New Mexico Historical Review

Volume 74 Number 2 Article 5

4-1-1999

The Battle of Ciudad Juàrez: Death Knell of the Porfirian Regime in Mexico

Lawrence D. Taylor

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmhr

Recommended Citation Taylor, Lawrence D.. "The Battle of Ciudad Juàrez: Death Knell of the Porfirian Regime in Mexico." New Mexico Historical Review 74, 2 (1999). https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmhr/vol74/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in New Mexico Historical Review by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Battle ofCiudad Juarez: Death Knell of the Porfirian Regime in Mexico

LAWRENCE D. TAYLOR

The battle that ended with the Anti-Reelectionists' capture of the bor­ der town of Ciudad Juarez in Chihuahua in May 19 U is probably the best~known of the military actions that occurred during the early phase of the Mexican Revolution. In the wake of the treaty that was signed at Ciudad Juarez, hostilities ended and Porfirio Diaz resigned. It was widely held that this action constituted the key event that toppled the old re­ gime and ushered in a new period of rule. This assumption came to form popular ideas about the battle and its significance in the forging of the modern Mexican nation. Over the years, researchers have hotly contended the importance of the battle as an historical event. Some historians, in reviewing the insur­ rection of 191 0-1911 have claimed that the battle was only the culminat­ ing blow in the war that resulted in Diaz's resignation and exile. I A few researchers have drawn attention to other military actions that occurred at the end of the struggle, which they consider also formed a part of the sequence of events that ended with Diaz's overthrow. One such engage­ ment was the storming ofCuautla, Morelos, on 19 May 1911 by an armed group under the command of Emiliano Zapata. In terms of the numbers of combatants, this battle rivaled that of Juarez. 2 One of the most recent interpretations of the significance of the battle of Ciudad Juarez is that of British historian Alan Knight. Knight argues that the Porfirian army had not been beaten by the time of the signing of the peace treaty and that it had really been betrayed by

Lawrence D. Taylor is a researcher with the Departamento de Estudios Culturales, EI Colegio de la Frontera Norte, in Tijuana, Mexico. He is the author of La gran aventura en Mexico: el popel de los volun/arios extranjeros en los eje~citos revolucionarios mexicanos. 1910-1915 and La revuelto magonista de 1911 en Baja California. 179 180 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW APRIL 1999 politicos in the capital, who, rather than witness the country slip into further bloodshed and chaos, were prepared to make peace at any price. According to Knight, the treaty that was negotiated at Ciudad Juarez between the two contending factions was motivated more by political than military considerations:

... the transaccion which ended the Diaz regime represented not the logical culmination ofa narrow, controlled, political revo­ lution, but rather the alarmed reaction-on the part of elites on both sides-to a mounting social upheaval ... The army emerged from the 191 1 revolution larger than in the last days of the Diaz regime ... In no sense had it been whipped: no major battles had been lost; of the cities of the Republic only Juarez had been taken by the rebels a Juerza y sangre. 3

I intend to take another look at the battle over Juarez and analyze it within the overall context ofthe war in northern Mexico and particularly against the backdrop ofU.S.-Mexican relations during this period. While not denying that other engagements during the 1910-1911 revolt-such as the Zapatista victory at Cuautla-constituted important advances in the rebel campaign against the Diaz government, I argue that the results of the rebel victory at Ciudad Juarez were especially significant for two reasons. Not only did the fall of the city consitutute the key to the collapse ofthe federal army's hold over northern Mexico, but, more im­ portantly, it also marked a triumph for the insurrectos (rebels) in the international arena as well. The capture of the city resulted in a signifi­ cant shift in the U.S. government's attitude and policy toward the rebel­ lion, allowing the insurrectos to freely bring arms into Mexico. This, in conjunction with the effect of the city's fall and the collapse of the federal forces in general, sounded the death knell of the Porfirian re­ gime. In order to properly understand the context in which the battle oc­ curred, it is useful to trace Francisco Madero's strategy and direction of the Anti-Reelectionist insurrection in the northern border region from its beginnings to the siege of Juarez in mid-April 1911. It is also impor­ tant to focus on the U.S. government's reaction to the rebellion as it developed in Mexico. The capture of a northern Mexican border city had constituted a key objective ofMadero and his immediate circle of followers since the ini­ tial call to arms with the publication of the Plan of San Luis Potosi and the beginning ofthe armed revolt on 10 November 1910. While engaged in planning the rebellion in the headquarters of the revolutionary junta (council) in San Antonio, Texas, they had come to believe that it was possible to create a general insurrectionary movement in Mexico in the form of a number of separate, but coordinated uprisings in the larger TAYLOR 181

cities, supported and sustained by popular disturbances in the smaller urban and rural areas. They assumed that the participants in these re­ volts would join Madero's army, which the provisional president planned to form and direct from a base in northern Coahuila.4 With this project in mind, Madero gave money to his uncle Catarino Benavides, a resident of Coahuila, to recruit volunteers and purchase small arms and munitions. Madero and a few armed companions-his brothers Julio and Raul, Jose Diaz (also a relative), and three ex-federal army officers named Rafael Aguilar and Ruben and Octavio Morales­ planned to meet with Benavides and the Coahuilan recruits on 20 No­ vember on one of the islands of the Rio Bravo near the border towns of Eagle Pass, Texas, and Ciudad Porfirio Diaz (present-day Piedras Negras). On the appointed day, Benavides met with Madero and his small group, but he had been unable to recruit more than ten poorly armed volun­ teers. Disappointed, Madero journeyed with his brother Raul to New Or­ leans, where the two bided their time in the hope that a significant rebel uprising might occur either in Veracruz or in some other region border­ ing the Gulf of Mexico. In the event that this happened, they would board a vessel headed for the region with the intent of leading the revolt there. When the anticipated large-scale rebellion failed to materialize, the two Madero brothers decided to move on.s Undeterred, they returned to San Antonio and from there proceeded to Dallas. After a week's stay, they went on to El Paso, where they helped to establish a revolutionary junta in that city in coordination with Abraham Gonzalez, the most promi­ nent of the Chihuahuan insurrecto leaders. 6 The El Paso junta also devised a plan for Chihuahua. Madero, to­ gether with some recruits, would enter Chihuahua a few miles down­ stream from El Paso at Ysleta to join the rebel group headed by Pascual Orozco, who until that time had been the most successful of the insur­ rection leaders in the state. They would then proceed to Casas Grandes in northwestern Chihuahua, and try to take it by surprise. At the same time, they would recruit and arm as many followers as possible by means of captured arms in order to sieze other towns in the region, such as Janos, Guzman, and Palomas. They would sever rail and telegraph com­ munications in order to isolate Chihuahua from other federal garrisons in the state. Once these objectives had been fulfilled, the insurrectos would lay siege to Ciudad Juarez, the most important link on the border between Mexico and the United States. The capture of the city and its customhouse would, they believed, allow the rebels to import foodstuffs, merchandise, and war materials into Mexico. It might also induce the United States government to recognize the Maderistas as belligerents.7 At the time of the rebellion's inception, President William H. Taft favored keeping the Diaz regime in power. In reply to the Mexican government's denouncement of rebels trafficking men and arms across 182 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW APRIL 1999

,­, ,

, ,I , /.p, • .,Id.o OJ i n.'.,,:6,:_ 4 r 111'41"".- ,

\ \ ld."'. '" J I I .Jull",.~ I I""",,t"., J I -- I I I I , I ',. &. S'~ "1110.1 t. \ ,, o m \, , 3• .... \ i \ \

" ~h.' \ r \ \ \

THE MADERISTA CAMPAIGN IN CHIHUAHUA FEBRUARY.MAY 1911

{:; CombaTes o CiTies o CapiTals • Towns - Railroads

...... RouTe of Madero's March

50 100 ~'"

The Maderista Campaign. Map courtesy of the author. TAYLOR 183 the international .border, Taft gave his assurances that he would do his best to uphold American neutrality within the limits of U.S. law. 8 American neutrality legislation was contained in the Revised Stat­ utes of 1873. Sections 5281 and 5282 prohibited U.S. citizens and any persons in U. S. territory from serving in foreign armies against nations with which the United States was not at war. Section 5286 prohibited organizing a military or hostile expedition in the U.S. that was to be launched against a state with which the U.S. maintained friendly rela­ tions. These statutes also specified fines and prison terms against those who violated them.9 In addition to the Revised Statutes, the government based its neutrality policy on a number of other considerations: presi­ dential proclamations, legal precedents, international concerns, federal court decisions, and the opinions and actions of the secretary of state, attorney general, military officials, customs and immigration officials, and state and municipal authorities. 10 Since Taft was not as active in foreign policy as his predecessor, Theodore Roosevelt, policy-making was largely under the control of Secretary of State Philander C. Knox, whose own policy regarding neu­ trality in relation to the Mexican revolt was heavily· influenced by his solicitor, James Brown Scott. During the Roosevelt administration, Scott had acquired a reputation as a defender both of free speech and of for­ eign residents in the United States." In December 1910, Knox advised the Mexicangovernment that he disagreed with its demands to curtail the subversive activities of Mexican rebels in the United States and to halt arms smuggling across the border. At the end ofJanuary 1911, Knox made a formal statement concerning this issue:

It is not an offense against the United States to transport arms, ammunition, and munitions of war from this country to any for­ eign country, whether they are tq be used in war or not; nor is it an offense against the United States for individuals to leave this country with intent to enlist in foreign military service; nor is it an offense against the United States to transport persons out of this country and land them in foreign countries, although such persons have an intent to enlist in foreign armies; nor is it an offense agaisnt the United States to transport from this coun­ try persons intending to enlist in foreign armies and munitions of war in the same ship. The purpose of the section in question (R.S. 5286) is to prevent the use of the soil or waters of the United States as a base, from which military expeditions or mili­ tary enterprises shall be carried on against foreign powers with which the United States is at peace. What it prohibits is a mili­ tary expedition or a military enterprise from this country against any foreign power at peace with the United States.'2 184 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW APRIL 1999

