euwareness netherlands

Case Study 1: IJsselmeer Basin

Dave Huitema

Case Study 1: IJsselmeer Basin

Dave Huitema

April 2002

University of Twente (UT) Center for Clean Technology and Environmental Policy (CSTM) PO Box 217 7500 AE Enschede The Netherlands

Tel: +31.53.489.3203 Fax: +31.53.489.4850 Website: www.utwente.nl/cstm Email: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]

EUWARENESS is a research project on European Water Regimes and the Notion of a Sustainable Status. Research institutes from six European countries (Netherlands, Belgium, France, Spain, Italy, Switzerland) have been cooperating in this two year project (2000-2002). More information is available on www.euwareness.nl. The project is supported by the European Commission under the 5th Framework Programme, and co-ordinated by the University of Twente in the Netherlands. Nurturing nature: how to make a lake and maintain it

The IJsselmeer case as an example of some modern dilemma's and tendencies in Dutch water management.

1 Zuiderzee and IJsselmeer

Introduction

This case study is on one of the larger fresh water lakes of Europe, named the IJsselmeer. The IJsselmeer is located in the heart of the Netherlands (see map below) and covers about 2,000 square kilometers, surrounded with about 600 kilometers of shore.

Figure 1: The IJsselmeer-area. The color differences in the map indicate depth of the lake. At the deepest parts, this is 7 meters below NAP. The surrounding provinces are Noord-Holland, Friesland and Flevoland.

The history of the IJsselmeer is a colored one. In the Roman age, the lake was much smaller and a freshwater lake. But rising seal levels, declining land, and a recurring river that feeds the lake (the IJssel) caused an enormous change. It became much larger (3,700 square kilometers) and became saline too. An inland sea, called the Zuiderzee was born. This sea was extremely dangerous for the hinterland (floods in 1287, 1570, 1573, 1686, 1825, 1875, 1916) but measures to enhance safety were difficult to devise because of political resistance or lack of technical means to control such a large water mass. When referring to political resistance, one can think of the importance of the lake for shipping purposes, which has implied that the city of Amsterdam used to block attempts to shorten the shore line. Technical capabilities for damming and poldering large water bodies were only developed in the course of the 19th century. It is in this century that the first plans were developed for the poldering (turning into land) of the Zuiderzee. The plans were largely deemed unrealistic and unnecessary, but this slowly started changing. In 1886, the Zuiderzee Vereniging (Zuiderzee Association) was founded, with the purpose of gaining government approval for a plan to conquer the Zuiderzee. This group commissioned a relatively unknown engineer, Mr. Lely, who the thought out what seemed to be a relatively realistic approach for the creation of a new polder. The plan was presented in 1891 and apparently impressed many. A state committee of experts was appointed which had to study the whether separating the Zuiderzee from the North Sea and creating polders would be in the national interest. In 1894, the Committee advised the government that that was the case indeed. De Pater (2000) emphasizes how the proponents of the project had to work the public opinion to achieve this result and drew upon images that proved long living. The Zuiderzeevereniging portrayed the Zuiderzee as nothing but a 'dead' piece of water that had not been put to beneficial use yet. Besides, the sea was an 'internal enemy' that should be conquered as it could strike at unexpected times. The Zuiderzeevereniging sought to connect the project to the certain level of nationalism and the desire for nation building that was present at the time (a grand project would should foreigners that the Netherlands was a modern country).

One might wonder why the plans then were not implemented. Opposition from active users of the lake was not as great as it had been in the past. The Zuiderzee had become far less relevant as a shipping water as ships from Amsterdam could sail to the North Sea over two new canals. The only active users of the sea were fishermen, who naturally objected to the polder plans. This opposition was not formidable and the proponents of poldering effectively portrayed the fishery communities as a marginal affair. More substantial opposition came from important departments as the Ministries of War (which saw the Zuiderzee as part of the Dutch defense system) and Finance (which feared the costs of the project). Consequently, implementation was yet far away. Two events finally pushed Mr. Lely's faltering project into realization. First, the Netherlands suffered from a flood of the Zuiderzee in 1916 that caused considerable damage, very deep into the country. Secondly, the First World War eliminated some of the traditional trading relations. Thrust upon itself as a neutral country, the Netherlands found that food production in the country was not sufficient for self-maintenance and food shortages were experienced. As poldering the Zuiderzee was presented as a solution to the chronic problem of flood safety (the project would reduce the shoreline and tide) and a possibility for creating additional agricultural land, resolve to implement Lely's plans stiffened despite continued resistance from the fisheries sector. A special agency to implement the plan (National Agency for the Zuiderzee Works, in Dutch 'Rijksdienst voor de Zuiderzeewerken' (from here on ZZW)) was founded and this agency set to work, generally following Lely's approach, but with significant changes at opportune occasions. High points in the project were the realization of the 30 kilometer long 'Afsluitdijk' (closure dam) between the provinces of Friesland and Noord-Holland in 1932 and the subsequent creation of the new polders (about 1,700 square kilometers of new land). The dam sealed of the Zuiderzee from the North Sea and Wadden Sea, and coupled with the continued influx of river water, the sea turned into a freshwater lake. After realization of the dam, polder construction started. Figure 2 shows some of the ideas that have existed on the location of such polders. With our current knowledge, the top left figure seems rather unrealistic (compare with figure 1), but the others are not far from what was later realized. After construction, the polders were landscaped by a special branch of the Public Works Agency (Rijkswaterstaat), called the Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolders (from here on RIJP).

Figure 2: Plans for the creation of polders in the IJsselmeer area

The considerable length of the implementation period of the Zuiderzee-project (1918-1985 or so) allowed ZZW and RIJP to keep learning from previous experiences. Especially the initial omission of 'corner lakes', bodies of water that separated the new from the old land, caused problems in the old land. It was found that a new polder, lying below sea level, attracted great amounts of ground water from under the old land, thereby causing subsidization and drying up of land. The damage to existing uses (agriculture, buildings) was considerable and the newer polders were built with a so-called corner lake to prevent such damage. These corner lakes are clearly visible on map 1 and are part of the IJsselmeer basin. Another change that can be observed is the way the new polders were put to use. Not only were ever-changing techniques used to make the polder dry and to expulse the salt, the land use for which the polders were used changed as well. The first polders were about 90% agricultural land, but the final one that was created (Southern Flevopolder) was only for 50% devoted that purpose. The later polders were much more tailored for housing (18%) and natural area (25% for said polder).

The current uses of the IJsselmeer

Being such a large area, and being so close to large populations, it should be no surprise that the IJsselmeer has many functions, both from the perspective of the surrounding land and from a water system perspective. Drinking water preparation: need for achievement of strict water quality standards and clean up of polluted water soil. A summary of the functions that the lake fulfils, from the perspective of the various users, would go something like this:

- Flood control: retention basin for high water levels in the IJssel (and Rhine) basin, control of influx of North Sea water at high tide, control of risks of flooding by the IJsselmeer itself.

- Agriculture: reserve of fresh water in summer, drainage area for superfluous water in the winter, flushing out saline water under mainland, potential site of expanded agricultural acreage by creating polders, receptor of pollution (see industrial and urban development).

- Nature: the IJsselmeer is part of the Ecological Main Structure (Ecologische Hoofdstructuur); large parts protected by the Habitat and Bird Directive (European Union) and Nature Protection Act (Netherlands). Main reasons: presence of protected bird and fish types and status as 'open landscape'. Presence of certain species requires achievement of certain water quality standards and clean up of polluted water soils.

- Recreation and tourism: sailing, windsurfing, beaches, vacation resorts.

- Military: practice area for the army (gun firing range) and air force (fly zone).

- Industrial: use of cooling water, receptor of pollution discharges. The latter function was used intensively in the 1950s/1960s. Much pollution from the Rhine systems was absorbed by particulates that fell on the lake soil. The soil is locally of very poor quality.

- Energy production: two power plants present that use cooling water. Plans for park to generate wind energy by windmills.

- Fisheries: 60% of all inland-water yields stem from the IJsselmeer.

- Transportation: transport of goods by boat, potential location for second national airport and rail infrastructure.

- Culture/landscape: certain parts of the coast are protected landscape, various towns are on the world heritage list or are otherwise (nationally) protected.

- Excavation/mining: supply of sand for the construction industry; drilling for gas and oil. - Urban development: the lake is in the proximity of the so-called Randstad, a densely populated and industrialized area where there is shortage of housing and industrial land. If new polders are created, the IJsselmeer would fulfil certain roles, including the role of receptor of waste water (see industrial). Together with agriculture and industry, urban development has caused discharges of wastewater to the IJsselmeer system, which has increased the concentrations of organics considerably.

- Waste disposal: parts of the IJsselmeer are used for under water storage of dredging sludges. These sludges are generated in the course of regular maintenance of waterways, but also when polluted water soils are cleaned up. In either case, they may even formally classify as hazardous wastes and are isolated from the environment.

Even though the IJsselmeer has long been (and to some extent still is) seen as an almost endless resource, many of the uses just described are currently seen as being at odds with each other if not through the entire lake, the in certain parts of it. Many interesting rivalries can thus be studied. Under the EUWARENESS-project several criteria have been developed to select particularly interesting rivalries. I have particularly looked for rivalries where economical and ecological uses are involved, where redistribution of property rights has taken place, and rivalries where new users emerge. In addition to these criteria, I have kept an eye towards the saliency of the rivalry in political terms, the periods in which the rivalry played, and 'representativeness' of the rivalry for more general developments in the basin. In the section below I will briefly describe the IJsselmeer regime as it developed since 1918 (with an emphasis on more recent developments) and on the basis of that description, certain interesting rivalries can be identified for closer study in later sections.

2 Regime history of the water basin

Ownership of the IJsselmeer

The issue of ownership of the IJsselmeer (and Zuiderzee) was irrelevant for a long time, but became poignant when the Zuiderzee project started being implemented. Until that time, the Zuiderzee has essentially been a free resource (common pool resource), mainly used by fishing interests. Fishermen claimed title to the sea because they had been using it for fisheries for so long, often with the seal of approval from local authorities or the church. The State however did however not recognize these rights, and if it did, set them aside with the Zuiderzee Act of 1918. The government of that day argued that the fishermen had acquired a privilege with their consents to use the water, but had never acquired ownership. Because ownership rested with the State, the State was free to alter the characteristics of the Zuiderzee, even if this would cause detrimental effects for fisheries. A majority of Parliament agreed to this explanation, and the Zuiderzee Act was approved and the right of the State to polder the land according to the plan Lely vested. The act did not contain provisions for compensation for the fishermen. The Zuiderzee Support Act of 1924 was intended to regulate this issue, but much more than an offer of financial compensation for lost investments, the act contained provisions on how to re- educate the fishermen so that they could find other jobs (Bossaers, 1987). One form of compensation that was initially deemed worthless was the award of a right to fish at the IJsselmeer. These rights turned out to be valuable, especially when the eel successfully adapted to the change from seawater to fresh water.

More generally speaking, the real effect of the Zuiderzee Act was to firmly establish state ownership of the fish in the lake and more generally the lake itself. Flood safety and agricultural production became the predominant concerns for a long time, advocated by the ZZW and RIJP. These organizations, together with certain other government departments, effectively dominated the decision process for a long time. Their intention was to change large parts of the IJsselmeer to land (by poldering) and despite the enormous amount of time and money involved, they managed to achieve this purpose, granting them incredible popularity and a positive public image. Goverde (1986) writes that the civil and agricultural engineers within ZZW and RIJP were all mighty until the 1970s, basically constrained only by financial limits. These financial constraints were sometimes very real, especially in the 1950s when the Zuiderzee project of the Agency had to compete with other infrastructural works, such as the construction of a road net. Despite this competition within the budget of the national government, the basic commitment to the plan remained in tact and adjustments were more instrumental than paradigmatic.

New uses

This situation remained until the 1970s, when the poldering project started to become the target of environmentalists who propagated the value of the IJsselmeer as open water (natural interest- landscape). These environmentalists were effective in questioning the poldering agenda and introducing the realization that perhaps the Lely project should not be completed. They did so in the course of a debate on the Markerwaard-polder, the last one to be constructed under the plan Lely. In essence, the Markerwaard debate was on the question whether the Netherlands should continue to use water as an extension area for activities that can not find a place on the land. In a sense, one could say that it was the first time since 1918 that natural interests entered the policy arena. The poldering project had been intended to enhance flood safety, agricultural production, and to a lesser extent housing. Now newcomers to the arena started advocating the interest of open water (natural use).

Another relatively new use of the IJsselmeer was recreation. Completely neglected in the first versions of the polder project, recreation has unexpectedly boomed since the Second World War. Sailing for instance was originally confined to professional boatsmen and the elite of the country, but this form of recreation has increasingly become popular. More generally speaking, the recreational value of the new polders and corner lakes was unexpectedly great, and recreation interests started claiming certain parts of the area for the use. The right to establish recreational facilities around the corner lakes was originally free given the lack of planning controls and through this situation, recreational use quickly increased to sizeable proportions. This development was stimulated by ZZW and RIJP from the 1950s onwards, but has become more and more regulated since then. Especially the land use planning system embedded in the 1965 Law on land use planning ('Wet op de ruimtelijke ordening') introduced an instrument to control recreational development (regional planning and local zoning ordinances). Crowding and the rise in importance of natural interests have led to an active use of the instrument. Certain areas of the lake have been put under protection, which implies that recreational development in these parts is restricted. Further restrictions may or may not have arrived with the implementation of the Bird Directive in the IJsselmeer; this is yet unclear. Natural interests lay an increasing claim to space in the IJsselmeer area (increase of extent). On the other hand however, recreation is stimulated as well, as government notes indicate that the IJsselmeer must overtake recreational functions from sensitive water bodies such as the Wadden Sea.

Drinking water preparation in the Netherlands tends to take place from deep groundwater reserves. Because these reserves are increasingly scarce in various locations however, the idea is that drinking water must increasingly be prepared from surface water. The province of Noord-Holland for instance, used to largely rely on water that infiltrated in the dunes along the coast for drinking water. However, the dune ecosystem is currently deemed too sensitive for further water extractions. Therefore, use of IJsselmeer water for drinking water preparation needed to be increased. This desire has made the province sensitive to threats to water quality in the IJsselmeer e.g. by urban, agricultural and industrial discharges of pollution, and to proposals for waste disposal in the lake. The use of the IJsselmeer as drinking water has also led to hesitations towards another projected new use: gas drilling. Under Dutch law, ownership of the lake also determines ownership of the valuable minerals in the soil. The minerals in the lake soil are thus state property. However, ownership of the minerals does not imply user rights. There is a general prohibition of test drillings without state approval, and this prohibition also applies in the IJsselmeer. The right to perform test drillings was to be granted by the State in the 1980s, but that move was seen as being at odds with both drinking water preparation and the natural value of the lake and caused political disagreement.

Coordination in the lake?

Ideas for more integrated water management developed within the water policy sector in the 1980s through the work of the Moons Committee (1982). The ideas also reached the IJsselmeer area and in 1985 the National Agency for the IJsselmeer Polders (RDIJ), an amalgam of RIJP and ZZW, initiated the development of an integral management plan for what the agency called 'little IJsselmeer', the part that would remain after poldering the Markerwaard. This plan was called Integral Policy Plan IJsselmeer ('Integraal Beleidsplan IJsselmeer') and the decision to start an integral planning exercise for the IJsselmeer coincided with a similar decision for the Markermeer ('Interim Beheersplan Markermeer'). The Agency established contact with other central government agencies and the surrounding provinces to create several committees (called COMIJS and REDIJS) that would prepare the plan. Non-government organizations, municipalities, and the waterboards were not invited to the table, and therefore the attempt at integral planning should be seen as selective cooperation between government levels. Elsewhere, the Public Works Agency had experienced positive results with the development of integral management plans, but it seems that in the IJsselmeer they essentially were a failure. On the basis of personal interviews with those involved, Spek (1991) identified several reasons for this. The first reason why integral planning in the IJsselmeer area did not work is that the status of the to be developed integral plan was unclear, as it was not prescribed by statute and would therefore not be binding. However, this problem was not unique to the IJsselmeer and can therefore not in itself explain why integral planning failed, be it that uncertainty about the Markermeer was greater than elsewhere because the commitment to poldering was waning. For the Northern part of the IJsselmeer, different additional problems emerged. Because the national ministries sent bureaucratic representatives to the committees that prepared the plan, the degree to which their opinions would be politically supported was uncertain. Other parties had sent senior politicians to the COMIJS meetings and these soon became frustrated with the impossibility to reach final deals. A third factor mentioned by Spek is that other parties indicated they felt that the Agency was a poor communicator during their meetings. The National Agency for the IJsselmeer Polders was said to have behaved in a rather arrogant way during the talks.

Provincial and municipal incorporation

The perception of arrogance might be related to the then pending change of authorities in the area (an institutional trigger). These implied that Rijkswaterstaat and the National Government more generally would not control the lake by themselves anymore, but share authority with the provinces and municipalities. This development took place in the polders first, and then for the lake itself. Provincial incorporation of all IJsselmeer polders was completed in 1986, when the newest polders (Noord and Zuid-Flevoland) were incorporated into a new province, Flevoland. These changes signified the outcome of a fundamental debate, which had begun in the 1970s. Government within the polders had essentially been a central government affair. The figure of bailiff ('land-drost') had been instituted in the newest polders (Noordelijke and Zuidelijke Flevopolder). This bailiff was to govern the polders on behalf of central government, specifically the Minister of the Interior ('Binnenlandse Zaken') without representation from the (few) inhabitants of the polders. As more and more new inhabitants arrived in the polders, and population increased, the need for local government and normal democratic institutions became poignant. Mainly because it would ensure uniformity of government structure throughout the Netherlands, public administration in the polders was modeled on the existing government structure on the main land.

Even before municipal and provincial incorporation of the land had been completed, a discussion started on the government of the lake itself. Some, especially conservation groups, were pleading for a functional form of government for the entire lake (see e.g. Wessel, 1988). This plea was motivated by the idea that the lake and its shores were a valuable and interdependent entity, which should be governed in an integrated fashion by a special government body. The 'Vereniging tot Behoud van het IJsselmeer' (Association for the Conservation of the IJsselmeer, from here on VBIJ) suggested that uncontrolled and uncoordinated development was taking place in the area (especially on the shore). The VBIJ feared that the division of authority over a great deal of municipalities would bring a certain level of policy competition and infighting to the area, creating even more uncoordinated development. This argument has not been taken very serious it seems. The argument of government unity was decisive and little further discussion was devoted to the topic: the lake was brought under provincial and municipal authority. The result was that responsibility for management of the lake became divided over various tiers of government.

One can not escape the impression that the pending provincial incorporation has had an effect on the interactions between the RDIJ and the provinces involved. Provincial incorporation would imply that the provinces (Noord-Holland, Friesland and Flevoland) could start to develop their own regional plans for the IJsselmeer and control the developments on the lake through the land use planning system which is highly decentralized in nature. Cooperation with the RDIJ, about to be stripped of its special role, was thus not stimulated by the pending changes that can be regarded as an institutional trigger. The actual incorporation of the lake occurred in 1989, and the three provinces quickly withdrew from the coordination body COMIJS (started by RDIJ) to develop their own inter-provincial policy for the lake. The move has officially been explained by a provincial frustration with the slow pace of plan development within COMIJS, but the deeper reason seems to be disagreement over the direction government policies for the lake should take. COMIJS in the end resulted in two 'study notes' ('Studienota IJsselmeer' and 'Studienota Markermeer', both 1990), which remained inconsequential as the provinces set out to prepare their own plans.

The withdrawal of the provinces from COMIJS marks the beginning of policy arrangements that are in existence until today and which reflect the relatively fragmented nature of Dutch government which has been observed by several foreigners including Wynne (1987). As the Netherlands is a far less centralized country than for instance the UK, government disputes are difficult to settle by central government. This is not only a result of the constitutional system but also of informal norms which stress cooperation and thus provide each level with a possibility to veto initiatives from other actors. In many cases, such veto rights, be they formal or informal, or not linked to responsibilities for solving certain problems. The irony of the situation is that every tier of government recognizes the need for integration and coordination of policy, yet has great difficulty in giving up authority in exchange for such coordination. The result is a game in which governments but others too start developing their own plans and visions for the area and present them as the relevant framework for decision making. Firet (1995: 13) sums up about 20 types of plans for the region alone1. Many of these plans are labeled or considered to be 'integral' by their makers, yet there are many subtle differences in their intentions, giving an eerie feeling about their actual coordination. The only coordination between these various instruments seems to be at the level of specific tiers of government (national actors each other, provincial actors with each other and municipal actors together).The rise in importance of European Union legislation, already observable in embryonic form in the 1980s, makes this fragmentation even greater, as it does give certain interests (especially nature) greater weight than had happened previously and provides incentives not to engage in coordinated action for some actors. I will make this point clear later.

National plans, provincial plans, municipal plans, integral plans?

One consequence of the decision not to create the Markerwaard in 1991was that the Ministry of Traffic and Water Management no longer had an interest in maintaining a separation of regimes for the 'little IJsselmeer' and Markermeer. The Ministry acknowledged the failure of the COMIJS saga and a new attempt at integral planning for the entire lake was initiated from within the central government, that is, without input from the provinces that would not cooperate anyway. The work of the central government ministries resulted in an Integral Management Plan IJsselmeer and Markermeer ('Integraal Beheersplan IJsselmeer en Markermeer') which was made public in 1992. The plan was presented as a water management plan ('Beheersplan') but seemed to contain many other elements as well, specifically some in the sphere of land use planning. Some commentators have suggested that Rijkswaterstaat at that time had trouble in getting used to their more limited role and was pushing the boundaries of its role as water manager 'Rijkswaterstaat must get used to the new situation. The IJsselmeer was their playing garden, but now everybody has become involved' (Firet, 1995: 30). The plan caused a meltdown between the provinces and the national government. The provinces perceived the plan as competing with the provincial planning work, which by then had a.o. resulted in the so called Framework Sketch ('Kadernota'), of 1990 and was progressing further. There were clear distinctions between the central government and provincial plans. The provinces were much more hesitant in allowing certain uses of the IJsselmeer; specifically the provinces intended to ban gas drilling, approached sand excavation more conservatively, and would not allow a nuclear power plant around the lake. Because of the strong disagreement, the perceived impossibility of overcoming provincial resistance, and legal realities of provincial jurisdiction, the Minister of Transport and Public Works backed off the Integral Management Plan. Clearly, the central government's plan had touched a nerve and new rules of engagement were established to avoid open disagreement in the future. Indicative of the growing important of the land use planning system, the new rules determined that Rijkswaterstaat would 'only' be the water manager for the area, whereas the provinces would become responsible for policy planning in the region. Several of the interviewees I spoke for this paper referred to this rule, which is a way of coordinating the work of various government levels.

