The Problem of Nature in the Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty

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The Problem of Nature in the Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty Duquesne University Duquesne Scholarship Collection Electronic Theses and Dissertations Spring 5-8-2020 The Problem of Nature in the Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty Alessio Rotundo Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/etd Part of the Continental Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Rotundo, A. (2020). The Problem of Nature in the Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty (Doctoral dissertation, Duquesne University). Retrieved from https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/1868 This Immediate Access is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. THE PROBLEM OF NATURE IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MERLEAU-PONTY A Dissertation Submitted to Duquesne University Duquesne University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy By Alessio Rotundo May 2020 Copyright by Alessio Rotundo 2020 THE PROBLEM OF NATURE IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MERLEAU-PONTY By Alessio Rotundo Approved on December 9th, 2019 ________________________________ ________________________________ Dr. Laney Rodemeyer Dr. Fred Evans Associate Professor Professor Duquesne University Duquesne University Philosophy Philosophy ________________________________ Dr. Anthony Steinbock Professor Stony Brook University Philosophy ________________________________ ________________________________ Dr. Daniel Selcer Dr. Kristine L. Blair Associate Professor and Interim Chair Dean, Duquesne University Duquesne University McAnulty College and Graduate School Philosophy of Liberal Arts iii ABSTRACT THE PROBLEM OF NATURE IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MERLEAU-PONTY By Alessio Rotundo May 2020 Dissertation supervised by Dr. Lanei Rodemeyer In my dissertation, I show that Merleau-Ponty’s idea of nature yields a double meaning: nature as ensemble of genetic and productive processes that are attainable in experience (phenomenal nature) and nature as that which enables this experience (transcendental nature). My thesis is that the two meanings of nature, when taken together, offer a guide to Merleau-Ponty’s final philosophical formulations about “flesh” and the “visible” and the “invisible.” The aim of the dissertation is to trace the salient conceptual and methodological complications entailed by this conception. I argue that the bivalence of the problem of nature in Merleau-Ponty receives a methodological clarification and proves coherent if we pay attention to the way Merleau-Ponty understands the thrust of radicalization in play in Husserl’s later work in phenomenology, especially regarding his expansion of the notion of intentionality. iv DEDICATION To Ron Bruzina. v ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The successful completion of this dissertation has been made possible by many friends and colleagues, to whom I would like to express my gratitude. I would like to thank Dr. Lanei Rodemeyer for her focused suggestions and comments through a material and a style of composition that was not always easy to read. I also would like to thank Dr. Fred Evans for his continuous readiness to engage in several insightful conversations about my topic. Their contribution has dramatically increased the final overall quality of the dissertation while also never limiting my freedom in developing the argument I was pursuing. I am thankful for Dr. Anthony Steinbock, who accepted without hesitations to be part of my dissertation committee and thus made this project possible. My heartfelt thank you goes also to the many librarians and administrative assistant at Duquesne University for their continuous help during the dissertation process. During the years of doctoral work in Pittsburgh, I have had the honor and privilege to meet several special people, who made this city feel like my home, in particular: Robyn, Peter, and their family; Ann and Jude; Dave and Mike; and Hanna. I would like to thank my parents and my sisters, who have always supported in many ways my choice to pursue the study of philosophy at home and away from home. A most special thank you goes to Dr. Ron Bruzina, who introduced my thoughts to Merleau-Ponty and to an entirely different dimension in philosophy. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract ....................................................................................................................................iv Dedication ................................................................................................................................. v Acknowledgement ...................................................................................................................vi Table of Contents .................................................................................................................. vii List of Abbreviations ...............................................................................................................xi Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1: Natura Sub Specie Structurae § 1. The Disinterested and the Interested Onlooker. .............................................................. 9 § 2. Naturizing and Naturized Consciousness ...................................................................... 17 § 3. Phenomenology between Husserl and Merleau-Ponty ................................................. 22 Chapter 2: Pathway to Nature: Operative Intentionality from Husserl to Merleau- Ponty § 1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 28 § 1.a. How Merleau-Ponty Came to Phenomenology: The Notion of “Operative Intentionality” ................................................................... 29 § 1.b. Cartesian “Realism” ..................................................................................................... 35 § 1.c. Operative Intentionality ............................................................................................... 38 § 1.d. Brief Methodic Reflection on the “Idea of Being” in Phenomenology .................... 43 § 1.e. The Prejudice of the World.......................................................................................... 46 § 1.f. Operative Intentionality as Temporalizing.................................................................. 50 vii § 2. The Project of the Phenomenology of Perception as Enquiry into Operative Intentionality........................................................................ 52 § 2.a. The Discovery of Contingency and Transcendental Philosophy: Descartes and Kant....................................................................................................... 55 § 2.b. The Embodied Subject: Phenomenology of Perception I .......................................... 60 § 2.c. Note on Husserl’s Ideas II: The Regressive Undoing of Self-Forgetfulness § 2.c.i. Body Oddity ............................................................................................................... 64 § 2.c.ii. Husserl on the Intuition of Space ............................................................................. 68 § 2.d. The Notion of Spatial Level: Phenomenology of Perception II ................................ 72 § 2.e. The Kantian Notion of a Level of All Levels and the General Level of Experience .......................................................................... 77 § 2.f. The Phenomenological Conception of “Natural Sign” .............................................. 80 Chapter 3: Orders of Experience: World-Horizon and the Apperception § 1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 84 § 1.a. Husserl and the Notion of Earth .................................................................................. 88 § 1.b. The Modalization of the World and the Natural Attitude ......................................... 91 § 2. The Theory of Integration and the Notion of Apperception......................................... 96 § 3. Historical Note on the Notion of Apperception ..........................................................103 § 3.a. Maine de Biran’s Theory of the Fact of Consciousness ..........................................106 Chapter 4: Mundus Sensibilis: Structure, Passage, Movement § 1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................113 § 1.a. Ontic Structural Realism ............................................................................................114 § 1.b. Syntactic and Semantic Views ..................................................................................117 viii § 1.c. Invariance between Physics and Phenomenology ....................................................119 § 1. d. Physics Deformalized ...............................................................................................122 § 1.f. Observation and Objectivation ..................................................................................124 § 2. Note on A. N. Whitehead .............................................................................................127 § 3. Natural Dynamis between Physics and Perception .....................................................135 § 4. The Praxis of Nature, or What the Things Do .............................................................139 Chapter 5: Nature and
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