’s worldview in a way

that confirms assumptions that are central to their class (or group) habitus. To use a

previous example, the habitus works to entrench existing tropes and clichés associated

with the “national Self” more so than working to adapt the “national Self” to reflect

present conditions. This following phenomenon is explained by David McCourt, who

writes that for Britain “the tropes and clichés such as the ‘special relationship’ and the

‘transatlantic bridge’ that constitute Britain’s role in the world are not therefore to be

considered ‘mere discourse’; for the individuals who deploy these terms they reflect the

objective world as they perceive it.”101 However, like in the previous discussion of doxa

and strategic culture, it is important to note that changing the national (or one’s

individual) habitus is possible, but that these changes tend to occur either gradually or

100 Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, 60-61. 101 McCourt, “Rethinking Britain’s Role in the World for a New Decade: The Limits of Discursive Therapy and the Promise of Field Theory,” 158.

81 thanks to moments of individual or collective crisis. In the case of crisis, such cases may

invoke moments of rational and self-reflective thinking, thus allowing the agent(s) to

transcend their social conditioning.

Finally, turning to internalized histories, the power of such a phenomenon has

already been touched upon. However, for those wondering why the traditional ‘bridge’

role continued to exert influence over UK foreign policy despite the shift to unipolarity,

Bourdieu us this:

The presence of the past in this kind of false anticipation of the future performed by the habitus is, paradoxically, most clearly seen when the sense of the probable future is belied and when dispositions ill-adjusted to the objective chances because of the hysteresis effect (Marx’s favourite example of this was Don Quixote) are negatively sanctioned because the environment they actually encounter is too different from the one to which they are objectively adjusted. In fact the persistence of the effects of primary conditioning, in the form of the habitus, accounts equally well for cases in which dispositions function out of phase and practices are objectively ill- adapted to present conditions because they are objectively adjusted to conditions that no longer obtain. The tendency of groups to persist in their ways, due inter alia to the fact that they are composed of individuals with durable dispositions that can outlive the economic and social conditions in which they were produced, can be the source of misadaptation as well as adaptation, revolt as well as resignation.102

It is here that an explanation emerges as to why the ‘bridge’ narrative has maintained its influence in the post-Cold War era. The fact that the UK has continued to emphasize the importance of the US-UK ‘special relationship’ makes perfect sense since it is

consistent with a flocking strategy, but UK foreign policymakers’ insistence on viewing

the country as a ‘bridge’ is because certain dispositions carried over from the Cold War,

thus outliving the conditions in which they were produced thanks to what Hurtado calls

102 Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, 62.

82 “the inertia of the habitus.”103 When this inertia causes the habitus of an individual or

class (or group) to be out of sync with the objective conditions of a field (or in our case,

the international system) this is when the “hysteresis effect” occurs, and during

moments of “hysteresis” this “may have the impact of causing a shift in the agents’ pre-

reflexive consciousness of the practice towards a more reflective and rational

consciousness, which may lead the agents to modify the practice.”104

However, like Don Quixote and his failure to accept reality, change may fail to

occur, and based on previous discussions it appears that what is most likely to make

moments of “hysteresis” turn into moments of significant or radical change are if they

occur during moments of crisis that are exacerbated by the inertia of habitus, leading

the “automaton” to reflect upon and evaluate their habits. At these moments it is the

personal preferences of the dominant that largely reshape the class (or group) habitus

to better reflect objective conditions, and said personal preferences are both socially

and individually produced – as in they are produced by observable social conditions like

class (or group) identity and also by unique individual experiences, although these

individual experiences are generally understood through the prism of one’s class (or

group) habitus and on a balance of probability tend to reconfirm rather than challenge

existing beliefs.105

103 Hurtado, “On Culture and Strategic Culture: Contrasting the Orthodox View with Bourdieu’s Concept of Habitus,” 207. 104 Ibid 207. Note that Hurtado is not saying that moments of “hysteresis” lead to moments of totally rational choice or thought, but towards more rational thinking or choices. In other words, some rationality emerges in the agent(s) thoughts, but said thought is still not entirely rational (i.e. free from class (or group) habitus). As pointed out earlier, he erroneously argues that moments of crisis are necessary for totally rational choice to emerge, while Bourdieu merely argues that they are helpful and are when such thinking is most likely to occur. 105 See: Bourdieu and Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, 133.

83 3.3 The Bourdieusian Literature on IR and Foreign Policy

With the Bourdieusian approach, and how it relates to other IR and foreign policy

theories, now properly understood, we can discuss other attempts at applying Bourdieu

to the study of IR and foreign policy. We already know it is the dominant strand of practice theory being applied to IR, but the body of literature is still quite small. The most important work of these works is Vincent Pouliot’s “International Security in

Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy,” but a few sources by the likes of

Julian Go, Peter Jackson and Frederic Merand, among others, will be discussed before moving on to Pouliot.

Starting with Julian Go, he applies Bourdieu’s field theory to the international system, arguing that it can explain why the UK, during its cycle of power from 1815 to

1918, and the US, during its cycle of power from 1945 to present, diverged in their imperial forms – with the UK practicing formal imperialism (i.e. direct territorial rule)

while the US has exhibited informal imperialism, which involves a variety of methods besides direct territorial rule, like “financial and military aid to cultivate client states, large-scale networks of military bases, sporadic military interventions (“gunboat diplomacy”), temporary military occupations, or covert operations to manipulate political outcomes in foreign countries.”106 This divergence, he claims, is understood if he

conceive of the international system as a field. If we apply field theory in this way, then

that means analysis of the international system must focus on both the distribution of

material capabilities (i.e. the “objective configuration of actor-positions”) and also the

106 : Julian Go, “Global Fields and Imperial Forms: Field Theory and the British and American Empires”, Sociological Theory 26.3 (2008): 201.

84 ‘rules of the game’ and “particular types of cultural or symbolic capital.”107 For our purposes, the key insight to come from this is that even in an era of unipolarity the unipole (US) still faces constraints, and one such constraint, at least historically, is the anti-colonial attitudes of other countries, as well as the need for symbolic capital to

“legitimate and enhance their global position,”108 which is lost if they violate the ‘rules of the game’, like by practicing formal imperialism. He also argues that although domestic considerations are important, we must also focus on the “configuration and cultural content of the current global field,”109 meaning that a neoclassical realist approach which asks simply, “what are the objective conditions (as determined by material capabilities) of the international system, and how are they understood at the unit level?” does not go deep enough, since it takes no account of the ‘rules’ nor the cultural content of the international system. However, for our research purposes, this article does not add too much, since Go’s findings clearly overlaps with Morris’ argument that the UK has had to find different ways of expressing itself as a ‘great power’ in the current post- colonial paradigm, so essentially what Go clarifies is that when looking at the international system one must also consider its norms or ‘rules of the game’, since they do impose some constraints, as well as the “objective configuration of actor-positions”.

But in terms of our earlier discussion on the logic of unipolarity it is difficult to see how

Go’s insights change much, especially since Morris’ work is clearly compatible with our

107 Ibid 206. 108 Ibid 224. 109 Ibid 224.

85 earlier theoretical discussions, thus raising no reasons to question previous findings on

the unipole’s preferences regarding alliances.110

Rebecca Adler-Nissen, studying how both British and Danish officials use their

opt-outs in the EU, develops a Bourdieusian theoretical framework to understand the

“practices, group pressures and identity constructions in the Council of Ministers.”111

Building on 53 interviews the author conducted with “primarily British and Danish

representatives,”112 Adler-Nissen utilizes field theory, habitus, and capital, and shows

how these representatives – who, are members of the EU diplomatic field, are

influenced by both their national habitus but also the habitus of the diplomatic field –

decide to use said opt-outs. What Adler-Nissen argues is that the British and Danish

officials under study utilize three different types of opt-out strategies (compensatory,

missionary, self-censorship),113 and Adler-Nissen finds that although British and Danish

officials mostly adopt compensatory strategies out of a desire to limit the “negative

effects of the opt-outs and safeguard the general standing of their country,”114 only the

British utilize missionary strategies, while self-censorship strategies are unique to the

Danish. Although the article is not referenced, it clearly overlaps with Go’s argument that we should conceptualize the international system as a field with its own ‘rules of the

110 Go’s insights also overlap with some of Walt’s. See: subsection 2.2, pg 24. 111 Rebecca Adler-Nissen, “The Diplomacy of Opting Out: A Bourdieusian Approach to National Integration Strategies,” Journal of Common Market Studies 46.3 (2008): 664. 112 Ibid 664. 113 Compensatory strategies are defined as strategies that “reflect the diplomats’ desire to eradicate the boundary between the ‘opt-out’ identity and their ‘normal’ diplomatic habitus”; missionary strategies are defined as exclusionary strategies that “[do] not attempt to gain diplomatic capital by creating a harmonious atmosphere, but by distinguishing the outsider as more ingenious and superior to the rest of the EU…[with the goal being] to win over other Member States”; and self-censorship is defined as strategies that “are attempts to avoid attracting attention… [and implies] that they deliberately abstain from seeking influence” (Ibid 673). 114 Ibid 673.

86 game’, but what Adler-Nissen does is point out that the global field is made up of many smaller fields, with the EU diplomatic field being one of them. Therefore, the rules affecting this field are different than the ones in which the unipole operates, so we must not assume that the same rules or logics apply if the US (unipole) is not involved. The other interesting observation is that she highlights just how much national habitus matters, with the UK being much more secure in playing a firm EU-outsider role thanks to the country’s position as a “world power and financial centre.”115 This suggests than even when dealing exclusively within the EU that the UK’s great power habitus still influences decision making, even though the EU diplomatic field’s habitus would also be an influencing factor. British attitudes towards the EU will be explored in the next two chapters, but for now the key is to recognize that the global field is not one monolithic bloc, but is in fact made up of myriad fields, with each needing to be properly identified and examined to determine their rules, habituses, and the positions of the agents who make up the field. To clarify: there is of course a larger international system, and its rules were covered in our discussion on structural realism and unipolarity. But there are also myriad smaller fields and when the unipole is absent then different rules may apply because the conditions are different, i.e. the states may be equal in terms of power. The other question would be which states are involved and what their national habitus is, as well as what the habitus of their political field is like.

Shifting to Peter Jackson, he uses Bourdieu’s concepts of fields, capital and habitus with the intention of providing ‘cultural’ approaches with a more rigorous and systematic approach to understanding the cultural roots of policymaking, and uses

115 Ibid 677.

87 French security policy after World War One as his case study. In regards to habitus, he

points to the security establishment’s firm belief that France “stood for civilization and

justice,” and that this “civilising mission” played an important role in determining which

foreign or defence policy choices were “thinkable and what was unthinkable.”116 For

example, it was unthinkable that France would “place itself outside international law,”

which meant the only acceptable actions were ones that reflected its international

identity as a “just and law-abiding power” – a power that only followed policies that

possessed an “unassailable legal position”.117 While habitus reveals the cultural reflexes

of these policymakers, field theory shows us that policymakers had to deal with three

overlapping fields or spheres: the field of international relations; the French domestic

field, which Jackson says consists of the political, domestic, cultural and social contexts

inside France and the time; and the inter-ministerial or bureaucratic field in which policy was hammered out.118 If we can understand how these all overlapped and influenced

the actors in question then we can properly understand French security policy during

this era.

To be honest, this author is unsure if Jackson’s use of the Bourdieusian

approach reveals any unique insights, at least in terms of foreign policy, that would not

have been found if he had instead just adopted a strategic culture approach. His

conclusion that the decision-making of French elites was guided by the “cultural

contexts in which they operated”119 is something that would have been discovered if he

116 Jackson, “Pierre Bourdieu, the ‘Cultural Turn’ and the Practice of International History,” 176. 117 Ibid 176. 118 Ibid 178. 119 Ibid 181.

88 had applied strategic culture instead of Bourdieu. The issue is that he never considers

individual habitus, looking only at the influence of class (or group) habitus, which, as we already know, is what strategic culture does. The existence of field theory enables us to

determine which political actors have sufficient capital to implement policies that reflect

their personal preferences and beliefs, and by studying these beliefs we are provided

with, to repeat the words of Winch, a “deeper well” from which to draw upon. Jackson

points to the French policy elite as a whole but fails to tell us how power was distributed

within this group (i.e. who was the most dominant?), nor does he investigate micro-

structures like familial and scholastic influences. One’s position, as well as mere

membership, in a given field explains much regarding an actor’s habitus, but it does not

explain everything – people have unique beliefs, but whether they are able to implement

them is determined by their position in said field. And even if we find that these micro-

level factors ultimately have little to no influence on a policy or policies in question, we

still need to investigate them to some extent, because, as we will see in chapter five,

individual habitus does matter, and thus it should be included in the analysis. If it is not

then the Bourdieusian approach becomes too similar to strategic culture, only perhaps a

bit more systematic thanks to the existence of field theory and the general model it

provides us for studying domestic political structures, as well as perhaps providing a

“more comprehensive conceptualisation of what culture is.”120

Turning to Frederic Merand, he employs Bourdieu’s concepts of field, crisis, and

habitus to study the genesis of the European Security and Defence Policy (EDSP), and

120 Jackson, “Pierre Bourdieu, the ‘Cultural Turn’ and the Practice of International History,” 181. Note: Jackson was not referring to strategic culture specifically when he said this.

89 argues that by applying Bourdieu we see that EDSP’s formation was not caused by

“realism’s balancing” or constructivism’s “strategic culture convergence,”121 but rather by social practices within the European foreign policy field and the international defence field, which are influenced by the structure and logic of each field. For example, Merand points to the existence of a hierarchy within the international defence field, with the US at the top (since this field revolves around NATO), and the UK and Germany in second and third, respectively, with the French as challengers.122 In the UK’s case, because

they are the second most powerful that means that of the European countries they are

the most equipped to push for innovative strategies regarding European defence.123 In

regards to the European foreign policy field, the key actors are France and Germany,

with Merand writing that the “Franco-German axis [is] the key power structure,” 124

meaning that they are the most equipped to push for innovative strategies in this field.

With these structures in mind, Merand points to the European security crisis of the

1990s – which was caused by, among other things, the end of the Cold War,

globalization, and the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo – and argues that diplomats

positioned within these fields used the openings created by this crisis to create a new

European security architecture.

What is perhaps Merand’s greatest insight is his finding that the “structural

constructivist” Bourdieusian approach, thanks to its concepts of fields and capital, is

perhaps the approach that is best equipped at explaining why, or at predicting which,

121 Merand, “Pierre Bourdieu and the Birth of European Defence,” 344. 122 See: Ibid 353. 123 Ibid 366. 124 Ibid 353.

90 political entrepreneurs will be successful. Merand points out that because of the UK and

France’s dominant positions in these interrelated fields their diplomats were able to

push through innovations to Europe’s security architecture. Tony Blair’s role in this will

be discussed in chapter five, but ultimately Merand’s argument is that political

entrepreneurs with the most capital are the ones who are most able to push through

policy change, and in international fields such as the European foreign policy field and

the international defence field, which country you are representing matters a great deal.

In other words, your position (or your country’s position) within the field is a key

determinant of likely success, because those who have the most capital are the most

likely to succeed. In fact, this argument overlaps nicely with John Kingdon’s work on

policy windows and policy entrepreneurs. Bourdieu’s concept of capital clearly lines up

with Kingdon’s discussion of the three resources policy entrepreneurs need to succeed,

which consist of “the ability to speak for others,” “political connections or negotiating

skills,” and “sheer persistence;” while Kingdon’s concept of policy windows – which

occur when the ‘policy stream’, ‘problem stream’ and ‘politics stream’ couple and create

a ‘window of opportunity’ for policy change – overlaps rather nicely with Bourdieu’s

concept of crisis, in the sense that in a Bourdieusian crisis a ‘window of opportunity’

opens, and said window is also open wide enough (or perhaps open long enough?) for

someone to push through radical reform, while in non-crisis situations the policy window

is probably only open wide/long enough for gradual reform.125

125 Kingdon quotes etc. found in: Karin Guldbrandsson and Bjoorn Fossum, “An Exploration of the Theoretical Concepts Policy Windows and Policy Entrepreneurs at the Swedish Public Health Arena,” Health Promotion International 24.4 (2009): 434-436.

91 Finally, we arrive at Vincent Pouliot. Using Bourdieu’s theory of practice as a linchpin for his “argument for a practice turn in IR,”126 he utilizes habitus and field theory to make sense of NATO-Russia diplomatic relations, and devises a theory of practice of security communities in the process, which leads to two key theoretical innovations:

First, it defines self-evident diplomacy as the constitutive practice of security community. When a practice is so fully part of everyday routine that it is commonsensically enacted, it forms the background knowledge against which all social interaction takes place. When the embodiment takes place among states’ officials, diplomacy becomes the shared background against which they interact. They think from diplomacy not about its opportunity. As a result, peaceful change can be dependably expected; the orchestra can play without a conductor. Second, the doxic nature of diplomacy inside security communities is part of patterns of domination that rest on matching dispositions and positions. Wielding power in and through practice endows diplomacy with a doxic aura of self-evidence and naturalness.127

Relying on (1) interview data from sixty-nine interviews with Russian and Atlantic security practitioners and experts, and (2) practice analysis, Pouliot shows that diplomacy is a normal but not yet self-evident practice in Russia-NATO relations, and that the resurfacing of Russia’s Great Power habitus in the mid-1990s has led to hysteresis in the relationship. One of the issues is that NATO, the dominant actor, practices what Pouliot calls the “inside mode” of pursuing security, which “proposes that stability in world politics relies on states’ domestic institutions and order…turning domestic politics into a central concern for international security;”128 while Russia, the dominated, engages in the “outside mode” of pursuing security, which is “based on geostrategic arrangements such

126 Pouliot, International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russia Diplomacy, 27. 127 Ibid 50. 128 Ibid 150-151.

92 as alliance-making and power-balancing…[with] the military instrument [being] the main tool to enhance security.”129 The other issue is that Russia, despite being dominated, has thus far failed to adjust accordingly to the international hierarchy of the post-Cold War era.130 Their historically “ingrained dispositions and the country’s position in the field”131 do not match up with the dispositions and position of NATO, leading to only limited security community development.

In terms of where Pouliot’s work could be improved, a greater examination of the individual habituses of dominant individuals like Presidents Putin or Yeltsin or former Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev, would be helpful. Granted,

Pouliot is right to argue that the “main brake on security community development was not individual but relational,”132 but dominant individuals have still played an important role. For example, Pouliot argues that “the presence of Yeltsin at the helm seemed to partly hold in check Great Power dispositions and the related rejection of the NATO-imposed order,”133 and earlier points to Yeltsin and

Kozyrev’s134 association with both a more liberal and democratic mode of political thought that began to emerge out of the Nikita Khruschev’s “’thaw’ in the

1960s.”135 This admittedly does not provide us with enough evidence to make any sort of definitive statements or arguments about what role the individual habituses of a Yeltsin or Kozyrev may have played in partly holding back

129 Ibid 150. 130 Ibid 228. 131 Ibid 230. 132 Ibid 229. 133 Ibid 208. 134 Aka the “team in power”. See: Ibid 157. 135 Ibid 157.

93 Russia’s Great Power habitus, but it would certainly make for a fascinating research question for any future Bourdieusian scholars interested in studying

Russian foreign policy or Russia-NATO relations. However, despite giving us this slight insight into the individual habituses of Yeltsin and Kozyrev, Pouliot makes no mention of anything that could give us insight into Putin’s individual habitus and how it may have accelerated hysteresis. When one considers Putin’s increasing dominance over the Russian political field this does seem problematic, especially since this development was already well underway by the time

Pouliot’s work was published. As will be made clear by the evidence in chapter five, the individual habituses of dominant actors matters, and thus when applying a Bourdieusian approach to foreign policy we must include these variables in our study. Therefore, we must apply field theory to determine the agents’ positions within the field, and then we must study habitus at both a class (or group) and individual level.

3.4: Methods

The focus must now shift to the research methods used in the next two chapters.

In terms of justifying the focus on the PM, this paper will track the historical development of, to paraphrase Peter Hennessey, the mutation from cabinet government to one of PM predominance during the Cold War, but with particular focus on this predominance in regards to foreign policymaking. This will be accomplished by studying the literature on the different Cold War PMs, with emphasis on their leadership styles.

The assumption here is that once PM predominance was achieved the PMs became unwilling to give up this extra capital, and that the trend for the Cold War and post-Cold

94 War period is continued predominance but with the level of predominance varying for numerous reasons, but chief among them being the personality and leadership style

(i.e. individual habitus) of the PM. In terms of more chapter specific concerns, Chapter four is concerned with establishing the ‘bridge’ within the habitus of the UK’s political field, and does so by examining the actions of foreign policymakers, with special focus on the PM thanks to their predominance in the political field. In other words, we will be studying class (or group) habitus, but largely ignoring the individual habituses of the different Cold War PMs, and the reasons for this will be explained in the upcoming chapter. But what is critical for the upcoming chapter is identifying repetition of the

‘bridge’ within the UK’s political field since repetition serves as evidence that something has become a habit – something that exists and is ingrained at the experiential level and thus repeated through practice.

Before moving on to discussing chapter five, an important point must be made – because we are looking at background knowledge and establishing that the UK’s great power habitus, and the belief in it’s ‘bridge’ role, were both ingrained in, respectively, the

UK’s national habitus and political field by the end of the Cold War, an exhaustive look at every ‘nook and cranny’ of the UK’s foreign policy machinery is unnecessary.

Bourdieu tells us that structure ultimately determines behaviour, and field theory tells us that it is the dominant who ultimately enforce or change the behaviours of the field.

Within the dominant, the actor with the most capital has the most influence of all – thus, since the ultimate aim of chapter four is to confirm that the ‘bridge’ role was in fact ingrained in the habitus of the UK’s political field by the end of the Cold War, the chapter will focus on the PM’s action and perhaps a few members of the core executive rather

95 than offer a detailed case studies detailing the struggles faced by civil servants trying to

create policy that guided UK action during the Korean War or in the lead up to the 1953

Iranian Coup. This is all about bringing the background to the forefront, and considering

our goals and limitations, the approach this paper have adopted is best.136

In regards to the post-Cold War period, the analysis will focus heavily on political

speeches, with the LMB speeches of the post-Cold War PMs receiving the bulk of the

attention. As Oliver Daddow writes, studying “political speeches [and] the language of

policy allows us to see into [politicians’] minds at work,”137 and since the focus here is

on ideational rather than material factors this is of utmost importance. The LMB speech

has been chosen because “[the once yearly speech] provides a rich source regarding

governments’ visions of Britain’s place in the world.”138 However, other speeches or

government documents highlighted by the academic literature will also be examined, as

well as autobiographies and other sources that allow us to better understand the

individual habitus of each post-Cold War PM.

This approach is not without its potential pitfalls, with Sharp writing that “one

cannot assume that the public statements or memoirs of politicians necessarily provide

136 Again, what we are interested in is the repetition of certain behaviours. Repetition suggests habit, and habit can be gleaned by looking at the final decisions made by the dominant policymakers. If the dominant ultimately keep following the same practices then we can see where the field thinks from, and what is considered acceptable behaviour etc. In other words, certain beliefs have obviously been ingrained in the UK’s political field, and if alternatives are being proposed then they are obviously being rejected because they do not conform with the field’s habitus. To conclude: all we are looking for is routines, like the UK as ‘bridge’, and if these routines survived the Cold War and carried into the post-Cold War era. If they did, are these routines still influencing decision- making? 137 Oliver Daddow, New Labour and the European Union: Blair and Brown’s Logic of History (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011), 3. 138 McCourt, “Rethinking Britain’s Role in the World for a New Decade: The Limits of Discursive Therapy and the Promise of Field Theory,” 153.

96 an accurate record of the actual motive behind a particular policy,”139 and we will see this in chapter four when we discuss Henry Kissinger and the ‘Year of Europe’.

However, such an approach will be maintained, with Sharp stating that despite the potential problems that may arise, “one can only argue that the problems of using public statements and records are usually outweighed by the difficulty of finding alternative sources for ascertaining motives and causes. In the absence of anything better, therefore, and bearing in mind the difficulties engendered by problems of context, truth and memory, we are forced to rely on statements of key government figures.”140 Within

this more personalized context the ideational factors explaining the UK’s desire to

maintain its traditional great power role will be fleshed out, and will provide a lens to

answering why the ‘bridge’ narrative has continued to influence UK foreign policymaking

during the post-Cold War era. To sum up the methodology used for chapter five, the

research will be conducted in the following manner: First, we will determine if the post-

Cold War PMs have followed the Cold War trend of PM predominance in regards to foreign policymaking. If they are found to be similar, then this strengthens the case for using field theory to understand the UK and other countries with similar political systems. Second, we will examine political speeches and other policy documents. This will be complemented by an examination of the PM’s unique individual experiences to explain why certain continuities have persisted in the UK foreign policy field, or to explain possible changes. Finally, we will review the existing literature to fill in gaps,

139 Sharp, “The Place of the European Community in the Foreign Policy of British Governments, 1961-1971,” 156. 140 Ibid 157.