Despite an already existing path for coordination within the land use planning system (national government can publish guidelines and can interfere in provincial plans to some extent), it was decided that a new institution should be created to coordinate the decision processes of national government with that of the provinces. Rijkswaterstaat had wanted to establish a separate organization for this purpose (ibid.: 30) but the provinces were afraid that their influence would be reduced if such an organization came into existence. The province of Flevoland (and its municipalities) for instance had now become the only actors to still advocate the Markerwaard-polder and the province was afraid that this desire would be forfeited by too close cooperation with central government (which no longer advocated the polder). Therefore, more informal means of coordination between the provinces and central government were established, this time in the form of (yet another) Steering Group ('Stuurgroep IJsselmeer-Markermeer') and an associated Working Group ('Werkgroep IJsselmeer/Markermeer'),

1 Because there may be more than one plan of each type (e.g. because each municipality has one), this implies and even greater absolute number of plans in practice. going by the appealing abbreviations of STIJM and CIJM. These two organizations still consist as of today, but they seem to hinge on a fragile equilibrium as the boundaries between water management and land use planning are not at all perfectly clear. Rijkswaterstaat (RDIJ) continues to play a large role in policy development at the central government level, for instance because of its extensive knowledge of the area and crucial importance of water management. A factor contributing to the importance of the agency seems to be the limited importance of the IJsselmeer for the National Agency for Land Use Planning ('Rijksplanologische Dienst', or RPD). The RPD does leave a certain vacuum in the national land use-planning arena for Rijkswaterstaat and therefore Rijkswaterstaat is able to exercise some control over the provinces through that capacity. The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Nature Management is another actor that has stepped in this vacuum. This Ministry actually succeeded (with help of Rijkswaterstaat and RPD) in gaining parliamentary approval for a PKB that also covered the IJsselmeer area. This PKB, called the Structure Scheme Green Space ('Structuurschema Groene Ruimte', SGR) dates back to 1995 and is mainly a spatial translation of the Ecological Main Structure ('Ecologische Hoofd Structuur', EHS) that this ministry is seeking to realize. The Structure Scheme Green Space (SGR) identifies the IJsselmeer as a multifunctional region, where nature, recreation and fisheries should co-exist and are more or less equally important. Especially in the northern part however, recreational development should remain limited.

Planning at the national level has moved forward in a coordinated fashion since 1995. There were several important considerations why new plans were considered necessary. Some of them came from within the water sector, others from other sectors. Triggers have been institutionally related, event related, or problem pressure related. Within the water sector, more and more acknowledgement of natural interest can be observed (institutional trigger). In addition to that, there is an profound realization that a climate change that could emerge in the coming century must be countered (problem pressure and event pressure). Each of these factors has had an effect on water quantity management in the lake. For years, the purpose of water quantity management in the lake has been to keep the lake at - 0.2 meters NAP in the summer (1 April to 1 October) and -0.4 meters NAP in the winter (rest of the year)2. This counter-natural approach is a compromise of safety interests (low levels at all times), agricultural interests (prefer high level in summer, low level in winter), nature (generally prefer high levels at all times, but also a certain amount of tide), and drinking water preparation (prefer high levels). Shipping interests are not really affected by this regime in this sense that the IJsselmeer is generally deep enough to be sailed, irrespective of 'ordinary' variations in water level.

The debate on the proper water level in the lake has continued for some time and the issue seems under continuous study (see e.g. RLG, 1999). In 1981 for instance, RAND-Corporation developed a quantitative model for water quantity and safety in the IJsselmeer. In that report much attention was paid to the risk of waves overtopping the dikes if the level of the lake were to be increased to +0.1 meter NAP in the summer time. The conclusion was that this could probably be done without an increase of risk (see RAND, 1981). The explanation for this outcome was that an important factor in determining risk in the IJsselmeer, the wind, would get fewer grips on the lake if it became

2 These figures are for the 'small IJsselmeer'; the Markermeer regime is different. deeper. Secondly, it was argued that a higher water level would increase possibilities for quickly discharging water from the lake through opening the locks; as the water level would be higher, water would be discharged more quickly. There were some uncertainties involved however, warned RAND. Especially the effect of higher water levels on dike stability were uncertain and certain inputs that had been used for the computer model were based on relatively short time series. Sixteen years after completion of the RAND study, the issue was still under study in the project 'Water management in the Wet Heart' ('Waterbeheer in het Natte Hart', WIN). The difference with previous between 1981 and 1997 appears to be that the various interests involved with water management might be weighted somewhat differently; especially the nature, recreation and drinking water interests are weighted more heavily. In this sense the water management sector is broadening its scope somewhat. I say somewhat because the WIN report itself is very clear about the priorities of Rijkswaterstaat (safety first) and the organization places all new claims within the framework of a safe water body. The result is observable when one compares the RLG study with the WIN study; the RLG study is much more interested in increasing water levels and serving natural interests than the WIN study. Within the WIN-project the implications of climate change, a potentially disastrous development for the Netherlands (event pressure), are assessed for the management of the IJsselmeer. If sea levels rise, the current practice of discharging onto the Wadden Sea when the lake reaches too high levels could be threatened. One response could be to raise the level of the lake as well, but this might have serious repercussions for safety, agriculture, ecosystems, etc. The WIN project was completed in 2000 and suggested that for the first 50 years, only modest changes were needed in the water management regime for the IJsselmeer, specifically the increase of water expulsion capacity. The project also resulted in a recommendation to alter the water level regime in the IJsselmeer somewhat to better accommodate nature (a higher level in spring and earlier start of the summer level).

Outside the water field, the upcoming Fifth Note on Spatial Planning was an institutional trigger for the central government departments to come together and start to develop a vision statement (in Dutch 'Meer Visie', meaning both 'More Vision' and 'Lake Vision') and the 'Integral Vision for the IJsselmeer area until 2030'. These notes could serve as an input into the Fifth Note. 'Meer Visie' was intended as a means to test societal reaction to the draft 'Integral Vision' and revolved around a policy game with real actors playing their own role. The idea was that various possible scenarios for the IJsselmeer area would be tested and that the actors involved would start to develop understanding for each other's positions. Interestingly, 'Meer Visie' found a certain level of division between actors representing central government. The implications for the Draft Integral Vision that was presented in the year 2000 are quite clear in this sense that hardly any significant changes in policies are observable. A definitive version would obtain the legal status of a sub Note of the Fifth Note on Spatial Planning.

Provincial plan forming

The provinces were able to agree amongst themselves on a Interprovincial Policy Plan IJsselmeer (1993) and an Interprovincial Policy Plan Markermeer (1994). The central assumptions of these plans are that (a) water management will be taken as a starting point for plan making, and (b) that the IJsselmeer is a multi-functional area, where the various functions laying a claim need to be weighted against each other. The provinces agreed that the IJsselmeer should remain open water, whereas they kept the possibility of a Markerwaard polder open, by stating that the Markermeer should remain a multi-functional space and not a water body. Despite the entire IJsselmeer being a multi-functional space (to use this neutral term), drinking water preparation, nature, recreation and tourism, and transport should receive increasing weight according to the provinces. The provinces noted that national policies had guided their plan, which suggests they had followed the principles of the land use planning system (indicative, non-binding, planning at the national level only). The provinces had deviated from national policies in at least two respects, besides the fact that they did not exclude the possibility of a Markerwaard polder: (1) the provinces found that gas and oil drilling should not be allowed in the IJsselmeer, (2) the provinces did not want to restrict the increase of tourism to the Southern part of the lake, but would also allow increase in the Northern part, where already existing 'concentration points' could be further developed. Interestingly, the provinces went so far as to agree that they would use the interprovincial plan as the basis for their statutory Regional Plans, which would then be used to influence the only plans which are directly binding to citizens, the municipal zoning ordinances. Indeed the various Regional Plans for the area, such as the Regional Plan ('Streekplan') Flevoland of 1993, the Provinciaal Omgevings Plan Flevoland of 2000, the Regional Plan ('Streekplan') Noord-Holland Noord of 1994, the Policy Note on Shore Development near the IJsselmeer and Markermeer of 1996 by the Province of Noord-Holland, and the Regional Plan ('Streekplan') Friesland of 1994 all literally adopted texts of the Interprovincial Plan. In this sense, the interprovincial plans were a major success in terms of policy coordination.

The actual meaning of this important step forwards in terms of coordination should however not be overestimated for various reasons. First of all, the interprovincial documents are (ands must be) rather abstract documents. This implies for instance that the interprovincial plan confirms the principle that the increase of boat harboring places ('ligplaatsen') is limited to 18,000 and that this growth should be concentrated. However, no actual division between the harbors in the various provinces was agreed upon so that it is not certain 'which harbor gets what'. Secondly, the actual practical meaning of the provincial regional plan only becomes clear through their effect on municipal zoning ordinances. Unfortunately, various municipalities (Lelystad, Almere, Wûnseradiel, Stede Broec, Edam/Volendam) have failed to establish an ordinance for the lake which is in accordance with the interprovincial plan, whereas some other municipalities had just introduced a new ordinance before the interprovincial plan was adopted and would not change these. There are various possible reasons why municipalities have not adopted zoning ordinances, and these include a lack of priority of the lake for the municipality, procedural errors, and (in some cases) conflicts between the municipalities and their provinces over the restraining effects of the interprovincial plan on recreation. In addition to that, even in municipalities where zoning ordinances were in fact introduced according to the interprovincial plan, the real effect may be limited. This is because (1) for the shore there are older zoning ordinances in place which contain less limitations that could be expected under the interprovincial plan; developments might have already started (e.g. Makkum), (2) enforcement of zoning ordinances is notoriously weak anyhow3, (3) disagreement with the national government can result in deadlock. The issue of gas drilling is an example of that, but it may very well be that the issue of recreation is one too. Finally, it should be noted that the phrase that interprovincial planning follows the water management field has important implications as this field is in transformation and the land use planning system essentially faces a moving target.

The rest of this paper

With the first two paragraphs, the general picture of regime development in the IJsselmeer has been sketched. When looking exclusively from a water policy perspective one can say that the regime has broadened from a simple regime to a complex regime, with some steps towards an integrated regime. Water management was mainly concerned with safety and agriculture since 1918. Control was in the hand of central government and the problem definition fixed. With the change of inland sea to freshwater lake, new and unexpected uses entered the scene and the demand for functions increased (recreation, nature, drinking water preparation). Recreation was a very welcome new guest at the table, but especially the formulation of natural interests was more problematic in the eyes of the water managers. Propagators of this interest, and the interest of drinking water preparation, largely bypassed the water policy sector and used the emerging land use planning arena as their playing field. The distinction between land use planning (emphasizing de-central planning) and the water policy sector (emphasizing central planning) has not been resolved yet, but current attempts at integral planning can be seen as an attempt to coordinate the two policy sectors. Given the relatively passive attitude of land use planners at the national level, it has been relatively easy to achieve coordination at the national level. However, especially the provinces and municipalities have different opinions on certain topics, specifically gas drilling and recreation. In the rest of this paper I will more closely examine certain specific rivalries, keeping in mind the criteria developed for case selection by the EUWARENESS coordinators. These criteria include a preference for rivalries where the economic and ecological uses are at odds, cases where property rights are redistributed, cases where there is public and private ownership and cases where there is a movement towards coordination. Obviously, it is impossible to satisfy all these criteria at the same time for every case. However, I have looked for particularly strong rivalries (the most contentious ones, with disparate views present in the discussion), with a preference for rivalries that involve new uses and/or redistribution of property rights, and a desire to find rivalries that were relevant in various periods of the study period (roughly taken to be 1970-2000 here). I have been less concerned with rivalries where coordination has been achieved, because I have assumed that coordination is a dependent variable and stimulating/prohibiting factors for its achievement need to be studied. Given this interpretation I have chosen to focus on the land/water rivalry, as epitomized in the debate on the final polder of the plan Lely (Markerwaard). This discussion ran from the 1970s until 1991 (covers much of the case study

3 As I will demonstrate in the discussion of the nature/recreation rivalry, these factors can be overcome, but this requires a very active attitude by the province. period), but was especially salient in the 1970s. The Markerwaard debate was the gate through which natural interests entered the IJsselmeer arena and also the first time that the water magicians (RDIJ) had to defend their ideas in terms of broader considerations than flood safety and agriculture. The second rivalry that I will address is the one between recreation and nature, both new uses of the IJsselmeer and both advocated by government policies. But recreation can not be welcomed everywhere because it may have negative effects on certain parts of the ecosystem. Separation of the two activities has been the basis of most policies here (a form of coordination) and we will see how that is being achieved. The third rivalry of interest here is the one between drinking water preparation and gas drilling. Especially in the 1980s this was a contentious issue and we will see whether and how coordination has been achieved here. Finally, we will look at the practice of fishing at the lake. Here, pressure on the resource has been enormous and significant measures to redistribute fishing rights have been taken. Here too, we will see how such redistribution was possible. Let it be clear that I have not been able to study all relevant rivalries that are present in the IJsselmeer area. However, I do find that the rivalries studied do give a representative sample of the issues at stake. After the sections on specific rivalries, a more analytical section with observations and analysis follows. A more theoretical interpretation of the rivalries and their development takes place in that section, so that the first four sections that follow now mainly contain a chronology and description of the rivalries, with here and there a reference to the theoretical framework.

3 The Markerwaard debate: the challenge of the existing situation and arrival of a new one

Goals of the Zuiderzee project

Although the actual purpose of the Zuiderzee-project was somewhat changing with he political tide, the project served three main purposes throughout its existence: (1) flood safety enhancement, (2) creation of agricultural land, and (3) creation of new land for housing. In the course of the years other possible uses for the polders have been 'invented', including natural use and use for a second National Airport, but the interests advocating these uses seem less well represented in the dominant coalition that was present in the IJsselmeer area until the early 1970s. Goverde, who was personally actively involved in the Markerwaard debate that ensued, has studied the development of the 'power balance' within the IJsselmeer region. He argues that the water management network essentially controlled the decision process until 1970, but slowly lost control in the period 1970-1985. The main reason seems to be that the construction of the Markerwaard could not only be defended anymore on the basis of Lely's plans, but increasingly had to be argued on the basis of broader arguments, which implied a window of opportunity for new groups to enter the discussion arena.

Second wave of environmentalism

Goverde (ibid.) describes how the 'first wave' of environmentalism in the Netherlands dated back to the early 1900s. From the start on, the first wave environmental movement had not questioned the Zuiderzee project, which was already there when the movement emerged. The environmental movement therefore long worked from within the polder paradigm and the 'Contact Commissie' (a government board for nature conservation containing environmentalists) actively cooperated with ZZW and RIJP in determining the set-up of the new polders. The second-wave of environmentalism came up near the end of the 1960s. It differed from the first wave in that it defined the environmental problematique more widely (not just nature conversation) and saw a greater need for protest (rather than an attempt to influence the government from within). The second wave of environmentalist groups took issue with the definition of water bodies as 'not yet reclaimed land' and they started propagating the value of water as valuable open space. The first expression of this development in the IJsselmeer came in 1964, when a tiny group of water sports fans started questioning the need for the Markerwaard-polder in the size as it had been proposed.

The influx of new actors

The critical comments by environmentalists resonated within certain government departments, particularly the Department of Finance, which was not convinced that the investment of government monies in the Markerwaard would be worthwhile. In 1971 a new Minister of Transport and Public Works was appointed. He had previously been Minister of Finance and had been critical of the Markerwaard polder in that capacity. One of his actions was to request a study by ZZW on the usefulness of the new polder. The ZZW unhappily complied and in 1972 a report was published by the title of 'Considerations on the Markerwaard'. The report, as a result of pressure from the Minister, contained a discussion of the option not to construct a polder in the Markermeer (ibid.: 197). This option was rejected by ZZW, but this was only possible by broadening of the set of considerations that had been relevant under the Zuiderzee project. Thus, the report argued that not only water, housing, and agricultural interests pleaded for polder construction, it also argued that other interests did not work against the plan. Specifically mentioned were water recreation, traffic over land and water, water supply, and nature creation. All these interests would not be harmed, in fact, even be improved by a polder. The new Minister was considering a stop work order for the dike between Lelystad and Enkhuizen (see figure 1), which was intended as the future outside border of the Markerwaard polder, and which had not been completed at that time. On this issue, ZZW argued that the work should continue anyhow because the dike was of crucial importance from a safety perspective and water management in general, not only for the Markerwaard polder. Partly because the Minister feared losing the money already sunk in parts of the dike since 1968, construction continued indeed and was completed by 1975. By that time however, the debate on the polder itself was nowhere near completion, also because the Ministerial Advisory Body ('Raad voor de Waterstaat') had decided to put the report 'Considerations on the Markerwaard' up for public inspection and consultation. The consultation process led to considerable response, partly organized by the 'Vereniging tot Behoud van het IJsselmeer' (The association for the Conservation of the IJsselmeer, from here on VBIJ). Members of the VBIJ were particularly drawn to the Markerwaard debate because the new polder was now being mentioned as a potential site for a second national airport, which they opposed. The connection between airport and polder presented both opponents and proponents with a mixed bag of opportunities, but certainly complicated things a lot more. For proponents construction of an airport could possibly provide an additional ratio for the polder but would at the same time bring uncertainty, more opposition, and perhaps delay. For opponents, the additional ration was not welcome, but the uncertainty and delay was. The critical Minister of Transport and Public Works had suggested that the polder and airport should be seen apart from each other and had thus requested a study of the polder regardless of whether the airport would be sited there. Despite the report 'Considerations on the Markerwaard' ignoring the possibility of a possible airport in the polder, the attempt to not let the discussion on the polder be overwhelmed by a discussion on aviation obviously failed. Many arguments were raised against the polder and the Ministerial Advisory Body requested so much additional studies from ZZW, that their report was delayed until 1976. Especially representatives of other government ministries kept seriously questioning the polder plans and demanding further motivations. In 1976, the Ministerial Advisory Body finally published its advice to actually construct the polder, but representatives of the Ministry of Finance and the Directorate for Recreation did not support this advice. Interestingly, the positive advice to the Minister of Transport and Public Works may have legitimized the Markerwaard-polder in the old days, that was no longer the case in 1976. The main reason was that the water management framework was no longer accepted as the relevant framework for deciding on the polder.

The Land use planning system becomes relevant

The large amount of criticism in the consultation process, especially from certain land use planning experts, had given the government the idea that a decision to polder should perhaps be better motivated from a land use planning perspective than had happened until then. This conclusion fitted in a more general desire at the time to increase the plan led character of governmental decision making, especially in land use, and a realization that land use planning policies in the Netherlands were relatively ineffective in actually shaping concrete government decisions. The government of the day decided to introduce the instrument of Core Planning Decisions ('Planologische Kernbeslissingen', from here on PKBs). These PKBs would outline national planning policies, assist the Minister of Spatial Planning in his supervisory role over lower tiers of government, and finally prevent haphazard and ad hoc decision making. Although the authority to draft a PKB was left to individual government departments, the Minister of Spatial Planning did deliver a list 23 areas that should become subject to a PKB. Indicative of the strength of the desire to plan and perhaps of an underestimation of complications associated with the PKB-instrument, this list was quickly approved without much resistance from within the Council of Ministers. Much to the despise of the ZZW, this decision implied that the Markerwaard would become subject to a PBK procedure. However, the Markerwaard polder was not considered important enough for a PKB on its own; instead the polder was to be studied in connection with the second national airport, which was seen as the main topic of the PKB. This decision implied various things. The first is that the then pending advice of the Ministerial Advisory Body ('Raad voor de Waterstaat') was degraded from an important step en route to a binding sectoral decision (the water management sector) to an input into a much more integral land use planning process. Secondly, the decision implied that the connection between airport and polder that the previous Minister of Transport and Public Works had attempted to prevent was now formally being made, introducing uncertainty regarding the outcomes of the process. Officials at ZZW continued to de-couple the two highly controversial projects and move the polder back in the realm of their own sector, but they failed and the report of the Ministerial Advisory Body was indeed reduced in importance. The fear of delay became true, as it was not before the early 1980s that considerable progress was started being made.

In 1980, the airport discussion was solved by a decision not to construct a new airport but to expand the existing ones. Although a government decision on the Markerwaard was also pending, it was expected that the formal PKB procedure for the polder would be lengthy and could therefore potentially delay the aviation PKB. The two procedures were de-coupled, and again this decision was somewhat of a mixed bag of opportunities for opponents and proponents. The Markerwaard polder would no longer be a site of a new airport, but Cabinet still decided to actually construct the polder, be it in a much smaller version than the one that had originally been planned and with the restriction that the polder should be financially feasible. This decision was presented in a policy note ('Beleidsvoornemen') that signaled the start of the official PKB procedure. The decision was based largely on recommendations from ZZW (merged with RIJP and then renamed) and the Ministerial Advisory Body, which had stressed the usefulness of the polder for housing development. The Cabinet argumentation for constructing the polder drew upon the image of a full country. Because the old land was filling up, it should be worthwhile to create reserve space, even if it is uncertain which functions in the future will start demanding space. Despite the Cabinet decision being a confirmation of its intention to construct the polder, traces of the concerns from various (more or less opposing) departments were visible in the government decision. The exact shape of the polder and required infra-structural works were to be determined by the Minister of Transport and Public Works later after more certainty would have been achieved about the need for the polder. Also Cabinet outlined its intention not to make more than 50% of the new polder available for agriculture. Housing, nature and recreation were to gain considerably more space than they had received in the previous polders.

