Bergsonian Intuition, Husserlian Variation, Peirceian Abduction: Toward a Relation Between Method, Sense and Nature1 David Morris, Department of Philosophy, Concordia University, [email protected] Published in The Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (2005), 267-298. http://philosophy.memphis.edu/sjp/sjp.htm

Abstract: universality, the transformed problem is Husserlian variation, Bergsonian intuition and finding an involvement with the field of Peirceian abduction are contrasted as methodological responses to the traditional philosophical problem of experience, an intuition, that opens the deriving knowledge of universals from singulars. philosopher to a sense already within Each method implies a correspondingly different experience. The world and thence nature view of the generation of the variations from which with its sense are thus participant in knowledge is derived. To make sense of the latter philosophical method. So we have to ask differences, and to distinguish the different sorts of variation sought by philosophers and scientists, a how nature makes such a method possible. distinction between extensive, intensive, and How is it that nature has a sense? abductive-intensive variation is introduced. The link Contrasting Husserl’s and Bergson’s between philosophical method and the generation of methods in light of the traditional problem variation is used to illuminate different philosophical not only gives us an insight into Bergsonian conceptions of nature and nature’s relation to meaning and sense. intuition, it leads to a suggestion about sense and nature. The contrast is framed by the 1) The Problem of Method theme of variation. In traditional induction, Husserl’s method of variation and Bergson’s consciousness arrives at universal judgments method of intuition in effect address a by detecting an invariant property within a traditional problem of philosophy: that the collection of variant singulars; the singulars universal the philosopher seeks appears and their properties are distributed in an distant from the singularity with which the already established space of variation. In philosopher begins. Husserl’s and contrast, for Husserl, a universal judgement Bergson’s methods, however, address the requires variation in which consciousness’s traditional problem only by radically generation of overlapping differences transforming it. The distance between the reconfigures the space of variation from singular and the universal is no longer within so as to point to a new general sense. conceived as a distance toward an entirely Induction involves what is here dubbed transcendent target, but as a distance already extensive variation, whereas Husserlian inherent within experience.2 Indeed, for judgement involves intensive variation, a Bergson the traditional problem is so much distinction explained in more detail below. transformed that this distance is reversed: Intensive variation is key to Husserl’s the issue is no longer rising from the discovery of a sense immanent within the singular to the universal, but rather having flow of consciousness. But so far as an intuition that descends to a grasp of the intensive variation is generated by singular. Such a grasp involves sense, a consciousness, it can be prejudiced. term of crucial importance for Merleau- Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty address this Ponty and Deleuze. Sense is meaning that problem of prejudice, as do some interesting inheres in or stems from singulars, yet, as new scientific research programs. meaning, sense is general. Where the Overcoming such prejudice requires traditional methodological problem is abductive-intensive variation, intensive founding a heuristic that would steer an variation that is driven by singulars and that autonomous thinker toward distant is inherently productive of new concepts.

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This is what we find in Bergsonian intuition. and thinking have an irreducible sense that The point about abductive-intensive requires special methods and non- variation is approached below by drawing a naturalizable concepts. But recent advances, connection between Bergson’s intuition and particularly in cognitive and neural science, C.S. Peirce’s method of abduction. The allow science to reject special methods, non- connection suggests something about nature, naturalizable concepts and sense itself. On namely that Bergsonian intuition leads to an the contrary, science—at least in its more “abductive” concept of nature, a concept of popular manifestations, if that is not too nice nature as having sense, which concept a qualification—claims an increasingly would help in contesting traditional exclusive right to explain experience and scientific reductionism. thinking. This is not simply another Before plunging in, another word indicator of the crisis remarked by Husserl about sense, nature and science. Touch the in his famous book10, it indicates a problem topic of sense, and language will nearly for philosophy itself. If cognition and always be nigh. For example, Merleau- concepts are naturalizable, then philosophy Ponty, in his earlier work, finds sense most is a natural phenomenon to be explained by of all in language.3 In contrast, Bergson science, and philosophy, the Kantian queen insists that intuition has a sense, yet this of the sciences, loses her head. If, on the sense is betrayed when translated into other hand, the queen wishes an audience symbols and language.4 The question at with the scientists—and some scientists stake here—does sense require language?— would wish this too since they still find pulses in a crucial episode of French something important in phenomenology and philosophy, the Derrida-Levinas ‘debate’ on philosophy—philosophy would have to phenomena. Levinas is wont to find in address its concepts and methods to the Husserlian phenomena a living, intuited court of natural science. In recent sense, prior to reflection and mediation, a phenomenology this problem has been position that echoes Bergson’s.5 On the approached by seeking a way to “naturalize” contrary, Derrida argues that sense is always phenomenology. One way to do so is to already a differential phenomenon of reduce sense and phenomenological language.6 Derrida here converges with concepts to the senseless entities of Heidegger’s insistence on the primacy of traditional nature. Another possibility, well language over intuitively given sense, articulated by Renaud Barbaras, is to seek a although Derrida’s différance is rather different sort of nature.11 This would be a different than Heidegger’s language.7 nature with sense. We are seeking a nature Beyond these positions, Merleau-Ponty’s with sense, so we put aside questions about later work, while influenced by Heidegger, language, and related questions that belong discovers a different twist of sense, namely to a different study of Husserl and Bergson. sense as indwelling in flesh and natural We are gleaning insights through Husserl, living bodies that manifest flesh.8 Bergson, and Peirce; light shed on those Following Merleau-Ponty, this paper is philosophers themselves is important but seeking the beginning of a way to the sense ultimately incidental. of nature. This pursuit is made urgent by our current scientific-philosophical situation. 2) The Problem of Finitude Husserl insisted that the philosophical We can get a bearing on Husserl’s method science of phenomena not be confused with of variation and its significance by seeing the empirical science of nature.9 Experience how it transforms the traditional problem of

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philosophical method, which problem stems transcendent universal). These errors from finitude. How does a singular, finite amount to a third, namely presupposing that philosopher arrive at knowledge of the ingredients of thinking are either universals? singular or universal, and not both singular Descartes solves the problem by and universal. discovering mediating terms within rational These substantive errors stem from a finitude, namely the natural light and the deeper methodological error, namely existence of God, which serve as a ladder to making presuppositions about thinking, universal truths. Hume solves the problem rather than analyzing it. Instead of through the mediating activity of induction, supposing that the problem is getting from which converts a vertical distance toward singulars to universals, Husserl asks: what is the universal into a horizontal distance really involved in thinking about universals? across singulars—or rather Hume eliminates Here a basic Husserlian claim takes on universals as obligatory fictions. Kant immense weight. In the Cartesian shows that experience is cognizable only if Meditations Husserl writes: “Objects exist it is constituted through the mediation of for me, and are for me what they are, only as categories (and related cognitive structures objects of actual and possible and operations). In virtue of this ideal consciousness” (CM §30, 99)—and constitution, we can make claims about transcending objects are included in this universals. But, notoriously, the Kantian claim.13 In other words, the transcendence solution leaves the problem of the of universal ideas is a sense immanent thing-in-itself, and of ideas that are merely within consciousness, not a result of regulative. This problem remains because consciousness crossing a distance to an we finite beings do not have intellectual outside. As he puts it, “Transcendency in intuition, because we have to add concepts every form is an immanent existential to intuitions, rather than being given characteristic, constituted within the ego. … concepts intuitively.12 If transcendental subjectivity is the universe These simplistic sketches of the of possible sense, then an outside is traditional problem let us situate Husserl, for precisely—nonsense. But even nonsense is in effect Husserl shows how the traditional always a mode of sense and has its problem is badly put. First, the traditional nonsensicalness within the sphere of problem presupposes that the givens of possible insight.” (CM §41, 117)14 For experience are singulars. Even in the Husserl, the real problem is reconstructing Kantian position we are given singulars and transcendent universals as senses immanent must add concepts to them. (If intuitions within consciousness. were not singulars, then synthesis would not To follow Husserl, let us return to the be needed and we would have intellectual phenomenological reduction, which is what intuitions.) Second, so far as the given is leads Husserl to a sense immanent within merely singular, the traditional solutions consciousness. Another result of Husserl’s presuppose either that universals are merely reduction is that experience is shot through, nominal (we never really escape singularity top to bottom, with a horizonal structure. to a genuine universal), or that knowledge of No object of consciousness, nor any part of universals already depends on a universal it, is ever entirely present or finished. The transcending of consciousness, either objective sense of a cogitatum is “never outside it or prior to it (we escape the present to actual consciousness as a finished singular only in virtue of an already datum; it becomes “clarified” only through