97 provide context, or provide greater analysis of events, since speeches and policy

documents are unlikely to capture everything.

3.5 Conclusion

At this point it is important to tie up discussion on theory and move towards

studying UK foreign policy. For starters, the reason why the Bourdieusian approach

provides a more systematic and rigorous explanation for studying unit-level variables than neoclassical realism is rather obvious. We have seen what the concepts of field

theory and habitus have to offer – concepts of which neoclassical realism has no

equivalent. Thus, this paper believes that the argument for neoclassical realists perhaps

adopting the Bourdieusian approach to explain how systemic pressures are interpreted

at the unit-level is a strong one. In terms of the discussion on strategic culture, the

absence of focus on what in Bourdieusian language would be called the “individual

habitus” means it is unable to bridge the macro-micro divide, and as we will see in

chapter five this ‘bridge’ is of the utmost importance. Similarly, the review of the

Bourdieusian literature on IR and foreign policy shows the approach can provide great

insights in terms of studying the international system or domestic factors, but the

absence of an examination of the individual habituses of the relevant dominant actors

by Jackson, Merand and Pouliot is problematic. For the Bourdieusian approach to be

properly utilized, individual habitus must be examined at some point, and Jackson,

Merand and Pouliot fail to do so in an adequate manner.

For the particularly astute reader, the connection between Mitzen’s ‘routines’ and

Bourdieu’s habitus would have been evident almost immediately, since habitus is clearly

the “internally programed cognitive and behavioural responses to information or stimuli”

98 that drive routines, and is also very clearly located in the experiential system. Hysteresis

and fantasy identities are also clearly the same, since both describe a situation where

the roles played by agents no longer correspond with objective conditions, leading to

eventual collapse. However, to predict how identities will reform after said collapse we

must employ field theory to determine who the dominant actor(s) are, because they are

the ones who will most influence the process, and then study the habitus at an

individual and class (or group) level. We know that UK foreign policy is a reflection of class (or group) habitus (in this case: UK national habitus, since it is a reflection of the

“national Self”) and that the beliefs and actions of the dominant actors in the political field very much reflect the national habitus or else they would not have been able to rise to such a position. However, individual habitus formed during the dominant actors’ formative years must also be studied because they are powerful enough where their individual preferences and beliefs can influence policy.

It is here that an argument will be advanced: the UK’s ‘bridge’ role survived the

Major and New Labour years because of both the individual and class (or group) habituses of the PMs, who, because of the absence of crisis in the UK political field during the post-Cold War period, continued to play this role because it was something the UK ‘did’ – something that became ingrained in the habitus of the political field.

Individual habitus, however, is of vital importance because thanks to their unique personal experiences and beliefs this is likely to explain why certain PMs (i.e. Blair) were more enthusiastic about playing this ‘bridge’ role than others, and thus it serves as an important tool in describing variance between administrations while class (or group) helps to explain continuities. In other words: individual habitus is useful in explaining

99 why periods of hysteresis are prolonged. The other argument this paper would like to advance, and then test, is that if there was any change under David Cameron it was likely to be more minor than radical since there were no crises, at least in the

Bourdieusian sense. What this means is that if he did push any changes through said changes would have reflected his individual preferences and beliefs, but they would still have strongly reflected the “national Self” – a “national Self” that he, based on the fact he became PM, was very likely to have bought into and personally represented.

100 Chapter 4: The Cold War

Those who have governed Britain in the days of decline entered politics or were in

their youth when Britain governed a quarter of the globe and lorded it over

international conferences: certainly their education in English history has been a

study of the country as a great, perhaps the greatest, Power in the world.

– F.S. Northedge, Descent From Power.1

4.1: Introduction

Before diving into an analysis of the Cold War era, or providing the road map for

the chapter, two things must be noted.2 First, the ‘Cold War era’ in this case will refer to

the period between the end of the Second World War and the fall of the Berlin Wall in

1989. It was felt that rather than trying to split hairs and divide this era into the immediate post-war and Cold War eras it would be easiest to adopt a more liberal definition of the term ‘Cold War’ that referred to the era in which the international system

was bipolar, the main powers were the USA and USSR, and said powers were

engaging in symmetrical balancing. Although the Soviet Union survived until late 1991,

events such as the First Gulf War, the thaw in the US-USSR relationship after the

1 F.S. Northedge, Descent From Power: British Foreign Policy, 1945-1973 (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1974), 360. 2 Matthew Connelly makes a compelling argument for the removal of the Cold War lens, arguing that “by taking off the Cold War lens, diplomatic historians and postcolonial scholars may finally recognize a common intellectual project and begin to illuminate the origins of the post-Cold War world” (Matthew Connelly, “Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War of Independence,” The American Historical Review 105.3 (2000): 769). Mary Sarotte sums up Connelly’s arguments as “rightly [questioning] the usefulness of treating the ‘Cold War’ as a distinct era, given the persistence of issues from earlier time periods –most notably colonialism and imperialism” (Mary Sarotte, “In Victory, Magnanimity: US Foreign Policy, 1989-1991, and the Legacy of Prefabricated Multilateralism,” International Politics 48 (2011): 484). Although Connelly’s argument certainly qualifies as fascinating this paper will treat the Cold War as one distinct era for ease of analysis, and the reasons will be explained above. But an exploration of UK foreign policy in the colonial and post-colonial era will certainly take place.

101 election of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985, the collapse of communism in Poland and the reunification of Germany meant that the Cold War was all but over by Thatcher’s resignation in November 1990. The fall of the Berlin Wall, with its obvious symbolism, thus serves as a convenient end-point for this particular era.

Secondly, it must be noted that this paper cannot go into exhaustive detail about each Cold War PM’s individual habitus. There is obviously a concern regarding this author’s inability to access documents in particular archives or conduct interviews with

British officials and politicians from this era, but also because the emphasis in this chapter is on class (or group) habitus rather than individual habitus, with the focus on how the country’s great power habitus influenced its policymakers’ thinking and gave birth to the ‘bridge’ role, which then became ingrained in the habitus of the UK’s political field. Despite this, previous discussion regarding the concept of “admission fee” suggests that their individual experiences failed to shake their respective beliefs in national symbols or the “national Self,” thus this chapter will shed some light into their early lives and unique individual experiences on occasion – in recognition that these unique experiences play a role in their decision making – but will focus mainly on illustrating how the ‘bridge’ role became internalized history. In other words, the focus is on showing how the ‘bridge’ became a ‘habit’ or ‘automatic’, which sets the scene for

John Major when he enters office in late 1990. To repeat an earlier statement, this paper will argue that based on Holsti’s research the ‘bridge’ role had become entrenched in the political field’s habitus by 1966-68, and remained that way throughout the Cold War, as evidenced by previous discussion on Macleod’s observations regarding UK foreign policy during 1989-93.

102 In terms of mapping out the route this chapter will follow, it will begin with a

discussion of Winston Churchill and the reconfiguration UK foreign policy underwent

following the end of the Second World War and will end with the resignation of Margaret

Thatcher in November 1990, and will be divided into three sub-sections: 1945 to Suez;

The End of Empire; Post-Imperial Reconstruction. 1945 to Suez will look at the first and

second Churchill governments, as well as the Attlee government of 1945-51 and will

conclude with Eden’s short stint in power. Of critical importance in this sub-section is the

UK’s attempts at trying to reclaim the superpower position it held before the outbreak of

World War Two, meaning that overall this was a period of rather high levels of

hysteresis. The End of Empire will look at the governments of Harold Macmillan and

Harold Wilson,3 and will chart how the UK as ‘bridge’ become ingrained within the UK’s

political field, bringing us back to Holsti’s observations about the UK’s roles in 1966-68, and will also explain what the end of ‘East of Suez’ meant to UK foreign policymakers and the country’s sense of self. Post-Imperial Reconstruction will examine the governments of Edward Heath, Harold Wilson, James Callaghan, and Margaret

Thatcher, and ultimately will show how the UK adjusted its foreign policy to suit its reduced world role, and how it came to redefine its sense of self as a great power.

Overall, the evidence provided throughout these sub-sections will advance three main arguments. The first of these arguments is that in regards to foreign policy, the

3 The Alec Douglas-Home government will not be discussed because, despite being in power for one year, there is little to discuss in regards to foreign policy except that he continued to implement the policies he inherited from the Macmillan government, like the continued de-colonization of Africa. Unlike Eden he is not a PM who managed to have a giant impact in a short period of time. However, the one thing of note for our purposes is that he is the last UK PM to fall squarely within the classic ‘chairman of the board’ variety and not predominant or, more controversially, presidential (See: Richard E. Neustadt, “White House and White Hall,” The Public Interest 0.2 (1966): 61).

103 UK’s ‘grand strategy’ during this period was driven by its desire to maintain its great

power status, and that much of its actions throughout this period must be interpreted as

attempts to shore up what Northedge calls the UK’s “world role.”4 According to Paul

Sharp, the problem that stems from this is “that the notion of a world role has itself

become an ‘eternal interest’, an end rather than a means, increasingly detached from

declining world interests of a more substantial nature which formerly justified it.”5

Although Sharp wrote this in 1982 it will be argued that his argument is perhaps just as

relevant today as it was at the time of its publication. Turning now to the second

argument, the evidence suggests that as the UK’s ability to wield influence

independently of the US declined the more stock it put into being a faithful ally, ‘junior partner’, ‘bridge’, and playing the role of ‘Greeks’. What this suggests is that what often begins as a considered, deliberate policy decision by leaders eventually becomes ingrained within its political field and elevated to the status of habit –meaning policy is being increasingly guided by unreflective mental inertia that determines what is

“thinkable” and “unthinkable”, and thus increasingly runs the risk of not reflecting the objective conditions of the international system. The third argument is that the Cold War era saw the rise of PM predominance within the UK’s political field, and proof of its growth, but particularly in regards to foreign policymaking, will be provided throughout.

4.2: 1945 to Suez

The significance of this particular period is two-fold. First, it marked the end of the

UK as a hegemonic power, as declines in the UK’s relative economic and military

4 Term found throughout in: Northedge, Descent From Power: British Foreign Policy. 5 Paul Sharp, “The Place of the European Community in the Foreign Policy of British Governments, 1961-1971,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 11.2 (1982): 164.

104 strength dwindled the UK’s capacity to exert its influence abroad without US assistance or acquiescence. Second, this period sees a gradual increase in the emphasis of the

‘bridge’ role within the foreign policymaking establishment, stemming from a desire to halt British international decline and maintain its great power status. This section (and the ones that follow) will focus more on themes associated with national self-identity and charting the history of certain narratives and roles rather than providing exhaustive analysis of events like the Suez Crisis, but ultimately the rise of the influential ‘bridge’ narrative will be explained.

To set the scene we must begin with the first Churchill government, and more specifically during the final days of World War Two. Simon Tate argues that during this time the UK government still saw itself as a hegemonic power6 because it possessed

“what it interpreted to be a hegemonic position of leadership in the Commonwealth and

Europe.”7 This hegemonic position, in combination with its ‘special relationship’ with the

US, would allow the UK to act as a “‘diplomatic bridge’ or as an honest broker” between the three circles of the US, Europe and the Commonwealth – allowing it to maintain its role as a hegemonic power through an “informal hegemonic division of labour with the coercively dominant US.”8 In what he would later dub his ‘three circles’ approach,9

Winston Churchill presented “post-war hegemony…as being a division of labour between British leadership in strategically important areas of Europe and the

Commonwealth…and American coercive force, which would provide financial aid and a

6 ‘Hegemonic power’ is defined in this paper as equal in power and/or influence with the US. 7 Tate, A Special Relationship? British Foreign Policy in the Era of American Hegemony, 61. 8 Ibid 61. 9 See: Marsh and Baylis, “The Anglo-American Special Relationship: The Lazarus of International Relations,”175.

105 security guarantee.”10 It was believed that this role would allow the UK to act as the

balance of power between the US and USSR, thus giving it (1) great influence over US

foreign policy, and (2) allowing it to maintain its role as a hegemonic power with the

ability to act independently of the US.11

The July 1945 election of a Labour government led by Clement Attlee did little to

change foreign policy attitudes within the UK political field, and John Kent notes that the

initial aim of the Attlee government in regards to foreign policy was “to regain a position

of equality with the United States and the Soviet Union.”12 This would allow the UK to

maintain its role as a hegemonic power and would be achieved by virtue of the UK

being a ‘third force’. Championed by Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, and similar to

Churchill’s perception of the UK as the ‘balance of power’, the idea of the ‘third force’

was “based on an imperial vision of Britain leading an international grouping able to act

independently of both the United States and the Soviet Union.”13 Critical to achieving

this independence from (and equality with) the US was for the UK to possess nuclear

weapons. The importance of status in the UK’s quest to develop a nuclear arsenal

cannot be understated, as Margaret Gowing notes that the UK decision in 1947 to

“make a British bomb” was due in part to its faith in, and desire to maintain, “its great

power status.”14 A second critical component of this ‘third force’ idea was the

maintenance and development of the UK’s remaining colonies. During his time in the

10 Tate, A Special Relationship? British Foreign Policy in the Era of American Hegemony, 69. 11 Ibid 68. 12 John Kent, “Bevin’s Imperialism and the Idea of Euro-Africa,” in British Foreign Policy, 1945-56, eds. Michael Dockrill and John W. Young (London: Macmillan, 1989), 51. 13 Ibid 47. 14 Margaret Gowing, “Britain, America and the Bomb,” in British Foreign Policy, 1945-56, eds. Michael Dockrill and John W. Young (London: Macmillan, 1989), 38-39.

106 Attlee government Bevin is noted as claiming that “if we only pushed on and developed

Africa we could have the United States dependent on us, and eating out of our hand, in

four or five years.”15

There is disagreement, however, on when this ‘third force’ was finally ruled out.

John Kent argues this happened in March 1949,16 pointing to (1) the decrease in the

UK’s world role, which consisted of a shrinking of its empire and overseas

commitments,17 and (2) the economic crisis of 1949, as dismissing the possibility of the

UK being an equal power to the US and USSR. John Darwin, however, is a little less

exact and points to between late 1951 and early 1952 as the death of the UK as a ‘third

force’.18 In regards to 1949, Darwin points to the creation of NATO in April of that year

as prolonging the belief the UK could continue to be a ‘third force’, writing that “[Attlee

and Bevin’s goal] was to preserve British power as a ‘third force’ in world affairs, in

alliance with America to contain Soviet aggression, but not subordinate to it.”19 Perhaps

in hindsight the developments that Kent points to were signs that the UK as a ‘third

force’ was impossible to achieve, but according to Darwin it took until “the seismic

consequences of the Korean War and the delayed after-shocks of the Palestinian

conflict”20 for the ‘third force’ to be finally ruled out. This paper will not attempt to resolve

this particular disagreement, but by combining the two approaches what becomes clear

15 Marsh and Baylis, “The Anglo-American Special Relationship: The Lazarus of International Relations,” 175. 16 Kent, “Bevin’s Imperialism and the Idea of Euro-Africa,” 70. 17 During Attlee’s tenure as PM the UK withdrew from India, Greece, Turkey and Palestine, in recognition that it “lacked the strength to retain all its world interests” (Anthony Adamthwaite, “Suez Revisited,” in British Foreign Policy, 1945-56, eds. Michael Dockrill and John W. Young (London: Macmillan, 1989), 225). 18 See: John Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 514-565. 19 Ibid 561. 20 Ibid 562.

107 is that by 1952 the UK as a ‘third force’ was dead, but elements of this line of thinking

remained influential and meant the UK saw itself as nothing less than what Darwin calls

“the third world power” with a Middle East imperium,21 with such thinking dominating

foreign policy until at least the Suez Crisis.22 In other words, Winston Churchill and

Anthony Eden governments, like the previous Attlee government, saw the UK as

nothing less than a great power with (1) the ability to act independently of the US, and

(2) as the holder of the ‘balance of power’.23 That such beliefs would continue to hold

such sway despite this period of decline is unsurprising, since, as Wallace noted in

1991, the “whole ethos of this country’s foreign policy continues to be biased by

ideological assumptions which date from the Edwardian era and before.”24 The idea of

the UK as a great power was deeply entrenched in the British national habitus thanks to

its long history of inhabiting such a role, and during the early Cold War years the UK still

possessed an empire. Combining habitus with Morris’ framework for great power

analysis, it is clear that the UK still possessed the material and ideational elements

necessary to be considered a great power, thus it is unsurprising that its foreign

policymakers were obsessed with reversing British decline, saving its empire, and

maintaining its role as a great power.

This mindset is captured perfectly by David Coates and Joel Krieger, who, in

their efforts to summarize the foreign policy of ‘Old Labour’, a group the authors claim

21 Ibid 565 and 592. 22 By “the third world power” Darwin means that UK foreign policymakers accepted that the UK was now the third most powerful state in the international system, and was thus either the weakest of the superpowers or possessed a status that was akin to that of a superpower. 23 Admittedly, in the aftermath of World War Two the US did encourage the UK’s belief in the latter, at least in terms of Europe. See: Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, The Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 61. 24 Wallace, “Foreign Policy and National Identity in the United Kingdom,” 70.

108 all the Cold War Labour PMs (Attlee, Wilson and Callaghan) were members of, and

describe its foreign policy thusly:

Promote the British state and its national interests, above class and party, by an active defence of imperial and commercial interests and the effective management of a balance of power in Europe. Britain’s role as an offshore balancer of Europe and as a Great Power to be enhanced by a dedicated commitment to an Atlantic alliance and a robust participation in NATO. Britain’s international status and security require the commitment to a global military capability and the willingness to use force, backed by the full triad of conventional, tactical nuclear and strategic nuclear weapons.25

This paper will argue that this is not an entirely accurate representation of the foreign policies of the Harold Wilson-James Callaghan governments of the mid to late 1970s, because after the end of ‘East of Suez’ the UK had no real/major imperial interests left except for perhaps Hong Kong. But in regards to Attlee, as well the other pre-Edward

Heath PMs – Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, Harold Macmillan, and the Harold

Wilson governments of 1964-70 – this is a good synopsis of their foreign policy goals

and overall framework.26 However, this desire to maintain imperial influence and other

hold-overs from its days as a hegemon allowed schools of thought like the UK as ‘the

third world power’ to influence its thinking. By studying Coates and Krieger’s statement

we see inflexibility of mind caused by “the inertia of habitus,” which ultimately led

successive UK governments to craft foreign policy that was not in accordance with the

objective conditions of the international system, which in this case was the UK’s relative

and absolute decline. This hysteresis lead to poor foreign policy decisions like its

25 David Coates and Joel Krieger, Blair’s War (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 102. 26 Please note that Churchill, Eden and Macmillan were all members of the Conservative party.

109 actions during the Suez Crisis, which resulted in great embarrassment for the Eden

government both internationally and domestically.

Ultimately, this period is best seen as representing a missed opportunity for UK

foreign policymakers. As Freedman writes, the British elite of this period “lacked the

flexibility to exploit respect and affection for the country’s values and culture, and to

come to terms with the changing international scene. It led Eden and his few close

confidantes to embark on a policy which was considered repugnant and foolish by those

obliged to implement and explain it.”27 What Freedman is touching upon is “the inertia of

habitus” and the difficulty of affecting change at both a class (or group) and individual

level in the absence of crisis. It will be argued, however, that although the

embarrassment the UK suffered during the Suez Crisis was certainly substantial, the

evidence will show that it was not serious enough to cause a collective disavowal of

historical assumptions regarding the UK’s ‘world role’. The events surrounding the Suez

Crisis fail to meet Bourdieu’s definition of crisis, so instead of leading to a transformation

of habitus within the political field it instead ushered in lesser changes that fit well within

the parameters of the national and political field’s habitus, marking the beginning of an

era where UK foreign policymakers were forced to accept the country’s reduced role in

the world, but the deeply internalized belief that the country was a great power

remained intact.28

27 Lawrence Freedman, “Introduction,” in British Foreign Policy, 1945-56, eds. Michael Dockrill and John W. Young (London: Macmillan, 1989), 6-7. 28 In other words, where people were thinking underwent little to no change because the great power habitus held, but the methods used to maintain its great power status had to eventually change in order to reflect the objective conditions of the international system.

110 Returning to the Attlee government, towards the end of its tenure it was paying

greater attention to harnessing US power for its own ends rather than trying to both

cooperate and compete with it as a ‘third force’. But the idea of the UK being a junior

partner (or ‘Greeks’) to the US in their ‘special relationship’ had yet to become the cornerstone of UK foreign policy. Rather, close cooperation with the US at this time was

seen instead as a prerequisite to maintaining “an independent postwar British role in world affairs.”29 To clarify, the Attlee government recognized that cooperating rather

than competing with the US was the only viable option, but it still believed that the

country possessed enough material capabilities to be able to exert influence

independently (i.e. without US support), and this attitude was maintained by the second

Churchill government. Ultimately, little had changed since 1945 except that the UK was less willing to believe that it could regain a position of equality with the US. In fact, the desire to regain something akin to its past global position and international influence helps explain the UK’s involvement in the Korean War, as Grey writes that the decision to enter the war in 1950 was driven by the Attlee government’s desire to “return to the level of influence with the Americans…that they had enjoyed during the Second World

War,”30 with Thomas Hennessey adding that Attlee made the decision to send troops

out of a desire to not only influence the US, but also out of fear over “how much

influence HMG might lose by not committing its forces.”31 Ultimately, the war showed

the limits of UK influence over the US, with the Attlee-Truman agreement of December

1950 serving as a perfect example of this, since the agreement “secured for the British

29 Marsh and Baylis, “The Anglo-American Special Relationship: The Lazarus of International Relations,” 177. 30 Jeffrey Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War: An Alliance Study (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), 2. 31 Hennessey, Britain’s Korean War: Cold War Diplomacy, Strategy and Security 1950-53, 280.

111 the watershed agreement of the right to be consulted on the use of the atomic

bomb…but it was an agreement with a limited lifespan – that of the Truman

administration.”32 Another limit was the fact that despite the UK’s desire for influence

over the running of the war – which lead it to commit substantial military resources – the

US still “dominated the United Nations Command and ran the war,”33 meaning UK

influence over US decision-making never came close to reaching its World War Two

peak.

Looking now at Winston Churchill’s return to office in 1951, it has already been

mentioned that it represented more continuity than change, with David Dutton writing that during the second Churchill government “Britain remained a great power…even though the key measure in this assessment was increasingly commitments and obligations rather than resources.”34 But some changes still occurred, with Peter Lowe

noting that by 1952-53 Churchill was increasingly critical of the US in regards to their

policies towards the Soviet Union and Korea, which resulted in him becoming

increasingly “preoccupied with achieving détente.”35 This belief that the UK had a crucial

role to play in achieving détente between the superpowers due to (1) their role as a

‘balancer of power’ and (2) the “hegemonic division of labour” that existed within the

‘special relationship’, carried over into subsequent administrations, with Harold

Macmillan’s effort at achieving détente in 1959 serving as a prominent example. It is

here that this paper will argue that it was the possibility of achieving détente that made

32 Ibid 281. 33 Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War, 5. 34 David Dutton, “Anthony Eden,” in The Makers of British Foreign Policy: From Pitt to Thatcher, ed. TG Otte (London: Palgrave, 2002), 230. 35 Peter Lowe, “The Significance of the Korean War in Anglo-American Relations, 1950-1953,” in British Foreign Policy, 1945-56, eds. Michael Dockrill and John W. Young (London: Macmillan, 1989), 133.

112 the UK take its role as a ‘bridge’ far more seriously, with both the founding of the EEC

and Ghanaian Independence in 1957 also exerting significant influence, forcing the UK

to take the European ‘circle’ more seriously.36 Alexander Groth, Robert Lieber and

Nancy Lieber summarize the UK’s attitude towards Europe community pre-1957, writing

that “the illusion of the British Empire and Commonwealth role persisted long enough to

delay British participation in European unity for many years. The British rejected

opportunities to join the European Coal and Steel Community (1951), an abortive

European Defence Community (1951-1954), and the European Common Market

(1956).”37 Ultimately, this meant that Europe was “only the third of the circles which

Britain found itself,” meaning that the “British were unwilling to give priority to this

seemingly narrower regional interest.”38

Returning to Winston Churchill, Peter Lowe echoes similar sentiments to Grey

and Thomas Hennessey, stating that the Korean War revealed how dependent the UK

was upon the US,39 while John Dickie notes that Churchill’s inability in 1955 to convince

Dwight Eisenhower to change his policy on Formosa revealed that “the Special

Relationship had severe limitations in the Pacific area…where the Americans continued

to act, as they did during World War II, with scant regard for the views of the British.”40

Despite these signs pointing to both an inability to wield power independently of the US

and an overall lack of influence in Washington, the second Churchill government, and

36 Ghanaian Independence is highlighted because it was the first of the UK’s African colonies to gain independence. 37 Alexander J. Groth, Robert J. Lieber and Nancy I Lieber, Contemporary Politics: Europe (Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers, Inc, 1976), 27. 38 Ibid 28. 39 Lowe, “The Significance of the Korean War in Anglo-American Relations,” 145. 40 John Dickie, ‘Special’ No More: Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1994), 85.