The PKB procedure and the government's intended decision

As required by the statutory procedures, the Policy Intention was put for public inspection and the government advisory body on land use planning ('Raad voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening', or RARO) was requested for its advice. In the consultation period that followed the Cabinet decision, about 20,000 people took the opportunity to express an opinion and more than 650 written reactions were received. A considerable part of these reactions were negative and many were in fact inspired by a fear of subsidization of the old land (particularly in the province of Noord-Holland). Both proponents and opponents questioned the motivation for construction of the polder. Proponents noted that given the proposed functions of the new polder, its dimensions were too small. Opponents argued that the government had inadvertently omitted alternatives for construction of the polder. Especially the VBIJ, in cooperation with other organizations from the fisheries, recreation and nature conservation sectors, were active in developing such alternatives. Already in 1974 had the VBIJ developed an alternative plan 'Waterlely' and in the early 1980s a whole range of organizations developed a 'wet vision' for the Markerwaard. In either case, opponents challenged the idea that 'lack of space' on the old land was a given and should automatically result in creation of a new polder.

The RARO clearly had difficulty in achieving agreement on the polder. The semi-dependent body has representation from many corners and thus it had representation from both proponents and opponents. The council members could not reach consensus and by 1982, the RARO presented two different scenarios to Cabinet. One was a 'wet scenario' (no polder) and one a 'dry scenario' (polder). Different groups within the RARO supported different scenarios. Despite the considerable amount of disagreement, there was consensus in the RARO that some of the assumptions underlying the Cabinet intention were feeble. Specifically, the Council pointed at the need for a broader vision on the development in the IJsselmeer region, the need to further study the issue of subsiding land, and to better assess the economic effects of the new polder.

Change in budgetary policies: monetarism instead of Keynesianism

By 1982, the political spectrum changed and a Cabinet with a deregulatory and 'no nonsense' agenda started its job. The events that unfolded from 1982 to 1985 indicate that the relevant framework for decision making changed radically. The water management perspective and land use planning perspective now had to seriously compete with a stringent government budget perspective. At the beginning of the new Cabinet rule, the implications of its agenda for the polder were unclear. On the one hand, the new Cabinet wanted to avoid lengthy procedures and was out to show strong political will ('daadkracht') which should be focused more strongly on serving business interests (in favor of the polder). On the other hand, the economic doctrine of the Cabinet was that the macro-economic feasibility of projects were less relevant than the effects on the government budget, which should become balanced again. Thus, even if the Markerwaard-polder would be socially worthwhile, constraints on the government budget could still work against government involvement. Opponents of the polder were successful in influencing the Cabinet in this sense that its program at the start ('Regeerakkoord') suggested that both the possibilities of constructing and not constructing the polder should be fully explored. In this sense the active involvement of opponents in the PKB procedure seemed to have paid off.

On the other hand, the study of options was referred back to ZZW and RIJP (united in a regional Directorate of the Public Works Agency, named RDIJ). Goverde, who was actively involved as an opponent at the time, describes the RDIJ's activities from 1982 to 1985 as 'political massage' to get approval for the polder (ibid: 292-348). He suggests that the main way in which the RDIJ attempted political massage was by their control over the study over the various options available. The Agency originally specified six alternative courses of action, two of which revolved around not constructing the polder, and four around constructing the polder. Between 1982 and 1985, these six options were changed in this sense that the non-polder options were fused into one option, whereas the four original polder options were constantly refined and expanded. RDIJ followed Cabinet policy, in this sense that the choice between the remaining options was 'reframed' so that they were compared in terms of costs and benefits, much less in terms of contribution to wider planning policies (ibid.: 305). The National Planning Agency ('Rijksplanologische Dienst', RPD) had started to study the issue after the divided RARO advice in 1982, but the conclusions that this Agency reached (that not poldering would meet planning policies best) was not made public and it seems that this conclusion played a small role in the deliberations of Cabinet. It seems legitimate to say that the financial focus implies a less integral approach to the issue. In addition to that, Goverde (e.g. 1986: 316) gives some examples of how the Ministry of Transport and Public Works selectively used the outcomes of various studies into the financial feasibility of the project. The Ministry for example used its opportunity to write an advice to the Cabinet to give a lower assessment of costs of subsidization than the assessment in formal reports. Also RDIJ suggested in 1982 that the polder would generate 50,000 new jobs (mainly in agriculture). RIJP had been hesitant in publishing the basis for this assessment but when it did, much critique followed. Analysis by the Agricultural Economic Institute ('Landbouw Economisch Instituut', LEI) had suggested that poldering of the Markerwaard would not be interesting both from an agricultural and national economic perspective (or perhaps even 'irresponsible' according to the LEI).

The government of the day was under much pressure to abandon its monetary based economic policy. There were many who advocated continuation of anti-cyclical government investments, but even those who did not still thought it would be useful to order all possible projects in order of attractiveness. This critique resonated within the government and an intergovernmental committee, called ICES, was formed to prioritize possible government investments. ICES produced a list of projects that essentially made clear how many projects were competing with the Markerwaard polder for government money and how low the polder was on the priority list. Still advocates of cost-benefit analysis in government decision making expressed fear that certain projects, such as the Markerwaard polder, would be implemented anyway, mainly because certain groups (RDIJ was specifically mentioned) would be willing to let their own interest prevail over the general interest (ibid: 229). This fear appears to have been unwarranted however.

Private initiative and the demise of the polder

In 1984, a group of private companies 'Initiatiefgroep Markerwaard B.V.' came forward. This group of 650 companies, which included a major bank, suggested that if government would not pay for the polder, the private sector would because the polder would be economically feasible. The group presented a calculation of cost and benefits and requested that the government would give certain guarantees in return, including a guarantee that the state would actually do the groundwork for the group. Although the initiative was intended as a signal to the Cabinet that the project should go ahead, the effect in the end seems to have been negative. The proposals of the group were checked for feasibility within the ICES-Committee and it was found that the private consortium had underestimated certain costs that would have to be borne by the government. The consortium had also not assigned any value to the lake bottom, which ICES considered a mistake4. Within ICES it was concluded that the portrayed arrangements would cost the government about one billion guilders, a figure that was kept from the public until the State Council ('Raad van State', the highest administrative court) ordered the government to publish the ICES report so in 1985. Because of the report, it was clear that the government would have difficulty in approving the project under its own budgetary policies. Yet something had to be decided as general elections were approaching, and the Cabinet decided that the polder should indeed be constructed and that the Markermeer would be formally designated as a future polder in national planning policies. At the same time however, the Cabinet also decided that polder construction would not be immediately started, unless responsible financing would be possible. The decision can best be seen as an invitation to the private sector to construct the polder, be it at full costs and without government subsidy.

When a new Cabinet started (consisting of the same two parties) in 1986, the phrasing of this was changed somewhat to an explicit statement that the polder would not be constructed for the time being. This decision was a response to revised assessments of costs of constructing the polder. Despite that being the case, the designation of the Markermeer as an area for a polder in national planning policies would remain in tact until 1991. Support waned considerably however. The Fourth Note on Land Use Planning ('Vierde Nota Ruimtelijke Ordening', abbreviated to VINO) of 1988 still indicated (lukewarm) support for construction and stated that poldering should 'not be made impossible'. But shortly after that, the central government's position shifted even further. The Addition to Fourth Note ('Vierde Nota Extra', abbreviated to VINEX), which appeared in 1991,explictly stated that a polder would not be created, mainly because credible private initiatives did not emerge and government continued to refuse to devote much spending to the polder itself. Nowadays only the Province of Flevoland (established in 1986) is actively supporting plans to create a large polder. There are however many smaller polder proposals.

The water-land rivalry reviewed: money as an integrating device?

It is difficult to place the water-land rivalry in the framework of the EUWARENESS project because the discussion is not so much on various uses of water and the balance therein, but rather on whether water should stay open water or not. Still there are various interesting remarks to be made, especially about the policies governing use of water. The Zuiderzee initially was in many ways a free resource, used intensively by various functions, especially fisheries and shipping. The economic importance of the fisheries sector was however not great enough to prevent acceptance of the Zuiderzee project, which created the IJsselmeer. At the time of the debate on the Zuiderzee project, fishing was the only

4 Interestingly, this mistake is still being made. The municipality of Amsterdam assumed it would obtain a part of the IJsselmeer for free when it wanted to construct a new housing area in the lake use of the sea, but claims by fishermen that they had a title to the sea were simply waved away. The ownership of the sea by the state was hardly challenged and the factual taking of fishing rights was hardly compensated. Because ownership of the state was so firmly established, property rights of others than the State tended to play a marginal role in the later developments regarding the land water rivalry. Parliament had approved the poldering plan, and in line with the judicial doctrine of the day, this decision was not testable by the courts (judicial testing of government decisions was long considered unconstitutional in the Netherlands). The regime that was then initiated in the early 20th century by the State was thought out by engineer Lely and revolved around two very strong organizational actors, the ZZW and RIJP. For a remarkably long time, these two organizations could continue to implement their plans and their say over the area was unchallenged until the end of the 1960s. In a sense this situation implied that water managers were in control over a large part of the Netherlands, and their rule was almost complete, except that fishing rights were controlled by the Ministry of Finance (see below). The uses with which this water regime was concerned were remarkably enough 'anti- water' uses: flood protection, agriculture and housing. Incredibly large human interventions were undertaken, which changed the Zuiderzee to IJsselmeer. Saline water was replaced by fresh water and entire fish populations destroyed or seriously affected. The idea that the Zuiderzee or even the IJsselmeer could also be seen as a valuable water resource was largely missing from the picture. In this sense management of the IJsselmeer was totalitarian, yet not very integrated.

The 'water regime' was challenged since the 1960s, after much of the Zuiderzee project had been completed. Largely because of one specific minister who questioned the financial feasibility of the last polder, the Markerwaard, the assumptions behind the project were scrutinized. These assumptions were to be renewed, and largely because of a coupling with the airport debate that was unwanted by the water sector, the project had to be defended on entirely different grounds, i.c. land use planning terms. One can say that in 1974 exclusive control over the IJsselmeer was wrestled away from the water sector, if not by formally removing it from the water managers, then by changing the framework within which ZZW and RIJP had to make decisions. The airport debate and the desire to have open land use planning procedures led to an influx of highly motivated actors, which opposed construction of the polder. Under land use planning procedures, the right to polder the area became contested and needed active confirmation in a national land use planning decision, despite the fact that the Zuiderzee Act of 1924 did contain such a right. The repeal of this right in this case, could be done without compensation because titles to the new polder had not been established yet and it was a government decision to use its right to polder the Markermeer or not.

The triggers for the regime change in the 1970s seem to be institutionally related. Especially the change of leadership of the Ministry of Transport and Public Works to a critic of the Markerwaard polder was instrumental in opening up the decision arena. Opponents of the polder made good use of their opportunities under land use planning law, but when a new 'no nonsense' Cabinet arrived in the 1980s, this channel of influence lost much of its relevance to the decision process on the Markerwaard polder. In the 1970s one can in a sense see two separate policy sectors operating in the IJsselmeer area.

(IJburg). A conflict erupted with central government. Arbitration was called for and the city in the end Actors from the water sector kept largely pleading for a polder, although motivated by different reasons. Despite some division between government actors within this field (e.g. in the Ministerial Advisory Body), plans to polder continued to be supported. Helpful in achieving this result was the fact that 'non water' actors were relegated to less important position, e.g. in said Advisory Council, they only had representation on sub-committees. Among the actors active within the land use planning field, there was much stronger division over what should happen in the Markermeer. Proponents of poldering had a significant say here as well but they could not tip the balance against opponents and the division within government figured very prominently here. It is my impression that the resistance from the land use planning field must be seen as a worrying sign from the perspective of integration as land use planning is clearly a more encompassing policy field than the water field. Land use planning clearly has broader problem definitions than the ones under which the water sector operates.

When, by the early 1980s, proponents of the polder overcame the concerns from opponents in the land use sphere, yet another change occurred. The land use planning process largely lost its meaning and the importance of financial considerations increased enormously. It is difficult to judge whether this should be seen as a broadening of the regime. For certain, the idea of the Cabinets of the early 1980s was that projects such as the Markerwaard polder should be judged only on the basis of narrow budgetary terms. There was a rejection of the idea that projects should be socially worthwhile. On the other hand, viewing poldering in monetary terms implies that the costs and benefits can be compared to other projects which the Cabinet desired to undertake and it seems that this comparison was not favorable for the polder project: money as an integrating device? Note that the implication here is that the rivalry was not 'won' by one of the uses because the other use was 'outplayed'. Rather, the whole rivalry was sort of neglected and a completely different framework of evaluation introduced.

With hindsight it is remarkable that the argument of nature protection seems to have played such a minor role in the decision to finally not construct a polder in the Markermeer. The case could well be made that large parts of the IJsselmeer have long been deserving of the Specially Protected Area (SPA)-status under the Ramsar convention of 1971 (the 1% per cent norm). Indeed, a report written on important bird areas in the European Union made in light of the Bird Directive of 1978 indicated that the Markermeer was of great importance. The VBIJ had started to play this international card in the early 1980s. The organization had requested that the European Parliament advise the European Commission that the Markermeer should become a Specially Protected Area (SPA). The European Parliament did so indeed, and when the Dutch government decided to construct the polder in 1985, this decision was brought to the attention of the European Commission through a formal complaint. Needless to say that the argument became less relevant when the decision was taken not to construct the polder. Because of this, it is difficult to say what would have happened if the Dutch policies, which clearly left the value of the Markermeer region from an environmental or natural perspective remained relatively unrecognized, would have collided with European efforts to maintain the lake as a special area for birds. I do not want to imply that the Dutch government has not recognized the importance of the IJsselmeer from a nature perspective per se, but certainly there was

had to pay a considerable amount of money). more of such a realization for the Northern part of the lake and the so called corner lakes (the pieces of water between the old land and the new polders). Specifically the somewhat unexpected natural value of the corner lakes, which attracted many tourists and recreation, seems to have helped recognize the importance of the area. The Public Works Agency saw the importance of these developments, and it attempted to extend its scope of authority as a 'water manager' to integrated plan forming. As the Agency remained committed to the Markerwaard polder throughout the 1980s, its attempts at such planning largely centered on the Northern part of the lake ('small IJsselmeer' in their terms) and the corner lakes.

Despite the increased recognition of the IJsselmeer as a nature reserve (see the next paragraph for some more detailed information) there is still a tendency to take measures that intrude upon the open water character of the IJsselmeer. What's more there still is a tendency to take (small) parts of the lake for lakeside development (be it recreational or urban). The best example of this are provided by the city of Amsterdam that is building a new urban area (40,000 houses) in one of the corner lakes and by attempts by the towns in the polders of Flevoland to expand into the lake. So despite the fact that the Markerwaard did not get constructed, the very typical Dutch attitude towards the lake (it is yet to be reclaimed land) is quite strong and backed by important economic interests (there is a chronic shortage of housing). The plans of Amsterdam did not go through without a protracted battle with conservation groups and the plans were defeated in a referendum, which was however not binding on the city. Under current Dutch regulations, Amsterdam needs to pay for the parts of the lake it has taken (see footnote 4) and there is an obligation to compensate the loss of nature elsewhere. The Committee for Water Management in the 21st century (WB21) has called the plans of Amsterdam a mistake, at odds with modern thinking about water management. Indeed, during the summer of 2001 there was much talk about construction of a new corner lake around one of the older polders of the Lely plan (the Noord- Oostpolder, see figure 1). This would stop the lowering of land near the polder, create opportunities for nature development and greater storage capacity in the IJsselmeer.

4 The nature-recreation rivalry5

Introduction

The image of the IJsselmeer as an uninteresting area and not yet reclaimed land, which was invoked in debates on the poldering plans, seem to have stuck around for long and at the time of the Zuiderzee project's inception little consideration was given to the natural and recreational values of the future lake. The new polders had high dikes, and the lake was quite deep behind these dikes so that there is a steep decline from land to lake. Both for natural and (many but not all) recreational purposes such a steep decline is not very attractive. The water is too deep for wading birds, and swimmers or wind surfers prefer less steep shores for their activities. Owners of large sailing boats on the other hand do appreciate deep water, but are still not greatly attracted to the shores of the new polder as there is very little to see which is of tourist value even though the shoreline is very characteristic. The implication is

5 Helpful comments to this part of the text were provided Mr. H. Bakker, Province of Noord-Holland. that parts of the lake that do not have great depth nor steep shores are attractive to both recreation and nature, certainly when these places are near some of the very characteristic old villages. The areas where such conditions exist are the Friesian coast, large parts of the Noord-Holland coast, and some parts of the coasts of the corner lakes (especially the parts near the Veluwe region). It is in the corner lakes where a certain level of tourism started to develop first, now is most intense and where the likelihood of conflict with other functions is greatest as the space is relatively limited. As tourists are in fact attracted to natural areas (because of their relatively quiet character for instance) there is a possibility that valuable natural areas are 'invaded' by tourists. Especially certain forms of recreation that are very mobile (speed boats, surf boards) have a tendency to sometimes penetrate natural reserves. Below I will discuss how this potential rivalry has been perceived and attempts are being made to solve it, both at the Noord-Holland shore and the corner lakes. Before doing so, I will delve into the recreational and natural value of the IJsselmeer somewhat deeper.

The natural value of the IJsselmeer

The role of the IJsselmeer in the Dutch water system implies that its presence plays a great role far beyond the immediate lake itself. Even if we restrict ourselves to the lake and the immediate coastline, the ecological value of the lake is enormous. The basis for the ecosystem is algae growth, mussels (driehoeksmosselen), and to e lesser extent certain types of water plants. Water plants are relatively rare and mainly concentrated along the Friesian coast, where slopes are not as steep. Birth grounds for fish are to be found exactly in that area and in other places where the water is not very deep. Wading birds are also concentrated there. The importance of the Friesian coast has long been recognized and large parts of the coast have been assigned a status as natural reserve. But wading birds are not the only birds present, as many (trekking) birds use the lake as a breeding, feeding and molting place, whereas some sorts rest at the lake during the winter time. 'Usage' of the lake by the birds is most intense in late summer (August and September) and during the winter months, when the IJsselmeer is one of the few fresh water bodies in Europe not to freeze over. All in all, there are 25 bird species in such concentrations in the IJsselmeer so as to make their habitat qualify as a Special Area of Protection (SPA) under the Bird Directive (Waterrecreatie Advies, 2000: 9). The figure below depicts the most important bird habitats in the area, and as the reader will see, practically the entire lake is important by some type of bird. A fact which is confirmed by the decision of the Under-Minister responsible for Nature Management to grant the entire lake SPA status in January 2001. This was not until the European Court had sentenced the Netherlands for not implementing the Directive (institutional trigger).

Figure 3: Important bird habitats in the IJsselmeer-area. The figure to the left shows areas where the common tern ('visdief'), black tern ('zwarte stern'), grebe ('fuut'), cormorant ('aalscholver') are concentrated. The figure to the right indicates where fish eating species ('viseters'), and particularly the common golden eye ('duikeend') are located6.

There is extensive fish life in the lake, with the most common species being the smelt ('spiering'), which is predated by many other fish species, especially perch ('baars'). The sorts of fish present again differ for deeper and shallower parts. In the deeper part the just described species dominate, but other species such as white roach ('blankvoorn') and eel ('paling') are present as well. In the shallow parts of the lake, plant-eating fish are present, including rock bass and pikeperch ('snoekbaars'). In accordance with its importance, the IJsselmeer is part of the so-called Ecological Main Structure, a concept introduced with the Nature Policy Plan in 1989.

The recreational value of the IJsselmeer

The IJsselmeer holds various attractions for tourists. The lake itself is the largest open space in the Netherlands, with the greatest undisturbed visibility. Just to be on the lake therefore is a sensation in itself. There are around 17,000 boats (mainly sailing boats) home to the region, that are served by 128 harbors. Especially the larger boats with greater depth cruise across the lake (and sometimes on to the North Sea), whereas smaller boats tend to remain in the corner lakes. The villages around the lake, nature reserves, and fishing grounds are the main destination for much day time recreation that takes place. It was assessed for instance that 470,000 sports anglers use the lake on one or more occasion

6 Klaas Jan Jonkman (Creative Fishing) is thanked for his advice on the translation of bird and fish species names. every year. In addition to that, the IJsselmeer is a favorite holiday destination for many and they are served by 25 companies that operate campgrounds or other facilities. The total number of 'beds' for tourists around the lake is assessed at 8-9,000. The total amount of spending associated with tourism in the area was estimated at two billion guilders annually (figures from Waterrecreatie Advies, 2000). The figure below gives some other data.

Recreation form Number of days spent at/near the Number of days spent at/near the corner lakes rest of the IJsselmeer

Tanning and swimming 250,000 100,000 Sailing and wind surfing 450,000 740,000 Motor yachts 2,600,000 130,000 Motor yachts (outgoing) 890,000 50,000 Rowing and canoeing 375,000 150,000 Angling 900,000 250,000 Figure 4: Recreation in the IJsselmeer (adapted from RLG, 1999).

The Noord-Holland shore

Earlier I have described how a certain amount of policy coordination is to be achieved through the land use planning system. Whereas the provinces have cooperated in devising an interprovincial plan, and evaluation of this plan in the year 2000 showed that in some cases municipalities had not adopted zoning ordinances that cover the part of the lake on their territory. Another problem is related to the fact that the major part of the shores of the IJsselmeer falls under existing (old) zoning ordinances and that even where municipalities did adopt new ordinances, the new ordinances often did not include the coast line. Of the three provinces involved, it seems that Noord-Holland acted most actively to stimulate a coherent inter-municipal policy for the shore. The province published its Regional Plan 'Noord-Holland-Noord' in 1994, a plan which largely reflected the interprovincial policy of a balanced multifunctional development of the IJsselmeer. One of the issues upon which the provinces had agreed revolved around concentration of new recreational facilities at already existing concentration points, which would now become focal points of tourism development ('speerpunten'). The Regional Plan identified the municipalities of Hoorn and Enkhuizen as such focal points. The map below indicates where these municipalities are located and where the other focal points can be found.

