TITLE PAGE
THE STATE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN LIBYA, 1969 – 2011
BY
NWEKE, CLEMENT UBAKA PG/MSc/10/57748
A PROJECT REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE.
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE FACULTY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES SCHOOL OF POST GRADUATE STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA NSUKKA
NOVEMBER, 2011.
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CERTIFICATION
This is to certify that the student, Mr Nweke, Clement Ubaka with registration number PG/MSc/10/57748, of the Department of Political Science,
Faculty of Social Sciences, School of Post Graduate Studies, University of
Nigeria Nsukka, has satisfactorily completed the requirements for the award of
Master of Science in Political Science (Political Economy).
………………………….. …………………………… Dr Ken Ifesinachi Prof. Obasi Igwe Supervisor Head, Department of Political Science
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APPROVAL
This research project by Mr Nweke, Clement Ubaka with registration number PG/MSc/10/57748 is written under the supervision and approval of the academic authorities of the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social
Sciences, School of Post Graduate Studies, University of Nigeria Nsukka.
………………………….. …………………………… Dr Ken Ifesinachi Prof. Obasi Igwe Supervisor Head, Department of Political Science
…………………………… External Examiner
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DEDICATION
This project is dedicated to God Almighty, the fountain of peace and freedom
and
To all who genuinely seek justice and freedom from oppression everywhere.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This study is completed through the support of various persons. First, I am eternally grateful to the great good God who bequeaths me all that I have and aspires to be. I am also thankful to all authors whose contributions are great sources of my learning and developing this area of study.
Special thanks to my erudite and affable Supervisor, Dr Ken Ifesinachi for his suggestive correction and specific contributions which form the ground for the advanced level of the study. Similarly, I remain ever appreciative of the sage Head of Department, Prof Obasi Igwe for his efficient administration of the department.
My gratitude also go to all my lecturers in the department, worthy of mention are Prof Ezeani (Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences), Dr. Aloysius-
Michaels Okolie for refining me in a furnace, Dr. Mba, Mr Agbo Humphrey, and Mr Ezeibe Christian for his friendly advice, and many others, for their moral and intellectual support. I will never forget the inspiration of my academic mentors. Deserving recognition are Barr Nick A. Obodo, Rev. Fr.
(Prof) Christian Anieke, Prof Edwin Onyeneje, Mr Mbaeze Christian and Dr
Menkiti.
I also appreciate my colleagues in the academic world for continuously spurring me into research quests. To all my family members and friends, you are all great pillars of support. Thank you all.
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ABSTRACT
The study examines the State and Political Economy of Democratization in Libya from 1969 to 2011, specifically focusing on the State and political economy of fundamental human rights in Libya for the period of study. Research questions (and hypothesis) for the study sought to discover if the government provides political and economic structures for the enforcement of the fundamental human rights of Libyans between 1969 and 2011. The second enquires whether the Libyan government base political recruitment into the legislature and executive on periodic election for the period under review. While the third sought to discover if the Libyan political structures support the development of political parties and constitutional opposition within the period. The theoretical framework used to analyze the study is the Marxian Political Economy theory. Data was collected for the study through the use of qualitative method by development of the logical data framework. The data collected was analyzed using qualitative descriptive technique, while the logical data clarified the empirical indicators. The study discovers that oil is at the heart of the human rights abuse in Libya and the government puts up machinery of the state as instrument of coercion and infringement of the fundamental human rights of her citizens in forms of unlawful arrests, detention, torture and killing. In response to the research questions, the study found out that the government of Libya tends to relegate political and economic structures for the enforcement of the fundamental human rights of citizens between 1969 and 2011. This is done by using the structures in place to subvert and infringe on the rights of the citizens in terms of denial of economic (entrepreneurial drive) and social- political rights (political aspiration and determination). It further discovered that Libya political recruitment into the legislature and executive based on periodic election between 1969 and 2011 tend to be undermined by the Libyan government. Political recruitment into the executive and legislature is not based on competitive election, but on