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explication of the given horizon and the new distance between the singular and the horizons continuously awakened. The universal is, for Husserl, neither a vertical predelineation itself, to be sure, is at all distance toward transcendence nor a times imperfect; yet, with its horizontal distance of induction or indeterminateness, it has a determinate association, but a horizonal distance at work structure.” (CM §19, 82-83) The basic in every flow of experience. Husserl is not ‘unit’ of thinking is neither a universal nor a the first to discover this sort of distance: the singular, it is not even a unit, but is an flowing tension between the singular and the always incomplete flow. A cogitatum lacks universal is the underlying theme of Hegel’s the presence, independence and already study of consciousness in the first part given determinacy that define the traditional Phenomenology of Spirit, and is the basis of singular. The Husserlian cogitatum, the Hegel’s turn to desire and life. Given that basic given of consciousness, already and in Hegel’s project is in a sense to show how advance of active synthesis appears as experience as a whole supplies what Kant encircled by what the traditional position would have called intellectual intuition, it is would call a universal. But this universal appropriate to observe here that in the too is no longer traditional, for it is not given Husserlian flow of distances, especially as complete, perfect, and abstract, it is since it involves Husserl’s other great indeterminately determinate and never fully discovery, passive synthesis, we have present. This is because the universal aspect something like a Kantian intellectual is manifest as an invariance in a flow of intuition—a given that arises together with variations.15 its rule.17 The natural attitude inclines us to the The Husserlian problem is not figuring view that thinking is given singular units out how thinking ever leaps to universals and must scrabble them together as building from singulars. This a false problem since blocks toward something further. In this every moment of thinking is exemplary of a case, if you are Hume, crossing the distance kind of incomplete, mediated universality. to the universal is building the tower of The problem is reconstructing the sense of Babel in a Godless world, or if you are traditional universals within this structural Descartes or Kant, such construction framework.18 To look ahead, in pursuing presupposes a transcendental Lego system this new problem we will see how Barbaras that would already snap blocks together so is right to say that Husserl has the wrong as to expose universal structure. Husserl’s kind of distance, a distance within reduction shows that each block is already a consciousness rather than a distance within stretch, a tension between the singular and life or nature. Husserl seeks Kantian the universal. Something as seemingly intellectual intuition by freeing singular as a block of Lego already churns consciousness from the actual in free with universals, for the block is never variation; but this variation can be entirely given, and the sense of it as Lego is prejudiced; Bergsonian intuition helps present through a rule foreshadowed in the address this problem by going in the faces it presents. The face and the rule can opposite direction, by sinking consciousness neither be split from one another nor fused into a distance that arises within singular together, the terms sustain one another becomings.19 To get to this point we first through their mutual repulsion. This need to study Husserlian variation. As is unsurpassable tension is what Renaud well known, variation plays a crucial role Barbaras suggests we call distance.16 The across Husserl’s philosophy, indeed

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variation is what allows for the intuition of In pretending to search for the ‘lost’ knife, essences (Wesensschau) and thence for Paula uncovers more evidence of deceit, eidetic reduction; yet variation is such a namely the lost and hidden things that pervasive theme that it rarely gets central Gregory has secreted in a drawer, which treatment as a problem.20 So rather than further confirm her judgement. beating the thickets of the Husserlian corpus This scenario nicely illustrates a we will strike at the core of variation by crucial point in Husserl’s account of drawing on passages in Formal and judgements of generality. It is not as if Transcendental Logic (FTL21), and in the Paula already had before her a set of Husserl authorized manuscript Experience instances S, S’, S’’ that each already have and Judgement (EJ22), compiled by the property p, deceit, neatly attached. In Landgrebe, passages in the midst of that case we would have to ask why she has relatively extended discussions of variation. not noticed that the property deceit is already there in all the instances (or in even 3) Variation one of them); and her judgement would In George Cukor’s film Gaslight (1944), the amount to the statistical claim: “Hey, all exceptionally malicious Gregory these S’s have property p.” Rather, her manipulates his wife Paula into believing judgement arrives at something new. Her she has lost things she has not lost and judgement is the discovery both that each hidden things she has not hidden. At night household incident has been a case of deceit, Gregory secretly forages in the attic for the and that the deceit and its motive is one and jewels of Paula’s murdered aunt; this dims the same in all the instances; she discovers the gaslight in the house and fills it with the one by way of the other, the property in ghostly footsteps, effects unnoticed by the instances by the sameness of deceit and Paula’s aging or insouciant maids. Paula, motive through variations, and vice versa. cut off from society, lacking confirmation According to Husserl, all cases of general that lights are really dimming, and so on, judgement arrive at something new. believes she is going mad. At the turning Suppose we are already given an S that is p point, Paula, played by Ingrid Bergman, and an S’ that is p’, etc.; and suppose it is finally confronted with Gregory’s perfidy, also given that the S’s are like one another, realizes that these events have not been and the p’s are like one another. We can madness but deception. Marvellously, she judge that these S’s that are like all have the conveys her judgement to Gregory by like property p. But according to Husserl, in playing its opposite, by pretending she is this judgement p still designates individual mad and that the knife she has just found, moments belonging to each S is p. It is still which could free Gregory from the ropes not a judgement in which p designates a that bind him, is a hallucination. She says: universal. (“The judgment S is p in which p designates the individual moment in the Are you suggesting this is a knife I hold individual object S is completely different in my hand? Have you gone mad, my from the judgement S is p in which p husband, or is it I who am mad? Yes of designates the universal, the eidos…” (EJ course, that’s it, I am mad, I am always §81, 325, 390.))24 Universal judgement losing things and hiding things, and I can requires something more, says Husserl, never find them, I don’t know where I put namely a judgement that p is one and the them. That was a knife, wasn’t it, and I same everywhere. This, Husserl says, 23 have lost it, and I must look for it… requires a new form of judging, a “new

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core” of generality that modifies the form of metaphor, at once lights up the instances and synthesis found in individual moments such is lit up by them. She notices “the invariant, as “S is p,” by pointing to the individual the indissolubly identical in the different and moments as a new kind of complex. ever-again different” instances; and this In terms of Gaslight, Paula’s invariant is “the universal essence” by which judgement is special because she discovers the variants are restricted (FTL §98, 218).26 the general property of deceit, which had not Husserl claims that any constituted yet been apparent, through an act that must objectivity “points back, according to its at the same time discover the cases as essential sort…to a correlative essential belonging to a new kind of variational form of manifold, actual and possible complex that points to the general property. intentionality…which is constitutive for that Put otherwise, for Paula, the cases have not objectivity.” (FTL §98, 217) The sense of the slightest tinge of deceit until they, of a the universal is a particular case of this sudden, point to deceit as that which brings pointing-back structure; its essential form them together in a variational complex, until involves invariance in variation, a style the cases newly illuminate a general form of manifest in variation. While the universal is deceit that in turn illuminate deceit within not part of the varying instances, it is the cases. Paula’s shift from judging herself inseparable from them, since the invariant mad to judging that she has been deceived is appears only in relation to the variation.27 rather like a Gestalt shift in which what had Notice here how the traditional view is previously appeared as a rabbit now appears being challenged. The natural attitude takes as a duck. This is key to the film: we are not grammar, predicate logic, etc., as given, watching someone statistically accumulating which inclines us to think that judging “the evidence already available but are rather rose is red” amounts to coupling a general immersed in Paula’s struggle to reshape her property, redness, to this singular rose. On overall world view in face of an evil this traditional view we are given a plurality manipulator. (In the first version of the film of roses that each have a property that in (1940, directed by Thorold Dickinson), we each instance already has a general are instead placed in an omniscient structure; the problem of generals and perspective. The film is hardly worth universals is how we detach or abstract that watching and one is amazed that the 1940 general property. Husserl transforms the makers did not realize that the later problem by suspending the natural attitude treatment is what is wanted.) and asking how we ever come to deploy Husserl’s profound point, as noted “red” as a general in the first place—and above, is that all cases of general judgement here he insists that this requires the creation as it were discover something new, namely of a new core of generality, much as Paula’s the sense of the property as a general (or judgement in Gaslight involves a universal).25 Returning to Paula’s discovery.28 More, this creation is bound to judgement, we can explore the formal a field of variation. In a word, for Husserl modification involved in discovering this universals are not beyond consciousness but sense. In running through varying instances are immanent in its flow. Universals are of her experience, Paula notices a manifest as an invariant constraint within a ““coincidence in conflict”,” (““Deckung im performance of variation.29 Widerstreit”” FTL §98, 219) something Bergson’s contrast between the common across different cases, something extensive and the intensive helps draw out that, to engage Husserl’s double ray an important point from Husserl’s account.