Figure 5: Interprovincial decision on development of recreation. The stars indicate focal points, the closed circles existing concentrations and the open circle indicate places where new development may take place.

Characteristic of Regional Plans, the statements about recreational development remained at a relatively abstract level. More specific guidelines were developed by the province of Noord-Holland in 1996, when the province published its Policy Note on the Coastline Development IJsselmeer and Markermeer ('Beleidsnota Kustlijnontwikkeling IJsselmeer en Markermeer'), which was presented by the province as the relevant framework for supervision of municipal plans, together with some other relevant plans (e.g. the Policy Note on Open Air Recreation and the Note on Noord-Holland and Tourism). The Policy Note on Coastline Development was stringent in various respects. First, the province indicated it would not approve of recreational developments outside the existing shore, unless there was a functional reason for such a type of expansion (this policy protects the open water). Several municipal projects were specifically mentioned in this respect and it was communicated that the province would not automatically approve of them. Secondly, the province indicated that certain towns (Scharwoude, Warder, Marken and Uitdam) would not be allowed to expand their harbors in order to attract more yachts, whereas expansion in all other harbors was limited to a certain number of boat places ('ligplaatsen'). The province had calculated that with the then existing municipal plans, the demand for boat places could be met until 2005 and probably some time thereafter. What the municipal plans were missing however were boat places near interesting objects, where boats would not stay overnight but just for a few hours ('aanlegplaatsen'). Municipalities were called upon to add such types of boat places to their repertoire.

The municipalities of Noord-Holland had already attempted to define their opinion on recreation and nature on the coast when the interprovincial plan was still being discussed. Collectively they had devised so called 'basic plans' which indicated where development could take place and where not. The basic policy underlying these plans was different from national policy: recreative developments were to be subordinated to the natural values of the area (nature over recreation). Expansion of tourism should occur in the already popular places, although even there, expansion in the range 100-500 boat places should be critically examined and the 'dominant interest' of tourism had to be demonstrated. The municipalities agreed that expansion of harbors of this size could potentially occur in Medemblik, Hoorn, Edam-Volendam, and Monnickendam (note that the province later did not consider all of these as focal points). The municipalities also agreed that developments that would increase the number of boat places by 500 were in principle unwanted (the province had no principled objections against such large developments, as long as they were in the focal points). The amount of coordination among the municipalities seems to have been exemplary, also given the fact that the province took over many of the ideas developed by the municipalities. However, it should be noted that three municipalities (Wieringermeer, Andijk and Venhuizen) had not agreed to the common municipal position, probably because they would have liked a certain amount of expansion that was not allowed. Obviously, with the basic plans being non-statutory figures, these municipalities could not be forced to accept the basic plans. The real effect of the cooperation has thus been through an effect on provincial policy, which in turn should guide municipalities with the plans. The differences between the municipal basic plans and the provincial policy note have led to a certain amount of tension, especially in Enkhuizen where the municipality had wanted to expand the harbor by 600 boat places, but where the provinces refused permission for 400 of those.

The municipalities have continued their active role in policy development. The Project Group Golden Triangle ('Gouden Driehoek'), which consists of Enkhuizen, Medemblik and Hoorn (but also has provincial representation) initiated the development of yet another regional vision in 1996, shortly after the provincial Policy Note on shoreline development had been presented. Interestingly, the task of preparing this vision was granted to the Association Water Recreation at the IJsselmeer ('Stichting Waterrecreatie IJsselmeer'), an organization which propagates recreation at the IJsselmeer and which is increasingly fulfilling the role of policy broker. The Association is sponsored by various authorities in the region and is quickly developing an important database on recreation in the area, which is extremely valuable in policy preparation. Besides, the Association is successful in networking with actors that represent other interests, especially the nature conservation associations. The Association presented its vision of the Noord-Holland shore in 1997, which in many ways reads as a propagation of tourism (the economic value of tourism is assessed at 767 million guilders annually and 650 full time jobs) and a request to solve some of its problems (such as long sailing times between certain places and extensive plant growth at certain areas where yachts are supposed to be able to sail). The provincial note on shoreline development is supported in many respects, but some changes are proposed and once again certain uncoordinated developments are flagged, specifically the desire of three municipalities to develop a 'historic shipyard'. The association concludes that there are plans for around 3,000 new boat places, but this is not sufficient to accommodate 'demand'. Demand has been assessed by the Association on the basis of 'waiting lists', that is requests for boat places which had not been met at the time of their report, and an assumed growth in the number of yachts of about 2% per year. The Association argued that waiting lists gave an underestimation of real interest as not everyone with an interest would take the effort to register7. The association found that the demand for extra boat places was about evenly divided over the Northern part and the Southern part of the IJsselmeer, but that most plans for development were for the Northern part (60%). The Association pleads for extra efforts in the Southern part of the lake, which seems congruent with the desire of the national government to concentrate recreation in the South. The association notes that if extra places can not be realized in the focal points, then they should be realized elsewhere. The association pleaded for Andijk as a replacement for a development in Enkhuizen that was rejected by the province; interestingly, the province's policy of 1996 had also indicated that no extra places in Andijk would be allowed. Clearly, the report put pressure on the province to alter its policy. Whether or not this has happened has not been studied here.

The Corner lakes: from stimulation of tourism to regulation of tourism

The original plans for the Zuiderzee project did not foresee the construction of corner lakes, and when they were suggested for the first time, in 1925, these proposals were mainly intended to serve military considerations. Fitting within the long standing tradition of using water to defend the country (inundation), the corner lakes were suggested to serve as a barrier to enemies that might seek to take the valuable agricultural land. It seems that this suggestion was ignored when construction of the first polders started, but as implementation of the Zuiderzee project progressed it became clear that the omission of corner lakes in the first polders implied enormous effects on surrounding land, especially by subsidization. Because the Zuiderzee project lasted so long, there was ample opportunity to change construction of future polders so that subsidization would be prevented (problem pressure). The actual dimensions and shapes of these lakes (small and straight) were however not very much to the liking of nature and recreational interests. Already in the early days of yachting on the lake, boat owners started to suggest that the corner lakes should be made suitable and attractive for yachting. They established a Zuiderzee Commission in 1942 which started to influence decision making (institutional trigger).

7 On the other hand, many people that do register, do this twice, so there can be some doubt about the accuracy of the lists from that angle as well. Nature conservation organizations also started to see the great possibilities at the lake and started pleading for the creation of nature reserves in the corner lakes. The arguments from both the recreational and natural interests were accepted by the ZZW and by 1950, a clear change in the landscaping of the Flevopolders becomes observable. Instead of straight coast lines, it was decided that the coast should have more curves and that there should be small islands in the corner lakes which would be attractive for tourists and nature. Especially the Southern part of the Flevopolder has been affected by this change of policy. The turnabout was completed around 1960, when ZZW published its 'Structure plan for the Southern IJsselmeer polders'. In that plan, the corner lakes are viewed explicitly in relationship with the old land (broadening of the problem definition of the project). From then on, the corner lakes were to be considered important elements with a right of existence on their own, and which were expressly intended for recreational purposes. By 1959 a 'Committee for Recreative Use of the Corner-lakes near the IJsselmeer-polders' (CORRIJ) was founded, which would assist recreational development in the area (Kuijpers and Glasbergen, 1991: 36-38). CORRIJ was intended as a forum of informal coordination and information exchange between the responsible government layers (coordination between government levels). Land use planning in the corner lakes for instance was at that time a responsibility of the Minister of Transport and Public Works (for the water) and the surrounding municipalities and provinces (for the coast). Together, the ministries, provinces and municipalities involved cooperated in developing norms and guidelines for the recreational use of the area, which were not binding upon the parties however as they were not statutory figures.

Despite this degree of informal coordination, Kuijpers and Glasbergen (ibid.) argue that a coherent approach to the development of the area was lacking. Unfortunately, they are not specific, but do indicate that several uncoordinated developments took place in the area at that time and that these developments had negative effects. Especially a certain tension between recreation and nature was felt, and CORRIJ in that time started to conceive of its task as something broader than just propagation of recreation, but also coordination of recreational development. By 1977, CORRIJ started developing its first corner lake wide plan called 'Ontwikkelingsvisie recreatief gebruik Randmeren', wherein the commission outlined its vision for the future of the corner lakes. This plan was warmly received by the Minister of Transport and Public Works in 1980. On the occasion, the Minister suggested that CORRIJ should reconsider its task. The commission should study how a more integral and 'more definitive' (in the sense of specific and final) policy for the corner lakes could be developed, that would then be formalized in the municipal ordinances. The Minister, acting in line with the already described trend of the time towards more integrated water plans, thus suggested an informal form of integral planning that would be binding on the partners at the negotiation table. Within CORRIJ an intensive and lengthy debate followed, and by 1983 the Minister decided to instigate a new steering - and working group, STIBRIJ ('Stuurgroep voor integrale beleidsplanning voor de Randmeren en IJsselmeerpolders') and CIBRIJ ('Commissie voor integrale beleidsplanning voor de Randmeren en IJsselmeerpolders') which were to act as institutional actors for a broader approach. The groups consisted of representatives from several ministries, provinces, municipalities, municipal co-operations, and recreation bodies ('recreatieschappen'). Together, they were given general guidelines by the minister and were to develop an integral policy plan. The authority of the Minister of Transport and Public Works to instigate these groups was based on his responsibility for land use planning for the water. Several municipalities were unsatisfied however with this action by the Minister and advocated that the proper channels of deciding on the corner lakes was through the land use system itself (which works bottom up generally), not by an extra-statutory plan. The municipalities pointed out that the corner lakes were about to be provincially incorporated, guaranteeing coordinated policy development already (institutional resistance against integration). Despite such resistance, STIBRIJ and CIBRIJ succeeded in publishing four integral plans in 1986 and 1987.

Kuijpers and Glasbergen (ibid: 38) write that the plans all revolved around the principle of zoning and separation of functions that were seen as disharmonious (especially nature and recreation). The problem analysis was that unbridled recreational development was harming nature in the area and certain zones should be reserved for nature in the future. One of these plans was put for public inspection and was in fact amended after receipt of responses. Because this plan was officially 'ratified' by STIBRIJ, it had a relatively high binding value. The other three plans were never formally ratified by all parties involved, only by the central government ministries and provinces involved and then after much time had elapsed (ratification in 1990). In two cases, the public authorities involved were unable to reach agreement on parts of the plan, in one case because a municipality considered that the plan would imply too great limitations on recreation on its territory. Municipal obstruction thus prohibited the actual ratification of the plans in a STIBRIJ context. Despite that being the case, the provinces and national government agreed that they would use the plan as the basis for their own policies, effectively implying that the two obstructing municipalities could potentially have a hard time gaining approval for their zoning ordinances. Indeed, the STIBRIJ plans did have a large effect on the provincial regional plans that were adopted for the area. Kuijpers and Glasbergen (ibid.: 42) note that the STBRIJ plans did not contain time tables nor specification of responsibilities over authorities involved. In two cases there actually was no budget for implementation of the plan. Kuijpers and Glasbergen (ibid.: 43) write that because of this, the plans have played a small role at the actual level of management and landscaping. Added to that is the already mentioned fact that municipal zoning ordinances are notoriously poorly enforced. In 2000, the number of illegal recreational settlements in natural areas around the corner lakes was assessed at 100 in the province of Gelderland alone (IIVR, 2000: 23).

An unforeseen ecological problem that emerged in the corner lakes, some time after they had been created, was an enormous growth of algae. The corner lakes had been very clear and clean initially, but because of the relatively low volume of the lakes and limited flow of water, concentrations of phosphates and nitrates quickly increased, with the main sources being communal wastewater and run off from agricultural land. At the end of the 1960s the results became visible for the first time in the form of exponential algae growth, which reduced visibility in the lakes considerably ('green soup'). The effect on water plants and bird life was strongly negative, and because of this and this had considerable effects on other elements in the ecosystem, especially the fish life that depended on water plants. The entire ecosystem that had existed collapsed in a few years. Governments involved reacted by cooperation in a working and a study group: 'Werkgroep Sanering Randmeren', and 'Projectgroep Eutrofiëringonderzoek Sanering Randmeren'. The work of these groups resulted in a large scale action plan, which started to be implemented by 1986. Under this project, called 'Bestrijding Overmatige Algengroei in de Veluwerandmeren' (BOVAR), various measures were taken, including the renewal of waste water treatment works, the flushing through of the corner lakes with relatively clean water, and measures to reduce the number of bream in the lakes. The population of this fish had increased enormously and because of its moving through the water soil increased the problem of low visibility. By the year 2000, Rijkswaterstaat could conclude that many of the measures taken under BOVAR had been successful. Certain water plants and bird species had returned, the fish population had become more diverse again, phosphate concentrations had vastly reduced and visibility starkly increased since 1995 (from around 20 centimeters in 1975 to 70 centimeters).

Despite the success, Rijkswaterstaat does not deem the situation in the corner lakes as very stable. Rijkswaterstaat contends that 'several developments' threaten the achieved results; especially 'administrative fragmentation', 'lack of public support', and 'growing claims for space' are mentioned as the deeper causes of the problematique (IIVR homepage). Rijkswaterstaat indicated that the corner lakes tended to be seen as 'reserve space' for projects which can not be realized elsewhere, which denies the own identity of the area (IIVR, 2000). In 1996, Rijkswaterstaat initiated a project that sought to (once again) develop an integral plan for the corner lakes: Integrale Inrichting Veluwe Randmeren ('Integral Landscaping of the Veluwe corner lakes'), or IIVR. This time the ambition was not to approach plan forming for each corner lake separately, but for all corner lakes at the same time (another broadening of the regime therefore and a positive step towards coordination). The implication was that 19 government organizations (municipalities, provinces, waterboards, and ministries) participated in the project. In line with a broader change of planning philosophy at Rijkswaterstaat (mainly the result of continuing public opposition against developments the Agency undertakes), the plan forming process was to be interactive, meaning that several societal organizations and the ordinary could participate in the process; some 20 societal organizations decided to join in, ranging from recreation to nature protection organizations.

Interactive decision processes instigated by Rijkswaterstaat usually do not result in statutory plans and the intention is not explicitly to change the existing distribution of authorities over the various sectors. Therefore, already accepted government policies are not supposed to be questioned during the process. The added value needs to come from joint study of problems and solutions and, in the case of IIVR, from providing others than Rijkswaterstaat with the overall view of relevant developments in the corner lake. In this case, Rijkswaterstaat started in 1997 with an inventory of problems and opportunities for development in the lake. Around 400 people have participated, and 400 strengths and 1,100 weaknesses were identified8. Rijkswaterstaat and others involved then proceeded to 'structure' the problems and solutions into three different possible scenario's, which had different emphases (one more recreation oriented 'Costa Fleva', the second nature orientated 'Nice and Clear', the third 'balanced' and named 'Green Guard Rail'). The scenario's were also put for public inspection and the results of consultation were fed back into the Steering Group, which then authorized the further development of the Green Guard Rail Scenario, with some of the original features omitted and others added. By October 2000, the Steering Group had reached consensus at public official level about a package of 36 measures and a budget of 40 million EURO. Rijkswaterstaat (RDIJ) would funnel about 16 million EURO, whereas other central government actors and the provinces also committed monies and private funding of some initiatives was also invited. It seems likely however that the national government will pay the lion's share of the costs, as the provinces are likely to be allowed to recover their costs from the national government fund for area-oriented management (SGB). The agreement was to be sanctioned by elected representatives in April 2001. The new integral plan ('Inrichtingsplan Veluwe Randmeren') differs from the previous plans in this sense that it contains a very clear budget and timetables for realizing the several parts of the plan (phase I, II and III). The status of the plan after political acceptance and the organization that would oversee implementation were also discussed and agreed upon. A steering group and various working groups would monitor progress and the governments involved were to sign a voluntary agreement ('convenant') indicating their intention to implement the plan. A plus of the plan is also that the recreation sector and nature conservation groups worked together to prepare their own view of future developments, which they defended in the interactive sessions. There is a longer tradition of cooperation between these groups (dating back to the Markerwaard polder debate), but it seems that the IIVR has had an effect of cementing their relations. By cooperating, these groups can be a very powerful force in the plan process. It is interesting to see however that certain segments of the nature groups have chosen to remain outside the planning process, perhaps because they envisioned there were greater opportunities to achieve their purposes if they did not participate.

One can not help being impressed with plan, but from a sustainability perspective a few comments can be made. The first is that agriculture (a main source of pollution) was not involved in the project. The result is that measures for additional reduction of phosphates are mainly sought within the discharges of communal wastewater. Very expensive expansions are planned for the wastewater treatment works in Harderwijk, whereas reductions by agriculture remain to be seen. Secondly, the draft plan of October 2000 devotes some attention to the meaning of the project within the framework of European Directives, specifically the Bird Directive. Whereas the plan promptly recognizes the great international importance of the corner lakes from bird life perspective, it does predict and actually defends the reduction of bird habitat (which might for instance be the consequence of the creation of more sailing routes through the lakes). 'Model calculations' have shown that 'the possibilities' for water fowl lessen by 5% because of the plan, but 'this does not mean to say that the number of waterfowl will reduce by 5% (. . . )'. Furthermore: 'If previous actions within BOVAR are ignored, the picture emerges that, on the whole, the foreseen measures do not fit in the desire to maintain existing bird values completely. However, when previous measures are taken into account, the picture changes. It is those actions, which have resulted to a development of the Veluwe corner lakes into an area with high bird value. In this respect the ambitions of the Bird Directive have been more than met, even before the

8 This seems more indicative of the concrete level of discussion than the existence of many serious problems. Directive came into force. (. . .) The order of events in this respect is determining for the picture that emerges. If investments in recreative facilities would have been undertaken earlier, possibly there would have been less waterfowls in the area, and future measures would rather have a positive effect for waterfowl.' (IIVR, 2000: 26). During my interviews I was informed that the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Nature Management (LNV) does not necessarily share this view of the Bird Directive and found that the existing value of the lake for bird life should be taken as a reference point to determine whether the measures proposed would be acceptable under the Bird Directive. In the worst case scenario these converging opinions could imply that the convenant would perhaps not be signed. Certainly withdrawal of the Ministry of LNV from the convenant could potentially have great impact as the plan is in many ways a package deal. A demand for greater bird habitat than envisioned in the plan could negatively affect the willingness of the other actors involved to agree to the plan. Already has the province of Flevoland declared its intention of withdrawing if LNV is not a part to the agreement. One should also not be surprised if the parts of the nature movement that did not agree to be a party to the agreement will use the Bird Directive as a tool against certain parts of the plan that actually reduce bird habitat.

Conclusion: whither Bird Directive?

The rivalry between nature and recreation seems greatest in the corner lakes and was addressed there first. At the initiative of Rijkswaterstaat attempts were made at integral planning, but as we have seen in the section on the Markerwaard-polder, municipalities and provinces have been hesitant in cooperating as they were waiting for provincial and municipal incorporation of the corner lakes. Despite that being the case, certain integral plans have already been developed in the mid 1980s and there was a certain commitment from the national government and provinces to achieve the common goal of a balanced development of recreation which had thereto been unbridled and started to have negative consequences for the natural beauty of the area (problem pressure). The reason why municipalities and provinces would not cooperate with integral planning are manifold, but include a conception of Rijkswaterstaat as 'only' a water manager and a fear of restrictions on local autonomy, especially where such restrictions could imply less economic development. The burst of algae in the corner lakes made very clear what the consequences could be of disturbance of the ecosystem (problem pressure, event pressure) and created support for drastic measures (preceded by about 15 years of research and talking). Despite a certain level of success in policy coordination, Rijkswaterstaat again initiated an attempt at integral planning, this time for all the corner lakes. A three-year process with much consultation resulted in a concept integral plan, which seems to be supported by most parties involved, perhaps in part because much new recreational development is still allowed. If approved, the plan would be a success in this sense that cooperation has been established over municipal and provincial borders, which is much less assured under the land use planning system. Integration has been specifically promoted by Rijkswaterstaat, which has many resources (financial and knowledge) to back up its commitment to integral planning. An alternative approach to reaching integration is through the land use planning system. The Noord-Holland coast demonstrates that the land use planning system can also function as an integrating framework. Here municipalities anticipated policy development at the provincial level and attempted to influence it, by agreeing amongst themselves over development of recreation. In the end various municipalities would not cooperate anymore, but there is a chance that the province (which went ahead with its own policies anyway) might be able to control developments in these municipalities.

It is my impression that the Bird and Habitat Directives will have great impact on the nature- recreation rivalry. The Netherlands has been hesitant in implementing the Directives and has 'underreported' to the Commission, that is, submitted an incomplete list of natural areas needed in the framework of Natura 2000. This list overlooked important parts of the IJsselmeer too. The reason why this occurred, it is suggested by critics, is associated with a fear that the Directives will restrict human activities in the designated areas more stringently than is currently the case even in the areas that have been designated natural reserve status ('Natuurmonument'). Interestingly, the Netherlands were among the greatest supporters of the Bird and Habitat Directives. Therefore, the conviction by the European Court of Justice for failure to implement the Directives in 1998 was a reason for great embarrassment. It appears that the Dutch government had reasoned that appointment of various areas as SPA was not necessary given the already present level of protection under Dutch law, but this reasoning was not accepted by the Court. Because of the verdict, the government started an emergency procedure to appoint large chunks of the IJsselmeer as SPAs in January 1999, a procedure which caused some concern with other actors involved and which might in fact be a threat to the integral planning processes I have discussed.