clientelism, patronage and prebendalism. Finally, the study investigated that the Libyan political structure tends to militate against the development of political parties and constitutional opposition between 1969 and 2011. It suppressed them in extra-legal and violent ways as manifest in the February 16, 2011 violent suppression of protests in Libya. Based on this the study recommends that the new government of Libya should control the arms in the hands of the liberation fighters to forestall future violence. It should also stop the ongoing arrests, detentions and killings against perceived supporters of the past regime of Gaddafi by the coalition fighters. Finally, the government should speedily work towards reconstructing and stabilizing the system so as to salvage the basis of the last revolt.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Title Page…………………………………………………..……………… i Certification…..……………………………………..……………………. ii Approval……………………………………..……………………………. iii Dedication...…………………… ……..…………………………………… iv Acknowledgment………………..………………………………………… v Abstract…………………..………………………………………………… vi Table of Contents………..…………………………………………………. vii CHAPTER ONE: 1.0 Introduction………………….……………………………………… 1 1.1 Statement of Problem………..………………………………………. 5 1.2 Objectives of Study……….…………………………………………. 9 1.3 Significance of Study……....………………………………………… 10 1.4 Literature Review…..………………………………………………… 11 1.5 Theoretical Framework…………………………………………….… 28 1.6 Hypotheses…………………………………………………………… 31 1.7 Method of Data Collection…………………………………………… 32 CHAPTER TWO: NATURE OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURES IN LIBYA BETWEEN 1969 AND 2011…………. 36 2.1 The State and Democratic Rights and Liberties in Libya…………… 36 2.2 Character of Political Institutions in Libya from 1951 – 1969 and 1969 - 2011………………………………………………………… 44 2.3 Structure of Economic Institutions in Libya between 1969 and 2011 55 CHAPTER THREE: PATTERNS OF POLITICAL RECRUITMENT IN LIBYA FROM 1969 – 2011………………………………………. 74 3.1 Political Appointment from 1969 – 1975…………………………. 75 3.2 Elective Principles from 1975 – 2011…….………………………. 76 3.3 Political Recruitment under the National Transitional Council (NTC) 82
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CHAPTER FOUR: POLITICAL PARTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL OPPOSITION IN LIBYA FROM 1969 – 2011……………………. 86 4.1 Political Parties in Libya from 1951 – 1952………………………... 86 4.2 Disposition of Political Parties and Opposition Groups in Libya from 1969 – 2011………………………………………………………….. 87 4.3 Socio-Economic and Political Reforms as Ground for Revolution in Libya……………………………………………………………… 98 4.4 2011 Revolutionary War in Libya and end of Gaddafi’s Regime….. 100 4.5 List of Wanted Figures for the Crimes and 2011 War in Libya……. 103 4.6 Transitional National Council Fighters (TNCF)…………………… 106 CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION…………………………………………… 108 5.1 Summary………………………………………………………….. 109 5.2 Conclusion…………………………………………………………. 112 5.3 Implication of Study……………………………………………….. 112 5.4 Recommendation………………………………………………….. 113 5.5 Prognosis…………………………………………………………… 114 Bibliography………………………………………………………… 115
CHAPTER ONE
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Democratization involves a continuous process of acquiring democratic principles and practices in a state as well as the endless rigorous aspect of institutionalization. Democracy could be evolved peacefully by the constituent parts of a state or through violent protests and war by the people arising from discontents in the socio-economic and political patterns of allocation of resources in the state. The recent crackdown of protesters and gross violation of human rights in Libya as well as the NATO-backed Coalition of Opposition
Group war that ousted Colonel Muammar Gaddafi (culminating to his gruesome execution on 20 th October, 2011) reawakens the interest of observers on the brand of democracy in the Jamahiriya state led by the regime of Colonel
Muammar Gaddafi (1969 – 2011) as well as the basis of political economy and social relations of production in Libya. In view of the fact that the regime of
Gaddafi toppled the leadership of King Idris in 1969 in a bloodless coup d’etat and suspended the Independence Constitution of 1951 which enshrined the fundamental human rights of citizens in order to expropriate the resources of the state (www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libya). This results to the alienation of the rest of the masses in Libya with the implication that both political and economic interests are at the heart of the struggle in Libya between the leadership and the citizens as in the class struggle analysis of Marx. 2
Until recently, it is largely believed that Africa has been a desert in terms of democracy and the rule of law, and it remains one of the most corrupt and badly governed regions of the world. Lacking voice and accountability
(including freedom of expression and citizen participation in selecting the government) is a rough (if partial) surrogate for democracy (National
Intelligence Council, 2008:7). The case in Libya is an extreme instance of this anomaly where sit-tight syndrome and clientele system engenders corruption that pervades its leadership.