113 the short-lived Eden government, continued with the same approach to foreign policy as

the Attlee government, with the successful US-UK collaboration in bringing about the

1953 Iranian Coup perhaps partially obscuring reality on the UK’s end. 41 This

successful example of the US-UK “hegemonic division of labour” is likely to have

confirmed British biases that they were still playing a world role similar to that of 1945 or

earlier, meaning they still possessed the power to, among other things, overthrow

unfavourable governments. But to repeat an earlier point, the entire period between

1945 to the Suez Crisis must be viewed as a failure by successive UK governments to

reverse decline due to its foreign policy not reflecting the objective conditions of the

international system, with Lowe referring to this as “the old adage of continuity in British

foreign policy [being] born out again.”42

Turning finally to the Eden government and the Suez Crisis, Dutton echoes

Lowe’s sentiments regarding the power of continuities and Freedman’s claims to the

inflexibility of the British foreign policymakers’ minds, writing: “Both in the war years and

after [Eden] seemed to have an illusory expectation of what Britain could still achieve in

world affairs. He knew that the world had moved on and yet had difficulty reconciling

himself to diminished British influence.”43 The country’s influence may have diminished by the time he became PM, and it certainly diminished after the Suez Crisis, but the belief that the UK was still a great power survived the crisis. Peter J. Beck notes that

Anthony Eden, “though accepting the need to strengthen Britain’s economic base and to

41 For more on US-UK cooperation during the 1953 Iranian Coup see: Ervand Abrahamian, “The 1953 Coup in Iran,” Science & Society 65.2 (2001): 182-215. 42 Lowe, “The Significance of the Korean War in Anglo-American Relations,” 145. 43 Dutton, “Anthony Eden,”235.

114 scale down existing military commitments, still opined that post-Suez Britain was

capable of playing ‘an independent role in the world’.”44 Adamthwaite, criticizing the

traditional understanding of the Suez Crisis as marking the end of the UK as a great

power, writes:

According to the received wisdom, Suez shattered the illusion of Britain as a great imperial power. The Eden government had ‘lived in blinkers’ largely unaware ‘of the fundamental shifts in power and influence produced by the Second World War’. By contrast, it is asserted that the crisis ‘affected Britain’s international position surprisingly little, even in the Middle East’. Both the traditional and revisionist views are open to criticism. Suez did not shatter an illusion of power. The post-mortems that immediately followed Suez greatly exaggerated its effects. Britain, it was said, had been reduced ‘from a 1st class to a 3rd class power’. Recent reassessments have rightly emphasised that Britain continued to exercise influence in the Middle East, intervening in Jordan in 1958 and again in Kuwait in 1961. And Anglo- American relations were quickly repaired by the Macmillan government. That said, Suez remains a climacteric. Britain, as Guy Millard, Eden’s private secretary, pointed out, ‘could never again resort to military action, outside of British territories, without at least American acquiescence’.45

Thus, in the minds of UK foreign policymakers, the country remained a great power, but the emphasis of its foreign policy desperately needed to shift. Another fascinating observation from this period is Eden’s dominance of his government, and this is particularly noticeable during the build-up to Suez. Darwin makes it clear that it was

Eden’s decision to use military force against Nasser, also his decision to, along with the

French, enter into a secret pact with Israel.46 Although Darwin seems to mostly chalk

this up to his personality and leadership style,47 Peter Hennessey shows that the trend

from 1945 through to Harold Wilson’s first government was not only an increasing PM

44 Peter J. Beck, “The Lessons of Abadan and Suez,” The Historical Journal 49.2 (2006): 543. 45 Adamthwaite, “Suez Revisited,” 225. 46 Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970, 603. 47 Ibid 603.

115 workload but greater PM involvement in foreign policy.48 In other words, what

Hennessey’s research suggests is the increasing predominance of the PMs during the pre-Suez Crisis years, and, as we will see when we study the governments of Harold

Macmillan and Harold Wilson, this predominance over the political field was cemented and became the new norm.

In the years following the Suez Crisis the UK underwent a series of further shocks, leading foreign policymakers to (1) further question whether the UK still possessed superpower status or something akin to it, and (2) place a greater emphasis on playing the ‘bridge’ role within the ‘special relationship’. During this process, those in the UK political field became increasingly aware of the need for, and comfortable with, the country playing a more junior ‘Greek’ role to the US ‘Romans’. As previously stated, this metaphor predates the end of World War Two, but it became increasingly central to

UK thought as the country shifted from a hegemonic and imperial power to a more transatlantic one, thus placing greater need on the UK fulfilling its perceived ‘bridge’ role. As Brian Harrison writes, the Suez Crisis threw “into relief the UK’s loss of superpower status,”49 and it was up to successive administrations to recognize this and adjust accordingly.

48 See: Peter Hennessey, The Prime Minister, 91-96. 49 Brian Harrison, Seeking a Role: The United Kingdom, 1951-1970 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 106.

116 4.3: The End of Empire

[W]e are a world power and a world influence or we are nothing.

–Harold Wilson50

After succeeding Eden as PM in January 1957, Harold Macmillan embarked on a mission to repair the damage inflicted by the Suez Crisis on the US-UK ‘special relationship’.51 He also placed significant emphasis on the UK gaining membership in

the EEC, since it was believed that by strengthening its position in Europe the UK could

offset some of its losses caused by the shrinking of its empire and the dwindling of its

influence within the Commonwealth. These themes would continue to be relevant during

Harold Wilson’s time in office, but ultimately this period must be looked upon as a period

of further British decline and increasing emphasis on playing the ‘bridge’ role.

Before discussing the main foreign policy achievements and failures of the

Macmillan government it is vital to discuss the man himself, in particular how he ran his

government. Richard Lamb reveals that power was very much centralized in the hands

of the PM, allowing Macmillan’s personal preferences and beliefs to have additional

weight in comparison to his predecessors, writing:

The archives show that even more than generally believed Macmillan ran his Government on the lines of an American President rather than a traditional British Prime Minister. In this he was considerably influenced by Winston Churchill’s methods during the Second World War. Like American presidents Macmillan favoured the use of personal policy advisers; as a result his Principal Private Secretaries, Tim Bligh and Philip de Zulueta, played important roles in deciding government policy…Intellectually

50 Harold Wilson, in: Paul Sharp, “The Place of the European Community in the Foreign Policy of British Governments, 1961-71,” 166. 51 See: Dickie, ‘Special’ No More: Anglo American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality.

117 Macmillan towered head and shoulders above his Cabinet colleagues and, often mistrustful of their judgment, he insisted on full control.52

Further evidence of his dominance comes from Harrison, who, when discussing the

UK’s first attempt at joining the EEC, writes that “The impulse to apply for entry came entirely from above. [Macmillan] ordered a secret review of British economic and military strength from civil servants in 1959-60, and this prompted a review of relations with the

EEC, which in July 1960 recommended applying for membership.”53 In regards to foreign policy in general, Tate claims that Harold Macmillan saw the US-UK ‘special relationship’ as one of interdependence, with the “balance of power and the continued peace in the world [maintained] by the deterrent power of the United States and United

Kingdom on one side against that of the USSR on the other.”54 This represents a continuation of the shift from a ‘third force’ to ‘the third world power’, as Macmillan recognized that the UK was no longer capable of operating independently of the US, nor as the sole ‘balancer of power’. Rather, it was accepted that UK power was becoming increasingly reliant on its close relationship with the US – that the UK could no longer rely solely on its own resources to project power and maintain its status as a great power. However, despite this shift from ‘third force’ to ‘the third world power’ he still saw the UK as one of the ‘big three’ superpowers, albeit weaker than the days of Roosevelt and Churchill

The picture thus far is one of continuity, but this was also a period of significant change. The eventual loss of empire, as well as increasing importance being placed on

52 Richard Lamb, The Macmillan Years: The Emerging Truth (London: John Murray, 1995), 1. 53 Harrison, Seeking a Role: The United Kingdom, 1951-1970, 117. 54 Tate, A Special Relationship? British Foreign Policy in the Era of American Hegemony, 91.

118 UK membership in the EEC, suggests that a profound policy shift occurred during the

Macmillan years, and, according to Frederick Hood, should be seen as a period where

“elites abandoned their pretensions to independent global role (sic) in favour of playing

the privileged interlocutor between the two sides of the Atlantic.”55 Hood’s statement,

plus his later comment that this abandonment of such “pretensions” was a result of the

UK’s forced withdrawal from Suez, is only partially correct.56 Although Suez represented

a major blow to the country’s psyche, it took other events such as Harold Macmillan’s

failure to obtain détente between the superpowers in 1959,57 the rapid decolonisation of

Africa, and its dwindling influence over the Commonwealth58 before the Macmillan

government embraced the role of ‘privileged interlocutor’ to a greater extent than its

post-war predecessors. Also, ‘pretensions’ regarding an independent global role were

not abandoned until the Wilson government announced a withdrawal from ‘East of

Suez’ in 1968. But the increasing emphasis Harold Macmillan and his government placed on Atlanticism59 and playing the role of ‘privileged interlocutor’ was a sensible

one given both the UK’s culture60 and Cold War bipolarity, where playing a ‘bridge’ or

‘privileged interlocutor’ role entailed obvious benefits.

55 Frederick Hood, “Atlantic Dreams and European Realities: British Foreign Policy After Iraq,” European Integration 30.1 (2008): 184. 56 Ibid 184. 57 See: Tate, A Special Relationship? British Foreign Policy in the Era of American Hegemony, 98 58 Tate writes that in the wake of decolonisation this meant the creation of various strategically important states in Africa in Asia, leading the UK to believe that “as the informal leader of an increasingly large number of [such states it] had gained added influence in the world order and secured its role in the special relationship” (Ibid 112). The issue is that these states were increasingly anxious to assert their independence from the UK, thus UK dreams of dominating the Commonwealth never materialized. 59 David McCourt defines Atlanticism as “the paramount position held by support for the US and its vision of world order in UK foreign policy” (David McCourt, “Embracing Humanitarian Intervention: Atlanticism and the UK Interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo”, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 15.2 (2013): 248). 60 Siding with the Soviets would have been unthinkable given the UK’s long history of liberal democracy, among other things.

119 In terms of playing this ‘bridge’ or ‘privileged interlocutor’ role, Andrew Scott

notes that both Churchill and Macmillan were proponents of summits between the US

and USSR to help ease tensions and reduce the possibility of nuclear war, and that the

UK saw this as an opportunity “to promote their own role and reputation as honest

broker between the superpowers.”61 For Harold Macmillan, his previously mentioned

visit to the USSR in 1959, and the role he played in “bringing Washington and Moscow

to sign [the] Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963”62 are evidence of the UK playing its

alleged ‘bridge’ role in the international system, since these represent obvious attempts

by the UK to be an intermediary in a bipolar system, providing value to the predominant

US by being a link between the two superpowers. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the outcome

of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty confirmed Macmillan’s biases regarding the UK still

playing a ‘world role’ akin to that of the 1940s; that despite the realities of the Suez

Crisis and decolonization the UK could still make a plausible case for superpower

status. Northedge elaborates, writing:

The test ban agreement, though it appeared to make minor contribution to checking the nuclear arms race, had the effect of fostering in Britain hallucinations of world power no longer justified by realities. In the first place, it seemed to certify Britain’s membership of the exclusive club of nuclear Powers which topped the world hierarchy of nations. Secondly, it entrenched the British illusion that, however much the country’s physical strength had fallen, its moral influence remained pre-eminent. This myth so captured Mr. Macmillan that after the signing of the test ban agreement he went to the lengths of thanking President Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev for co-operating with him to make the negotiations a success.63

61 Andrew Scott, Allies Apart: Heath, Nixon and the Anglo-American Relationship (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 111. 62 Ibid 111. 63 Northedge, Descent From Power: British Foreign Policy, 1945-1973, 292.

120 For Macmillan, playing the role of ‘Greeks’ and being a ‘bridge’ or ‘privileged

interlocutor’ was more than mere rhetoric, with his actions providing obvious proof of this. However, the “hallucinations” Northedge speaks of were probably a result of UK foreign policymakers looking to rebound after the devastating blow handed to them by

Charles de Gaulle that January. In order for the UK to be a ‘privileged interlocutor’ and exert the kind of influence in Washington that it desired (i.e. that was commensurate with its perceived ‘world role’), it had to be able to exert influence in Europe, making it all the more vital that it gain membership in the EEC.64 De Gaulle’s veto was a

devastating blow to the UK and their claims to being a ‘privileged interlocutor’ since it

revealed that UK hegemony in Europe was pure fantasy.65 Attempts to join Europe and

remain a ‘privileged interlocutor’ were maintained and emphasized by Harold Wilson,

but ultimately this did nothing to reverse British decline, nor was it able to save the last

remnants of the UK’s former role as an imperial (read: global) power with an ability to

act independently of the US: its military presence ‘East of Suez’. Macmillan, like Attlee,

Churchill and Eden, also believed that the UK was still one of the ‘big three’

superpowers,66 meaning he too suffered from an inflexibility of mind caused by ‘the

inertia of habitus.’

Turning now to Harold Wilson, he also dominated his cabinet in a style more befitting of a US President than a traditional UK PM. Ben Pimlott writes that although

“previous prime ministers had sometimes employed non-civil service staff…Wilson was

64 For an in-depth discussion of EEC negotiations during the Macmillan years, see: Lamb, The Macmillan Years, 158- 203. 65 Tate, A Special Relationship? British Foreign Policy in the Era of American Hegemony, 100. 66 Christopher Hill and Christopher Lord, “The Foreign Policy of the Heath Government,” in The Heath Government 1970-1974, eds. Stuart Ball and Anthony Seldon (London: Longman, 1996), 313.

121 the first to do so American-style, on a substantial scale, and as a matter of principle.

This innovation stuck: what was pioneering and risqué in 1964 became an established

practice, copied and institutionalized by later administrations.”67 The tone of, and the

reforms pursued by, the Wilson governments from 1964-1970 were very much driven by

Wilson himself, and this increasing domination of the PM over the cabinet and rest of

the political field was cemented during this period.

Although by 1964 the evidence showed that the UK was no longer one of the ‘big three’ superpowers, Harold Wilson entered office with the belief that the UK still held such a position. Geraint Hughes writes that Wilson and his cabinet ministers entered office “sharing the Conservatives’ view that Britain could still act as a global power because of its Commonwealth role and its links with former colonies,”68 but events

between October 1964 and January 1968 (and particularly after January 1966) proved

that such a view was not in accordance with reality. Paul Sharp explains this delayed

acceptance of reality, writing that Harold Wilson, “like many others [while serving in

opposition], consistently overestimated the freedom of action in foreign policy enjoyed

by any British government. What took place in the first couple of years of Wilson’s office

was a steady narrowing of his perceptions of the options and means open to British

foreign policy.”69 This narrowing (and eventual acceptance) of reality is perfectly

summed up by then Chancellor of the Exchequer Roy Jenkins, who, when announcing

the end of ‘East of Suez’, told Parliament in January 1968 that “we are no longer, and

67 Ben Pimlott, Harold Wilson (London: HarperCollins, 1992), 338. 68 Geraint Hughes, Harold Wilson’s Cold War: The Labour Government and East-West Politics, 1964-1970 (Suffolk: The Boydell Press, 2009), 85. 69 Sharp, “The Place of the European Community in the Foreign Policy of British Governments, 1961-1971”, 160.

122 have not been for some time, a super Power. It does not make sense for us to go on

trying to play a role beyond our economic strengths.”70 Ultimately, this period represents

the death of the Churchillian ‘Three Circles’ approach, and what emerged in its place was a new ‘Two Circles’ approach which consisted of an increased focus on both the

UK’s ‘special relationship’ with the US and its role as a ‘privileged interlocutor’ between

the US and European ‘circles’.

This move away from the Commonwealth, however, was not easy for Wilson, as

he was particularly fond of it thanks to a family trip he took to Australia as a child.71 How

much of this fondness can attributed to class (or group) habitus or to rational thought

free of its influences is beyond the scope of this paper, but a trip to Australia would constitute a unique individual experience that may have led to unique individual

thoughts that just so happened to re-enforce the existing class (or group) habitus. On

the other hand, perhaps young Wilson had already been taught that the Commonwealth

was vital to national interests and identity and the lessons he drew from this trip were

tainted by confirmation bias. This is something that cannot be known for certain unless

research that is beyond the scope of this paper is conducted,72 but it provides a

fascinating question for future researchers to explore. Returning to the 1960s, Pimlott

notes that Wilson entered office preferring the Commonwealth to the European

Common Market and that it took until the summer of 1966 for the Wilson government to

start transitioning away from the Commonwealth and towards joining the common

70 Harrison, Seeking a Role: The United Kingdom, 1951-1970, 122. 71 Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 20. 72 As noted, this section is focusing on class (or group) habitus (like the UK’s national habitus) rather than individual habitus.

123 market.73 Parr, however, points to January 1966 as the turning point, writing that it was

during this time that Wilson “endorsed secret official studies of the economic implication

of accession,” representing a “sustained reconsideration of Britain’s ultimate posture

towards Community membership.”74 However, it is clear that by the summer of 1966 the

UK was in the midst of economic difficulties thanks to the Sterling Crisis and greater economic integration with Europe was seen as a way to boost economic growth, which in turn would provide it with the necessary resources to sustain its ‘world role’/great power status. As Parr notes, in Wilson’s eyes “EEC membership would serve as the framework for renewed policies of economic growth, and would provide an alternative arena for the exercise of British power. Europe was the only place to go to provide the base of Britain’s future political independence and to enable the British to remain a power with global reach.”75

1966 is also a key year in regards to the UK playing a ‘bridge’ role, with the

March 1966 NATO Crisis, caused by de Gaulle’s decision to remove the French from

NATO’s military structure, providing an opportunity for the UK to work with the US and

help steer the organization through crisis. James Ellison writes that:

It was the British, with Washington’s sanction, who led France’s fourteen allies towards the March 18th declaration, and by means of George Thomson’s diplomacy, laid the foundations for solidarity at the June North Atlantic Council meeting. The Wilson government, and Wilson in particular, were motivated by a desire to reclaim political influence in Atlantic- European affairs, and to push the Johnson administration away from a

73 Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 433-434. 74 Parr, Britain’s Policy Towards the European Community: Harold Wilson and Britain’s World Role, 1964-1967, 190. 75 Ibid 202.

124 hardware solution to nuclear sharing and towards a new détente-oriented Alliance.76

Of critical importance here is that the UK is clearly operating as a ‘bridge’ between the

US and Europe, rather than just the US and USSR. In combination with other previously

mentioned developments occurring in January 1966, this helps strengthen Pimlott’s

argument that 1966 was the year when the UK began to take as much (if not more)

interest in the European ‘circle’ as the Commonwealth ‘circle’.

In regards to Ellison’s mention of the Wilson government’s “desire to reclaim

political influence in Atlantic-European affairs,” the author is referring in large part to a

desire by Wilson to smooth over lingering animosities left over by disagreements over

the proposed MLF,77 which “put distance between London and Washington.”78 When

discussing some his foreign policy accomplishments in January 1965, Wilson proudly

proclaimed that “Apart from anything else we have killed the MLF,”79 with John W.

Young adding that Wilson’s desire to “retain Polaris”80 explains his desire to kill the

MLF. This desire was influenced by numerous factors, which Young lists as “probably the ambition of continuing a Great Power role, the desire to influence United States

76 James Ellison, The United States, Britain and the Transatlantic Crisis: Rising to the Gaullist Challenge, 1963-68 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007): 190-191. 77 To put it simply, the MLF was “a scheme to create a jointly owned nuclear force for European defence among certain NATO members” (John W. Young, “Killing the MLF? The Wilson Government and Nuclear Sharing in Europe, 1964-66,” in Power and Stability: British Foreign Policy, 1865-1965, eds. Erik Goldstein and BJC McKercher (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 295.) 78 Ellison, The United States, Britain and the Transatlantic Crisis: Rising to the Gaullist Challenge, 1963-68, 190. 79 Young, “Killing the MLF? The Wilson Government and Nuclear Sharing in Europe, 1964-66,” 295. 80 Ibid 300.

125 thinking, and the relatively low financial expenditure that led to that retention, as well as

the narrowness of Labour’s [1964] election victory – by only a handful of seats.”81

Returning to the economic problems of 1966, they mark the beginning of the end

of the UK’s ‘East of Suez’ role, since the country was being forced to pay for defence

commitments it could no longer afford.82 Another factor was increasing anti-US

sentiment due to the increasing intensity of the Vietnam War. Although Wilson never

gave the US what they cherished most, which was British combat troops, Pimlott states

that he gave the US everything else out of the belief that the UK could not relinquish its

world role,83 in particular in the part of the world ‘East of Suez’ – leading to public outcry

that he was an American stooge à la Harold Macmillan.84 Geraint Hughes notes that by

the spring of 1967 disillusionment with the Commonwealth and the US was almost fever

pitch thanks to difficulties arising from (respectively) Rhodesia and Vietnam, leading UK

politicians and the public to becoming increasing Europhiliac.85 Combined with a

worsening economy and rising belief that an increased role in Europe was vital to

wielding influence over American policy – since the Vietnam War was exposing how

little influence the UK had in Washington, weakening its claims to being both a

‘privileged interlocutor’ and a global power – this led to a renewed effort to join the EEC,

81 Ibid 300. 82 Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 388. 83 Jonathan Colman writes that Wilson saw the US-UK special relationship as an important “means of preserving Britain’s status as a great ‘power’” (Jonathan Colman, A ‘Special Relationship’? Harold Wilson, Lyndon B. Johnson and Anglo-American Relations ‘At the Summit’, 1964-68 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 10.) 84 Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 385-388. 85 Hughes, Harold Wilson’s Cold War: The Labour Government and East-West Politics, 1964-70, 106.

126 but December 1967 was merely a replay of 1963 as UK membership was once again

vetoed by France.86

By January 1968 any illusions that Wilson and his government may have held

that the UK could regain a position in the international system similar to that of the pre-

Suez Crisis era lay in tatters thanks to the events of the past three years, and it was

within this context that the end of the UK’s ‘East of Suez’ role was announced. Before

discussing the consequences, it is important to clarify what ‘East of Suez’ or the UK’s

‘East of Suez’ role actually means. David McCourt writes that despite its “grandiose

label” it refers to:

A diverse set of remnants from Britain’s Imperial past, located in Southern Arabia, the Persian Gulf, and in the Far East: literally, therefore, eastwards of the Suez Canal. It comprised two large sovereign bases, one at Aden, the other at Singapore, in addition to a collection of smaller posts in the Persian Gulf at Sabah, Sarawak, and Hong Kong, and in the Far East at Sharjah, Bahrain, and Masirah. In total, it numbered some 80,900 men. This infrastructure was associated with a set of treaties with and promise of protection to a number of fledgling states, protectorates, and tribal organizations.87

McCourt also notes that the UK’s withdrawal from its ‘East of Suez’ role was a process

that began with the defence cuts of 1965 and was sped up by the recommendations of

the 1966 Defence White Paper,88 but it took until January 1968 for a complete

withdrawal to be announced. Although Wilson and his government were adamant in

their efforts to maintain an international role for the UK which reflected its “traditional

86 Ibid 107. 87 David M. McCourt, “What Was Britain’s “East of Suez Role”? Reassessing the Withdrawal, 1964-1968,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 20:3 (2009): 454. 88 Ibid 455.

127 presence and commitments in the area”89 and its traditional role as an imperial power with global interests, it was simply no longer feasible. However, this withdrawal does did not signify the end of the UK and its belief in its great power status,90 but rather the end of a losing battle that UK politicians had been fighting since 1945, which was preventing the death of the UK’s ability to project power both globally and independently.91 In reality, this had been signified by the outcome of the Suez Crisis, but it took until 1968 for it to fully sink in.

The Wilson government spent the remainder of its days focusing on maintaining close relations with the US in order to remain a ‘privileged interlocutor’, but Wilson’s earnest belief that the UK was still one of the “big three” superpowers had clearly been eroded away by time and events, and the Nixon administration’s emphasis on détente further weakened any claims that the UK had an important role to play (at least militarily) in maintaining global order thanks to what Hill and Lord dub the “decline of the containment doctrine.”92 This shift in emphasis by the Nixon administration also closed an avenue for the UK to wield influence, because if the two superpowers were more willing to talk and accommodate one another then that implies that they also had less need for an ‘honest broker’ to bring them together. Ultimately, the days of the UK as a superpower were clearly over, its ability to maintain its great power status was being thrown in doubt, and within this context it was up to Edward Heath upon his election in

1970 to try and set the UK upon a new course.