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In the traditional view, induction and the calls a restriction within variation specifying formation of general concepts involves what a new general core. is here called extensive variation. The Taking this classification of variation varying instances are taken as given whole back to Husserl, the difference between and entire, one outside the other, within an levels of generality, from empirical already extant space of variation, and thus generalities to genuinely eidetic universals, are an extensive multiplicity. Induction or has to do with the kind of intensive variation concept formation amounts to a statistical involved. Consider a block of Lego. It is a abstraction of or quantification or singular thing, but its horizon lays out a field association over elements already given in of variation, and the rule that restricts this the instances. On Husserl’s view, variation is already a template for an judgements of generality involve what is universal. But the horizon of variation is here called intensive variation. The passively given, and therein lies the Lego- instances are not laid out in a space of block’s tendency to the singular. Contrast variation that already contains the universal this with Paula’s judgement, or scientific property that the instances are judged to induction. Consciousness gathers together possess; instead, the differential overlapping and runs through an increasing plurality of of instances reconfigures their overall singulars, thus creating an increasingly variational relation so as to point to a new variable field that is knit together by an sort of unity itself created by the variational intensive variation, and the internal overlapping, and without this intensive restriction on this variation holds the cases Gestalt shift there would be no new core of together in a complex. And so we move generality. To put it another way, the work from a finite empirical generality, to a of scientific or forensic discovery is not so comprehensive empirical generality. Eidetic much totting up regularities in an existing universals are arrived at by freeing variation space of extensive variation, it is seeing from the actual, in a free play that starts existing variations as knitting together a from an example in order to range over all space with a novel intensive structure. possibility.32 Darwin’s genius is not so much extracting Descartes’s cogito serves as an evidence from an existing data set that example. Gaslight is of course a critique of encompasses geology, earthworm activity, Cartesianism, for it is neither an infinite God pigeon breeding, and so on; his genius is nor solipsistic reflection that helps Paula first of all seeing this motley as a unified escape her malicious deceiver, but an other space of variation from which we can learn person, namely a detective played by the something about the origin of species.30 nicely finite Joseph Cotten. But consider Our contrast between intensive and Paula’s judgement that these empirical extensive variation invites spatial- variations of experience have all been mathematical concepts invoked by Delanda deceptive. Descartes’s meditations precisely in his recent work on Deleuze, Intensive start from a generality of this sort. This Science and Virtual Philosophy.31 Where serves as an example that leads to further extensive variation points to a commonality variation, using imagination to free that could already be located in the space of Descartes from the actual, pushing the field extensive variation, intensive variation is a of variation even further, eventually dynamic complex that curves the space of replacing a finite deceiver like Gregory with variation from within, giving it a new an invented all-powerful malicious deceiver, metric, which is cognate to what Husserl which invention adds even more variation to

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the field. And then in this free field of essentialism tends to detach the visible variation Descartes finds “the invariant, the singular from the invisible universal that it indissolubly identical in the different and reflects—even as essentialism appeals to ever-again different” variations, “the increasingly complex forms of attachment universal essence by which all “imaginable” between thing and essence, visible and variants of the example, and all variants of invisible. any such variant are restricted” (FTL §98, Hegel shows how the contradiction of 219)—namely the cogito. The cogito points essentialism transforms into a demand for back to a field of free variation that conceptual thinking, in which the content of encompasses all possible variants, and thus the concept is inseparable from a process we arrive at a universal eidos proper.33 intrinsic to what the concept is about. To In sum, for Husserl ideas are neither illustrate: When Paula judges that Gregory the result of consciousness contacting a self- has been deceiving her, her criterion is not standing universal that entirely transcends the conformity of singular household consciousness, nor of adding an exotic happenings to an already specified universal ingredient to consciousness. They are the essence of deceit; her judgement must first amplification, by the work of free conscious of all grasp singular happenings as a process variation, of a fundamental structure of the very happening of which institutes a consciousness. uniquely ‘Gregorian’ pattern of deceit, Husserlian variation thus abandons which pattern then serves as the conceptual traditional universals in pursuit of something criterion of her judgement. As when a the structure of which is much more like professor twigs to a plagiarised passage in what Hegel, in the Science of Logic, would an essay, the crucial thing is not judging the call concept.34 Briefly, Hegel contrasts unfolding phenomenon against an already concept with essence. One way to put the existing universal standard, it is grasping contrast is that the content specified by an that unfolding as instituting its own essence is (supposedly) detached from the standard; the passage stands out as singularity of a thing, whereas the content of plagiarised when grasped as not fitting with a concept is specified only by grasping it the unfolding essay’s concept of itself. through singularity. In its least complex Essentialism has a problem grasping such form, an essence is imposed on a thing by Gestalt shifts, or discoveries that resolve the our reflecting identifications; essence is thus Meno paradox, for according to detached from the thing. But in thinking essentialism, each thing either is or is not this way, we implicitly attach a thing to the essentially X, which leaves no room for an essence that it reflects, and so we are led to a X that itself unfolds its criterion, a visible more complex form of essence, in which that has its own invisible.35 Put in terms of essence is taken as internal to the thing. We the above, Hegelian concepts let us grasp take the thing itself as doubled, as reflecting universals through a sort of internal upon itself; we do so by distinguishing the curvature within the field of variation—as appearance of the thing from the essence of opposed to essences that impose universals which it is the appearance, or in a more on the field of variation from the outside. complex stance we construe the thing’s Concepts are a structural feature of the present appearance as actualizing what processual field of singular variation. (Since essentially has been and will be possible. this field runs through all variations, for Either way, for essentialism, singular Hegel in the end there is one concept variations are mere appearance. So generative of all concepts.)

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Hegel may seem a detour. But what or bad plays that make sense or do not. we approach below is not unrelated to Sense is there in the language or the game, Deleuze’s theme of concept creation,36 and not in transcendent universals. as mentioned at the outset we are also Our next task is to see how Husserl’s stalking the theme of sense. Both Merleau- method of variation falls short of sense. Ponty and Deleuze learn from Hyppolite, and in Logique et existence (Hyppolite’s 3) The Problem of Prejudice study of Hegel’s Logic), Hyppolite translates The Husserlian position immediately runs Hegel’s “concept” as “sense [sens]”. Likely into a problem of prejudice: generality is this has some impact on the theme of sense reached through the variational work of in Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze,37 and on consciousness, but when consciousness frees Deleuze’s theme of concept creation. More itself of the actual, how does it proceed, important, the points drawn from Hegel help might it not be going on prejudice? The us venture a broad formula for sense, one problem is approached here by noting how that anticipates the points about sense that Husserl’s theme of variation appears in, yet follow. With Husserlian variation we are no is challenged by, recent science and longer pursuing transcendent universals, but Husserl’s phenomenological successors. concepts, structures of processual fields of Science obviously depends on singular variation. Ultimately, for Hegel, variation, for the first step in experiment is conceptual structure would have to be the production or collection of a field of generated from within the field of singular varying instances that will serve as the basis variations itself, else the reflective logic of for some general conclusion. The essentialism would sneak back in. When we methodological problems that immediately grasp concepts as generated by singulars, or arise are twofold: 1) How to produce a field when our grasp of the world of singulars of variation—collect examples, or generate itself presses us to new concepts, we variants on an example—that can stand as encounter sense.38 exemplary for a general conclusion. This To illustrate: Grammar is not a problem is addressed by procedures of universal essence fixed in advance of the experimental design (control groups, etc.) or usage of singular terms, nor are singular data collection (random sampling, etc.) 2) terms fixed in advance of and opposed to How to conceptualize the field of variable grammar. A native speaker of a language instances as a unitary whole that can serve neither learns grammar in advance of words as the basis of a general conclusion. This nor words in advance of usage and grammar, problem is addressed by (a) theories of but learns both through each other, gaining measurement that order instances in an an ever more comprehensive grasp of the already unified space of variation; (b) web of syntax and semantics39 that defines statistical theories that aggregate a plurality the language. Similarly, the chess player of instances in such a space. In recent gains what Bergson calls a “dynamic science, though, the usual methods of schema” of chess through long play in producing and conceptualizing variation are which general rules and singular situations being challenged. Two examples: are deeply entangled.40 Very often native Robert Full and Claire Farley, who speakers or chess savants cannot formulate study animal locomotion, realize that “direct the universal rules, but they certainly have a experimental perturbations pushed too far in sense for the language or the game, a sense search of significant difference” disrupt the of how words and pieces fit together in good “finely integrated system[s]” they are studying.41 Full and Farley, like Merleau-