Gaddafi’s regime seem to have concatenated self-serving leadership and tribal political patronage to perpetuate in power for 42 years in a complex socialist direct democracy, which polarize and subjugate the masses from the political and economic rewards of the state. What is oblivious however is whether Libyans are at home with the trend for these past years or are being suppressed from expressing their fundamental human rights to vote and be voted for, to hold the government accountable or at least change it peacefully.
Those past silent or suppressed situations is opposed to the February 16, 2011 protest demanding for regime change, which later turned into violent rebellion and revolution in a pro and anti-Gaddafi war that ousted Gaddafi. With the current exit of Gaddafi in power and assumption of leadership role by the
Transitional National Council under Mustafa Abdul Jalil, the establishment of democracy is almost certain in Libya, however the real concern of democratization remains nebulous given the manner of its acquisition ala Iraq, 3 due to the potential unstable conditions that will emanate from it and the possibility of enthroning puppet regime by the West (Bokor, 2011a:2).
However, issues of democracy and its practices are of relevance to advanced democratic states across the globe especially in areas where they are yet to be imbibed or is wrongly adopted comparative to western models of liberal democracy due to the negative human rights impact on citizens by their government as evidenced in the attack of peaceful protesting Libyans demanding for regime change by the government, the consequent revolution and toppling of the regime.
In this vein, Appadorai (2001) identifies the essentials of a state to include a definite territory, population, government and sovereignty. The state includes the government and the governed as well as the responsibilities and rights of each party in the society. While the primary responsibility of the government is the protection of territory, people and properties (as well as their well being), the people enjoy certain rights and liberties, as well as fulfill some obligations. The democratic principles are obtainable and better assured in democratic states. This is because democracy is the prevalent and most acceptable system of modern governments which assures fundamental human rights such as popular participation, periodic elections, constitutional opposition, among others. These principles include popular sovereignty, rights and liberties, economic well-being, rule of law and democratic values (Sodaro,
2008:171). 4
The situation in Libya negates these principles. For instance, the suspension of the constitution in 1969 and its substitution with the Green Book automatically denies the Libyans the fundamental human rights of sovereignty.
Similarly, there is the apparent absence of real political parties purported to have been banned in 1972, restriction on entrepreneurship and on wage work, extra-judicial execution of political opponents, academic professionals, students, as well as dissidents at home and abroad, are all manifestations of the abuse of the rights of the people by the government (Sijil, 2011a). Political recruitment into the leadership is restrictive in an undemocratic manner such that the ordinary citizen seems to be polarized from leadership positions. Thus impeding the rights and liberties of Libyans to vote and be voted for in a competitive, free and fair election. This is done in order to pave way for the appropriation of the resources by the elitist self-serving leaders (Mulligan,
2011). The leadership structurally disconverged the government from the citizens such that the benefits hardly trickle down to the masses since political positions are patrimonous and probably unrealistically elective and is the major basis for the determination of economic reward (Ake, 1981:1 – 3).
