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Fascist Corporativism and the Myth of the New State: the Construction of the Totalitarian State in Italy

Fascist Corporativism and the Myth of the New State: the Construction of the Totalitarian State in Italy

Fascist Corporativism and the Myth of the New : The Construction of the Totalitarian State in

By Zane Elward

Submitted to Central European Department of History

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts

Supervisor: Professor Constantin Iordachi Second Reader: Professor Julian Casanova

CEU eTD Collection Budapest, Hungary 2015

Copyright in the text of this thesis rests with the Author. Copies by any process, either in full or part, may be made only in accordance with the instructions given by the Author and lodged in the Central European Library. Details may be obtained from the librarian. This page must form a part of any such copies made. Further copies made in accordance with such instructions may not be made without the written permission of the Author.

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Abstract

This thesis approaches the corporative state in Italy as a case study of the attempt

to construct a totalitarian state. In past analyses, corporativism has been interpreted as a façade for

an authoritarian , content with sharing power with the traditional economic elite and

thus not representative of Fascist or a totalitarian orientation. This, however, is a

reductionist perspective, analyzing it through its failures instead of how it fit into the wider

ambitions of the regime. The purpose of this thesis is to provide a more complete understanding

of corporativism’s significance by employing the culturalist methodology of taking Fascist

ideology seriously. This will be applied in the analysis of their rhetoric and policies, particularly

the Carta del Lavoro and the legal framework of corporativism.

This essay will argue that corporativism was shaped by Fascist ideology, that it served a

purpose in the regime, and that it furthered and reinforced its totalitarian ambitions. Corporativism

not only suppressed the workers’ movement, but was meant to marginalize the influence of the

economic elite, subordinating them as organs of the state. Together, this was intended to grant

Fascism an unchallengeable monopoly on politic power, simultaneously extending it into the

economic sphere. Moreover, corporativism legitimized the regime and mobilized support; through

promises of genuine social harmony and direct representation, corporativism formed the

cornerstone of the myth of , essential in forming consensus for the regime.

Used as it was by the Fascists, corporativism fulfilled a role in the Fascist effort to construct

a totalitarian state, and its examination provides a case study by analyzing the regimes’ totalitarian

CEU eTD Collection intentions, how the regime made compromises yet strove to overcome them, ’s desire to

create a new man, and its compromises and the gradualist approach ultimately prevented Fascism

from achieving its totalitarian ambitions.

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Table of Contents

Introduction: and the Corporative State ...... 1 0.1: Framework and Methodology ...... 8 Chapter 1: The Origins and Philosophy of in Italy ...... 12 1.1: and the Syndicalist Alternative for the State ...... 13 1.2: Corporatism and the Italian Nationalist Association ...... 18 1.3: Mussolini’s Ideology, Revolutionary Syndicalism, and ...... 22 Concluding Remarks ...... 26 Chapter 2: Corporativism and of the Fascist Dictatorship ...... 28 2.1: The Dominant Positions within Fascism on Corporativism ...... 29 2.2: From Coalition to Dictatorship ...... 34 2.3: Integral Syndicalism and the Legge Sindacale ...... 37 Concluding Remarks ...... 41 Chapter 3: The Formation of the Corporative State...... 43 3.1: The Carta del Lavoro: or Program? ...... 45 3.2: The Gradual Establishment of Corporativism ...... 51 3.3: The PNF and Intersyndical Committees ...... 55 Concluding Remarks ...... 58 Chapter 4: The Significance of the Carta del Lavoro and Corporativism ...... 61 4.1: Cartelization and Compartmentalization: Marginalizing the Economic Elite ...... 63 4.2: Forced Unity and Creating the “Uomo Fascista” ...... 69 4.3: The Myth of the New State: Mobilizing Support for the Regime ...... 75 Concluding Remarks ...... 79 Conclusion: Fascist Corporativism: Toward a Totalitarian State ...... 81 Appendix ...... 87 Bibliography ...... 94

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Introduction Totalitarianism and the Corporative State

Italian Fascists in the and declared at every opportunity that they had constructed a

new, totalitarian state, which, according to il , , incorporated and directed

all activities within society. Corporativism – the Fascist form of corporatism, a system in which

society is structured into economic organizations from which representatives of workers and

employers are arranged into to negotiate legislation affecting all socioeconomic

matters – was to be at the center of this new state, championed as the “” between liberal

and . The Fascists promised this system would bring national unity, social

justice, direct political representation, and . In reality, none of these

objectives would be achieved and the corporative state remained incomplete. Nevertheless, steps

were taken toward its creation, and while it was never representative nor provided the promised

social harmony, it was shaped by Fascist ideology and represented a part of the effort to construct

a totalitarian state.

Much like the corporative state, it is accepted by all scholars of Fascist Italy that a fully

developed totalitarian regime never emerged.1 For decades following the collapse of Fascism, this

led many to exclude Fascist Italy from the classification of totalitarian, though this is due to the

concentration on totalitarianism as a structure of the total state, not as a type of ideology and CEU eTD Collection

1 Alexander J. De Grand, : Its Origins & Development, 3rd ed. (Lincoln; London: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 169–170; Stanley G. Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914-1945 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), 122; David D. Roberts, The Totalitarian Experiment in Twentieth- : Understanding the Poverty of Great (New York; London: , 2006), 335. 1

movement. The concept of the totalitarian state is most often applied to the repressive regimes of

Nazi and the under Stalin. In comparison, Fascist Italy, given its relatively

low amount of terror and compromises, falls short. Yet the aim and ideology of the Fascists, with

their intention to direct every realm of existence within a society through the new “total” state they

sought to create, is itself totalitarian.

According to preeminent Fascist historian Emilio Gentile, totalitarianism when applied in

such a way can best be understood not as a regime which can be fully developed, but rather as an

ongoing process; an experiment. It is a revolutionary movement with the aim to obtain a monopoly

of power in order to create a new, single-party state that seeks to encompass and direct all aspects

of society, penetrating and subordinating it to its ideology. The ideology is institutionalized

through rituals, and thus takes the form of a political which is exclusivist, allowing no

alternative perspectives, and desires to transform society so as to create a new man. In its

efforts to achieve this goal, the movement will utilize terror (physical or psychological), “capillary

organizations” and a revolutionary party which infiltrates the masses for , and

mobilization through myths, the sacralization of politics and the of the leader.2 This definition

thus puts an emphasis on totalitarianism as a political religion and as an ideology of the state,

which is to be a permanent entity forever guiding the masses.

In this sense, Fascism must be understood as a totalitarian movement, as according to the

definition put forth by renowned scholar of fascism :

[F]ascism is best defined as a revolutionary form of nationalism, one that sets out to be a political, social and ethical , welding the ‘people’ into a dynamic national community under new elites infused with heroic values. The core myth that inspires this CEU eTD Collection project is that only a populist, trans-class movement of purifying, cathartic national rebirth () can stem the tide of .3

2 Emilio Gentile, The Origins of Fascist Ideology, 1918-1925 (New York: Enigma, 2005), xiv-xv. 3 Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism (London; New York: Routledge, 1993), xi. 2

Under this definition of widely accepted generic fascism,4 it becomes clear that Fascism is the

quintessential totalitarian ideology. Fascism not only embodies the ambition to infiltrate all of

society with its quasi-religious political ideology to create a new society, but they additionally

envisioned their totalitarian project as a perpetual process to be embodied in the permanent state,

which they revered. Indeed, Gentile argues that Fascism represented “an embryonic ideology of

the State,” influenced by philosopher ’s concept of the ethical state directing all

aspects of society.5 Once again though, it is important to stress that the Fascists failed in their

ambitions to create the totalitarian state.

While some6 deny that Fascism even had a totalitarian drive, others7 argue it represents a

sort of “arrested totalitarianism,” asserting it existed initially but was abandoned in favor of

forming a conservative authoritarian state centered on the personal dictatorship of Mussolini. On

the other hand, it has become increasingly common for scholars to recognize that Fascism

maintained its totalitarian ambitions. In this viewpoint, scholars argue the Fascists actively sought

to subordinate their conservative allies by overturning former compromises, and thus the regime

maintained its totalitarian aim. 8 Moreover, it is typically accepted that the totalitarian drive

accelerated after the Ethiopian War and the formation of the .9 With this partial consensus,

4 Gentile, The Origins of Fascist Ideology, 368; A. James Gregor, “The Problem,” in Fascism: Critical Concepts in Political Science, ed. Roger Griffin and Matthew Feldman, vol. 1 (London; New York: Routledge, 2004), 344; Philip Morgan, Italian Fascism, 1915-1945 (Houndmills [England]; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 97. 5 Gentile, The Origins of Fascist Ideology, 275. 6 R. J. B. Bosworth, Mussolini (London; New York: Arnold; Oxford University Press, 2002); Payne, A History of Fascism. 7 De Grand, Italian Fascism; Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner

CEU eTD Collection Publishers, 2000). 8 Emilio Gentile, La via italiana al totalitarismo: il partito e lo Stato al totalitarismo (: Carocci, 2008); Morgan, Italian Fascism, 1915-1945; Roberts, The Totalitarian Experiment. 9 Didier Musiedlak, “Mussolini, Charisma and Decision-Making,” in Ruling Elites and Decision-Making in Fascist- Era , ed. António Costa Pinto, 1st ed, Monographs (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 2009), 14; , Mussolini Il Duce II: Lo Stato Totalitario, 1936-1940 (: Einaudi, 1981), 7–15; , The Origins of Totalitarianism, New ed, A Harvest Book HB244 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), 257. 3

historian Philip Morgan has observed that it would be more beneficial to focus on “the ‘totalitarian’

intentions and goals of the Fascist regime, and the means through which it attempted to realise

them,”10 meaning that the study of Fascism should be broken down to the institutions constructed

by the Fascists in their attempt to form their totalitarian state.

Interestingly, although this approach has been applied to various Fascist institutions,11 it

has not satisfactorily been utilized in relation to corporativism. The corporative state has not been

approached seriously as an institution in the Fascist attempt to construct a totalitarian state, and no

study has demonstrated how the Fascists sought to marginalize the influence of their allies, the

economic elite, within it. One of the major works on the consolidation of the dictatorship, The

Seizure of Power: Fascism in Italy, 1919-1929 by Adrian Lyttelton,12 concentrates primarily on

the extension of Mussolini’s personal power over the party, and approaches the corporative system

as a buttress for a conservative authoritarian regime. Alberto Aquarone takes a similar stance in

L’organizzazione dello Stato totalitario, in which he provides a noteworthy study of the regime’s

structure but falls short by portraying it as Mussolini’s personal dictatorship. Aquarone’s view

represents the typical perspective on corporativism: a façade for a conservative regime and a means

to enhance Mussolini’s personal power, intended to suppress workers for industrialists.13 Many

with this perspective do not believe that the Fascist regime represented a new state, merely a more

repressive form of the pre-Fascist “liberal” state, in place since the unification of Italy in 1861.

10 Philip Morgan, “Fascism in General, and Fascism in Particular,” Contemporary European History 12, no. 1

CEU eTD Collection (February 2003), 113. 11 See: Victoria De Grazia, The Culture of Consent: Mass Organization of Leisure in Fascist Italy (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Tracy H. Koon, Believe, Obey, Fight: Political of Youth in Fascist Italy, 1922-1943 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985); Gentile, La via italiana al totalitarismo. 12 Adrian Lyttelton, The Seizure of Power: Fascism in Italy, 1919-1929 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987). 13 De Grand, Italian Fascism; , The Birth of Fascist Ideology: From Cultural to (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); Payne, A History of Fascism. 4

Others, such as Mussolini’s famed biographer Renzo De Felice, do not fully accept this

perspective, asserting corporativism was initially a centerpiece of Fascism’s revolutionary drive

but was bogged down by compromises under the regime. 14 Although Gentile challenges De

Felice’s argument that the revolutionary Fascist movement was subordinated to the more

conservative regime and has written extensively on the totalitarian nature of Fascist Italy, he does

not spend much time evaluating corporativism through this lens.15 Therefore the significance of

corporativism within the Fascist state remains unclear, and it is often approached as a sham.

However, as historian David D. Roberts points out, corporativism is commonly approached

through a reductionist perspective, analyzing it through its failures instead of examining how it fit

into the wider ambitions of constructing a totalitarian state.16 Certainly, the corporative system was

a sham in the sense that it neither provided the promised representation nor social harmony, and it

was a main component of Fascist propaganda. Yet to approach it solely as a façade is simplistic

and prevents a more complete understanding of the system and the regime; it assumes that

corporativism was devoid of purpose and that it was not shaped by Fascist ideology.

This essay will argue that corporativism was shaped by Fascist ideology, that it served a

purpose in the regime, and that it furthered its totalitarian ambitions. To be sure, to assert

corporativism was shaped by Fascist ideology is not to neglect concessions to employers’

associations which slowed corporativism’s development and prevented direct economic

coordination; it is to suggest that, while certain aspects benefitted employers, corporativism was

meant to gradually marginalize and diminish the influence of economic elite while furthering

CEU eTD Collection Fascism along its totalitarian path. Corporativism was constructed according to Fascist ideology,

14 Renzo De Felice and Michael Arthur Ledeen, Fascism: An Informal Introduction to its Theory and Practice (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1976), 49. 15 Gentile, La via italiana al totalitarismo. 16 Roberts, The Totalitarian Experiment, 306, 308. 5

primarily based on Alfredo Rocco’s top-down model of corporativism and Mussolini’s own

political thought, with influences from the syndicalists on Fascism’s Left wing, whose desires

largely represented corporativism’s propagandized image.

Similarly, to suggest corporativism furthered Fascism’s totalitarian ambitions is not to

argue that corporatism as a system is innately totalitarian, or that one is dependent on the other;

other totalitarian regimes would not employ corporatism while authoritarian and democratic states

would. Indeed, corporatism would come in all forms. Common to each of its varieties is the manner

in which it structures society according to economic organizations from which representatives

meet in a corporative body to collaborate in the formulation and implementation of policy. The

relationship between these organs and the degree of involvement in the formulation of policy

determines corporatism’s nature. Scholars of corporatism have distinguished between liberal

corporatism, also known as neo-corporatism, and authoritarian corporatism. Neo-corporatism is a

tripartite system, consisting of representatives from autonomous organizations of workers and

employers who meet with the state to negotiate. The representatives collaborate and “have a formal

role in policy formation.”17 Authoritarian corporatism, conversely, is a bipartite system between

employers and the state with workers cut out, and there is less emphasis on representation and

more on the implementation of agreed upon policies.18

Yet in Fascist Italy, I argue that corporativism – a term which will be applied exclusively

to the corporatist system under Fascism – was employed in a totalitarian manner. Corporativism CEU eTD Collection

17 Alan Cawson, Corporatism and Political Theory (Oxford; New York: B. Blackwell, 1986), 19, 35, 40. Neo- corporatism is only possible in mature, developed capitalist nations. It was adopted by many western nations as a way to coordinate the economy to some measure without imposing state intervention, as in the Fascist and authoritarian models. 18 Ibid., 19, 40, 69; For more on the various types of corporatism, see: Karl Landauer, Corporate State , (Research Series 54) (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1983). 6

was intended to extend state authority over both employers and workers, infiltrate society, and

mobilize support, thus representing a totalitarian direction.

Although the subordination of the workers’ movement is typically approached as the main

consequence of corporativism, suggesting it was an instrument for industrialists, the corporative

state seems to have blurred the lines between public and private sectors to such a degree that

employers could be considered de facto agents of the state, implementing discipline and fostering

economic development not only in their interests, but also in the regime’s. Moreover, the

industrialists’ enhanced power seems to have been aligned with Fascism’s productivist orientation.

Therefore, corporativism appears to have expanded state power not only over the workers, but also

over employers, who had enhanced economic power but were unable to impact national policy

outside their industries, forced to submit to the national interests as defined by the Fascists.19

Corporativism also had significant psychological effects, representing a legitimizing force

as part of the myth of the new state. A myth in the Fascist sense, according to historian Stanley

Payne, is something “held to be true not as an existing empirical fact but as a metareality of the

past and the absolute goal which would be realized in the future.”20 The myth of the new state

would hold a central role within Fascism, building consensus for the regime by promising a bright

future was on the horizon;21 yet this myth would not have been sustainable if no steps were taken

toward its construction.

19 Peter Hayes comes the same conclusion in respect to industries in , who followed Nazi policies due

CEU eTD Collection to incentives of economic gain but also out of fear that failure to do so would result in the direct takeover of their firm by the Nazis or their replacement by another firm. Corporativism in Italy had a similar effect by promising enhanced economic control while simultaneously threatening state intervention where private enterprise proved inadequate. For details, see Peter Hayes, Industry and Ideology: IG Farben in the Nazi Era, New ed., 2nd ed (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 20 Payne, A History of Fascism, 215. 21 Emilio Gentile, Il mito dello Stato nuovo: dal radicalismo nazionale al fascismo (Roma: GLF editori Laterza, 1999).1 7

In this approach, and according to Mussolini’s ideology, the significance of corporativism

seems to be primarily political, not economic. I will still address to a degree its economic

significance, such as in the of labor relations. However, due to external circumstances

and the existence of competing institutions such as the Istituto per la Ricostuzione Industriale,

corporativism’s economic impact is more difficult to assess. Nevertheless, the study of Fascist

corporativism offers a case study of the Fascist regime, illuminating much about Fascism and its

efforts to construct a totalitarian state such as Fascism’s totalitarian intentions, how the regime

made compromises with the old elite yet strove to overcome them and marginalize their allies,

Fascism’s desire to create a new man and impose a revolution from above, how institutions fit

together in the wider effort to construct a totalitarian state, and how compromises and the gradualist

approach ultimately prevented Fascism from achieving its totalitarian ambitions.

Framework and Methodology

The importance of corporativism in the construction of the totalitarian system in Italy will

be demonstrated through exploring a number of questions surrounding corporativism: what did the

various positions within Fascism desire for corporativism, and how were their ideas represented

in its final form? What was its purpose according to its legal framework, and how were decisions

made in the shaping of its legislation? What was its form in reality and how did it further the

construction of the totalitarian state? What does this demonstrate about Fascism?

The first chapter will provide context on the philosophies that ultimately competed in the

CEU eTD Collection construction of Fascist corporativism, particularly national syndicalism and Nationalism, as well

as Mussolini’s own political thought. The second chapter will address the formation of the Fascist

Party and the establishment of the dictatorship, examining the professed ambitions of Fascism, the

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compromises of the regime, and what institutional changes were necessary before corporativist

reform could begin. Furthermore, it will demonstrate that was being made toward

corporativism under the coalition government. The third chapter will evaluate the projected

principles of Fascist corporativism, particularly through the Carta del Lavoro, which was intended

to reflect the regime’s social policies and thus reflects much about the corporative system. The

legislation surrounding the development of corporations will be considered as well to illustrate

how corporativism was constructed, its legal function, and its actual function. The final chapter

will analyze corporativism implementation, in an effort to evaluate more in depth its significance

within the regime as a whole. It should be noted that this examination will be limited exclusively

to the with the exception of Fascism’s relevant precursors, and thus corporative

reforms during WWII and the Italian Social will not be considered.

In the above examinations, this study will combine intellectual and political history,

examining what the Fascists said and wrote as well as their policies in regards to the corporative

state. Looking through the lens of totalitarianism as defined by Gentile, corporativism will be

viewed as one of the regime’s “capillary organizations” extending the reach of the state. Moreover,

the mobilizing purpose it serves in the myth of the new state will be deemed an integral element

of a totalitarian state and Fascist ideology, not merely an illusion to hide forces. To

provide a deeper understanding, this study will utilize the culturalist approach of taking Fascist

ideology seriously, assessing what has in the past been considered mere propaganda as

representative of what the Fascists actively believed.22 This will help provide a more accurate

CEU eTD Collection grasp of how the Fascists’ viewed and utilized the Carta del Lavoro, which will be the main

22 This approach was spearheaded by who stated “only ... when have grasped fascism from the inside out, can we truly judge its appeal and its power.” See: George L. Mosse, The Fascist Revolution: Toward a General Theory of Fascism, Second printing (New York: Howard Fertig, 1999), x. 9

primary source of this analysis, and corporativism in general. This will entail using mostly Fascist

speeches, writings, and legislation as primary sources.

With this in mind, it is important to remember the wide use of propaganda by the Fascists;

while their words must be taken seriously, they cannot be taken at face value. In the interest of not

succumbing to Fascist ideology, the methodology of anthropologist Katherine Verdery will be

utilized. In her work on totalitarianism in Romania, Verdery has provided insight into the

evaluation of documents from totalitarian societies. According to her, the point is not a simple

question of how accurately the document represents society. Often, documents are propaganda,

doctored to present a specific picture or an idealized version of the society; they do not truly

characterize the system. Thus, what is more beneficial is considering what agency and function

they fulfilled in the totalitarian system. Verdery’s methodology asks, what was their purpose and

why was it necessary to create these documents if they did not truly represent society?23 This

question will be applied to the Carta del Lavoro and corporativism in general.