89 Ibid 469. 90 See: Ibid 454. 91 Hughes, Harold Wilson’s Cold War: The Labour Government and East-West Politics, 1964-70, 110. 92 Hill and Lord, “The Foreign Policy of the Heath Government”, 289.

128 4.4: Post-Imperial Reconstruction

In regards to style and personality, Edward Heath wielded greater influence and

dominance over his government than Macmillan or Wilson had. John Ramsden notes

that “the style and personality of the Prime Minister was therefore even more than

usually central to the government’s working”93 and as an MP had “demonstrated an

inflexible determination and a readiness to override Party views when his own mind was

once made up.”94 Once he became party leader, and later PM, he was essentially

“unchallengeable in the policy field.”95 It is also important to note that the Heath

government’s foreign policy must be divided into “Early” and “Later” Heath.96 “Early”

Heath lasted from his entering of office in June 1970 to February 1972, while “Later”

Heath lasted from February 1972 to his election loss in 1974.

Starting with “Early” Heath, between June 1970 and early 1971 Heath was

convinced that he could reverse the withdrawals from ‘East of Suez’,97 turning the clock

back to 1964 and reversing the damage done to the UK’s status by the Wilson

government.98 Such a desire raises two important points. First, the goalpost to measure

the UK’s international standing was no longer the pre-1945 days as a hegemonic power

or even pre-Suez Crisis, but rather pre-1968/the end of ‘East of Suez’. In other words,

Heath was not attempting to recapture the country’s superpower status. Similarly, it is

difficult to argue that Wilson, during his time as PM from 1964-1970 or 1974-1976,

93 John Ramsden, “The Prime Minister and the Making of Policy”, in The Heath Government 1970-1974, edited by Stuart Ball and Anthony Seldon (London: Longman, 1996), 21. 94 Ibid 21. 95 Ibid 22. 96 Hill and Lord, “The Foreign Policy of the Heath Government”, 286. 97 Ibid 289. 98 Ibid 307.

129 wanted to relive the supposed glories of pre-1945 either. What emerges from the previous discussion on Wilson is that from 1964 until January 1968 he seems to be focused on maintaining the UK’s ‘world role’ as it existed during the Macmillan years, but was not interested in reviving the idea of the UK as a ‘third force’. An argument that

the Attlee, Churchill, and Eden governments, along with perhaps the first few years of

Macmillan’s premiership, were dominated by a desire to relive the glories of pre-1945 are compelling, but such arguments cannot be made about the Wilson, Heath, and

Wilson-Callaghan years since it was during this period that what Hill and Lord describe

as the “traditionalist” school of thought, which argued for the UK playing a similar world

role as it had in the early 1950s and 1960s, died out.99 As the upcoming analysis on the

Thatcher government will reveal, although she saw the UK as a great power she also

lacked the desire to turn the clock back to 1945. Ultimately, the evidence presented thus

far leads to the following conclusion: that UK foreign policy in the pre-Suez Crisis era

was dominated by a desire to relive the glories of pre-1945, but for the remainder of the

Cold War era it eventually accepted its loss of superpower status and was instead

dominated by a desire to halt further declines and maintain its existing ‘world role’/great

power status. Whether the post-Cold War era has a continuation of this trend is another

issue that will be examined later, but for now it has been established that from 1945 to

Heath the habitus of both the political field underwent significant but gradual change.

Although this has essentially already been answered, the second point or issue is

whether Heath saw the UK as a great power. Evidence suggests that despite his desire

to turn the clock back to 1964, Heath saw the UK as a “middle power of the first rank,”

99 Ibid 286.

130 meaning he recognized the reality of the UK’s international standing but still exhibited a

“reluctance to relinquish some elements of great power status.”100 The question now

becomes whether Heath’s conception of the UK’s world role meets Morris’ criteria for

great power status, and this paper will argue that it does. What Heath’s time in office

represents is not the end of the UK as a great power, but rather an acceleration in the

shift away from the Commonwealth and towards Europe.

Returning to his “Early” period, upon entering office Heath adamantly denied that

the UK “was merely a regional power, confined in its roles to its own corner of the

world.”101 This is perhaps best represented by Heath’s decision, within weeks of

entering office, “to retain a military presence in Southeast Asia…[Allowing him] to [claim]

to have reversed the policy of the previous Labour government to [withdraw] all British

defence forces from Malaysia and Singapore by the end of 1971.”102 This led to the

negotiation of the Five Power Defence agreement with Australia, New Zealand,

Malaysia and Singapore, an agreement that “still links Britain to its Commonwealth

partners in the Far East.”103 Admittedly, the British only contributed a “token force” and

in no way was it an attempt to “return to the old days of Empire,”104 but rather it

represents Heath’s desire to maintain the UK’s ‘world role’, which was that of a “leading

power with extra-European interests… [As a country with] a role to play outside of

100 Michael Harvey, “Perspectives on the UK’s Place in the World,” Chatham House, December 2011, 5. 101 Hill and Lord, “The Foreign Policy of the Heath Government,” 286. 102 Andrea Benvenuti, “The Heath Government and British Defence Policy in Southeast Asia at the End of Empire (1970-71),” Twentieth Century British History 20.1 (2009): 53-54. Note: Douglas Hurd also discusses Heath’s emotional attachment to the UK’s ‘East of Suez’ world role, mentioning Heath’s decision to retain a presence in southeast Asia was driven by “his emotions as well as his intellect” (Douglas Hurd, An End to Promises: Sketch of a Government 1970-74 (London: Collins, 1979), 47. 103 Ibid 54. 104 Ibid 56

131 Europe.”105 This desire to avoid casting the UK’s “post-imperial future in purely

European terms”106 led Heath to maintain the UK’s global interests and its leading

‘world role’, thus meeting the ideational requirements for great power status as laid out

by Morris.107 This is supported by Paul Sharp, who argues that despite the erosion of

UK extra-European interests between the years of 1961 to 1971, the desire to maintain

“a world role as an end in itself…was not necessarily the absurd product of an inability

to face ‘reality’… [Because] when the governments in question came to look at their

assets for policy-making they found strengths – in diplomatic and financial experience,

influential international connections and positions in international organisations – which

were born of the same past which had produced the residual global commitments and

interests.”108 Furthermore, the European Defence Agreements also shows that Heath

still bought into the idea of the UK as a regional protector, although this role conception

all but died after 1968 and the end of ‘East of Suez’. However, if by chance there were

any residual desires to reclaim something akin to the UK’s imperial world role these

were definitely killed in February 1972,109 when Heath acknowledged in the House of

Commons “that a shift had taken place in his own reading of Britain’s international

position [and he no longer believed] that [the UK] could carry on fairly well outside the

105 Ibid 57. 106 Ibid 57. 107 This also suggests that suggests that Morris’ arguments regarding nomenclature concerns may explain Heath’s use of the term “middle power” rather than “great power,” but that is best left for a research project that is focused solely on the Heath years. 108 Sharp, “The Place of the European Community in the Foreign Policy of British Governments, 1961-1971,” 167. 109 I will use this speech as the end of the “Early” Heath era, and thus everything occurring from this speech to his election defeat in 1974 will be considered as occurring in the “Later” Heath era.

132 EC… [Marking the beginning of a period where he became] increasingly interested in

the practicalities of forging a collective diplomacy with the EC.”110

What the analysis has shown so far is that “Early” Heath, just like the rest of his

postwar predecessors, saw the UK’s ‘world role’ as an end in itself, and that maintaining

its great power status was of utmost importance – meaning the ‘grand strategy’ of UK

foreign policymakers remained constant from 1945 up to, and throughout, the “Early”

Heath years. Turning now to “Later” Heath, this period was dominated by the UK’s

increased focus on the EC, but this shift in focus did not represent a change in the UK’s

postwar grand strategy. These “Later” years not only represent a continuity in regards to

‘grand strategy’, but also continuity in terms of belief in the UK’s ‘bridge’ role.

The first part of this “Later” period was dominated with concerns related to

gaining membership in the EC, which was finally achieved on January 1, 1973. The

second part, stretching from the gaining of membership to the fall of the Heath

government in 1974, was dominated by attempts to strengthen the UK’s ties and

influence in Europe, but while also maintaining its ‘special relationship’ with the US. The

traditional narrative is that the Heath years as a whole represent a low point in the

‘special relationship’, supposedly damaged by Heath’s desire to shift away from the US

in favour of Europe. Alex Spelling, however, notes that this was not the case, as it was

only from April 1973 to early 1974 that the US-UK relationship was at a low point.111

This ‘low point’, he argues, was not caused by Heath trying to distance his country from the US, but rather because Henry Kissinger misinterpreted the UK’s inability to push his

110 Hill and Lord, “The Foreign Policy of the Heath Government,” 286. 111 Alex Spelling, “‘Recrimination and Reconciliation’: Anglo American Relations and the Yom Kippur War,” Cold War History 13:4 (2013): 487 and 506.

133 ‘Year of Europe’ initiatives through the EC’s political machinery as a sign of reticence.112

Also compounding issues was Heath’s use of the term ‘natural relationship’ rather than

‘special relationship’ throughout his time as PM.113 However, this represents another case of Anglo-American misunderstanding, since Heath used the term ‘natural’ because he wanted to express the permanency of the alliance and thought that “a ‘special’ relationship’ implied [that it] could be broken off at any time.”114

Despite Nixon and Heath’s strong personal relationship, this never allayed

Kissinger’s mistrust over the UK’s European ambitions, with Spelling claiming that it is

Kissinger’s problematic recollections that have dominated interpretations of this period.115 But Kissinger’s mistrust is perhaps more understandable when one considers

Thomas Robb’s claim that Heath purposely downplayed the ‘special relationship’ in public, but admittedly only did so in order to allay French fears that the UK was

“America’s Trojan horse within the EEC.”116 What emerges from Robb’s article is that

Heath was still determined to play the UK’s now traditional ‘bridge’ role and maintain the

‘special relationship’, but that he pursued this in a more muted manner than past PMs due to his commitment to implementing a more pragmatic foreign policy.117 Thus Hood’s assertion that the Heath years represented a “brief hiatus [from] the role of privileged interlocutor”118 does not appear to be entirely accurate.

112 Ibid 488. 113 Alex Spelling, “Edward Heath and Anglo-American Relations 1970-1974: A Reappraisal,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 20:4 (2009): 641. 114 Ibid 642. 115 Ibid 642. 116 Thomas Robb, “The Power of Oil: Edward Heath, the ‘Year of Europe’ and the Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’,” Contemporary British History 26:1 (2012): 74. 117 Ibid 75. 118 Hood, “Atlantic Dreams and European Realities: British Foreign Policy After Iraq,” 186

134 Proof of Heath’s commitment to the ‘bridge’ or ‘privileged interlocutor’ role, and a further strengthening of Robb’s above argument, are found during the ‘Year of Europe’ initiatives. According to Scott, during this period the UK was “caught somewhere between the opposing views of the United States and France,”119 and despite their efforts to play the role of ‘bridge’ and clear a path ahead for greater Euro-American cooperation, they were ultimately unable to overcome the challenge of “bridging the gulf in expectations between the United States and France, which meant finding a formula for transatlantic relations that impressed the White House without alarming Paris.”120

Perhaps the best example of this occurred in July, with Scott writing that:

When Heath and Home met with Michel Jobert on 2 July, they found the French foreign minister repeating familiar objections, concluding that it [the Year of Europe] was all designed to improve [Nixon’s] popularity at home. Despite their own doubts, the prime minister and foreign secretary sought to deflect his criticism. Home stressed that the administration was frightened of the growing isolationism in the United States, while Heath urged that the Year of Europe could be seen as a genuine attempt to re-engage the United States in transatlantic solidarity and security. The challenge for Europe, if it really believed in its own identity, he stressed, was to prepare a common position.121

Furthermore, on July 23, thanks to significant British efforts the nine EC members agreed to use “European identity” as the “basis for constructive dialogue with the United

States…[and], in the short-term, they resolved to exchange all information they obtained in their bilateral conversations with the US.”122 It is noted that Heath enthusiastically relayed these developments to Nixon, confident that he had helped bridge the gap

119 Scott, Allies Apart: Heath, Nixon and the Anglo-American Relationship, 154. 120 Ibid 159. 121 Ibid 155. 122 Ibid 156.

135 between the US and Europe and increased the probability of success for the ‘Year of

Europe’ initiatives,123 but Kissinger interpreted “Heath’s agreement to disclose Britain’s

bilateral exchanges with the United States…as final proof of Heath’s own determination

to prove himself a good European at the expense of relations with the United States,”

leading Kissinger to conclude that the ‘special relationship’ was essentially over.124

The great irony in all of this is that what angered Kissinger the most was his

belief that the UK had failed to play its ‘bridge’ role within the ‘special relationship’,

arguing that the UK had failed to “take the lead in forging a positive European response”

and that it was “preoccupied with impressing the French” rather than maintaining its

“preferential position in Washington.”125 This, however, simply was not the case, and

thus if parts of Heath’s premiership must be seen as representing a low-point in the

‘special relationship’ the blame should fall largely on Henry Kissinger rather than the

Heath administration. What is perhaps most interesting for our purposes is the fact that the UK attempted to play the role of ‘bridge’, which is what Kissinger and Nixon expected of them, yet still managed to lose influence in Washington. This ties into a larger theme that has been hinted at throughout this chapter, which is that even at the

best of times UK influence over US foreign policy is limited – even if they play their

expected ‘role’ within the ‘special relationship’ and international system. Like all

relationships there are going to be peaks and valleys, but despite the UK’s Cold War-

era ‘world role’ this did not guarantee influence within Washington. Instead, UK

influence appears to be determined almost entirely by the President and the members

123 See: Ibid 156. 124 Ibid 157. 125 Ibid 143.

136 of his inner circle (i.e. the other members of the National Security Council). Because of

this, if prominent members of this circle misinterpret UK actions then the UK’s attempts

at “power-by-proxy” are largely undone. Based on the evidence gathered thus far, this

paper will suggest that only in times of particularly close PM-Presidential relations can

“power-by-proxy” be achieved, but even then such “power” is limited, which the cases of

Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair will make abundantly clear.

Shifting from the ‘Year of Europe’ to domestic politics, in February 1974 Harold

Wilson returned to office, leading the Labour party to 301 seats versus the

Conservatives’ 297 and forming a minority government. He would serve for 18 months, with James Callaghan then serving as his replacement until his election loss to

Margaret Thatcher in May 1979. Donoghue notes that, although Wilson employed a far more laid back leadership style than he had during his first time in office, Callaghan was incredibly dominant, meaning that during his three years in power the UK’s foreign policy very much reflected his personal preferences and beliefs.126 Of particular note is

that during this five year period it was Callaghan who first referred to the UK as a

‘bridge’, stating that “Britain’s post-imperial role was to act as a ‘bridge’ between the

USA and Western Europe within the NATO alliance.”127

This shift from being an ‘interlocutor’ to ‘bridge’ represented merely a change in

wording rather than actual policy, but from this stems three critical points. First, that this

was the period when the term ‘bridge’ entered the popular lexicon and has continued to

126 Donoghue, Prime Minister: The Conduct of Policy under Harold Wilson and James Callaghan, 15 127 Hood, “Atlantic Dreams and European Realities: British Foreign Policy After Iraq,” 186. For more on the emphasis the Wilson-Callaghan governments placed on the ‘special relationship’ see: Alan P. Dobson, Anglo- American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict, and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers (London: Routledge, 1995), 143-147.

137 hold totemic status.128 Secondly, that use of this term symbolized that the Atlanticism of the previous 1964-70 Wilson governments was once again front and centre.129 Thirdly, this helps to lay the foundation for Macleod’s later claim that UK efforts (albeit during the late Thatcher and early Major years) at being a faithful ally and maintaining the ‘special relationship’ were relegated to the country’s “dogged advocacy of NATO as the only acceptable collective defence institution for Europe.”130 However, this claim is not entirely accurate because Macleod seems to forget that UK involvement in the 1991

Gulf War was very much driven by a desire to maintain the ‘special relationship’ and be a faithful ally,131 but what it does reveal are links between the thinking of the Wilson-

Callaghan, Thatcher, and Major governments – in particular that the idea of the UK as a regional protector seems to have finally died shortly after Heath left office, and that maintaining and promoting NATO appears to have filled the void left by the end of ‘East of Suez’. Put another way, the UK was no longer a global military power, and ‘dogged advocacy of NATO’ was the UK’s way of emphasizing to the US that despite this it still provided value. Returning to the Wilson-Callaghan years, this period represents a period of renewed interest in the Commonwealth, as Callaghan was particularly anxious to repair relations with the UK’s former colonies and was critical of Heath’s focus on

Europe, claiming in his memoirs that Heath had “banked everything on our relations with Europe.”132 It was obviously a far more Eurosceptic period than the Heath years and this Euroscepticism would be continued by the Thatcher government.

128 Hood, “Atlantic Dreams and European Realities: British Foreign Policy After Iraq,” 186. 129 See: Hill and Lord, “The Foreign Policy of the Heath Government,” 314. 130 Macleod, “Great Britain: Still Searching for Status?,” 171. 131 This will be discussed in-depth in chapter 5. 132 James Callaghan, Time and Chance (London: Collins, 1987), 296.

138 Turning finally to Margaret Thatcher, we shall begin by examining her leadership

and cognitive style. Stephen Dyson notes that not only was she incredibly dominant

within her government but that her foreign policy style can be explained by her stark

black and white worldview,133 dividing the world into categories such as “us and them”

or “friend and enemy.”134 She entered office with incredibly limited knowledge of (and

interest in) foreign policy and it is noted that a “lack of experience exacerbates the tendency toward a simplified schema of world politics in lower complexity leaders, suggesting these individuals…became almost “maverick” in their reliance upon their own belief sets in decision making.”135 In such instances, it makes a “full account of the

individual make-up of international leaders”136 all the more vital. Of importance here is

her lack of international travel before assuming office, and her beliefs during her

university years. Robin Harris notes that while attending Oxford in 1945 she publicly

“proclaimed that the British Empire, with its unique international role, must never be

dismembered… [And] that only Churchill could be entrusted with the nation’s foreign

policy.”137 Although when she assumed office Thatcher described the UK’s world role in

a similar fashion as Heath, describing it as “a middle-ranking power, given unusual

influence by virtue of historical distinction, skilled diplomacy and versatile military forces,

but greatly weakened by economic decline,”138 by the end of the Falklands War her tune

changed in a way that was more in line with her university beliefs.

133 Dyson, “Cognitive Style and Foreign Policy: Margaret Thatcher’s Black and White Thinking,” 38. 134 Ibid 35 135 Ibid 39. 136 Ibid 46. 137 Robin Harris, Not For Turning: The Life of Margaret Thatcher (New York: Thomas Dunne Books/St. Martin's Press, 2013), 34. 138 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 9.

139 Turning to her foreign policy, the Falklands War is important for two reasons.

First, it appears to be her foreign policy awakening, and Paul Sharp claims that until the

war the country’s foreign policy very much belonged to Foreign Secretary Peter

Carrington.139 After the invasion, however, John Dickie notes Thatcher’s dominance in foreign policymaking, as she became increasingly disillusioned with the FCO and thus more ‘presidential.’140 Secondly, by the war’s end Thatcher had developed a firm

doctrine which was centred on the idea that the UK was a “liberal great power,”141 placing her in a similar mould to the rest of her pre-Heath predecessors. A response in the Falklands was seen as vital in order to maintain the UK’s self-respect and international standing, since a failure to respond would signify that any potential claims to great power status were ultimately hollow.142 Britain’s victory was interpreted by

Thatcher as a sign that the UK could “act independently and even use force without the skies falling at either home or abroad,”143 but it should not be interpreted as a desire to

relive the glories of pre-1945. Rather, it should be interpreted as Thatcher believing she

could reverse the sense of decline and national malaise that had been prevalent since

the end of its ‘East of Suez’ role and the disintegration of its empire. Also, rather than

obsessing over and attempting to reclaim the UK’s past imperial role, Thatcher instead

seemed more interested in re-defining what it meant to be a great power in an

increasingly liberal world, where globalization and economic doctrines associated with

neoliberalism were becoming the norm.

139 Paul Sharp, Thatcher’s Diplomacy: The Revival of British Foreign Policy (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), 48. 140 Dickie, The New Mandarins: How British Foreign Policy Works, 130. 141 Sharp, Thatcher’s Diplomacy: The Revival of British Foreign Policy, xviii. 142 Ibid 68-69. 143 Ibid 100.

140 Vital to maintaining the UK’s role as a “liberal great power” was its ‘special relationship’ with the US. As John Dumbrell writes, “to Thatcher, the US-UK relationship was not only ‘natural’ and ‘special’: it was ‘extraordinary’ and ‘very, very special’.”144

Thatcher and Reagan developed a notoriously close relationship, allowing the UK to enjoy a period of influence over US foreign policy not seen since the days of Harold

Macmillan.145 Keeping with Macmillan, Thatcher also shared the belief that in order to

maintain the UK’s great power status it had to demonstrate “Britain’s usefulness to the

US as a uniquely valuable source of political and practical support.”146 She may not

have placed the same emphasis on Europe as Heath did, but she still recognized the importance of UK influence in Europe in regards to the post-war ‘hegemonic division of labour.’

By examining how Thatcher talked about Europe we find evidence of her playing a ‘bridge’ role. As Henrik Larsen writes, rather than seeing Europe “as a unit with unique cultural attributes” it was instead presented as “part of a broad project of the ‘West’ –

[with Thatcher] almost always referring to the alliance with the US.”147 This concept of

the ‘West’ is best seen in her famous Bruges speech in 1988, where she concluded her

speech with calls for a “Europe which plays its full part in the wider world, which looks

outward not inward, and which preserves that Atlantic community - that Europe on both

144 John Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations from the Cold War to Iraq 2nd edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 106. 145 Sharp, Thatcher’s Diplomacy: The Revival of British Foreign Policy, 137. 146 Ibid 102. 147 Henrik Larsen, Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis: France, Britain and Europe (Florence, Ky: Routledge, 1997), 51.

141 sides of the Atlantic – which is our noblest inheritance and our greatest strength;”148 and

earlier in the speech discusses how it would be a mistake to “forget that European

values have helped to make the United States of America into the valiant defender of

freedom which she has become.”149 But in terms of being a ‘bridge’, the idea that since

the Wilson-Callaghan years the UK played this role largely through ‘dogged advocacy of

NATO’ is very much supported by this speech, with Thatcher proving her Atlanticist credentials by making European commitment to NATO one of her guiding principles for the future of Europe, stating that:

Europe must continue to maintain a sure defence through NATO. There can be no question of relaxing our efforts, even though it means taking difficult decisions and meeting heavy costs. It is to NATO that we owe the peace that has been maintained over 40 years…We must strive to maintain the United States' commitment to Europe's defence. And that means recognising the burden on their resources of the world role they undertake and their point that their allies should bear the full part of the defence of freedom, particularly as Europe grows wealthier. Increasingly, they will look to Europe to play a part in out-of-area defence, as we have recently done in the Gulf…It is not an institutional problem. It is not a problem of drafting. It is something at once simpler and more profound: it is a question of political will and political courage, of convincing people in all our countries that we cannot rely for ever on others for our defence, but that each member of the Alliance must shoulder a fair share of the burden…We should develop the [Western European Union], not as an alternative to NATO, but as a means of strengthening Europe's contribution to the common defence of the West.150

However, perhaps the best example of Thatcher as ‘bridge’ is captured by Brian White, who discusses the role the UK played from 1984 to the Gorbachev-Reagan summit of

148 Margaret Thatcher, “The Bruges Speech” (Speech, Bruges, Belgium, September 20, 1988), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3562258/Full-text-of-Margaret-Thatchers-speech-to-the- College-of-Europe-The-Bruges-Speech.html (accessed May 6, 2016). 149 Ibid. 150 Ibid.

142 December 1987, highlighting the ‘special’ relationship between Mikhail Gorbachev and

Thatcher and how her closeness with Reagan “gave the prime minister the opportunity to play if not a mediatory role at least an important communications role between the superpowers and their respective leaders.”151 It is fitting that Thatcher was able to play such an important role in bringing about improved Soviet-US relations since, as previously argued, it was during her hero Winston Churchill’s second stint in office where the possibility of détente made the UK take its ‘bridge’ role far more seriously. It is doubtful that this similarity between her and Churchill was lost on the PM, with White mentioning that she was useful to Gorbachev “in much the same way that Churchill had been to the post-Stalin leadership in the 1950s.”152

Despite her close relationship with Reagan, the UK’s influence over US policy still suffered from severe limits. For example, the US’s invasion of Grenada showed the

UK lacked decisive influence in Washington, with Thatcher proving herself adept at convincing the US to assert itself globally but ultimately unable to restrain it.153

Thatcher’s influence in the US waned considerably after the election of George H.W.