The line of reasoning by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Nature Management (LNV) is that the Specially Protected Area status for parts of the lake will imply no restrictions on functions already planned in the area under the PKB of 1995 ('Structuurschema Groene Ruimte'), which has weighted the various interests involved. As written above, this Decision allows a large expansion of recreation activities in the area and some of the developments may cause reduction in bird habitats. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether the PKB could indeed be used as a blanket provision to prove that natural interests in the area have been properly taken into account in the decision to allow an expansion of recreative developments and that individual developments are consistent with the SPA status of the area wherein they are to take place (RLG, 1999). However, thus far the actual 'restrictive' value of the SPA status remains unclear. On the one hand, the European Directives seem mainly concerned with procedural guarantees that nature interests are weighted in decision processes. Certainly in cases where environmental assessment is obligatory anyhow (this includes major recreational developments but also gas drilling) it is unlikely that the Directive really has the potential to change the decision process much, let alone the outcomes. On the other hand, the requirement to demonstrate social need and lack of alternatives for a certain project could very well alter decision- making procedures and outcomes. That is because Dutch legislation allows for strategic environmental assessment but hardly requires it; environmental assessment as it is currently practiced in the Netherlands thus hardly encompasses the study of alternative projects, which seems to be required under EU law. So far, there is only national jurisprudence that speaks to this issue. Dutch Courts have ruled up till now that national environmental assessment procedures guarantee that sufficient attention is paid to natural interests in the decision process. Despite that being the case, various actors have been unpleasantly surprised by what they see as a one sided action by the Ministry of LNV to appoint (almost) the entire lake9.

The uncertainty related to the actual meaning of this decision could bring forward much litigation when specific projects are started, and the refusal of certain nature protection groups (e.g. the Bird Protection Association, 'Vogelbescherming') to participate in integral planning are an omen indeed. In this sense, the Bird Directive might be at odds with the results of integral planning that have been achieved so far, as it seeks to protect natural interests only and is thus in a sense a potential institutional trigger for fragmentation. The compromises reached at the negotiation table may prove to be feeble and could be undermined by legal proceedings at both the national and EU level. Difficult dilemmas may emerge here, with the core of the problem being that the Bird Directive requires that reductions of Bird Habitat only be made in case of a great societal interest demanding it. The burden of proof is on developers and local governments and one wonders whether integral planning efforts, which assign certain functions to certain areas, are taken as an indication of great social need. For certain, there is a tendency in litigation to look at the merits of each proposal on its own. The implication might be that the area-wide overview that is achieved in integral planning is lost again, as there will be less interest in litigation in alternatives for proposed projects and the amount of damage that these cause. It will be hard to prove for many projects that they are socially needed, and that they should occur at the selected site. The last thing will be expressly difficult as the IJsselmeer is so large and offers many possible locations for certain developments. It will be interesting to see what the effect of the Bird Directive will be in the end. If litigation does indeed occur and many projects are prohibited despite their motivation in integral planning, one can perhaps expect a new round of integral planning, this time with greater attention for natural values.

5 Gas drilling and drinking water preparation10

Introduction

One of the bones of contention between the national government and the provinces in the early 1990s was related to the drilling of gas and oil in the IJsselmeer (as mainly gas is suspected I speak of gas drilling here). It is interesting to observe that the existence of a rivalry between the two functions involved (gas drilling itself and drinking water preparation) is not recognized by all actors involved and that some actors explicitly deny a tension between them. The oil company NAM for instance wrote me that 'gas drillings are not dangerous to water quality: natural gas is in a gaseous state. However, often (not always) associated with natural gas is light oily fluid (called condense) that could potentially lead to water pollution in the case of a calamity. However, this fluid is so volatile that it damps ver soon and will not cause negative effects'11. Despite that being the case, gas drilling is opposed by some as it is

9 Interview with Mr. H. de Jong, Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries (LNV) Office for the Northwest, Diemen, 26 January 2001. 10 Helpful comments to this part of the text were received from Mr. B. Polkamp (NAM). 11 Letter drs. B.Polkamp, NAM, dd. May 2001. perceived as being detrimental to drinking water preparation, and it is this perception and its effects that are the topic of this section. As was the case for the two other rivalries I have described so far, the Dutch government has a hard time deciding on drilling activities and several governments are aiming at definitive decisions on the issue, but are then 'disturbed' by other government agencies. Furthermore, the debate about drilling in the IJsselmeer is strongly connected to proposed drilling activities elsewhere.

The importance of the lake for gas exploration and gas policies

The Netherlands own one of the greatest gas fields in Europe, which was discovered in 1959 near Slochteren in the province of Groningen. At the time of discovery, the government assumed that the role of gas in energy production would become less and less in time. Therefore, there were huge contracts to export the gas to other countries at a relatively low price with the purpose of selling half of the total amount at a quick rate. The rise of nuclear energy would imply that the market for natural gas would collapse in the long run. The ample availability of cheap gas also led to the government decision that gas should overtake the role that coal had played within the national economy until that day. Half of the reserves were thus earmarked to replace coal with cheap gas as long as it was available. It was not until the 1970s that the paradigm of quick use of existing reserves was changed. Especially because nuclear energy had not delivered the promising results that had been expected, because of the oil crisis, and because of concern over the amount of minerals available in the future, the policy changed. Policies now started revolving around resource conservation, but also around the discovery of new reserves of minerals. It was suspected that in the North of the Netherlands several more small gas fields could be found; with the then high oil prices exploration of these fields became attractive, and the huge Slochteren field could be saved. The 'small field' policy has been successful in terms of energy production and the Ministry of Economic Affairs now estimates that about half of all national gas use is catered for by gas from smaller fields. Dutch gas production (on and off shore) was estimated at 72 million cubic meters in 1999 (Homepage Ministry of Economic Affairs). The Dutch State earned around 9 billion guilders in association with this production in 1999 alone, but has earned much more in the past (up to 25 billion in the year 198512). Generally speaking, about 85% of all revenue from mining activities go to the State.

Current known gas reserves in the Netherlands are probably sufficient for the next twenty years, but the Ministry of Economic Affairs notes that this figure is based on a scenario where export to other countries is kept low (which could be at odds with EU free market legislation). It is also concerned about the aging of the gas-related infrastructure and with the withdrawal of many international players from Dutch territory13. The largest player on the market, Netherlands Oil Company ('Nederlandse Aardoliemaatschappij', NAM) foresees that in about 12 years, demand can perhaps not be met in case of production interruptions and peak demands (Waterrecreatie Advies,

12 Interview with Mr. R.T.A. Hillen, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Directorate for Energy, Den Haag, 15 January 2001. 13 Ibid. 2000: 41). Known reserves of gas from the Netherlands could probably be increased if the energy companies involved were allowed to explore the areas under several natural areas. NAM has expressed a desire to perform test and/or exploration drillings in the Waddenzee, the Biesbosch, and the IJsselmeer. In each case, controversy has arisen over the acceptability of the plans, especially since the late 1980s. It seems fair to say that the topic has been subject to enormous political 'mood swings', with Parliament approving of drillings in the Waddenzee in the early 1990s and currently opposing further development practically anywhere. It does appear that there is a certain correlation between these swings in the political mood and the economic tide. The main argument for acceptance of drillings in the Waddenzee has been that the revenues would be needed to fund government spending a debt reduction. Currently (2001), the Dutch government has a budget surplus and the extra monies from the sale of the gas are deemed less necessary. The size of gas reserves in the IJsselmeer is unknown of yet. The reason is that one test drilling was allowed in the 1960s, but that this drilling had not identified gas. After this one test drilling, only seismological studies of the soil have occurred, but these do not yield definitive results on the presence of gas.

The importance of the lake in terms of drinking water preparation

The Netherlands tends to rely more on groundwater than on surface water as an input to drinking water preparation. This situation is different however for great parts of the West of the country, including the province of Noord-Holland. The provincial water companies there, PWN and WRK, let in IJsselmeer water near Andijk. A share of the water is pretreated and then injected into the dunes (another purification step) and then used for drinking water. A second share of the water is pretreated and then used for industrial purposes. The Fourth Note on Water Management of the national government indicated that the use of surface water for drinking water preparation should increase from 300 to 600 million cubic meters a year so that use of ground water could be reduced. Specifically the Markermeer and IJsselmeer were considered as places where large quantities of 'raw water' could be found. In the Markermeer, one repository for the analysis of drinking water was to be constructed, and one for the keeping of large quantities of water. This desire to increase the storage capacity of the IJsselmeer for drinking water preparation seems widely shared and was an input to the project Water in the Wet Heart (WIN, see above). Besides sufficient quantities of water (which seem pretty much guaranteed), there also is a need for sufficient quality.

The basis for water quality norms in the entire IJsselmeer have been the ecological function of the water and the protection of human health (RIZA, 1994). These two purposes led to the identification of a so-called General Environmental Quality ('Algemene Milieukwaliteit, AMK') standard. This standard is also called the 'boundary standard' and the water needed to meet this norm by the year 2000. Because parts of the IJsselmeer are also swimming water, water with important fish populations, and/or a source for drinking water, water quality in these parts of the lake must meet tighter norms, called 'target standards', by 2010. The parts for the lake where such target standards have been set from the perspective of drinking water preparation are the 'small IJsselmeer' and the Veluwemeer, one of the corner lakes. The exact meaning of the just described standards seems to have been largely left to water quality experts. These are located in the RIZA, an expert institute associated with Rijkswaterstaat. This institute developed boundary standards for about 55 parameters and target standards for about 30 parameters (including heavy metal content, transparency, and color of the water). RIZA monitors developments in water quality in the lake. It was found that by 1992, 75% of all boundary standards had been met and 28% of all target standards. The figure below shows developments in two parameters.

Figure 6: Some data on water quality in the IJsselmeer

(Adapted from RIZA 1994: 30 and 32). Reflected are phosphate

and chloride concentrations at different measurement points

(IJ1, IJ11/25, IJ 3) in various years (1972-1992).

Norms for drinking water preparation generally prescribe that sodium content should be below 120 mg/liter and chloride content below 150 mg/liter (Te Raa, 1994). These norms are regularly exceeded in case of the IJsselmeer, sometimes by as much as 30 mg/liter, and concentrations should not rise further14. In the mid-1990s it was decided that IJsselmeer-water would be temporarily exempted from saline norms (from 1994-2000) in the hope that saline content would eventually be reduced. The most important source (62% of total input) for saline in the IJsselmeer is the river IJssel and saline content of that river is influenced mainly by discharges of the Kali mines in France. Another important source (17%) is the Wieringermeer-polder, to the Northwest of the lake (Te Raa, 1994). By diverting water from underneath the polder towards the Wadden Sea, the contribution of this source was considerably reduced at the expense of about 30 million guilders (about 14 million EURO). Unfortunately, changes in the water quantity regime in Flevoland then again threatened to undermine the results of this effort. Water stemming from under the Flevoland polders (highly saline) used to be discharged to the Markermeer and then carried on towards the North Sea through the North Sea canal. The pumping stations performing this task were however diesel-driven and these were expensive in comparison with the electrically driven pumping stations discharging to the IJsselmeer. Operation of the diesel stations was ceased and the electric stations, all located in 'small IJsselmeer' took over. As a consequence, an additional source of saline content was added to the IJsselmeer, a clear example of fragmented decision making. The province of Noord-Holland did not positively receive this additional discharge and a study group was founded in 1994. One of the measures proposed by this group was a change in the operation of the locks between Wadden Sea and IJsselmeer. By maintaining an air bell at the bottom of the lock, the boundary between saline and fresh water could be better maintained. Also, saline content appears to be concentrated in certain parts of the water ('salt clouds') and by tracing these clouds and guiding them to the locks and then discharging them to the Wadden Sea, improvements seemed possible as well, as were measures to better clean the source water. Another option is to accept the higher saline content of the northern part of the IJsselmeer and start focusing on drinking water inlet from the Markermeer. The disadvantage is of course a destruction of capital in this sense that the recently renewed drinking water preparation station near the IJsselmeer becomes worthless; the advantage would be however that the Markermeer is smaller than the IJsselmeer and consequently better manageable (ibid.)15.

The regulation of gas drilling and it's meaning for the IJsselmeer

Gas production usually is a staged activity in this sense that seismological research precedes test drillings and test/exploration drillings precede exploitation drillings i.e. the use of a gas well. It is assessed that in cases such as the IJsselmeer, where the underground is relatively well known and much seismological research has already taken place, one out of two test drillings could succeed in finding gas, be it in commercially attractive quantities or not. Gas is commonly found in porous rock formations underneath an impermeable layer, which prevents the escape of the gas upwards. The depth at which gas can be found varies but can be as much as 4,000 meters below surface level. Because it is crucial to know the geology above the gas and in order to maximize the chances of reaching the targeted prospective gas accumulation, test drillings must be made in a straight line downward. By contrast exploitation drillings can also be made with a curve, so that the surface location need not be exactly above the gas reserve.

Gas drilling and other forms of mining in the Netherlands are regulated by the Mining Law ('Mijnwet') that was introduced under Napoleonic rule in 1810. The law has been amended in 1903 and 1988 and is currently being totally replaced, but its principles are still in tact (Taverne, 1993). The starting point of Dutch legislation is that a landowner also owns the minerals underneath it. However, nobody is allowed to actually mine these minerals without a license of the state. In case minerals are found, the owner of the land is not granted a special position in the granting of a government license, which is called a concession. The holder of the concession may thus very well be someone else than the owner of the land underneath which the minerals lie. In such a case, the concession holder pays a (marginal) compensation to the land owner, which is related to the size of the site in question but not to the value of the minerals. Concessions contain various provisions; many of these are financial, but

14 These values are potentially harmful to agriculture as well; the estimated maximum acceptable concentration for agricultural purposes is 300 mg/liter (Nijman and Elzinga, 1985). 15 One potential problem with the solution is the inlet of IJsselmeer water into the Markermeer. This inlet is necessary to keep North Sea water (also highly saline) from moving into the Markermeer. How independently the Markermeer can be managed is thus uncertain. since more recent times they may also be related to environmental protection and work safety. The financial provisions used to be negotiated on an ad hoc basis, but are now made more uniform because EU Directives have demanded so. The Dutch government tends to claim partial ownership over the 'mine' in question plus a tax on the revenues. Generally these combined measures have the effect of delivering the state about 85% of all revenues. The environmental provisions in drilling licenses or concessions do not imply that no other licenses need to be obtained from the government. This is because the Mining Law's environmental provisions are relatively narrow in character. Nowadays the requirement of planning permission and a license under the Environment Management Act of 1993 are standard. The holder of a concession becomes the formal owner of the minerals, but since 1988 concessions are only valid for a certain amount of time and can elapse. Certainly when an owner of a concession remains inactive in using his rights, the concession may be taken away again (Taverne, 1993: B-17).

Originally, the Dutch Mining Law did not regulate the search for minerals. As long as land owners and those in search of minerals could agree, searches were free. If landowners would not cooperate, expropriation by the state in the 'general interest' was possible, but only after a lengthy procedure. At various points in time, the freedom of search was curtailed, be it for parts of the Dutch territory or for the entire country. Especially in the early 20th century, the State decided that the search for minerals could only be undertaken by the state itself. This decision was inspired by financial motives, and indeed the state took control over the coal and salt deposits that were found at that time. In 1923 freedom of search was reconstituted, only to be abandoned again for ten years starting in 1933 for the North of the country. Between 1943 and 1967 no limitations were set, but the discovery of gas in Slochteren increased interest in gas drilling enormously and much drilling activity occurred. The government felt that the level of competition between the various oil companies reached unhealthy proportions and would (without coordination) lead to a waste of capital. Therefore, in 1967 the Act on the Search of Minerals ('Wet Opsporing Delfstoffen') came in force and this act prohibited the search for minerals without a government license, thus effectively taking the title of land owners to the minerals under their land. The act's main purpose was market control and not so much regulation of actual drilling activities, yet searching activities can also involve a certain level of risk (certainly in the case of drillings) and therefore similar regulations apply as for actual production. The general principle under Dutch policy is that the person that holds a license to search for minerals and actually finds them will also receive the concession under the Mine Act. This principle does however not have statutory force and its application is contingent on the possibility to reach agreement on the concession conditions. Also, legislation allows for the filing of competing claims within four months after a concession has been requested.

The Dutch government has explicitly stated at the introduction of the Act on Land Use Planning ('Wet op de ruimtelijke ordening', WRO) in 1965 that provinces and municipalities could not bypass the interest of mining in their land use plans. Thus the intention of the act was explicitly not the taking of already existing drilling rights. According to Taverne (1993: B-31) this implies that a minerals company must be able to count on the willing cooperation from province and municipality should it try to develop a new drilling activity. In case an oil company wishes to start drilling at a certain specific location, there is a requirement to consult the province in which the site located on the acceptability of the site from a land use planning perspective. Aspects that need to be discussed are the soil structure, after care, and pollution of ground- and surface waters. The provincial advisory committee for land use planning (abbreviated in Dutch to PPC), which contains representation from many authorities and organizations, is to be involved. The plans must also be discussed with an inter departmental commission that operates at the national level (abbreviated to PWC) in case the chosen site is in an area where groundwater is distracted for drinking water preparation or in other areas of interest ('aandachtsgebieden'). In both cases, the Ministers of Economic Affairs (EZ) and Housing, Land Use Planning and Environmental Management (VROM) serve as arbitrator and give a final decision, but after hearing the province and other advisory bodies. Only after the Ministers take their decision, can drilling actually start. Indicating a broadening of the mining regime a committee was established that advises the Minister of Economic Affairs on the institution of areas that should be exempted from drilling activities. These designated areas must qualify as 'extremely vulnerable' and must be of 'great interest' (ibid: B-20). The committee in question has not advised that parts of the IJsselmeer should be exempted from drilling activities. However, the PKB of 1995 on Green Space ('Structuur Schema Groene Ruimte') did indicate that certain parts of the IJsselmeer were a 'core' part of the Ecological Main Structure (EHS). Because of that, drillings activities were prohibited in principle in these areas. In other parts of the lake, drillings would have to be considered on a case-by- case basis.

Enter the provinces

In the IJsselmeer area, several oil companies have obtained permission to perform drillings and there is a reasonable expectation that gas can be found. The figure below illustrates the areas where permission to drill has been given and where not. Generally speaking, the areas in the lake have been granted to the NAM, whereas drilling licenses in the Flevopolder have been granted to Elf. The two companies also divide the other licenses in the area between themselves.

Figure 7: Drilling licenses granted in the IJsselmeer area.

The interrupted lines indicate the outside borders of license areas; shaded areas are exempt from drilling activities. 'Boorvergunning' = drilling license.

The drilling licenses that are most important for my purposes with this paper are the 'IJsselmeer' and the 'Zuid-Friesland' license (see figure 7). The first one mentioned was granted in July 1986 and the second one in June 1979. In both cases this was well ahead of provincial incorporation of the lake and occurred without much public opposition. The decision to grant the license could be taken by the Minister of Economic Affairs after much interdepartmental coordination at the national level (for about 2 years) but without any legal obligation to consult with the provinces. After the licenses were granted, no objections were received. NAM had started to perform seismological research and had identified four interesting sites with potential gas reserves (Gaast-A, Oudermirdum-A, Enkhuizen-A, and Urk-A), all outside the areas with special protection status. As required by the drilling license, the exact sites had to be approved of by the interdepartmental committee on land use planning (PWC) and in that committee, concerns were expressed about the effects of drilling for drinking water supplies and fisheries. The committee requested a risk analysis of the proposed activities and that certain precautionary measures would be studied. At that time public concern arose over exactly the same topics, and the PWC ordered NAM to consult with the united water companies (RIWA), a nature conservation organization (NMF) and Rijkswaterstaat on its risk assessment work. Each of these organizations had objected to the selected sites, or had expressed concerns. NAM published its risk assessment near the end of 1989 and their report was submitted to the PWC with extremely critical comments from the three organizations that NAM had consulted. For example, the three organizations deplored the fact that the NAM had only assessed the risks associated with the test drilling (not with the subsequent exploitation drilling), had not taken into account various emergency scenario's, and had not assessed the risks associated with the (unlikely) presence of oil in the soil.

By the time the PWC was about to decide the objections to the specific sites the issue had become very politically sensitive, and especially the water companies and provinces involved lobbied very hard against the drillings. The Minister of Economic Affairs of the day, in an attempt to sway opponents, had counter experts examine NAM's risk assessment. These found no crucial problems with it, but the resistance did not wane. Already in 1989, the provinces of Noord-Holland and Flevoland had started litigation against the Ministry of Economic Affairs and demanded that the IJsselmeer licenses be withdrawn. Their specific concerns were associated with the fact that two of three water inlets for drinking water preparation in Noord-Holland had been closed since 1986. The reason for this closure was that water pollution had become too serious and the inlet stations were not properly equipped to combat pollution. Having just one inlet in Noord-Holland made water supplies to this relatively populous province very vulnerable and the province wanted that as little as possible risks should be taken, in fact drilling should be ruled out. The Minister of Economic Affairs however had refused to withdraw the license and the provinces consequently took their concerns to the court, effectively paralyzing the decision process at the national level. The State Council ('Raad van State'), in its decision of 26 March 199216, expressed sympathy for the provincial position. Yet the Council also concluded that the interest of the NAM, which was that it should be able to rely on government decisions, should deemed more important than the changed circumstances in the water supply situation. Arguments that the court used revolved around the possibility of controlling risks (the province and its advisers had not looked at such possibilities) and the fact that the Ministry of Economic Affairs could be expected to properly regulate the drillings. Despite this positive outcome, the Minister of Economic Affairs sensed that there would be no political support in Parliament for a decision to allow drillings, and did not take a decision on the NAM's request for permission. The Ministerial resolve not to take a decision stifled in 1992/3, when the NAM also requested permission to drill in the Wadden Sea. These proposals caused even more resistance. Subsequent ministers of Economic Affairs have judged it wise not to decide on the IJsselmeer drillings in an already turbulent climate. By 2001 still no decision had been taken on the objections to the four drillings and no decision was forthcoming any time soon. NAM did not publicly complain too much, but seems to wait until the political and public climate

16 Raad van State, Afdeling Rechtspraak, Uitspraak van 26 Maart 1992, nummers R01.89.1899 en R01.89.4344, AB 1992/512. changes. 'NAM has a certain public image, Shell is one of their shareholders too. At every price they want to prevent to become subject of protests as they have experienced before.'17

Whereas the NAM is patient, it does seem that the chances of the drillings actually taking place are being constantly reduced. Since 1989, more stringent requirements regarding environmental assessment have been introduced and with the IJsselmeer becoming Special Protected Area under the Bird Directive, the burden of proof on NAM to demonstrate the need for the drillings has possibly gotten heavier18. Additionally, the provinces and municipalities around the lake are still actively engaged in efforts to undermine the NAM's licenses. As the licenses by statute are to expire after four years of non-usage, the renewal of the licenses is a logical target for the opponents and a good occasion to start a debate. One of the officials involved recalls: 'At the time of the first expiration it was hardly possible to get the license renewed'19. On each occasion however, the Minister of Economic Affairs has renewed licenses, based on the argument that NAM can not be blamed for the fact that it is not using its license and that inactivity of the licensee is the only proper legal ground for repealing the license.

