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NORTH KOREA CHRONOLOGY 2003 Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project Social Science Research Council

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NORTH KOREA CHRONOLOGY 2003 Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project Social Science Research Council NORTH KOREA CHRONOLOGY 2003 Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project Social Science Research Council 1/1/03 Pres-elect Roh Moo-hyun: “I am skeptical whether so-called ‘tailored containment’ reportedly being considered by the United States is an effective means to control or impose a surrender on North Korea,” he told reporters. “Success or failure of U.S. policy toward North Korea isn’t too big a deal to the American people but it is a life-or death matters for South Koreas. Therefore, any U.S. move should fully consider South Korea’s opinion.” (Peter S. Goodman, “North Korea Threatens to Abandon Treaty,” Washington Post, January 1, 2002, p. A-13) “If the United States makes and announces a unilateral decision, and South Korea follows it, it can’t be called real cooperation between the two countries.” (Hwang Jang-jin, “Roh Expressed Doubts about ‘Tailored Containment’ Policy,” Korea Herald, January 1, 2003) “The president[-elect] thought that he should put the brakes on the escalating tension between Washington and Pyongyang,” says Roh admin official. “He was desperate. He wanted to get a promise from the Bush admin that it would rule the possibility of force. That is why Mr. Roh made such a strong comment.” (JoongAng Ilbo, “The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis: The Untold Story,” p. 22) “If the United States continues to put pressure on North Korea by refusing dialogue, Pyongyang will only resist and [pressure] will be ineffective,” an LDP official says. “We’re going to lose everything if North Korea opts to withdrawal from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or resume operations of its nuclear reprocessing facilities.” (Yomiuri Shimbun, “N. Korea Policy Problematic,” January 1, 2003) 1/2/03 Pres Bush in Crawford: “what I worry about with a leader like Kim Jong-il is somebody who starves his people. The United States of America is the largest -- one of the largest, if not the largest donor of food to the North Korean people. And one of the reasons why the people are starving is because the leader of North Korea hasn't seen to it that they're economy is strong or that they be fed. We've got a great heart, but I have no 1 heart for somebody who starves his folks.” Q You're talking about a diplomatic solution and you believe that there is one. How do you think you can bring some of the other countries in the region that are reluctant right now -- THE PRESIDENT: Well, I don't think the countries are reluctant to -- Q -- reluctant to put pressure on. THE PRESIDENT: They may be putting pressure on and you just don't know about it.” (Office of the Press Secretary, text of President’s Remarks to the Press Pool) US official: “Even if we have to accept North Korea having a few more nuclear weapons, we will still keep them in their box and contribute to the dissolution of the regime.” Yoo Jay-kun, chief foreign affairs adviser to Roh: “Washington has to understand that we have no choice but to settle this matter peacefully.” (Wall Street Journal, “A Split with Seoul Complicates Crisis over North Korea,” January 2, 2003, p. 1) Dep FM Lee Tae-shik in Beijing: “If China is given the right card by the U.S., maybe China will play a more active role.” (AFP, “North Korea Vows to Strengthen Military As Bush Calls for Diplomacy,” January 2, 2003) Lee refers to South Korean ideas for a Bush letter promising not to attack, resumption of HFO shipments, aid and security assurances from others in return for North’s promise to abandon its nuclear programs. Han Sung-joo: US will have to find “some kind of face-saving way” to hold talks. “That will happen once it becomes clear that there is no way out” (Peter S. Goodman, “S. Korea Readies Plan to End Standoff with North,” Washington Post, January 5, 2003, p. A-15; James Brooke, “North Korea Issues Warning, And Seoul Seeks Compromise,” New York Times, December 5, 2003, p. 12) Top MOFAT official: “We will play an active role as mediator between the United States and North Korea, urging representatives of both countries to seek a compromise.” (Shim Jae-yun, “S. Korea to Seek Compromise on Nuclear Issue,” Korea Times, January 3, 2003) 1/3/03 State Dept spokesman Boucher: “We are not willing to bargain or negotiate over commitments that have made before. We are looking for North Korea to visibly and verifiably dismantle its nuclear programs and we have no intent to invade the North. Those things