To utilize this approach, secondary sources will be heavily employed so as to provide the

necessary data and framework to interpret the Carta del Lavoro and subsequent corporative

reforms. Moreover, many findings and concepts arising from studies on various institutions and

relationships under Fascism will be considered when attempting to understand corporativism’s

purpose.24

Through this methodology, the significance of the Carta del Lavoro and the subsequent

corporative legislation will hopefully become clearer, shedding some light on the meaning of CEU eTD Collection

23 Katherine Verdery, Secrets and Truths: Ethnography in the Archive of Romania’s (Budapest; New York: Central European University Press, 2014). 24 For example, John F. Pollard argues that Fascism was attempting to neutralize and subordinate the , and that at times Mussolini actually thought that he had. I will suggest a similar argument in regards to corporativism and the economic elite. See: John F. Pollard, The Vatican and Italian Fascism, 1929-32: A Study in Conflict (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 10

corporativism as an institution with an integral role in the attempt to construct a totalitarian state.

This analysis, aside from hopefully taking a step toward a more complete understanding of the

corporative system, will provide a case study into the means through which the Fascists attempted

to construct their totalitarian state.

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Chapter 1 The Origins and Philosophy of Corporatism in Italy

Corporatism emerged in Europe in the nineteenth century, advocated by conservatives and

Catholics as an alternative to the parliamentary system. The system was meant to establish a

representative body based on economic organizations instead of political parties, intended to

involve people more directly in the political process by allowing corporations comprised of

representatives from worker and employer syndicates to meet in a legislative body forming laws.

Based primarily on the concept of medieval , it was considered reactionary and did not gain

wide support initially. In the 1890s and early 1900s, however, corporatism was adopted by more

radical movements and altered according to their ambitions.25

In Italy, corporatism caught on as a replacement for the supposedly inadequate parliament.

Radicals on both the Right and Left attacked parliamentarism as divisive, producing an atomized

and individualized society and allowing personal interests to take precedent over national ones by

allowing too much socioeconomic freedom. The critiques of parliamentarism put forth by the

revolutionary syndicalists of the Left and the Nationalists of the Right present insight into the form

of corporatism each proposed as an alternative, which would later form the core positions within

Fascism, their models competing and blending in the establishment of corporativism.

The purpose of this chapter is to give the theoretical background of the evolution of each CEU eTD Collection of these positions, essential to understanding the dominant corporative models within Fascism.

Moreover, it will demonstrate each positions’ influence on Mussolini, and his own political

25 Landauer, Corporate State Ideologies. 12

thought will be evaluated. Through doing so, it will become evident that the top-down elitist

version of corporativism, as proposed by the Nationalists, was much more aligned with

Mussolini’s ideology than the more representative model desired by the syndicalists. Nonetheless,

the syndicalists did greatly influence the future Duce and aided in his transformation from

revolutionary socialist, to a blending of nationalist and syndicalist thought, to Fascism.

Revolutionary Syndicalism and the Syndicalist Alternative for the State

Syndicalism emerged in in the 1890s as a response to the perceived weakness of

reformist socialism. The socialists were seen as too willing to compromise because of their belief

that the realization of socialism was inevitable based on the of .

The revolutionary syndicalists believed they had been absorbed into the bourgeois system and

were thus impeding the socialist revolution. This was further demonstrated, in the syndicalists’

view, by the socialists’ over-concentration on the economic wellbeing of the masses. The

revolutionary syndicalists feared this would merely enlarge the base of the parliamentary system,

inhibiting a change in the .26

The revolutionary syndicalists were thus mistrustful of the parliamentary system, and

placed their faith instead in workers’ syndicates. These organizations were applauded by

syndicalists for their discipline and , and were seen as the instruments of the coming

revolution. However, the desired revolution was not merely political and socioeconomic, with the

sole aim of improving workers’ conditions, but embodied a psychological and anthropological

CEU eTD Collection revolution, with the workers developing the “heroic” values of discipline and sacrifice. Yet

syndicalists feared these organizations were unable to accomplish this goal on their own and

26 Gentile, The Origins of Fascist Ideology, 15. 13

therefore needed the guidance of an elite vanguard; the syndicalist intellectuals.27 This would

become a dominant tenet in Fascist ideology and is indicative of how the Fascists would attempt

a revolution from above, believing the masses were incapable of leading one themselves.

Nonetheless, syndicates were to be the cornerstone of a future system in which the

economy would be organized into a of syndicates with workers’ representatives

from each industry meeting in a legislative body to make laws affecting all socioeconomic

conditions.28 As noted above, the would not be comprised of parties, but economic

organizations and thus represent a more direct form of democracy, in the eyes of the syndicalists.

The masses would be directly involved in the process through their participation in the workplace

and everyday organizations, ending the individualistic, uninvolved society syndicalists deplored.

This system was not a reform of the current parliamentary system, but its replacement.

Therefore, the revolutionary syndicalists entirely rejected the reformist policies of the socialists in

favor of ; revolution would be achieved through a in which workers

took control of the means of production and forced a radical change in the system, ending the

dominance of the industrial class. In this regard in particular, the revolutionary syndicalists were

influenced by Sorel’s belief in the value of violence, though they were also influenced by many of

his criticisms of socialism and economic determinism.29

Entering Italy around 1900, syndicalism attracted a number of influential Italian

intellectuals who would influence Mussolini’s political ideas and join Fascism. However, in Italy,

syndicalism would gradually transform according to Italian conditions. As Marxists, albeit

CEU eTD Collection unorthodox ones, revolutionary syndicalists believed that , industrialization, and the

27 Payne, A History of Fascism, 67; David D. Roberts, The Syndicalist Tradition and Italian Fascism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 58. 28 Gentile, The Origins of Fascist Ideology, 63. 29 Payne, A History of Fascism, 66. 14

concentration of capital would eventually lead to the realization of socialism; yet many began to

wonder why capitalism was not imploding. They decided that not enough capitalist concentration

had occurred, and by around 1909 many believed that capitalism needed to develop further,

arguing that without a mature capitalism there could be no revolution.30 This encouraged a turn

toward productivism, that is, maximizing production in the interest of .

Revolutionary syndicalists came to view Italy as a poor, underdeveloped country incapable

of achieving socialism. Economic growth and the concentration of capital in fewer and fewer hands

were seen as necessary prerequisites; this was in complete contradiction to Lenin’s notion that a

socialist revolution can be carried out in the most backward of countries. 31 Lenin’s concept,

however, was based on the belief that when one socialist revolution occurs, the other European

countries would follow, and therefore the more advanced industrial countries would assist the

underdeveloped ones in constructing socialism. Conversely, while they remained internationalists

in the sense that they encouraged among nations, Italian revolutionary

syndicalists turned toward nationalism around 1910, believing each nation had to construct

socialism on its own.

The process originated with observations by syndicalists like , who while

abroad witnessed discrimination against Italian workers. For instance, American workers in the

United States would bar foreign workers from joining their labor unions in order to protect

American jobs and wages. For Labriola, this signified that no international bond between workers

existed.32 Additionally, syndicalist Roberto Michels asserted that the nation was a historical reality,

CEU eTD Collection as often shared interests with and defined themselves according to communities outside

30 Ibid., 67; Roberts, The Syndicalist Tradition, 55–58. 31 A. James Gregor, Marxism, Fascism, and Totalitarianism: Chapters in the Intellectual History of Radicalism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 204–210. 32 Payne, A History of Fascism, 66; Roberts, The Syndicalist Tradition, 110. 15

their economic groups, such as those based on religious heritage, historic traditions, language, and

culture – what Michels conceived of as the nation based culture.33

This trend was furthered during the Italo-Turkish War of 1911, known in Italy simply as

the Libyan War. During the war, revolutionary syndicalists like Michels and Angelo Oliviero

Olivetti came to question the concept that the working class had no fatherland and no interest in

war. Both recognized that national sentiment had mobilizing potential, and also that it was capable

of instilling the masses with the “heroic values” necessary for revolution.34 Furthermore, they

came to accept that expansion promoted industrialization through the acquisition of space and

resources, producing a stronger and wealthier nation. With this understanding, some revolutionary

syndicalists supported the war in Libya.35

Nationalism was ultimately embraced by the revolutionary syndicalists in their support for

intervention in WWI, becoming “national syndicalists.” Not only did the war persuade those

unconvinced by the Libyan War that defensive wars furthered the establishment of a syndicalist

order, it proved to them that the international of socialism was indeed a sham and that

nationalism was a reality to reconcile with.36 It thus became clear that Italy had to build socialism

on its own.

During this time national syndicalists solidified their productivist orientation, insisting

further industrial development and education of the masses were necessary before any sort of

revolution could take place. The error of Lenin's approach appeared confirmed by the Bolshevik

Revolution, perceived as bringing economic ruin, chaos, and dictatorship to Russia. Sergio

CEU eTD Collection Panunzio, Olivetti, and other prominent syndicalist leaders concluded that a premature workers

33 Gregor, Marxism, Fascism, and Totalitarianism, 193. 34 Ibid., 199–202. 35 Payne, A History of Fascism, 68. 36 Roberts, The Syndicalist Tradition, 104; Gentile, The Origins of Fascist Ideology, 25. 16

revolution in Italy would end similarly. 37 Furthermore, revolutionary syndicalists had long

acknowledged the complexity of modern industry and had come to realize that workers did not

have the proper expertise necessary to administer factories, and therefore recognized employers as

essential elements in the process of production.38 Consequently, Panunzio and the others turned

away from class struggle in favor of collaboration. There now entered a hierarchical aspect into

the syndicalists’ thought, as it was considered necessary to have both worker and employer

syndicates represented in the political-; the system was thus transformed from a

syndicate structure to corporatism.

The form of corporatism desired by revolutionary syndicalists was much more

representative than the form which emerged under Fascism. Nevertheless, it must be noted that

syndicalists nonetheless desired a strong state. Panunzio, for instance, insisted on one which would

extend into the socioeconomic sphere and provide the discipline and collectivism necessary for

corporatism. While he did intend for the corporations to be autonomous and self-governing, he

considered it vital that they have state sponsorship, meaning the state would mediate any conflicts

between the labor and employer syndicates and also enforce negotiated contracts. Moreover, the

state would ensure universal, mandatory membership in the syndicates, and provide discipline to

prevent a premature revolution. All of this would be enforced by a “labor police.”

Nevertheless, the process was imagined to be democratic by the national syndicalists, as

the masses would be directly involved in the decision-making process of socioeconomic policies.

It has thus been termed “participatory totalitarianism” by David D. Roberts.39

CEU eTD Collection

37 Roberts, The Syndicalist Tradition, 154. 38 Ibid., 70. 39 Ibid., 264–271. 17

Corporatism and the Italian Nationalist Association

The Associazione Nazionalista Italiana (Italian Nationalist Association, ANI) was formed

in 1910 and largely consisted of monarchists, traditionalists, and conservatives seeking to maintain

the status quo in Italy while simultaneously modernizing the nation. Formed by Alfredo Rocco,

Luigi Federzoni, Gabriele D’Annunzio, and , the movement was largely given its

doctrinal base by , who had been promoting national pride since the Italian defeat

at Adowa in 1896 had dashed its hopes of adding to its African colonies. Corradini made

it his mission to bring nationalism to the masses and introduce a populist element into the

movement, mainly by appealing to the middle class.

Naturally, at the core of the Nationalist’s ideology was the supremacy of the nation.

According to Rocco, society was an organism, and the aims of society surpassed those of the

. The nation was conceived of as the ultimate form of society in the modern era and was

based on common objectives, language, territory, and ethnicity. For the Nationalists, the nation

transcended the individual and class, and all were expected to sacrifice everything for the nation.40

In the early 1900s, Corradini, along with other pre-ANI nationalists, such as Giovanni

Papini and , would lament the deplorable state of the Italian nation and the

lack of national sentiment. At the root of the “degradation of the nation,” as Corradini put it in a

1903 article from his journal Il Regno, was socialism, denounced for its apparent placement of one

class above all others and its promotion of class struggle which prevented national harmony.41

Papini and Prezzolini similarly rejected socialism, 42 although they were more radical than CEU eTD Collection

40 Gentile, Il mito dello Stato nuovo, 178. 41 Enrico Corradini, “Article from Il Regno, 1903,” in Italian : From Pareto to Gentile, ed. Adrian Lyttelton, trans. Douglas Parmee, Roots of the Right (New York; London: Harper & Row, 1975), 137. 42 , “A Nationalist Programme, February 1904,” in Italian Fascisms: From Pareto to Gentile, ed. Adrian Lyttelton, trans. Douglas Parmee, Roots of the Right (New York; London: Harper & Row, 1975), 111; 18

Corradini, later collaborating with radical socialists and revolutionary syndicalists in their journal

La Voce, founded in 1908.

Yet the nationalists did not blame socialism alone; the was seen as

collaborating in its own demise. Allegedly compromised by humanitarian ideals and socialist

equalitarianism, the bourgeoisie was seen as incompetent. Moreover, it was apparently kept weak

by the parliamentary system, its reverence of the individual, and its belief in the majority, perceived

as alienating the masses from politics and the nation. Indeed, Rocco would later identify the

primary antagonism between and Nationalism as the lack of state authority in the

former.43 In order to be strong, Papini claimed a society needed discipline, hierarchy, and a ruling

elite, as a “society is not an organization unless it contains a minority that gives the order.”44

Furthermore, the nationalists encouraged expansionism, necessary for nations to provide room for

their burgeoning populace, remain relevant, and achieve glory. 45 To accomplish this, class

collaboration and national rejuvenation were necessary.

For this to be possible, nationalism had to appeal to the masses. This was particularly

difficult because the Left, including syndicalists before their turn toward nationalism, argued the

had no nation. In 1909, Corradini began to construct a worldview that would help to

alter this, largely based on the Social Darwinist principle of international conflict as perpetual and

inevitable. The world, according to Corradini, was divided into rich nations and “proletariat

nations,” which were discriminated against and kept inferior. Italy, naturally, was a proletariat

nation, meaning that the entire country, not just the toiling masses, was proletariat.46 His solution CEU eTD Collection

Giuseppe Prezzolini, “An of Brigands, 1904,” in Italian Fascisms: From Pareto to Gentile, ed. Adrian Lyttelton, trans. Douglas Parmee, Roots of the Right (New York; London: Harper & Row, 1975), 121. 43 Gentile, Il mito dello Stato nuovo, 172. 44 Papini, “A Nationalist Programme,” 108. 45 Gregor, Marxism, Fascism, and Totalitarianism, 152. 46 Payne, A History of Fascism, 64. 19

was unity and modernization, both necessary to build an Italy capable of challenging other nations.

It was therefore not a class revolution but a national one that was needed.

Many others adopted and promoted this idea. In La Voce, for instance, Papini and

Prezzolini argued Italy was threatened by perpetual inferiority, and that class in itself was an

inadequate source of revolution, arguing as the revolutionary syndicalists also came to see that the

proletariat was unprepared to lead society. Instead, they too would stress unification,

modernization, and education.47

It was these objectives that would ultimately be supported by the ANI, although Papini and

Prezzolini would never join it, rejecting, among other things, its . At its core was the

Social Darwinist concept of perpetual conflict between nations, and thus the nation needed to

prepare for war. This concept gave the impetus for , promoting the

transcendence of class in the interest of industrial growth. To aid in this, production needed to be

subjected to the interests of the nation. Economic coordination was intended to eliminate what was

viewed as wasteful internal , directing production toward preparation for war. In fitting

with his notion of Italy as a “proletariat nation,” Corradini would explain it to the First Nationalist

Congress on 3 by stating that “just as socialism taught the proletariat the value of

the class struggle, we must teach Italy the value of the international struggle.”48

In this program the rejection of the liberal state was clear. The Nationalists’ desire for

economic coordination was incompatible with liberalism’s detachment from socioeconomic

matters. To this end, advocated a totalitarian control of society and the economy, CEU eTD Collection

47 Gregor, Marxism, Fascism, and Totalitarianism, 151. 48 Enrico Corradini, “Report to the First Nationalist Congress in on 3 December 1910,” in Italian Fascisms: From Pareto to Gentile, ed. Adrian Lyttelton, trans. Douglas Parmee, Roots of the Right (New York; London: Harper & Row, 1975), 147. 20

providing the necessary discipline and directing the economy.49 At the Nationalist congress in

1914, Rocco gave Federzoni’s notion shape in his proposal for state sponsored syndicates of

workers and employers in nationally organized corporations.50 The proposal was supported by

Corradini and adopted by the ANI, as the Nationalists believed it would help Italy modernize and

recognized that syndicates were realities to come to terms with. Unlike the alternative version

proposed by the revolutionary syndicalists, however, this was a top-down and statist form of

corporatism intended, as Roberts puts it, to “cement a permanently hierarchal system” within

society, solidifying the dominance of the bourgeoisie.51 Nonetheless, this model provided the

Nationalists with their own alternative to the parliamentary state.

Keeping with Corradini’s efforts to bring nationalism to the masses, Rocco’s state was

meant to have a level of popular involvement. Although participation would be superficial, devoid

of any real political value, the Nationalists recognized the modern era as one of mass politics and

therefore acknowledged that any effort to modernize the nation required broad, constant

participation and enthusiasm. The desired involvement and unification would be achieved by a

“spiritualization of the economy” and making production a act cast as benefitting all of

the nation regardless of class.52 Indeed, in Nationalist thought, the nation transcended class. In this

manner as well, Rocco’s corporatist model was even more totalitarian than that of the revolutionary

syndicalists, who provided for more dispersed decision-making and legitimate representation.

Although it would be altered according to Mussolini’s own ideas, the corporative state that

would emerge under Fascism would largely take the form as envisioned by Rocco. As such, Fascist

CEU eTD Collection corporativism is often misunderstood as reactionary and an instrument for industry. In some

49 Roberts, The Syndicalist Tradition, 143. 50 Payne, A History of Fascism, 65. 51 Roberts, The Syndicalist Tradition, 144-5. 52 Roberts, The Totalitarian Experiment, 293. 21

regards, this seems logical, as the corporatism adopted by the ANI was intended to enhance the

power of industrialists, reestablish the absolute authority of the state, and protect the status quo,

and therefore Gentile, Roberts, De Grand, and others perceive it as reactionary.53 Yet Stanley

Payne argues that while Rocco’s form of corporatism was not revolutionary because it sought to

maintain the position of the old elite, it was not reactionary. To support this, Payne points out that

the system was not a return to medieval guilds but was intended to promote modernization and

economic coordination.54 Moreover, although it would not produce a , Rocco’s

corporatism does represent drastic institutional change from the liberal state, albeit much more

elitist and top-down than the revolutionary syndicalists’ model.

However, regardless of how Rocco’s corporatist state is conceived, it will be shown in

Section 3.2 that while Rocco was its primary architect, Mussolini manipulated its structure

according to his own political thought so that Fascist corporativism would neither solidify the

economic elite nor be a mere tool of industry.

Mussolini’s Ideology, Revolutionary Syndicalism, and Nationalism

In order to understand why Mussolini adopted corporatism and how he manipulated it, it

is necessary to understand his own political ideology. To be sure, Mussolini was no ideologue and

his ideas were not original. He was also an inconsistent thinker and often hesitant, and was

certainly more pragmatic than doctrinal. However, this has resulted in Mussolini being cast as a

mere opportunist, devoid of political thought mostly concerned with personal power; many

CEU eTD Collection historians have adopted this paradigm, such as RJB Bosworth and De Grand, to name a few.