Of course, the provinces and municipalities have obtained a certain amount of influence over NAM's activities through their role in the planning process that had not been present in 1986. Defying national planning policies, the provinces decided that they would not allow drillings in the lake and indicated so in their interprovincial plan of 1992 as already described. The interprovincial plan was then translated into Regional Plans and into some municipal zoning ordinances. In each case, the NAM and the Ministry of Economic Affairs have objected against regulations in zoning ordinances that forbid gas drilling. This has resulted in a certain amount of litigation before the State Council, which essentially revolves around the question of the relation between the land use planning system and the regulations under the Mining Law20. The provinces and municipalities argued that risks of drilling to water supply were too grave to be acceptable and furthermore that the interprovincial policy plan and municipal basic plans required them to ban drillings. The State Council quashed both lines of argumentation. The Council found that the interprovincial and basic plans were not statutory plans and were therefore not binding upon the local authorities. Furthermore, the Council found that an absolute ban on drillings was not supported by the law, as decisions about drillings were to be made by the Minister of Economic Affairs. The first verdict of the State Council leaving drilling rights in tact, involved the province of Friesland, and was critically discussed by legal experts, because they felt that the Council had wrongly ignored the fact that decisions within the land use planning system can be based on broader considerations than decisions of the Minister of Economic Affairs and are thus

17 Interview with Mr. R.T.A. Hillen, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Directorate for Energy, Den Haag, 15 January 2001. 18 One fear of those in favor of the drillings is that the Bird Directive may also have an external effect, in this sense that drilling stations outside the lake, which can be observed from the lake will also be subject. 19 Interview with Mr. R.T.A. Hillen, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Directorate for Energy, Den Haag, 15 January 2001. 20 Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak Raad van State, 23 Juni 1998 (nummer E 01.96.0078, AB 1999/146); 20 September 2000 (nummer E01.96.0333). different decisions with potentially a different outcome21. That being true, it seems that the Council was not convinced that the municipality and province in this particular case had given arguments against drilling that were acceptable under the planning system and which were of sufficient weight to forbid drillings. Implicitly, the Council is thus saying it was not convinced of the seriousness of the threat to drinking water supply from drillings (as it had done in 1992). The second verdict of the Council involved the province of Noord-Holland. This time the council had requested expert advice from a semi-government institute ('Stichting Advisering Bestuursrechtspraak', STAB). The expert from this body was critical of the province, as he found no basis for the provincial policy in national government policy. In addition the expert had interviewed provincial officials who had indicated to him that a case- by-case review of drilling proposals was also the true purpose of the province, not a prohibition per se. It seems that this only weakened the provincial position. The STAB expert noted that this intention was nowhere expressed in the provincial plan22. The Council indeed again quashed the province's decision to ban drillings; at the same day the council ruled that the ban of drillings in a zoning ordinance of a Friesian municipality should also be quashed. The third province, Flevoland, only very recently established its own plan ('Provinciaal Omgevingsplan'), and this plan too is bound for litigation as it prohibits drilling in the lake23.

The provincial evaluation of the interprovincial plan for the IJsselmeer concludes that the provinces wish to maintain their policy stance, yet need to motivate it differently. We will see whether the province of Flevoland has succeeded in that respect. Meantime at the national level drillings are still not excluded. The Ministry of Economic Affairs notices however that the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Nature Management (LNV) has moved its position somewhat and has been more or less forced to implement the Bird Habitat by appointing the entire lake as a SPA. However such a change of position has not prevented LNV from supporting the draft Integral Vision for the IJsselmeer Area, which allows drillings. Also, it was foreseen that with the uncoordinated policies of the various government levels, decision making on the drillings would essentially be moved to the courts, which was deemed a sad developments from the perspective of democracy24.

Review

Property rights play an important role in the drilling debate. Under Dutch law, minerals are the property of the land owner, and this suggests that this owner will play an important role in the discussion on drilling. That is not the case in reality however, as on the one hand a landowner can be disowned in the general interest if he refuses to cooperate with drillings, and on the other hand authorization of a land owner to start drillings is not sufficient to make drillings legal. Thus it is not so much land ownership that determines the outcomes of the procedure, but much more ownership of the

21 See the note of dr. Struiksma under the case report on the verdict in Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak Raad van State, 23 Juni 1998 (nummer E 01.96.0078, AB 1999/146). 22 STAB report 34204/H, dated 27 December 1999. 23 Interview with Mr. Zeilemaker, Netherlands Oil Company (NAM), Assen, 11 January 2001. 24 Interview with Mr. R.T.A. Hillen, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Directorate for Energy, Den Haag, 15 January 2001. minerals itself. Such ownership is only transferred from the landowner (who can do relatively little with his ownership) to an oil company after reserves have been demonstrated and a concession is granted. In the case of the drillings in the IJsselmeer, nobody has yet demonstrated the actual presence of minerals reserves and this implies that the decision process is in dead lock. The licenses to perform test drillings, which could demonstrate the presence of reserves and normally lead to transfer of ownership, have never been made definitive. The reason is not so much that various users compete for the minerals, but rather that there is a perceived rivalry between gas drilling and drinking water preparation. Whereas oil companies (and the national government) would want to use the minerals for energy purposes, opponents of the drillings claim that the minerals should be left as they are, in order not to disturb the IJsselmeer ecosystem. These opponents use other legislation than the relevant mining legislation, i.c. the land use planning law, to combat the proposed drillings. This despite the fact that relevant land use planning legislation prescribes that the land use regime may not interfere with mining legislation to the extent that granted rights are taken away. In this sense, the land use planning system serving as a channel for increased complexity. It seems that this complexity is 'solved', or addressed, in various ways. On the one hand it must be noted that the problem pressure in this case is reduced by the economic circumstances of the Netherlands. The need for exploration of minerals is currently not perceived to be very great. Consequently, there is little need for pushing gas drillings. On the other hand however, actors are still trying to swing the decision process in a certain direction, especially the provinces and municipalities. They are looking for ways to block the drillings and use their statutory plans to that effect. The NAM and Ministry of Economic Affairs have been able however to prevent these plans from getting accepted by resorting to the courts. Because of the decision of the courts, the status quo is maintained and no definitive coordination takes place. The courts are thus able to block municipalities and provinces from stopping drillings, but are on the other hand not able to steer the decision process in a positive direction. Actual coordination in this case seems to take place through the political and the market process. Because the Minister of Economic Affairs can not count on a majority in Parliament for the drillings and the NAM is very sensitive to public opinion because of its reputation, no further steps are taken. This equilibrium is clearly temporary. It can be expected that in some years there will be an increase in the need for minerals and the Waddenzee discussion has shown that Parliament is sensitive to economic arguments for drillings in times of budget shortages. Opponents will once again resort to the courts and a prolonged judicial battle can be expected. An alternative scenario would be that the provinces succeed in finding a judge proof formulation for their stop on drillings. If we may believe the legal experts quoted, then this should be possible as the land use planning framework is supposedly broader than mining law and thus allows for reasons to refuse drillings which are outside the scope of the Mining Law. Specifically, one can think of relevant planning considerations such as the visibility of drilling installations. Here too, the Bird Directive may have a certain effect on the decision process, specifically because the need for drillings must potentially be better motivated than currently required. 6 The fisheries sector25

Introduction

After the description of three rivalries hat have all come to the forefront more recently, and which involved a rivalry between various uses, I now turn to rivalry that is located within one use: fisheries. Although the use of the IJsselmeer as fishing ground does rival with some other uses (such as the creation of polders, the pollution of surface water, and birdlife26), I focus on the conflicts that have arisen within the sector itself. It will become clear that the rivalry is very old and that governments throughout the ages have shown a certain level of involvement in this rivalry. The IJsselmeer is classified as an inland water under current Dutch legislation, but the current set of regulations show many traces of the lake's history as a sea and therefore greatly differs from the system in other parts of the country. It has historically been difficult to organize the fishermen as they come from different villages and use different fishing techniques, which makes their interests different. Interestingly, the figure of a Producer's Organization (PO) has been introduced in the IJsselmeer, and it seems that this figure is becoming increasingly effective in coordinating the interests of the fishermen and channeling their contacts with the government. Despite that being the case, parts of the sector are in fragile condition and relations with government appear to be fundamentally unsound. Because it is my opinion that some knowledge of the history of fisheries is important in understanding modern day events, I have decided to include background information on regulation before the EUWARENESS study period.

History of the IJsselmeer as a fishing water

Already at a time when there was no central government there were local regulations governing the use of fishing waters. Especially the towns on the Eastern bank of the Zuiderzee (Genemuiden, Kampen) had ordinances governing fishing, which created valuable fishing rights. These rights were exclusive and assigned over the various interested candidates by means of a lottery. It seems that the local system of control came under threat in the 16th century, when fishermen from other areas (mainly Holland) would not recognize the exclusive user rights of the fishermen on the East bank. The issue was brought before the courts of the time, and these decided that the cities could not claim exclusive fishing rights over parts of the lake. But such verdicts were not the end of the matter. The issue became so important that it even influenced the formation of the Dutch republic. The province of Holland at some point refused to allow the Eastern province of Gelderland to the newly established union of provinces

25 Helpful comments to this part of the text have been received from Mrs. G. Mahabir, Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries (LNV), Directorate for Fisheries, Den Haag. 26 It is assessed that because of fisheries activities, about 50,000 birds are killed annually in the IJsselmeer (Van Eerden, Dubbeldam and Muller, 1999). On other hand, protected bird species, especially the cormorant eat much fish. The connection between the increase in population of these birds and reductions in the population of eel is controversial but the High Court (Hoge Raad, 15 February 1991, number 141222, AB 1991/394) has confirmed such a connection in a case where an eel nursery sought damages against the Minister of LNV. ('Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden') if Gelderland would not explicitly commit to a repeal of all limitations on fishing rights in the Zuiderzee. On the South bank of the water, fishery in the middle ages was more or less self regulated, with authorization by the cities and provinces. The fishermen had established guilds ('gildes') that regulated the mount of fish to be caught and divided these rights over the fishermen. Not only did the guild-, city- and provincial regulations control catchment, they also regulated fishing techniques. The province of Holland for instance forbade the use of nets between two boats in 1786. The purpose of these regulations was to protect the resource from overuse (Bossaers, 1987).

Under French rule, all local and guild regulations concerning fisheries in the Zuiderzee were repealed, with the intention to replace them with national regulations. National regulations were introduced indeed, but not until after the French had been defeated and the Dutch State formally created. Interestingly, the new national regulations applied only to fisheries in the North Sea, and in combination with the repeal of local regulations, this implied that the Zuiderzee was effectively made a freely accessible fishing ground. This seems the result of oversight, but became ideologically supported as liberal political thought dominated the Netherlands for much of the 19th century, and this situation was considered the best. Initially there were some regulations in place to protect the fisheries from foreign competition, but the idea of free trade became paramount in Dutch politics. Together with the few restrictions on the North Sea fisheries that had been imposed, any limits on import and export of fish were soon repealed too, making all fish in the Netherlands a common pool resource. The combined effect on no national restrictions and no restrictions on trade was that the Dutch fisheries sector became highly internationally orientated. Fish from the Zuiderzee was exported to England, Germany, and even Russia.

First central government measures in the IJsselmeer

The first talk of new regulations was inspired by intense competition between fishermen and decreasing stock (problem pressure). Around 1880, a period of meager yields started, which seemed to be related to the continuous increase of fishing boats (to around 1,600), to an increase in the number of non-professional fishermen, and to the fact that the fishermen from certain villages were using a particular type of net ('kuilnet' in Dutch) which killed much young fish. At the request of large parts of the fisheries sector itself and after much hesitation by Parliament, attempts were made to outlaw the use of these nets. Legislation to this effect was indeed passed (1881 Amendments to the Fisheries Act of 1857) but these failed to have an effect as fishermen ignored the law. Several violations were brought before the courts, but there the legislation essentially collapsed because Circuit Courts ('Kantongerechten') had just been forbidden to decide matters outside their jurisdiction. The Zuiderzee had not been placed under the jurisdiction of any Circuit Court and therefore the courts declared they could not sentence violations of the regulations (institutional barrier for regime change). The use of 'kuil'-nets therefore continued and in fact increased, but it remained a very controversial issue that divided the fishermen and prevented a strong cooperation between them. New attempts were made at legislation to prohibit the kuilnet in the early 20th century, but by then Parliament seemed no longer convinced that kuilnet fisheries were the cause of the malaise in fisheries. Besides kuilnet fisheries, the fishermen were divided over various other issues too. Fishermen who focused on the Zuiderzee as fishing grounds would have complaints about boats fishing on the North Sea and sometimes picking up good yields at the Zuiderzee. Also, the fishermen from the various sides of the sea often complained about use of 'their' ground by fishermen from elsewhere, even though their ownership of such sites was never formally condoned. Then there were fishermen who did not use drag nets, but used standing gear (e.g. 'fuiken'). These fishermen would put their nets near the waterside and sometimes found them destroyed by boats with dragging nets. Finally, religion was also an issue. Indicative of the 'pillarization' in Dutch society, catholic fishermen would be stimulated by their church not to cooperate with protestant fisherman, and vice versa (Bossaers, 1987). Whereas some of these divisions implied that the various villages were at odds with each other, there was also competition between the various individual fishermen, even when from the same village, of course.

Fish market and contact with government

The results of the lack of cooperation between the fishermen surfaced both in the way the market for fish products operated and in the way the sector related to the government. Regarding the fish market, divisions between fishermen led to a 'buyer's market', implying that fish products were generally very cheap. Attempts to establish cooperatives and to gain some market control failed because many fishermen, if they cared to join the cooperatives, would be tempted not to comply with their regulations. The cooperatives tried to establish auctions; the idea was that their members would be obliged to deliver their catchment, and that the crop would go to the highest bidder, whereas minimum prices would be guaranteed. Fishermen however often went outside the auctions, and competition between purchasers was sometimes absent so that buyers dictated prices. As these buyers were often also the suppliers of capital for fishing gear, the fishermen became greatly dependent on fish traders. Until the First World War, yields remained poor and the economic situation of the fishermen became very marginal. Proponents of the closure of the Zuiderzee were able to portray the sector as one in decline and of little economic interest. Regarding relations with government, fishermen continued to be divided. A certain amount of regulation by the government came into being in the beginning of the 20th century. By 1907 the government was advised that a 'Fisheries Council' (Visserijraad) should be established. This Council would have representation from all the villages and advise the minister on all measures pertaining to fisheries. Such a council was indeed established ('Zuiderzeevisserijraad') in 1910 and was moderately successful, despite clear divisions between the fishermen. Much time was devoted to the 'kuilnet' issue but this was not resolved. Despite that being the case, the council was successful in agreeing on other restrictions, particularly a minimum size for catchment, the closure of certain areas for fisheries, and closure of fisheries during certain periods (see Bossaers, 1987: 96). These restrictions were sanctioned by the new Fisheries Act of 1911, which contained a license system, and which forbade fishing without such a license. The Fisheries Council also stimulated the formation of fish auctions, where multiple buyers would be present and prices would thus go up; this had a certain level of success in certain villages.

The first Wold War and the period after

During the First World War, the Dutch State greatly increased its interference with the economy, and this included fisheries. Because fish was seen as a good alternative for the relatively scarce meat, the government started stimulating fish consumption among the public and started to play a role in the distribution of fish. The dependence of the fishermen on traders was reduced and the fishermen had some good years, which ended however at the end of World War I, when both the Russian and the German markets continued to be closed for Dutch fisheries products whereas Dutch consumers returned to their beef. Because of their economic hardship, Parliament accepted legislation (proposed by the council) which supported the fishermen by a subsidy on their yields. The original idea was that these were to be largely paid by the municipalities around the Zuiderzee, but the sums required were too large for the municipalities and the national government had to pick the greatest part of the tab. An important issue now became the threat of the Zuiderzee-project. The flood of 1916 had increased the support for closure of the Zuiderzee, but many thought that closure would imply an end to the fisheries in the Zuiderzee. The fishermen, represented by their unions and the Fisheries Council, were interested in compensation for what they saw as the taking of their rights. However, the government committee that was founded to advise on the closure of the Zuiderzee ('Zuiderzeeraad') did not contain any representation of the fishermen and this seems to have had a large bearing on the following course of events. The sub-committee of the Zuiderzeeraad that focused on the issue of compensation concluded that closure of the Zuiderzee was not the taking of private rights, but only constituted a change of use of a collective property. In no way was the government thus bound to compensate the fishermen. Their loss of capital was considered the result of them taking 'normal entrepreneurial risks'. The advice to the minister was to compensate the fishermen mainly in natura. They should receive free education and assistance with the purpose of finding other employment, and in the sense that the fishermen that were presently using the Zuiderzee should be granted licenses for fisheries at the IJsselmeer (this appeared not to be a very valuable gift at the time however)). The basic attitude that there was no right of compensation permeated the entire decision process afterwards however. The fishermen had estimated their damages at Dfl. 100 million, but the government committee advised that Dfl. 6 million would be sufficient. Even such an amount of compensation was not quick to materialize however. The Act on the closure of the Zuiderzee and creation of polders ('Zuiderzeewet 1918') did not contain any provisions for compensation of fishermen; these were to be introduced by a separate act. It took the government long to introduce the Zuiderzee Support Act ('Zuiderzeesteunwet') and after it had been accepted in 1924 by Parliament, it was not proclaimed for quite some time and there were little signs of the Act being implemented. In addition, the Act was even less forthcoming with compensation than what had been the advice of the committee.

There are signs that the fishermen were not greatly worried about these developments. By the mid 1920s, fishery catchment caught up again and income subsidies hat had existed since the war could now be repealed. The Fisheries Council was functioning to almost everyone's satisfaction, and was widely accepted by the fishermen. The Zuiderzee project was considered unrealistic at best, and the fishermen were convinced that it was not about to be finished any time soon. They were however, very wrong in assuming this. As the first parts of the Zuiderzee project were completed near the end of the 1920, the effects were on the water system were starting to become clear. With the completion of the closure dam in 1932, the Zuiderzee became the IJsselmeer and the fish population changed considerably from sea fish to fresh water fish. Only eel was able to survive the change and in fact became the most important crop. The Fisheries Council had been abolished because it was expected that fisheries would collapse. Fishing continued however, and soon the government found itself in need of a replacement as many regulatory issues surfaced. After some excellent fishing years, the population of eel had started to drop quickly. There was fear over the sustainability of the then current practices and minimum sizes for caught fish were re-introduced, the use of 'kuil'-nets was more and more restricted, and the relatively new motorboats were limited (only boats with moderate motor-capacity were allowed). These regulations were apparently widely violated. The Fisheries Council was replaced with the so called Contact Commission ('Contactcommissie'), but this body appears to have been largely ineffective and there were attempts to re-establish the Visserijraad. With the advent of the German occupation in 1940, the pressure increased. North Sea fisheries were soon forbidden and as a result prices for IJsselmeer fish had a tendency to rise. The occupation authorities imposed a maximum price on fish, but many fishermen delivered to the black market. The war situation could have been economically rewarding for the fishermen if not other limitations had been set, such as a prohibition of fishing at night and a prohibition to fish in large parts of the IJsselmeer at all.

After the Second World War

After the war, the fishermen initially had good years as there was still a shortage of meat and the German occupier had stopped the polder activities. The divisions between the fishermen had moved to the background somewhat as they realized that it was in their common interest to deal with the issue of closure and compensation of damages resulting of the closure dam and new polders. A general cooperation by the name of COVY ('Coöperatieve Vereniging van IJsselmeervissers') was founded in 1946 with the purpose of more rationally organizing fisheries at the IJsselmeer (Bossaers, 1987: 189). For some time COVY bought and traded fish and the organization stimulated the establishment of fish auctions, where its members should bring their yields. Unfortunately, these auctions were undermined by sales of fish to the black market. After a few years, COVY changed its activities from market interference to lobbying and influencing government policies. One item of concern to the fishermen was the use of motorboats with great power. COVY attempted to have regulations with limits on motor power of fishing boats, but without much success. Conflicts between the fishermen undermined the effectiveness of the lobbying work (and continued to do so); by 1954 the organization was split in two, COVY North and COVY South.

Not long after the war, the Dutch authorities had decided that they wished restart the poldering activities. Obviously, an implication would be that a large chunk of the fishing grounds was to be nullified. A government committee studied the issue for years and delivered a report in 1955, suggesting that about 45% of all fishing licenses in the IJsselmeer should be revoked (400 licenses would remain), that buy out measures should be taken (especially) for elder fishermen, and that a fisheries management plan should be adopted. The number of licenses that the committee advised would be consistent with what seemed to be the 'carrying capacity' of the IJsselmeer at that time. It seemed that the number was acceptable from the perspective of the sector too as the number of fishing boats was already quickly declining, in part because some Zuiderzee fishermen went to the North Sea.