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Ponty, Kurt Goldstein and J.J. Gibson, different infants. The upshot is that realize that experimental variations in the Thelen’s conclusion points back to a lab give insights into invariants of an variational field that infants themselves have artificially perturbed organism in an generated, which leads to better insights artificial environment. But Full and Farley than what happens when you put infants want insights into “functional properties that through the paces of a pre-established field emerge only when they interact with one of variation. another and the [natural] environment.”42 In both these cases experimenters turn Yet scientific generalization requires a field to a field of intensive variation, since of variation. The problem is how to get one evolution and developing infant movement that is not an artefact. Instead of putting are conceiving as building up variational animals into artificial frameworks of possibilities, rather than occupying points in experimental variation, Full and Farley look an already extant space of variation. But the to evolution as generating variation. principle of intensive variation is not Evolution in effect designs “natural generated by the conscious activity of the experiments,” by producing a space of experimenter, as in Husserl’s variation, it is variant legs, e.g., the rather different sorts of generated by the world. And seeking to legs that we find in humans, dogs, lizards, grasp this intensive variation within the cockroaches and crabs. By taking this space world presses the experimenter to new of intensive variation as their field, Full and organizing concepts. This sort of intensive Farley gain insight into the way all Earthly variation, in which intensive variation is legs work. inherently generative of new concepts, is The second example comes from a here called abductive-intensive variation. psychologist who takes a dynamic systems The discussion of Peirce in the final section theory approach to her investigations, Esther of the paper will give the reasons for this Thelen.43 In a way, Thelen’s investigation name. repeats Full and Farley’s methodological The difference between intensive point, but on an accelerated time scale. If variation and abductive-intensive variation you want to give a proper account of is crucial to the difference between Husserl something like the development of reaching and his phenomenological successors. in infants, do not try to organize the field of Heidegger repeatedly criticises Husserl for variation according to a pre-established failing to raise the question of existence. extensive space of measurement, or by This cannot really be disentangled from a grouping infants in pre-established stages of methodological criticism: Husserl’s quest development, or by taking the field of for essences is insulated within conscious varying infant behaviour as a topic for variation, without ever getting down to the statistical aggregation. Instead: Study the variational field of existence. Where evolving behaviours of individual infants in Husserl conceptually delineates structures of cases of reaching. Notice how the problem experience through the free variation of of reaching for things collapses extensive consciousness, Heidegger asks us to imagine spaces of variation into new internal patterns hammers breaking. Where Husserl uses free (conceived as attractors); track differences variation to arrive at the eidos of in these attractors in multiple instances of an intentionality, Heidegger reconceives individual infant of reaching, and then track intentionality by having us subside into the same infant longitudinally through angst and boredom, variations that development. Only then compare across spontaneously seize us within the flow of

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existence. Where Husserl traces invariant existence, a nature, that itself presses the structures within all possible imaginings of a philosopher to new concepts. In other phenomenon, Heidegger opens us to words, it is not possible to do philosophy existence by having us attend to variational without doing a philosophy of nature. We perturbations that spontaneously arise in the have thus arrived at a version of Barbaras’s flow of existence in advance of criticism of Husserl, namely that Husserl is philosophical reflection. In this way missing the way that life is generative of the Heidegger aims to free us from the distance between singulars and universals. conceptual prejudices of the tradition.44 And so we now turn to Bergson as a So too with Merleau-Ponty. philosopher who holds that “theory of Phenomenology, says Merleau-Ponty, wants knowledge and theory of life seem to us insight into essences within existence. What inseparable,” as he puts it in the beginning is required for this is a slackening of the of Creative Evolution.46 Having put intentional threads, a spontaneous variation Bergson in context of a perennial and that exposes us to something beyond our ongoing philosophical and scientific everyday prejudiced view.45 Thus Merleau- problem brought out through Husserl’s Ponty turns for insight to illnesses, illusions, concept of variation, we are now prepared to or to the dialectical unmasking of bad see how Bergson’s intuition responds to this assumptions about experience, which problem, and how the response arises in the unmasking points us to previously unnoticed link between knowledge and life. variational structures within experience. The insight we gain is not into universals 4) Intuition beyond us, but to a sense already immanent Like Husserlian variation, Bergson’s method within experience. of intuition so permeates his philosophy that In short, for Husserl, the analysis of it seeps up everywhere. One of the sharper universals amounts to reconstructing already discussions is found in the opening of the accepted universals, by an act of free fourth chapter of Matter and Memory, in the conscious variation. But substantive and famous passage about the turn of methodological problems encountered by experience. According to Bergson, pure the above scientists and philosophers turn intuition, what is given us in inner or outer them to a field of variation that is not experience, is an undivided continuity. But generated by consciousness, or from the our practical interests tend to break up this internal constraints of consciousness. And continuity into elements laid out side by this field involves a new sort of variation: side. Beginning with this fractionated field, abductive-intensive variation, a radical empiricism and dogmatic rationalism set variation in which production of variation is themselves the task of reconstructing the inherently productive of new concepts that bonds that holds things together. Because comprehend the field of variation—in which the initial fractionation is driven by practical variation exposes a sense already immanent concerns, rather than following the internal within the field. lines of things, the traditional philosophical We began with a traditional problem enterprise is doomed. Bergson writes: of philosophy: how can a philosopher arrive at universality, beginning from singularity? …we start from what we take to be The point of the above is to show that the experience, we attempt various possible philosopher is rather seeking sense, and the arrangements of the fragments which path to sense is complicit with a varying apparently compose it, and when at last we feel bound to acknowledge the

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fragility of every edifice that we have concept is generated by the given, it is sense. built, we end by giving up all effort to Sense is nature as intellectual intuition. build. But there is a last enterprise that The remaining problem is: What is the might be undertaken. It would be to seek method of intuition? How is it possible? experience at its source, or rather above How is it that concepts are generated and that decisive turn where, taking a bias in exposed within the flow of experience? the direction of our utility, it becomes How is it that nature has a sense, that there properly human experience. (MM 184) is an intuition within nature? The passage I The last enterprise is the method of intuition. have cited, and complementary sorts of The context we have been building lets us passages, e.g., in chapter one of Creative remark several things about it right away. Evolution, or in the lecture “Philosophical First, what we are seeking, concepts that let Intuition,” are somewhat curious as us make sense of articulations of a statements of method, because they really continuity, are not found by contacting a amount to metaphysical claims that at once transcendent beyond, or by adding a magic motivate the method and result from the dash of universals to experience; what we method. Not that this circularity is a are seeking is within experience, but at its disaster, rather it is a sign of real source, past our usual fragmentation of it. philosophical thinking, it is the sort of circle We are seeking sense. Second, seeking sense that we find in those spots where Plato or within a continuous experience means Kant, Aristotle or Hegel set out their finding coherent cores in an intensive rather method. More, these passages do not give than an extensive variation. Third, the sense an algorithm for having intuition—but on we are seeking will overturn existing the other hand the very thing that intuition is conceptual prejudices and lead to new rules out an algorithm. Still, we need a concepts, and so will involve abductive- methodological indication of what intuition intensive variation. Fourth, in the sentence is like. immediately following the ones just quoted, So we now dip into the very beginning Bergson notes that what Kant has of Matter and Memory, where it is widely demonstrated is the impotence of agreed that Bergson takes up the method of speculative reason. Bergson, like Hegel, is intuition. There Bergson asks us to give up not satisfied with this impotence. Bergson our traditional empiricist-rationalist attributes it to service to practical distinctions between sensations and ideas, necessities, whereas for Kant, as noted etc., and to return to the field of experience. above, this impotence is due to the fact that Doing so, we intuit a flow of images; images speculative reason is not intellectual are at once sensuous and sensible, i.e., intuition. By freeing reason from utility and intelligible. But this variable flux of images by thus moving beyond the turn of is not indeterminate, invariant patterns stand experience, Bergsonian intuition seeks out. The most important invariant is what precisely what Kant would have called we call our body. In intuition the body intellectual intuition: an intuitively given stands out in a new way: where we find an experience that already contains the invariant centre of indeterminate action concepts that make sense of it. This sort of within the image system, there we find a concept, as suggested, will grasp a structure body. Bergson thus arrives at a new and of invariance within an intensively variant important concept of the body. The body as experiential continuity. So far as this centre of action is not a block of well hinged matter given in advance of interaction, not a