53 Gentile, Il mito dello Stato nuovo, 193; Roberts, The Syndicalist Tradition, 145; De Grand, Italian Fascism, 69. 54 Payne, A History of Fascism, 65. 22

Yet this perspective goes too far. Mussolini’s is not a reflection of a lack of

political thought. Indeed, his emphasis on being a “man of action” was not to encourage any

spontaneous action, but action spurred by thought. It was more to demonstrate his opposition to

the deterministic perspective of socialism and to portray that he was willing to accept any policy

if it provided a solution.55 Moreover, he was surely concerned with the tenure of his political power,

and this was certainly motivated by personal ambition, but it was also to prolong the reign of

Fascism and ensure the achievement of its goals (as defined by him). Nevertheless, he desired

radical change, and, as Emilio Gentile observes, can only be construed as a conservative in the

most simplistic of concepts. As Mussolini put it: “Every revolutionary becomes a conservative at

a given time . . . I have come to stay as long as possible.”56

Furthermore, Mussolini was greatly influenced by a variety of philosophies and

intellectuals. In fact, in The Origins of Fascist Ideology, Gentile enumerates a set of core ideas

Mussolini held throughout his life. Among these are Mussolini’s often insistence on the primacy

of politics and his aversion to economics; with this in mind it is not surprising that he was

influenced by the criticisms of socialism put forth by Sorel and the revolutionary syndicalists who

saw socialists as too focused on materialist gains, desiring instead an anthropological revolution

instilling new values. Moreover, this notion makes the primarily political, not economic, nature of

corporativism more understandable. In relation to this concept, Mussolini also viewed politics as

an art, and therefore moldable.57

In addition to his perspective of politics, Mussolini was greatly influenced by the Sorelian

CEU eTD Collection emphasis on the use of myths to mobilize the populace. This was an element of his elitism and his

55 Gentile, The Origins of Fascist Ideology, 16. 56 Quoted in: Ibid., 31. 57 Ibid., 3. 23

contempt for the masses, who he was always suspicious of. Like the Nationalists, Mussolini

recognized that in the modern era the masses were a political reality that had to be dealt with. But,

much like his perception of politics, he viewed the masses as moldable. Influenced by the ideas of

French sociologist , as well as by Sorel, Mussolini began to see the masses

primarily as emotional, not rational, meaning myths were their primary motivation and that

through the use of myths, a leader can mold the masses.58 Moreover, Mussolini’s contempt for the

masses and his lack of faith in their rational capacities caused him to reject the possibility of the

spontaneous organization of the masses to achieve collective aims, and thus was heavily influenced

by the revolutionary syndicalists’ notion that a vanguard of an elite minority was necessary to lead

the people, a role which Mussolini naturally envisioned for himself.

Mussolini’s suspicion of the masses was not merely a lack of confidence in their rational

and organization abilities; he was also greatly pessimistic about human nature. According to him,

the masses were drawn toward evil and idleness if there was no superior entity guiding them.59 In

many ways, this was an influence from Giovanni Gentile’s concept of the “ethical” state, directing

the masses and giving them purpose. In this idea, as well as those detailed above, it is not difficult

to see Mussolini’s emphasis on the inevitable hierarchical structure of society and why he adhered

to the belief in the necessity of a guiding elite. Only through this elite, according to Mussolini, was

the palingenesis and rejuvenation of society possible.

If we acknowledge these principles as the core of Mussolini’s political thought, it is not

difficult to understand why he was influenced by both syndicalism and Nationalism nor why he

CEU eTD Collection wielded power as he did. Mussolini turned toward syndicalism as early as 1902-4 when he

interacted with many of its leaders during exile in . Moreover, syndicalists, such as

58 Ibid., 3, 15; Morgan, Italian Fascism, 1915-1945, 22. 59 Gentile, The Origins of Fascist Ideology, 3. 24

Panunzio, often published articles in his journals. However, despite this early draw toward

syndicalism, it was superficial. In truth, he was not genuinely a syndicalist, as he never had faith

in the masses and was never a democrat; yet its influence helps to explain his criticism of reformist

socialism, motivating him to identify himself as a “revolutionary” and “aristocratic” socialist

during the years prior to WWI when he was a member of the .60 Moreover,

many elements of syndicalism were clearly adopted into his political thought: its praise of action

and violence; its principle of the vanguard; its language and philosophy in his attacks on reformist

socialism; its stress on direct action like the general strike; its use of myth; its call for a new state;

and its emphasis on an anthropological revolution and the creation of a new man.61

Nationalism also greatly influenced him. In fact, according to Roberts it was ultimately

more influential on Mussolini than syndicalism.62 His earliest influences from nationalism came

from La Voce, the journal of Papini and Prezzolini. Although it would take WWI for Mussolini to

fully embrace nationalism, by 1909 he began to accept cultural nationalism. During WWI, he

followed the same transition as syndicalists, rejecting the “myth” of internationalism and turning

completely to the Italian nation. It was the after the defeat at Caporetto in 1917 that

convinced him that the nation transcended class and was capable of mobilizing the masses.63

Nation, not class, became the main protagonist of history for Mussolini, superior to all else.

One influence that would play a vital role in the formation of Fascist corporativism came

from both movements: productivism. Due to the syndicalists he began to see even before the war

that capitalist development was not yet complete in Italy. An unorthodox Marxist, he was

CEU eTD Collection nonetheless convinced that opulence through excessive production was essential before any sort

60 Payne, A History of Fascism, 83. 61 Gentile, The Origins of Fascist Ideology, 8–9. 62 Roberts, The Syndicalist Tradition, 184. 63 Morgan, Italian Fascism, 1915-1945, 23. 25

of socialist society could be realized. 64 However, he was also influenced by Corradini’s notion of

Italy as a “proletariat nation,” and WWI and its aftermath convinced him of the imperative of

preparing the nation for war, as the Versailles peace conference demonstrated Italy’s relative

weakness among the great powers, which he believed only unity and imperialism could change.

Thus, this productivism would ultimately bring Mussolini closer to the Nationalists’ position.

Concluding Remarks

All of these positions should be considered equally legitimate precursors to Fascist. At the

same time the syndicalists were being influenced by nationalist ideas, the ANI was incorporating

syndicalist ones, producing a national syndicalism of their own. While they retained major

differences, their anti-systemic ambitions, corporatist and productivist philosophies, elitism, and

their willingness to use violence to achieve their goals made them very compatible movements.

In addition, separate but clearly linked to corporativism was the ambition to transform man.

Fascists from both backgrounds would view Socialists and much of the working class as “trapped

in ‘bourgeois materialism.’”65 Although the Right-wing of Fascism was not as concerned with the

creation of a new man as the syndicalists, they too desired a transformed one, less focused on

material improvement and completely devoted to the nation, instilled with “heroic” values

necessary for the desired economic development and, of course, war. In regards to these ideas,

these positions influenced Fascism in more ways than their philosophies on corporatism.

In the pursuit of these objectives, members from these positions who joined Fascism would

CEU eTD Collection advocate a strong state at the center of the corporative system in order to provide discipline and a

64 Gregor, Marxism, Fascism, and Totalitarianism, 235, 281-4. 65 Michael Mann, Fascists (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 7. 26

monopoly for state-recognized syndicates. In the Commission of 18, established by the Fascist

Grand Council to debate the future structure of the state, Gino Arias warned prophetically that this

would lead to the replacement of collective bargaining by the rule of decree, but was ignored.66

Similarly, free economics was rejected in favor of coordination. With minimal exceptions,

the majority of Fascists from both positions agreed that eliminating internal economic competition

would increase production the most. Moreover, economics would necessitate granting

unions greater autonomy, which the Fascists were skeptical of, afraid it would create a state within

a state. Instead, labor was to be subordinated, controlled, and disciplined in the interest of

production and to avoid the establishment of an organization capable of challenging the state.67

The Fascist corporative system was thus always intended to be a hierarchical one.

Moreover, while corporatism is not innately totalitarian, both syndicalists and Nationalists in Italy

developed totalitarian models of corporatism centered on to total state. Albeit, the Nationalist’s

top-down model was much less representative than that of the syndicalists, yet the syndicalists’

version cannot be considered democratic as no alternative avenues of representation were to be

allowed outside of the Fascist syndicates. However, they did desire to grant the workers a

genuinely collaborative role, in contrast to the Nationalists. It is questionable, though, if the

syndicalists’ model could ever be implemented under Mussolini, due to his elitism and contempt

for the masses. The following chapters will discuss the system of corporatism which emerged

under Fascism, corporativism, as well as the implementation of corporative reforms and how these

ideas were reflected within them.

CEU eTD Collection

66 Lyttelton, The Seizure of Power, 321. 67 Ibid., 323. 27

Chapter 2 Corporativism and the Establishment of the Fascist Dictatorship

Although Fascism would rise to power in October of 1922 following its famed March on , it

would be five years before the Carta del Lavoro was published and seven before any corporative

reform. The delay was due to the gradualist approach adopted by Fascism, in which it slowly made

alterations to the state from within a coalition government from 1922 to 1925, in order to maintain

an air of legality. Such appearance was necessary to avoid provoking unnecessary resistance or

dismissal from the . Nonetheless, Fascism moved toward the establishment of a

dictatorship and a corporative state from the beginning, solidifying its rule through electoral reform

and eventually banning competing parties. During the same time, the Fascist Party used violence

and other means of coercion to grant the Fascist syndicates, or trade unions, monopolies in

negotiating labor relations.

This chapter will provide background on the formation of the Fascist Party and the

dominant positions on corporativism within it. Furthermore, it will discuss the pre-corporative

reforms under the coalition government that were necessary before any of these ideas could be

implemented. This will not only illuminate why corporative reform was delayed, but also grant a

deeper understanding of the coalition between Fascism and the economic elite. It will also

demonstrate, particularly though the analysis of integral syndicalism, that corporative reforms CEU eTD Collection were always intended, with Mussolini playing the various forces off of each other for his own

goals. Ultimately, all of this worked toward a totalitarian solution, meant to solidify Fascism’s

dictatorship, establish corporativism, and neutralize the members of the economic elite.

28

The Dominant Positions within Fascism on Corporativism

The ideas discussed in the first chapter would give form to Fascist corporativism, with

Mussolini mediating between the competing syndicalist and Nationalist models according to his

political ideology as well as pragmatic concessions to industry. Fascism as a movement first

emerged in 1919 as an amalgamation of various interventionist movements, including the national

syndicalists and those revolutionary socialists who followed Mussolini, under the title di

combattimento. Its program blended nationalist and syndicalist ideas and called for radical

institutional change,68 but as it preformed terribly in the 1919 elections due to its ambiguity, it

moderated its program to the Right to appeal to the middle class.

To a large extent, this push to the Right was motivated by the anti-Socialist violence carried

out by the organization, known as the squadristi or the . This so-

called “war on Bolshevism” which took place throughout the massive labor upheavals during the

(“red biennium”) of 1919-20, genuinely perceived at the time as threatening a

Bolshevik-style revolution, attracted a large following in the more Right-leaning middle class. 69

This trend would be furthered following the Fascists’ electoral victory in 1921, when its

ascendance to a national party forced the movement to define itself as a full-fledged party.

The Partito nazionale fascista (PNF) which emerged was a fusion of ideas from the Right

and the Left, though it ultimately advocated a more nationalist, Right-leaning agenda. Considered

desirable were a strong, republican state, a disciplined functional hierarchy, imperialism instead

of coexistence, productivism, protection for labor, and free trade, which they predicted would wean

CEU eTD Collection out ineffective firms. Furthermore, the new program called not for the replacement of the

68 Payne, A History of Fascism, 91. 69 Gentile, The Origins of Fascist Ideology, 70; Payne, A History of Fascism, 96. 29

parliamentary system, but for the existence of corporatism alongside the parliament, ensuring both

individuals and producers would be represented.70

In 1923, after the Fascists had taken power, the Nationalists of the ANI were absorbed into

the Party. The Nationalists should not, however, be considered opportunists but genuine Fascists.

Although they had numerous differences, particularly over social policies, the exact form of the

state, and the Nationalists’ apparent obsession with imperial expansion, they nonetheless desired

a radical transformation of the state and its replacement with corporativism. Moreover, like the

Fascists, they too glorified violence, as could be seen by their own use of paramilitary violence

against the Socialists. Regardless, there remained great differences in their desires for the

corporativist state.

Those on the Left of Fascism included former revolutionary syndicalists such as A.O.

Olivetti, , , and . Aside from having their own

corporatist tradition, these Fascist syndicalists were heavily influenced by Gabriele D’Annunzio,

who, with the support of nationalists and irredentists, sought to claim the city of Fiume for Italy

and led a government there from 1919 to 1920.71 His action greatly furthered nationalism in Italy

and furthered the image of the liberal state’s incompetence as it was unable to control its own

people or guard its interests against competing great powers. Moreover, D’Annunzio’s state in

Fiume offered the first example of a post-liberal corporatist state, proclaiming Europe’s first

corporatist constitution, the Carta del Carnaro. 72

The Carta del Carnaro, the work of syndicalist , was not merely

CEU eTD Collection expressing intentions and social policies, as the Carta del Lavoro later would, but was meant to be

70 Morgan, Italian Fascism, 1915-1945, 65. 71 Gentile, The Origins of Fascist Ideology, 152; Roberts, The Syndicalist Tradition, 12. 72 Morgan, Italian Fascism, 1915-1945, 45; Payne, A History of Fascism, 92. 30

the constitution of the new state in Fiume, establishing corporatism as its base. Work was

considered to be the center of society and corporations were to be democratic, representing freely

organized syndicates. Equality was guaranteed for all.73

D’Annunzio’s experiment profoundly influenced Fascism as a whole, not just the Fascist

syndicalists. In Fiume, D’Annunzio spearheaded what would later become the “Fascist style,”

incorporating the shirts, Roman , the leader cult, and the liturgy which would be later

adopted by Fascism.74 Not surprisingly, the corporatist ideas enshrined in the Carta del Carnaro

also had a monumental impact. Although those on the Left of Fascism would champion the

democratic and libertarian nature of Carnaro, many would reject it outright. Nonetheless, it gained

corporatism wide popularity and support within Italy, particularly among radicals who would later

flock to Fascism. Naturally, this placed corporatism at the center of the debates on the structure of

the future Fascist state.

Many Fascist syndicalists desired to implement a similar, if not identical, corporatist

constitution. This is not surprising as revolutionary syndicalists had been involved in the writing

of the Carta del Carnaro. Still, there were a few desired alterations. Panunzio, for instance, who

Roberts identifies as the most influential syndicalist theoretician within Fascism, advocated

compulsory unions instead of free association with a strong state and labor police ensuring

discipline.75 Rossoni likewise desired a monopoly for Fascist unions, and supported greater state

arbitration to limit the influence of industry. 76 While there was much variation amongst the

syndicalists, most desired this form of corporativism; compulsory, state-sponsored but CEU eTD Collection

73 Gentile, The Origins of Fascist Ideology, 150. 74 Payne, A History of Fascism, 92. 75 Roberts, The Syndicalist Tradition, 20, 271. 76 De Grand, Italian Fascism, 69. 31

autonomous syndicalists with genuine representation for both labor and industry in the

corporations.

Those on the Right-wing of Fascism primarily came from the former ANI or were attracted

by Fascism’s turn toward the middle class. Typically, while they supported the nationalism and

of D’Annunzio’s movement, they rejected the libertarian principles of the Carta del

Carnaro. They did not desire autonomous syndicates with a voice in politics, but the subordination

of the workers’ movement to class collaboration in the interest of the nation.77 As noted above,

Alfredo Rocco would be the primary spokesmen for this branch of Fascism, proposing a top-down

model for corporativism which would incorporate syndicates as organs of the state and coordinate

production in the interest of economic growth. This position tended to favor industry and

employers over the working class. Mussolini, for his part, tended to think more like the Nationalists

with their rejection of the libertarian Carta del Carnaro and in fact had distanced himself from

D’Annunzio’s Fiume excursion.78

The third dominant position was proposed by those who, like , had been

influenced by both syndicalism and Nationalism. Bottai advocated a corporative state guided by a

bureaucracy of technocrats and managers, which would collaborate with associations of laborers

and employers to direct the economy. State authority would be supreme, with no syndicate able to

challenge its authority, but there would be greater representation than Rocco’s model while still

granting employers some private initiative.79

Mussolini remained uncertain with no corporative model of his own. Yet he accepted the

CEU eTD Collection development of corporations as a historical fact, as revealed in an article in Da Gerarchia on 5

77 Gentile, The Origins of Fascist Ideology, 184, 321. 78 Bosworth, Mussolini, 143; Payne, A History of Fascism, 143. 79 De Grand, Italian Fascism, 70. 32

May 1925, and desired to coordinate their development with the aims of the state, much like Rocco.

He saw corporativism as the “expression of national solidarity” and considered it the most efficient

manner for the development of production. Asserting that corporativism allowed for the

reconciliation of labor and capital, he insisted it would transform production into a collective action

and would not abolish capitalism, but “unleash and enhance it.”80 From this, we already see less

emphasis on social harmony and more on production and development, as would be reflected in

the legge sindacale and later corporativist reform, to be discussed in the following sections and in

Section 3.2.

These positions were not as united as presented here; the descriptions above represent the

basic viewpoints and commonalities of each perspective, in the interest of remaining brief.

Moreover, some corporativist philosophers, such as , will not be considered because,

while they had their own philosophies and desires, they did not bear any influence on the

construction of the system itself and thus remained abstract models, irrelevant to this analysis.81

Furthermore, it should be noted that there were other economic ideologies within Fascism

that will not be considered for similar reasons. Nonetheless, briefly considering what linked the

various strands within Fascism helps to illuminate the relationship between Fascism and

corporatism and the mutual influence they had on each other in shaping the Fascist regime and

corporative state. Historian Alexander J. De Grand insists accurately that what bound the various

positions together was not corporatism, but the common ideological strains of ultra-nationalism, CEU eTD Collection

80 My translation: Benito Mussolini, “Sindacalismo Fascista, 23 October 1925,” in Opera Omnia di Benito Mussolini, ed. Edoardo Susmel and Duilio Susmel, vol. 21 (Firenze: La Fenice, 1956), 327–9. 81 For information on Spirito, see: Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914-1945, 220; Roberts, The Totalitarian Experiment, 300. For a broader view of corporativist positions, see: Roberts, The Syndicalist Tradition. 33

elitism, collectivism, and ,82 the last of which I reject and would replace with the

insistence on a top-down model for society and a strong, unchallengeable state.

While not exhaustive of the various positions’ commonalities, this list demonstrates

corporatism and Fascism were not interdependent from the start. Corporatism as a system merged

well with Fascism’s collectivism and elitism and seemed to offer a means to strengthen the nation,

which explains why corporativism was adopted as the centerpiece of the Fascist state so early on;

for some this was out of genuine ideological conviction, while for others it was due to an

acknowledgment that corporativism served Fascism’s ambitions and would help to establish the

desired total state.

Additionally, corporatism’s versatile nature meant it could be molded according to Fascist

ideology into what would become corporativism. In the last chapter, I detailed the ways in which

corporatist philosophies would ultimately influence and shape Fascism, yet the reverse is also true.

The elitism and top-down model for society envisioned by the various positions within Fascism

overshadowed syndicalism’s more representative model, determining the form corporatism could

take under its regime, resulting in the top-down, totalitarian model embodied in the Fascist

corporative system.

From Coalition Government to Dictatorship

Before any of these changes could take place, however, Fascism had to solidify its

dictatorship, which it moved toward from the start. Although some Fascists genuinely desired to

CEU eTD Collection work within the system, the apparent abandonment of the destruction of parliamentarism –

declared in the 1921 program advocating the existence of corporativism alongside the parliament

82 De Grand, Italian Fascism, 146. 34

– seems to have been a necessary ploy for participation in parliamentary politics. Already in 1922,

the Fascists would adopt two main myths: the creation of a new to restore the glory

of Italy, and the creation of a new state, the second clearly depicting Fascism’s ambition to destroy

the existing system. Moreover, by this time Mussolini had not only denounced socialism and

liberalism, but democracy entirely, advocating an “‘aristocratic’ century of new elites.”83

Following Mussolini’s ascension to prime minister, il Duce made it clear he did not intend

to rule with parliament. In his first speech to parliament he threatened to replace it with Fascists,

insinuating it only remained by his good grace. He then requested and received the right to rule by

decree for a year. With this extensive power, we must ask why, if Mussolini was committed to

institutional change from the outset, he accepted a coalition government and a period of semi-

constitutional rule maintained from 1922 to 1925.

To begin with, Mussolini was uncertain of the form the future state should take. Having no

clear vision himself, he was further hampered by the fact that there were competing blueprints

within the party, detailed in the previous section. Furthermore, regardless of Mussolini’s threat to

parliament, Fascism in truth still represented a parliamentary minority and was forced to accept

that coalition government was unavoidable at the time. Mussolini’s power was therefore far from

untouchable, and thus incremental change was necessary to avoid dismissal by the monarch.

Before Mussolini could move past this, a more stable power base was needed.84

To this end, the was passed, thanks to the imposing presence of the Blackshirts

in parliament and deputies foolish enough to think it would normalize Fascism. Under this law,

CEU eTD Collection the proportional electoral system, which since 1919 had assigned parties parliamentary seats

proportional to the votes they received nationally, was replaced with one in which two thirds of

83 Payne, A History of Fascism, 106. 84 Morgan, Italian Fascism, 1915-1945, 80–87. 35

the seats were awarded to any majority so long as they obtained over 25% of the vote; the

remaining third was proportionally dispersed among the remaining parties. The system essentially

redefined collaboration to mean Fascistization, as it discouraged dissent by marginalizing any

party that opposed Fascism. Moreover, as Lyttelton puts it, the law “would allow Mussolini to use

parliamentary and legal methods as a cover for the transformation of the State, which, once the

majority was safe, could be carried through without any formal break in constitutional

continuity.”85 Simply put, a break with legality prior to this may have provoked resistance from

the king; the Acerbo Law cast a cloud of legality over the regime’s institutional changes, increasing

the king’s reluctance to act.