Government policy since 1960: increasing controls

The government did not respond to the committee report until 1962, except by introducing retirement plans for elder fishermen, an idea that seems to fit in the general development towards the welfare state. The delay in government response regarding the other topics that had been presented was unfortunate because the situation in the lake worsened. By 1962 it was clear that the 1955 report had been too optimistic in its assessment of the 'carrying capacity' of the IJsselmeer fish population. Experts advised the government that 300 fishing licenses was the maximum the population could bear and that further restrictions should apply: the 'kuil'-net was to be banned. The government took measures indeed: the carrying of double kuilnets was banned, minimum size of the mazes in the nets increased and several types of nets were completely forbidden (the 'zegen net', the 'snoekbaarssleepnet', and the 'staande snoekbaarsnetten'). Despite these measures, pressure on the fish population kept increasing. The completion of the dike that would become the outside border of the Flevopolder in 1967 considerably reduced the amount of fishing water available. All fishermen were driven together in the remaining pieces of the lake. Scientific report now assessed that there was only room for 100-150 fishing boats, but the actual number was much larger. After so many years of discussion, the ban of the kuilnet in 1970 came as a surprise. The ban was instigated after yet another scientific report identifying the use of this net as detrimental for the fish population.

With hindsight the ban appears to have been partly counterproductive. It seems that the termination of 'kuil'-fisheries has benefited other fish species more than the eel itself (other species were previously killed with the 'kuil'-nets too). It is reported that food competition between eel and other sorts intensified and the eel suffered; yields per square hectare went down by about 40-50% in the year 1970 alone (Nijman and Elzinga, 1985) and have not improved considerably since. Eel crop has been spiraling down from an estimated 1,200 tons in the end of the 1980s to 370 tons in 1994. Fishermen contend that birds (cormorants) are eating up the fish27, whereas government reports point to a decline in the trek of young fish into the IJsselmeer. There are other important fish species in the lake, such as smelt ('spiering'), pike, rock bass ('voorn'), and ruff ('pos'). For most of these however, there is only a small internal market and commercial value abroad is limited.

Anatomy of government institutions

Management of the fisheries sector is formally regulated by the Fisheries Act of 1963. This act, reflective of the Dutch post war tendency to delegate public authority to private organizations, introduced a complex public-private corporate structure, with the main institution being the Fisheries Board ('Visschap'). This board has regional management committees, including one for the IJsselmeer, and the regional management committee is where much of the negotiations on actual fishing limitations take place. An important input to the deliberations of the regional management committee are data generated by state funded research (Institute for Fisheries Research, in Dutch abbreviated to IVO). Decisions of the Fisheries Board need to be authorized by the minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Nature Management. Usually this is done without problems, but the minister sometimes departs from their preferences. Since 1970, the problems of competition between fishermen have remained in this sense that fishermen started using 'shooting nets' (schietfuiken) instead of kuilnets on a large scale. The use of these nets obtained such proportions that the desired reduction in fishing capacity was not achieved at all and wild competition emerged. This time not only between professional fishermen, but also with amateur anglers. Especially for pike ('snoekbaars'), catchment by non-professional fishermen became increasingly important (about 10 % of pike yields came from anglers). As a consequence, non- professional pike angling was also limited (to a maximum 30 fishes a day) in the 1980s.

Low point in the relations

The way the new restrictions on professional fishermen were imposed in the second half of the 1980s indicated a low point in the cooperation between private and public sectors. In 1985 government had become concerned over the ever-decreasing crop of eel. It requested the cooperation of fishermen to voluntarily report their equipment in a questionnaire so that the actual pressure on the fish population could be measured. To the astonishment of the fishermen, the Minister used the individual responses to that questionnaire as a basis for assigning fishing rights to the fishermen. In 1986, the minister decided that the number of nets reported in the questionnaire would be the maximum allowed number of nets aboard the ships in the future. Various skippers felt robbed as they would have reported in a different fashion if they had known the importance of their replies. Since then, trust between the sector and public authorities has been minimal and fishermen do no longer cooperate with government studies on fish yields (IBN/DLO, 1997). The situation was aggravated when in 1989, the Fisheries Board advised the minister that the fishery pressure should be reduced by 75%, mainly by limiting the number of nets per ship (Visserijschap, 1988: 18; LEI/DLO, 1997: 1). The Fisheries Board writes that 'Fisheries was trapped in a viscous circle: more and more gear was used to obtain a reasonable share of the declining fish population. (. . .) Because it was (. . .) impossible that fishermen agreed upon management by themselves, the Fisheries Board has taken the initiative to overtake this task and to advise on constructive proposals to the government (owner of the water) to introduce rules concerning fisheries in the IJsselmeer' (ibid: 5). The Minister partially agreed and decreed that the fishing pressure should be reduced by 50% and imposed further restrictions on fishery operations by restricting the fishing season to a smaller part of the year. The measures of the 1980s did not result in the desired effect of sustainable eel populations. In the early 1990s the debate returned and once again regulations were introduced to reduce fishery pressure.

27 See one of the previous footnotes.

Reasons for policy failure

What were the reasons for failure of policies? One reason actually lies outside the control of the actors involved and this is the trek of young fish into the IJsselmeer. For unknown reasons this trek has waned (the current trek is 1/20th of the trek in 1965) and human measures to stimulate it (changed lock management) appear to fail. On the other hand, problems and wrong assumptions hamper the effectiveness of policies. For instance, it is certain that the number of fishing vessels on the IJsselmeer has greatly decreased since the 1950s. By the mid-1990s only about 75 vessels were being still operated (LEI/DLO, 1997). Whereas the expectation was that fishing capacity would be reduced, this development has apparently been offset by a dramatic increase of yield per boat (about five fold from 1946 to 1983 alone). Whereas limitations on the number of fishing nets make more sense than reductions of the number of boats, it is now clear that the actual (time of) use of these nets is important too. It appears that fishermen have started to use their material much more intensively than they previously have done. It is pointed out that it is unclear up to today what the actual yields from IJsselmeer-fisheries are because the requirement to bring fish to the official auctions was repealed in 1975 and fishermen are no longer cooperating with statistical reports. LEI/DLO (ibid.) writes that in that light, the desire to halve capacity is impossible to monitor. Finally, there is the issue of 'sleeping' fishing rights which relates to the fact that actual use of fishing rights is below what has been allowed previously. When new policies restrict the value of licenses, these old licenses could be activated. The problem here seems to be that such licenses represent a certain economic value; the state has been reluctant to actually pay compensation for their taking. Combined with the reluctance of the fishermen to give up their livelihood this stands in the way of attempts to take rights out of the market. The profession of fisherman is not considered an ordinary profession that can easily be given up. The Council for Rural Areas (RLG, 1999) for instance indicates that fishermen would not want to work in the tourism industry. Neither would they want to work in eel-nurseries (which already have earnings of around Dfl. 80-100 million a year, compared to 10-20 million for actual fisheries in the lake).

After 1995

Whatever the reasons for the continued misery, by 1995 it became clear that further drastic measures were needed to control fisheries in the IJsselmeer. At the same time, the government did not want to continuously interfere in the fisheries sector. Fisheries policies showed a paradigm shift towards deregulation by the government and self-regulation by the sector. Poignant examples of this shift were the so-called Fish Management Committees ('VBSs') which are legally prescribed in waters owned by the state. The VBCs need to write and implement plans for the improvement of the fish population in their area, in return for the right to fish28. These rights have been 'split' for some time, in this sense that professional fishermen are exclusively granted the right to fish for eel, whereas amateur anglers can fish for other species. Such splitting has not occurred in the IJsselmeer, because the lake is a special case and the fishermen there have rights that go back to the construction of the closure dam. For these other species, there is increasing competition from amateur anglers, as described above. Fisheries in the IJsselmeer also differ from the rest in the country that the rights to fish are not linked to specific parts of the lake, the Ministry of LNV calls this 'common pool fisheries' and seems to be concerned with the effects. Whether or not the decision not to split rights for the IJsselmeer has been beneficial for the professional fishermen is unclear. For certain, they are now also catching many species. The Ministry wants to abolish the differences between IJsselmeer and the rest of the country (Ministerie van LNV, 1999).

The movement towards more self-regulation was reflected in the desire of the Ministry to have a Producers' Organization (PO) established for the fishermen on the IJsselmeer. The Organization was to consist of independent experts and their most important task would be to draft a 'fishing plan' for each year (in consultation with the Fisheries Board). The Ministry wanted to restrict its own role to indicating the main principles and the PO would then have to translate these into their fishing plan. The Ministry outlined the main principles in their 'Regulations on fisheries pressure in the IJsselmeer' ('Regeling Visserij-inspanning IJsselmeer') and the main idea was that the fishery intensity should be reduced by 50% in the period until 2000. The Ministry introduced an incentive, so that fishermen would become member of the PO. Members of the PO would have a choice between various means of reducing their contribution: they could opt for reduction of the number of nets, or for a reduction of sailing days. Non-members would not have this option, and would have to reduce catchment in a way prescribed by the Minister on a year by year basis. The Ministry had been advised to introduce a market for tradable fishing licenses (Visserijcentrum, 1995), so that fisheries would become more efficient and the sector would pay itself for the pending reductions in fishing rights. This recommendation was taken over. Licenses are in fact traded amongst the fishermen and in some cases the Minister of LNV approves of changes in licenses when fishermen want to change their type of nets. The latter type of trade has led to litigation before the State Council. The Minister of LNV had allowed fishermen to relinquish their license for 'shooting nets' ('schietfuiken') and gain a license for 'large nets' ('grote fuiken'). Competitors had considered this trade as too advantageous because the fishing capacity of their competitors was said to increase. The High Court was not impressed with their case, and considered that the license system did not seek to protect the competitive position of all fishermen involved29. Despite that being the case, it is easy to see that the licenses have an economic value. LEI/DLO calculated the total value of existing licenses at Dfl. 16 million (LEID/DLO, 1997: 11; this is 7-8 million EUR)). Clearly, some fishermen are willing to take action against perceived threats to the economic value of their licenses. Coordination is here achieved through the courts.

Once the decision had been taken that a PO would start to play a major role in the Fisheries Management of the lake and that its members would receive certain benefits, competition between various groups of fishermen emerged. The government had indicated that only one PO would be

28 One Fish Management Committee was established for the corner lakes of the IJsselmeer, but I will not delve into their work. 29 Voorzitter van de Afdeling Rechtspraak van de Raad van State, 1 Oktober 1992, nummers S01.92.0376 en S01.92.0388, AB 1994/43. accepted and that this PO should have at least 51% of all licensees in the IJsselmeer as its member. The Dutch Fishery Association ('Nederlandse Vissersbond'), which thus far had only represented the Coastal and North Sea fishermen, was asked to start representing their colleagues from the IJsselmeer as well, and the Association conceded30. Competing groups from Den Oever and Wieringen however also sought recognition as the PO for the IJsselmeer. In the end, the Dutch Fisheries Association apparently impressed most fishermen (more than 51% became a member) and the Association was therefore granted official status as the PO for the IJsselmeer; the Dutch Fisheries Association- Producers Association had become a reality. The Minister of LNV rejected the request of the other groups for PO status. Here too, the decision was apparently important enough to start litigation, and the two rejected organizations felt that they were being treated unfairly. They were striving for PO status and the associated advantages. Now that they had not been granted PO status, they still desired the associated advantages for their members an appealed. They also felt that the special position of the Dutch Fisheries Association would result in a monopoly in IJsselmeer fisheries for this organization, which would not be in line with European legislation. The court in this case (The State Council) decided against the appeals because the PO is a European construct itself and European legislation does allow a monopoly for a certain PO in a certain area. Also, the court did not find that the decision was greatly detrimental to the interests of the fishermen that had appealed, and concluded that in no way the fishermen were forced to become members of the Dutch Fisheries Association PO. Indeed, noted the Court, the purpose of fisheries policies is the same for all fishermen in the lake, it was just that for PO members this goal could be achieved by multiple means31. The legal challenge to the unifying force of the PO had been denied. Unifying indeed, because despite the remarks of the court that fishermen would not be forced to become a member of the PO, around 80% of all fishermen currently is (they hold 97% of the licenses). When I asked the secretary of the PO about this high figure and the actual advantages of membership, he indicated that PO members had freedom of choosing the days at which they would not fish (non members must stay ashore during 6 consecutive weeks of the fishing season and these weeks are determined by the Minister of LNV). Because of this freedom, they could on the spot decide to either sail or not on a particular day, a freedom that is highly appreciated as the yields of fish vary with various factors and the Minister of LNV tends to forbid non-members to sail in the weeks with the highest yields (this difference sounds very forceful to me). I also asked the secretary whether the way in which the 50% reduction was structured (basically by limiting the days during which the fleet can sail) realistically implied that fishery pressure was reduced by 50%. This is in fact unlikely as most of the fleet will try and sail on those days when the chance of good yields is highest. The secretary confirmed my hypothesis here, while noting that the real pressure of fisheries in the lake is in fact unknown to the Ministry32. The PO however, has since some time required its members to auction fish at auctions that are maintained by the PO. Therefore, the PO is aware of fish yields. The fishermen who are members of the PO democratically voted to accept this obligation. They did so under the condition that the figures on sales at the auction would not be transferred to the Minister of LNV. Currently, the PO indeed keeps these data a secret from the government. It seems possible that

30 Interview with Mr. G. Hiemstra, Dutch Fisheries Association, Emmeloord, 11 December 2000. 31 Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak Raad van State, 22 Juli 1999, nummer H01.98.0129, AB 1999/442. one reason why 20% of the fishermen did not join the PO is because they wanted liberty of choice in where to bring their yields. With this choice, they however also forego the market regulation that the PO achieves. The PO has set minimum prices for fish, and if these prices are not paid at the market, the PO takes them out. The PO compensates the fishermen who have brought such fish to the auction. In order to pay for its activities. The PO charges 2.5% of the turnover that the fishermen have. The proceeds of that charge are also spent to take fishing licenses 'out of the market', that is make them inactive33.

It is my impression that the PO has worked wonderfully in unifying the fishermen. Certainly the auctions and the initiative to withdraw licenses from the market are good plans. On the other hand, the 50% reduction that the PO had to realize has proven to be very difficult to attain. Already in 1997, the PO had achieved a reduction of 20% of fishery pressure (as defined by the Ministry, this may not be real pressure as I have said before). The remaining 30% was to be delivered by 2000. The PO and the Ministry of LNV intensively consulted on the way to achieve this, and it was decided that the Ministry would start paying for withdrawal of licenses. The total available budget was set at Dfl. 6 million, but the PO had warned the Ministry that this amount would not be sufficient as the prices per license was too low. Indeed, only Dfl 1.1 million of the subsidy was used, and the subsequent events became topic of a heated controversy. The fishery plan for 2000 specified the already achieved 20% reduction in fishing days and an additional percentage (it seems 27%) by surrender of licenses in return for government subsidies. The PO calculated that Dfl 8 million (about 3.6 million EURO) would be needed to actually make the fishermen surrender their licenses, of which Dfl 4.9 million had already been available.

The Ministry countered with an offer of Dfl. 8.2 million but required a commitment from the sector that if goals would not be achieved, a shortening of the fishing season would be accepted. No agreement was reached and consequently the Minister ordered fisheries to a halt for a week in the year 2000. Many fishermen ignored the prohibition and were fined. These fines were the lifted again by the Courts, mainly because the prohibition had not been announced in time. It seems there is much fall-out between the PO and the Ministry, which has now intended that it will no longer allow the PO members to achieve reductions by forfeiting sailing days. The already troubled relationship was further clouded when the government announced it had found certain concentrations of dioxins in eel from the IJsselmeer. A food warning was released, against eating eel from the IJsselmeer more than once a week34. The fishermen considered this a ploy of the government to further destroy their businesses. One of them commented: 'We too deliver fish to the RIVO [government research center, DH] every month. The dioxin concentrations have always been under the norm. And that would be completely different now? That is impossible. Apparently we as fishermen must all disappear from the IJsselmeer.

32 Interview with Mr. G. Hiemstra, Dutch Fisheries Association, Emmeloord, 11 December 2000. 33 The PO does not transfer these licenses to the Minister of LNV, so that they remain potentially useful; the Ministry considers this a flaw in the system, also because the Ministry subsidizes the PO, as does the EU. 34 See a.o. 'Kabinet slaat alarm om "dioxinepaling"', De Telegraaf, 22 September 2000. I fear that that is the final goal of this Cabinet'35. Interestingly, the warning only preceded a report form the EU Scientific Committee on Food, which warned for high levels of toxins in European fish36.

Review

The policy approach to fisheries in the IJsselmeer is clearly different from the approach in the rest of the country in that fishing rights are not divided on an area basis and have not been split between eel and other sorts. This difference is based on historic considerations and goes back to the closure of the Zuiderzee in 1932. Arrangements made then have not basically been altered. Although the number of actors claiming rights is in fact declining, pressure on fisheries is not on the decline. This is because the reduction in number of fishermen active in the region is offset by an increase of productivity per boat. The rivalry between fishermen is thus still great and combined with a decline in fish stock since 1970, this gives great problem pressure, which seems to have many historic precedents. It is such problem pressure that led the fishermen themselves to request government intervention in the early 1900s. This intervention has grown and declined with the years. Currently the government is not actively promoting eel from the lake as it has done in the past, but it does operate a license system that prohibits fishing in certain periods and areas of the lake. This licensing system was tightened on various occasions and in various ways. In 1970 kuilnet fisheries were prohibited, a measure intended to support the eel population. Ironically, this measure seems to have been somewhat counterproductive from the point of view of the eel population because of unforeseen effects in the ecosystem (food competition between eel and other fish increased). Also, twice there have been decisions to reduce 'fisheries pressure' by 50%, but it is questionable whether these measures have had the desired effect, especially since they are based on a reduction of the number of days during which fishermen can sail. The formation of a PO seems to have had a strongly uniting effect on the fishermen (instrumental form of coordination). Exactly because only one PO was allowed is the area, and because membership was made attractive, most fishermen became members and the PO seems to have the effect of uniting them better. This has positive and negative consequences. The positive for the fishermen is that the PO reintroduced the requirement for its members to auction fish coupled with a price guarantee that safeguards them from a buyer's market. In addition, the PO uses funds to buy fishing rights from fishermen at a price that is acceptable to them. The auctions generate information about fish crop that is useful from a perspective of productive fisheries, and the PO itself is inclined to introduce a quota system that would better guarantee sustainable yields. From the perspective of government, the PO also has certain benefits (some of which are the same as for the fishermen), especially the possibility to retreat somewhat from regulation of the sector. However, exactly because the PO unites fishermen, the PO can give them a stronger influence over policy. From a government perspective, concentration of knowledge on fish yields in the sector itself can be problematic as this knowledge is crucial in devising policies that serve other interests than just a fish crop that is economically sustainable. Also, the withdrawal from fishing rights of the market to the PO implies that the fishing rights are still legally valid. Whereas government

35 See 'IJsselmeervissers ontzet over dioxine-alarm', De Telegraaf, 23 September 2000. would want these rights permanently removed, they can now re-enter the market. In addition, the failure of the PO to reach 50% reduction and the fall out between the Ministry and PO in 2000 generates questions about the effectiveness of the PO's work. It will be interesting to see how a 50% reduction, that the Ministry desires will in the end be achieved. It might very well be that the amount of compensation for withdrawal must be distinctly increased form what it has been, in order to reflect the true economic value of the rights.

7 Some considerations on the management of the IJsselmeer

Introduction

Because the IJsselmeer is an enormously large area with several parts that differ greatly, and where a large number of uses lay claim to the lake, it tends to be difficult to express opinions on the lake as a whole. Still that is the purpose of this final section, where I will analyze the developments in management of the lake in the last 30 years or so. I will do this by referring to both some general trends, but also some trends for specific issues that I have described above. This section is not intended as a summary of the above and I will not repeat statements in the above that describe the natural characteristics of the lake and problems with them; instead I will focus mainly on property rights, public policy, and regime transformation. These topics are treated in separate sub-sections.

Regime development in the IJsselmeer

Under EUWARENESS, five dimensions of the regime need desciption and I will briefly discuss these now. (a) Co-ordination of levels and scales. This indicator relates to the degree to which coordination of policies takes place at the water basin level or not. The answer to this question obviously differs for various time periods. ZZW and RIJP (and then RDIJ) used to have, and still have authorities at the level of the entire basin. However, other policy sectors (land use planning, nature management) and other tiers of government (provinces, municipalities) have also obtained a say over the developments in the basin since the 1970s. In a sense this implies fragmentation of authorities, because provinces and municipalities operate on a different scale. On the other hand, the new responsibilities (especially land use planning) can be said to have a broader scope than ZZW and RIJP used to have (certain in the polder debate). Also, the provinces have undertaken various attempts to coordinate with each other and to coordinate the actions of municipalities. In the case of the corner lakes, RDIJ has succeeded in coordinating policies, despite a lack of formal authorities. Especially its knowledge and financial resources will have contributed to the acceptance of this role by others.