are quite clear in terms of our policy. … We have no intention to sit down and bargain again to pay for this horse again, as it has been put very bluntly by Jim Kelly and others.” (Transcript of Daily Briefing, Department of State, January 3, 2003) DPRK Amb to China Choe Jin-su calls for talks: “The U.S. should respect the international community and respond to dialogue without any preconditions.” He adds, “If other countries are concerned about nuclear security on the Korean Peninsula, they should urge the United States to assure us of security, and if they can't do that, they should be quiet,” he said. “The Bush administration has been saying the whole time it has no intention of invading our country. We can't believe that. Who can believe these words?” (James Brooke and Elisabeth Rosenthal, “New Seoul Leader to Press U.S. and North to Yield a Bit,” New York Times, January 4, 2003, p. A-6) IAEA draft resolution “deplores in the strongest terms the DPRK’s unilateral acts.” 2 Rodong Sinmun signed commentary: “For Japan to follow the U.S. anachronistic hostile policy toward the DPRK without a political principle leads to its self-destruction. … It is like poking one’s eyes with one’s own hands. (KCNA; Kyodo, “N. Korea Says Japan ‘Suicidal’ in Following U.S. Policy,” January 4, 2003) “China fever” in South Korea. Two-way trade jumped about 20% in 2002, making China South Korea’s largest trading partner. In 2001, for the first time, more Chinese (444,113) than Americans visited ROK and South invested $830 million in China, for first time more than in US. (James Brooke, “China ‘Looming Large’ in South Korea As Biggest Player, Displacing the U.S.,” New York Times, January 3, 2003, p. A-12) 1/5/03 “Thanks to improving air and naval power, the United States can help defend the South from bases in Japan or even Hawaii, making the concept of the American troops as a tripwire against a North Korean invasion an outdated one. But an even more contentious argument for withdrawing the troops is that they have become detrimental to American interests. The Pentagon might be unwilling to launch preemptive strikes against North Korea because Americans might be quickly overrun or taken hostage during a North Korean counterattack.” Kurt Campbell: “Any movement of American forces would almost certainly involve countries and individuals taking the wrong message. The main one would be this: receding American commitment, backing down in the face of irresponsible North Korean behavior. And frankly, the ultimate beneficiary of this would be China in the long term.” Morton Abramowitz, who as a senior Pentagon official helped block President Carter’s troop withdrawal plan: “The whole point is to preserve stability. You would take a great risk by pulling out troops.”(James Dao, “Why Keep U.S. Troops?” New York Times, January 5, 2003, p. IV- 5) John McCain (R-AZ): “We're talking about a country that's governed by a sociopath. And by the way, we could go after his estimated $4 billion that he has around the world. We could go after him directly. But we are facing a nation that is Orwellian, a most oppressive nation in the world, which we've been propping up indirectly by our hundreds of millions of dollars of oil and food support. By the way, that is in direct contradiction with what the United States is supposed to be all about. Now, if you allow the North Koreans to gain some sort of leverage or agreement that would be beneficial to them, that will be a lesson to all other nations: Do the same thing. … There are a variety of options. First, by the way, an economic embargo enforced by the Chinese, Japanese, South Koreans and the United States is the best option. There is a series of military options that we have, including selective surgical strikes, such as were advocated by people like Brent Scowcroft in 1994. And yes, I recognize the North Korean artillery on the DMZ. I recognize that they have this missile capability. But a few years from now, if they develop this arsenal, then they have a variety of options which they don't have today. So it's the absolute last, last option, but to remove it as an option, I think, would not do justice to the seriousness of the threat.” (CBS, “Face the Nation,” January 5, 2003) 1/6/03 Bush press conference: “I went to Korea and clearly said that the United States has no intention of invading North Korea. I said that right there in South Korea. And in Kim 3 Jong-il's neighborhood, I spoke as clearly as I said, and said we won't invade you. And I'll repeat that: We have no intention of invading North Korea. We expect North Korea to adhere to her obligations. She's in an agreement with the United States; she said that she would not develop nuclear weapons.
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