Attorney General George W. Wickersham protested that Knox's po­ sition contradicted the president's instruction concerning neutrality en­ forcement. Wickersham also claimed that it obstructed the work of the Departments of Justice, War, and the Treasury, whose members were trying to ensure American neutrality in the Mexican conflict. The ability of the u.s. government to repress the Maderistas who operated from American soil was thus hindered not only by cabinet dissension, but also by conditions along the border. The U.S. simply did not have suffi­ cient numbers of police and soldiers to patrol the 2,000 miles that sepa­ rated the two countries. 13 Wickersham was eventually successful in acquiring Taft's consent to augment the number of troops, secret agents, and customs officials along the border, but the increases were insuffi­ cient for the task. 14 Despite the limited number ofAmerican officials, several Maderistas were arrested in Texas and Arizona and held for a grand jury throughout the spring and summer of 1911. 15 This was due not only to Wickersham's direction, but also to the diligence of government personnel (primarily customs officials) at the local level. Some federal officials, such as Luther T. Ellsworth, the u.S. Consul at Ciudad Porfirio Diaz, and Robert W. Dowe, U.S. customs agent at Eagle Pass, Texas, did everything within their power to persecute those they suspected of violating American neutrality. These officers, with the aid ofpolice and detectives (some of whom were paid Mexican spies), gathered large amounts of evidence in order to prosecute suspects. 16 In spite of these efforts, the rebels operated relatively freely be­ cause they enjoyed the sympathy of a large part of the population of Texas and other southwestern states. Moreover, this sympathy increased as the rebellion made gains in Mexico. It seemed to many Anglo and Mexican Americans that the Maderistas were fighting for ideals such as liberty and democracy-things never associated with the Diaz regime. I? Collaborators, some of whom were military and government personnel, constantly informed rebels ofthe movements oflaw enforcement agents and the local sheriffs in counties closest to the border were hesitant to arrest neutrality violators, since they were dependent on Mexican Ameri­ can votes to stay in office. In judicial cases that dealt with neutrality violations, local courts and juries, swayed by popular sentiment, fre­ quently acquitted suspects. 18 In the meantime, rebel groups in Chihuahua had begun to move against Ciudad Juarez. On 7 January 1911, Orozco and his men evacu­ ated Ciudad Guerrero in southern Chihuahua in view of the advance on that town by a strong federal column under the command of General Juan J. Navarro. 19 After circulating rumors to the effect that he was planning an attack against Chihuahua, Orozco led his forces, together with those commanded by Luis A. Garcia (a total of some 1,500 men), in the direction of the border city. The contemplated attack had to be TAYLOR· 185 aborted, however, because on 4 February 1911, a large group of federal reinforcements on the northwestern railway, under the command of Colo­ nel Antonio Rabago, succeeded in slipping by the insurrecto encamp­ ment and into the city. The imminent arrival of more troops from Ciudad Chihuahua under General Navarro was a further deterrent. 2o Despite the withdrawal of the forces under Orozco and Garcia from the border area, February witnessed an increase in the number of mili­ tary engagements in both Chihuahua and the rest of Mexico. 21 Madero, whose arrest the U.S. Department of Justice had ordered since the insurrections's outbreak, was aware that the authories were fast closing in on him. On the night of 13-14 February, he and his 130 men crossed over to Zaragoza, Chihuahua, where they met the rebel group commanded by Jose de 1a Luz SotO. 22 Proceeding southeast, the column arrived at Guadalupe in the last week of February. While encamped there, Madero learned that Casas Grandes was lightly defended and he decided to as­ sault that town. Unwilling to wait for Orozco and his forces, whom he had ordered to join him at Galeana, Madero instead sent instructions to De la Luz Soto, whose men were encamped at Asuncion, located north­ east ofCasas Grandes. They were to proceed to Casas Grandes in prepa­ ration for a joint attack on the federal garrison. 23 The assault, carried out on 6 March 1911, ended in the rout of the insurrectos because of the timely arrival of a force of federal cavalry under Colonel Samuel Garcia Cuellar, who had initially been ordered to recapture Asuncion. 24 Although the defeat constituted an undeniable setback for the rebel campaign in Chihuahua, Madero's example of per­ sonal leadership and valor during the battle attracted further popular support for the Anti-Reelectionist cause. Madero's leadership in battle also provided the revolt with a strong directing force andfocus.25 Henry Lane Wilson, the U.S. ambassador to Mexico, and American consuls in different regions submitted reports to the State Department, indicating that the rebellion was spreading in Sonora and other northern states. The reports also revealed that hostilities had begun or, in some cases, resumed in Morelos, Guerrero, Tlaxcala, Puebla, Veracruz, Tabasco, and Yucatan. 26 In response to the increased rebel activities, Taft ordered an addi­ tional 10,000 soldiers-the so-called "Maneuver Division"-to the bor­ der. Officially, the reinforcements were to engage only in training operations and enforce neutrality laws. Unofficially, they were to supple­ ment customs officials' efforts to intercept rebel arms shipmentsY Taft confided to Army Chief-of-Staff General Leonard Wood that he had or­ dered the deployment so that they could be sent into Mexico to protect American lives and property, should revolutionary conditions warrant it. Taft doubted it would come to that, and he needed approval from Congress to do so, but he was counting on the presence of the troops to ensure that belligerent Mexican forces would respect U.S. interests. 28 186 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW APRIL 1999

The additional American troops on the border coupled with increased manuevering ofthe Pacific Fleet on the western coast of Mexico height­ ened tension between the two administrations. The Mexican govern­ ment interpreted the actions as both insulting and threatening.29 At the same time, leaders of American financial and business com­ munities had begun to express their disillusionment with the Diaz re­ gime. New York banking houses were angered by the nationalistic financial policies ofMexico's Ministro de Hacienda, Jose Ives Limantour, who sought loans and credit in Europe instead of the United States. John D. Rockefeller, president ofthe Standard Oil Company, and Edward L. Doheny, director of the Mexican Petroleum Company, were annoyed when the Diaz regime stemmed American economic expansion in Mexico by granting oil concessions to the British firm of W. D. Pearson and Son. American mining corporations also demended further concessions from the Mexican government, but Diaz refused to authorize them. 30 A number of other diplomatic problems were also cause for Ameri­ can concern. The most serious of these was Diaz's refusal to renew the U.S. government's lease of Magdalena Bay, located off Baja California. The navy had been using this area as a coaling station and as a gunnery practice range; with Diaz's action, U.S. naval authorities worried that either the Diaz administration or a subsequent Mexican government would lease both Magdalena Bay and nearby Turtle Bay to the Japanese. 31 Another source of American irritation arose from the fact that in 1909 Diaz had granted asylum to Nicaraguan dictator Jose Santos Zelaya, whose government the U. S. had helped to overthrowY Despite these problems, the Taft administration continued to cooperate with the Diaz regime in maintaining American neutrality within the limits of the law and with the resources at its disposal. Following the Casas Grandes debacle, Madero, joined by Orozco and Francisco Villa, proceeded to regroup his forces at Hacienda Bustillos, some sixty miles northeast of Chihuahua. Despite the proxim­ ity of his encampment to the state capital, the provisional president selected Ciudad Juarez as the next target. 33 In imitation of Orozco's actions during the first attempt to capture the border city, Madero made it appear that he would soon march against Chihuahua. Once federal troops had been transferred there to deter any rebel assault, he moved his refurbished army, complete with some im­ provised "cannons" constructed out of scrap material at the Madera railway shops, in the direction of Ciudad Juarez. On 15 April, the insurrectos defeated a small federal advance force sent out from Ciudad Juarez at Bauche, where the Mexican Central and Northwestern Rail­ ways intersected on the outskirts ofthe town. The insurrectos proceeded to surround the border city on three sides and they soon had a force of 500 troops in the area, which outnumbered the federal defenders (less TAYLOR 187 than 700) by three to one.34 At the same time, an event occurred in Sonora that was to have considerable bearing on the course of the rebellion: the capture of the border town of Agua Prieta on 13 April 1911, by insurgent forces led by Arturo "Colorado" Lopez, Juan N. Medina, Antonio Rojas, and other leaders. 35 With the exception of the capture of Mexicali by the group of Magonista insurrectos led by Jose Maria Leyva and Simon Berthold on 29 January 1911, this victory constituted the first time a Mexican border town had fallen to rebel troopS.36 The occupation was short-lived, since, during the night of 17-18 April, a federal column led by Colonel Reynaldo Diaz retook the town. 37 The Maderista achievement might have proved more durable had it not been for the lack ofadequate coordination among the various insurrecto groups in the region, as well as breaches of disci­ pline among both officers and men. 38 During the final federal assault that terminated with the penetration of the rebels' inner defense perim­ eter, three of the insurgent leaders-Arturo Lopez, Juan Medina and Belisario Garcia-cros~,ed~the international line to safety in Douglas, Arizona while many of their troops got drunk on alcoholic beverages they had found in the town's stores and cantinas. 39 The brief occupation also did not afford the rebels a port of entry for the importation of arms and other supplies. Cornelius O'Keefe, the U.S. customs collector, had closed the customs facilities on the Ameri­ can side ofthe border when the insurrectos arrived on 13 April. O'Keefe explained that he had done so to prevent the shipment of arms, muni­ tions, and provisions to the rev'olutionists. In doing so, O'Keefe acted in accordance with Wickersham's interpretation of the neutrality laws rather than Knox's. 40 In any event, the Treasury Department drew O'Keefe's attention to the fact that only the President or the Secretary of the Treasury could legally close a port of entry, but they did not order the port reopened.41 Be that as it may, the temporary rebel victory at Agua Prieta consti­ tute.d a significant reversal for the federal cause and obliged the central government to send increasingly large bodies of reinforcements to the northern theater of war. 42 The initial triumph of 13 April demonstrated that not only were the Anti-Reelectionists capable of capturing a border town, but and that sooner or later, they would do so again and gain more permanent footholds in northern Mexico. The federal reconquest of the town on 18 April proved to be one of the most bloody and hard-fought battles ofthe war. A column ofapproximately 1,000 men suffered numer­ ous casualties before achieving its objective. In addition, there could be no assurance that the operation might not have to be repeated, since most of the effectives who took part in the attack would have to be transferred to some other dangerous place. The town also might have to be abandoned altogether, thus making it a tempting target for insurrectos 188 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW APRIL 1999 in the region. The rebel victory, while short-lived, served to elevate the morale of the northern insurgents, given the several reverses that they had expe­ rienced, such as the defeat at Casas Grandes and the prolonged siege of Ojinaga that began on 14 March and had not yet ended. The progressive concentration of federal troops in Chihuahua during the preceding months had induced revolutionary groups in other regions of the coun­ try to increase their activities. Soon, other regions of Mexico would be threatened, which would impose additional burdens on the federals' re­ sources. 43 In the meantime, the planned assault on Ciudad Juarez had been delayed because of the commander-in-chief's caution. Madero was warned by Francisco Vazquez Gomez, one of his principal supporters, that an attack on Ciudad Juarez might result in citizens' deaths in the neighboring city of El Paso, thus provoking U.S. intervention. Madero and the federal commander Navarro agreed to a five-day suspension of hostilities. The truce commenced on 23 April and was to apply to a limited quadrilateral region bounded on its four corners by Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, Munaca and Casas Grandes. 44 The cease-fire provided an opportunity to resume informal negotiations that had been going on since the end of February. These efforts involved members of Madero's family and others who shared the confidence of the leaders of the op­ posing forces. 45 During the previous months, President Diaz had adopted a number of initiatives to curb the wave of uprisings in the country. His reforms consisted of removing unpopular state governors such as Alberto Terrazas in Chihuahua, Mucio Martinez in Puebla, and Enrique Munoz Aristegui in Yucatan. He also made changes in all cabinet positions except in the case of the Secretaria de Hacienda and the Secretaria de Guerra y Marina. In an address delivered before Congress on 1 April, Diaz likewise made proposals not only banning the reelection of the president and vice-president, and the reforms of the electoral and judi­ cial systems, but also the breakup of large rural landholdings.46 These concessions failed to stem revolutionary ferment that had gripped the country, and, if anything, probably encouraged the rebels, since it was interpreted by many as a sign of government weakness.47 In the face of the imminent rebel attack against Ciudad Juarez, the government was much more disposed to participate in discussions that might lead to a solution to the conflict based upon compromise. By mid­ April, several weaknesses inherent in the Porfirian army had created a military crisis for the federal forces. Diaz and his advisers realized that the increased military demands were placing pressures upon the country's limited resources to combat the insurrectos. Although the army had fought with a degree of tenacity and fortitude, it was likely to TAYLOR 189