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terminus of input action that then sends plunges us into a time beyond us, there we output to the outside. Intuition shows us find sense. that action is always interaction, a circle Second, the body as conceived in between interactants. A living body is that Matter and Memory is what enables material locus in which circles of interaction Bergson’s account of intuition. That is, if intersect in a nexus complex enough to we ask how Bergsonian intuition is possible, afford indeterminate action and yet persist. we will have to discuss the body as opening Bergson’s concept of body not only us to a field of variation in which the body anticipates Merleau-Ponty’s insights, but stands as an invariant yet indeterminate also current efforts to think of bodies as centre of action. The practical demands of dynamic or autopoietic systems. the body evolving and living require that the The example from Matter and Memory body artificially cut up the world in a way illustrates how intuition leads to new that prejudices experience; yet the body as concepts: the invariant dynamic that we call invariant is not independent of the variation body follows the internal line of things, thus in which it lives and moves and has its marking a concept that points to a field of being. The body is tuned to the variational variation given in advance of the bias of continuity of experience, by contracting the utility. This concept is what Bergson, as duration-variation of things into an intuited noted above, might call a “dynamic duration. So the distance linking singulars schema.” and universals is opened by life—this Two important points emerge. First, distance is the body—contra Husserl’s for intuition to yield concepts, we must, as failure to see this, as Barbaras notes. The Bergson famously put it with the example of body, then, is tremendously ambiguous in sugar dissolving, wait. We must wait for the Bergson’s philosophy,47 it is the requisite field of variation to expose an invariant that link between the theory of knowledge and gives us an intuitive encounter with a the theory of life, which link and its concept. Both Husserl and Bergson view ramifications make Bergson’s method of concepts as melodic invariants of intensive intuition possible. The body not only has variations of intuition, but Husserl has us sense, it is our opening onto sense. Indeed grasp these by having consciousness whistle the body is our opening onto the sense of the its own tune until it hits restrictions in the body; in intuition we use our bodies to grasp whistling. Bergson instead has us tune into the concept of the body, and the dynamic an intuitively given melodics of becoming. schema through which we thinkers conceive Husserlian concepts are given in the time of the body is that very schema which is the free variation, Bergsonian concepts are body; the lines of thinking follow the lines given in the duration-variation of things of the body. The body is—for us—the first themselves. And so we are led to a sense of nature, it grants what Kant would complication in the concept of invariance: at have called intellectual intuition. the ideal level, Husserlian invariants become And so Bergson needs to write static, whereas Bergsonian invariants are Creative Evolution, for it is evolution as always varying. This point resonates with creative that makes possible a body open to the current scientific concept of attractors, a field of intuitive variation that itself has a and with conceptual analysis of invariants as creative sense. But rather than following manifest in variation. It also affords another Bergson down this path (or is it up this way of defining sense: where we have to path?), let us once again have him activate wait for concepts, where concept formation some thoughts worth thinking again, namely

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some points from Peirce and Bateson about variation freely plays with an example so as abduction. to draw out neighbouring but different possibilities, in Bergson’s intuition we are 5) Abduction given a field of variation in which different Concepts are neither a novel ingredient of things show an affinity in virtue of repeating thinking nor consciousness’s contact with a a common generative point. Manuel beyond, they are invariants within variant Delanda’s Deleuze calls this a singularity, thinking, they are, in a word, a kind of and this is what the scientists Full, Farley process of thinking. But concepts are not and Thelen are noticing: Bergson notes that fixed cognitive ingredients of a process. octopus and human eyes in their similarity They are process through and through. are utterly different yet point back to a Concepts are a kind of reasoning process. common generative procedure that does not For Husserl this reasoning process exist independently of evolving eyes (beat requires variation, and in Experience and matter with sunlight for millions of years Judgement he distinguishes variation from and you get eyes); likewise Full and Farley alteration. Alteration already possesses an notice that biped and quadruped legs point essence for something given, and back to a common generative procedure in maintaining its identity, alters it. In contrast, virtue of which very different leggy bodies variation involves differential leaps from have an affinity (have motile creatures run one singular to another so as to manifest the into hurdles and eventually you get legs to kind of “coincidence in conflict” that first hurdle over them). For Bergson the exposes the intensive variational field in differential, variational process that enables which an essence can appear. Variation and concepts and intuition is also the alteration (Variation und Veränderung) are differential, variational process of life. For different sorts of difference. (EJ §87.f, 347, Bergson, concepts are a kind of reasoning in 419)48 (Derrida’s différance is perhaps things, a reasoning in life, and this reasoning another name for Husserlian variation.) in life is what we have been calling sense. Bergson’s intuition involves yet a different This sort of differential process is at kind of difference. As is well known, work in the reasoning that Peirce calls Deleuze will come to call this repetition. If abduction. Peirce on abduction is even more the field of variation given in intuition is thorny than Husserl on variation; both intensive, if the field cannot be fractionated philosophers have the characteristic of into “elements laid side by side,” if the writing the same blessed book over and over variation of intuition involves the sort of again—repeating the same idea—so with becoming that Bergson discusses in the neither is there an authoritative text; and, as “Possible and the Real” and in chapter four with variation, abduction is so central it is of Matter and Memory, then elements and hard to get it square in view, although Peirce moments of this field cannot be understood does have texts that focus on it.49 To pierce as organized in an already established space to the quick, here are some of the things of variation. The elements and moments Peirce says: 1) Abduction is a procedure of instead are singularities utterly different than rational inquiry. 2) It is a kind of inference one another in their happening. They that is insightful. 3) Abduction is neither exhibit a pattern and invariance in the deduction nor induction. 4) In contrast to peculiar ways that repetitions do: it is the deduction or induction, abduction adds same thing happening, yet utterly different something new to thought, namely because it is a repeat. Where Husserlian hypotheses—and “hypothesis” is Peirce’s

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other name for abduction. As Peirce puts it, to be, but a swine? Would that explain “the essence of an induction is that it infers things? from one set of facts to another set of similar We can now draw out a differential- facts, whereas hypothesis infers from facts variation structure underlying abductive of one kind to facts of another.” (2.642)50 reasoning processes. Here is a true story; Peirce’s repeated example is of beans in a put yourself in it. In class a student is bag. From the fact that all the beans in the friendly with you, but in the coffee shop the blue bag are white, and that this handful of same student repeatedly does not recognize beans is from the blue bag, we can deduce you at all; your greeting gestures go right that the beans in this handful are white; the through him and you feel a fool. This is, as deduction is certain because it adds nothing Peirce, would put it, a surprising fact. new to the facts, just puts them a different Eventually, abduction strikes: “If the student way. If it is the case that beans taken from has a twin, all is explained!” The facts are the blue bag keep turning up white, we no longer surprising. In your abduction, conclude by induction that all beans in the remarking unique difference (“It’s not one blue bag are white. Here too the induction student, but two!”) is inseparable from does not give us a new sort of fact, for it linking that unique difference to its singular quantifies in a probabilistic way over facts generative point (“They’re twinned from already given about colours of beans in a birth!”). That is, the appearance or bag. Abduction is different: it starts from expansion of a field of variation is the facts that one of the bags of beans in the coincident with the appearance of a concept room, say the blue bag, contains only white that links variations as appearing within one beans, and that this handful of beans, which field. Singular elements already apparent in was taken from a single bag, contains all the experiential field all of a sudden stand white beans; the inference by abduction is out as in fact being variations in virtue of that this handful of beans is from the blue expressing a concept that for the first time bag. Put another way, in its context, this grasps them as variations. (Compare Paula hypothesis is the best possible explanation grasping that the dimming of the gaslight for the fact the beans are white in colour. and the lost jewellery are in fact events Notice that the abduction yields another kind ‘twinned from birth’.) Contrast this with of fact: from facts about colours of beans, to Husserl, in which conscious free variation a hypothesis about which bag the beans are plays new variants from an example via an from. Sherlock Holmes uses abductive existing link, and thence adds them to the reasoning all the time, which is what field. In the sort of variation we are astonishes Watson: it is not surprising that studying here, which is here dubbed someone studying the colour of swans might abductive-intensive variation, variation claim all swans are white, but it is surprising arises by a sort of twist from within, in that someone given facts about dogs not which a novel grasp of the variation as barking in the night can confidently claim variation is simultaneous with a novel grasp that so and so is the culprit. The 1940 of the concept that links the variations as version of Gaslight invites mere induction, constituting a variational field. This twist is which is why it is such a miserable film, sense. Now in the case of the twins, we are whereas Cukor’s 1944 version demands not formulating an utterly novel concept; abduction of us and of Paula: what if what is novel is grasping that the concept Gregory isn’t the swanky swain he appears “twinning” is expressed in (it now turns out) these twins. But consider how the world