Bush, as the two did not share a particularly close relationship. What emerges from

Sharp is the idea that close personal relationships are not inheritable,154 and that the closeness of Reagan and Thatcher’s relationship can be explained by their similar world views,155 bringing us back to Dyson’s point that individuals and their personalities matter in politics.

151 Brian White, Britain, Détente and Changing East-West Relations (Florence, US: Routledge, 2002), 147. 152 Ibid 147. 153 Sharp, Thatcher’s Diplomacy: The Revival of British Foreign Policy, 121-122. 154 Ibid 140. 155 Ibid 137.

143 4.5 Conclusion

By the time of Thatcher’s resignation in November 1990 the Soviet Union was all but finished, and thus John Major entered office as the current unipolar world order was

starting to take shape. But, before moving on to that era, we must conclude our

thoughts on the Cold War, and do our best to make sense of this important chapter in

the UK’s history. In regards to 1945 to 1956, we see both a gradual acceptance of the

UK’s diminishing world role yet also numerous attempts at maintaining its historic

position as a superpower, with the Suez Crisis perhaps the best example of the

hysteresis of this period. Slowly but surely the sense of the UK as ‘bridge’ begins to take

shape, but it is more focused on bridging the US and USSR than the US and Europe,

and represents a considered, deliberate policy choice rather than mental inertia. From

1957 to 1970, we see the ‘bridge’ role as we currently understand it –between the US

and Europe –begin to fully take shape and become ingrained in the political field’s

habitus, as well as a few last (and albeit rather weak) attempts to maintain its previous

position as a superpower, but decolonization and the end of ‘East of Suez’ made this

impossible. The UK’s grand strategy was still being driven by its belief in its great power

role, but many of the sources of that power had dried up, as its empire had simply

ceased to be. Finally, the period from Heath’s election to Thatcher’s resignation should

be seen not as a time dominated by a desire to maintain or reclaim the UK’s past

superpower status but rather as the period when the it was accepted by the political

elites that the country was no longer an imperial power, and the political field responded

by refashioning its ingrained belief in its great power role in a way that more accurately

reflected the country’s position in the international system. The ‘bridge’ role was now

144 firmly ingrained in the minds of those in the UK political field, and it was believed that

through this role, and through its relationship with the US, that the UK could maintain its great power status. Attention now shifts to how the UK would continue to maintain its great power status in the post-Cold War era, which is a question that will be explored in- depth in the following chapter.

145 Chapter 5: Post-Cold War

5.1: Introduction

To begin, this author would like to repeat the methods employed in this chapter.

First, we will determine if the post-Cold War PMs have followed the Cold War trend of

PM predominance in regards to foreign policymaking. If they are found to be similar, then this strengthens the case for using field theory to understand the UK and other countries with similar political systems. Secondly, we will examine political speeches and other policy documents for the reasons outlined by Daddow. This will be complemented with an examination of the PM’s unique individual experiences to explain why certain continuities have persisted in the UK foreign policy field, or to explain

possible changes. Finally, we will review the existing literature to fill in gaps, provide

context or greater analysis of events.

With that reminder out of the way, the chapter will be divided into the following

subsections: John Major; New Labour; David Cameron. The research on John Major

and the Blair years will unsurprisingly show that they both continued with the ‘bridge’

role, but what is perhaps most interesting is that Major and Blair, despite maintaining

this Cold War continuity, perceived the UK’s great power role in much different

manners, with Blair being the biggest proponent of an active, globally involved UK. This,

in turn, made Blair an even greater proponent of the UK as ‘bridge’ than his

predecessor, and by studying Blair’s individual habitus we get a great sense of why this

occurred, with the philosophy of John Macmurray and Blair’s ‘muscular Christianity’

being of the utmost importance. It becomes clear that to understand Blair we absolutely

must look beyond just the ingrained beliefs of the UK’s national and political habitus (i.e.

146 beyond class (or group)), and it is the Blair years which make perhaps the strongest

case for applying the Bourdieusian approach to the study of UK foreign policy. However,

despite Blair’s gung-ho attitude towards the UK as ‘bridge’ it is a fellow New Labourer,

Gordon Brown, who begins to shift the UK from said role towards that of a ‘hub’, but this shift is only pursued to a limited extent, as he still also believed in the UK as ‘bridge’.

However, this shift away from ‘bridge’ to ‘hub’ is fully embraced by David Cameron, and it will be argued that understanding Cameron’s individual habitus is of critical importance to understanding this embrace, and it also highlights the role the essential role the PM plays in any attempts at breaking away from long held and ingrained beliefs in the UK’s political field. Admittedly, there appears to be less information available on

Cameron’s formative years than Tony Blair, so the inability to conduct interviews does hurt this paper a bit. However, enough can be gleaned from existing sources to make sense of some of Cameron’s individual habitus and how that shaped UK foreign policy – albeit recognizing that the Cameron years represents a period where the Bourdieusian approach is perhaps less helpful than the Blair years.

5.2: John Major

Before discussing John Major’s influence on UK foreign policy, it is vital to start with an examination of Thatcher’s last days in office. In his memoirs, Major notes that for the first year and a half as PM he felt as if he “was living in sin with the electorate”1

due to him gaining power via party election rather than general election. By winning the

1992 general election Major felt confident enough to implement his own agenda rather

1 John Major, John Major: The Autobiography (HarperCollins: London, 2000), 291.

147 than merely tying up the loose ends of the final Thatcher government, writing that it

“was a huge satisfaction for me to win my own mandate.”2 With the argument that

Major’s time in office before the 1992 election was more about tying up Thatcher’s loose

ends than implementing his own foreign policy, his speeches from 1992 to his election

defeat in 1997 will receive the greatest attention, but his actions before the 1992

election still reveal a great deal about his attitudes towards foreign policy.

Two weeks before John Major was appointed PM, Margaret Thatcher gave her last major speech on foreign policy at the 1990 LMB, and in many ways this speech

helped lay the groundwork for the following decade. Thatcher states that upon entering

office the country had become “reconciled to decline,” but thanks to her economic

policies the country could “face the 1990s with confidence.”3 In regards to Europe, she

was adamant that the UK’s “destiny lies in Europe”4 but framed the country’s role as

falling within what Oliver Daddow terms the UK’s outsider tradition. Daddow writes that

this tradition has undergone five phases since 1815, but since gaining membership in

the EC in 1973 the UK’s approach can be best described as “outsider as insider,” which

consists of leadership on some issues but at the same time increasing use of opt-outs

and the possibility of withdrawal via referendum.5 Henrik Larsen confirms this outsider

tradition, writing that for the UK “the development of ‘Europe’ was not seen as

something natural and organic, and certainly not something [it was] naturally part of,”6

2 Ibid 291. 3 Margaret Thatcher, “Speech at Lord Mayor’s Banquet” (Speech, London, UK, November 12, 1990), http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/108241 (accessed January 23, 2016). 4 Ibid. 5 Oliver Daddow, “Interpreting the Outsider Tradition in British European Policy Speeches from Thatcher to Cameron,” Journal of Common Market Studies 53.1 (2015): 74. 6 Henrik Larsen, “British and Danish European Policies in the 1990s: A Discourse Approach,” European Journal of International Relations 5.4 (1999): 456

148 and argues that within this outsider discourse are two sub-discourses: the interstate

cooperation sub-discourse and the essential cooperation sub-discourse.7 The former

sees Europe as external (us/them) and represents strict interstate cooperation, while the latter sees European cooperation as essential for British interests – as worth paying

the price for the benefits that come from cooperation and partnership.8

Thatcher clearly falls in the interstate cooperation category, while John Major and

Tony Blair were clearly of the essential cooperation persuasion,9 but the key element

here is that they both resembled Thatcher in the sense that they maintained the UK’s

‘outsider as insider’ tradition. Finally, the ideational elements Morris deems necessary to be a great power are also on display, since not only does Thatcher announce that “Free

Kuwait we shall!” but that if sanctions do not compel Iraq “to withdraw soon [Arab] and

Western forces will have no alternative but to free Kuwait by military means.”10 Also of

relevance is her closing statement that “Britain’s unique qualities are needed once

again: steadfastness in defence; staunchness as an ally; and willingness always to give

a lead.”11 This lends further credence to Marc R. Devore’s argument that Thatcher saw

supporting the US and becoming militarily involved in the 1991 Gulf War as critical to

“reaffirming the United Kingdom’s status as a great power.”12

7 Ibid 457. 8 Ibid 457. 9 See: Ibid 463. 10 Margaret Thatcher, “Speech at Lord Mayor’s Banquet” (Speech, London, UK, November 12, 1990), http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/108241 (accessed January 23, 2016). 11 Ibid. 12 Marc R. Devore, “Armed Forces, States, and Threats: Institutions and the British and French Responses to the 1991 Gulf War,” Comparative Strategy 31.1 (2012): 62.

149 Upon entering office, John Major inherited a government that was already

committed to using military force against Iraq,13 and thus it would be a mistake to see

UK involvement in the 1991 Gulf War through the same prism as the UK’s involvement

in the 2003 Iraq War, which was very much driven by Tony Blair’s personal preferences

and beliefs.14 But the lead up to the 1991 Gulf War shows that Major was (1)

predominant in regards to foreign policymaking; (2) placed immense importance on the

US-UK ‘special relationship’; (3) saw the UK as a great power; and (4) believed that the country’s great power status was best maintained by being a faithful ally to the US and playing the role of ‘bridge’ between the US and Europe. In other words, although he

differed from Thatcher and subscribed to the essential cooperation sub-discourse, his foreign policy can in large part be described as “continuing the substance of Mrs.

Thatcher’s foreign policy,”15 or in more Bourdieusian terminology, as suffering from the

inertia of habitus.

Peter Hennessey writes that Major had a “consensual, consultative style in the

Cabinet Room and his bilaterals with ministers,”16 which was in stark contrast to Heath

and Thatcher, who are both described as “führerprinzip leaders.”17 Perhaps the best

example of this difference in leadership is provided by a Whitehall deputy secretary,

who confided in Hennessey that “discussion is allowed; argument even.”18 However,

when it came to foreign policy and military matters, Major was predominant, with the

build-up to the 1991 Gulf War showing that he was unafraid to declare war without

13 For further proof, see: John Major, John Major: The Autobiography (HarperCollins: New York, 1999), 240. 14 This will be discussed in greater detail in the section on New Labour. 15 Macleod, “Great Britain: Still Searching for Status?,” 171. 16 Peter Hennessey, The Prime Minister: The Office and its Holders since 1945 (Palgrave: New York, 2000), 444. 17 Ibid 439. 18 Ibid 439.

150 consulting cabinet or parliament, bolstering Strong’s argument that the Westminster model best describes how the UK declared war until 2003.

Major states that he and President George H.W. Bush set out and agreed upon the principal options for the 1991 Gulf War during a car ride from Washington, DC to

Camp David,19 and that when the war started only four members of the UK government had received advanced notice of the impending Operation Desert Storm.20 Further highlighting Major’s predominance is the fact that Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd “was

[only] informed about an hour before the first bombs fell.”21 It is inaccurate, of course, to think that Hurd and other cabinet ministers had no idea that war was on the horizon, since Major had formed a war cabinet and Thatcher had alluded to military action in her last LMB speech two months prior. All signs pointed to an impending war. But the fact that only four members of the UK government received advanced notice speaks to

Major’s predominance and his willingness to wield the powers inherent to his office.

The build up to the 1991 Gulf War also reveals the close relationship between

Major and President Bush. During the previously mentioned car ride, which as Major notes was the “first time [they] had engaged in serious matters,” he writes that the atmosphere was “very relaxed, almost as though we were old familiar colleagues.”22 A friendship clearly formed, and was maintained even after President Bush left office, with photos of he and Major vacationing together in 1998 included in the latter’s autobiography, with Major referring to their friendship as an “enduring special

19 Major, John Major: The Autobiography (1999), 225-226. 20 Ibid 233. 21 Ibid 233. 22 Ibid 225.

151 relationship.”23 This close relationship is part of a larger theme: continuity with his Cold

War predecessors. Major placed immense importance on the US-UK ‘special

relationship’ and believed one of the keys to its maintenance was being an Atlantic

‘bridge’. Admittedly, his LMB speeches focus far more on Europe and the UK economy

than the UK’s relationship with the US,24 but both the special relationship and ‘bridge’

role are clearly alluded to, with reference in his 1991 speech to how good relations with

Europe “underpin the vital relationship with the US,” 25 while in 1992 he states that “our

role as a leading power in Europe has brought added value to our relationship with the

United States.”26 His Atlanticism is on full display in his 1993 speech, where he

highlights not only the importance of NATO but also the necessary ideational elements

necessary to be considered a great power by stating that “NATO’s transformation has

gone a long way and it will go further…we must adapt the Alliance; it must be able to

contribute to peace and security in a wider world; we must bring our fellow Europeans

into new kinds of partnership.”27 The emphasis on NATO is a hallmark of Atlanticism,

23 See: last page of photo section located in ibid 616-617. This idea of an “enduring special relationship” is confirmed by Raymond Seitz, who writes that the Gulf War “was a stunning political success for Major and Bush and sealed their friendship” (Raymond Seitz, Over Here (Weidenfeld & Nicolson: London, 1998), 320). 24 The greater focus on the economy began with his 1992 LMB speech, where he admitting that while “it is a time- honoured tradition to speak to this audience about foreign affairs…Tonight I would like to break with tradition…[and] primarily [talk] about confidence. About recovery. About the future of our country. About how to generate growth and bring lasting jobs and prosperity” (John Major, “Mr. Major’s Speech to the Lord Mayor’s Banquet” (Speech, London, UK, November 16, 1992), http://www.johnmajor.co.uk/page4355.html (accessed January 23, 2016). In other words, his LMB speeches focused more on the economy rather than foreign policy, which was a break from his 1991 LMB speech. Considering that this speech occurred after receiving his 1992 mandate, it stands to reason that this “break in tradition” is a symptom of him no longer feeling like he was “living in sin” by gaining office through appointment rather than general election. In other words, from the 1992 election onwards we get a better sense of the ‘real’ John Major, one pursuing policies based more on his personal preferences and beliefs rather than to some extent tying up Thatcher’s loose ends. 25 John Major, “Mr. Major’s Speech to the Lord Mayor’s Banquet” (Speech, London, UK, November 11, 1991), http://www.johnmajor.co.uk/page1016.html (accessed January 23, 2016). 26 John Major, “Mr. Major’s Speech to the Lord Mayor’s Banquet”, 1992. 27 John Major, “Mr. Major’s Speech at the 1993 Lord Mayor’s Banquet” (Speech, London, UK, November 15, 1993), http://johnmajor.co.uk/pages1315.html (accessed January 23, 2016).

152 while the ideational elements are met because Major believed it was the UK that had to

lead this charge; that the UK, being a great power, had to be at the forefront of

reforming NATO into an alliance that provided value in the post-Cold War era.

Major’s Leader’s Speeches, given yearly at the annual Conservative Party

Conference, also provide valuable insight into his foreign policy views, making up for the

absence of foreign policy discussion in his LMB speeches. In his inaugural 1991

Leader’s Speech he states his steadfast belief that the UK was a force for good, and

that the UK, being “a great European power,” must remain in Europe, with NATO

playing a central role in British and European defence.28 This sentiment is reiterated in

his 1995 LMB speech, with Major stating that he wanted the UK to be in the “Heart of

Europe.”29 Being at the “Heart of Europe” was of critical importance for maintaining the

‘special relationship’ and the UK’s ‘bridge’ role, with Major stating in his 1992 Leader’s

Speech that “Britain is the unbreakable link between the United States and the continent

of Europe… [And] we in this Party will preserve and strengthen our special relationship

with the United States.”30

Counter-arguments that Major did not view the UK as a great power will be

discussed shortly, but to tie up discussion on Major’s view of the special relationship

and the UK’s now traditional role as an Atlantic ‘bridge’, his autobiography lays it bare.

“If the importance of the Anglo-American alliance needed any emphasis it was provided

28 John Major, “Leader’s Speech, 1991” (Speech, Blackpool, England, October 11, 1991), http://britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=137 (accessed March 24, 2016). 29 John Major, “Mr. Major’s Speech at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet” (Speech, London, UK, November 20, 1995), http://www.johnmajor.co.uk/page1375.html (accessed January 23, 2016). 30 John Major, “Leader’s Speech, 1992” (Speech, Brighton, England, October 6, 1992), http://britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=138 (accessed March 24, 2016).

153 vividly by the Gulf War…Although the term ‘special relationship’ is often misused, there

is a unique rapport between Britain and the United States.”31 He also writes that “we

straddled the divide between the United States and Europe… [and that] the United

States wanted Britain to be a strong voice in Europe as geography, economics and

common values suggested we should.”32 Thus, when Major stated in 1995 that he wanted the UK to be in the “Heart of Europe,” he was clearly viewing this through the prism of the ‘special relationship’ – through the ingrained notion that the UK maintains its great power status in part by playing a ‘bridge’ role. To conclude, Major’s foreign policy outlook appears to be perfectly summed up with the following words: “Ray Seitz, the engaging and Anglophile diplomat who served as United States ambassador to

Britain for much of my premiership, reinforced this view by telling me repeatedly that

Britain’s influence in America would grow as our role in Europe developed.”33 Ending

with a discussion of individual habitus, Major’s father lived in the US as a child, with the

former PM writing that he “grew up with tales of America. My father retained an abiding

affection for the great democracy where he had once lived, and I imbibed it at his

knee.”34 This suggests that he may have been emotionally pre-disposed to desiring

close relations with the US thanks to cherished childhood memories, so the fact that

Major appears to have viewed UK foreign policy largely through the prism of the ‘special relationship’ and believed that maintaining the traditions of said relationship, like needing to play the role of ‘bridge’ despite the shift to a unipolar system, is unsurprising.

31 Major, John Major: The Autobiography (1999), 496. 32 Major, John Major: The Autobiography (2000), 578. 33 Major, John Major: The Autobiography (1999), 496. 34 Ibid 496.

154 Turning finally to the counter-arguments, Alex Macleod argues that his findings support the argument that the Major government was “fully conscious of having lost its status as a major power, but clings to the belief that it still matters in the international system.”35 His methodology has already been discussed, but a key element of his

argument is the absence of references to the ‘special relationship’. Applying Macleod’s logic, if this relationship, which “allowed [the UK] to claim status that did not confine its influence to Western Europe,” is barely mentioned, then this absence of references must be taken to confirm “the trend towards Britain’s irreversible turn to Europe as its primary sphere of influence”36 – thus serving as confirmation that “British policy makers

have come to terms with the irretrievable loss of great power status.”37 Macleod also highlights the Major government’s use of the term medium-sized power to describe its international status, and this is confirmed by Major in his autobiography, writing that “we

were no longer an imperial power, but a medium sized nation that could ‘punch above

its weight’ thanks to our historic legacy, our skilled diplomacy and the muscle of our

armed forces.”38 However, upon closer inspection, and admittedly greatly aided by the

gift of hindsight, issues arise which weaken Macleod’s thesis. In regards to hindsight,

Tony Blair clearly saw the UK as playing a great power role, so if Macleod is correct

about the Major government his analysis certainly does not apply to the Blair years, thus

making his conclusions premature. It also must be noted that Macleod did not have

35 Macleod, “Great Britain: Still Searching for Status?,” 178. Note that Macleod uses the terms “major power” and “great power” interchangeably. For proof see Ibid 180. 36 Ibid 182. 37 Ibid 186. 38 Major, John Major: The Autobiography (2000), 578.

155 access to sources like John Major’s autobiography, which grants present researchers a

much greater understanding of his thought process.

But leaving hindsight aside it is evident that there are some issues with

Macleod’s findings. The first issue is that he interprets the paucity of mentions to the

special relationship as proof that the UK no longer viewed itself as having influence

outside of Western Europe, and this is problematic for two reasons. First, earlier

analysis has shown that the ‘special relationship’ was central to Major’s thinking, thus

said paucity of references does not represent a shift in thinking within the UK political

field. It certainly seems logical to conclude that a paucity of references to something

represents a shift away from it, but in regards to Major that was not the case. Second,

Major clearly believed that the UK had global influence, writing that although “Britain’s

influence had waned” and “had the lingering impulses of an imperial power, but no

empire,” the country still mattered.39 To him, it still mattered because it was one the five

permanent members of the UN Security Council, possessed a disproportionately

effective armed forces, shared “the special bonds of the Commonwealth,” and

maintained a special relationship with the US – ensuring that “our voice counted at the

top table.”40 This sentiment is also found in his 1994 Leader’s Speech, where he

describes the UK as still being in the “top league” thanks to, among other things, its

membership and leadership role in NATO, EU, Commonwealth and the UN Security

Council, and because it is “one of only five significant nuclear powers in the world.”41

39 Major, John Major: The Autobiography (1999), 495. 40 Ibid 495-496. 41 John Major, “Leader’s Speech, 1994” (Speech, Bournemouth, England, October 14, 1994), http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=140 (accessed March 24, 2016).

156 When combined with the fact that from 1992 to 1995 the UK took the lead in

Bosnia,42 Major’s belief that the UK had to lead the transformation of NATO, and the

country’s contribution to the 1991 Gulf War, the PM clearly saw the UK as wielding

influence at an international rather than purely European level.43 Foreign Secretary

Douglas Hurd echoed these sentiments, writing in 1992 that “Britain has punched above

her weight in the world. We intend to keep it that way,” and that it “plays a central role in

world affairs…which we continue to earn through active diplomacy and a willingness to

shoulder our share of international responsibilities.”44 Adding to this are the themes of

the 1992 Conservative Manifesto, which William Wallace lists as ‘leadership’,

‘responsibility’ and ‘Britain’s leading role.’45

The second issue with Macleod’s analysis is that he fails to take nomenclature concerns into consideration, and also overemphasizes material capabilities (or in his case, references to material capabilities in political speeches) at the expense of ideational elements. Previous discussion of Justin Morris’ work laid out the importance

of considering material and ideational elements when determining if a country still

possesses great power status, but Macleod’s failure to consider nomenclature concerns

is problematic for two reasons. First, he fails to consider that terms like “great power”

42 See: McCourt, “Embracing Humanitarian Intervention: Atlanticism and the UK Interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo,” 249-252. 43 This is made clear in his 1995 Leader’s Speech, where he argues that “Britain has big interests in the world. We are the only nation at the hub of the European Union, NATO and the United Nations. We are a nuclear power and a member of the [P5]. Our armed forces are today serving in more than forth countries, including Bosnia… International influence creates international obligations –and we will meet them” (John Major, “Leader’s Speech, 1995” (Speech, Blackpool, England, October 13, 1995), http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech- archive.htm?speech=141 (accessed March 24, 2016).) 44 Douglas Hurd quoted in William Wallace, “British Foreign Policy after the Cold War,” International Affairs 68.3 (1992): 438. 45 Ibid 438.

157 are unlikely to be used in the current post-colonial paradigm because it conjures up

images of colonialism, which the UK would want to avoid, especially if it valued close

relations with the Commonwealth, which Major clearly did. Second, he fails to consider that Major’s unique life experiences would make him averse to the use of terms that may conjure up images or memories of colonialism. This may be unfair and perhaps falls under the “in hindsight” category, but in his autobiography Major speaks of his time in Nigeria in 1966 and 1967, and how his experiences there taught him to “dislike the institutional racism of colonial life.”46 Considering this, it stands to reason that Major

was, on either a subconscious or conscious level,47 concerned with describing the UK in

a manner that conjured up images of what he witnessed in Nigeria. In other words, a

consideration of individual habitus lends weight to Morris’ arguments regarding

nomenclature concerns, and thus the absence of the Major government describing itself

as a great power should not be interpreted as a relinquishing of that ‘world role’, but

rather as trying to present its perceived great power status in a way that was acceptable

in a post-colonial context.

Despite these criticisms, Macleod is correct to argue that the Major years up to

1993 inclusive represented a period where the commitment to the ‘special relationship’

and ‘bridge’ felt largely ritualistic.48 Even in the years absent from Macleod’s analysis

(1994-97), Major’s attempts at playing a ‘bridge’ role were limited mostly to ‘dogged

advocacy of NATO.’ In fact, the Clinton-Major years are often seen as a low point in the

US-UK ‘special relationship’, with a frosty relationship between the President and PM

46 Major, John Major: The Autobiography (1999), 35. 47 Or possibly both. 48 Macleod, “Great Britain: Still Searching for Status?,” 174.