In addition, Joffe and Paoletti (2010:3) describes that a strict surveillance was also put in place to monitor all forms of oppositions in Libya for prompt action, while the functions of the institutions for the enforcement of human rights were nebulous or at least that of acquiescence to leadership whims.
Given this scenario, the basic institutions relevant for democratic practices and 5 the protection of the fundamental human rights seem to be lacking or dysfunctional.
Arend (1999) identifies some of the institutions necessary for a (liberal) democratic state to include the legislature, the court, the political party and interest groups. The continued economic quagmire and quest for political equality of all Libyans irrespective of status, despite little leeway for opinion expression provided by Saif al-Islam (Gaddafi’s son), necessitates a rethink on the state and political economy of democratization in Libya under the regime of
Colonel Muammar Gaddafi.
In the light of this, the study broadly evaluates the state and political economy of democratization in Libya under the regime of Colonel Muammar
Gaddafi (1969 – 2011). Specifically, the study analyzes the political and economic structures provided by the state for the enforcement of the fundamental human rights in Libya for the period of study. The study also evaluates the pattern of political recruitment into public offices as well as the accommodation of opposition groups in Libya within the period of study.
1.1 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
Studies in the past tend to focus on the human rights abuse in Libya without juxtaposing them with the economic and political structures for the enforcement of the fundamental human rights in the state. Thus, obliterating the fact of existence of the political and economic institutions responsible for certain functions in the state as well as their dispositions under the regime. 6
Moreover, past scholars vaguely explain without evidence, the pattern of political recruitment partly due to the system of clientelism and patronage in the state or as a result of the complex nature of getting into the leadership position in the state or due to mere ignorance on that relevant aspect of study about the state. Again, all evidence provided by past scholars indicates that the state does not support the existence of political parties. However, they fail to explain the existence and quest (though often suppressed) of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Liberation Group (political opposition groups) as well as many other pockets of agitations by some families as in the case of Abu Salim Prison massacre in 1996; championing oppositions despite the challenges (Africa
Policy Institute, 2011:12 and Sijil, 2011a).
Furthermore, indications as to the rationale for the suppressions and marginalization point to the fact as opined by Mulligan (2011:1) that “oil is a major obstacle to democracy in Libya because of great oil reserve and its rewards and that the leaders always want to enjoy the revenue alone”. To achieve their selfish aim, they tend to resort to political oppression as strategy for holding-off citizens from the rewards. However, the institutions and patterns used for the abuse or that ensure the protection of the rights of the citizens was not analyzed alongside.
The studies of Obayuwana and Obinor (2011) in terms of human rights, describes the democracy and state of Libya as police state with high surveillance, but not specifically mentioning the institutions under whose watch 7 the rights are abused and their reactions; in this case the Civil Society
Organizations. Neither did they specify the categories of the persons been abused, especially opposition political groups, academics, and dissidents.
Coming close to solving the problem is the study of Morss (2011) which explains the patterns of human rights abuse in Libya such as public execution of dissidents and opponents by hanging, torture, etc, without fair trial.
Unfortunately, the nature and disposition of the economic and political structures for the enforcement of the fundamental human rights were ignored.
Moreover, Richard Joseph (cited in National Intelligence Council,
2008:8) describes in detail, the system of prebendalism in Libya where state offices are sought and then utilized for the personal benefits of officeholders and their clients. However, he did not specify whether the offices are sought through elective means or through selective nepotism/tribalism. A closer link was created by Joffe and Paoletti (2010:3) who aver that Libya’s governance purports to be based on direct popular democracy, yet Libyans are ultimately conditioned by the coercive techniques of the Revolutionary Committee
Movement. Notwithstanding, they delinked the unconnected nature of the popular participation from the grassroot to the echelon of leadership through elective means. They also failed to adopt the political economy paradigm in the analysis of the pattern of recruitment.