Nonetheless, Mussolini remained hesitant to enact true institutional change, out of fear of

being dismissed. True, the establishment of the Fascist Grand Council (FGC) in 1923 as the party

equivalent of the Council of Ministers nominally transferred many important decisions to the Party,

and along with the incorporation of the squadristi into the state represented the beginning of the

Fascistization of the state. However, the major institutions of the old system remained in place. It

was not until the Matteotti crisis that things would change.

On 10 , Socialist deputy was kidnapped after criticizing the

Fascists for the violence and fraud utilized in the recent election. For two months no body was

found, but it was clear to everyone he had been taken by the squadristi. Resistance to Fascism

grew widespread, representing a true crisis for the Party, but the opposition withdrew from

parliament which made it impossible for them to directly challenge Mussolini. Moreover, it

CEU eTD Collection remained weak and divided, so the king, believing he had no other viable option, did not act against

Mussolini. Mussolini was depressed and unable to act, but the implicit support from the King and

85 Lyttelton, The Seizure of Power, 132. 36

the demands for action from the Fascist radicals emboldened him to officially launch the

dictatorship in a speech to parliament on 3 January 1925.86

It was this crisis which revealed to Mussolini that even with the Acerbo Law, the political

base of Fascism was insecure. The enormous opposition during the crisis exposed that it was

possible for significant anti-Fascist sentiment to arise, which could then take the two-thirds

majority from Fascism. This, as well as the demands from Fascist radicals to implement

institutional change, provided Mussolini with the impetus for radical change and the construction

of the corporative state.87

Integral Syndicalism and the Legge Sindacale

It would be wrong to think, however, that the delayed implementation of corporativism and

Mussolini’s uncertainty about the future structure of the state meant there was ever any doubt a

form of corporatism would be present; every blueprint detailed above envisioned corporatism at

the heart of the new system. Moreover, to say that the construction of the legal framework of

corporativism only began after the Matteotti crisis is not to say that no progress was made toward

its implementation. It is simply to say that any steps taken toward the creation of corporativism

were done through the PNF and the Fascist unions, not the state.

Indeed, while the dictatorship was still under construction, what has been termed “integral

syndicalism” was emerging. Without the help of legislation, pressure was applied on independent

organizations, typically through squadristi violence, in an attempt to “subject all interest groups to

CEU eTD Collection a process of totalitarian co-ordination.”88 The process was meant to organize syndicates of workers

86 For an excellent account of the Matteotti crisis, see Chapter 10 in, Lyttelton, The Seizure of Power. 87 Roberts, The Syndicalist Tradition, 237; Gentile, The Origins of Fascist Ideology, 220. 88 Lyttelton, The Seizure of Power, 221–4. 37

and employers in every branch of industry, forming a de facto corporativism coordinated not by

the state but by the Confederation of Fascist Unions. In , this process was approved

by the FGC with Edmondo Rossoni heading a top-down integral syndicalism appointing local

leaders and subordinating the masses, that was nonetheless supposed to represent the spontaneous

and voluntary organization of unions.89 While some argue that Mussolini was never enthusiastic

about corporative reforms, it should be noted when considering motions such as this passed by the

FGC that Mussolini directed these meetings, coordinating not only when it would meet but who

was on the FGC and what would be discussed.90

Such de facto monopoly on union representation was necessary before they could be turned

into state organs in the corporative system, but the effort was not limited to workers; employer

associations were also meant to be included in the process. To this end, the Confederation of

Agriculture was merged into the Federazione italiana sindicati Agricolori. Yet the incorporation

of the industrial employer’s confederation, Confindustria, proved much more difficult as it not

only resisted absorption, it even resisted acknowledging the Fascist unions and the implementation

of binding contracts.

Initially, Confindustria refused to adopt the title of Fascist, and thus remained outside of

the FGC, reserved for Fascist organizations. Yet in time its leaders saw that closer cooperation

with Fascism was the only way to avoid forced integration into the system, and thus the president

of Confindustria, , attended his first FGC meeting in July of 1923. However,

Confindustria remained an independent organization for the time being and this was only after

91 CEU eTD Collection Mussolini came out in to state that “Confindustria must not be touched.”

89 Morgan, Italian Fascism, 1915-1945, 84. 90 In fact, De Felice argues Mussolini was enthusiastic about corporativism: Renzo De Felice, Mussolini Il Duce I: Gli Anni Del Consenso 1929-1936 (Turin: Einaudi, 1974), 177. 91 Quoted in Lyttelton, The Seizure of Power, 229. 38

Though there is no document confirming it, it seems likely, in my opinion, that Mussolini did not

want to provoke resistance from the and realized he could not fight the workers’ unions

and the employers’ associations simultaneously, and therefore sought to compromise and integrate

industry in another manner. On one hand, Lyttelton accurately notes that this represents that the

Fascists acknowledged the power of Confindustria,92 but the reverse must also be recognized;

Confindustria realized Fascism could in fact incorporate it by force if it refused to cooperate. The

allotment of autonomy to Confindustria represents one of the primary compromises within the

Fascist regime in regards to corporativism, one which Fascism would work to gradually overturn.

In response to this concession, Rossoni and the union leaders launched a labor offensive in

the north which coincided with a visit by Mussolini to Turin. The labor upheavals infuriated

Mussolini and proved to him once and for all that labor was irreconcilably hostile to Fascism and

that it was foolish to let labor ruin relations with industry.93 Hereafter it seems very unlikely, in

my opinion, that a form of corporatism in which the masses had a genuine voice could ever emerge

under Mussolini, although tighter constraints on employers through state coordination of

production remained a possibility.

Yet his contempt for the masses did not prevent Mussolini from using the syndicates

against the various employer associations to get what he desired. As Alexander de Grand argues,

“One of the used by Mussolini to intimidate the fellow-travelers in industry was to allow

more freedom to the Fascist unions.”94 This is evident in his negotiations with Confindustria over

exclusive bargaining rights for Fascist unions. In December of 1923, the Palazzo Chigi Pact had CEU eTD Collection

92 Ibid. 93 Ibid., 229–230. 94 De Grand, Italian Fascism, 60. 39

seemed to achieve this goal in return for recognizing the autonomy of Confindustria.95 However,

the pact was frequently broken and was ruined by labor upheavals during the Matteotti crisis.

Between the signing of the pact and its future replacement, strikes increased from 200 in

1923 to 355 in 1924, culminating in a Fascist-led strike in 1925.96 The labor agitation sufficiently

convinced Confindustria of the need to cooperate, and the monopoly of Fascist unions in industry

was cemented in the Palazzo Vidoni Pact in October 1925.97 Thus, Mussolini would threaten union

agitation in order to force the cooperation of employers, suppressing it once he got what he desired.

This sort of negotiation always benefited the regime and employers, but rarely workers; as the pact

granted the Fascist unions a monopoly, all other unions proved meaningless and soon dissolved.

Instead of negotiating with Confindustria as equals, as the pact provided for in theory, workers’

representatives were barred from the factories and workers were deprived of any alternative for

collective bargaining than the Fascist unions, which naturally surged in membership.

The granting of exclusive rights to Fascist unions signaled that corporative legislation

could begin. Immediately after the pact was declared, Mussolini had Rocco begin on legislation to

solidify Palazzo Vidoni into law. This took the form of the law on the legal regulation of labor

relations, commonly referred to as the legge sindacale, or the syndicalist law, enacted on 3 April

1926. The law made it so that the right to negotiate collective contracts was granted only to

syndicates formally recognized by the state, which naturally meant only those organizations which

had accepted Fascist domination, either in title or implicitly as Confindustria had. Additionally, CEU eTD Collection

95 Alberto Aquarone, ed., “Il Patto di Palazzo Chigi,” in L’organizzazione dello Stato Totalitario, vol. 2 (Torino: Einaudi, 1978), 435–36. 96 De Grand, Italian Fascism, 60. 97 Alberto Aquarone, ed., “Patto di Palazzo Vidoni,” in L’organizzazione dello Stato Totalitario, vol. 2 (Torino: Einaudi, 1978), 439. 40

labor strikes and lockouts were banned, with special labor courts set up meant to arbitrate disputes

and thus render labor agitation unnecessary;98 in reality the courts were rarely utilized.99

Concluding Remarks

Mussolini’s gradualist approach, far from indicating he had settled for an authoritarian

compromise with the old elite, was seen as necessary in order to avoid provoking resistance and

dismissal from the monarch, as Mussolini’s position was not yet untouchable. It was only after the

Acerbo Law that genuine institutional change could begin. Still, it seems likely that Mussolini, due

to his uncertainty and caution, would have delayed corporative reform had the Matteotti crisis not

demonstrated that even with the Acerbo Law, the Fascist dictatorship was precarious, meaning

that only corporative reform would solidify it.

However, this is not to say that prior to the Matteotti crisis, Mussolini was uncertain about

corporativism; integral syndicalism demonstrates that although its exact form remained uncertain,

corporativism was always to be the future form of the state. This is further evident from the fact

that each of the various blueprints for the state placed corporativism at its center. The exact form

the corporative state would take, however, remained uncertain.

The legge sindacale reflects this uncertainty, as it left corporativism’s form unclear since

it was not a genuine corporative reform. This represents another concession to Confindustria, who

resisted the immediate implementation of corporativism. Indeed, the incremental establishment of

corporativism (discussed in the next chapter), clearly represents the power of Confindustria, and CEU eTD Collection

98 Alberto Aquarone, ed., “Legge 3 Aprile, N. 563, Sulla Disciplina Giuridica dei Rapporti di Lavoro,” in L’organizzazione dello Stato Totalitario, vol. 2 (Torino: Einaudi, 1978), 442–51. 99 Morgan, Italian Fascism, 1915-1945, 106–7. 41

the legge sindacale actually benefitted the confederation by allowing it to solidify and extend its

dominance over private industry, enabling it to incorporate firms it had not in the past.100

Conversely, it was also resigned to adopt the title of Fascist and, as it will be shown in

Section 4.1, the expansion of Confindustria was desired by Fascist corporativists, who believed

the concentration of capital was beneficial, either as a means to improve the wellbeing of the entire

nation or as more efficient, as discussed in Chapter 1. It should therefore be considered a step

toward corporativism, even though no corporations were legally established. Still, Payne has

argued that this law represents the “first pillar of the corporate state.”101

CEU eTD Collection

100 De Grand, Italian Fascism, 69; Morgan, Italian Fascism, 1915-1945, 107. 101 Payne, A History of Fascism, 115–6. 42

Chapter 3 The Formation of the Corporative State

Immediately following the passage of the legge sindacale, the industrialists were able to maintain

their independence from Fascism, for the most part. For instance, the FGC authorized the Ministry

of Corporations (established in 1926), along with the Ministry of Interior and the party, to purge

the corporations in an effort to further fascistize them. Yet this was applied much less to

Confindustria than to agriculture and the unions. Moreover, the legge sindacale had allowed the

employers too much maneuverability, who often negotiated individual contracts instead of

granting Fascist unions priority in . 102 Rossoni and other syndicalists therefore

demanded greater regulation of labor relations and the guarantee of protection for workers.

It was in response to this demand and frustration in the unions that the Carta del Lavoro,

or Labor Charter, would be published in Il Popolo d’Italia on 23 . Approved by the

FGC, it was intended to represent the regime’s social policy. The Fascists, for their part, often

referred to the Carta del Lavoro as representing the “spirit of corporativism” and the centerpiece

of the system.103 Yet among scholars there is much debate over its significance, as it was neither

a decree nor a law, and it remains unclear as to if it should be considered a program representing

genuine intent for the future or it is was merely propaganda. The uncertainty is made worse by the

CEU eTD Collection 102 Lyttelton, The Seizure of Power, 330. 103 My translation: Edoardo Susmel and Duilio Susmel, eds., “La Prima Riunione per lo Studio dello Carta del Lavoro, 11 February 1927,” in Opera Omnia di Benito Mussolini, vol. 22 (Firenze: La Fenice, 1957), 522; Benito Mussolini, “Discorso all’Assemblea Quinquennale del Regime, 10 March 1929,” in Opera Omnia di Benito Mussolini, ed. Edoardo Susmel and Duilio Susmel, vol. 24 (Firenze: La Fenice, 1958), 8; Edoardo Susmel and Duilio Susmel, eds., “85° Riunione del Gran Consiglio del Fascismo, 11 November 1927,” in Opera Omnia di Benito Mussolini, vol. 23 (Firenze: La Fenice, 1957), 64. 43

fact that the principles enumerated in the Carta del Lavoro are often not reflected in the corporative

reforms that followed.

The confusion has led Lyttelton to declare that it is “impossible to determine . . . how far

this high-sounding initiative was originally intended as a real solution to the problems raised, and

how far as a propaganda diversion,” though he himself tends to support the latter.104 Roberts

similarly views it as a propaganda effort to placate the syndicalists and mobilize them as myth-

makers, spreading the perception that the new state was taking shape.105 Morgan, on the other hand,

believes that it represented intent encouraging improved labor relations while indicating a

possibility for the future.106

I, however, would suggest a middle ground; while it certainly served some propagandistic

purposes, in some regards it reflected the intentions of the regime and may have even threatened

more radical changes to the economic elite. Through closely analyzing the Carta del Lavoro, the

subsequent corporative reforms, and the functions of the PNF related to labor relations, as will be

done in this chapter, we come closer to understanding the charter and its significance. Upon doing

so, it seems plausible to suggest that the Carta del Lavoro genuinely represented the productivist

orientation of the regime, which naturally favored employers, while simultaneously intimidating

them with the threat of greater state intervention in labor relations, which remained propaganda to

the masses as long as employers cooperated. This is reflected in the form taken by corporativism,

which would never provide the promised representation and social harmony, but would instead

increase and extend state authority and grant employers, as organs of the state, greater control over

CEU eTD Collection their industries.

104 Lyttelton, The Seizure of Power, 330. 105 Roberts, The Syndicalist Tradition, 283. 106 Morgan, Italian Fascism, 1915-1945, 108. 44

The Carta del Lavoro: Propaganda or Program?

The uncertain significance of the Carta del Lavoro is in part due to its ambiguous nature,

as it was not a decree and, while often referenced, was hardly reflected in corporative reform.

Rossoni and the unions desired a legally binding document and set for labor relations,

while the employers, particularly those in Confindustria, wanted merely a “platonic statement of

intent.”107 In this aspect, the employers won. Yet still, in the text itself, their interests remained to

be balanced. This job was originally given to Giuseppe Bottai, Mussolini’s undersecretary in the

Ministry of Corporations, but while he managed to settle many of the disputes, in the end he was

unable to placate both sides, particularly the industrialists. The final draft was ultimately made by

Rocco, although Mussolini himself made some alterations to push it further to the Left to reflect

the ambitions of the syndicalists.108

The influence of the employers’ associations ensured the rejection of a national minimum

wage in each sector of the economy, the eight hour work day, severance pay, and also insurance

for the workplace. Less concessions were made to labor, which received paid holidays and, in

theory, dismissal was to be more difficult. In general, there were vague assurances for labor

protection and state-led coordination of the economy to ensure production was in the interest of

the nation. Production was to be a collective action, involving both the worker and the employer,

with any conflict mediated by the labor courts, which would subordinate opposing interests to the

“superior interests of production.”109 CEU eTD Collection

107 De Grand, Italian Fascism, 70. 108 Lyttelton, The Seizure of Power, 330; Roberts, The Syndicalist Tradition, 282. 109 My translation: Alberto Aquarone, ed., “La Carta del Lavoro,” in L’organizzazione dello Stato Totalitario, vol. 2 (Torino: Einaudi, 1978), 477. For the Italian and translated versions of the Carta del Lavoro, see the appendix on page 87 of this thesis. 45

On paper, the Carta del Lavoro transcends . Yet it seems plausible that many

of the articles concerning improvements of labor conditions were primarily suggestions to the

employer and mostly represented propaganda; although it was projected as the heir to the more

libertarian Carta del Carnaro, the Carta del Lavoro did little to improve social relations. Aside

from not being a legal document itself, meaning its social policies were not officially adopted, the

assurances it gave to labor were always for the future, prefaced with phrases such as, “The Fascist

State proposes to bring about . . . .”110 Yet no details on how this would be achieved were included

in the document and the Fascists never implemented them. For instance, important decisions over

wages and hours were not discussed in the Carta del Lavoro and were not to be handled by the

state, but were left to future collective contracts.

The improvement of working conditions were thus delegated to the employer, as shown

not only in the Carta del Lavoro but also in a speech by Mussolini to industrialists in Cesena a

year later on 8 June 1928. In his speech, he stressed the need for greater collaboration with the

workers, casting the relationship between workers and employers as akin to that between soldiers

and officers on the battlefield. He therefore encouraged the employers to take care of them and

even pay them higher wages, emphasizing it would benefit all by fostering consumption. 111

However, the state never intervened to improve labor relations, which was instead left to the PNF

to enact, as will be demonstrated later.

Additionally, other assurances it gave, such as mediation through labor courts and the

corporations controlling employment, were never realized, as the labor courts hardly ever handled

CEU eTD Collection labor disputes and the control of employment was abandoned by the FGC in 1927. While it is

110 My translation: Ibid., 481. 111 Benito Mussolini, “Discorso agli Industriali, 8 June 1928,” in Opera Omnia di Benito Mussolini, ed. Edoardo Susmel and Duilio Susmel, vol. 23 (Firenze: La Fenice, 1957), 192–97. 46

certainly possible that more corporative and labor reforms might have been implemented had the

regime continued and the industrialists been further marginalized, it must be acknowledged that as

early as 31 Mussolini was instilled by the Council of Minister with the power, as the

, to enact regulations realizing the social policies enumerated in the Carta del

Lavoro,112 but these powers would go unused.

As far as defending and improving the rights of labor, the Carta del Lavoro falls short,

leaving too much ambiguity and to be done in the future. It therefore seems likely that Roberts and

Lyttelton are correct that these articles were indeed propaganda, meant to demonstrate to labor that

genuine change was coming that would improve their situation. Its propagandistic values were not

limited to workers, however, but also served as propaganda abroad, as well as within the party

itself, as will be discussed in the next chapter. Indeed, Roberts points out that although syndicalists

had some reservations about the Carta del Lavoro, they supported it because they saw it as opening

the path toward the development of corporativism and believed it genuinely represented the

regime’s desire to grant labor the same protection as the entrepreneur class.113

The fact that these guarantees were mostly propaganda and suggestions to employers about

respecting labor is further demonstrated by those articles which legitimately represent the

orientation of the regime, namely its productivism. Work, according to the Carta del Lavoro, was

a social duty, not a right. This underscores the discipline stressed by the Fascists and emphasized

in the charter, discipline which was to be enforced through fines, suspension, and even dismissal

without compensation; this does not sound like a defense of labor but its subordination. Moreover,

CEU eTD Collection while article fourteen described policies meant to ensure fair salaries and article twelve vaguely

112 Edoardo Susmel and Duilio Susmel, eds., “246° Riunione del Consiglio dei Ministri, 30 October 1928,” in Opera Omnia di Benito Mussolini, vol. 23 (Firenze: La Fenice, 1957), 240–46. 113 Roberts, The Syndicalist Tradition, 265, 283. 47

assured living wages, article eight stressed that the employer is obliged to “promote in every

way . . . the reduction of costs,” without excluding wage reductions. Combined with the fact that,

according to article seven, the “direction of [the productive process] is the right of the

employer,”114 it seems foreseeable that workers’ rights would be cast aside in favor of production,

with no recourse against the employer.

This perhaps becomes most clear when considering the third article, which granted those

syndicates recognized by the state the right to “guard their interests.”115 In many ways, this clause

seems positive, providing labor and employer syndicates the ability to defend their interests and

negotiate. However, in order to achieve this, the worker and employer syndicates had to be equal;

either both needed to be subordinated to the state, or both needed autonomy with their own centers

of power for leverage. This would never be the case in Fascist Italy. The employers, particularly

those represented in Confindustria, would be granted much more autonomy than the labor unions

ever would, and thus were more than capable of defending their interests. Indeed, according to the

Carta del Lavoro, private initiative embodied “the most efficient and useful instrument” in

production for the nation. Thus, “only when private initiative is lacking or is insufficient” would

the state intervene, typically granting employers great autonomy.116

In contrast, the Fascist unions drew their authority only from the state, meaning that they

had no ability to represent their interests. This was furthered by the division of the Confederation

of Fascist Unions in November of 1928 into six smaller branches: industry, commerce, banking,

agriculture, land transport, and maritime and air transport. While Lyttelton approaches this

CEU eTD Collection primarily as a concession to Confindustria, it was actually desired by most Fascists as Mussolini

114 My translations: Aquarone, “La Carta del Lavoro,” 478–9. 115 My translation: Ibid., 477. 116 My translation: Ibid., 478. 48

and many others feared that such a large organization could challenge the authority of the state,

while corporativists such as Bottai believed the CFU was organized along class lines, not corporate,

and thus needed to be broken up before any corporativist reform could be achieved.117 It was

therefore in line with corporativist goals, however it would ultimately prove harmful for labor as

it greatly reduced the leverage of the labor force, limiting their ability to counter the influence and

power of the employers and making them completely dependent on the state.118

Far from being mere concessions to industrialists, this greater autonomy awarded to

employers and the emphasis on production at the cost of the worker is completely aligned with

Mussolini’s ideology. Mussolini’s elitism had always stressed a minority leading the masses, and

at that early stage in the regime no Fascist technical class had arisen capable of replacing the old

elite in the administration of industry. Moreover, in a speech on 10 March 1929, Mussolini

championed the employer class as vanguard in the cessation of class antagonism, asserting that

they had become “free from class mentality” and truly devoted to civic responsibility. 119

Conversely, in a speech given only shortly after the publication of the Carta del Lavoro applauding

Fascism’s first five years in power, Mussolini condemned the unions, insisting that the slow

construction of corporativism was due to the fact that the unions were still against the state.120

Therefore, Mussolini remained suspicious of the masses while he had come to view the employers

as agents of the Fascist system.