fragment or collapse altogether should the conflict continue for any length oftime.48 Since its inception, the Porfirian regime had been more civil than military in character. In order to remove the threat of a military coup, Diaz had attempted to maintain an army that would be relatively weak, but also strong enough to quell local rebellions. Basing his policy on these contradictory objectives, he progressivley reduced the portion of the budget dedicated to the army's maintenance. Between 1884 and 1910, the number of effectives serving in the internal security forces was re­ duced by thirty percent. By 1910, official estimates put the total number of soldiers at 29,000 but the actual figure was about halfthat--,-14,000­ and only 6,000 were eventually dispatched to Chihuahua to fight against the dissident groups that had taken up arms since November of that year. 49 To compensate for this numerical weakness, the Diaz government could also count upon several corps of rurales (rural police) for defen­ sive purposes. The rurales, some of whom were ex-bandits, were fairly efficient and well-paid, unlike the regular rank-and-file soldiers who were often recruited through the leva (draft). The government could also draw upon the services of national guards that were under the jurisdiction of the different states as well as private units of rurales that belonged to, for example, municipios, haciendas, and mines. There also existed a so­ called "auxiliary" federal force, made up of undertrained reserve ele­ ments. It was neither powerful nor useful as a military unit. Even with these, the Porfirian forces did not total more than 30,000 men-too few to deal with a general insurrection.50 The progressive deterioration of the army, especially from January 1911 onward, motivated the government to adopt a series ofmeasures in order to increase the number of effectives in the armed forces. The most important of these reforms consisted of strengthening those units des­ tined for defensive purposes by incorporating civilian "volunteers," who were usually financed by wealthy urban and rural families.5' In general, however, the government was content to rely on the tropa de linea (regular troops) and rurales to stem the rising tide of rebellion. In the case of the regular army, the quality of the rank-and-file soldiers left much to be desired. Desertion was a recurrent problem; though it never became widespread. 52 A more serious problem existed with the disaffection that appeared among federal troops as the campaign con­ tinued. In late January, for example, Louis Hostetter, the U.S. Consul at Hermosillo, reported that federal troops charged with holding one of the key passes at Sahuaripa had broken and fled in the face of the first rebel . attack. 53 Such occurrences became more common and the government found it increasingly difficult to find enough soldiers to replace those they lost and to find those who had the will to fight. 190 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW APRIL 1999

Recruiters in the central states reported that many men refused to volunteer their services for fear that the government would send them to Chihuahua or Yucatan, far from their homesY Resorting to the leva did not help, either, because the government often resorted to pressing recruits into service who had been serving time in jailor who came from the most poverty-stricken areas of Mexico City. Such soldiers did not relish either army life or having to risk their lives in combat for a govern­ ment that had done little for them in the past.55 The methods the Diaz government relied on to combat the rebellion also proved ineffective. The federal army revealed considerable ability on the defense, but its senior leaders lacked the initiative and experi­ ence to undertake offensive operations' against the rebels. The army's counter-insurgency strategy consisted essentially in concentrating its forces in the larger cities and mobilizing smaller columns to ferret out rebel parties and destroy them. These columns rarely operated far from railway lines, in part because of their commanders' wishes to minimize desertions that normally would occur on overland marches, but also to maintain contact with supply bases. Such tactics, however, were rarely successful against an enemy as wide-ranging and seemingly ephemeral as the Mexican insurrectos. The federal contingents, well-armed but slow, were pitted against an enemy composed ofmen who were well acquainted with the region in which they fought. 56 Unlike the counter-guerrilla strategy the British employed during the second Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902, the Mexi­ can federal army did not possess sufficient cavalry units to form large flying ,columns, which would have enabled it to surround and destroy rebel groups. 57 In time, the federals abandoned their attempts to eradicate the insurrecto groups in rural areas and instead concentrated on safeguard­ ing the most important strategic points. Troops were shunted from gar­ rison to garrison via the railways, their principal communications arteries, in order to fortify areas under siege. 58 Thefederals attempted to protect railway lines with armored trains and small cavalry patrols, but they did not have enough men and rolling stock to guard the entire system. Be­ cause of dangers of rebel ambushes and mines buried in road beds, it became increasingly difficult to hire engineers who could operate troop and supply trains. Rebel forces also attacked telegraph and train lines throughout the rebellion, which proved very efficient at preventing federals from reinforcing their own garrisons. 59 Only a radical change in strategy and tactics would have saved the Porfirian army from defeat. As the distinguished Mexican military histo­ rian colonel Miguel Sanchez Lamego has commented:

...the war which was being fought presented peculiarities which existing regulations did not take into account; it was absolutely TAYLOR 191

necessary, therefore, to modify the organization of the existing army units, so that these, with a new role to play, could respond to the demands fo{ modern warfare. 60

. Nevertheless, the federal high command refused to modify its techniques during the 1910-1911 rebellion. Unlike the situation the British faced in South Africa during their struggle with the Boers, the Mexican federal army did not have the immense manpower reserves from which to draw. Having sufficient manpower would have permitted federal forces to un­ dertake both offensive and defensive operations concurrently.61 These factors-the lack of initiative and manpower-coupled with shortcomings in the supply system (munitions and other necess'ities often did not arrive when they were most needed), constituted serious deficiencies in the federal army as a fightingmachineY Such weaknesses help to explain the defensive posture-which some have interpreted as defeatist-the federals adopted during the 1910-1911 campaign. The principal condition that the insurrectos insisted upon when negotiating a peace was the resignations of both President Diaz and Vice-President Ramon Corral. This created an initial stumbling block to the peace discussions. 63 As the talks progressed, Madero relented some­ what on his insistence regarding Diaz's removal and instead concen­ trated on demands for changes in the cabinet and state gubernatorial posts, on electoral reform, the pardoning of political prisoners, the evacu­ ation of federal troops from the northern states, government recognition of some ofthe military ranks held by rebel officers, the immediate resig­ nation of Corral, and the designation of a new Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores with the prior approval of the insurrecto provisional govern­ ment. The peace discussions became official with the designation of Fran­ cisco Carbajal, Magistrate ofthe Supreme Court, as the government rep­ resentative on 26 April. Madero appointed his father, Don Francisco Madero, Dr. Francisco Vazquez Gomez, and Jose Maria Pino Suarez as representatives ·for the insurrecto faction. Although the truce was ex­ tended for another Jive days, until 3 May, and included additional terri­ tory between Ciudad Juarez and Ojinaga, nothing came of the talks because of Madero's renewed insistence that Diaz resign and the latter's reluctance to do so under pressure.64 On 7 May, the breakdown of the peace negotiations and Vazquez Gomez's admonitions about bad results should the rebels assault Juarez led Madero to order his troops to suspend the siege and move south. His plan at this point involved launching an attack against Chihuahua and eventually marching upon Mexico City. He did not, however, close the door to further talks, having instructed his peace negotiators to remain in El Paso to consider any new proposals the government ad­ vanced. 65 That same day, following a prolonged two-day session with 192 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW APRIL 1999

Anti-Reelectionist attack of Ciudad Juarez. Map after Vicente Cazarrubias, Centro de Informacion del Estado de Chihuahua, Chihuahua, Mexico. TAYLOR 193

his cabinet, President Diaz issued a declaration in which he accepted the possibility that he might resign, as long as he could be satisfied that 'the country would not slip into a situation of anarchy and chaos. 66 Any hope, however, that Diaz's statement might lead to a renewal of the peace discussions was shattered on the morning of the following day (8 May) when some of the insurrecto soldiers fired on the town without Madero's authorization. When informed of Madero's plans to march south, Orozco, Francisco Villa, and Giuseppe Garibaldi, an Italian soldier of fortune with Madero's forces, secretly agreed to fire upon the federals without Madero's knowledge or consent. At 10:30 AM, the rebel troops who occupied forward positions opened fire on the federal outer ring of defenses. Madero tried unsuccessfully to check his men, but he had no alternative except to order a massive assault on the town. 67 The insurrectos captured Ciudad Juarez two days later. . Advancing east along the right bank of the Rio Grande, c~lumns of rebel soldiers under Orozco and Garibaldi occupied the parts of the city closest to El Paso. They then worked their way south, breaking holes through the adobe walls so as not to completely expose themselves to federal fire in the streets. The column commanded by Garibaldi included a Foreign Legion contingent of 200-300 volunteers of vaious nationali­ ties. A third column under Jose de la Luz Blanco attacked from the east. The rebels cut off the town's water supply by blocking the current in the acequia madre and shutting offthe engine in the pumping station. From the south, a fourth column under Villa's command advanced along the railroad line and captured the roundhouse and the Ketelson and Degetau warehouses. Over the next two days, rebels captured the bull ring, cowboy cor­ ral, post office, church, and other strongholds of the federals' inner defenses. By the morning of the third day (10 may), only the cuartel general (barracks) remained in federal hands. Shortly after noon, realiz­ ing that further resistance was useless, General Navarro and the remain­ der of his garrison surrendered. 68 The most important result of the rebel victory at Ciudad Juarez was its influence on the the U.S. government's perception of the upheaval in Mexico. WHile the capture of Ciudad Juarez and other towns along the border did not lead the United States to label the Anti-Reelectionists as belligerants, the fall of the border city nevertheless obliged the U.S. to recognize that a fundamental political change was occurring in Mexico at the national level and that Diaz's downfall was inevitable. On 12 May 1911, after conferring with Secretary of State Knox and Attorney Gen- . eraI Wickersham, President William H. Taft decided to recognize the Anti-Reelectionists' de facto control of the international port of entry and to keep U.S. customs facilities open. Taft justified this action by explaining that: 194 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW APRIL 1999