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around us, when we investigate it, constantly abductive systems obtain. For example, the twins, manifests abductive-intensive anatomy and physiology of the body can be variation. As Darwin puts it: “How considered as one vast abductive system inexplicable is the similar pattern of the with its own coherence within itself at any hand of a man, the foot of a dog, the wing of given time.”54 There is something a bat, the flipper of a seal, on the doctrine of obviously right about this. Much as students independent acts of creation! how simply may be twinned, one’s hands have explained on the principle of the natural irreducibly different senses, yet point back selection of successive slight variations in in that very difference to a singular origin; the diverging descendants from a single and one’s heart and liver likewise are progenitor!”51 twinned in a different way.55 If this were In his book Mind and Nature: A not the case, then one’s body could not be Necessary Unity, Gregory Bateson makes the sort of centre of action that it is; further, some insightful yet maddeningly obscure if one’s hands did not prolong into a remarks about this abductive aspect of universe that twinned out like one’s body nature. He begins with the remark that: “We does, then there would be no possibility of are so accustomed to the universe in which bodily action. What is here called twinning we live and to our puny methods of thinking is as it were the condition through which about it that we can hardly see that it is, for alone dynamic schema, concepts and sense example, surprising that abduction is are possible. possible.”52 Why is it that concepts that And so from variation, through apply in one case apply in another, that the intuition and abduction, we are led round by anatomy of a seal flipper is echoed in some a different route to Bergson’s point about other thing? On the one hand, the creative evolution. If philosophy can begin possibility of abduction is a liability, for it with singularity and arrive at concepts, or reinforces prejudiced patterning; the fact rather create concepts that grasp the that we can map both gender roles and singular, it is because nature has already sexual biology using the concept of activity made this sort of movement between the vs. passivity leads to bad social and singular and the conceptual, or rather it is biological concepts that are hard to shake, because nature is this movement of precisely because they are mutually abduction, in which singular beginnings reinforcing. But, on the other hand, as twin, repeat, spread out and vary in ways Bateson puts it, “all thought would be totally that point back to singularity, thus impossible in a universe in which abduction manifesting the structure of invariance in was not expectable.”53 In other words, if variance that is called concept. concepts are not items given, but a process Reductionism, reducing nature to a roster of of reasoning in things, reasoning in life; and already given, extensively variant elements if concepts express abductive-intensive is misguided. If scientific and philosophical variation, the encounter of remarkably method and thinking are possible, it is different variants that are nonetheless because nature is abductive, because nature repeats of a pattern; then concepts are only has inflated itself as conceptual, because possible if nature is expectably abductive. nature has a sense. To do philosophy we What does this mean? Bateson writes need a philosophy of nature that does not “that there are, in nature and seek to reduce nature to what is most correspondingly reflected in our processes thinkable for us, with our practical of thought, great regions within which prejudices; we need to grasp nature as

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abducting itself into what is thinkable in itself. And abduction will not be the du comportement (Paris: Quadrige/Presses expansion of a formula already packed into Universitaires de France, 1942), e.g. it is a beginning point, but the coming into being central to his discussion of the human order. of new, radical differences that at once point 4 See the “Introduction to Metaphysics,” in back to—or perhaps we should say Henri Bergson, The Creative Mind: An express—a singular conceptual origin, a Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Mabelle sense. L. Andison (New York: Citadel Press, 2002); for the French, see Henri Bergson, 1 This paper was provoked by late night Édition du Centenaire (Paris: Presses discussions of Bergsonian and Husserlian Universitaires de France, Oeuvres), pp. method with Rocco Gangle, Heath Massey, 1392-1432. Because the ambition of and Joshua Ramey, at the Collegium philosophy is to gain an intuition that would Phaenomenologicum XXVI: Thinking connect us with the inner mobility of things, through the Difference between Immanence “Metaphysics is therefore the science which and Transcendence: Levinas, Bergson, and claims to dispense with symbols” (162, 1396 Deleuze. My thanks to them for their in the French; Bergson’s emphasis). In provocations, and to Leonard Lawlor for Bergson’s usage, concepts are the fruit of setting up the context in which such analysis; they immobilise things and discussions were possible. An earlier version generalise, thereby betraying their object. In of this paper was presented at Bergson in this paper a different usage of concept is Context, the annual conference of the British developed. Society for Phenomenology, March 2003, 5 This is point about intuition is apparent in St. Hilda’s College. I would like to thank Emmanuel Levinas, The Theory of Intuition members of the audience for their questions, in Husserl's Phenomenology, trans. André and especially John Mullarkey and Orianne, second ed. (Evanston, Illinois: Valentine Moulard for their astute Northwestern University Press, 1995), esp. criticisms. at the end of chapter 6 and in the final 2 For this concept of distance, see Renaud chapter; the point also surely anticipates Barbaras, "Life and Perceptual Levinas’s later emphasis on a non-relational Intentionality," Research in Phenomenology relation to the Other. My thanks to the 33 (2003) and Renaud Barbaras, Le désir et anonymous reviewer of this paper for la distance: Introduction à une pointing out the connection between Levinas phénoménologie de la perception (Paris: J. and Bergson. Vrin, 1999). 6 See “Violence and Metaphysics” in 3 See especially Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Smith (New Jersey: The Humanities Press, Chicago Press, 1978) and Jacques Derrida, 1962); Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Speech and Phenomena, trans. David B. Phénoménologie de la perception (Paris: Allison (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern Galimard, 1945). But the special role of University Press, 1973). For a detailed language is already apparent in Maurice study of this issue and its relevance to Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behaviour, French philosophy, see Leonard Lawlor, trans. Alden L. Fisher (London: Methuen, Thinking Through French Philosophy: The 1965); Maurice Merleau-Ponty, La structure Being of the Question (Bloomington &

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Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University 2003), esp. chapter 2, and Leonard Lawlor, Press, 1970). Derrida and Husserl: The Basic Problem of 11 For a survey of the issue, see Jean Petitot Phenomenology (Bloomington & et al., eds., Naturalizing Phenomenology: Indianpolis: Indiana University Press, 2002), Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and esp. part three. Cognitive Science (Stanford: Stanford 7 This position is already evident in Martin University Press, 1999). This collection Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John includes Barbaras’s “The Movement of the Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New Living as the Originary Foundation of York: Harper and Row, 1962); Martin Perceptual Intentionality,” which contests Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max the effort to reduce phenomena to the nature Niemeyer Verlag, 1963). It becomes ever of the usual scientific tradition. more apparent in the increasing emphasis on 12 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, language in his later work. trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: 8 See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible Macmillan Education, 1929), and Immanuel and the Invisible, trans. Alphonso Lingis Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Pluhar (Indiana: Hackett, 1987), esp. the Press, 1968); Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Le dialectic of teleological judgement and §77 visible et l'invisible (Paris: Galimard, 1979). therein. In Merleau-Ponty’s earliest monograph 13 Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, (Merleau-Ponty, La structure du trans. Dorion Cairns (Dordrecht: Kluwer, comportement ) he cites with approval Hegel 1991) and Edmund Husserl, Cartesianische (via Jean Hyppolite) on “the hidden mind of meditationen und Pariser vortrage (Haag: nature.” If in his later thinking Heidegger’s Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), hereinafter CM, influence turns Merleau-Ponty to finding a with references by section number and page sense, a logos, already at work in being, for # in the German; these page #s are also Merleau-Ponty this would also have to be a given in the margin of the English edition. sense of the being of nature. As is well Compare Edmund Husserl, Formal and known, Merleau-Ponty can never tear Transcendental Logic, trans. Dorion Cairns himself away nature; he is entranced by the (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978) and organization of natural bodies and Edmund Husserl, Formale und behaviours as anticipating symbol and logos. transzendentale logik (Den Haag: Martinus (See e.g., Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ***check Nijhoff, 1974), hereinafter FTL, with La nature: notes, cours du Collége de references by section number and the page # France, Traces écrites (Paris: Seuil, 1995).) given in the margins in both the German and 9 Husserl’s division is nicely elucidated in English editions: “…absolutely everything Joseph J. Kockelmans, Edmund Husserl's of which an Ego can think is related to [the Phenomenology (West Lafayette, Indiana: Ego’s] life of consciousness.” (FTL §97, Purdue University Press, 1994), and 216) Levinas, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's 14 On this issue, also cf. CM §28, 97. Phenomenology . Scholars of sense in Merleau-Ponty should 10 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of the take note of this remark. European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. David Carr