Nonetheless, the Carta del Lavoro should not be seen as giving free reign to employers;

indeed, it seems plausible that the document could be considered a veiled threat to them. In other CEU eTD Collection

117 Morgan, Italian Fascism, 1915-1945, 108; Roberts, The Syndicalist Tradition, 289. 118 De Grand, Italian Fascism, 71. 119 My translation: Mussolini, “Quinquennale del Regime,” 8–9. 120 Benito Mussolini, “Prefazione a ‘il Gran Consiglio nei Primi Cinque Anni dell’,’ 10 July 1927,” in Opera Omnia di Benito Mussolini, ed. Edoardo Susmel and Duilio Susmel, vol. 23 (Firenze: La Fenice, 1957), 13. 49

words, the same clauses that were propaganda to workers were threats to employers. By portraying

many of the more radical and revolutionary ambitions of various Fascists, it demonstrated what

could be made law if employers failed to cooperate with the state. Moreover, although private

initiative was given preference, there existed a looming threat of state intervention where private

enterprise was deemed inadequate by the state.121 Therefore, while employers, especially those in

Confindustria, were granted enhanced economic control, there was an implicit assertion that

production should be in accordance with national interests. This would become clear later in the

regime, particularly as war approached, as will be shown in Section 4.1.

When examined closely, the emphasis of the Carta del Lavoro therefore does not seem to

be harmonious labor relationships, although it may encourage it; the focus instead is on production

in the interest of the nation. Coordination of production, while desired by many syndicalists and

Nationalists alike, is not entirely necessary; the primary goal is production and the creation of

itself. Therefore, enhancing the productive capabilities of the industrialist was desirable to

Mussolini in the interests of the nation, so defined by him. In direct accordance to the Fascists’

“embryonic ideology of the state,” the nation was identified with the state, which ultimately means

that, as Roberts asserts, the Fascists were “not turning the state over to special interests, but

exerting the state’s sovereignty over them.”122

In regards to labor relations, the Carta del Lavoro does seem to have an economic

significance. Regardless of its assurances to labor, it demonstrates the intent to subordinate

workers, disciplining them and removing avenues for labor agitation. Moreover, the regime’s

CEU eTD Collection ambitions to enhance the economic elite’s control over the workplace and production is evident.

121 Aquarone, “La Carta del Lavoro,” 478. 122 Roberts, The Syndicalist Tradition, 265. 50

Together, these represented the regulation of labor relations and Fascism’s emphasis on production,

and therefore the Carta del Lavoro, and corporativism by extension, do have economic importance.

However, for reasons detailed in the introduction, its economic significance beyond this is

difficult to assess. Indeed, its political impact is more approachable. According to my analysis of

the Carta del Lavoro, it is plausible to argue that the charter was meant to transform the economic

elite in to de facto organs of the state, fulfilling production in the interest of national economic

growth. Simultaneously, the subordination of workers would help protect the regime and also serve

to regiment the masses, while the labor assurances presented a benevolent regime. With this

understanding, the Carta del Lavoro seems to be reflective of many of the regime’s policies,

particularly its productivist orientation. Its more ambiguous assurances for more radical reforms,

however, seem to be propaganda for the workers and a threat for the employers.

The Gradual Establishment of Corporativism

True institutional change began with the announcement in late 1927 of the corporativist

reform of the Chamber of Deputies. Instead of national elections including all citizens, 1000

nominees would be selected only from those professional groups, agencies, and syndicates

officially recognized by Fascism. The Fascist Grand Council would then choose 400, to be

approved in a simple yes or no public “election,” who would then serve as the new deputies.123

The FGC justified this process by arguing essentially that fascistization was incomplete and a

period of supervision was necessary to ensure committed Fascists with a national consciousness CEU eTD Collection

123 Alberto Aquarone, ed., “Riforma della Rappresentanza Politica, Legge 17 Maggio 1928, N. 1019,” in L’organizzazione dello Stato Totalitario, vol. 2 (Torino: Einaudi, 1978), 489–92. 51

were “elected.”124 In truth, this ensured that the Chamber of Deputies was meaningless and loyal

to Mussolini, as the FGC was comprised of people directly appointed by Mussolini.

Fascist syndicalists desired more but agreed with the rationale and so supported the reform,

as long as it was only a temporary measure. The subsequent corporative reforms established during

the 1930s were to a large degree motivated by the , which for many demonstrated

the inadequacy of laissez faire capitalism. The first of these was the National Council of

Corporations (CNC), established as a genuine effort undertaken by Bottai during his tenure as

minister of corporations to grant corporations more importance. In theory it represented a

corporative parliament, comprised of a three tiered system with the corporations at its base, a

general assembly of representatives from the syndicates, the party and other organizations in the

middle, and headed by the Central Corporative Committee under Mussolini himself.125

Bottai desired the CNC to be an institution with consultative and deliberative functions in

which the state could set the parameters for production.126 It was thus granted extensive powers

for organizing production, regulating prices, and being a body for self-governance and inter-class

collaboration, at least on paper. Indeed, the CNC could have had real power if il Duce had allowed

it to, but little ever came of it.127 In part, this was justified at the time by the fact that actual

corporations were still nonexistent.

Yet in 1934, when twenty-two corporations representing every sector of the economy were

established, it became more difficult to justify the corporations’ lack of self-governance and

representation. According to the Constitution and Function of the Corporations, decreed 5

CEU eTD Collection February 1934, the corporations were granted the powers enumerated in the legge sindacale and

124 Roberts, The Syndicalist Tradition, 288. 125 De Grand, Italian Fascism, 80. 126 Ibid. 127 Morgan, Italian Fascism, 1915-1945, 157; Roberts, The Syndicalist Tradition, 293. 52

were, according to the legal framework, intended to regulate collective contracts, discipline labor,

and coordinate production.128 Indeed, when Rocco gave his report to the Chamber of Deputies

introducing the bill, he portrayed it as providing corporativism precise form, granting the

corporations space for economic coordination and self-governance of the economy by

producers.129 Their self-interests, according to Rocco, would be employed by the state for the

achievement of its own goals.

These corporations, however, had little direct economic power and there was absolutely no

collaboration between workers and employers on production. In fact, this coordination of

production was deliberately circumscribed by the government; with Mussolini as the head of the

CNC, only he could approve measures to regulate economic affairs, and he chose not to interfere

with production.130 Rocco’s speech emphasizing self-governance and production being regulated

by the producers themselves should not be considered mere propaganda though. It simply reveals

that in his ideology, the term producers favored employers, and thus in his model, self-governance

and regulation was not to be a collaborative act.

This is evident in Mussolini’s political thought as well, which would not allow for him to

delegate economic decisions to self-run organizations incorporating the masses, and he was never

enthusiastic about economic coordination. Private initiative, aligned with national interests, would

be regularly emphasized in his speeches, such as those to industrialists following the Carta del

Lavoro and his speech to the senate regarding the corporative state, in which he declared, “The

corporative economy respects the principle of private . . . . The corporative economy CEU eTD Collection

128 Alberto Aquarone, ed., “Costituzione e Funzioni delle Corporazioni, Legge 5 Febbraio 1934, N. 163,” in L’organizzazione dello Stato Totalitario, vol. 2 (Torino: Einaudi, 1978), 535–37. 129 Alfredo Rocco, “The Formation and Function of the Corporations, 1934” in Italian Fascisms: From Pareto to Gentile, ed. Adrian Lyttelton, trans. Douglas Parmee, Roots of the Right (New York; London: Harper & Row, 1975), 292. 130 Morgan, Italian Fascism, 1915-1945, 158. 53

respects individual initiative,” referencing the Carta del Lavoro and stressing that intervention was

to be utilized only where private enterprise was inadequate.131 Decisions were thus made by

employers with Mussolini’s approval.

As it was now clear that the CNC was not the representative body desired by syndicalists,

many became disillusioned with the reforms. Therefore, Bottai and other leading corporativists

initiated reform that would culminate in the creation of the Chamber of Fasce and Corporations in

1939. The Chamber would replace the Chamber of Deputies and included the National Council of

the PNF, the CNC, and also the FGC, and the law granted all deliberative authority to the senate

and this reformed chamber, completely removing the king from the law making process.132 On the

surface, it can be considered a serious attempt to replace the rule through decree which had

characterized the dictatorship, and it therefore gave syndicalists a false hope that a representative

institution was emerging.133 In reality, by comprising the Chamber of Fasce and Corporations of

the PNF’s National Council, the CNC, and the FGC, the Fascists made it so that all of its members

were appointed directly by Mussolini himself, completely removing any sort of genuine

representation and elections and enhancing Mussolini’s authority.

The corporative system therefore entrenched the Fascist dictatorship and Mussolini’s

position, granting Fascism a complete monopoly on political power. It furthermore completely

deprived the masses of any direct political representation, insisting instead that the Fascist

leadership, particularly il Duce, represented the general will of the nation. By neutralizing labor

agitation and eliminating all other political parties, there were no political alternatives or practical CEU eTD Collection

131 My translation: Benito Mussolini, “Discorso al Senato per lo Stato Corporativo, 13 January 1934,” in Opera Omnia di Benito Mussolini, ed. Edoardo Susmel and Duilio Susmel, vol. 26 (Firenze: La Fenice, 1958), 150. 132 Alberto Aquarone, ed., “Istituzione della Camera dei Fasci e delle Corporazioni, Legge 19 Gennaio 1939, N. 129,” in L’organizzazione dello Stato Totalitario, vol. 2 (Torino: Einaudi, 1978), 567. 133 Roberts, The Syndicalist Tradition, 299. 54

means to demonstrate displeasure with the regime, enabling the Fascists to portray themselves as

succeeding in their ambition to represent the nation. However, this system was only viable because

it was imposed and supported by violence and coercion; in reality it was a sham in regards to

representation. Nonetheless, it should be evident that Mussolini achieved totalitarian control in the

political realm, and, as it will be demonstrated in Section 4.1, corporativism allowed for the

extension of state power not only over workers, but also over the economic elite.

The PNF and Intersyndical Committees

Parallel to the corporative system of the state was the intersyndical committees organized

by the PNF. Organized by various provincial party branches in 1926 following the syndicalist law,

they were extended to the entire nation a year later. The committees consisted of representatives

from the employers’ and workers’ syndicates and were places to negotiate contracts, settle disputes,

and ensure political control was maintained over the associations;134 their purpose was to enforce

the agreements between the state and employers and, following the Carta del Lavoro, served as

the PNF’s instruments to encourage the suggested labor reforms. 135

Although corporativism allotted employers an extensive amount of , its

legislation and the Carta del Lavoro were, according to historian Victoria de Grazia, “premised on

the self-reform of organized industry and its abiding cooperation with the state.”136 This is clear in

the speeches Mussolini made noted above in Section 3.1. As stated above, the state did little to

enforce the implementation of these suggestions; this task was left up to the Party. CEU eTD Collection

134 Philip Morgan, “‘The Party Is Everywhere’: The Italian Fascist Party in Economic Life, 1926-40,” The English Historical Review 114, no. 455 (February 1999): 89. 135 De Grazia, The Culture of Consent, 68. 136 Ibid. 55

The PNF would use intimidation to pressure firms to self-reform and improve the

conditions of the workers, albeit minimally. Often these reforms took the form of company stores

and housing. For instance, the Strambino Cotton Mills offered housing for 200 of its 650 workers,

the Borgosesia Wool Works housed 400 of its 2,000 workers, and the Marzotto Wool Firm

exceptionally provided housing for all of its 1,200 employers.137 However, these were low quality

dorm- or barrack-like buildings and were used to justify low wages and a lack of consumer

products. These reforms offered superficial improvements to the quality of life meant to distract

workers from the fact that their conditions were not truly improving. At other times, the coercion

of the Party was utilized to “encourage” contributions directly to the PNF and the regime.138

In any case, the pressure from the PNF for self-reforms served to remind the employers

that many Fascists desired much greater reform, and that it had little choice but to cooperate with

the regime. The intersyndicalist committees were typically the platform through which the PNF

would threaten employers and negotiate these self-reforms. Lacking legal authority, they were

utilized to varying extents throughout Italy. For instance, in the province of Genoa they were often

the first choice for arbitration, while in other provinces, such as Rieti, it was a last resort, indicated

by the fact that in 1931 only two of a recorded 346 industrial disputes were arbitrated by the

committees.139

Regardless of this variation, labor disputes in general were settled by the PNF’s committees,

with the corporations handling only those over contracts already in place.140 Typically, it was cases

of political importance in which the committees would intervene, such as when factories dismissed CEU eTD Collection

137 Ibid., 85. 138 See Ibid., 69–70. De Grazia discusses how the PNF coerced contributions for the construction of the casa del fascio in Lecore Signa in , as well as those directly to the Party and Mussolini himself. 139 Morgan, “The Party Is Everywhere,” 98. 140 Lyttelton, The Seizure of Power, 309; Morgan, “The Party Is Everywhere,” 89–90. 56

workers who were officials in the syndicates or when the syndicates threatened to break the ban

on strikes. In situations such as these, the committees would step in and settle the disputes, not

always in the favor of the employer. For example, they averted a 15 percent wage cut in a factory

in Perugia in 1930 and resolved an issue of unpaid wages in Piacenza in 1933.141 Yet these victories

only ever represented marginal improvements for the workers to offset the more general

productivist orientation of the regime, which would always favor the creation of wealth over its

distribution, aligning it more with the employers.

Nonetheless, the intersyndical committees demonstrate that self-reform within the

industries and, more importantly, cooperation with the Fascists, were aspects of the corporative

legislation which support conceiving of the Carta del Lavoro as a threat to employers. The

employers surely knew that the situation could be made much worse for them if the negotiations

taking places in these committees became legally recognized organs of the corporative state.

Yet the committees’ significance is not limited to this; the Party’s involvement in labor

relations, a realm nominally reserved for the state’s corporative system, represents the sort of party-

state tension and institutional chaos present in any totalitarian system. In fact, in Fascist Italy the

Party, Ministry of Corporations, and the syndicates all blamed the interference of the others for

corporativism’s slow development and wanted to push the others out. This allowed for Mussolini,

as the head of government, simply to preside over the competing institutions and intervene to select

a course of action, much like Hitler would in Nazi Germany. This not only solidified the

indispensable position of il Duce but also maintained the drive toward totalitarianism.

CEU eTD Collection

141 Morgan, “The Party Is Everywhere,” 99. 57

Concluding Remarks

Above all else, the corporative reforms increasingly concentrated power into the hands of

Mussolini, granting him control over decision-making in the regime. Although it never realized

the coordination powers desired by Rocco, Fascist corporativism nonetheless extended the reach

and authority of the state, primarily for its executive, Mussolini, who became separated from the

parliament, severing any sort of accountability. The state structure provided by corporativism was

thus directly aligned with Mussolini’s elitist mentality and suspicion of the masses, causing him

to believe that the masses must be led by a minority representing an elite vanguard, which he

naturally led. While it would be inaccurate to assert that from the beginning Mussolini had a full-

fledged plan envisioned for the Fascist state, it should be acknowledged that this general structure

fits well with his ideology and it thus seems quite plausible that this was always his intention.

This is demonstrated by Mussolini’s heavy involvement in the shaping of the corporative

state. As head of government, Mussolini was able to dismiss and appoint state ministers and top

officials in the party as he saw fit, giving him complete control over the Council of Ministers and

the Fascist Grand Council. The members of each were aware that their power was dependent on il

Duce, and as such their positions were precarious. While he would often entrust the ministries to

others, with the understanding that they would follow his direction, Mussolini took control of a

greater amount of ministries during each corporative reform, as demonstrated in Table 3.1 on the

following page.

CEU eTD Collection

58

Table 3.1: Number of Ministries Held by Mussolini per Year142 1927-8 7 1929 9 1930-1 2 1932-3 4 1934 7 1935-6 8 1937-9 6 1940-2 5

As the table demonstrates, with the exception of 1930 when the CNC was established,

Mussolini held at least six ministries out of a total of sixteen when each of the major corporative

reforms were enacted: the Carta del Lavoro in 1927; the corporative reforms of the Chamber of

Deputies in 1929; the 1934 creation of corporations; and the 1939 establishment of the Chamber

of Fasce and Corporations. By being head of many ministries simultaneously, and appointing the

remaining members of the FGC, il Duce dominated both the Council of Ministries and the FGC,

directing debates and having the final say. Indeed, by holding on average six ministries, he only

needed three others for the power of veto.143 Therefore, although there were clearly concessions

to employers, most notably the piecemeal creation of corporativism, it seems as though the form

it ultimately took was largely directed by the political thought of il Duce.

Yet corporativism also served other purposes in the regime. For instance, the corporations

really did represent places in which representatives of workers and employers could meet, under

the supervision of officials from the Party and the Ministry of Corporations directing in the national

interests. But only the employers were granted real representation, allowed to select technical

experts to guard their interests. The representatives of labor, on the other hand, came from the PNF CEU eTD Collection

142 Numbers from: Goffredo Adinolfi, “Political Elite and Decision-Making in Mussolini’s Italy,” in Ruling Elites and Decision-Making in Fascist-Era Dictatorships, ed. António Costa Pinto, 1st ed, Social Science Monographs (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 2009), 29. 143 Ibid., 28–9; Musiedlak, “Mussolini, Charisma and Decision-Making,” 8. 59

and the ’s bureaucracy, not the workplace. The productivist tone always granted

preference to the proposals of the employers, as is clear in the Carta del Lavoro.

Indeed, the state often relied on the technical expertise offered by organizations such as

Confindustria, which offered plans for the desired national economic growth. Corporativism thus

primarily took the form advocated by Rocco, which was more aligned with Mussolini’s elitism

and contempt for the masses than the more representative form proposed by the syndicalists.

Naturally, this entailed the Fascist state siding more frequently with the employers, while the state

and the Carta del Lavoro only ever suggested improving the conditions of workers. The Party,

through its intersyndical committees, was left to enforce this “self-reform” of the work place, using

the intimidation of state intervention threatened by the Carta del Lavoro to foster cooperation. In

this way, the state-party tension vital to the drive toward totalitarianism was maintained.

Corporativism nonetheless represents a gross enhancement of the economic powers of

employers. Lyttelton approaches this as a sort of organized, state-capitalism. This is in some

regards aligned with Mussolini’s reference to corporativism as “super-capitalism”144 and Rocco’s

assertion that “the Fascist economy is . . . an organized economy. It is organized by the producers

themselves, under the supreme direction and control of the state.” 145 From this approach,

corporativism represents a fundamental change in the institutional structure of the state, extending

it into the economic realm and representing a move toward the totalitarian control of society.

Integral to this was the incremental marginalization of the economic elites; corporativism was not

intended to solidify their positions, as Rocco desired, but, as it will become clear in the final chapter,

CEU eTD Collection transform them into agents of the state, co-opting them for their own purposes.

144 My translation: Benito Mussolini, “Discorso per lo Stato Corporativo, 14 ,” in Opera Omnia di Benito Mussolini, ed. Edoardo Susmel and Duilio Susmel, vol. 26 (Firenze: La Fenice, 1958), 87. 145 Lyttelton, The Seizure of Power, 202. 60

Chapter 4 The Significance of the Carta del Lavoro and Corporativism

The corporative system would never serve to coordinate the economy, embody a legitimate form

of representation, nor provide social harmony. However, instead of demonstrating that

corporativism was devoid of significance within the Fascist state, this suggests that the system was

intended for other purposes; indeed, upon evaluation of the system, it becomes evident that its

significance was not in economics, but in politics.