... international law favors the continuance ofcommercial trans­ actions and holds them innocent in a neutral country until those transactions become really a part of a military operation against a friendly government. The mere sale ... of supplies in El Paso to Mexicans, whether insurrectos or supporters of the Govern­ ment, and their delivery across the border, without more, is not a violation of international law or of the neutrality statute.69

Taft's decision gave the insurrectos the right to receive merchan­ dise, including arms, munitions, food and other necessary war materials. In reply to critics who claimed that such a policy favored the insurrecto cause over that of the Mexican federal forces, Taft acknowledged the validity oftheir argument, but claimed that such a situation had resulted from the weakness of the Diaz government, for which the U.S. was not responsible. 70 Not only did the capture of Ciudad Juarez make possible the legal importation of arms and ammunition, but it also made the rebels much more solvent economically. Control of the customhouse on the Mexican side of the border gave the insurrectos the right to collect import taxes, thus affording them an additional source of income with which to fi­ nance further military operations. They could also borrow money from banks in Ciudad Juarez, under pressure if necessary and U.S. bankers would also be more inclined to lend money to the revolutionary junta in view ofthe likelihood that it would soon form a legally constituted gov­ ernment in Mexico. 71 Almost overnight, the victory considerably enhanced Madero's im­ age and movement he represented in the minds of Americans and Mexi­ cans as a whole. Ciudad Juarez, during the course ofthe Maderista revolt in the north, had become the focal point of U.S. and even world atten­ tion. News reports about the city's capture made the front page of many ofthe world's leading daily papers. They extolled Madero, Orozco, Villa, and Garibaldi as heroes in the battle. In the days after the Juarez's cap­ ture, Madero, Abraham Gonzalez, and the principal rebel military offi­ cials were invited to several banquets held in their honor by civil and military officials in EI Paso. Victory celebrations also occurred in Ciudad Juarez, depite the destruction and disorganization the fighting had caused. 72 The fall of the border city caused the federal government to with­ draw troops from towns in the northern border region to protect the state capitals in the interior, as well as the larger urban centers further south. Ojinaga was finally occupied by the rebel group led by Jose de la Cruz Sanchez on 8 May1911. 73 On 9 May 1911, Tijuana fell to a group of Magonista rebels led by the Welshman Caryl Ap Rhys Pryce. 74 A few days later the Maderistas occupied Agua Prieta and Naco following the TAYLOR 195 federal evacuation of these towns. 75 After rebel occupation, the U.S. government informed Mexico that'it would permit the passage of mer­ chandise and other materials at these points. Not only were there nu­ merous historical antecedents fordoing so, it declared, but it also believed that commerce should be carried on normally in any port of entry into a foreign country whose functioning could be guaranteed, independently of whomever was in control of the customhouse receiv­ ing the goods being imported. 76 It is worth inquiring at this point whether, as some writers have asserted, the federal army could have undertaken an expedition to re­ take Ciudad Juarez after its capture. A related question is whether or not the Diaz government could have adopted a more aggressive stance in the face of a defeat that many considered inevitable, instead of merely holding on to the cities they still occupied. Ambassador Wilson claimed that Diaz, "deserted by many of his oldest friends and reluctant to spill more Mexican blood, yielded to what seemed to be the inevitable but really was the culmination of a national hysteria which would have sub­ sided if vigorously and unitedly opposed."77 Any attempt to answer this question requires an analysis of the military situation in Chihuahua and the war in Mexico. The capture of the federal garrison in Ciudad Juarez took 600 sol­ diers-a tenth of the federal forces stationed in Chihuahua-in a single stroke out of combat. 78 The' defeat was a catastrophe for the Porfirian cause in the region. The rebel seizure of Ciudad Juarez and Ojinaga gave the Maderistas control over virtually the entire northern portion of the state. 79 In addition, the guerrilla warfare that had been characteristic of the Mexican insurrectos gave way to one of positions. The steady aggrega­ tion of men and arms had transformed the rebel column Madero led into an army, though small and undisciplined. 80 It now possessed a pair of field guns captured from the federal garrison in Ciudad Juarez along with other services such as rail transport, a commissariat, and even a medical corps,81 Madero's army would most likely march next on Chihuahua City. Observers doubted that the federals would be able to retain control· over this city or any other town in the southern portion of the state. 82 Am­ bassador Wilson, writing from Mexico City, commented that "[T]he fall ofCiudad Juarez has produced a great gloom in this city as it is probably the prelude to the defeat of the army of [General Antonio] Rabago and the taking of Chihuahua."83 The capture of Ciudad Juarez also boosted morale of the Anti­ Reelectionist movement in general. Not only did it help to rebitalize the rebel troops' confidence ·in Madero and the Anti-Reelectionist cause, but it also facilitated recruitment among those Mexicans who had waited for one or the other side to prevail. With the fall ofthe border city, rebel 196 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW APRIL 1999 activities greatly increased in number and magnitude throughout the country.84 The federal army's morale, in comparison, took a noticeable plunge. The battle of Ciudad Juarez had, in many ways, been a siege tournament of sorts in which relatively large numbers of contending forces fought hard to succeed. The fact that the Mexican regular army had been beaten in a pitched battle by groups of undisciplines peones sent shock waves reverberating throughout the army and resulted in a marked loss of fed­ eral soldiers' confidence to win. This lack of federal resolve to continue fighting is reflected in the rapid deterioration oftheir situation in the ten days after Juarez fell and before the peace agreement was signed. Dur­ ing this period, the ports of Acapulco, Manzanillo, and Mazatlan, as well as the provincial capitals of Chilpancingo, Colima, Pachuca, and Zacatecas, were fell to the rebels. Other major towns, such as Uruapan, Iguala, Cuautla, Huatusco, and Tulancingo, were also conquered.85 The fighting also spread to other states such as Guanajuato, Oaxaca and Chiapas, which up to that date had experienced little revolutionary ac­ tivity.86 A particularly noteworthy example ofthe collapse of federal morale occurred when Emilio Madero, Jesus Agustin Castro, and other Durangan and Coahuilan leaders assaulted Torreon, the hub of the rail­ way transportation network in the north. As the rebel contingents took the outlying towns of Gomez Palacio and Lerdo and massed for an as­ sault on the city, the federal commander General Emiliano Lojero pan­ icked and moved his men out the night of 14-15 May during a heavy rainstorm. The evacuation occurred so quickly that many federal sol­ diers were left without forward defensesY The sacrifice ofTorreon with­ out a fight proved a serious error. When rebel forces captured the southern Chihuahuan town of Santa Fosalia de Camargo, Chihuahua city was effectively cut off from possible reinforcement from the south. 88 Given this situation, the Diaz government had no option, from the military standpoint, than a peace agreement. Negotiations had resumed the day after the fall of Juarez. On 17 May, Madero wired Diaz to advise him of conditions: Diaz's resignation, Corral's resignation, the complete overhaul of the cabinet, and the detention of General Bernardo Reyes, who had returned to Mexico upon Diaz's request. Madero sent another message later that day with a list ofpeople he recommended for cabinet and other government positions. Diaz accepted the conditions without delay and a'new five-day armistice went into effect. The resulting peace treaty, signed in front of the Juarez customhouse late on 21 May, stipu­ lated that Diaz and Corral should resign by the end of the month and that Francisco Leon de la Barra should serve as interim president and call for general elections. Furthermore, hostilities would cease and the insurrecto forces would be disbanded and the interim government was TAYLOR 197

to consider popular desires with a view to satisfying them, and arrange for indemnification for damages incurred during the fighting. 89 . By 21 May, when the peace accords were signed, Ambassador Wil­ son estimated that the insurrectos control1ed roughly two-thirds of the country and the "remaining one third was rapidly tending to the same direction."90 The federals controlled only the state capitals ofHermosil1o, Saltil1o, Chihuahua, Culiacan, Durango, and Cuernavaca. All of these centers were under rebel siege and, in each case, the water supply had either been cut off or was in the process of being severed. The federal army had gradual1y been reduced to its Mexico City garrison, where its largest contingents were held in reserve. It was only a matter of time before a battle for control of the Feder DistriCt would begin.91 Even in the nation's capital, however, there existed an internal as well as an external threat, since, on 24 May 1911, public riots and manifestations broke out to protest the delay in the presentation of the president's resignation to the congress. On the afternoon of the following day, Diaz 92 presented his resignation, and a week later sailed to Europe in exile. · The Treaty of Ciudad Juarez was later criticized by those who claimed it brought a compromise government into power in which many conser­ vative elements of the. former administration remained. Though Diaz, Corral, Limantour,and other more prominent figures were gone, the gov­ ernment bureaucracy retained many adherents of the old regime and the ,federal army, though defeated in battle, remained intact since its officer corps and internal structure stil1 existed.93 In negotiating the treaty, Madero had focused on his primary goal: removing Diaz and his main associates from power. The social and eco­ nomic reforms announced in the Plan of San Luis Potosi-such as that with regard to land redistribution~wouldhave to wait for a later date. As historian Knight has commented, Madero and other members of the revolutionary and Porfirian elites were not in any hurry to enact these reforms. They were eager to end the ·war and ensure Mexican internal stability. Madero personal1y abhorred war and had only resorted to force when he saw no other alternative for political change. Atthe war's end, he felt it was time to work for political and social reform through civilian rule.94 The treaty did not bring lasting peace to Mexico, however. The old regime's bureaucratic and military structure hindered reform and worked to lessen presidential power after Madero's election to that office in October 1911. The administration was plagued by a number ofupris'ings that culminated in the coup of February 1913 and Madero's assassina­ tion. In conclusion, the Diaz government had considered Chihuahua, in view of rebel successes there, the most critical area in its counter-insur­ gency campaign. It had, therefore, considerably increased its military 198 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW APRIL 1999 presence there in the months prior to the attack on Ciudad Juarez. This signified that the outcome of the rebellion in northern Mexico would thus hinge on military developments in that state. The eventual rebel capture ofthe border city did not in itself consti­ tute .the turn of the rebellion tide.' The real change in rebel fortunes occurred earlier, in April, when insurrecto activities increased through­ out the country. The rebel seizure of the Sonoran border town of Agua Prieta (though short-lived), acquired an added significance with regard to the war ni the northern borderlands and the country in general. It was apparent to military authorities that although the rebels had not achieved definitive success in any bne region, neither could the army quell the uprising. The Diaz government realized that it could not maintain a sus­ tained military effort indefinitely. Doubting that the army could contain the insurrection, government officials began to consider a negotiated end to the struggle. The fall of Ciudad Juarez to the rebels resulted in the loss of one of two key federal garrisons in the area; the other was in Chihuahua City, the state capitol. This loss proved irreparable, since the army, weakened and demoralized, had no hope of recapturing the town. Although these battles occurred on Mexico's northern fringe, the effects of the rebel capture of the most populous and strategic communications hub on the border spread into the country's interior, boosting the revolutionary movement in general. An even more important result of the battle was the change in atti­ tude on the part of the U.S. government toward the rebellion. It was evident to Taft that a political change was inevitable in Mexico and Diaz's days in power were numbered. The rebel capture of a port-of­ entry coupled with the U.S. decision to keep its customs facilities open allowed the insurrectos to obtain additional arms, money, and other sup­ plies necessary to continue the fight. Under these circumstances, the Diaz government had no other alter­ native than making peace with the rebels. The treaty that ended the struggle, though it achieved Madero's initial aim ofbringing Diaz down, did not result in any fundamental reforms or changes for the country. Thus, further strife would develop throughout the decade from 1910­ 1920, the effects of which can still be felt today.