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15 As Levinas puts it in his important study an intuited individual as such indicates a of Husserlian intuition, for Husserl essences central point: it is the process of variation, as are inexact and are not to be confused with driven by consciousness, not singulars, that are at the heart of Husserl’s account. Platonic essences. Essences arise from Bergson diverges from Husserl because for ideation, not idealization, and thus (Levinas Bergson variation will come back to a suggests) would not fall to Bergson’s movement within the singular thing itself. criticism that essences falsify the meaning of concrete reality. (Levinas, The Theory of For Husserl, philosophy cannot be driven by singulars, and this point is at the crux of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology , Husserl’s emphasis on an absolute division chap. 6, esp. pp. 115-119.) Levinas’s point between natural science and philosophy. In about ideation cannot be disentangled from his insistence that the distinctive character of contrast, the task of Bergsonian philosophy is to descend to the singular, and so Bergson Husserlian intuition is that its object is opens a possibility of drawing science and “given in person,” and that Husserlian philosophy closer together. This difference consciousness is already open to the is vital to Deleuze’s appropriation of presence of the world. So the object of an Bergson for a transcendental empiricism (vs. essence has an intimate role in the intuition of essence. a Husserlian transcendental phenomenology). Kockelmans, Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology likewise argues that for On the issue of variation in Husserl and Husserl essences are not Platonic because in science, also see Maxine Sheets- they are given in an intuition that links Johnstone, The Primacy of Movement consciousness to its object. Put even more (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing emphatically, for Husserl the intuition of Company, 1999), esp. chapter 4. essences depends on singular objects that 16 Barbaras, "Life and Perceptual stand as exemplars, as shown in Burt C. Intentionality," and Barbaras, Le désir et la Hopkins, "Phenomenological Cognition of distance: Introduction à une the A Priori: Husserl's Method of "Seeing phénoménologie de la perception. Essences" (Wesenserschauung)," in Husserl 17 For this point in Hegel, cf. G.W.F. Hegel, in Contemporary Context: Prospects and Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller Projects for Phenomenology, ed. Burt C. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977). Hopkins (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997). But On this issue, it is also worth referring to the Hopkins—who unlike Levinas and discussion of the problem of the given in Kockelmans is at ease equating Husserl’s John McDowell, Mind and World eidos with Plato’s idea—also rightly notes (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University that for Husserl such an exemplary singular Press, 1996), which is in some way inspired “is not in the proper sense an intuited by Hegel. individuum as such” (p. 165; Hopkins is 18 here quoting from Husserl’s Experience and We need to reconstruct this sense, Judgment). On the one hand, Husserl’s according to Husserl, because the insistence that we arrive at essences and universality that belongs to general thought categories through intuitions enables the is the telos of logical activity and philosophy connection drawn below to Bergson on and is not to be found in rules of experience. singulars. On the other hand, Hopkins’s On this point, see Edmund Husserl, point that in such intuitions the object is not Experience and Judgment: Investigations in

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a Genealogy of Logic, trans. James S. points out that Levin is muting Husserl’s Churchill and Karl Ameriks (Evanston: sharp distinction (emphasized by Levinas in Northwestern University Press, 1973) and his study of intuition, see note 33; also see Edmund Husserl, Erfahrung und urteil: Kockelmans, Edmund Husserl's unterzuchungen zur gealogie der logik Phenomenology and Klaus Held, "Husserl's (Hamburg: Claasen verlag, 1964), Phenomenological Method," in The New hereinafter EJ, with references to section Husserl: A Critical Reader, ed. Donn number, page # in the English edition, page Welton (Bloomington & Indianapolis: # in the German: EJ §80, 319, 384. Indiana University Press, 2003)) between a 19 priori and empirical sciences, and is also The connection between intuition in muting the difference between free variation Bergson and in Kant is suggested by Nathan and alteration (see note 48), which Rotenstreich, "Bergson and the difference is key to Wesensschau. On the Transformation of the Notion of Intuition," other hand, Husserl’s commitment to Journal of the History of Philosophy 10 intuition of essences does put intuition of (1972); the approach here is from a direction essences proper and thence eidetic variation different than Rotenstreich’s, since it takes into continuity with other sorts of intuitions bearings from Hegel’s critical relation to (such as might lead to induction), which Kant. again is why it is possible to draw 20 Cf. Richard M. Zaner, "Examples and connections between Husserl and Bergson, Possibles: A Criticism of Husserl's Theory yet contrast them. The key difference, as of Free-Phantasy Variation," Research in argued below, is that in Husserl Phenomenology 3 (1973), which remarks the consciousness drives variation, whereas for peculiar tension between the centrality of Bergson intuition opens us to variation variation and the lack of thematic within singulars themselves (cf. note 15). discussions of it. Zaner’s remark, though For more on the relation between induction part of an earlier phase of Husserl research, and Wesensschau, see the discussion below remains true. Research into the literature on the different levels of generality and reveals that variation is a topic that comes universality in Husserl. Elisabeth Ströker, up in discussions of Husserl, but hardly ever The Husserlian Foundations of Science gets thematic or extended treatment, e.g., it (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997) should especially only rarely appears in article or chapter titles be consulted on the matter of Husserl and or as a keyword in abstracts or indices. science; chapter II of this work, esp. pp 71- More important, variation is not treated as a 73, begins to problematize variation in a problem. While the topic of variation comes discussions of problems concerning up, especially in discussions of Wesensschau evidence of essences, i.e., the theme of (since free variation is crucial to insights Wessensschau. into essences), the question how variation is Kockelmans, Edmund Husserl's possible does not seem to arise. Phenomenology, chapter five, gives a Zaner’s article criticises the account of compact and masterful synopsis of the variation in David Michael Levin, theme of variation as part of a survey of "Induction and Husserl's Theory of Eidetic Husserl. Levinas, The Theory of Intuition in Variation," Philosophy and Husserl's Phenomenology is another Phenomenological Research 29 (1968), important monograph that takes up variation which argues that eidetic variation is amongst other themes. Hopkins, continuous with induction. Zaner rightly "Phenomenological Cognition of the A

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Priori: Husserl's Method of "Seeing "Phenomenological Cognition of the A Essences" (Wesenserschauung)," gives a Priori: Husserl's Method of "Seeing relatively extended treatment of the theme of Essences" (Wesenserschauung)," and variation, which is also discussed in Held, Kockelmans, Edmund Husserl's "Husserl's Phenomenological Method." Phenomenology. Further writings that focus on 28 On Husserl’s divergence from traditional variation, are Nebojsa Kujundzic, "Thought empiricist appeal to abstraction, cf. Hopkins, Experiments: Architecture and Economy of "Phenomenological Cognition of the A Thought," Journal of the British Society for Priori: Husserl's Method of "Seeing Phenomenology 26 (1995), which draws a Essences" (Wesenserschauung)." link between Husserl and Mach on variation; 29 and Sheets-Johnstone, The Primacy of “[T]he variation of the necessary initial Movement, esp. chapter 4. example is the performance in which the 21 “eidos” should emerge and by means of See note 13 for details of the convention which the evidence of the indissoluble for citing FTL. eidetic correlation between constitution and 22 See note 18 for details of the convention constituted should also emerge” (FTL §98, for citing EJ. 219, emphasis mine). Husserl says this of 23 eidetic variation, but other sorts of Transcription by author from DVD generals/universals would also be manifest edition, Warner Home Video, 2004. in the performance of variation. 24 The account of structure of universal 30 judgements given here is extracted from EJ For support of this view of Darwin, see §87 ff. Stephen Jay Gould, The Structure of Evolutionary Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: 25 Strictly speaking we should distinguish The Belknap Press of Harvard University judgements of generals (which hold of Press, 2002). multiple instances) and judgements of 31 universals (which holds of all instances). Manuel DeLanda, Intensive Science and But this distinction is not quite thematic in Virtual Philosophy (London: Continuum, the materials under discussion, and so the 2002). distinction will be blurred in the treatment 32 Levinas remarks that Husserl’s own given here. This does not have an impact on writing leads to questions about how we are the point being made, which concerns the to distinguish between different levels of structure of judgements of both generality generality (Levinas, The Theory of Intuition and universality. in Husserl's Phenomenology , pp. 107-9). 26 The quote from which this material is The suggestion made here is that the taken in fact specifies the conditions in difference is not so much in the structure of which this universal essence would be an the ideas as in the process of variation. ideal. But any structure of empirical Hopkins, "Phenomenological Cognition of generalities would also have this form in the A Priori: Husserl's Method of "Seeing Husserl—empirical generalities are just Essences" (Wesenserschauung)," gives a detected in a different sort of variation. fine grained analysis of the difference between levels, without yet taking up 27 The interpretation of judgement and variation as a problem. variation in Husserl given here is in its broad outlines confirmed by Hopkins,