In this chapter, I will evaluate the political and economic effects of the corporative system

on employers and laborers alike. Moreover, I will consider its role in Fascist propaganda,

particularly in the myth of the new state. By doing so, we will hopefully gain a greater

understanding of the significance of the corporative state, as well as the Carta del Lavoro, within

the wider Fascist system and its efforts to construct a totalitarian state, demonstrating that

corporativism was meant to marginalize the political influence of employers and the economic

elite, subordinate the masses and force unity, and provide legitimization for the dictatorship,

largely fulfilling political roles in the regime.146

Mussolini asserted in that “Fascism desires the State to be strong,

organic and at the same time founded on a wide popular basis.”147 Fascism, it seems, was intended CEU eTD Collection

146 My argument builds on and expands David D. Roberts’ approach to corporativism, who argues it was meant to expand state power, politicize the economy, and mobilize the populace, although he nonetheless finds difficulty in granting it significance and does not recognize the marginalization of the economic elite. See: Roberts, The Totalitarian Experiment in Twentieth-Century Europe, 273, 318. 147 Benito Mussolini, “The Doctrine of Fascism,” in Italian Fascisms: From Pareto to Gentile, ed. Adrian Lyttelton, trans. Douglas Parmee, Roots of the Right (New York; London: Harper & Row, 1975), 55. 61

for the era of mass politics. Political scientist and historian Antonio Costa Pinto argues that a

primary purpose of corporativism was to provide the regime with legitimization.148 As neither

improvements for the working class nor a genuine form of representation were emerging, it was

unlikely the regime would gain widespread support spontaneously. It thus employed diversions

and utopian imagery, a common propaganda tool of totalitarian movements.

Fascist Italy was not alone in its employment of corporatism to legitimize a dictatorship. It

was, however, the only one to use it toward a totalitarian goal.149 Corporatism in itself was not

totalitarian, and they are not dependent on each other; to be totalitarian is not to have a corporatist

structure, and the reverse is also true. For instance, Franco in employed corporatism in an

authoritarian manner, demobilizing the populace and sharing power with the economic elite,

allowing for limited pluralism.150 The corporative system in Italy, based on its legal framework,

could have been employed in a similar way. When considering the Italian case, however, we must

remember Mussolini’s ideology which conceived politics and institutions as moldable, meaning

that how they are used, not their framework, is what gives them meaning.

Many, including historian Stanley Payne and sociologist Michael Mann, approach Fascist

corporativism as authoritarian in nature, parsing out economic authority in the regime’s overall

division of power and subordinating the masses for the economic elite.151 Analyzing the structure

of the regime during the 1920s and early 1930s, this seems correct. Yet applying this understanding

to the entirety of corporativism, including its intention and direction, misses the fact that the system,

while maintaining a hierarchal division of society, was nonetheless meant to subordinate everyone, CEU eTD Collection

148 António Costa Pinto, The Nature of Fascism Revisited (Boulder; New York: Social Science Monographs; Distributed by Columbia University Press, 2012), 120. 149 It was also utilized under Engelbert Dollfuss in , Antonio de Oliveira Salazar in , in Spain, and the new Baltic States. See: Ibid., 119–20. Alternatively, no other totalitarian state utilized corporativism. 150 Payne, A History of Fascism, 267. 151 Mann, Fascists, 209; Payne, A History of Fascism, 119-21. 62

regardless of class, to the state and exclude all from political participation. Corporativism was not

a space for pluralism, but one meant to gradually diminish it by extending the state over the

economic elite, just as the regime attempted to neutralize the Catholic Church and the monarchy.

Cartelization and Compartmentalization: Marginalizing the Economic Elite

The subordination of the working class and the emphasis placed on private initiative,

evident in the Carta del Lavoro and the corporative system’s structure, greatly enhanced the

economic power of employers. The system allotted them an extensive measure of economic

autonomy, at least initially, in contrast to the suppressed masses, and this discrepancy, along with

the widespread which further inhibited workers’ power to resist, granted employers

absolute freedom in employment. Employers were able to dismiss workers and rehire them at

lower wages, and wage reductions were commonplace.152

This enhanced economic power was not only allowed by corporativism, but supported by

the state. Indeed, under the Fascist regime there was an immense growth of state-sponsored

cartelization in private industry, particularly in heavy industry. State aid came in the form of

legislation passed on 16 which enabled firms controlling the majority of production in

their industry to force other firms into agreements in order to more completely dominate the

field. Then, on 12 January 1933, the state prevented new firms from being established or smaller

ones from expanding by requiring state approval for the construction and expansion of plants.153

These laws allowed one or two firms to dominate each industry and encouraged cooperation CEU eTD Collection

152 Lyttelton, The Seizure of Power, 329. 153 De Grand, Italian Fascism, 84. 63

through economic incentives. Corporativism was integral in the cartelization of industries, as it

was through the corporative boards that the allocated materials to their members.154

From this information, the corporative system appears to be clearly in favor of the

entrepreneur class and a demonstration that Mussolini had resolved to share power in an

authoritarian compromise. However, although cartelization and the elimination of rivals benefited

employers, it was also in the interest of the regime. As demonstrated in Chapter 1, the syndicalists,

Nationalists, and Mussolini all believed that the concentration of capital and production in the

hands of fewer and fewer was necessary, viewing it as the path to mass production and economic

development. Syndicalists considered it essential to improving the conditions of the entire nation,

while Rocco saw cartelization as an aspect of strengthening the nation and preparing it for

imperialist conflict, as he revealed as early as 1918; internal economic competition, he asserted,

was incompatible with international grandeur and competition.155

For Mussolini, who tended to think more like Rocco on this issue, economics was second

to politics, a means to make the nation strong enough for war and independent of other nations;

his productivist orientation emphasizing economic development meant that the distribution of

wealth was much less important than its accumulation. This helps to explain the regimes’ lack of

interests in employers’ large profits while the working class suffered, as well as Mussolini’s

willingness to delegate the control of production, a matter he considered less important, to the

employers themselves.

The delegation of economic power to the industrialists should not be considered a mere

CEU eTD Collection division of power, in contrast to the assertion of many that corporativism ensured the dominance

154 Ibid., 106. 155 Alfredo Rocco, “The Political Manifesto, 1918,” in Italian Fascisms: From Pareto to Gentile, ed. Adrian Lyttelton, trans. Douglas Parmee, Roots of the Right (New York; London: Harper & Row, 1975), 280. 64

of private interests and protected the economic elite Fascism had allied with. 156 Any enhancement

of private power and concessions to employers were temporary measures seen as necessary, while

the ultimate goal was to co-opt the economic elite, diminishing their influence and transform them

into “capillary organizations” of the state, subordinated to its will; by transforming them into state

agents, their enhanced authority also meant enhanced state authority.

The gradualist approach toward this ambition can be understood for a number of reasons.

For instance, the persistence of the monarchy as well as the economic power of industrialists

encouraged such an approach to avoid provoking resistance before the regime was untouchable;

as the power of these two traditional centers of power decreased, Fascism would become more

radical. Additionally, the intentions of Mussolini were bound to displease the working class, and

his regime could not function if the economic elite was against him as well. Moreover, their

technical and administrative expertise made them necessary for economic development.

The first step in the gradual marginalization of the entrepreneur class was to subordinate

them to national interests. As the employers’ monopolies were supported by the state, they were

essentially dependent on it in a way that aided this by integrating them as organs of the state.157

Moreover, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, employers were coerced into cooperating with

the regime and, within corporativism, the threat of state intervention and more radical reforms

always loomed in the background, as made clear by the Carta del Lavoro.158 Had an employer

refused to cooperate as an agent of the state, the Fascists could have undermined them by granting

156 See: De Grand, Italian Fascism, 162; Payne, A History of Fascism, 116; Charles S. Maier, Recasting Bourgeois

CEU eTD Collection Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the Decade after (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 13–14. This is in line with the typical approach to corporativism, as representing the division of power among Fascism and the economic elite, enhancing their power and Mussolini’s personal dictatorship in an authoritarian regime. 157 Pinto, The Nature of Fascism Revisited, 93. 158 Aquarone, “La Carta del Lavoro,” 478. The Carta del Lavoro stated that state intervention would be utilized wherever private initiative was deemed inadequate, or, in other words, when employers failed to cooperate. For more information, see Section 3.1. 65

greater state aid to a rival firm through the laws detailed above. This threat engendered cooperation,

which in reality meant obedience and subservience to the regime, and the enhanced power of

Confindustria forced conformity to maintain discipline; fortunately for the employers, their

interests in production often paralleled those of the state.

While this agreement certainly benefitted employers at times, it seems plausible to suggest

that the Fascists were using the employers just as the employers sought to use the Fascists, all the

while marginalizing their influence and absorbing them into the state. This characterized many of

Fascism’s relationships with the various traditional elites and institutions: according to historian

Alexander De Grand, by delegating some level of power in certain aspects of society to various

interest groups, such as the Catholic Church in education and the employers in economics, Fascism

created “fiefdoms” within the nation, which they then compartmentalized in order to marginalize

their influence. Indeed, it was nearly impossible for these fiefdoms to exercise influence outside

of their allotted domain.159

Politically and economically, compartmentalization was implemented through

corporativism. Its limitation of employers’ influence outside of specific industries is represented

primarily by the turn toward autarchy and Italy’s involvement in WWII. In some ways, the policy

of autarchy was circumstantial, as it was brought on by the all countries adopted

during the Great Depression as well as the trade sanctions from the over the

war in Ethiopia, which made Germany Italy’s primary trade partner. Nevertheless, Italy could have

been moved out of this and returned to international trade, a move greatly encouraged by

160 CEU eTD Collection Confindustria and even some anti-German Fascists. It was rejected, however, as it would have

necessitated an abandonment of imperial expansion and an improvement of the relations with the

159 De Grand, Italian Fascism, 109. 160 Morgan, Italian Fascism, 1915-1945, 205. 66

West. The maintenance of autarchy thus demonstrates a significant loss of influence for employers,

as industrialists could do nothing to alter this course.161 Similarly, the industrialists would not be

able to resist involvement in the war, as Mussolini paid little attention to their opposition.162

Compartmentalization does not, however, represent the carving up of society in the interest

of sharing power and establishing a conservative authoritarian dictatorship, as De Grand argues.

Instead, it seems more likely that it was Fascism’s method of choice in its attempt to neutralize

these traditional and powerful interest groups by subordinating them to the state. As the

institutional reforms increasingly marginalized the monarch, and as the Fascists sought to

subordinate the Catholic Church,163 corporativism was meant to integrate employers into the

regime as organs of the state, subjected to the national interests. The corporative system therefore

represented a totalitarian effort to subject everyone to the state.

The turn toward autarchy and war demonstrate this, as they do not represent a division of

power with Mussolini directing foreign policy and delegating on other matters. Indeed, in Fascist

Italy, foreign policy and domestic issues were increasingly intertwined. The decision for autarchy

and war affected the economy and production, and thus represent a curtailment of the autonomy

of employers. Directed by the national interest of preparation for war, production transitioned from

manufacturing what was most efficient and essential to producing what was necessary for war.

Moreover, as a consequence of autarchy, items which could be purchased abroad for much less

were produced at high-costs. 164 This was impractical for Italy’s level of industrial development

and was adverse to industrialists’ desires. CEU eTD Collection

161 De Grand, Italian Fascism, 108. 162 Morgan, Italian Fascism, 1915-1945, 210. 163 See: Pollard, The Vatican and Italian Fascism. 164 Morgan, Italian Fascism, 1915-1945, 207. 67

War and expansion were intended to further radicalize the regime and move it toward its

totalitarian ambitions by further curtailing the traditional elites and undoing the compromises

preventing the regime’s intentions. 165 For instance, historian Philip Morgan argues that the

monarchy would have been abolished if Italy had been victorious in WWI.166 It therefore does not

seem altogether implausible to suggest that the economic elite would, through corporativism, be

further marginalized, subordinated to the state, and perhaps even eventually replaced.

Policies to this effect can be seen even before the war, such as the reinstatement of

representatives from the workers’ syndicates in the workplace in 1939.167 Workers’ representatives

had been barred from factories since the Palazzo Vidoni Pact of 1925, a compromise with the

economic elite which had been affirmed numerous times throughout the regime despite the

demands of Fascist syndicalists and the unions. The exact rationale for such a change is unclear,

as it could have been an effort to foster more support among workers for the regime, a concession

to syndicalists, or a means to involve the regime more directly in production. What is clear,

however, is that this represented a negation of a compromise with the economic elite and a state

encroachment on their prior autonomy.

Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that the enhanced economic power initially granted

employers was in their interests, as was the incremental construction of corporativism. However,

as discussed in previous chapters, the gradualist approach enabled Mussolini and the Fascists to

enact institutional change while retaining an air of legality thus averting resistance. In this manner,

through collaboration, “the gradual transformation of the ruling class [would occur] in the context CEU eTD Collection

165 De Felice, Mussolini Il Duce II, 7–15; Morgan, Italian Fascism, 1915-1945, 193; Roberts, The Totalitarian Experiment, 324. 166 Morgan, Italian Fascism, 1915-1945, 169. 167 De Grand, Italian Fascism, 87. 68

of the ‘normative state.’”168 The entrepreneur class was negotiated with under this understanding,

as well as out of necessity because Fascism had thus far failed to produce a new technically-

oriented Fascist elite capable of replacing them and therefore needed the entrepreneur class to

foster economic growth.

Nevertheless, it seems as though the benefits granted to the employers were also in the

interest of the Fascist regime and, moreover, allowed for the compartmentalization of the economic

elite, as they became increasingly unable to influence policy outside of their own industries and

would eventually be fully subordinated. The Fascists were therefore utilizing corporativism to

further their totalitarian control on society by subordinating the economic elite, which in turn

helped to suppress the masses.

Forced Unity and Creating the “Uomo Fascista”

Contrary to its portrayal as a system meant to uplift the working class and provide social

harmony, corporativism was intended to suppress the masses and keep them out of politics while

at the same time presenting the image of national unity. The workers’ syndicates, in contrast to

those of the employers, were completely integrated into the state and deprived of any leverage

independent of state power, as they had no right to strike. By doing so, the workers had no political

voice in the corporative system and their representation was meaningless.

The lack of representation for the workers should not, however, be considered a concession

to the employers, although it was clearly beneficial to them. Upon analyzing the political thought

CEU eTD Collection of Mussolini and other leading Fascists, it becomes clear that it was aligned with Fascist thought,

with the exception of Fascist syndicalists who desired genuine representation for the worker.

168 Musiedlak, “Mussolini, Charisma and Decision-Making,” 1. 69

Indeed, in The Doctrine of Fascism, Mussolini would assert that the corporative state was meant

to reconcile the syndicates into the state,169 an accomplishment he had claimed for Fascism as early

as 1925.170 Moreover, directly aligned with the totalitarian infiltration of society, the integration

of the syndicates into the state simultaneously meant the infiltration of the state into the syndicates,

demonstrated by the fact that the workers’ representatives in the corporations would always come

from the PNF and the Ministry of Corporations.171

Of course, to integrate the syndicates into the state is not to necessitate a lack of

representation, as the Fascist syndicalists desired both (see Section 1.1). Yet Mussolini’s elitism,

which placed a minority vanguard leading the masses, as well as his contempt for the masses, made

anything other than a top-down version of corporativism unlikely. As early as 1922, Mussolini had

rejected not only the parliamentary system, but democracy, announcing that “the democratic

justice of universal suffrage is the most blatant injustice,”172 and indeed, with the reforms to the

Chamber of Deputies in 1928, only those “active elements of the life of the nation” could

participate in elections, limiting the vote to those in the Fascist syndicates, although even this

would be meaningless.173 He seems to have always envisioned a system with a more limited level

of meaningful political involvement, from which the masses were always to be excluded.

The subordination of the masses was not to be limited to the political realm, however; the

corporative system, while it performed reasonably well on a national scale in comparison to other

CEU eTD Collection 169 Mussolini, “The Doctrine of Fascism,” 42. 170 Mussolini, “Sindacalismo Fascista.” 171 Morgan, Italian Fascism, 1915-1945, 157–8. 172 Benito Mussolini, “Which Way the World Is Going, 25 February 1922,” in Italian Fascisms: From Pareto to Gentile, ed. Adrian Lyttelton, trans. Douglas Parmee, Roots of the Right (New York; London: Harper & Row, 1975), 65. 173 My translation: Susmel and Susmel, “85° Riunione del FGC,” 61. 70

countries during the interwar period, according to Payne,174 the economic situation of the working

class decreased substantially.175 High unemployment, low wages, and less hours characterized the

Fascist era for workers. Between 1929 and 1933, unemployment rose from 300,000 to over 1

million, and the increase in the costs of living outpaced the increase in wages between 1936 and

1939. To offset unemployment, work hours and wages were decreased so that more would have

jobs.176

Instead of making genuine efforts to improve the conditions of the working class, such as

increasing wages, the Fascists often attempted to distract them from their plight, such as the

housing projects discussed in Section 3.3. To this end, the National Recreational Organization

(Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro, OND) was established in 1925 as a state agency, though in 1927

it was transferred to the party. The original purpose of the OND was to aid in the Fascistization of

the populace and create a “supraclass national identity,” or, in other words, to force unity and

collaboration. Ultimately, however, it was an attempt to distract the workers and blunt social

tensions.177 Knowing that they were failing them in the workplace, the Fascists sought to use the

OND to appeal to workers by making it seem as though the regime was compensating for lower

wages. The OND thus provided leisure activities, access to media and shows, and attempted to

manipulate consumer habits.178

The intention, however, was never really to improve the economic situation more than

marginally, as demonstrated in the section on intersyndical committees in Chapter 3. Although

CEU eTD Collection 174 Payne, A History of Fascism, 225–6, 478. Payne points out that Italy’s annual economic growth rate, while lower than the average for Western Europe, was higher than the UK’s, and its total production and output per worker grew greater between 1913 and 1938 than those of France and Germany. See pages 225 and 226. 175 R. J. B Bosworth, Mussolini’s Italy: Life under the Fascist Dictatorship, 1915-1945 (New York: , 2007), 2, 276. 176 De Grand, Italian Fascism, 81, 87, 111. 177 De Grazia, The Culture of Consent, 2–3. 178 Ibid., 75, 155, 164–70. 71

low wages were often cast as temporary measures, with a “utopia of unlimited consumption” on

the horizon,179 their economic situation would never improve. In reality, the weakened economic

situation made it easier to extend the regime over the workers and subject them to the state.

Moreover, with employment so precarious, many were afraid to resist; as historian Tracy H. Koon

asserts, “For most the ultimate sanction was not fear of death but loss of income.”180

To be sure, none of the Fascists, Rocco and Mussolini included, desired the economic

turmoil and lowered living standards that occurred under Fascism. However, the syndicalist and

Nationalists had both always stressed a functional hierarchy, considered necessary for production.

Rocco, the architect of the Carta del Lavoro and other major corporative reforms, went further to

assert even before the rise of Fascism that the corporative state he desired was to represent the

“disciplined control of inequality,” naturally with the masses on the bottom.181 Indeed, according

to Emilio Gentile, the “social harmony” desired by Fascists actually represented the working

masses accepting and even embracing their function and position in the hierarchy. 182 This appears

to accurately assess Mussolini’s ideology, who states in The Doctrine of Fascism that, “We want

to accustom the working classes to being under a leader, to convince them also that it is not easy

to direct an industry or a commercial undertaking successfully.”183 Until the masses accepted this,

the system had to force unity and project social harmony, made easier by the weakened position

of the masses which resulted in less public social turmoil and a large degree of passive acceptance.

The seeming disinterest in the economic improvement of the working classes was not mere

disinterest or contempt, however. It was due instead to the influence of syndicalism on Mussolini’s CEU eTD Collection

179 My translation: Mussolini, “Discorso per lo Stato Corporativo,” 90. 180 Koon, Believe, Obey, Fight, 217. 181 Rocco, “The Political Manifesto,” 259. 182 Gentile, Il mito dello Stato nuovo, 251. 183 Mussolini, “The Doctrine of Fascism,” 45. 72

political thought. As noted in Chapter 1, the syndicalists and Mussolini rejected socialism because

they believed it was too focused on materialism and the economic improvement of the masses.

The syndicalists argued that this would prevent the true revolution by merely turning the working

class into members of the bourgeoisie, and thus expand the base of the parliamentary system. What

was needed, they asserted, was an anthropological revolution instilling new values.184 This idea

became entrenched in Mussolini’s ideology and the effort to create the uomo fascista, or Fascist

man, was ever present.