NOTES

1. See Jesus Silva Herzog, Breve historia de la Revolucion Mexicana, 5th ed., 2 vols. (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica, 1966), I: 160; Stanley R. Ross, Fran­ cisco 1. Madero: Apostle of Mexican Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), 165-66; Michael C. Meyer, El Rebelde del norte: Pascual Orozco y la Revoluci6n (Mexico: Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de Mexico, 1984), 53; and Jorge Alberto Lozyoa, El ejercito mexicano (Mexico: EI colegio de Mexico, 1976), 42. TAYLOR 199

2. See Alan Knight, The Mexican Revolution, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), I :205; and Santiago Portilla, '~La etapa armada," in Asi fue la Revolucion Mexicana, 8 vols. (Mexico: Consejo Nacional de Fomento Educativo,- 1985),2:227; and Santiago Portilla, Madero, de ciudad Juarez a la ciudad de Mexico (Mexico: Martin Casillas Editores, 1985), 44. 3. Knight, Mexican Revolution, 1:204, 463-64. 4. Rafael Aguilar, Madero sin mascara (Mexico: Imprenta Popular, 1911), 19­ 23; Roque Estrada, La revolucion y Francisco I. Madero: primera, segunda y tercera etapa (Guadalajara, Jalisco: Imprenta Americana, 1912),319-25; Ross, Francisco I. Madero, 125-26. 5. Estrada, La revolucion y Francisco I. Madero, 351-55; Juan Sanchez Azcona, Apuntes para la historia de la Revolucion Mexicana (Mexico: Instituto Nacional de Estudios Hist6ricos de la Revoluci6n Mexicana, 1961), 193-94; Alfonso Taracena, Francisco I. Madero: vida del hombre y del politico, 2nd ed. (Mexico: Ediciones Botas, 1938), 346; Jose C. Valades, Historia general de la Revolucion Mexicana, 10 vols. (Mexico: Secretaria de Educaci6n Publica/Ediciones Gernika, 1985), 1:191. 6. Estrada, La revolucion y Francisco I. Madero, 363-68; Charles Curtis Cumberland, Mexican Revolution: Genesis under Madero (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1952), 126; Ross, Francisco I. Madero, 132-34; Jose C. Valades, fmaginacion y realidad de Francisco I. Madero, 2 vols. (Mexico: Antigua Libreria Robredo, 1960), 2 :98-1 0 I. 7. Antonio V. Lomeli, Mexican Consul in EI Paso, Texas, to the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores in Mexico City, 3 January 1911, in. Isidro Fabela and Josefina E. Fabela, eds., Documentos historicos de la Revolucion Mexicana, 27 vols. (Mexico: Editorial Jus/Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica, 1960-1973), 5: 139-40; San Francisco Chronicle, 5 February 1911; Alfonso Taracena,' Vida de accion y sacrificio de Francisco I. Madero (Mexico: Manuel Quesada Brandi, 1969), 348-49; Alfonso Taracena, La verdadera Revolucion Mexicana, 18 vols. (Mhico: Editoral Porrua, 1991), 1:298-99. 8. Colonel R. Gama Martinez, jefe politico of the Distrito de Bravos, Ciudad Juarez, to President Diaz, 21 January 1911, in the Universidad Iberoamericana, Biblioteca Francisco Javier Clavijero, Colecci6n Porfirio Diaz, legajo 36, caja 11; hs, 005473-005475; Alberto Leal to the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores in Mexico City, Ramo: Revoluci6n Mexicana, L-E-640, expo 3, hs. 57-58 (hereafter AHGE/RM, followed by the number of the legajo [volume], expediente [file], and document); Daniel Cosio Villegas,. El Porfiriato: la vida politica exterior. Parte fI (Mexico: Editorial Hermes, 1963), 387-91. . 9. Sections 5281 and 5282 decreed a fine of $2000 and a sentence of up to ten years in prison. They indicated an additional fine of $1000 for the recruitment of other persons. Section 5286 specified a fine of $3000 and up to three years in prison. 10. William Dirk Raat, Revoltosos: Mexico's Rebels in the United States, 1903­ 1923 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1981), 228-29. II. Ibid., 115-16, 229-30. 12. Philander C. Knox to Francisco Le6n de la Barra, the Mexican Ambassador to the U.S., 24 January 1911, in United States Department of State, Record Group 59, file 812.00, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Mexico, 1910-1929 (Microcopy 274), National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C., documents 633, 654 (hereafter NA/RG 59, 812.00, followed by the number of the document or documents); Raat, Revoltosos, 231-32. 13. Edward 1. Berbusse, "Neutrality-Diplomacy of the United States and Mexico, 1910-1911," The Americas 12 (January 1956),271-73; Dorothy P. Kerig, Luther f. Ellsworth: U.S. Consul on the Border during the Mexican Revolution (EI Paso: Texas Western Press, University of Texas, 1975), 41-42; Raat, Revoltosos, 232­ 34. 200 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW APRIL 1999

14. Report by H. A. Thompson, special agent for the Department of Justice, filed in Ajo, Arizona, 24-25 March 1911, in United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Record Group 65, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C., Investigative Case Files of the Bureau of Investiga­ tion, 1908-1922 (MI085), roll I, General Section 12 (herafter NA/RG 65, ICFBI, followed by the roll ["r"] and general documentary section ["GS"]); Berta Ulloa, "Las relaciones mexicano-norteamericanas, 1910-1911," Historia Mexicana 15 (July-September 1965). 15. Luther T. Ellsworth, U.S. Consul in Ciudad Porfirio Diaz, Coahuila, to the Secretary of State, II May 1911, in Gene Z. Hanrahan, ed., Documents on the Mexican Revolution, 2 vols. (Salisbury, N.C.: Documentary Publications, 1976), 1:365-68. 16. Ellsworth to Secretary of State, 4 February 1911, in NA/RG 59, 812.00/728; Ellsworth to Secretary of State, II February 1911, II May 1911, in Hanrahan, Documents on the Mexican Revolution, 1:148-52, 365, 369; Kerig, Luther T. Ellsworth, 16-49. 17. General J. H. Duncan, United States Army Commander in San Antonio, Texas, to the Adjutant General of the United States Army, 25 February 1911, in the United States Adjutant General's Office, Record Group 94, National Archives, Washington, D.C., document no. AG171'6354, A283 (hereafter NA/RG 94, fol­ lowed by the number of the document); Newsclipping from the Arizona Republi­ can, I March 1911, in AHGE/RM, L-E-640, expo 3, h. 17; Petition signed by sixty-four citizens of the town of Lublin, Texas, and addressed to the United States President and to the president of the United States Congress in which they de­ clared their sympathy for the revolutionary cause and requested the American government's intervention in the struggle on behalf of the insurrectos, 8 March 1911, in NA/RG 59, 812.00/897; Eugene Nolte, federal marshal at San Antonio to George W. Wickersham, 15 April 1911, in Hanrahan, Documents on the Mexican Revolution, 1:336-37; Wickersham to Knox, 29 April 1911, in NA/RG 59, 812.00/ 1548. 18. El Paso Herald, I March 1911; Kerig, Luther T. Ellsworth, 20; Michael Dennis Carman, United States Customs and the Madero Revolution (EI Paso: Texas Western Press, 1976), 32-34. 19. El Paso Morning Times, 3, 23, 24, 27, and 30 December 1910; Valades, Historia general de la Revolucion, I :238-42; Francisco R. Almada, La revolucion en el estado de Chihuahua, 2 vols. (Mexico: Instituto Nacional de ·Estudios Hist6ricos de la Revoluci6n Mexicana, 1964), 1:185-87. 20. El Paso Morning Times, 2 and 3 February 1911; Col. A. C. Sharpe, Fort Bliss, EI Paso Commanding Officer, to the Adjutant General of the U.S. Army in Washington, D.C., 2 February 1911 and Thomas D. Edwards, the U.S. Consul in Ciudad Juarez, to the Secretary of State, 4 February 1911, in NA/RG 59, 812.00/ 722, 723; San Francisco Chronicle, 5 February 1911; Meyer, El rebelde del norte, 37-39. 21. Condensed news reports from La Prensa, La Habana, Cuba, I February 1911, in Fabela and Fabela, Documentos historicos de la Revoluc/on, 5:216-17; Henry Lane Wilson, U.S. ambassador in Mexico, to the Department of State, 6 and 8 February 1911, in NA/RG 59, 812.00/739, 796. 22. Francisco Le6n de la Barra, the Mexican Ambassador in Washington, D.C., to the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores in Mexico City, 19 January 1911, and Antonio V. Lomeli, the Mexican Consul in EI Paso, Texas, to the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico, 14 February 1911, in Fabela and Fabela, Documentos historicos de la Revolucion, 5: 173 and 244-45; Wickersham to the Secretary of State, 26 January 1911, in NA/RG 59, 812.00/673, Antonio V. Lomeli, the Mexi­ can Consul in El Paso, Texas, to the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico, 14 February 1911, in Fabela and Fabela, Documentos historicos de la Revolucion, 5:244-45. TAYLOR 201

