Intuition, Variation, Abduction

Bergsonian Intuition, Husserlian Variation, Peirceian Abduction: Toward a Relation 1 Between Method, Sense and Nature David Morris, Department of Philosophy, Concordia University, [email protected] Published in The Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (2005), 267-298. http://philosophy.memphis.edu/sjp/sjp.htm Abstract: universality, the transformed problem is Husserlian variation, Bergsonian intuition and finding an involvement with the field of Peirceian abduction are contrasted as methodological responses to the traditional philosophical problem of experience, an intuition, that opens the deriving knowledge of universals from singulars. philosopher to a sense already within Each method implies a correspondingly different experience. The world and thence nature view of the generation of the variations from which with its sense are thus participant in knowledge is derived. To make sense of the latter philosophical method. So we have to ask differences, and to distinguish the different sorts of variation sought by philosophers and scientists, a how nature makes such a method possible. distinction between extensive, intensive, and How is it that nature has a sense? abductive-intensive variation is introduced. The link Contrasting Husserl’s and Bergson’s between philosophical method and the generation of methods in light of the traditional problem variation is used to illuminate different philosophical not only gives us an insight into Bergsonian conceptions of nature and nature’s relation to meaning and sense. intuition, it leads to a suggestion about sense and nature. The contrast is framed by the 1) The Problem of Method theme of variation. In traditional induction, Husserl’s method of variation and Bergson’s consciousness arrives at universal judgments method of intuition in effect address a by detecting an invariant property within a traditional problem of philosophy: that the collection of variant singulars; the singulars universal the philosopher seeks appears and their properties are distributed in an distant from the singularity with which the already established space of variation. In philosopher begins. Husserl’s and contrast, for Husserl, a universal judgement Bergson’s methods, however, address the requires variation in which consciousness’s traditional problem only by radically generation of overlapping differences transforming it. The distance between the reconfigures the space of variation from singular and the universal is no longer within so as to point to a new general sense. conceived as a distance toward an entirely Induction involves what is here dubbed transcendent target, but as a distance already extensive variation, whereas Husserlian inherent within experience.2 Indeed, for judgement involves intensive variation, a Bergson the traditional problem is so much distinction explained in more detail below. transformed that this distance is reversed: Intensive variation is key to Husserl’s the issue is no longer rising from the discovery of a sense immanent within the singular to the universal, but rather having flow of consciousness. But so far as an intuition that descends to a grasp of the intensive variation is generated by singular. Such a grasp involves sense, a consciousness, it can be prejudiced. term of crucial importance for Merleau- Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty address this Ponty and Deleuze. Sense is meaning that problem of prejudice, as do some interesting inheres in or stems from singulars, yet, as new scientific research programs. meaning, sense is general. Where the Overcoming such prejudice requires traditional methodological problem is abductive-intensive variation, intensive founding a heuristic that would steer an variation that is driven by singulars and that autonomous thinker toward distant is inherently productive of new concepts. 1 This is what we find in Bergsonian intuition. and thinking have an irreducible sense that The point about abductive-intensive requires special methods and non- variation is approached below by drawing a naturalizable concepts. But recent advances, connection between Bergson’s intuition and particularly in cognitive and neural science, C.S. Peirce’s method of abduction. The allow science to reject special methods, non- connection suggests something about nature, naturalizable concepts and sense itself. On namely that Bergsonian intuition leads to an the contrary, science—at least in its more “abductive” concept of nature, a concept of popular manifestations, if that is not too nice nature as having sense, which concept a qualification—claims an increasingly would help in contesting traditional exclusive right to explain experience and scientific reductionism. thinking. This is not simply another Before plunging in, another word indicator of the crisis remarked by Husserl about sense, nature and science. Touch the in his famous book10, it indicates a problem topic of sense, and language will nearly for philosophy itself. If cognition and always be nigh. For example, Merleau- concepts are naturalizable, then philosophy Ponty, in his earlier work, finds sense most is a natural phenomenon to be explained by of all in language.3 In contrast, Bergson science, and philosophy, the Kantian queen insists that intuition has a sense, yet this of the sciences, loses her head. If, on the sense is betrayed when translated into other hand, the queen wishes an audience symbols and language.4 The question at with the scientists—and some scientists stake here—does sense require language?— would wish this too since they still find pulses in a crucial episode of French something important in phenomenology and philosophy, the Derrida-Levinas ‘debate’ on philosophy—philosophy would have to phenomena. Levinas is wont to find in address its concepts and methods to the Husserlian phenomena a living, intuited court of natural science. In recent sense, prior to reflection and mediation, a phenomenology this problem has been position that echoes Bergson’s.5 On the approached by seeking a way to “naturalize” contrary, Derrida argues that sense is always phenomenology. One way to do so is to already a differential phenomenon of reduce sense and phenomenological language.6 Derrida here converges with concepts to the senseless entities of Heidegger’s insistence on the primacy of traditional nature. Another possibility, well language over intuitively given sense, articulated by Renaud Barbaras, is to seek a although Derrida’s différance is rather different sort of nature.11 This would be a different than Heidegger’s language.7 nature with sense. We are seeking a nature Beyond these positions, Merleau-Ponty’s with sense, so we put aside questions about later work, while influenced by Heidegger, language, and related questions that belong discovers a different twist of sense, namely to a different study of Husserl and Bergson. sense as indwelling in flesh and natural We are gleaning insights through Husserl, living bodies that manifest flesh.8 Bergson, and Peirce; light shed on those Following Merleau-Ponty, this paper is philosophers themselves is important but seeking the beginning of a way to the sense ultimately incidental. of nature. This pursuit is made urgent by our current scientific-philosophical situation. 2) The Problem of Finitude Husserl insisted that the philosophical We can get a bearing on Husserl’s method science of phenomena not be confused with of variation and its significance by seeing the empirical science of nature.9 Experience how it transforms the traditional problem of 2 philosophical method, which problem stems transcendent universal). These errors from finitude. How does a singular, finite amount to a third, namely presupposing that philosopher arrive at knowledge of the ingredients of thinking are either universals? singular or universal, and not both singular Descartes solves the problem by and universal. discovering mediating terms within rational These substantive errors stem from a finitude, namely the natural light and the deeper methodological error, namely existence of God, which serve as a ladder to making presuppositions about thinking, universal truths. Hume solves the problem rather than analyzing it. Instead of through the mediating activity of induction, supposing that the problem is getting from which converts a vertical distance toward singulars to universals, Husserl asks: what is the universal into a horizontal distance really involved in thinking about universals? across singulars—or rather Hume eliminates Here a basic Husserlian claim takes on universals as obligatory fictions. Kant immense weight. In the Cartesian shows that experience is cognizable only if Meditations Husserl writes: “Objects exist it is constituted through the mediation of for me, and are for me what they are, only as categories (and related cognitive structures objects of actual and possible and operations). In virtue of this ideal consciousness” (CM §30, 99)—and constitution, we can make claims about transcending objects are included in this universals. But, notoriously, the Kantian claim.13 In other words, the transcendence solution leaves the problem of the of universal ideas is a sense immanent thing-in-itself, and of ideas that are merely within consciousness, not a result of regulative. This problem remains because consciousness crossing a distance to an we finite beings do not have intellectual outside. As he puts it, “Transcendency in intuition, because we have to add concepts every form is an immanent existential to intuitions, rather than being given

Load more