This ambition of Fascism is evident within corporativism, representing an influence from

syndicalism and devoted corporativists like Giuseppe Bottai. Bottai desired to educate and alter

man’s very nature, and greatly influenced Mussolini with his notion that man could be

transformed.185 The influence of this idea on Mussolini was evident as early as 1925, when he

insisted in an article published in Da Gerarchia that in order to make production a collective act,

thus making corporativism work, the fascistization of the populace through education and various

Party institutions was necessary.186 This would be a constant theme in regards to discussions on

corporativism. For instance, at the eighty-fifth meeting of the FGC on 11 November 1927, Bottai

would enumerate many obstacles to the system, primarily related to coordination of production,

social harmony, and the discipline of workers. The solution advocated by all was an increased

focus on propaganda and education, emphasizing the workers’ duties to the nation and that the

value of the nation predominated those of class.187 CEU eTD Collection

184 See Chapter 1 for more information, or see: Roberts, The Syndicalist Tradition, 58; Gentile, Il mito dello Stato nuovo, 227. 185 Gentile, Il mito dello Stato nuovo, 226. 186 Benito Mussolini, “Fascismo e Sindacalismo in Da Gerarchia, 5 May 1925,” in Opera Omnia di Benito Mussolini, ed. Edoardo Susmel and Duilio Susmel, vol. 21 (Firenze: La Fenice, 1956), 335. 187 Susmel and Susmel, “85° Riunione del FGC,” 65. 73

Thus, corporativism was directly linked to the efforts to construct a new uomo fascista, a

clear indication of Fascism’s totalitarian nature with its desire to transform men themselves,

demonstrating that the desired Fascist revolution was primarily moral in character. Not only is this

evident in the Fascists’ efforts to create a new technical class of Fascists capable of managing the

factories and replacing the entrepreneur class, but also because the very structure and principles of

corporativism sought to “spiritualize the economy” by involving everyone in the collective action

of production for the nation;188 this necessitated a new type of man completely devoted not to class

interests but to the those of the nation, subjecting himself to it willingly and enthusiastically. To

this end, the subordination of workers provided by corporativism served to regiment the populace,

necessary for production to become a collective action and to harden the masses for war. It

moreover represents a more general characteristic of totalitarian regimes and an objective that

various Fascists institutions would work toward.

It would be only through the transcendence of class consciousness and its replacement with

a national one devoted to Fascism that unity and collaboration would be achieved within

corporativism. Furthermore, by suppressing the workers’ movement, the Fascist elite aimed to

replace workers as the revolutionary instrument in the transformation of society, attempting to

impose a revolution from above instead of fostering one among the populace at large. Failing to

construct such a national identity and transform man, however, corporativism would serve only to

eliminate class consciousness, sever community ties, and produce a divided and atomized society.

Regardless of its failure, corporativism sought to encourage such national devotion and support

CEU eTD Collection for Fascism through its myth of the new state, which will be demonstrated in the remaining section.

188 Roberts, The Totalitarian Experiment, 305, 308. 74

The Myth of the New State: Mobilizing Support for the Regime

Corporativism was a centerpiece of Fascism’s promised utopian future, representing the

cornerstone of the myth of the new state.189 As elaborated in Chapter 1, the Fascists rejected the

parliamentary system and promised to replace it with something more participatory and providing

social harmony, projecting the vision of the Fascist syndicalists. This trend continued throughout

the regime, with Mussolini portraying it as a central aim of Fascism, stating the parliamentary

“method of political representation cannot be sufficient for us, we wish for a direct representation

of individual interest.”190

Indeed, early into the regime, it was claimed corporativism was already providing social

harmony: “Labor and capital,” according to Mussolini, had “ceased to consider their antagonism

as an unbeatable fatality of history.”191 To demonstrate Fascism’s commitment to social justice,

the Carta del Lavoro was regularly referred to in speeches and documents, portrayed as

representing the true social policy of the regime and the centerpiece of corporativism.192

In this regard, the Carta del Lavoro served a purely propagandistic purpose, both

domestically and internationally, as it was claimed that the “social legislation of the Fascist regime

is the most advanced in the world;”193 in reality the corporative system only exacerbated class

tensions and any class collaboration was superficial and forced. Nonetheless, Mussolini’s

rhetorical commitment to representation and social harmony fostered the image that it was the

189 Gentile, Il mito dello Stato nuovo, 237. 190 Mussolini, “The Doctrine of Fascism,” 46.

CEU eTD Collection 191 My translation: Mussolini, “Quinquennale del Regime.” 192 Ibid.; Mussolini, “Discorso Al Senato”; Susmel and Susmel, “246° Riunione Del CM”; Benito Mussolini, “Discorso All’assemblea Generale Del Consiglio Nazionale Delle Corporazioni, 10 June 1932,” in Opera Omnia Di Benito Mussolini, ed. Edoardo Susmel and Duilio Susmel, vol. 25 (Firenze: La Fenice, 1958), 113–14. 193 My translation: Mussolini, “Quinquennale del Regime,” 8. See also: Benito Mussolini, “Indirizzi Corporativi, Published in Il Popolo d’Italia, 19 ,” in Opera Omnia di Benito Mussolini, ed. Edoardo Susmel and Duilio Susmel, vol. 26 (Firenze: La Fenice, 1958), 266, in which Mussolini portrays Fascist corporativism as an example for the world. 75

regime’s ultimate goal. Moreover, the appearance that this mythic new state was approaching was

furthered by the incremental establishment of corporativism, which seemed to promise a more just

society would emerge with further reforms. This illusion was meant to encourage enthusiastic

support for the regime, a goal not limited to the masses but intended for those within the PNF itself.

Had the form of corporativism desired by Mussolini been known to all in the PNF, the

Fascist syndicalists would have become disillusioned from the start, as they would be later on.

This was unacceptable, as the regime needed the syndicalists to project their model as the face of

corporativism to gain support. Thus, as historian David D. Roberts asserts, the illusion that the

new state was being created was also to mobilize the syndicalists as “myth-makers,” spreading the

myth of the new state through lectures, articles, and books194 and insisting that Fascism was

committed to its realization.195 This not only served to mobilize the populace, but provided a

“safety-valve” for discontent within the regime.196

Although not a syndicalist, the renowned philosopher Giovanni Gentile was similarly

mobilized as a myth-maker for the regime. Fascist Italy was the only regime to champion its

supposed totalitarian nature with its all-encompassing state, as reflected in Mussolini’s infamous

profession, “everything in the state, nothing outside the state, nothing against the state.” Within

Fascism, the totalitarian state was envisioned as a positive entity, based on Gentile’s concept of

the “ethical” state guiding the masses, which heavily influenced Bottai and Mussolini.197

While Mussolini’s concepts of society and the state can hardly be deemed ethical, il Duce

was influenced by Gentile’s notion of the state granting society value, and the Fascist state was

CEU eTD Collection 194 See, for instance, Guido Bortolotto, Lo Stato e la dottrina corporativa, 1931; Giuseppe Bottai, Esperienza corporativa, 1934; Guido Zanobini, Corso di diritto corporativo, 1942. Although there were exceptions; Roberts brings attention to A.O. Olivetti, “Le corporazioni come volontà e come rappresentazione,” La stirpe 9, no. 4 (April 1931), which was very critical of the system. See: Roberts, The Totalitarian Experiment, 318. 195 Roberts, The Syndicalist Tradition, 283. 196 Ibid., 294. 197 Gentile, Il mito dello Stato nuovo, 219. 76

envisioned as one leading the masses. Moreover, the projected objectives of the regime were

aligned with Gentile’s own ambitions. He therefore was an influential supporter of the regime,

acting as a myth-maker just like the syndicalists. For instance, in The Origins and Doctrine of

Fascism, Gentile portrayed the Fascist corporative state as genuinely democratic and populist.198

The myth of the new state, as propagated by the Fascist syndicalists, Gentile, and Mussolini

himself, was thus an integral aspect of the regime. Its primary intention was to foster the support

and participation necessary for the legitimization of the regime and also for the corporative state

to work, which came both from the belief that the new, representative corporative state was on the

horizon, and also by projecting Italy as the first nation in the world to reconcile labor tensions and

provide social harmony, which provided Italy with national glory and thus support for the regime.

In this manner, the corporative state did have immense psychological effects on many, as

many believed that it represented a venue for real change and opportunities.199 Sociologist Michael

Mann questions how such a myth can be a mobilizing force in a regime. 200 However, as a

totalitarian movement, myth was only one component in the construction of consensus; there was

violence behind it as well as a lack of alternatives. Moreover, in the context of the widespread

disillusionment with liberalism, politically after WWI and economically due to the Great

Depression, it is not unthinkable that such a myth would gain wide support, as it did under Fascism.

Indeed, it has been argued first and most famously by Renzo De Felice that the new society

Fascism promised to create fostered support for the regime during the early 1930s, which De Felice

has termed, “gli anni del consenso,” or “the years of consensus.” While he has also acknowledged

CEU eTD Collection that the consensus in part stemmed from a lack of alternatives, violence, and the security Fascism

198 Giovanni Gentile, “The Origins and Doctrine of Fascism, 1934,” in Italian Fascisms: From Pareto to Gentile, ed. Adrian Lyttelton, trans. Douglas Parmee, Roots of the Right (New York; London: Harper & Row, 1975), 311. 199 Sternhell, The Birth of Fascist Ideology, 253. 200 Mann, Fascists, 12. 77

provided many, De Felice asserts that it nonetheless achieved broad consensus which extended

even to the youngest members of the working class.201

Ultimately, this support turned out to be passive consensus, or what historian Victoria de

Grazia has called “static acceptance.”202 De Felice acknowledged this limit in the consensus as

well, stating that it could “easily dissolve in a prolonged stalemate in social progress,”203 and now

this consensus has come to be understood more as no overt opposition to the regime.204 Since the

regime would not offer the new society and state which it promised, it turned to war in its efforts

to accelerate its totalitarian ambitions and fascistize the populace. However, more was needed than

the static, unenthusiastic support for the regime to fight in the Second World War, which would

ultimately lead to the regimes downfall and the abolishment of the corporative system.

Nonetheless, the attempt to mobilize the populace and achieve enthusiastic support and

participation for the regime, however superficial, is reflective of a totalitarian state. Although

authoritarian regimes attempt to provide themselves with legitimization, they are characterized by

a lack of participation; totalitarian ones, in contrast, seek to mobilize its subjects. Fascism accepted

as fact that modern society meant mass politics. Moreover, participation was necessary for its

productivist vision of corporativism and imperialist expansion. The mobilization characteristic of

totalitarian states was therefore desired and attempted by Fascism. The myth of the new state

centered on corporativism was thus an integral part of the regime and its totalitarian ambitions.

CEU eTD Collection 201 De Felice, Mussolini Il Duce I, 192–3, 201. While his thesis initially provoked widespread controversy, it was ultimately corroborated by many others; see: De Grazia, The Culture of Consent; Emilio Gentile, “Fascism in Italian Historiography: In Search of an Individual Historical Identity,” Journal of Contemporary History 21, no. 2 (April 1986): 179–208. 202 De Grazia, The Culture of Consent, 226–7. 203 Renzo De Felice, Interpretations of Fascism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 181. 204 Morgan, Italian Fascism, 1915-1945, 151; Roberts, The Totalitarian Experiment, 318. 78

Concluding Remarks

The concessions the Fascists made to the economic elite are not inconsequential, yet they

should not be considered to have been intended as permanent agreements nor as reflecting the

orientation of the regime. Indeed, they were seen as necessities in order to avoid resistance, as the

regime was sure to dissatisfy much of the working class initially and could not survive resistance

from both the masses and the economic elite. It therefore decided to collaborate with this elite in

the subordination of the working class before subordinating the elite themselves. Furthermore, this

approach was necessary because the Fascists, lacking their own administrative elite, needed

employers to foster economic development essential to strengthening the nation and preparing for

war. As it took this gradualist approach in the construction of the corporative system and the

marginalization of employers, it did maintain a degree of pluralism for a while and, moreover, it

never fully overcame these concessions to achieve a totalitarian state.

Nevertheless, the inability of employers to prevent a realignment of foreign policy toward

Germany and involvement in the war demonstrates how their influence was decreasing; pluralism

was diminishing within the Fascist state, in part thanks to the corporative system which

compartmentalized employers and, by threatening state intervention and radicalization with the

Carta del Lavoro, encouraged cooperation, which under Fascism meant obedience. The trajectory

of the regime was thus totalitarian.

Moreover, corporativism was employed in a totalitarian manner toward the masses. The

suppression of workers weakened their position, furthering the Fascist’s attempt to create a new

CEU eTD Collection man. At the same time, it forced national unity, albeit at the cost of social harmony. Such unity is

integral to all totalitarian regimes, which gain their by posing as representing the entire

populace. In Nazi Germany, unity was achieved through the racial community; in Fascist Italy it

79

was through corporativism. Additionally, in contrast to other countries which employed

corporativism, the Fascists mobilized their populace for participation in the system, however

superficial and manipulative. Central to this mobilization and the creation of consensus was the

myth of the new state, built largely around the corporative system and its propagandized image.

While the corporative system only represents one institution in the larger effort to construct

a totalitarian state in Italy, one which cannot be considered to have ever been fully developed, it

nonetheless served as an integral part in the attempt by gradually marginalizing and subordinating

the economic elite, suppressing the working class and forcing unity, and mobilizing support for

the regime through propaganda. The corporative system thus furthered and reinforced the

totalitarian ambitions of the regime and although the two systems are not innately intertwined in

theory, they were in Fascist Italy; according to Mussolini, in order to employ corporativism as the

Fascists did, a nation must have only one party, to discipline and connect the populace through a

“common faith,” as well as a “totalitarian state, that is to say the state which absorbs into itself, to

transform and strengthen it, all the energy, all the interests, all the hopes of the people.”205

CEU eTD Collection

205 My translation: Mussolini, “Discorso per lo Stato Corporativo,” 96. 80

Conclusion Fascist Corporativism: Toward a Totalitarian State

On 25 July 1943, with the inevitable defeat of the Axis evident, the Fascist Grand Council voted

to remove Mussolini from power. Although they desired to maintain the Fascist dictatorship and

grant more legitimate functions to various institutions, including the corporations, the king

intervened and established a which subsequently eliminated all organs of the

Fascist regime.206 By this decree, the Chamber of and Corporations was dissolved, bringing

an end to the corporative state. The system was officially abolished by the 1946 constitution.

While a voluntaristic and autonomous version of corporatism is democratic, the top-down,

totalitarian nature of Fascist corporativism was incompatible with democracy. Indeed, it was a

farce in regards to representation, allowing no avenue for debates and political opposition,

imposing the will of Mussolini and the Fascists upon the masses instead. In Chapter 3, the top-

down, elitist nature of corporativism was detailed in the examination of its legal framework and

its function, which largely served to solidify the Fascist dictatorship and extend the authority of

Mussolini and the state. It is clear that corporativism thus primarily took the form advocated by

Rocco and the Nationalists who comprised Fascism’s Right-wing. The viability of this system is

doubtful, and it should be recognized that it only survived and functioned because it was imposed

and supported by force. Nonetheless, it seems that corporativism as it was developing was directly CEU eTD Collection

206 Morgan, Italian Fascism, 1915-1945, 222–3. 81

aligned with Mussolini’s own ideology. Therefore, corporativism was largely shaped by Fascist

ideology and fulfilled a purpose in the regime.

Approaching corporativism through its propagandized image, this appears to be false as

the professed intentions do not match corporativism’s functioning. Yet its projected objections

were reflective of the ambitions of the Fascist syndicalists, who desired a more representative form

of corporativism. The desires of the Fascist syndicalists, however, were rarely implemented and

the syndicalists largely served as myth-makers for the regime. In truth, it is doubtful as to if their

model could ever have been established under Mussolini, whose elitism and contempt for the

masses was much more compatible with Rocco’s vision.

Nonetheless, upon analysis it becomes clear that it is its implementation, not its framework,

which makes corporativism totalitarian. This is evident considering the use of corporatism by other

regimes which remained authoritarian while in Fascist Italy corporativism was meant to further

and reinforce the regime’s totalitarian ambitions. Totalitarianism and corporatism are not

dependent on each other, as other totalitarian states would not employ corporatism. Yet in Fascist

Italy, it represented an integral institution in the attempt to construct a totalitarian state.

Economically, corporativism served to regulate labor relations, neutralizing labor agitation and co-

opting the elite into cooperating with the regime. Through enhancing the economic power of

employers, corporativism was intended to turn the economic elite into organs of the state, thus

enhancing its own power through the enhancement of private power. State intervention in the

economy blurred the lines between the private and to such a degree that employers

CEU eTD Collection were in fact transformed into such agents of the state.

Yet this served a political purpose as well, arguably more important. Indeed, it was

essential in granting Fascism its monopoly on power, subordinating the working class and

82

removing them from the political process. Furthermore, corporativism compartmentalized the

economic elite, making it nearly impossible for them to influence policy outside of their industries.

However, as the regime progressed, the state began to encroach on their domain as well, as foreign

policy intertwined with domestic issues and began to dictate all aspects of society, and employers

became increasingly subordinated to the interests of the state with the economy being directed

toward war. The economic elite could do nothing to stop this. Corporativism was thus working to

subordinate all to the state.

By doing so, corporativism was creating a system in which there were no avenues for

political representation. The likelihood of overt and publicized opposition was greatly decreased

because of the lack of political alternatives, discouraging the working class from rising up against

the regime. Additionally, by subordinating the masses and disciplining them, corporativism had a

role in the wider effort to regiment society, making them accustom to a leader and hardening them

for war. Consequently, social cohesion and national unity were forced, achieved at the cost of

social harmony and justice. Yet this seems to be aligned with Fascism’s call for a functional

hierarchy with the masses accepting their position and being led by an elite vanguard. Moreover,

the subordination of the workers demonstrates how the Fascist state sought to claim the

revolutionary role typically assigned to the working class for itself, desiring instead to impose a

revolution from above in the goal of creating the uomo fascista.

The transformation of society was a key ambition of Fascism and was clearly reflected

within the corporative system. The solution to issues within corporativism was always the

CEU eTD Collection education of the populace and increased propaganda; a new man was necessary in order for the

system to function properly. This was because, as stated above, Fascism desired the working class

to embrace its function in society and sacrifice the interests of its class in the interests of the nation.

83

Complete devotion to the nation and self-sacrifice were necessary in order for the worker to accept

his low wages and living-standards, content that he was improving the nation as a whole. The

Fascists therefore attempted a “spiritualization of the economy,” as David D. Roberts puts it, and

corporativism was Fascism’s “attempt at totalitarian collective action.”207

For this ambition, the myth of the new state was absolutely essential, of which

corporativism was the cornerstone. The myth was meant to convince the populace that a bright

future was on the horizon, in which a representative system would emerge and provide social

harmony, unity, and prosperity. In other words, it projected the ambitions of the Fascist

syndicalists. Through this myth, the Fascists desired to mobilize the populace, achieve support for

the regime, and convince workers to embrace the corporative system and sacrifice their own

interests. Considered altogether, corporativism’s significance in the regime seems to have been

largely political, as its economic impact is much more difficult to approach due to competing

institutions. Upon such reflection, the corporative system reflects Fascism’s totalitarian direction.

The Fascists, however, were unable to realize their ambitions. They did not establish a

totalitarian state, nor create a new man, failing even to create a technically-oriented Fascist elite.

Furthermore, corporativism and the myth of the new state only created passive consensus and

eventually led to disillusionment as the regime failed to achieve its propagandized goals. As the

promises of corporativism were revealed as empty, and the gap between rhetoric and reality

became apparent, more of the populace were pushed toward the opposition. Considering the

disillusionment produced by corporativism and the regime as a whole, it is questionable to what

CEU eTD Collection degree Fascism would have been able to transform society and create its new man even if the

regime had not met its end in the Second World War.

207 Roberts, The Totalitarian Experiment, 308–14. 84

Moreover, although the corporative system should be understood as gradually working to

overturn the compromises it made with the economic elite, these concessions ultimately prevented

the full development of the corporative and totalitarian state. Furthermore, the turn toward war to

further these ambitions led to the downfall of the regime, and the failure to fully establish

corporativism enabled Fascism’s demise at the hands of the monarch, which was marginalized but

remained. The monarch’s persistence, however diminished in influence, demonstrates that while

corporativism succeeded in protecting the regime from the masses and the economic elite, it

nonetheless had failed to make it untouchable.

Nevertheless, regardless of its failures, corporativism was intended to solidify the

dictatorship and further it toward its totalitarian ambitions, both of which it was doing; it must be

remembered that although it was the monarch who ultimately abolished the Fascist regime, it was

only after the FGC removed Mussolini from his position that the king was able to do so.

Corporativism moved Fascism toward these goals by extending the authority of the state over both

the economic elite and the working class, forcing unity and aiding in the creation of a new man,

and mobilizing the populace in support of the regime. The Carta del Lavoro is indicative of all of

these ambitions.

Under examination, the Carta del Lavoro seems to reflect the productivist orientation of

the regime, demonstrating its emphasis on economic development and the creation of wealth over

its dispersal. Naturally, this aligned the regime more with employers than workers. Moreover, its

“assurances” for social harmony and protection for workers seems to be largely propaganda to

CEU eTD Collection placate the syndicalists and appeal to the masses, as they were never acted upon. Yet this

propaganda, as an aspect of the myth of the new state, was integral to the regime in the construction

of consensus. Furthermore, read closely and in consideration of the policies which followed, the

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same clauses which were propaganda for the masses could be considered threats to the economic

elite, threatening radicalization and state intervention if they did not cooperate and obey. In both

regards, employer and worker organizations alike were to become an extension of the state. With

this understanding, the Carta del Lavoro appears more reflective of Fascism’s intentions and

nature than it has been granted in past studies.