In addition, the study of Africa Policy Institute (2011:2-3) indicates the convergence between Libya uprising and elite-driven leadership that blend 8 political repression and socio-economic marginalization. The consequence is that the sit-tight regime perpetuates in power without allowing others to fully take-over position of leadership. The study fails to adopt the political economy paradigm in its analysis and did not make specific mention about political groups repressed, the aspects of economic marginalization and who ultimately benefits (possibly resulting from Marx’s thesis of economic determinism from political position in a reinforcing manner).
The continued stifling of democratic practices and the abuse of soci- political and economic rights such as absence of competitive periodic elections, suppression of opposition groups, and autocratic-oligarchy demands a new look at the issues of fundamental human rights in Libya. This is because economic impoverishment of citizens, denial of political rights, as well as the recent violent crackdown of peaceful protesters demanding for regime change are testimonies to the above facts and form the crux of the study. In view of the foregoing, there is the need for holistic study of the economic and political structures for the enforcement of the fundamental human rights in Libya with a view to ascertaining their nature, structure and functions. There is also the need to evaluate the basis of political recruitment with regard to democratic elections, and the tolerance of constitutional opposition under the regime of Gaddafi.
Mulligan, (2011), Obayuwana and Obinor (2011), Joffe and Paoletti
(2010:3), and Morss (2011) have written on democracy and human rights issues in Libya, however, their studies fail to apply the political economy theory in the 9 analysis of the state and political economy of democratization in Libya with specific reference to the political and economic structures provided by the government for the enforcement of the fundamental human rights in the state, the pattern of political recruitment based on elective principles and the tolerance of opposition groups. The above gaps are intended to be filled by the study in consideration of the following questions:
- Did the government of Libya provide political and economic structures for the enforcement of the fundamental human rights of citizens from 1969 to 2011?
- Did the Libyan government base political recruitment into the legislature and executive on periodic election between 1969 and 2011?
- Did the Libyan political structure support the development of political parties and constitutional opposition between 1969 and 2011?
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF STUDY
The broad objective of the study is to explicate the state and political economy of democratization in Libya under the regime of Colonel Muammar
Gaddafi from 1969 to 2011. The specific objectives of the study include
- To evaluate the government’s provision of political and economic
structures for the enforcement of the fundamental human rights of
citizens in Libya from 1969 to 2011.
- To analyze the basis and nature of political recruitment into the
legislature and executive through electoral process for the period of
study. 10
- To adduce evidence with regards to the support and development of
political parties and constitutional opposition between 1969 and 2011.
Establishment of the above objectives with empirical evidence will provide the point of departure from previous studies which tends to focus analysis on human rights abuse in Libya without juxtaposing them with the nature and structure of the economic and political institutions in the state. This will give credence to the interaction of the state and democratization process in
Libya and provide the answers to the questions of the study.
1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY
The relevance of the study arises from the need to eliminate the persistent human rights abuse in Libya, especially in recent times, and the consequent need for instituting a lasting democracy with regard to the respect for the fundamental human rights of citizens or at least to reduce the abuse to the barest minimum. The study has both theoretical and practical importance.
Theoretically, the study will contribute to the advancement of the political economy theory to a higher level of analysis. This will be actualized by providing empirical evidence through logical data relating to the problems of the study. Moreover, it will both provide the answers to the prevailing questions
(problems) and serve as a basis for further research. The study will also contribute to existing literature on the area of study as a source of reference.
On the other hand, the practical relevance of the study is to expose the functions or dysfunctions of the institutions responsible for the enforcement of 11 the fundamental human rights in Libya. The study will provide a guide to the leaders and policy makers in Libya (and elsewhere) for the proper enforcement of fundamental human rights through the improvement of the functions of the existing institutions. This will be actualized by the adoption and practice of democratic principles including the respect for the rights and liberties of citizens, such as popular participation and periodic election which will be protected by the independence of the necessary institutions including the judiciary.