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33 It is must be emphasized that for Husserl plays on a logic of essence, whereas a logic of concept is what is needed; the working of there is an crucial difference between such a language’s grammar is not viewed as a philosophical ideas and ideas arrived at by hidden institution behind the scenes, which induction, and this is why for Husserl there is why grammar is not a mystery (see the is a tension between a science of nature and discussion of grammar below), but the a science of experience. On this tension, see workings of Borges lottery keep receding Levinas, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's behind the visible even whilst being Phenomenology , chapters 4-6 and esp. pp. identical with the visible as its reflection. 112-116; also see notes 15 and 20 above. 36 34 G.W.F. Hegel, Science of Logic, trans. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What is A.V. Miller (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Humanities Press International, 1969). Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). 35 The suggestion being made here is that 37 See Leonard Lawlor, "The End of perhaps the Merleau-Ponteian theme of institution (see Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology: Expressionism in Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty," Continental L'institution dans l'histoire personnelle et Philosophy Review 31 (1998) and the publique: le probléme de la passivité, le editorial introduction and Deleuze’s review sommeil, l'inconscient, la mémoire: notes de of Logique et existence in Jean Hyppolite, cours au Collége de France, 1954-1955 (Paris: Belin, 2003)), which is related to the Logic and Existence, trans. Leonard Lawlor theme of sense, might be understood in and Amit Sen (Albany: State University of terms of the implication of the visible and New York Press, 1997). the invisible that we find in Hegel’s concept, 38 This essay cannot provide the argument which term Hyppolite translates as “sense” that Hegelian concept is already sense, but (see note 37). The connection drawn likely it is. between Hegel’s concept and Merleau- 39 Strikingly, Robert Rosen’s argument for a Ponty’s theme of the entwining of the new scientific formalism for biology visible and the invisible is warranted by repeatedly criticizes traditional scientific Hegel’s constant play, in his analysis of formalism for reducing everything to syntax; essence, on the word Schein—which is he argues for a reciprocal relation between played out as show, appearance, the shining syntax and semantics (Robert Rosen, Life forth of essence. Hegel’s problem with the itself : a comprehensive inquiry into the logic of essence, as noted above, is that it nature, origin, and fabrication of life, involves terms that either show up or do not, Complexity in ecological systems series and that it cannot grasp the relation between (New York: Columbia University Press, what shows and what is being shown. The 1991)). logic of institution—which is what we find 40 in the concept that mediates its own The reference here is to Bergson’s essay instituion—is precisely the logic of “Intellectual Effort,” in Henri Bergson, something making itself visible for the first Mind-energy: Lectures and Essays, trans. H. time, of an invisible institution that needs its Wildon Carr (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood visible to be what it is. Borges’s lottery of Press, 1975). Leonard Lawlor, The Babylon appears enigmatic as institution Challenge of Bergsonism (London: precisely because Borges’s articulation of it Continuum, 2003), pp 70-79 explores

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Bergon’s essay and dynamic schema in of Martin Heidegger?” (Levinas, The Theory detail, and draws a connection to the theme of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology, p. of sense; the connection is arguably resonant 119). For this sort of point in Heidegger, with the account of sense suggested here. see, e.g., Being and Time, where he writes of 41 “being-in” that “we cannot indeed consent to Robert J. Full and Claire T. Farley, nullify the primordial character of this "Musculoskeletal Dynamics in Rhythmic phenomenon by deriving it from others— Systems: A Comparative Approach to that is to say by an inappropriate analysis, in Legged Locomotion," in Biomechanics and the sense of a dissolving or breaking up.” Neural Control of Posture and Movement, (Heidegger, Being and Time, §28, p. 131 in ed. Jack M. Winters and Patrick E. Crago the German.) Analysis cannot proceed from (New York: Springer Verlag, 2000). On this theoretical contemplation, and Heidegger’s sort of issue about the organism, also see criticism of Husserl would be that despite Gerald L. Geison and Manfred D. Husserl’s beginning in variation, so long as Laubichler, "The Varied Lives of consciousness is driving the variation, Organisms: Variation in the Historiography Husserlian variation is an analysis that starts of the Biological Sciences," Studies in from the wrong point. History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 32, no. 1 (2001) and 45 See the preface to Merleau-Ponty, Manfred D. Laubichler, "The Organism is Phenomenology of Perception. Dead. Long Live the Organism," 46 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Perspectives on Science 8, no. 3 (2000). Arthur Mitchell (Mineola, N.Y.: Dover, 42 Michael H. Dickinson et al., "How 1998), p xiii. Animals Move: An Integrative View," 47 This ambiguity could also be tracked by Science 288 (2000). looking at Bergson’s discussion in Matter 43 Esther Thelen, "Motor Development: A and Memory of the quality of the colour red New Synthesis," American Psychologist 50, vs. the quantification of it as light with no. 2 (1995), Esther Thelen and L.B. Smith, frequency X, taking some guidance from A Dynamic Systems Approach to the Deleuze’s comments in Gilles Deleuze, Development of Cognition and Action, ed. Bergsonism, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Stephen Palmer, MIT Press/Bradford Books Barbara Habberjam (New York, N. Y.: Zone Series in Cognitive Psychology (Cambridge, Books, 1988). The ambiguity here is that MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books, 1994). the body, as just mentioned, serves to 44 What is at stake here and in Merleau- contract one order of time into another, yet Ponty is well captured in Levinas’s belongs to both. insightful analysis of the tension between 48 On alteration vs. variation, cf. Husserl the intellectualist philosopher and Kockelmans, Edmund Husserl's Husserl the phenomenologist who turns us Phenomenology , 141. Also see Thomas M. to life. Levinas’s analysis culminates in the Seebohm, "Individuals, Identity, Names: questions at the end of his chapter on the Phenomenological Considerations," in intuition of essences: “Is our main attitude Husserl in Contemporary Context: toward reality that of theoretical Prospects and Projects for Phenomenology, contemplation? Is not the world presented in ed. Burt C. Hopkins (Dordrecht: Kluwer, its very being as a center of action, as a field 1997), 141-142, which makes the point that of activity or of care—to speak the language the variation that gives empirical universals

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“is not “free” variation” since the former has practice, the first number in the reference is not yet prescinded from predicates, i.e., un- the volume number, and the number after free variation is a bit too much like the decimal point is the paragraph number in alteration; Seebohm’s point about free that volume. variation is related to our point about 51 Charles Darwin, The Variation of Animals intensive variation. and Plants Under Domestication, 2 vols., 49 Douglas R. Anderson, "The Evolution of vol. 1 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Peirce's Concept of Abduction," University Press, 1998), p. 12. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce 52 Gregory Bateson, Mind and Nature: A Society 22 (1986) gives a clear overview of Necessary Unity (New York: E.P. Dutton, abduction in Peirce, and his position is 1979), p 142. compelling. Also see C.J. Misak, Truth and 53 the End of Inquiry (Oxford: Clarendon Bateson, Mind and Nature: A Necessary Press, 1991). Unity, p 143. 54 50 “Deduction, Induction, Hypothesis” in Bateson, Mind and Nature: A Necessary Charles S. Peirce, Collected Papers of Unity, p 143. Charles Sanders Peirce, vol. 1/2 55 Cf. John Russon, The Self and its Body in (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (Toronto: University Press, 1960); as per established University of Toronto Press, 1997).

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