36 See 'High levels of toxins are found in European fish', International Herald Tribune, 18 December 2000. Dioxins are specifically mentioned. (b) Co-ordination of non-public actors. This relates to cooperation between public and non-public actors and the participation of non-public actors in policy making. There is a tradition of cooperation between public and non-public actors in the area. Note the fact that RIJP was working closely with farmers on landscaping of the new polders. Also note the fact that conservation organizations were invited to the same table ('Contact Commissie'). On the other hand, the new polders were sort of empty and normal democratic institutions were not present. Both the advents of a more radical wave of environmentalism and the creation of normal democratic institutions caused an influx of new actors, often advocating different priorities than RDIJ. Again, the land use planning system has been effective in channeling this influx and this system is generally very open to participation. The most important government layers from a land use planning perspective are local (municipal and provincial) and it is interesting to observe that they have different priorities than the national government (where RDIJ is still an important actor). This has clearly hampered cooperation and one can observe at least two different systems of integrated planning at work: one at the national and one at the provincial level. Only in case of the corner lakes have these two levels cooperated. In the case of fisheries, the PO is a good example of cooperation between private actors, but perhaps not as good an example of cooperation between public and private actors. Noteworthy is the establishment of cooperation between various private actors in the area. The fishermen, recreation organizations and conservation groups have linked up and produced their own vision on how the lake should develop. This coalition is potentially powerful because of their large membership (millions of people) and is based on the idea that certain forms of use (e.g. recreation) can in fact be combined with the nature function of the lake. In the course of developing their plan, these organizations gathered valuable information on the lake, which is especially concentrated in the Association for Water Recreation. This Association seems to function as a policy broker, linking especially nature and recreation groups. The common theme that unites these interests is their vision that the IJsselmeer should remain an open space. One member of the coalition, the Stichting Natuurmonumenten ('Association for Nature Monuments') has entered the IJsselmeer arena because of its involvement in the debate on the expansion of Amsterdam into the lake (the Association opposed this development and fought a bitter campaign). (c) Co-ordination of perspectives. The number of users of and uses for the IJsselmeer has been increasing during the case study period. Originally the lake was seen as not yet reclaimed land, that was to be put in agricultural use, whereas the Zuiderzee plan stressed safety as well. This plan was to be implemented at the expense of the IJsselmeer as fishing grounds. More or less unforeseen, the natural and recreational value of the lake was very high and an influx of new users occurred. Especially tourism in the corner lakes came to be promoted, followed somewhat later by nature protection. Nowadays, drinking water preparation and gas drilling are also claiming the lake for their purposes. Coordination of perspectives partly relates to the development of a river basin plan. Again, both the provinces and central government actors are engaged in plan formation at the level of the basin as a whole. The perspectives are coordinated at these levels (i.e. between the various ministries involved) but the two contrasting perspectives are not really coordinated, at least not for the most salient and contentious issues. Especially in the cases of gas drilling and recreation the courts have had to step in and settle differences. Court verdicts however do not solve disagreements for the long term. (d) Coordination of policy interventions and property rights. The question here is whether policy interventions are targeting all uses and users. Again the issue of the relationship between the land use planning system and the water management system is relevant. In the early 1970s coherence of policies for the lake was high anywhere, mainly because all policies were developed within ZZW and RIJP without much involvement from others. The debate on the Markerwaard polder and the incorporation of the polders and lakes in the late 1980s led to fragmentation of the regime and coherence was reduced. Various actors were attempting to push decision making in a certain direction (to polder or not to polder) and proponents and opponents were fighting each other through the land use planning procedures. When this debate was nearing completion because of Cabinet decisions, the relevant framework for the debate changed again, this time to purely financial considerations. It is within this framework that the government finally decided not to polder the Markerwaard. Given that decision new ideas on what to do with the lake had to be developed, especially at the level of the national government. Already before the poldering debate was closed, Rijkswaterstaat had attempted to get integral planning for the lake going. However, the provinces and municipalities (anticipating incorporation of the lake) refused to let Rijkswaterstaat play any other role than that of water manager. Rijkswaterstaat grudgingly accepted its new role, but there is a clear impression that the agency still acts as a very active agent towards integral planning. The corner lakes, where algae growth took dramatic proportions and the tourism-nature rivalry is intense, the agency's actions have been accepted it seems. If the convenant on the corner lakes is signed in April 2001, then one can speak of a clear development towards an integrated regime. The European Bird and Habitat Directives, which could bring much litigation against parts of the plans, could threaten consensus however. (e) In the rest of the lake, municipal and provincial incorporation seems to have resulted in continued disagreement between the national and other government levels. There are distinct differences between plans that are produced at the national level and the plans that are produced at lower tiers of government (disagreement on tourism and gas drillings). In many situations there is further disagreement between the provinces and their municipalities, especially on recreation. At the Noord-Holland shore, the province played an active role in bringing together the municipalities involved (high coherence) but in other parts of the lake such coordination is rare. Despite the continued presence of various uncoordinated plans in the small IJsselmeer and Markermeer, it seems fair to say that in comparison with the 1980s, policies are becoming more coherent, especially interprovincial planning and continued coordination between departments at the central government level are responsible for this37.

37 Fisheries are regulated under a somewhat separate set of regulations, which is not fully explained again as this section is a a general overview. See for a description earlier. (f) The coordination of responsibilities and resources for implementation. Obviously, RDIJ is the most prominent actor when it comes to coordination at the level of the entire basin. The agency seems well prepared for this task and the other actors need its resources and knowledge of the basin, as the case of the corner lakes demonstrates. If one reasons from the perspective that all authorities and resources regarding the lake should be in one hand, the clearly the current situation (where RDIJ lacks important authorities) is unsatisfying. On the other hand, the Markerwaard debate shows that the water managers can at times have quite a narrow vision of what needs to take place in the basin. The existence of competing authorities must then be welcomed.

The contribution to sustainability

It seems that the philosophy underlying public policies regarding the lake is still in certain ways based on the assumption that decision making is not a zero sum game. Alternatively put, the IJsselmeer is still regarded as an enormous resource, which can easily accommodate functions that need to move from elsewhere. A poignant example is the distraction of raw water for drinking water, needed to address the problem of lowering ground water levels on the main land. Another is the desired concentration of growth in tourism in the IJsselmeer, whereas such growth is no longer wanted elsewhere. To some extent it seems that the assumption of a non-zero sum game is justified. The IJsselmeer is indeed an enormous space and probably can accommodate much growth from elsewhere. The policies of most government levels involved seem mainly directed at steering development to the right place, reserving certain parts of the lake for certain uses. Zoning is thus the instrument that is supposed to make it all work.

In my opinion, the IJsselmeer case demonstrates the difficulty of determining the actual sustainability of water management. What needs to be remembered is that the concept 'natural' has little meaning in a country like the Netherlands, and even more so in the IJsselmeer. What we have in fact in an ecosystem that is man-made and man-controlled to a large extent. What the basin looks like is human choice and each option has positive and negative sides. This fundamental dilemma is visible is various debates that have now started, e.g. on changing water levels in the lake, on allowing the tide to return, and on turning parts of the lake saline again. Almost ironic are the attempts to create small natural islands in the lake where nature does not behave as expected and human maintenance is quite extensive. These examples demonstrate the 'dilemmas and tendencies' that are spoken off in the title of this paper. The choices are dilemmas in the sense that the choice for one type of ecosystem excludes the choice for another. The choices that are being made show certain 'tendencies' in the sense that a certain degree of fashion is present in which choices are being made (e.g. corner lakes or not, restoration of the ecosystem to the situation of 30 years ago or not). In other words: what is sustainable seems to differ for every generation that one poses the question to. It also differs for the various actors involved; some consider gas drilling sustainable, others not.

That being said, one can say something about certain 'hardcore' ecological parameters for the basin. I have not made extensive study of water quality, but water quality in the corner lakes has improved greatly in the past years (discharges of nutrients decreased for example). Even more basic perhaps is the continued existence of the water itself. Although I would hesitate to call the construction of living areas in the lake unsustainable, one can easily acknowledge that the ecosystem that existed in the lake at such locations is terminated completely. Such ecological considerations seem to have gained greater consideration than in the past. It is also interesting that an issue as climate change and potential rising sea levels have been brought into the discussion by RDIJ. This agency has assessed the potential implications of the phenomenon for water management in the IJsselmeer. For now the conclusion is that in the first 50 years or so, technical measures (discharge capacity in the closure dam) are adequate to offset the rising level of the North Sea.

Conditions for regime change

Under the EUWARENESS case study guidelines, various issues need to be assessed here, specifically relating to the factors that enhance integration or not. Again, the issue of perspective is very important in answering the questions posed by the coordinators. The dilemma in the case of the IJsselmeer is that there are various attempts at integrated planning at the basin level, but that these attempts differ from each other. This situation itself implies that there is a certain degree of fragmentation in the policies towards the IJsselmeer. Both the provinces and the national actors claim that their vision is the most 'integral' one. The provincial actors do so because they claim better knowledge of the local situation and better possibilities to weigh the importance of various interests. This calculation appear to result in hesitation towards certain developments that involve a risk to the local population or drinking water preparation (i.e. opposition to gas drillings, to a nuclear reactor) but a positive stance towards recreation. RDIJ on the other hand can claim that it can judge the necessary developments in the lake from a national perspective, which implies that the developments in the IJsselmeer are brought in connection with developments elsewhere. Increasingly, the latter assertion rings true, as coordination at the national level (especially in the project 'Meer Visie') involves consultation with various other government departments. The calculation made at the national level is more hesitant towards recreation (at least in the Northern part of the lake) but is more cognizant of the need for drillings.

In this setting, making statements about development towards integration easily lead to necessity to take sides in specific debates. The discussion then threatens to become one similar to a beauty contest: who has the most integral vision? I want to avoid that type of discussion and therefore limit myself to certain remarks that may be less controversial. These remarks include most aspects that need to be studied for EUWARENESS (attempts for coordination, favorable conditions) at the same time.

- The introduction of recreational use has been more or less a natural development. Acceptance of this was the work of private actors that started in the 1930s and came to bear fruit shortly after that. The fact that recreation was not fundamentally opposed to poldering may have helped. This line of reasoning is similar for natural interests until the 1970s.

- Private actors (VBIJ) introduced the radical vision of natural use being at odds with the poldering project in the 1970s. Because of the long tradition of the plan Lely, ZZW and RIJP radically rejected this vision. Helpful in allowing this vision to permeate the decision process was the introduction of land use planning procedures and the arrival of a Minister that was against poldering for financial reasons. In the end, financial reasons were paramount in the decision to terminate the poldering project, not protection of the natural value.

- The decision to not continue the poldering project opened up possibilities for reconsideration of priorities by the water managers. It can be said that from that moment on (effectively 1991), RDIJ started paying more attention to the natural value of the IJsselmeer. There were calls to establish a special agency for the IJsselmeer at that time, and RDIJ could have played a powerful role here, given its area wide orientation and its resources. In fact, it does seem that RDIJ has become a strong actor in terms of propagating the IJsselmeer as open water, enhancing the natural value and development of integral visions. Certainly in the corner lakes this is visible. The attempts of RDIJ for coordination are accepted in the corner lakes especially because RDIJ provides financial means to address an easily visible problem (deterioration of the ecosystem).

- The management of the IJsselmeer was never put in one hand however. At the national level, RDIJ needs to reach consensus with at least three other departments that to some extent propagate economic functions (housing, recreation, gas drilling). At the national level, plan forming is best described as a compromise between these interests and natural interests, with increasing limitations on economic functions (witness the exclusion zones for drilling and recreation, the increasing hesitation towards housing, and most of all: witness the granting of SPA status to the IJsselmeer). To some extent, these developments are institutionally driven (pressure from the EU, pressure from the provinces) and to some extent they are problem driven (too much recreational development is I no one's interest). Even if certain functions can still claim rights to the IJsselmeer, these rights need more motivation all the time.

- The advent of provincial planning can be seen as a movement towards fragmentation but perhaps also as a movement towards integration. The fact that the three provinces were willing together is a unique feature, which implies that provincial planning covers the entire basin as well. Furthermore, provincial land use planning has a long tradition of a very broad view (tradition of integration), much broader than the view of RDIJ in the early 1990s. In fact, it can be argued that the interprovincial plan was the first real integrated plan, something only matched by the 'Meer Visie' that was produced by the national government much later. The unusual step to coordinate provincial plans was taken because the provinces were relatively inexperienced with the issues at stake in the IJsselmeer and therefore had little expertise. It is also recognition of interdependence of the three provinces: dependence in the relation vis-à-vis the national government (united front), but also dependency in terms of policy content. The latter argument hinges on the fact that development in one province influences developments in another. Regarding this factor, it is my impression that the interprovincial plan is not extremely radical and certainly not redistributive. For instance, the argument could well be made that recreational development should best take place in the province of Flevoland, where ample space is available and less sensitive natural areas are present. Such an agreement would however be against the interest of the other provinces and therefore each province is allowed to increased recreation to some (undetermined extent).

- The reason why the provinces and RDIJ could not agree on development of an integral plan (despite the presence of various traditions of integral plan forming) seems to be located in various factors specified by the EUWARENESS coordinators. There was a strong tradition of integral plan forming both at RDIJ and the provinces, but these traditions were very different (RDIJ's tradition was less broad). Mutual respect seemed to be lacking, as the provinces considered RDIJ's approach in the period 1985-1990 rather arrogant and the provinces were keen to show they could 'go alone' in 1991, when they obtained land use responsibilities. This implied that the provinces had a credible alternative, but their position was still not taken into account by RDIJ. Information asymmetry is also present in this sense that provincial considerations are regionally inspired and not nationally. Furthermore, the relationship between the land use planning system and the water management system is not clear. Rijkswaterstaat is seen as an organization that trespasses the border between these two areas.

- Situations where integration could be achieved include the corner lakes, the Noord-Holland coast, and the case of fisheries. Regarding the corner lakes: the initiative was with Rijkswaterstaat and this agency could build on its experience with integral plans for separate corner lakes and the BOVAR project. The older experiments with integral plans for each separate corner lake had failed because of municipal resistance. IIVR (integral planning for all the corner lakes together) was even more ambitious but was prone to be more successful. The reason for that is probably related to problem pressure (ecological disaster) and the resources that RDIJ has available. On the Noord- Holland coast, the province could be successful in coordinating plan forming by various individual municipalities because there was a credible alternative threat. The province would simply not approve municipal plans for new recreational development is the municipalities would not reach consensus on where such development was to take place. In the fisheries case, coordination was achieved through the establishment of a PO. The idea of a PO stems from North Sea fishery practices and individual fishermen took the initiative to invite the PO to also become active in the IJsselmeer. The establishment of the PO was supported by the government, which put an attractive bonus on membership of the PO. Through the PO, fishing rights are taken out of the market and information on yields becomes available (but not to government).

Regime phases and change analysis

All in all it can be said that the IJsselmeer (as a water body) is currently better off than it would have been without the changes in the regime that have occurred in the 1970s. Looking forward, there is a tension between the priorities specified under the land use planning system and those under the water management system. This tension may increase now that RDIJ increasingly is the lead agency in terms of national policy development for the lake and is increasingly concerned with a broader range of issues. In the corner lakes, it seems that RDIJ has presented itself well as an integral planner. However, that does not yet imply that RDIJ will be able to play this role in the rest of the lake, certainly with the current disagreements present. The greatest question mark over the basin seems to be the actual importance of the Habitat Directive in terms of daily activities in the lake. This Directive could imply further changes in basin management towards a natural direction.

References: Bakker, H.J. and H.J.M. Goverde, IJsselmeer. Van behouden naar beheren, Edam, 1988. Bossaers, K.W.J.M., Zuiderzeevissers. Geschiedenis van de belangenorganisties van de vissers op de Zuiderzee en IJsselmeer, Amsterdam, 1987. Coops, R., IJsselmeerplannen nog erg mistig, in: ROM, 1994, no. 5, p. 15. Dirkx, J., Waterbeheer in discussie: wie snapt het nog?, in: IJsselmeerberichten, 2000, no. unknown, pp 12-13. Eerden, M.R. van, W. Dubbeldam, and J. Muller, Sterfte van visvogels door visserij met staande netten in het IJsselmeer en Markermeer, Lelystad, 1999 (RIZA report). Firet, J.M., Beleidsnetwerken IJsselmeer, achtergronden op de voorgrond, in: Firet, J.M. et al (eds.), Dwarsliggers komen in het IJsselmeer niet voor. Cultuur historisch jaarboek voor Flevoland, 1997, pp. 79-87. Gerits, R.T.F., Milieueffecten van gasboringen in het IJsselmeer, Amsterdam, 1990. Goverde, H.J.M., Het bestuur van het IJsselmeer in de toekomst. Een beoordeling van drie voorstellen, Nijmegen, 1978. Goverde, H.J.M., Macht over de Markerruimte, Nijmegen, 1987. Hidding, M.C., Planning voor stad en land, Bussum, 1997. Huitema, D. and J.P.P. Hinssen, Natuurbeleid bestuurskundig bekeken, Enschede, 1998. IIVR (Integrale Inrichting Veluwerandmeren), Inrichtingsplan Veluwerandmeren. Schakel tusen strategie en uitvoering (draft of 10 October), Lelystad, 2000. Keulartz, J., Engineering the environment. The politics of nature development, in: Fisher, F. and M. Hajer (eds.), Living with nature. Environmental politics as cultural discourse, Oxford, 1999, pp.83- 102. Koekebakker, P.H., Stop de heerschappij van waterstaat over het IJsselmeer, in: Plan, 1977 (vol. 11), pp. 37-42. Kuijpers, C.B.F., Onderzoek water in ruimtelijke bestemmingsplannen, Utrecht, 1990. Kuijpers, C.B.F. and J. van der Veen, Naar een samenhangend bestuur voor het IJsselmeer?, Utrecht, 1991. Lauwaars, S.G. and M. Platteeuw, Een groene riem onder het natte hart, Lelystad, 1999. LEI/DLO (Landbouweconomisch Instituut/Dienst Landbouwkundig Onderzoek), Perspectieven IJsselmeervisserij, Den Haag, 1997. Ministerie van LNV, Beleidsbesluit Binnevisserij, Den Haag, 1999. Nijman, J. and R. Elzinga, De functies van het Markermeer, Amsterdam, 1985. Oranjewoud Ingenieursbureau, Advies. Richtlijnen voor het opstellen van een plan voor de ontwikkeling en het beheer van het IJsselmeergebied, Heerenveen, 1982. Pater, B. de, Vergane glorie, nieuw elan. Inpoldering een beelden van de Zuiderzee, in: Historisch- Geografisch Tijdschrift, vol. 18 (2000), no. 2, pp. 37-47. Provincie Noord-Holland, Kustlijnontwikkeling IJssel- en Markermeer. Beleidsnota, Haarlem, 1996. Provincie Noord-Holland, Bedreigde belangen. Geen gas- of olieboringen in het IJsselmeer, Haarlem, 1990. Raa, B.D. te, Zout hindert drinkwaterwinning uit het IJsselmeer, in: ROM, 1994, no.3, pp. 13-15. RAND Corporation, Policy analysis of water watermanagement for the Netherlands. Vol. XVII. Flood safety model for the IJssel lakes, Santa Monica, 1981. RIZA (Rijksinstituut voor Integraal Zoetwaterbeheer en Afvalwaterbehandeling), De waterkwaliteit van het IJsselmeer in de periode 1972-1992, Lelystad, 1994. RLG (Raad voor het Landelijk Gebied), Voor een open toekomst. Advies over het ontwikkelingsperspectief voor het IJsselmeergebied, Den Haag, 1999. Stichting Natuur en Milieu, Westelijk Flevoland geen alternatief voor nat IJsselmeer. Commentaar op de ontwikkelingsvisie Westelijk Flevoland, Utrecht, 1988. Stuurgroep IJsselmeer, Rapport van de stuurgroep IJsselmeer. Voorstellen voor een nieuwe organisatorische opzet voor het visserijkundige beheer van het IJsselmeer, Rijswijk, 1995. Spek, E., ROM-Beleid, maatkostuum voor het IJsselmeer/Markermeer?, Utrecht, 1991. Taverne, B.G., Beginselen en voorbeelden van regelgeving en beleid ten aanzien van de opsporing en winning van aardolie en gas, Delft 1993. Vereniging tot Behoud van het IJsselmeer, IJsselmeer naar de 21ste eeuw, Edam, 1996. Visserijcentrum, Rapport van de Stuurgroep IJsselmeer. Voorstellen voor een nieuwe organisatorische opzet voor het visserijkundig beheer van het IJsselmeer, Rijswijk, 1995. Wessel, J., Hoe te beheren? Welk bestuur beheert?, in: Bakker, H.J. and H.J.M. Goverde, IJsselmeer. Van behouden naar beheren, Edam, 1988, pp. 41-50.

Interviews

- All interviewees have obtained a draft of this report with a request for comments. Only in three cases were comments returned and these have been incorporated in the text-.

Mr. H. Bakker, J. van der Veen and H. Vonk, Province of Noord-Holland, Haarlem, 2 February 2001. Mrs. J. Firet, Quintessens Process Management B.V., Kampen, 6 December 200. Mr. G. Hiemstra, Dutch Fisheries Association, Emmeloord, 11 December 2000. Mr. R.T.A. Hillen, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Directorate for Energy, Den Haag, 15 January 2001. Mr. H. de Jong, Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries (LNV) Office for the North west, Diemen, 26 January 2001. Mrs. G. Mahabir, Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries (LNV), Directorate for Fisheries, Den Haag, 4 January 2001. Mr. R. Steensma, Association for Water Recreation IJsselmeer and Cornerlakes (Stichting waterrecreatie IJsselmeer en randmeren), Lelystad, 10 January 2001. Mr. H. Verheij, Association for the Preservation of the IJsselmeer (Vereniging tot het Behoud van het IJsselmeer, Lelystad, 10 January 2001. Mr. H. Vos, National Public Works Agency (Rijkswaterstaat), Office for the IJsselmeer polders, Lelystad, 13 December 200. Mr. Zeilemaker, Netherlands Oil Company (NAM), Assen, 11 January 2001.

EUWARENESS is a research project on European Water Regimes and the Notion of a Sustainable Status. Research institutes from six European countries (Netherlands, Belgium, France, Spain, Italy, Switzerland) have been cooperating in this two year project (2000-2002). The project is supported by the European Commission under the 5th Framework Programme, and co-ordinated by the University of Twente in the Netherlands.

The EUWARENESS-project has focused on sustainable use of water resources by means of integrated water management. It aims to contribute to the implemen- tation of the EU Water Framework Directive. A better understanding is needed of the dynamic relationships between various conflicting uses of water resources, the regimes under which these uses of water resources are managed, and conditions generating regime shifts towards sustainability. The EUWARENESS-project studied the long term evolution of 6 national regimes, and also - more in depth - the specific regime transitions of 12 water basins across Europe during the last decades. Important issues are the participation of users, redistribution of property rights among users, the coherence between water rights and water policies.

More information: www.euwareness.nl

The EUWARENESS project is joined by: University of Twente (project co-ordinator) - The Netherlands Université Catholique de Louvain - Belgium Université Francois Rabelais de Tours - France Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona - Spain Istituto per la Ricerca Sociale - Italy Institut de Hautes Études en Administration Publique - Switzerland