158 and frustrations mounting over differences between their country’s respective Balkan

strategies. Jumping ahead to Blair for a moment, Dyson notes that the US State

Department welcomed Blair and his more gung-ho attitude towards the use of military force because that meant “the British no longer had to be dragged along to confront the

Serbs.”49 Returning to Major, we see that his commitment to the ‘special relationship’

and ‘bridge’ role are sincere and play an influential role in the country’s foreign policy,

but in regards to being a ‘bridge’ it would appear that it was more rhetoric than action,

suggesting that this policy was pursued entirely because of habit – that the role was so

ingrained within the UK political field and in Major’s habitus that the role was still cited

and believed in despite the lack of action.

To conclude this section, we see that Major’s foreign policy views and habits

were very much in line with his predecessors, and thus it is unsurprising that the ‘bridge’

narrative continued to be influential to UK foreign policymaking despite the post-Cold

War shift to unipolarity. Major represented more continuity with the Cold War PMs than

change, and although it was not stated earlier, his belief that influence in Europe leads

to influence in Washington, and more generally the belief that influence in Washington

is vital to the UK’s national interests, shows that the ‘Greeks and Romans' metaphor

was still influencing his government’s foreign policy.

49 Stephen Benedict Dyson, “What difference Did He Make? Tony Blair and British Foreign Policy from 1997-2007,” in The Blair Legacy: Politics, Policy, Governance and Foreign Affairs, ed. Terence Casey (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 240.

159 5.3: New Labour

Beginning with Tony Blair, his predominance in regards to foreign policymaking was highly visible, with Richard Heffernan writing that he had a “presidential style, borne out of his eagerness to embody his government,” and that as perhaps the most commanding PM since the Second World War “he has striven to place Downing Street

— and himself — at the very hub of government.”50 Blair’s autobiography confirms this, mentioning that “after a few years in government I had accumulated seventy [special advisers], [which] was considered by some to be a bit of a constitutional outrage.”51

Furthermore, Peter Hennessey labels Blair as a “command premier” who, along with

“his inner group of advisers seemed determined to operate inside No.10, once they got there, as they had within the Labour Party – driving policy and presentation from the centre around a core of delivery musts, and brooking no serious resistance either from ministerial colleagues or from cumbersome, traditional government mechanics.”52

Finally, Anthony Seldon comments that Blair was heavily influenced by Thatcher’s leadership style, writing that he was “mesmerised by her use of language, her emphatic leadership style and intolerance of dissent, and her authority on the world stage.”53

In terms of understanding Blair’s individual habitus, the importance of his university friend Peter Thomson and the works of the philosopher John Macmurray must be examined. In regards to Thomson, whom Blair considers to be “probably the

50 Richard Heffernan, “Exploring (and Explaining) the British Prime Minister,” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 7 (2005): 608. 51 Tony Blair, A Journey: My Political Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010), 19. 52 Hennessey, The Prime Minister: The Office and its Holders since 1945, 477. 53 Anthony Seldon, Blair (London: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 441.

160 most influential person in my life,”54 he was an Australian Anglican priest who, despite being in his mid-thirties, was enrolled in Oxford at the same time as Blair. In terms of how he influenced Blair’s life, it largely boils down to two factors. First, he is responsible for introducing Blair to the works of John Macmurray; and second, for making him take his religious beliefs more seriously. Seldon writes that what Blair took from Thomson was “the idea that your religious beliefs aren’t something that shut you away from the world, but something that meant you had to go out and act,”55 while Blair states that

Thomson’s “influence remains like an insistent reminder that life has to be lived for a purpose.”56 In terms of understanding Blair’s politics, the former PM writes that to understand his politics one must understand that for him religion comes before politics, and this causes him to have a different starting point than many of his political cotemporaries, explaining that religion “starts with values that are born of a view of humankind,” while politics “starts with an examination of society and the means of changing it.”57

Turning to John Macmurray, in 1994 Blair stated that “if you really want to understand what I’m all about you have to look at a guy called John Macmurray. It’s all there.”58 Described as a combination of Christian Socialism and a conservative critique of liberalism,59 Macmurray argued that in the relationship between individuals and society neither should predominate, and opted for what Seldon describes as a “third way,” writing that for Macmurray “ultimate reality was neither the individual nor society

54 Blair, A Journey: My Political Life, 79. 55 Seldon, Blair, 44. 56 Blair, A Journey: My Political Life, 80. 57 Ibid 80. 58 Seldon, Blair, 32. Also: John Rentoul, Tony Blair (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 41. 59 Rentoul, Tony Blair, 43.

161 alone, but could be fully formed only in personal relationships.”60 Eventually, after being

exposed to works such as Reason and Emotion and Conditions of Freedom, Blair

developed a theory about socialism that would guide him throughout his university and

political career, writing:

I developed a theory about the basics of socialism being about “community” –i.e. people owed obligations to each other and were social beings, not only individuals out for themselves – which pushed me down the path of trying to retrieve Labour’s true values from the jumble of ideological baggage that was piled on top of them, obscuring their meaning. For me, it was socialism, and wasn’t about a particular type of economic organisation, anchored to a particular point in history.61

This central belief in the importance of “community” is of critical importance to

understanding Blair’s foreign policy and will be examined in greater detail when

discussion turns to his first term as PM, but for now it is crucial to understand that his

individual habitus was greatly shaped by Thomson and the works of Macmurray, and

that during his formative Oxford years he developed what Dumbrell refers to as his

“muscular Christianity,”62 which, like Thomson, forced Blair to (1) become a “doer

[rather than] a spectator,”63 and (2) believe that society should place focus on the

community rather than just the individual. This belief in the importance of being a “doer” helps to explain why Blair was so keen to maintain the UK’s great power status, since he very much believed that the UK had a duty to shape the international community for

the better. The UK had to act, had to ‘do’ rather than simply be a ‘spectator.’ Turning to

60 Seldon, Blair, 32. 61 Blair, A Journey: My Political Life, 81. 62 John Dumbrell, “Working with Allies: The United States, the United Kingdom, and the War on Terror,” Politics & Policy 34.2 (2006): 465. 63 Blair, A Journey: My Political Life, 80.

162 Morris, because of this emphasis on action the Blair years more than adequately meet

the ideational elements necessary to maintain great power status.

Returning to Blair’s individual habitus, it appears safe to argue that his individual

beliefs are very much a reflection of national habitus, and that we should view his

thinking towards foreign policy as an example of homology rather than transcendent

thought, as his thinking is in line with his post-war predecessors. The section on the

Cold War provided evidence that within the political field the predominant belief was that

the UK remained a great power, and earlier discussions on Bourdieu’s concept of the

“admission fee” leads to the conclusion that since PMs must be viewed as believing in

and embodying the national habitus, then logically the British public continues to believe

that the country is a great power and must continue to play this role in the international

system. Blair provides evidence of this, at least anecdotally, writing that “the British,

whatever they say, prefer their prime minister to stand tall internationally…Brits would

want to know that in a French city people would recognise me. Our leaders should

stand out, and if not cut a sash, at least make an impact.”64 In terms of empirical

evidence, Robin Niblett’s analysis supports Blair’s assertions, writing that in regards to

foreign policy the British mood can best be described as one “that combines a hankering after Britain’s continued status as a great power with a sense of ‘contented passivity’.”65 This “hankering” Niblett speaks of is evident in Tony Blair’s first LMB

speech, and that is where our attention now turns.

64 Blair. A Journey: My Political Life, 409. 65 Robin Niblett, The Chatham House-YouGov Survey 2011: British Attitudes Towards the UK’s International Priorities (London: Chatham House, 2011), 1. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/0711ch_yougov_analysis.pdf (accessed Mar 13, 2016). Note: The fact that this survey was conducted after Blair left office and wrote his autobiography is not of much

163 Unlike John Major, Tony Blair followed tradition and focused his LMB speeches

primarily on UK foreign policy, and his first speech in 1997 is incredibly revealing in that

it lays out the assumptions and principles that would guide the country’s foreign policy

during his time in office. First, he claims that the goal of UK foreign policy is clear:

We cannot in these post-Empire days be a super-power in a military sense. But we can make the British presence in the world felt. With our historical alliances, we can be pivotal. We can be powerful in our influence – a nation to whom others listen. Why? Because we run Britain well and are successful ourselves.66

This idea of the UK as a “pivotal” power is essential to understanding Blairite foreign

policy for two reasons. First, it is clear that based on his word choice that “pivotal” is just

another way of calling the UK a great power,67 which strengthens Morris’ argument

regarding nomenclature concerns. Second, as a “pivotal” power the country must act,

which is reflective of Blair’s personal belief in the importance of being a “doer” rather

than a spectator. More generally, Blair is clearly placing himself within the same

postcolonial paradigm as his other post-1968 predecessors and is ruling out any attempts to turn the clocks back to pre-1945 and the days of the ‘big three’ and empire.

If this were the case, then Blair’s would not so readily admit that the country is no longer

significance. As previously stated, this paper’s historical analysis, plus discussion of Morris’ more flexible approach to defining ‘great power’, shows that Blair was well founded in believing that the UK still maintained this status. Furthermore, the fact that Blair placed such importance on the UK playing a leading international role in his foreign policy speeches (analysis to follow shortly) and was re-elected twice is evidence that his words and actions were deemed by the UK public to be reflective of the country’s national habitus or “national Self”. This is further strengthened by the fact that this survey is also being conducted during a period of austerity (thanks to the financial crisis of the late 2000s) and with the legacy of Blair’s post 9/11 wars (Afghanistan and Iraq) still relatively fresh in people’s minds. 66 Tony Blair, “Speech by the Prime Minister Tony Blair at Lord Mayor’s Banquet” (Speech, London, UK, November 10, 1997), http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20060403085217/http:/pm.gov.uk/output/page1070.asp (accessed January 23, 2016). 67 This is confirmed by later speeches, which will be discussed shortly.

164 “a super-power in a military sense.” Turning the clock back to pre-1945 implies a desire for the UK to be in a position where it had sufficient material capabilities to potentially compete with, or at the very least to wield military action on the international stage independent of, the US, and such a desire clearly vanished in the period between the

Suez Crisis and the end of ‘East of Suez.’ Nothing about Blair’s foreign policy points to a desire to relive past glories. In fact, Blair clearly states that by adopting a modern foreign policy the UK can “escape from the legacy of the past and shape an exciting future for [itself].”68

A good way to view Blair’s foreign policy is to see him as similar to Margaret

Thatcher, in the sense that both were of the firm belief that the UK possessed great

power status and that maintaining this status was best achieved through the ‘special

relationship’, in particular by being a ‘bridge’ between the US and Europe. In laying out

the principles that must guide UK foreign policy, the importance of playing the ‘bridge’

role was seen by Blair as being of the utmost importance, and he even goes so far as to

state that “we are the bridge between the US and Europe” when discussing the second

principle of a modern UK foreign policy: “Strong in Europe and strong with the US.”69

Five principles are mentioned in total, and for our sakes the first (“be a leading partner

in Europe”)70 and second principles are of great significance, since the first shows that

like Major he saw the UK as being at the heart of Europe, while the second reveals that like Major he too suffered from the inertia of habitus.

68 Tony Blair, “Speech by the Prime Minister Tony Blair at Lord Mayor’s Banquet” (Speech, London, UK, November 10, 1997), http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20060403085217/http:/pm.gov.uk/output/page1070.asp (accessed January 23, 2016). 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid.

165 However, the third and fourth principles, which are, respectively, that the UK

requires a strong defence in order to defend itself and project influence abroad, and that

the UK must use its power to promote “the values and aims we believe in,”71 tie into a

broader belief – that the UK, along with the US, is a force for good. “Leaving all

sentiment aside, they [the US] are a force for good in the world. They can always be

relied on when the chips are down. The same should always be true of Britain.”72 This

sentiment manifests itself again in 1998, where Blair discusses not only the importance

of standing shoulder to shoulder with the US, but also repeats that the UK is a “pivotal”

power.73 The firmness of Blair’s belief that the US is a force for good is underscored in

the introductory chapter of his autobiography, which is focused almost entirely on

reminding the US of its greatness, and that since it is a force for good in the world it must not be afraid to act.74

Despite claims at the 1999 LMB speech that the UK must no longer pretend to be

“the Greeks to the Americans’ Romans” and “use the strengths of our history to build

our future not as a super power but as a pivotal power,”75 Blair’s foreign policy was

clearly influenced by ‘Greeks and Romans’ thinking. His approach to Iraq in 2002-03 is

a prime example, with Dumbrell arguing that “through British intervention, America

71 Ibid. Note: the fifth principle, that the UK must continue to champion free trade, is not of much importance to this paper. 72 Ibid. 73 Tony Blair, “Speech by the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs” (Speech, December 15, 1998), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20071104143615/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page1168.asp (accessed January 23, 2016). 74 Blair, A Journey: My Political Life, xi-xvi. 75 Tony Blair, “Shaping A Pivotal Role for Britain in the World” (Speech, London, UK, November 22, 1999), http://www.the-islander.org.ac/oldsite/1461.htm (accessed January 23, 2016). Note: in this speech he reaffirms the importance of the UK playing a ‘bridge’ role in the post-Cold War era, stating: “My vision for Britain is as a bridge between the EU and the USA”.

166 should be prevailed upon to refocus on Palestinian Israeli peace, sharpen its public

diplomacy, offer mediation as well as confrontation, and above all multilateralize.”76

Coupled with the importance he placed on cultivating close personal relations with both

Clinton and George W Bush, and Wallace and Phillips’ mention that the British believed

that Afghanistan (rather than Iraq) was attacked in the immediate aftermath of 9/11

because they were “able to restrain the bellicose Americans,”77 it would appear that the

‘Greeks and Romans’ metaphor always exerted influence on his thinking, and that post

9/11 it seems to have increased. Niblett’s question as to whether the 2003 Iraq War

serves as a watershed and effectively killed the idea of ‘Greeks and Romans’ within the

UK political field will be explored in later sections,78 but when discussing Blair it appears safe to conclude that despite public proclamations to the contrary, ‘Greeks and Romans’

thinking certainly helped guide his foreign policy.

Turning the clock back slightly to the late 1990s, Blair writes that his foreign

policy awakening was abrupt and “happened over Kosovo.”79 If Kosovo is when a Blair

doctrine on foreign policy truly emerges then it looks incredibly similar to his words in

the 1997 LMB speech, since playing the role of ‘bridge’ was central to his 1999 LMB

speech – a speech given nearly six months after the Kosovo War ended. The key

speech highlighted by both Blair himself and the academic literature is the speech he

gave at the Economic Club of Chicago in April 1999,80 which lays out the key concept of

76 Dumbrell, “Working with Allies: The United States, The United Kingdom, and the War on Terror,” 463. 77 Wallace and Phillips, “Reassessing the Special Relationship,” 275. 78 See: Robin Niblett, “Choosing Between America and Europe: A New Context for British Foreign Policy,” International Affairs 83.4 (2007): 639. 79 Blair, A Journey: My Political Life, 223. 80 See: Blair, A Journey: My Political Life; Oliver Daddow and Pauline Schnapper, “Liberal Internvention in the Foreign Policy Thinking of Tony Blair and David Cameron,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 26.2 (2013): 330-349; John Dumbrell, “The US-UK Special Relationship: Taking the 21st Century Temperature,” The British

167 his doctrine: the idea of international community, with Blair highlighting “the explicit

recognition that today more than ever before we are mutually dependant, that national interest is to a significant extent governed by international collaboration.”81 Critical to

this concept of international community is the maintenance of international security,

which, of course, begs the important question of when the international community

should involve itself in armed conflicts. According to Blair, there are five considerations

states must bear in mind:

First, are we sure of the case? … Second, have we exhausted all diplomatic options? … Third, on the basis of a practical assessment of the situation, are there military operations we can sensibly and prudently undertake? Fourth, are we prepared for the long term? … Finally, do we have national interests involved?82

Criticisms of this doctrine emerge during both the Brown and Cameron administrations,

but for now the important point is, as Blair stated in his 2001 LMB speech, that the

doctrine of international community meant “we took a much more active and

interventionist role in solving the world’s problems.”83 This more active and

interventionist role manifested itself in UK involvement in Iraq in 1998 and 2003, Kosovo

in 1998-99, and Afghanistan in 2001, and is clearly a reflection of his muscular

Christianity and personal belief in the importance of community rather than the

Journal of Politics and International Relations 11 (2009): 64-78; Alex Danchev, “Tony Blair’s Vietnam: The Iraq War and the ‘Special Relationship’ in Historical Perspective,” Review of International Studies 33 (2007): 189-203. 81 Tony Blair, “Prime Minister’s Speech: Doctrine of the International Community at the Economic Club, Chicago” (Speech, Chicago, USA, April 24, 1999), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20071104143615/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page1297.asp (accessed January 23, 2016). 82 Ibid. 83 Tony Blair, “Lord Mayor’s Banquet” (Speech, London, UK, November 12, 2001), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20040621031906/http://number10.gov.uk/page1661 (accessed January 23, 2016).

168 individual. But for this paper’s purposes, the most important aspect of this doctrine is

that (1) it further strengthens arguments that the UK under Blair met the ideational requirements to maintain great power status, and (2) the US-UK ‘special relationship’ and the UK’s traditional ‘bridge’ role was central to its implementation.

Evidence of this comes from his 2004 LMB speech, which he concludes by stating that “we have a unique role to play. Call it a bridge, a two lane motorway, a pivot or call it a damn high wire…our job is to keep our sights firmly on both sides of the

Atlantic, use the good old British characteristics of common sense and make the argument.”84 This is reiterated in his final LMB speech in 2006, where he states that “the

alliances Britain has with America and within Europe must remain the cornerstone of

our policy…They are the vital life source of British power, influence and weight in the

new global community taking shape around us.”85

In contrast to Major, there are obvious examples of Blair playing a ‘bridge’ role

beyond that of ‘dogged advocacy of NATO.’ His attempts at building international coalitions in the lead-up to both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars are obvious examples, but less discussed is Kosovo – in particular his actions during the first few months of

1999 to bring the Europeans and US together in agreement over the use of military

force to prevent ethnic cleansing. His dealings with Clinton, the NATO hierarchy and

key European leaders like Jacques Chirac show considerable diplomatic skills on Blair’s

84 Tony Blair, “Speech at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet” (Speech, London, UK, November 15, 2004), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20071104143615/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page6583.asp (accessed January 23, 2016). 85 Tony Blair, “PM’s World Affairs Speech to the Lord Mayor’s Banquet” (Speech, London, UK, November 13, 2006), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20071104143615/http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page10409.asp (accessed January 23, 2016).

169 part, but more importantly his desire to lead and utilize the special position that he felt his country held that enabled it to talk to, unite, and influence both the US and Europe for a common purpose, which for Blair hopefully meant the deployment of ground troops rather than just air strikes.86

Another good, albeit subtler, example of UK as ‘bridge’ is the genesis of the

ESDP at the 1998 Saint-Malo Summit.87 Merand notes that Blair wanted to do something with the EU in NATO, so a small group of diplomats made it happen, drafting the “Declaration on European Defense…late at night…and slipped under the conference room door early in the morning for the leaders to endorse”.88 In terms of the

‘bridge’, it is clear that Blair, either consciously or subconsciously, was trying to bring

Europe and the US closer, since greater cooperation between the EU and NATO in terms of security and defence would obviously achieve that. It further highlights the power held by the PM in terms of foreign policymaking, because although Blair did not write the ‘Declaration’ he was the one who got the proverbial ball rolling by making his desires known and officials below him responded and made it happen. This was not a case of officials driving policy and convincing Blair of something but rather officials responding to the PM’s demands and preferences, further strengthening arguments regarding PM predominance. Furthermore, the fact that it was slipped under the

European leaders’ door for them to endorse, and not brought back to Westminster for further discussion with the cabinet, is telling, since it confirms PM predominance and also highlights the power the PM gains over foreign policy thanks to their participation in

86 Blair, A Journey: My Political Life, 230-243. 87 Refer to subsection 3.3 if you have forgotten our previous discussion on the ESDP. 88 Merand, “Pierre Bourdieu and the Birth of European Defense”, 367.

170 summits. To conclude this paragraph, when all these examples are considered together

it represents numerous cases of the UK acting as a “pivotal” power and all the other

metaphors Blair used to describe the UK’s role in bringing the US and Europe together,

even if the UK did not always achieve all of its desired goals.

Finally, despite Blair’s obvious attempts at using his country’s ‘bridge’ role within

the ‘special relationship’ to gain influence in Washington, and his close personal

relationship with both Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, just like his predecessors his

influence was never more than limited at best, which reiterates the fact that it is

ultimately the President and their inner circle that decides how much influence the PM

will have in Washington. Dyson astutely points out that the “declining influence of Colin

Powell coupled with the increasing power of secretary of defence Donald Rumsfeld and

vice president Dick Cheney,”89 as well as the administration’s adherence to neo-

conservatism, were obvious barriers limiting Blair from having anything more than a

limited influence on US foreign policy. Blair’s overall standing and influence in

Washington is perhaps best summed up by noting that “Rumsfeld and Cheney…saw

Blair as a potentially useful spokesman but as someone who also represented a multilateralism they found distasteful…[and] his ability to shape the policies of the Bush administration was less than he seems to have supposed – the US approached the UN in a hostile fashion which seemed almost guaranteed to prevent the emergence of consensus, and Blair’s continued efforts to push for a resolution of Israel-Palestine were given little more than lip-service.”90

89 Stephen Benedict Dyson, The Blair Identity: Leadership and Foreign Policy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), 6. 90 Ibid 6.

171 Concluding this sub-section with Gordon Brown and his time as PM, like Blair he

too was predominant in foreign policy making. This is captured well by Kevin Theakston,

who notes that “a return to collective Cabinet government was promised but the

controlling and micro-managing Brown could hardly reinvent himself as an Attlee-esque

chairman of the Cabinet…There were few ‘ad hoc’ or ‘MISC’ Cabinet committee’s in

Brown’s system (only six by 2010), but Brown himself chaired two key central

committees: NEC, the National Economic Council handling economic policy and the

recession (Blair had not chaired his own government’s economic policy committee), and

NSID, the lead committee on national security, international relations and

development.”91 In regards to individual habitus, his father was a Minister of the Church

of Scotland, and was taught that “wealth should help more than the wealthy, that good

fortune should serve more than the fortunate and that riches must enrich not just some

of our communities but all of our communities.”92 Like Blair, his emphasis on the

importance of community played a role in his foreign policymaking, but, unlike his

predecessor, despite his religious beliefs and upbringing he never suffered from, as

Jonathan Powell calls it, Blair’s “messiah complex.”93

Dumbrell highlights Brown’s 2008 Kennedy Memorial Lecture as being critical to understanding his foreign policy, writing that it focused on the power of ideas and values rather than military intervention.94 For Brown, the focus was not on the UK being a

91 Kevin Theakston, “Gordon Brown as Prime Minister: Political Skills and Leadership Style,” British Politics 6.1 (2011): 87. 92 Gordon Brown, “Shared Values, Shared Futures,” in Gordon Brown, The Change We Choose: Speeches 2007-2009 (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 2010), 132. 93 Jonathan Powell, The New Machiavelli: How to Wield Power in the Modern World (London: The Bodley Head, 2010), 56. 94 Dumbrell, “The US-UK Special Relationship: Taking the 21st-Century Temperature,” 67.

172 ‘pivotal power’ or a ‘bridge’ but helping to build a truly global society, with the PM

emphasizing this in said Memorial Lecture address, stating “global problems require

global solutions; the greatest of global challenges demands of us the boldest of global

reforms.”95 This emphasis on global society is evident in his 2007 LMB speech, where

he states that his approach to foreign policy is best described as “hard-headed

internationalism,” and the need to build a “global society” through “our shared interests

and shared values.”96

Dan Bulley argues that Blair’s doctrine of international community was an attempt

to legitimize British claims to “ethical foreign policy,” and continuity of this principle was

evident during Brown’s time as PM.97 “Ethical foreign policy,” as Bulley points out,

consists of humanitarian intervention, and this seems to contradict Dumbrell, who as

previously mentioned argues that Brown was moving away from military intervention. To

understand this, we turn to Oliver Daddow, who argues that both Brown and Cameron

tried to return UK foreign policy to where it was before 9/11, when it was “more

constructive and pragmatic.”98 Maintaining focus on Brown, Daddow notes that critical

to the Brown overhaul of foreign policy was “toning down the missionary zeal of the Blair

years when it came to discussing the use of force to change the world for the better…

[Stressing] the part that development aid could play in increasing global justice and

95 Gordon Brown, “A New World Order” in Gordon Brown, The Change We Choose: Speeches 2007-2009 (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 2010), 18. 96 Gordon Brown, “Lord Mayor’s Banquet Speech” (Speech, London, UK, November 12, 2007), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.number10.gov.uk/page13736 (accessed March 20, 2016). 97 Dan Bulley, “The Politics of Ethical Foreign Policy: A Responsibility To Protect Whom?,” European Journal of International Relations 16.3 (2010): 441-442. 98 Oliver Daddow, “The Use of Force in British Foreign Policy: From New Labour to the Coalition,” The Political Quarterly 84.1 (2013): 110.