23. Valades, Historia general de la Revolucion, 1:250-51. 24. El Imparcial, 10, 12, and 13 March 1911; £1 Pais, 13 March 1911; Report concerning the battle of Casas Grandes, 6 March 1911, submitted by Colonel Samuel Garcia Cuellar to the Secretaria de Guerra y Marina in Mexico City, Campana de 1910 a 1911: estudio en general de las operaciones que han tenido lugar del 18 de noviembre de 1910 al 25 de mayo de 1911, en la parte que corresponde a la Segunda Zona Militar (Mexico: Secretaria de Guerra y Marina, 1913), 184-97; Report concerning the defense of Casas Grandes submitted by Colonel Agustin A. Valdes to the. Secretaria de Guerra y Marina in Mexico City, 19 March 1911, Fabela, Documentos historicos de la Revolucion, 5:270-80; Rosendo Armendariz, "Relato de un revolucionario," £1 Legionario 9 (December 1959), 58-61. 25. Declaration of Charles C. Doll, survivor of the battle of Casas Grandes, Los Angeles Herald, 7 March 1911; Natalio Garduno Nava, "Como se salvo Madero," £1 Legionario, 17 (November-December 1967), 65-68; Ross, Francisco 1. Madero, 148; Taracena, Vida de accion y sacrificio de Francisco I. Madero, 337; Rogelio Fernandez GUell, La Revolucion Mexicana: episodios (San Jose: Editorial Costa Rica, 1973),73. 26. Wilson to the Secretary of State, 20 March 1911, NA/RG 59, 812.00/1 027; Henry Baerlein, Mexico, the Land of Unrest: Being Chiefly an Account of What Produced the Outbreak in 1910, Together With the Story of the Revolutions Down to This Day (London: Herbert and Daniel, 1913),33,42. 27. President William H. Taft to the Sub-Secretary of State, 12 March 1911, in NA/RG 59, 812.00/922; P. Edward Haley, Revolution and Intervention: The Diplo­ macy of Taft and Wilson with Mexico, 1910-/917 (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachu­ setts Institute of Technology, 1970), 25-32; Carman, United States Customs, 73­ 86; Don M. Coerver and Linda B. Hall, Texas and the Mexican Revolution:A Study in State and National Border Policy, 1910-1920 (San Antonio: Trinity University Press, 1984), 23. For the background to the mobilization of troops along the border, see McCain, Adjutant General, to the Commanding General of the United States Army in San Antonio, 21 November 1910, in Hanrahan, Documents on the Mexican Revolution, 1:68. ' 28. Taft to Major General Leonard Wood, Chief-of-Staff of the United States Army, 12 March 1911, in Ha'nrahan, Docu";ents' on the Mexican Revolution, 1:225­ 29. 29. Leon de la Barra to the Secretary of State, 12 March 1911, in United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: 1911 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1912), 422. 30. William Weber Johnson, Heroic Mexico: The Violent Emergence of a Modern Nation (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1968); 47. It was also about this time (early March 1911) when rumors began to crop up in British newspapers about the Standard Oil's alleged financing of Madero's rebellion in exchange for future concessions. These rumors subsequently proved groundless. See Kenneth 1. Grieb, "Standard Oil and the Financing of the Mexican Revolution," California Historical Quarterly 50 (March 1971), 60, 68. 31. "The Magdalena Bay Resolution," American Journal of International Law 6 (1912),937-39; Eugene Keith Chamberlin, "The Japanese Scare at Magdalena Bay," Pacific Historical Review 24 (November 1955), 345-49; Raymond Zilinskas, "Japanese at Turtle Bay, Lower California, 1915~" Southern California Quarterly 60 (Spring 1978), 46-48, 52. 32. Documents that deal with the execution of Leonard Groce and Lee Roy Cannon in Nicaragua, two United States citizens who had aided the revolutionary forces of General Juan Estrada, in United States Department of State, Foreign Relations: 1909, 446-57; Jose Santos Zelaya, La revolucion de Nicaragua y los £stados Unidos (Madrid: lmprenta de Bernardo Rodriguez, 1910), 42, 56-57, 80­ 81, 84-85,90,96-101, 117, 125-26, 138-74; Walter V. Scholes, "Los Estados 202 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW APRIL 1999

Unidos, Mexico y America Central en 1909," Historia Mexicana 10 (April-June 1961), 622. 33. It is also possible that Madero, an ardent admirer of Benito Juarez, wished to emulate the latter by making Ciudad Juarez his provisional capital. During the period of the French Intervention, it was known as Paso del Norte. Ross, Fran­ cisco I. Madero, 151. 34. While the Ciudad Juarez garrison numbered 858 men, 186 of those were either sick or wounded, leaving 631 to defend the town. Almada, La Revolucion en Chihuahua, 1:204, 219, 222-24; Miguel A. Sanchez Lamego, Historia militar de la Revolucion Mexicana en fa epoca maderista, 3 vols. (Mexico: Instituto Nacional de Estudios Hist6ricos de la Revoluci6n Mexicana, 1976), I: 105; Marcelo Caraveo, Cronica de la Revofucion, 1910-1929 (Mexico: Editorial Trillas, 1992),47-49; Almada, La Revolucion en Chihuahua, I: 204, 219, 222-23. 35. Documents grouped under the collective heading "Historia grafica del combate de Agua Prieta, 13-14 Abril 1911," Archivo de la Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional, Mexico City, Ramo: Historia, XI/481.5/268, hs. 209-21 (hereafter cited as ASDN/ H, followed by the number of the expediente, or file, and pages in question); Izabal Iriarte, Mexican consul in Douglas, Arizona to the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico, 13 Abril 1911, and Manuel Garcia, the comisario or sheriff of Agua Prieta, Sonora, in Fabela and Fabela, Documentos historicos de la Revolucion, 5:295-97; Louis Hostetter and Alexander V. Dye; the U.S. consuls in Hermosillo and Nogales, respectively, to the Secretary of State in Washington, D.C., 14 April 1911, NA/RG 59, 812.00/1333,1456; New York Times, 14 April 1911; Los Angeles Times, 14 April 1911; Newsclipping from the Arizona Republican, 19 April 1911, Archivo Hist6rico "Genaro Estrada," Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico, D. F., Ramo: Revoluci6n Mexicana, L-E-835, expo 2, h. 25 (hereafter cited as AHGE/RM, followed by the number of legajo or volume, the expediente or file, and the hoja or page in question); Manuel Sandomingo, Historia de Agua Prieta (n.p.: Imprenta Sandomingo, 1951), 131-33. 36. Colonel Celso Vega, military governor of the Northern District of the Ter­ ritory of Baja California, with headquarters in Ensenada, to the Secretaria de Guerra y Marina in Mexico, 29 January 191 1, Almada, La Revolucion en Chihua­ hua, 1:367; newsclippings from the Arizona Republican and the Daily Express, San Antonio, Texas 30 January 1911, San Diego Union, I February 1911, and the Imperial Valley Press, 4 February 1911, AHGE/RM, L-E-629, expo 30, h. 73; L-E­ 630, expo I, hs. 43, 141; L-E-632, h. 295; L-E-862, expo 4, h. 332, respectively; Miguel A. Sanchez Lamego, Historia militar de la Revofucion Mexicana en fa Epoca maderista, 3 vols. (Mexico: Instituto Nacional de Estudios Hist6ricos de la Revoluci6n Mexicana, 1976-1977), 1: 184. Although the liberals confiscated some 200 dollars in customs revenues, the U.S. authorities closed the border to the passage of arms and other supplies, other than what the insurrectos were able to smuggle into Mexico. Lowell L. Blaisdell, The Desert Revolution: Baja California, 1911 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1962), 49. 37. Dye to the Secretary of State, \6 and 18 April 1911, RG 59, 812.00/1345, 1376; Arturo M. Elias, Mexican Consul in Tucson, Arizona to the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores in Mexico City, 18 and 19 April 1911, Fabela and Fabela, Documentos historicos de la Revolucion, 5:302-4; New York Times and Los Ange­ les Times, 17 and 18 April 1911; Francisco R. Alamada, La revolucion en el estado de Sonora (Mexico: Instituto Nacional de Estudios Hist6ricos de la Revoluci6n Mexicana, 1971),47. 38. Elias to theSecretario de Relaciones Exteriores in Mexico City, 18 April 1911, Fabela, Documentos historicos de la Revolucion, 5:303; Los Angeles Times, 17 April 1911; New York Times, 18 and 19 April 1911. 39. At the beginning of June, 1911, Arturo L6pez was executed by rebel leaders in Cananea due to his abandonment of the insurrecto garrison in Agua Prieta without proper justification. San Diego Sun, 18 April 1911; Elias to the Secretario TAYLOR 203