This thesis by no means attempts to exhaust the discussion on corporativism; its study can

be improved upon and also expanded by extending it into WWII and radicalization under the

Italian Social Republic. Additionally, the impact of corporativism and the Carta del Lavoro on the

political and economic culture of post-Fascist Italy could be analyzed. Similarly, corporativism’s

influence on post-Fascist models of corporatism could be considered more in detail, as it could be

that corporativism’s example demonstrated that the state needed to be more removed from

corporatism in order for it to be a viable system, that workers’ and employers’ associations need

to be autonomous and equal, and it should not replace parliamentarism but exist alongside it.

Taking these topics into account, this thesis could be expanded.

Nonetheless, this thesis attempts to build upon the works of others in order to challenge

long-held notions about corporativism and provide a nuanced understanding of the system. In

approaching the corporative state as it has been here, it becomes a case study for the regime in

general and Fascist ideology. It reflects its anti-systemic nature as well as its pseudo-legal but

ultimately violent nature, as much of its policies were enforced through squadristi violence under

the guise of constitutional reform. It is also indicative of the ambition to create a new man and its

CEU eTD Collection use of myth to mobilize society. Perhaps most importantly, it demonstrates Fascism’s aspiration

to establish its desired but never realized totalitarian control of society, subordinating all to the

state. Simultaneously, however, it reveals the regime’s compromises and its ultimate failures.

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Appendix

La Carta del Lavoro208

The Carta del Lavoro was published in Il popolo d’Italia on 23 April 1927. The version transcribed below is from pages 477 through 481 in Alberto Aquarone’s, L’organizzazione dello Stato totalitario. The English text next to the Italian is my own translation.

Stato Corporativo The Corporative State

I. La Nazione italiana è un organismo avente fini, I. The Italian nation is an organism, having aims, life, vita, mezzi di azione superiori a quelli degli individui and the means of action superior to those of the single divisi o raggruppati che la compongono. È una unità or grouped individuals that compose it. It is a moral, morale, politica ed economica, che si realizza political and economic unite that is realized integralmente nello Stato Fascista. completely in the Fascist State.

II. Il lavoro, sotto tutte le sue forme intellettuali, II. Work, in all of its forms, intellectual, technical, tecniche e manuali è un dovere sociale. A questo and manual, is a social duty. In this sense, and only titolo, e solo a questo titolo, è tutelato dallo Stato. in this sense, it is protected by the state. Il complesso della produzione è unitario dal punto di All of production is a unit from the point of view of vista nazionale; i suoi obbiettivi sono unitari e si the nation; its objectives are unitary and are to take riassumono nel benessere dei produttori e nello on the well-being of producers and the development sviluppo della potenza nazionale. of national strength.

III. L’organizzazione professionale o sindacale è III. Professional or syndicate organizations is free. libera. Ma solo il sindacato legalmente riconosciuto e But only the syndicate legally recognized and sottoposto al controllo dello Stato ha il diritto di subjected to the control of the state has the right to rappresentare legalmente tutta la categoria di datori legally represent the entire category of employers and di lavoro o di lavoratori per cui è costituito, di workers for which it is constituted, to guard their tutelarne, di fronte allo Stato o alle altre associazioni interests before the state or other professional professionali, gli interessi; di stipulare contratti associations; to stipulate collective labor contracts collettivi di lavoro obbligatori per tutti gli obligatory for all belonging to that category, to appartenenti alla categoria, di imporre loro contributi impose their contributions on them and exercise the e di esercitare rispetto ad esso funzioni delegate di functions delegated to them of public interest. interesse pubblico. CEU eTD Collection

208 Aquarone, “La Carta Del Lavoro,” 477–81. 87

IV. Nel contratto collettivo di lavoro trova la sua IV. In collective labor contracts, the solidarity espressione concreta la solidarietà fra i vari fattori between the various factors of production finds its della produzione, mediante la conciliazione degli concrete expression through the reconciliation of opposti interessi dei datori di lavoro e dei lavoratori opposing interests of employers and workers, and in e la loro subordinazione agli interessi superiori della their subordination to the superior interests of produzione. production.

V. La Magistratura del Lavoro è l’organo con cui lo V. The labor court is the organ through which the Stato interviene a regolare le controversie del lavoro, state intervenes to regulate labor controversies, sia che vertano sull’osservanza dei patti e delle altre whether they relate to the observance of contracts and norme esistenti, sia che vertano sulla determinazione other existing standards, or to the determination of di nuove condizioni di lavoro. new labor conditions.

VI. Le associazioni professionali legalmente VI. The legally recognized professional associations riconosciute, assicurano la uguaglianza giuridica tra i ensure the legal equality between employers and datori di lavoro e i lavoratori, mantengono la workers, maintain the discipline of production and of disciplina della produzione e del lavoro e ne labor, and promote its perfection. promuovono il perfezionamento. The corporations constitute the unitary organizations Le Corporazioni costituiscono l’organizzazione of production and fully represent their interests. unitaria della produzione e ne rappresentano integralmente gli interessi. In virtue of this integral representation, and since the interests of production are national interests, the In virtú di questa integrale rappresentanza, essendo corporations are by law recognized as organs of the gli interessi della produzione interessi nazionali, le state. Corporazioni sono dalla legge riconosciute come organi di Stato. As representatives of the unitary interests of production, the corporations may dictate obligatory Quali rappresentanti degli interessi unitari della standards on the regulation of labor relations and also produzione, le Corporazioni possono dettar norme on the coordination of production every time that they obbligatorie sulla disciplina dei rapporti di lavoro ed have the necessary powers of the affiliated anche sul coordinamento della produzione tutte le associations. volte che ne abbiano avuti i necessari poteri dalle associazioni collegate.

VII. Lo Stato corporativo considera l’iniziativa VII. The corporative state considers private initiative privata nel campo della produzione come lo in the field of production the most efficient and most strumento piú efficace e piú utile nell’interesse della useful instrument in the interest of the nation. Nazione. The private organization of production, being a L’organizzazione privata della produzione essendo function of national interest, the organizer of the una funzione di interesse nazionale, l’organizzatore enterprise is responsible to the state for the direction dell’impresa è responsabile dell’indirizzo della of production. The collaboration of productive forces produzione di fronte allo Stato. Dalla collaborazione is derived from the reciprocity between rights and

CEU eTD Collection delle forze produttive deriva fra esse reciprocità di duties. The person undertaking the work - technician, diritti e di doveri. Il prestatore d’opera - tecnico, employee, or worker - is an active collaborator in the impiegato od operaio - è un collaboratore attivo economic enterprise, the direction of which is the dell’impresa economica, la direzione della quale right of the employer, who has responsibility for it. spetta al datore di lavoro che ne ha la responsabilità.

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VIII. Le associazioni professionali di datori di lavoro VIII. Professional organizations of employers are hanno obbligo di promuovere in tutti i modi obliged to promote in every way the increase and l’aumento e il perfezionamento dei prodotti e la improvement of production and the reduction of riduzione dei costi. Le rappresentanze di coloro che costs. The representatives of those who exercise a esercitano una libera professione o un’arte e le liberal profession or an art and the associations of associazioni di pubblici dipendenti concorrono alla public employees, contribute to the protection of the tutela degli interessi dell’arte, della scienza e delle interests of art, science, and letters in the lettere, al perfezionamento della produzione e al improvement of production and in the obtainment of conseguimento dei fini morali dell’ordinamento the moral aims of the corporative system. corporativo.

IX. L’intervento dello Stato nella produzione IX. The intervention of the state in economic economica ha lungo soltanto quando manchi o sia production takes place only when private initiative is insufficiente l’iniziative privata o quando siano in lacking or is insufficient, or when the political giuoco interessi politici dello Stato. Tale intervento interests of the state are at stake. Such intervention può assumere la forma del controllo, may assume the form of control, encouragement, or dell’incoraggiamento e della gestione diretta. direct management.

Contratto di lavoro. Labor Contracts

X. Nelle controversie collettive del lavoro l’azione X. In collective labor disputes, legal action cannot be giudiziaria non può essere intentata, se l’organo commenced if the corporation has not had first corporativo non ha prima esperito il tentativo di attempt at reconciliation. conciliazione. In individual disputes concerning the interpretation Nelle controversie individuali concernenti and application of collective labor contracts, the l’interpretazione e l’applicazione dei contratti professional associations have the right to intervene collettivi di lavoro, le associazioni professionali and attempt reconciliation. hanno facoltà di interporre i loro uffici per la conciliazione. The jurisdiction for such disputes is transferred to the ordinary judiciary with the addition of councilors La competenza per tali controversie è devoluta alla designated by the relevant professional associations. Magistratura ordinaria con l’aggiunta di assessori designati dalle associazioni professionali interessate. CEU eTD Collection

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XI. Le associazioni professionali hanno l’obbligo di XI. Professional associations have the duty to regolare mediante contratti collettivi i rapporti di regulate by means of collective contracts labor lavoro fra le categorie di datori di lavoro e di relations between the categories of employers and lavoratori, che rappresentano. workers which they represent. Il contratto collettivo di lavoro si stipula fra The collective labor contract stipulated between associazioni di primo grado sotto la guida e il associations of the first grade, under the guidance and controllo delle organizzazioni centrali, salvo la control of central organizations, may in part be facoltà di sostituzione da parte dell’associazione di substituted by associations of superior grade, in cases grado superiore, nei casi previsti dalle leggi e dagli provided by the laws and the statutes. statuti. Each collective labor contract, under the penalty of Ogni contratto collettivo di lavoro, sotto pena di nullity, must contain precise rules on disciplinary nullità, deve contenere norme precise sui rapporti relations, periods of probation, the measure and disciplinari, sul periodo di prova, sulla misura e sul payment of wages, and work hours. pagamento della retribuzione, sull’orario di lavoro.

XII. L’azione del sindacato, l’opera conciliativa degli XII. The action of the syndicates, the conciliatory organi corporativi e la sentenze della magistratura del work of the corporations, and the sentences of the lavoro garantiscono la corrispondenza del salario alle labor courts will guarantee the correspondence of esigenze normali di vita, alle possibilità della wages to the needs of ordinary life, to the possibility produzione e al rendimento del lavoro. La of production and the productivity of labor. The determinazione del salario è sottratta a qualsiasi determination of wages is not subjected to any norma generale e affidata all’accordo delle parti nei general standard but is entrusted to the agreement contratti collettivi. between the parties in the collective contract.

XIII. Le conseguenze delle crisi di produzione e dei XIII. The consequences of production crises and fenomeni monetari devono equamente ripartirsi fra monetary phenomena must be shared equally tutti i fattori della produzione. between all the factors of production. I dati rilevati dalle pubbliche amministrazioni, The data collected by government administrations, by dall’Istituto Centrale di Statistica e dalle the Central Institute of Statistics and of the legally Associazioni professionali legalmente riconosciute recognized professional associations about the circa le condizioni della produzione e del lavoro, la conditions of production and labor, the situation of situazione del mercato e del lavoro, la situazione del the labor market, the situation of the monetary market mercato monetario e le variazioni del tenore di vita and the variations in the standards of living of dei prestatori d’opera, coordinati ed elaborati dal employees, coordinated and processed by the Ministero delle Corporazioni, daranno il criterio per Ministry of Corporations, will give the criteria to contemperare gli interessi delle varie categorie e delle balance the interests of the various categories and varie classi fra di loro e di esse coll’interesse classes with the superior interests of production. superiore della produzione. CEU eTD Collection

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XIV. Quando la retribuzione sia stabilita a cottimo, e XIV. Where payment is established by piecework, la liquidazione dei cottimi sia fatta a periodi superiori and the clearance of piecework is a period longer than alla quindicina, sono dovuti adeguati acconti a fortnight, adequate payments are due fortnightly or quindicinali o settimanali. weekly. Il lavoro notturno, non compreso in regolari turni Night work, not included in regular periodic shifts, periodici, viene retribuito con una percentuale in piú, should be paid as a percentage greater in comparison rispetto al lavoro diurno. to day work. Quando il lavoro sia retribuito a cottimo, le tariffe di When the work is paid at piece rates, the rates for cottimo debbono essere determinate in modo che piecework much be determined such that for the all’operaio laborioso di normale capacità lavorativa, worker working at the normal working capacity, it is sia consentito di conseguire un guadagno minimo possible to obtain a minimum gain over the pay-base. oltre la paga-base.

XV. Il prestatore d’opera ha diritto al riposo XV. The employee has the right to a weekly day of settimanale in coincidenza con le domeniche. rest, Sunday. I contratti collettivi applicheranno il principio Collective contracts apply the principle of taking into tenendo conto delle norme di legge esistenti, delle account the standards of existing laws, the technical esigenze tecniche delle imprese e nei limiti di tali demands of the enterprise and, in the extent of those esigenze procureranno altresí che siano rispettate le demands, shall endeavor to comply with civil and festività civili e religiose secondo le tradizioni locali. religious holidays according to local traditions. Work L’orario di lavoro dovrà essere scrupolosamente e hours must be carefully and intently observed by the intensamente osservato dal prestatore di opera. employer.

XVI. Dopo un anno di ininterrotto servizio il XVI. After a year of uninterrupted service in prestatore di opera, nelle imprese a lavoro continuo, companies functioning with continuous work, the ha diritto ad un periodo annuo di risposo feriale employee has to an annual holiday with pay. retribuito.

Uffici di collocamento. Employment offices.

XVII. Nelle imprese a lavoro continuo, il lavoratore XVII. In companies functioning with continual work, ha diritto, in caso di licenziamento senza sua colpa, the employee has the right, in the event of dismissal ad una indennità proporzionata agli anni di servizio. without his own fault, to compensation proportionate Tale indennità è dovuta anche in caso di morte del to the years of service. Such compensation is also due lavoratore. in the event of the death of the worker.

XVIII. Nelle imprese a lavoro continuo il trapasso XVIII. In companies functioning with continual dell’azienda non risolve il contratto di lavoro ed il work, the transfer of the firm does not affect the labor CEU eTD Collection personale ad essa addetto conserva i suoi diritti nei contract and the people in charge retain their rights confronti del nuovo titolare. Egualmente, la malattia against the new owner. Likewise, the illness of the del lavoratore che non eccede una determinata durata, worker does not cancel his . The non risolve il contratto di lavoro. Il richiamo alle armi call to arms or service in the MVSN is not cause for o in servizio della MVSN non è causa di dismissal. licenziamento.

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XIX. Le infrazioni alla disciplina e gli atti che XIX. Infractions of discipline and acts disturbing the perturbino il normale andamento dell’azienda, normal functioning of the company committed by the commessi dai prestatori di lavoro, sono puniti, employees are punished according to the gravity of secondo la gravità della mancanza, con la multa, con the misdemeanor, with a fine, the suspension of work, la sospensione dal lavoro e, per casi gravi, col or in grave cases, with immediate dismissal without licenziamento immediato senza indennità. compensation. Saranno specificati i casi in cui l’imprenditore può Contracts will specify in cases in which the employer infliggere la multa o la sospensione o il licenziamento may impose a fine or suspension or immediate immediato senza indennità. dismissal without compensation.

XX. Il prestatore d’opera di nuova assunzione è XX. Newly hired employees are subject to a period soggetto ad un periodo di prova, durante il quale è of probation, during which there is a mutual right to reciproco il diritto alla risoluzione del contratto col cancel the contract with only the payment of wages solo pagamento della retribuzione per il tempo in cui for the time in which work was actually performed. il lavoro è stato effettivamente prestato.

XXI. Il contratto collettivo di lavoro estende i suoi XXI. Collective labor contracts extend its benefits benefici e la sua disciplina ai lavoratori a domicilio. and its discipline to the workers at home. Special Speciali norme saranno dettate dallo Stato per rules will be dictated by the state to ensure the assicurare la pulizia e l’igiene del lavoro a domicilio. cleanliness and hygiene of work at home.

XXII. Soltanto lo Stato può accertare e controllare il XXII. Only the state can ascertain and control the fenomeno della occupazione e della disoccupazione phenomenon of employment and unemployment of dei lavoratori, indice complessivo delle condizioni workers, since these are the complete indexes of the della produzione e del lavoro. conditions of production and work.

XXIII. L’ufficio di collocamento a base paritetica è XXIII. The employment office is under the control of sotto il controllo degli organi corporativi. I datori di the corporations. The employers have the obligation lavoro hanno l’obbligo di assumere i lavoratori to hire workers enrolled in these offices, and have the inscritti a detti uffici e hanno facoltà di scelta freedom of choice among those inscribed except that, nell’ambito degli inscritti agli elenchi, dando la other things being equal, priority shall be given to precedenza agli inscritti al Partito ai Sindacati those enrolled in the Fascist Party and the Fascist Fascisti secondo la loro anzianità di inscrizione. syndicates according to seniority of registration.

XXIV. Le associazioni professionali di lavoratori XXIV, Professional associations of workers have the hanno l’obbligo di esercitare una azione selettiva fra obligation to exercise a selective action between i lavoratori, diretta a elevarne sempre di piú la members, to direct and increase the technical capacity capacità tecnica e il valore morale. and moral value.

XXV. Gli organi corporativi sorvegliano perché XXV. The corporations shall supervise to ensure that siano osservate le leggi sulla prevenzione degli the observance of laws on the prevention of injury

CEU eTD Collection infortuni e sulla polizia del lavoro da parte dei singoli and cleanliness of the workplace. soggetti alle associazioni collegate.

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Previdenza e istruzione. and education.

XXVI. La previdenza è un’alta manifestazione del XXVI. Welfare is a manifestation of the principle of principio di collaborazione. Il datore di lavoro e il collaboration. The employer and the employee must prestatore d’opera devono concorrere contribute proportionally to the costs of it. The state, proporzionalmente agli oneri di essa. Lo Stato, by means of the corporations and the professional mediante gli organi corporativi e le associazioni associations, shall endeavor to coordinate and unify, professionali, procurerà di coordinare e di unificare, as much as is possible, the system and the institution quanto è più possibile, il sistema e gli istituti di of welfare. previdenza.

XXVII. Lo Stato Fascista si propone: 1) Il XXVII. The Fascist state proposes to bring about: 1) perfezionamento dell’assicurazione infortuni; 2) il the improvement of accident insurance; 2) the miglioramento e l’estensione dell’assicurazione improvement and the extension of maternity maternità; 3) l’assicurazione delle malattie insurance; 3) the insurance of occupational illnesses professionali e della tubercolosi come avviamento and tuberculosis as the foundation of general all’assicurazione generale contro tutte le malattie; 4) insurance against all diseases; 4) the improvement of il perfezionamento dell’assicurazione contro la insurance against involuntary unemployment; 5) the disoccupazione involontaria; 5) l’adozione di forme adoption of special marriage endowment for young speciali assicurative dotalizie per giovani lavoratori. workers.

XVIII. È compito delle associazioni di lavoratori la XVIII. It is the duty of workers’ associations to tutela dei loro rappresentati nelle pratiche protect their members administratively and legally in amministrative e giudiziarie relative accident and social insurance. all’assicurazione infortuni e alle assicurazioni sociali. In collective labor contracts, whenever technically Nei contratti collettivi di lavoro sarà stabilita, quando possible, health insurance funds will be established sia tecnicamente possibile, la costituzione di Casse with contributions from employers and employees, to mutue per malattia con contributo dei datori e dei be administered by representatives of one and the prestatori di lavoro, da amministrarsi da other under the supervision of the corporations. rappresentanti degli uni e degli altri, sotto la vigilanza degli organi corporativi.

XXIX. L’assistenza ai propri rappresentati, soci e non XXIX. Assistance provided to its representatives, soci, è un diritto e un dovere delle associazioni whether members or not, is a right and duty of professionali. Queste debbono esercitare professional associations. These functions of direttamente con propri organi le loro funzioni di assistance must be exercised directly through their assistenza, né possono delegarle ad altri enti od corporations, and cannot be delegated to other istituti se non per obbiettivi d’indole generale, entities or institutions except for objectives of a eccedenti gli interessi di ciascuna categoria di general nature that exceed the interests of each produttori. category of producers.

CEU eTD Collection XXX. L’educazione e l’istruzione, specie l’istruzione XXX. The education and instruction, especially professionale dei loro rappresentati, soci e non soci, vocational instruction, whether member or not, is one è uno dei principali doveri delle associazioni of the main duties of the professional associations. professionali. Esse devono affiancare l’azione delle They should support the actions of the National Opere nazionali relative al dopolavoro e alle altre Recreational Club and other education initiatives. iniziative di educazione.

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