173 economic security in the medium and long terms.”99 His stance on military action is

clarified in his 2008 Kennedy Memorial Lecture, where, repeating the term “hard-

headed internationalist” from his 2007 LMB speech, he said that military action could be used to prevent crimes against humanity, but only when necessary – placing diplomatic

and economic action before using armed force.100 This seems to strengthen Daddow’s

argument that Brown was attempting to steer UK foreign policy away from the excesses

of the post 9/11 Blair years, with the 2008 NSS calling for the country, in rather

Brownian terminology, to “be hard-headed about the risks, our aims, and our

capabilities… [And] that in an increasingly interdependent world [we] cannot opt out of

overseas engagement. But overseas especially we need to be realistic, and set realistic

expectations, about what we can achieve.”101

Finally, in regards to the ‘special relationship’ and ‘bridge’ role, the 2008 NSS,

Brown’s 2008 Kennedy Memorial Lecture and the 2007 and 2008 LMB speeches

highlight the continued importance of the ‘special relationship’, but absent are any direct

mentions to the UK being a ‘bridge’ between the US and Europe. A ‘bridge’ role is

perhaps implied in the 2008 LMB speech, with Brown stating that “with the far-sighted

leadership we have in Europe, the whole of Europe can and will work closely with

America and with the rest of the world to meet the great challenges which will illuminate

our convictions and test our resolution.”102 This fits with Philip Gannon’s argument that

99 Ibid 114. 100 See: Brown, “A New World Order,” 20. 101 Cabinet Office, “The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent World,” March 2008, pg. 6. 102 Gordon Brown, “Working for a Secure International Order,” in Gordon Brown, The Change We Choose: Speeches 2007-2009 (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 2010), 35.

174 Brown saw the UK as the Atlantic Bridge uniting the US and Europe “in reaching a

solution to the global economic crisis”.103

However, the Brown years must also be seen as breaking with tradition to an

extent, since as Daddow points out, Brown and Miliband “overhauled the language of

foreign policy…and in came the presentation of Britain – and especially the City of

London – as a ‘hub’ for global economic and diplomatic relations.”104 This was

emphasized in his 2009 LMB speech, where he reminded the audience that Britain’s

strength lay in its unique position as being “right at the heart of great international

institutions and alliances – the EU, NATO, UN, the Commonwealth, the G8 and G20.”105

In fact, this speech is notable for its absence of mentions to the ‘special relationship’ or invoking the ‘bridge’ metaphor. Rather, his thesis is that British power stems from being at the centre of global institutions, alliances, and the global economy,106 and that its

interests are best served by adopting a global focus, rather than the more traditional

Atlanticist focus on the US and Europe. Capturing this well is David Miliband, who in

2008 stated:

I’m not sure the image of the UK as a bridge was ever right. It epitomised our ambivalent relationship with Europe, suggesting Europe was a bilateral relationship rather than an institution of which we are party. But with the rise of India, China and other emerging powers, the notion is even more inappropriate. I prefer to describe our role in the world as a global hub.107

103 Philip Gannon, “The Bridge that Blair Built: David Cameron and the Transatlantic Relationship,” British Politics 9.2 (2014): 210. 104 Daddow, “The Use of Force in British Foreign Policy: From New Labour to the Coalition,” 114. 105 Gordon Brown, “Five Giants to do Battle with,” in Gordon Brown, The Change We Choose: Speeches 2007-2009 (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 2010), 51. 106 Ibid 52. 107 David Miliband, “Speech at the FCO Leadership Conference” (Speech, London, UK, March 4, 2008), in Harvey, Perspectives on the UK’s Place in the World, 8.

175 Ultimately, Brown’s foreign policy was in many regards a continuation of Blair’s, but it also represents some important shifts in UK national role conception, primarily through an increasing focus on being a ‘hub’ rather than a ‘bridge’. Whatever desire there was to play the latter role it appears to be have been largely ritualistic and done mostly out of habit. The best way to describe the Brown years is as representing both a transition from, and continuity with, the Blair years, which is unsurprising given Brown’s prominent position in Blair’s core executive.

What is most important, however, is that during the Brown years the mental inertia surrounding the ‘bridge’ role starts to fall apart within the UK’s political field, and this can be largely attributed to Gordon Brown because as we have seen he was the dominant actor in the foreign policymaking process. Such a shift would not have occurred unless he supported it. Admittedly, there is not too much within his individual habitus to explain why he wanted to start moving away from the ‘bridge’. The issue is that the Brown government is underserved by the academic literature, at least when it comes to foreign policy, with Blair and Thatcher receiving the bulk of the attention.

Thus, future researchers willneed to conduct interviews and archival research that are both beyond this author’s means in order to get the full story. We have seen that individual habitus clearly helped prolong the ‘bridge’ hysteresis during the Major and

Blair years, but regarding the issues with Brown this may lend credence to Schindler and Wille’s argument that the Bourdieusian approach is bad at explaining change and is better suited to explaining continuities. However, the Bourdieusian approach is one hundred percent correct to point to the importance of the dominant actors and their individual preferences and beliefs, but perhaps when one is unable to gain a certain

176 level of access or particular vantage point this approach fails to add much more than a

strategic culture approach would save for field theory.

5.4: David Cameron

Critical to understanding Cameron’s foreign policy is recognizing that like Gordon

Brown his priority has been to turn the clock back to Blair’s first term, in order to “divorce himself from the messianic fervour of the post 9/11 Blair.”108 Cameron has attempted to

achieve this largely through two means: first, by strengthening the FCO; and second, by

returning to what Oliver Daddow and Pauline Schnapper call the UK’s bounded liberal

tradition.109 Turning to the FCO, Daddow writes that during Cameron’s first term, “Prime

Minister-Foreign Secretary relations appear to be more equal under Cameron and

Hague than seem to have been the case between Blair and his Foreign Secretaries,”

and that this move to greater collective responsibility is part of Cameron’s efforts to

“depersonalize foreign policy-making in Britain” and avoid accusations of “‘sofa

government’ in Downing Street.”110 Furthering this movement towards depersonalization

is Strong’s argument that, when it comes to deciding if armed forces will be deployed

overseas, the royal prerogative has given way to parliamentary prerogative power.

Although his examination ends with Syria in 2013, the Parliamentary debate and vote in

2015 on expanding anti-ISIS airstrikes into Syria would appear to support Strong’s argument that Syria 2013 established the political convention “that parliament ultimately

108 Oliver Daddow and Pauline Schnapper, “Liberal Intervention in the Foreign Policy Thinking of Tony Blair and David Cameron,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 26.2 (2013): 333. 109 Ibid. 110 Daddow, “The Use of Force in British Foreign Policy: From New Labour to the Coalition”, 115.

177 decides when Britain goes to war.”111 (This argument is further strengthened when one

considers that the Conservatives won a majority of seats in the 2015 election, meaning

they no longer had any coalition partners to potentially appease or consider before

deploying military force overseas.) Admittedly, this development weakens arguments

regarding the suitability of the Westminster model to explain aspects of the UK

government’s decision-making, but, in regards to UK foreign policymaking under

Cameron, PM predominance was still the reality, despite the steps taken to move away

from ‘sofa government’ and empower the FCO, and the weakening of the royal

prerogative in regards to military matters.

In terms of what this more equal PM-Foreign Secretary relationship looks like

under Cameron and William Hague, the latter, when describing how the decision-

making of the UK government needed to be improved, stated that:

Good decision-making also requires the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to be in its rightful place at the centre of decision-making. It is our intention to take a close interest not only in its day-to-day decisions but in its future as a great institution, able to attract the finest talent and, while it cannot have a monopoly on knowledge or expertise to be at the centre of Britain’s thinking about and development of relationships with other nations (sic). In my view, the sofa-style decision-making of Labour’s Downing Street has often prevented it from taking this role.112

This sentiment is echoed in Hague’s speech at the 2010 Conservative Party

Conference, where, only a few months after forming a coalition government with the

Liberal Democrats, he states, “On our first day the Prime Minister established the

111 Strong, “Why Parliament Now Decides on War: Tracing the Growth of the Parliamentary Prerogative through Syria, Libya and Iraq,” 617. 112 William Hague, “The Future of British Foreign Policy” (Speech, London, UK, July 21, 2009), http://conservativespeeches.sayit.mysociety.org/speech/601323 (accessed April 1, 2016).

178 National Security Council so that all relevant ministers consider these issues together

with all the expert advice available to them. And the Foreign Office is back where it

belongs at the centre of Government, able to lead in constructing a foreign policy which

runs through the veins of all government departments.”113

Similar sentiments are also expressed in his 2011 Foreign Secretary’s Speech,

where he highlights the government’s creation of the NSC, which “brings together the

key ministers, the Chief of the Defence Staff, the heads of the intelligence agencies,”

and to underscore the shift away from ‘sofa government’ he states that “on Libya alone

[it] has already met almost sixty times.”114 The 2015 NSS lays out the structure of the

NSC,115 and it is clear that PM predominance, albeit weaker than during the Blair years,

is still the reality. The PM chairs the NSC and four of its six current sub-committees,

meaning Cameron’s personal preferences and beliefs still carry great weight, plus

nothing has been done to curb his “hiring and firing” powers, with all of the NSC’s

permanent membership consisting of people appointed to their positions by the PM,

such as the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Foreign Secretary. But what this does

accomplish is forcing the PM to hear the opinions of his cabinet ministers, weakening

the chance of a Downing Street ‘sofa government’ from emerging once again. Finally,

although it is clear that Cameron is the predominant actor in the current UK

government, this was also the case during the 2010-2015 coalition government, with

Timothy Heppell pointing to Cameron’s ability to outmanoeuvre Nick Clegg and have a

113 William Hague, “Foreign Secretary’s Speech” (Speech, Birmingham, UK, October 6, 2010), http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=345 (accessed April 1, 2016). 114 William Hague, “Foreign Secretary’s Speech” (Speech, Manchester, UK, October 5, 2011), http://britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=346 (accessed April 1, 2016). 115 See: HM Government, “National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom,” November 2015, 82.

179 strongly Conservative dominated cabinet, with his party in-control of the core executive

and thus the policy agenda.116 This is echoed by Philip Gannon, who focuses his

foreign policy research on the Conservative part of the Coalition government (in

particular on the core executive) because “the Coalition agreement makes only a small

reference to foreign affairs and there has been little evidence of disputes between the

partners of the Coalition.”117

Turning to Cameron’s “bounded liberal” foreign policy, his overall foreign policy

vision is laid out in a 2006 speech, where he described himself as an adherent to liberal

conservatism, which follows five propositions:

First, that we should understand fully the threat we face. Second, that democracy cannot quickly be imposed from outside. Third, that our strategy needs to go far beyond military action. Fourth, that we need a new multilateralism to tackle the new global challenges we face. And fifth, that we must strive to act with moral authority.118

Of critical importance here is that the propositions are couched in language designed to

prevent a repeat of Blair’s crusading zeal, or his “messianic fervour,” with Daddow and

Schnapper arguing that “all but the first of the 2006 conditions were meant to distance

the Conservative approach from that of Blair,” and that Cameron wanted to “rewrite the

Blair doctrine by spelling out different conditions under which such interventions could

be acceptable within UK foreign policy.”119 In 2011, a liberal conservative doctrine for

116 See: Timothy Heppell, The Tories: From Winston Churchill to David Cameron (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 150. 117 Gannon, “The Bridge that Blair Built: David Cameron and the Transatlantic Relationship”, 211. 118 David Cameron, “David Cameron’s Speech” (Speech, Boston, USA, September 11, 2006), http://www.guardian.com/politics/2006/sep/11/conservatives.speeches (accessed April 1, 2016). 119 Daddow and Schnapper, “Liberal Intervention in the Foreign Policy Thinking of Tony Blair and David Cameron,” 343.

180 military intervention was clearly spelled out120 when Cameron stated that in order to

justify military action the following must be met: “Demonstrable need, regional support

and a clear legal basis.”121

In terms of what the priorities under this liberal conservative foreign policy are,

Hague sets out five of them in a speech from 2009, stating that a new Conservative government would bring “a major change to our decision-making; the nourishing of the

transatlantic alliance; the freshening and deepening of new relationships beyond

America and Europe; a determination to assist the reform of international institutions

and treaties; and the upholding of values and principles we hold dear here at home.”122

For our purposes the second and third priorities are of the utmost importance, since “the

nourishing of the transatlantic alliance” suggests a continued focus on the ‘special

relationship’, while the “freshening and deepening of new relationships” speaks to a

desire to shift away from the UK’s traditional ‘bridge’ role, and the evidence supports

both of these claims.

Unlike Major, with his father having spent part of his childhood in the US, or Blair,

with his muscular Christianity and his staunch belief in being a force for good, there is

little from Cameron’s formative years to explain his attachment to the ‘special

relationship’. However, in regards to his adherence to liberal conservatism, a trip

120 Despite attempts to distance himself from Blair, it is clear that the Cameron administration bought into Blair’s “proactive preference,” suggesting that this has become the UK’s “new strategic common sense” (Yee-Kuan Heng, “What Did New Labour Ever Do for Us? Evaluating Tony Blair’s Imprint on British Strategic Culture”, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 14 (2012): 572. 121 David Cameron, “PM Statement to the House on Libya” (Speech, London, UK, March 21, 2011), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-to-the-house-on-libya (accessed April 1, 2016). 122 William Hague, “The Future of British Foreign Policy” (Speech, London, UK, July 21, 2009), http://conservativespeeches.sayit.mysociety.org/speech/601323 (accessed April 1, 2016). Note: the “major change to our decision-making” has already been discussed (strengthening of FCO, creation of NSC etc.).

181 through Eastern Europe and Russia in 1985 between school and university appears to

have had a large influence on his personal beliefs, with Cameron telling Dylan Jones

that:

To me my entry into politics was all about freedom and the individual, the individual versus the big state. But it’s just not just about that. I’ve always had what I would call a very liberal conservative outlook – freedom of the individual but believing in a responsible society, too. The background was always the Cold War, and what was happening in socialist sates affected me deeply. What had a big impact on me was traveling through Eastern Europe and Russia between school and university. It shocked me… [And] that split between East and West was one of the things that definitely got me interested in politics and in particular Conservative politics; that whole issue of the individual versus the state, that whole thing, [that’s what] fired me up.123

Therefore, individual habitus does not appear to offer much insight into his attitudes

towards the ‘special relationship’, but for those studying his domestic policies a study of

individual habitus would appear to yield significant results. However, Daddow does note

Cameron and Hague’s “scepticism of ‘grand schemes to remake the world’,” arguing

that the conservative in ‘liberal conservative’ should “read ‘realist’” and that their outlook is best described as an “unabashed realism evocative of E.H. Carr’s critique of

Woodrow Wilson’s utopian idealism of the interwar years 1919-39.”124 Considering this,

if one were to see the USSR or communism in general as an example of utopian

idealism or a “grand scheme to remake the world” gone wrong, then Cameron’s trip in

1985 has a greater influence on his foreign policy then perhaps first believed. He saw

first-hand the suffering that such “idealism” can bring, and hence became instinctively

apprehensive of politicians (or policies) that claimed they could personally reshape the

123 Dylan Jones, Cameron on Cameron: Conversation with Dylan Jones (London: Fourth Estate, 2008), 32-34. 124 Daddow, “The Use of Force in British Foreign Policy: From New Labour to the Coalition,” 116.

182 world and impose solutions rather than empowering individuals and allowing them to

make their own decisions. This is obviously something that cannot be stated with any

sort of conclusiveness unless personal interviews and greater personal archival

research is conducted, but it suggests an avenue for further research that would appear

to be fruitful.

Returning to the ‘special relationship’ and ‘bridge’, the Cameron Conservatives

have been consistent in their support for the ‘special relationship’ and the central role it

plays in UK foreign policy. Matt Beech argues that much of Cameron’s foreign policy

can be explained by his adherence to Thatcherism, writing that “Cameron and his

generation of Conservatives follow many (Euroscepticism and the stead-fast belief in

free-market economics) but not all of the central tenets of Thatcherism. But additionally

they seem to have imbibed the imagined history of co-operation and partnership

between the UK and US.”125 Previous analysis showed that Thatcher saw the UK as (1)

a great power; (2) believed that country needed to play a ‘bridge’ role to help maintain

said great power status; (3) believed in the existence of a “hegemonic division of labour”

between the UK and US, and (4) in regards to Europe, was an adherent of the interstate

cooperation sub-discourse. Based on the available evidence, it would appear that

Cameron bought into all of these elements of Thatcher’s foreign policy except for the

UK’s need to play a ‘bridge’ role between the US and Europe.

As previously stated, the Brown years saw the UK simultaneously maintain and

move away from its traditional ‘bridge’ role. Hood, in 2008, wrote that such changes, like

125 Matt Beech, “British Conservatism and Foreign Policy: Traditions and Ideas Shaping Cameron’s Global View,” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 13 (2011): 350.

183 moving away from traditional monikers like ‘transatlantic bridge’ or ‘pivotal power’

towards a global hub, “may seem to be ‘business as usual’ masked by minor rhetorical

change…[But it] is not entirely implausible to argue, however, that these changes in

emphasis indicate that a gradual recasting of British foreign policy may be in

progress.”126 Based on the actions of the Cameron government, it would appear that

such a recasting occurred, and that the ‘bridge’ role no longer exerts much influence on

UK foreign policy or the UK’s perception of its role within the ‘special relationship.’ It is

here that individual habitus must be considered. Of the post-Cold War leaders Cameron

is by far the most Eurosceptic, and, like Thatcher, was never going to be a heart of

Europe type. It is clear from speeches prior to and during the UK’s June 2016

referendum on EU membership that he was in favour of remaining in the EU but was

more interested in looking beyond Europe than within Europe. In other words, due to his

personal preferences it would appear that Brown’s ‘hub’ gave Cameron an excuse to

move away from Europe and the ‘bridge’.

Concluding discussion on Cameron’s similarities with Thatcher, both he and

Hague have been consistent in emphasizing the importance of the ‘special relationship’

and playing the role of “junior partner in the relationship, but still capable of influencing

the behaviour of the US and capable of pursuing her own agenda, rather than

unthinkingly following the lead of the US.”127 This is perhaps best captured in

Cameron’s 2006 speech in Boston, where he stated that the UK’s relationship with the

US must be “solid but not slavish” and invoked the memories of Churchill, Thatcher and

126 Hood, “Atlantic Dreams and European Realities: British Foreign Policy After Iraq,” 193. 127 Victoria Honeyman, “David Cameron and Foreign and International Policy,” in The Conservatives under David Cameron: Built to Last? eds. Simon Lee and Matt Beech, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 179.

184 Major to highlight the UK’s ability to successfully act “as a junior partner to the United

States.”128 This suggests that like his post-war predecessors, ‘Greeks and Romans’

thinking, with its belief in a ‘hegemonic division of labour’, is still exerting influence within

the UK’s political field. Hague has also echoed similar sentiments, stating that the

‘special relationship’ is “central to our foreign policy [and] remains the cornerstone of

strategic thinking in London.”129 Rather unsurprisingly, given the repetition of thought

this paper has sought to capture, Hague also reiterated that the UK remains a great power, although he did so in ways that were sensitive to nomenclature concerns –

making statements like the UK “still carries far more clout than its current share of the

world population would suggest,”130 and that “Britain has never shirked – and under this

government never will shirk – the international responsibilities conferred on us by our

economic and military strength, our alliance in NATO and by our membership of

international organisations.”131

Critical, however, is the fact that none of the Cameron or Hague speeches examined thus far make any mention of the UK plays the role of ‘bridge’. Now focusing

exclusively on speeches made by, or documents released since, Cameron took office, it

would appear that the shift that began under Brown was accelerated and fully embraced

by the Cameron administration. Continuities abound with Blair and his other post-war

128 David Cameron, “David Cameron’s Speech” (Speech, Boston, USA, September 11, 2006), http://www.guardian.com/politics/2006/sep/11/conservatives.speeches (accessed April 1, 2016) 129 William Hague, “The Special Relationship” (Speech, Washington, DC, February 16, 2006), http://conservativespeeches.sayit.mysociety.org/speech/600129 (accessed April 1, 2016). 130 William Hague, “The Future of British Foreign Policy” (Speech, London, UK, July 21, 2009), http://conservativespeeches.sayit.mysociety.org/speech/601323 (accessed April 1, 2016). 131 William Hague, “The Foreign Secretary’s 4th and Final Speech on Britain’s Foreign Policy Delivered at Georgetown University” (Speech, Washington, DC, November 17, 2010), http://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/international-security-in-a-networked-world--2 (accessed April 1, 2016).

185 predecessors, with the 2010 NSS132 and Cameron’s inaugural LMB speech highlighting

the continued centrality of the ‘special relationship’, with Cameron stating in the latter

that the UK’s relationship with the US “is not just special; it is crucial.”133 Emphatically

rejecting “this thesis of decline,” he highlights the country’s role as a “great economic

power” and its unique inventory of hard and soft power, noting the appeal of the City of

London as a business centre and the country’s universities, while also reminding the

audience that the country remains “one of only a handful of countries with the military

and technological means to deploy serious military force around the world,” and that “we

have the resources – commercial, military and cultural – to remain a major player in the

world.”134 But the shift away from playing a ‘bridge’ role is evident earlier in his speech,

noting the “rise of new great powers,” with Brazil, India and China being among those

mentioned.135 This is reflected most clearly in the 2010 NSS, which states that “the

world of 2030 will be increasingly multipolar, with power distributed more widely than in

the last two decades”136 and highlights relations with India, China and the US as being

of utmost importance.137 Based on this evidence, it would appear that the UK has finally

broken the inertia of habitus and moved on from its traditional ‘bridge’ role, making the

necessary adjustments not only for the current unipolar international system, but in

response to a perceived shift towards multipolarity. This decision to continue to flock to

the US makes perfect sense given the UK’s national habitus and the current unipolar

132 See: HM Government, “A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy,” October 2010, 5, 10, 15; 133 David Cameron, “Speech to Lord Mayor’s Banquet” (Speech, London, UK, November 15, 2010), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/speech-to-lord-mayors-banquet (accessed April 1, 2016). 134 Ibid. 135 Ibid. 136 HM Government, “A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy,” 15. 137 Ibid 15-16.

186 system, but the decision is being driven largely by future considerations, rather than an

attachment to past national role conceptions. A curious issue, however, emerges. The

rise of these ‘new great powers’ is not a particularly recent development, and has been

evident since Blair’s time in office, yet Blair remained steadfast in his belief that the UK

must be a ‘bridge’ between the US and Europe. He was looking at largely the same

information as Cameron yet came to a different conclusion. This variation is best

described by differences in individual habitus, and as previously highlighted it appears

to have been caused in large part by their differing views of the UK’s role in Europe.

Although in his 2011 LMB speech he states that “leaving the EU is not in our

national interest,” equal, if not greater, importance is placed on forging ties with the

emerging powers, and the metaphor of the City of London and the UK as a ‘hub’ is

strongly implied.138 His 2012 LMB speech focuses significantly on economics, but the

overall argument is that the UK, by being a ‘hub’ and improving relations with countries

beyond the North Atlantic, can avoid decline.139 The 2013 version is similar, with the

focus mostly on economics but still containing an implied reference to both the UK and

the City of London being a ‘hub’, with the PM calling London the “global home of

finance” and also highlighting the country’s improving relations with India and China.140

All of this points to the seriousness of Cameron’s claims back in 2006, where, citing the

138 David Cameron, “Prime Minister’s Speech at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet” (Speech, London, UK, November 14, 2011), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-speech-at-the-lord-mayors-banquet (accessed April 1, 2016). 139 See: David Cameron, “Lord Mayor’s Banquet Speech” (Speech, London, UK, November 12, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9673847/David-Camerons-Lord-Mayors- Banquet-speech-in-full.html (accessed April 1, 2016). 140 David Cameron, “Lord Mayor’s Banquet 2013: Prime Minister’s Speech” (Speech, London, UK, November 11, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/lord-mayors-banquet-2013-prime-ministers-speech (accessed April 1, 2016).