de Relaciones Exteriores in Mexico City, 20 and 21 April 1911, Fabela and Fabela, Documentos historicos de la Revolucion, 5:304; Alamada, La revolucion en Sonora, 47-48. Concerning the drunken state of the rebel soldiers during the federal at­ tack, see Los Angeles Times, 18 and 19 April 1911; New York Times, 18, 19, and 20 April 1911; The Mexican Herald, 19 April 1911; Pascual Ortiz Rubio, La revolucion de 1910: apuntes historicos (Mexico: Ediciones Botas, 1937), 238-39. 40. The Maderista junta in San Antonio, directed by Juan Sanchez Azcona, published a declaration in which it asserted that the federals were able to retake the town due to "the unjustifiable action of U.S. customs officials and secret agents," who supposedly had confiscated more than 100,000 cartri'dges which had been sent to Douglas, Arizona. Report of Fred Thompson, special agent of the Department of Justice in Douglas, Arizona, 16-18 April 1911, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Record Group 65, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C., Investigative Case Files of the Bureau of Investiga­ tion, 1908-1922 (M I 085), roll I, General Section 12 (hereafter cited as NA/RG 65, ICFBI, followed by the roll [r] and general documentary section [GS] in ques­ tion); Elias to the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores in Mexico City, 14 and 17 April 1911, Fabela, Documentos historicos de la Revolucion, 5:297-98, 30 I; New York Times, 18 and 19 April 1911; George W. Wickersham, U.S. Attorney General, to the Secretary of State, 26 April 1911, NA/RG 59, 812.0011507. 41. Morrison, the U.S. Attorney for the District of Arizona, to Wickersham, 14 April 1911, and Knox to the Secretary of the Treasury, 16 April 1911, NA/RG 59, 812.0011335, 1498, respectively; Michael Dennis Carman, United States Customs and the Madero Revolution (EI Paso: University of Texas at EI Paso, 1976), 67; New York Times, II May 1911. A similar situation had occurred in Ojinaga in mid­ March of 1911, when Chihuahuan rebels under Jose de la Cruz Sanchez, Toribio Ortega, and other leaders captured a portion of the town, including the custom­ house, while the defending federals were left hemmed in on three sides and pinned up against the international boundary. Robert W. Dowe, U.S. customs collector at Eagle Pass, Texas, ordered that the rebels be allowed to import food and medicines across the line, but not arms and ammunition, while the federals, who no longer possessed access to the port of entry, were perm'itted to receive foodstuffs and other non-military supplies when U.S. authorities "opened" a temporary customs port at a river ford outside the town. Knox to the Secretary of the Treasury, 23 March 1911, NA/RG 59, 812.0011012; Carman, United States Customs and the Madero Revolution, 60-61. 42. Ambassador Wilson was so impressed by the battles of Casas Grandes and Agua Prieta that he referred to them as rebel victories. Henry Lane Wilson, Dip­ lomatic Episodes in Mexico, Belgium and Chile (Garden City: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1927), 212-13. 43. Antonio G. Rivera, La revolucion en Sonora (Mexico: Imprenta Arana, 1969), 226-27; Hector Aguilar Camin, La frontera nomada: Sonora y la Revolucion Mexicana (Mexico: Secretaria de Educacion Publica/Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1985), 154-57; Portilla, "La etapa armada,': 224-25. 44. Los Angeles Times, 17, and 20-22 April 1911; Manuel Maria de Zamacona e Incl6n, Mexican Ambassador in Washington, D.C., to the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores in Mexico City, 18 and 22 April 1911, Fabela and Fabela, Documentos historicosde la Revolucion, 5:307, 323; New York Times, 19 April 1911; Colonel Edgar Z. Steever, Commander of U.S. forces at EI Paso, to the Adjutant General of the Army in Washington, D.C., 23 April 1911, NA/RG 59, 812.00/1908; Francisco Vazquez Gomez, Memorias politicas, 1909-1913 (Mexico: Universidad Iberoamericana/Ediciones El Cabellito, 1982), 117-26; Alamada, La revolucion en Sonora, 48. 45. Vazquez Gomez, Memorias politicas, 79-115. 46. Porfirio Diaz, "Informe presidencial del I de abril de 191 j," Mario Contreras and Jesus Contreras, eds., Mexico en el siglo XX: 1900-19 I 3, 2 vols. (Mexico: 204 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW APRIL 1999

Universidad Aut6noma de Mexico, 1975), 1:339-43; Wilson to the Secretary of State, 27 and 29 March and 5 April 1911, NA/RG 59, 812.00/1037,1210, and 812.032/3; Marion Letcher, the U.S. Consul in Chihuahua City, to the Secretary of State, 3 April 1911, and Luther T. Ellsworth, the U.S. Consul in Ciudad Porfirio Dfaz (Piedras Negras), to the Secretary of State, NA/RG 59, 812.00/1279, 1614, respectively; translation by J. L. Canalizo, the Mexican Consul in Philadelphia, of commentaries to the address given by President Diaz in the Mexican Congress are published in The Public Ledger, Philadelphia, 3 April 1911, Fabela and Fabela, Documentos historicos de la Revolucion, 5:288-90. 47. Ross, Francisco 1. Madero, 154. 48. Paul 1. Vanderwood, "Response to Revolt: The Counter-Guerrilla Strategy of Porfirio Diaz," Hispanic American Historical Review, 56 (November, 1976), 555, 570-73. 49. Friedrich Katz, La Guerra secreta en Mexico, 2 vols. (Mexico: Ediciones Era, 1982), I :47; Santiago Portilla, "Una sociedad en armas: insurrecci6n antirreeleccionista en Mexico, 1910-1911" (Ph.D. diss., El Colegio de Mexico, 1982), 498-500, 503. 50. Hamilton Fyfe, The Real Mexico: A Study on the Spot (New York: McBride, Nast and Company, n.d.), 110; Katz, Guerra secreta, I :48; Portilla, "Sociedad en armas," 500-1. 51. Fyfe, The Real Mexico, 145; Portilla, "Sociedad en armas," 509-13. The government also tried to raise soldiers' morale by increasing their daily pay from 37 centavos to one peso, which did not constitute a low wage for that period. El Tiempo, Mexico City, 16 April 1911; Letcher to the Secretary of State in Wash­ ington, D.C., 18 April 1911, NA/RG 59, 812.00/1492; Baerlein, Mexico, 262-63; Leone B. Moats, Thunder in Their Veins: a Memoir of Mexico (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1933),67. 52. Estrada, La Revolucion, 498. 53. Hostetter to the Secretary of State, 27 January 1911, in NA/RG 59, 812.001 764. 54. Rafael Isunza, Governor of Puebla, to President Diaz, 17 April 1911, in Y la revolucion hablo por todos (Mexico: Instituto Nacional de Antropologia e Historia, Secretaria de Educaci6n Publica, 1985), 41. 55. Ambassador Wilson to the Secretary of State, 6 February 1911, in NA/RG 59, 812.00/739. 56. Robert Martin Alexius, "The Army and Politics in Porfirian Mexico" (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1976), 307-10; 323-24. 57. Only a fourth of the federal forces that fought against the Maderista insur­ gents were cavalry units. Portilla, "Sociedad en armas," 506; Alexius, "The Army and Politics in Porfirian Mexico," 318. Although Diaz's military advisors urged him t9 form regiments of light cavalry recruited from the ranches of Jalisco, Michoacan, and Guanajuanto, the president preferred to rely on his regular troops to deal with the rebellion. Rosendo Salazar, Del militarismo al civilismo en nuestra Revolucion: esbozo de una lucha que duro treinta y cinco anos por la consecucion de gobiernos nacionales no militares (Mexico: Libro Mex Editores, 1958), 183­ 84. For a discussion of the British tactics used during the second Anglo-Boer War, See Glen St. John Barclay, The Empire is Marching: A Study of the Military Effort of the British Empire, 1800-1945 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1976), 37; and Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War (New York: Random House, 1979), 543, 559-60; 572-74, 586. 58. Report by Robert Sturtevant, Captain of the Fifth Regiment of Infantry and military attache to the United States embassy in Mexico city, to the head of the War College Division, Washington, D.C., 19 April 1911, in NA/RG 59, 812.001 1360; Alexius, "Army and Politics," 315-17. 59, Press clippings from the Arizona Republican and the San Diego Union, 18 December 1910, and the El Paso Times, 19 December 1910, in AHGE/RM, L-E- TAYLOR 205

620, expo 17, hs. 81, 126; expo 18, h, 242; Vito Alessio Robles, "Reparacion de las vias ferreas en la ultima campana," Revista del Ejercito y da la Marina 12 (Sep­ tember 1911), 161-62, 164; H. B. C. Pollard, A Busy Time in Mexic'o (New York: Duffield and Company, 1913), 202-11; Giuseppe Garibaldi, A Toast to Rebellion (Garden City, N.Y.: Garden City Publishing Company, 1937), 234-35. 60. Translation by the author. Although Sanchez Lamego made the comment in reference to the federal army during President Victoriano Huerta's regime, the Huertista army was essentially a larger version of the old Porfirian army. Miguel A. Sanchez Lamego, Historia militar de la revolucion constutucionalista, 5 vols. (Mexico: Instituto Naciona1 de Estudios Historicos de la Revolucion Mexicana, 1956-1960),3:455. See also Alexius, "Army and Politics," 307-10. 61. Louis Spence, Mexico of the Mexicans (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1917),55; Ethel Brilliana (Harley) Tweedie, Mexico from Diaz to the Kaiser (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1918), 54-56; Alexius, "Army and Politics," 314, 317-18, 327. 62. Manuel Calero, Un decenio de politica mexicana (n.p.: 1920), 38; Alexius, "Army and Politics," 317-18, 321. . 63. Gustavo I. Madero, financial organizer and agent of the Anti-Reelectionist movement, as well as mediator in the peace discussions, to his brother Francisco, 18 April 1911, in Portilla and Franco, Triunfo de la Revolucion, 47-49; Zamacona to the Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores in Mexico City, 19 and 21 April 1911, in Fabela and Fabela, Documentos historicos de la Revolucion, 5:309, 320-21; Vazquez Gomez, Memorias politicas, 127-49. 64. London Times, 6 May 1911; Vazquez Gomez, Memot'ias politicas, 151-69. 65. Part of Madero's hesitation to attack the city was reportedly due to the advice of a Boer volunteer, Benjamin Johannes Viljoen, who served as advisor on Madero's staff during the siege and subsequent baltle. Thomas J. Edwards to the Secretary of State, 7 May 1911, NA/RG 59, 812.00/1655; Ross, Francisco J. Madero, 163; Meyer, El rebelde del norte, 25-28. 66. Wilson to the Secretary of State, 8 May 1911, in NARG 59, 812.00/1664. For the text of Diaz's "Manifiesto a la Nacion," see Ramon Prida, De la dictadura ala anarquia (Mexico: Ediciones Botas, 1958),297-99.' 67. "Manifiesto de Francisco I. Madero acerca del ataque a Ciudad Juarez," Antonio P. Gonzalez and J. Figueroa y Domenech, La Revolucion y sus heroes: cronica de los sucesos politicos ocurridos en Mexico des de octubre de 1910 a mayo de 191/, 5th ed. (Mexico: Herrero Hermal)o's Sucesores, 1912),270; state­ ment of and insurrecto participant in the battle, reproduced in Hector Ribot, Las (dUmas revoluciones (Mexico: Imprenta de Humboldt Numero 5, 1912), 159-60; Garibaldi, A Toast to Rebellion, 287-c89; Sanchez Azcona, Apuntes, 237-46. 68. Report of General Orozco to Madero concerning the siege and capture of Ciudad Juarez, 8-10 May 1911, in Archivo de Roque Gonzalez Garza, Mexico City, carpeta 40, unnumbered document; Edwards to the Secretary of State, 13 May 1911, in NA/RG 59, 812.00/1846; Report of General Juan J. Navarro to the Secretaria de Guerra y Marina conc.erning the capture of Ciudad Juarez, 8 June 1911, in Mexico. Secretaria de Guerra y Marina, Campana de 1910 a 19/1, 288­ 94. 69. Letter from President William H. Taft to the Secretary of the Treasury, 12 May 1911, included with Taft's letter to the Secretary of State of the same date, NA/RG 59, 812.00/1808; see also New York Times, 11 May 1911. 70. Ibid.; also Colonel Edgar Z. Steever, Commander of the Fourth Cavalry Regiment in El Paso, to the Adjutant General of the U.S. Army in Washington, D.C., 12 May 1911; Memorandum of Major-General Leonard Wood, Chief-of­ Staff of the U.S. Army, to the Adjutant General, 12 May 1911, Manuel de Zamacona, Mexico's Ambassador in Washington, D.C., and Adjutant General Mc'Cain to Steever, 12 May 1911, included in a letter from the Secretary of War Jacob M. Dickinson to the Secretary of State, 13 May 1911, in NA/RG 59, 812.00/1780, 1908, respec- 206 NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW APRIL 1999 tively; London Times, 12 May 1911; Zamacona to the Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores in Mexico City, 13 May, 1911, Fabela and Fabela, Documentos historicos de la Revolucion, 5:386-87; El Pais, 21 May 1911; Raat, Revoltosos, 239. 71. New York Times, II May 1911; Cumberland, Mexican Revolution, 141. 72. El Paso Herald, 29, 31 May and I, 2 June 1911; El Paso Morning Times, 29, 30, and 31 May and I, 4, 5, 6, and 8 June 1911; press clippings from the Arizona Democrat and the San Francisco Examiner, 12 and 22 May 1911, in AHGEIRM, L-E-655, hs. 125, 189; New York Times, 1 June 1911; Report of Agent No. 71 (F. R. Lancaster) of the United States Department of Justice in EI Paso, 2 June 191 I, in NAIRG 65, ICFBI, r. I, GS 19. 73. Alamada, La Revolucion en Chihuahua, 1:226-27. 74. Colonel Celso Vega, }efe politico (political administrator) and military gov­ ernor of the Northern District of the Territory of Baja California, to the Secretar,fa de Guerra y Marina in Mexico City, 10,' 12, and 18 May 1911, in Almada, La Revolucion en Chihuahua, 2:369-71; Joseph Stewart, Second Assistent Postmas­ ter General, San Diego, California, to the Chief Clerk of the Department of State, Washington, D.C., 16 May 1911, NAIRG 59, ,812.0011794; Blaisdell, Desert Revo­ lution, 118-19. 75. Cananea, although not a border town, was also occupied during this period. Dye to the Secretary of State in Washington, D.C., 10, 13, and 19 May 1911, NAI RG 59,812.0011705,1759, 1849, 1925. 76. Brigadier General Tasker H. Bliss, Commander, United States Army, San Diego, California, to the Adjutant General of the Army in Washington, D.C., 17 May 1911, NAIRG 59, 812.0011925; Santiago Portilla, "Estados Unidos y la insurrecci6n maderista" and "EI pacto de Ciudad Juarez," in Asi fue la Revolucion Me,''Cicana, 2:252, 257, respectively; Carman, United States Customs, 73-74. 77. Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes, 214. See also Vanderwood, "Response to Re­ volt," 579. Even after he had resigned the presidency and left the country, Presi­ dent Diaz himself claimed that he could have, had he wished, beaten the rebels. Extract of a letter from Dfaz to President Taft, 20 July 1911, in Raat, Revoltosos, 227. 78. General Navarro reported his losses as some 100 killed, wounded, and miss­ ing while the rest of the garrison were taken prisoner (531 men). The prisoners were granted freedom on 30 May 1911. The federal forces who were defending the Segunda Zona Militar (Military Zone No.2), which comprised the states of Chi­ huahua and Durango, had a total of 10 generals, 56 jefes (officers holding a rank above captain), 372 oficiales (officers holding the rank of captain or one step below that), and 6,028 rank-and-file soldiers. Almada, Revolucion en Chihuahua, 2:224; Sanchez Lamego, Historia militar, I: I 07. See also Meyer, El rebelde, 44; and Portilla, "La etapa armada," 224. 79. Sanchez Lamego, Historia militar maderista, 1: II 0-14. 80. Steever to the Adjutant General of the United States Army in Washington, D.C., 1\ May 1911, NA/RG 59, 812.0011908. 81.This was also the case with respect to rebel groups that operated in other regions of Mexico, such as in the states of Morelos and Guerrero. In some of the engagements that occurred there, particularly with regard to assaults on towns and cities in these areas, rebel forces at times numbered in the thousands. Vanderwood, "Response to Revolt," 570; Portilla, "EI pacto," 262. 82. Wilson to the Secretary of State in Washington, D.C., 10 May 1911, and Letcher to the Secretary of State, 15 and 21 May 1911, in NAIRG 59, 812.001 1707,1867, and 1926, In a report to the State Department dated 19 May 1911, Consul Edward of Ciudad Juarez claimed that the rebel groups operating in Chihua­ hua'totalled 4,575 men. Edwards to the Secretary of State, 19 May 1911, in NA/ RG 59, 812.0011927. See also the New York Times, 25 May 1911. 83. Wilson to the Secretary of State, 10 May 1911, in NAIRG 59,812.0011707. 84. Alonzo B. Garrett, U.S. Consul in Nuevo Laredo, to the Department of State TAYLOR 207 in Washington, D.C., II May 1911, in NA/RG 59, 812.00/1727; Juan Sanchez Azcona, La etapa maderista de la Revolucion (Mexico: Instituto Nacional de' Estudios Historicos de la Revolucion Mexicana, 1960), 39. 85. Jose Vasconcelos, the Anti-Reelectionist agente confidencial (confidential a'gent) in Washington, D.C., to Madero, 14 May 1911, Taracena, Francisco I. Madero, 423-26; Mark Hanna, United States Consul iIi M9nterrey, Nuevo Laredo, to the Secretary of State in Washington, D.C, 17 May 1911; Arnold Shanklin, Office of the Solicitor, Department of State, to the Secretary of State, 17 May 1911; Clement T. Edwards, United States Consul in Acapulco, to the Secretary of State, 20 May 1911; Wilson to the Secretary of State, 17, 22, and 25 May 1911 all in NA/RG 59, f812.00/l949, 1826, 1866, 1888, 1824, 1825, 1981, respectively; Jesus 'Romero Flores, Anales historicos de la Revolucion Mexicana, 3 vols., (Mexico: Libro Mex Editores, 1960), I: 183-84. 86. London Times, 10 May 1911; Lewis W. Haskell, the United States Consul in Oaxaca, to the Secretary of State, 17 May 1911, NA/RG 59, 812.00/1949; Portilla, "EI pacto," 260. . 87. George C. Carothers, U.S. consular agent in Torreon, to the Secretary of State, 22 May 1911, in NA/RG 59, 812.00/1968; Sanchez Lamego, Historia militar, I: 139-43. Tulitas Jamieson fled to EI Paso with her family but her husband wit­ nessed the baltle. She claimed that a shipment of wooden-nosed training bullets sent by mistake from Mexico City was a factor in the decision to evacuate the town. Letter from Dr. William Jamieson to his father in Ottawa, 24 May 1911, in Tulitas Jamieson, Tulitas of Torreon: Reminiscences of Life in Mexico by Tulitas Jamieson, as Told to Evelyn Payne (El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1969), 116­ 21. 88. Sanchez Lamego, Historia militar. .maderista, I: 136-3 7. 89. For the text of the treaty, see Fabela and Fabela, Documentos historicos de la Revolucion, 1:400. 90. Wilson to the Secretary of State, 22 and 23 May 1911, NA/RG 59, 812.00/ 1888, 1981. The Treaty of Ciudad Juarez did not put an immediate end to the fighting in Mexico. For example, the Magonista forces, which vowed to continue their struggle even after the resignation of President Diaz on 25 May, were to pose a problem for the interim government of Francisco Leon de la Barra in the coming months, especially in Baja California, where they were not decisively defeated until the last week in June 1911. With regard to the Anti-Reelectionist struggle, certain Mexican towns held out against rebel attacks well after the formal end of hostilities. For example, Chinipas, in southwestern Chihuahua, did not fall to the Maderistas until 20 June 1911. Romero Flores, Anales historicos, I: 176; Almada, La revolucion en Chihuahua, 1:237, 257-69; Sanchez Lamego, Historia militar, 1:126-27; 2:15-29. 91. Vanderwood, "Response to Revolt," 570; Portilla, "La etapa armada," 225, and "El pacto," 262. 92. Wilson to the Secretary of State in Washington, D.C., 24 and 26 May 1911, and Arnold Shanklin, from the U.S. Consulate-General in Mexico City, to the Secretary of State, 27 May 1911'; NA/RG 59, 812.00/1943, 1962,2048, respec­ tively; New York Times, 25, 26, and 28 May 1911; Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes, 214-15; Vazquez Gomez, Memorias politicas, 225-30. For the text of Diaz's resignation, see Fabela and Fabela, Documentos historicas de la Revolucion, 5:402. 93. Carlo de Fornaro, Carranza and Mexico (New York: Mitchell Kennerley, 1915), 15-16; "Carta abierta a Don Francisco I. Madero, con motivo de los tratados de Ciudad Juarez," 27 April 1911, in Luis Cabrera, Obras politicas (Mexico: Imprenta N acional, 1921 )203-13. 94. Ross, Francisco I. Madero, 170; Knight, Mexican Revolution, 1:228. ·~1~~;~·e}1i11~~~g·'~~~·:·;;" . ~ " -~~~' r .' . "--,.:"""'.,,-=:"/ ir(i1ie~-=Anierican:Wecs:~::--~~il;'·,~ ._~. :6~kmtlnitY~~~iJ~i~;7:7:~):/::'¥","-:'- ·~.::-i~""~· .: .. .Eai~eil~by P!ed~r~Li~~~ __c.: .... _ Ap .~r}~D:plogy'Qf.::iiis.t9riS~1'adi~les 0n • ,",. < •• - ~ ... ~ • ..1 'f. ..E;~~qp~an·Im~~~~~9.J;1.to; the'Am~t:i,c:a~ .JNesHit~th~/19~;~en~: ':-- .::/i' C'" .'Li~iiiY::ltiition: '$"4$~@'Q Pd~fr,:"'~X~;95::' .': :"