187 country’s ‘special relationship’ with the US as precedent, he called for the UK and India

to “forge a new special relationship,”141 with the hope of ending the country’s obsession

with Europe and America. 142 The 2015 NSS expands upon this, pointing to the

importance of “building strong relations with growing powers, including China, India,

Brazil and Mexico.”143 However, it is clear that if forced to choose between these two

‘obsessions’ Cameron would clearly choose the US over Europe. One only has to

compare his views towards Europe with the 2015 NSS, which highlights the essential

nature of the ‘special relationship’ on multiple occasions.144 Concluding with his 2015

LMB speech, Cameron echoes the 2015 NSS, calling for the UK to maintain its “position

as number one in the world for soft power”145 while also remaining an economic and

military power. It is clear that Cameron’s belief in the UK’s great power status survived

the 2015 election, and that for the months he was in power before resigning in the wake

of Brexit, the country continued to play an active role in trying to shape the international

system through a combination of its military, economic and soft power.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the best way to understand the shift in thinking from

Major to David Cameron is to understand the individual habitus of each PM. By

examining speeches and memoirs we can gain access into their thinking process,

141 David Cameron, “The Challenges of Globalisation” (Speech, Mumbai, India, September 5, 2006), http://conservative-speeches.sayit.mysociety.org/speech/600005 (accessed April 7, 2016). 142 See: William Hague, “The Future of British Foreign Policy,” 2009. 143 Ibid 14. 144 See: HM Government, “National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015,” 14 and 51. 145 David Cameron, “Lord Mayor’s Banquet 2015: Prime Minister’s Speech” (Speech, London, UK, November 16, 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/lord-mayors-banquet-2015-prime-ministers-speech (accessed April 1, 2016). See also: HM Government, “National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015,” 9.

188 allowing us to explain why the ‘bridge’ role survived for as long as it did. Admittedly, the

UK exhibits rather low levels of hysteresis during this period, especially when one

considers how it reacted during the decade following the end of World War Two, and

besides Blair and Major’s staunch belief in the value of its ‘bridge’ role the rest of their

foreign policy lined up rather well with the objective conditions of the unipolar system.

What this chapter reminds us is that a lie cannot live forever,146 and thus the UK as

‘bridge’ was, in the long term, bound to die. The objective conditions (of your respective

field simply cannot be outrun in the long-term. However, as the Bourdieusian approach

shows, the dominant actors by and large determine how long these ‘lies’ last, and in the

UK’s case this paper has shown that this ‘lie’ was kept alive thanks in large part to the

personal preferences and beliefs of John Major and Tony Blair, with the personal

preferences and beliefs of Gordon Brown, but especially David Cameron, playing a

large part in explaining its death. To refer to previous discussions on theory, this is

something the Bourdieusian approach explains that a strategic culture approach cannot

– the micro-macro bridge provided by the former is of obvious importance, and this

author thinks more than enough evidence has been provided to show the obvious

benefits one may enjoy from adopting this approach.

146 Or, perhaps more appropriately, since Bourdieu is involved: Don Quixote cannot tilt at windmills forever. One would also presume that Sancho Panza cannot remain gullible forever, with his gradual Quixotization suggesting a greater foolishness in its place.

189 Chapter 6: Conclusion

Despite a recent article by Andrew Burncombe that points to (1) Obama’s unprecedented criticisms over the ““s**t show” left in Libya by David Cameron and other

European leaders” and (2) the existence of special relationships between the US and countries like France and Israel as proof that the US-UK ‘special relationship’ is finally over,1 such a claim is ultimately premature. Members of the UK political field since the end of World War Two have continued to see the UK as a great power, and nothing in the speeches made by Cameron or Hague during their time in government, or in government documents like the 2010 or 2015 NSS, suggests that this aspect of national habitus is going to change any time soon, or that the US-UK ‘special relationship’ is no longer the most effective way to maintain its great power status. Burncombe’s article also seems to forget that this is by no means the first time the US and UK governments have been at odds over foreign policy, with the ‘special relationship’ managing to survive past tensions over Vietnam and the Suez Crisis. It stands to reason that if the relationship survived those periods then it will survive this latest blip.

But, to borrow language from Burncombe, one potentially ‘destructive’ belief that appears to finally be over is the UK’s insistence of playing a ‘bridge’ role between the

US and Europe. Given the current unipolar international system, and especially considering the 2010 NSS’s predictions that the world will become increasingly multipolar, with power shifting away from Europe and towards rising powers like India and China, this shift is very much in accordance with the objective conditions of said

1 Andrew Burncombe, “Thankfully the UK’s Destructive ‘Special Relationship’ with the United States is Finally Over,” Independent, March 11, 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/thankfully-the-uks-destructive- special-relationship-with-the-united-states-is-finally-over-a6926171.html.(accessed April 7, 2016).

190 international system. But a shift away from Europe in general is unsurprising given

Cameron’s Euroscepticism and his government’s decisions to hold a referendum on

continued membership in the EU, with the public voting to leave. Although it has been

noted that Cameron supported remaining in the EU, he clearly adopted an approach similar to Thatcher’s, in that rather than being a ‘Heart of Europe’ type he preferred to keep his distance. In fact, considering that the UK public voted to leave the EU this would suggest that it is highly unlikely that the May government will attempt to move away from being a ‘hub’ and back to its traditional ‘bridge’ between the US and Europe.

It simply makes no sense given that the UK is in the process of leaving the EU, and maintaining such an identity would suggest the political field is suffering from a horrendous case of hysteresis.

Ultimately, this paper represents an attempt at utilizing a Bourdieusian framework to better explain political phenomena. It has been argued throughout that utilizing field theory and engaging with both macro and microstructures through the study of individual and class (or group) habitus offers a more complete understanding of why political agents make certain decisions than by adopting a purely structural realist, neoclassical realist or strategic culture approach. It is entirely possible that by adopting any of these approaches that the research outcomes may be the same, but a

Bourdieusian approach certainly appears to offer a more complete understanding of the issue at hand, particularly when compared to a purely structural one. Despite this, a

Bourdieusian approach is not infallible and at times may fail to offer much more than a strategic culture approach, particularly when an investigation of an agent’s individual habitus does not seem to reveal much pertinent information in regards to the subject,

191 which is arguably what occurred with Gordon Brown or David Cameron and their attitudes towards the ‘special relationship’. However, recognizing the importance of microstructures and unique individual experiences on an agent’s personal preference and beliefs is still an important step to undertake,2 even if the conclusion is ultimately

that more research needs to be done before any sort of definitive conclusion can be

reached.

It is the importance of recognizing microstructures and unique individual

experiences that brings us to Schindler and Wille’s earlier criticism of the Bourdieusian

approach because of its struggle to explain change, since, to repeat their argument,

such an approach “stresses the patterned and repetitive nature of practice and

emphasizes the unconscious reproduction of the social order.” Their argument rests on

the idea that a Bourdieusian approach over-relies on the concept of hysteresis to

explain social change and advance the argument that change and stability are “a

product of how practices relate to the past… [and that this process of] ‘making present’

of the past is marked by fundamental uncertainties.”3 The first part of their argument is

in line with Bourdieu, but in regards to the second part what they are saying is that the

origins of change are not just explained by hysteresis, but that change can originate

“within practice itself” thanks to possible uncertainty about the meaning of the past.4 The

example they discuss is Russia-NATO relations after the end of the Cold War, and they

argue against Pouliot’s explanation that change in NATO-Russian relations since 1992

2 This is especially important if said agent is one of the dominant actors in their field, but the reader is already well aware of this. 3 Schindler and Wille, “Change In and Through Practice: Pierre Bourdieu, Vincent Pouliot, and the End of the Cold War”, 332. 4 Ibid 337.

192 can be explained by a resurfacing of Russia’s great power habitus, a habitus that was

out of date after the end of the Cold War while NATO’s was not.5 This thesis agrees that

hysteresis does not necessarily explain all social change, but what Schindler and Wille

fail to discuss is whether hysteresis may be more useful in describing social change in

non-crisis situations, or situations that deal largely with just one field. To bring this back

to the UK, the end of the Cold War represented a crisis for some in the international

system but not for the members of the UK’s political field or even the UK itself.6 Thanks

to the absence of crisis we see greater certainty over the meaning of the past, and this

is reflected in a strong sense of “national Self” and political tradition. Neither the

country’s “Self” nor traditions were really challenged by the end of the Cold War (thus

no domestic crisis) so change was likely to be the result of hysteresis rather than from

within practice itself.7 Perhaps this anti-hysteresis strand of practice theory that

Schindler and Tille subscribe to is worth looking into to fill in the potential blind-spots the

Bourdieusian approach may have regarding the aftermath of crisis situations, but when crisis is absent then this paper wholeheartedly believes that it has made a strong case for using the dominant, Bourdieusian strand of practice theory.

When considering the themes explored by this paper it becomes evident that there are a few questions simmering below the surface that this paper has yet to, or is

5 See: Pouliot, International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO-Russian Diplomacy. 6 It should also be noted that although the end of the Cold War may have represented a crisis for NATO it didn’t for the member states since they had ‘won’ the Cold War, thus there was no great domestic upheaval like in Russia or many of the other former Soviet states. What this means is that there was significantly less pressure or need for them to change/reform the assumptions guiding their overall foreign policy because they (but especially the US) were in a dominant field position, which field here meaning the international system. 7 The problem is probably more likely to be explained by an inability to sufficiently sketch out the individual habitus of the dominant actor or actors’ and then explain how it affects decision-making in a specific policy area, like with Gordon Brown and David Cameron.

193 simply unable to, answer. For starters, is the Bourdieusian approach predictive or does it only explain post-facto? This is thankfully one we can explain, and the answer is that it does both, but is probably best at explaining post-facto because of the evidence required to investigate individual habitus, which often is not available to researchers until after a certain agent has left the political field. What this means is that post-facto we are usually able to acquire sufficient evidence and analyze the individual habituses of the dominant agents and are better able to explain variances between governments, like why Blair took the UK’s ‘bridge’ role more seriously than Major. But in terms of prediction a Bourdieusian approach predicts that subjective dispositions will usually lag behind objective conditions of a field to some degree, and that this hysteresis is the driver of change since it forces habitus to be changed or re-examined, although said changes tend to be minor and also tend to occur gradually except in the event of crisis.

As stated earlier, in this regard the Bourdieusian approach and strategic culture overlap, but where they differ is obviously on Bourdieu’s emphasis on examining microstructures, and field theory helping to give greater shape to the study of social or political structures.

Another question this thesis subtly poked at, but left mostly alone, was how much the overall state of the UK economy affects how a PM describes the country’s ‘world role’. This paper has established that while in office all the post-war PMs believed that the UK remained a great power (and, if Morris is to be believed, with good reason), but does the state of the economy affect their terminology? For example, Major’s time in office was beset with economic difficulties and he described the UK as a ‘medium power’, while Blair experienced a period of sustained economic growth and described

194 the country as a ‘pivotal power’, which of the two obviously invokes a greater sense of

national strength. Blair was obviously more inclined to action (or in his words, being a

“doer”) than Major, but did the strength of the economy not only confirm his biases but also make him even more inclined to act, which was then reflected in the terminology he used to describe the UK’s ‘world role’? The evidence presented seems to suggest that the answer is yes, since a country’s economic strength would have to be considered as part of the objective conditions of the international system, but more research needs to be done to support this.

Another question is what factors lead to a close relationship between PM and

President? The example of Heath shows you need to have the President’s inner circle on your side, but more generally it also shows that it is not enough for the UK to simply play its expected role(s) in both the international system and within the ‘special relationship’. In fact, the answer suggested by the evidence presented in this paper is that US Presidents have their own personal preferences and beliefs, and the PMs whose individual habituses best match that of their American counterparts enjoy the

closest relationships, with Thatcher-Reagan being perhaps the best example.

There is also the broader issue of how foreign policy differs between political

parties. Based on earlier discussion of the foreign policy principles of ‘Old Labour’ and

the similarities between the Attlee, Churchill and Eden governments, it would appear

that party affiliation is not a significant influence on foreign policy. But on the other hand,

Cameron represents a far more realist, and thus significantly less idealist, foreign policy than Blair. So, in this case, that would at least superficially suggest that party affiliation

does matter. However, the shift to greater restraint/realism was started by Brown, which

195 would once again appear to suggest that foreign policy differs very little between the two main parties. Based on the evidence this paper has provided, the answer appears to be that foreign policy differences are best explained by differences in the individual habituses of the PMs rather than which party they belong to, especially considering the dominant position the PM holds in regards to shaping foreign policy. This conclusion is also supported by the fact that this paper shown that the ‘bridge’ role was embedded within the UK’s political field, which serves as further proof that foreign policy is shaped mostly by ingrained beliefs about the nation’s role in the world and that these beliefs are shared by both Labour and Conservative MPs. Ultimately, it is hoped that this thesis encourages other researchers to not only answer these lingering questions but to see the value in adopting a Bourdieusian approach. This ‘practice turn’ in IR is, in this author’s opinion, rather exciting, and it is hoped that this excitement spreads to others, but perhaps in particular to those who study foreign policy, because it certainly appears as if the Bourdieusian approach will lead the field in many exciting new directions.

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History.” Review of International Studies 34 (2008): 155-181.

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(1995): 32-64.

Kitchen, Nicholas. “Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical Realist

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209 Larsen, Henrik. “British and Danish European Policies in the 1990s: A Discourse

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Power Journal –Africa and Francophonie 2.4 (2011): 61-92.

Leander, Anna. “Review: Pierre Bourdieu on Economics,” Review of International

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Martin, John Levi. “What is Field Theory?” American Journal of Sociology 109.1 (2003):

1-49.

Marsh, Steve and John Baylis. “The Anglo-American Special Relationship: The Lazarus of International Relations.” Diplomacy & Statecraft 17:1 (2006): 173-211.

Marsh, David. “Understanding British Government: Analysing Competing Models.” The

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McCourt, David M. “What Was Britain’s “East of Suez Role”? Reassessing the

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McCourt, David M. “Rethinking Britain’s Role in the World for a New Decade: The Limits of Discursive Therapy and the Promise of Field Theory.” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 13 (2011): 145-164.

210 McCourt, David. “Embracing Humanitarian Intervention: Atlanticism and the UK

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Dilemma.” European Journal of International Relations 12.3 (2006): 341-370.

Morris, Justin. “How Great is Britain? Power, Responsibility and Britain’s Future Global

Role.” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 13 (2011): 326-347.

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International Studies Association 40.1 (2005): 5-23.

Neumann, Iver B. “Returning Practice to the Linguistic Turn: The Case of Diplomacy.”

Millennium Journal of International Studies 31.3 (2002): 627-651.

Neustadt, Richard E. “White House and White Hall.” The Public Interest 0.2 (1966): 55-

69.

Niblett, Robin. “Choosing Between America and Europe: A New Context for British

Foreign Policy.” International Affairs 83.4 (2007): 627-641.

Noetzel, Timo and Benjamin Schreer. “NATO’s Vietnam? Afghanistan and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance.” Contemporary Security Policy 30:3 (2009): 529-547.

211 Nye, Jr, Joseph S. “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy.” Political Science

Quarterly 119:2 (2004): 255-270.

Nye, Jr, Joseph S. “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.” Annals of the American

Academy of Political and Social Science 616 (2008): 94-109.

Ortner, Sherry B. “Theory in Anthropology Since the Sixties.” Comparative Studies in

Society and History 26.1 (1984): 126-166.

Rathburn, Brian. “A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and

Necessary Extension of Structural Realism.” Security Studies 17 (2008): 294-321.

Riise-Kappen, Thomas. “Ideas do not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic

Structures, and the End of the Cold War.” International Organization 48.2 (1994): 185-

214.

Robb, Thomas. “The Power of Oil: Edward Heath, the ‘Year of Europe’ and the Anglo-

American ‘Special Relationship’.” Contemporary British History 26:1 (2012): 73-96.

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(1998): 144-172.

Sarotte, Mary. “In Victory, Magnanimity: US Foreign Policy, 1989-1991, and the Legacy of Prefabricated Multilateralism.” International Politics 48 (2011): 482-495.

Schindler, Sebastian and Tobias Wille. “Change In and Through Practice: Pierre

Bourdieu, Vincent Pouliot, and the End of the Cold War.” International Theory 7.2

(2015): 330-359.

212 Schwarz, Benjamin C. “’Cold War’ Continuities: US Economic and Security Strategy

Towards Europe.” Journal of Strategic Studies 17:4 (1994): 82-104.

Sharp, Paul. “The Place of the European Community in the Foreign Policy of British

Governments, 1961-1971.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 11.2 (1982):

155-171.

Spelling, Alex. “Edward Heath and Anglo-American Relations 1970-1974: A

Reappraisal.” Diplomacy & Statecraft 20:4 (2009): 638-658.

Spelling, Alex. “‘Recrimination and Reconciliation’: Anglo American Relations and the

Yom Kippur War.” Cold War History 13:4 (2013): 485-506.

Strong, James. “Why Parliament Now Decides on War: Tracing the Growth of the

Parliamentary Prerogative through Syria, Libya and Iraq.” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 17 (2015): 604-622.

Stuart, Toby E. and Joel M. Podolny. “Local Search and the Evolution of Technological

Capabilities.” Strategic Management Journal 17 (1996): 21-38.

Theakston, Kevin. “Gordon Brown as Prime Minister: Political Skills and Leadership

Style.” British Politics 6.1 (2011): 78-100.

Wacquant, Loic. “Pointers on Pierre Bourdieu and Democratic Politics.” Constellations

11.1 (2004): 3-15.

Wallace, William. “Foreign Policy and National Identity in the United Kingdom.”

International Affairs 67.1 (1991): 65-80.

213 Wallace, William. “British Foreign Policy after the Cold War.” International Affairs 68.3

(1992): 423-442.

Wallace, William. “The Collapse of British Foreign Policy.” International Affairs 82.1

(2005): 53-68.

Wallace, William & Christopher Phillips. “Reassessing the Special Relationship.”

International Affairs 85.2 (2009): 263-284.

Walt, Stephen M. “Alliances in a Unipolar World.” World Politics 61.1 (2009): 86-120.

Wohlforth, William C. “The Stability of a Unipolar World.” International Security 24.1

(1999): 5-41.

4: Speeches

Blair, Tony. “Speech by the Prime Minister Tony Blair at Lord Mayor’s Banquet.”

Speech, London, UK, November 10, 1997.

http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20060403085217/http:/pm.gov.uk/output/page10

70.asp. Accessed January 23, 2016.

Blair, Tony. “Speech by the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs.” Speech, December 15,

1998.

http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20071104143615/http://www.pm.gov.uk/outpu

t/Page1168.asp. Accessed January 23, 2016.

Blair, Tony. “Prime Minister’s Speech: Doctrine of the International Community at the

Economic Club, Chicago.” Speech, Chicago, USA, April 24, 1999.

214 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20071104143615/http://www.pm.gov.uk/outpu

t/Page1297.asp. Accessed January 23, 2016.

Blair, Tony. “Shaping A Pivotal Role for Britain in the World.” Speech, London, UK,

November 22, 1999. http://www.the-islander.org.ac/oldsite/1461.htm. Accessed January

23, 2016.

Blair, Tony. “Lord Mayor’s Banquet.” Speech, London, UK, November 12, 2001.

http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20040621031906/http://number10.gov.uk/pag

e1661. Accessed January 23, 2016.

Blair, Tony. “Speech at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet.” Speech, London, UK, November 15,

2004.

http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20071104143615/http://www.pm.gov.uk/outpu

t/Page6583.asp. Accessed January 23, 2016.

Blair, Tony. “PM’s World Affairs Speech to the Lord Mayor’s Banquet.” Speech, London,

UK, November 13, 2006.

http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20071104143615/http://www.pm.gov.uk/outpu

t/Page10409.asp. Accessed January 23, 2016.

Brown, Gordon. “Lord Mayor’s Banquet Speech.” Speech, London, UK, November 12,

2007. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.number10.gov.uk/page13736.

Accessed March 20, 2016.

215 Cameron, David. “The Challenges of Globalisation.” Speech, Mumbai, India, September

5, 2006. http://conservative-speeches.sayit.mysociety.org/speech/600005. Accessed

April 7, 2016.

Cameron, David. “David Cameron’s Speech.” Speech, Boston, USA, September 11,

2006. http://www.guardian.com/politics/2006/sep/11/conservatives.speeches. Accessed

April 1, 2016.

Cameron, David. “Speech to Lord Mayor’s Banquet.” Speech, London, UK, November

15, 2010. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/speech-to-lord-mayors-banquet.

Accessed April 1, 2016.

Cameron, David. “PM Statement to the House on Libya.” Speech, London, UK, March

21, 2011. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-to-the-house-on- libya. Accessed April 1, 2016.

Cameron, David. “Prime Minister’s Speech at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet.” Speech,

London, UK, November 14, 2011. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime- ministers-speech-at-the-lord-mayors-banquet. Accessed April 1, 2016.

Cameron, David. “Lord Mayor’s Banquet Speech.” Speech, London, UK, November 12,

2012. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9673847/David-

Camerons-Lord-Mayors-Banquet-speech-in-full.html. Accessed April 1, 2016.

Cameron, David. “Lord Mayor’s Banquet 2013: Prime Minister’s Speech.” Speech,

London, UK, November 11, 2013. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/lord- mayors-banquet-2013-prime-ministers-speech. Accessed April 1, 2016.

216 Cameron, David. “Lord Mayor’s Banquet 2015: Prime Minister’s Speech.” Speech,

London, UK, November 16, 2015. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/lord- mayors-banquet-2015-prime-ministers-speech. Accessed April 1, 2016.

Hague, William. “The Special Relationship.” Speech, Washington, DC, February 16,

2006. http://conservative-speeches.sayit.mysociety.org/speech/600129. Accessed April

1, 2016.

Hague, William. “The Future of British Foreign Policy.” Speech, London, UK, July 21,

2009. http://conservativespeeches.sayit.mysociety.org/speech/601323. Accessed April

1, 2016.

Hague, William. “Foreign Secretary’s Speech.” Speech, Birmingham, UK, October 6,

2010. http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=345. Accessed

April 1, 2016.

Hague, William. “The Foreign Secretary’s 4th and Final Speech on Britain’s Foreign

Policy Delivered at Georgetown University.” Speech, Washington, DC, November 17,

2010. http://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/international-security-in-a-networked- world--2. Accessed April 1, 2016.

Hague, William. “Foreign Secretary’s Speech.” Speech, Manchester, UK, October 5,

2011. http://britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=346. Accessed April

1, 2016.

Major, John. “Mr. Major’s Speech to the Lord Mayor’s Banquet.” Speech, London, UK,

November 11, 1991. http://www.johnmajor.co.uk/page1016.html. Accessed January 23,

2016.

217 Major, John. “Leader’s Speech, 1991.” Speech, Blackpool, England, October 11, 1991. http://britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=137. Accessed March 24,

2016.

Major, John. “Leader’s Speech, 1992.” Speech, Brighton, England, October 6, 1992. http://britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=138. Accessed March 24,

2016).

Major, John. “Mr. Major’s Speech to the Lord Mayor’s Banquet.” Speech, London, UK,

November 16, 1992. http://www.johnmajor.co.uk/page4355.html. Accessed January 23,

2016.

Major, John. “Mr. Major’s Speech at the 1993 Lord Mayor’s Banquet.” Speech, London,

UK, November 15, 1993. http://johnmajor.co.uk/pages1315.html. Accessed January 23,

2016.

Major, John. “Leader’s Speech, 1994.” Speech, Bournemouth, England, October 14,

1994. http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=140. Accessed

March 24, 2016.

Major, John. “Leader’s Speech, 1995.” Speech, Blackpool, England, October 13, 1995. http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=141. Accessed March

24, 2016.

Major, John. “Mr. Major’s Speech at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet.” Speech, London, UK,

November 20, 1995. http://www.johnmajor.co.uk/page1375.html. Accessed January 23,

2016.

218 Thatcher, Margaret. “The Bruges Speech.” Speech, Bruges, Belgium, September 20,

1988. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3562258/Full-text-of-

Margaret-Thatchers-speech-to-the-College-of-Europe-The-Bruges-Speech.html.

Accessed May 6, 2016.

Thatcher, Margaret. “Speech at Lord Mayor’s Banquet.” Speech, London, UK,

November 12, 1990. http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/108241. Accessed

January 23, 2016.

5: Government Documents

Cabinet Office. “The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an

Interdependent World.” March 2008.

HM Government. “A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security

Strategy.” October 2010.

HM Government. “National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security

Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom.” November 2015.

6: Reports

Harvey, Michael. Perspectives on the UK’s Place in the World. London: Chatham

House, December 2011.

Niblett, Robin. The Chatham House-YouGov Survey 2011: British Attitudes Towards the

UK’s International Priorities. London: Chatham House, 2011.

219 7: Online Resources

Anonymous. “Text: Rumsfeld Defense Department Briefing.” Washington Post.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/rumsfeld_092601.html. Accessed August 11,

2015.

Burncombe, Andrew. “Thankfully the UK’s Destructive ‘Special Relationship’ with the

United States is Finally Over.” Independent, March 11, 2016.

http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/thankfully-the-uks-destructive-special-relationship-

with-the-united-states-is-finally-over-a6926171.html. Accessed April 7, 2016.

220