1.4 LITERATURE REVIEW
Review of related literature for the study is based on research questions in order to operationalize the major variables of the study. The research questions of the study are: “did the government of Libya provide political and economic structures for the enforcement of the fundamental human rights of citizens from
1969 to 2011?” “Did the Libyan government base political recruitment into the legislature and executive on periodic election between 1969 and 2011?” “Did the Libyan political structure support the development of political parties and constitutional opposition between 1969 and 2011?” The areas of review include the state and government’s provision of political and economic structures for the enforcement of the fundamental human rights of citizens in Libya from 1969 to
2011. Another is the basis and nature of political recruitment into the legislature and executive through electoral process for the period of study.
Finally, the study reviews literature with regards to the support and 12 development of political parties and constitutional opposition between 1969 and
2011.
Political and Economic Structures for the Enforcement of Fundamental
Human Rights in Libya between 1969 and 2011.
According to Bankole, (2011:6) Libya as a post-colonial and rentier state with crude oil-based economy is faced with the daunting challenges of dictatorship, political alienation, political corruption and fundamental human rights abuse similar to states with related features. At independence, enormous power and wealth was concentrated in the hands of the leader as a hereditary head of state. Hence, the attraction of concentrated wealth and the quest for the booty from leadership led then 27-year old Colonel Muammar Gaddafi and his group of military officers to topple the regime in a bloodless coup on 1 st
September, 1969 so as to perpetuate in power and expropriate the rewards of the state (Mulligan, 2011:1). A Wikipedia analysis confirms that
The discovery of significant oil reserves in 1959 and the subsequent income from petroleum sales enabled one of the world’s poorest nations to establish an extremely wealthy state... with resentment among some factions over the concentration of the nation’s wealth in the hands of King Idris www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libya).
Libya’s crude oil generates about 95% of export earnings, 75% of government receipts, and over 50% of the gross domestic product (WHO,
2007:10). Justifying the above idea, Mulligan (2011:1) puts succinctly that
Libya’s oil reserves are among the largest and most valuable in the world, and that alone is a big obstacle to democracy. Leaders in oil-rich countries almost always enjoy rich economic 13
rewards, and there is an endless supply of factions that would, no doubt, like to have those rewards for themselves…
The discovery of oil in Libya in 1959 exacerbated factionalization and the consequent military takeover. The most popular among the factions are the
Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Liberation Group whose intellectual and financial spread poses great threat to the regime (Sijil, 2011a). The despotic regime of Gaddafi suspended the 1951 Constitution (common among military regimes) which provided for the democratic principles in Libya
(www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libya, and Eke, 2010:36). This paves way for freelance draconian laws by the government.
Eke (2010) while commenting on the character of the post-colonial state with oil-based economy, demonstrates how political corruption impedes on the use of oil revenue to develop rentier state economy. The thesis of oil as central to the human rights abuse in Libya could also be deduced from the study of
Abati (2011:51) who quotes Gaddafi as alleging that the war by the West against Libya is as a result of their need to steal Libya’s oil. The implication here is that the leadership is already enmeshed in the appropriation of the benefits accruing from oil in Libya and tries to hold-off all threatening interests.
Although the NATO allies deny quest to steal oil in Libya, evidences in recent times are pointers to the fact that oil is actually at the heart of the game in the state. According to Bokor (2011b)
News reports that the rebels have struck a deal with Qatar for the sale and export of Libya’s crude oil in rebel-controlled hands have given a glimpse into the twists and turns of the 14
ongoing impasse in that country… which reinforces suspicion that the International Coalition’s ulterior motive is to create favourable conditions for the West to exploit Libya’s crude oil stock with impunity and to scare other countries wishing to build-up some military strength to challenge the allies or interests of the West.
There appears to be a convergence between the Coalition of Opposition
Group’s war-driven democracy evolution in Libya and demand for oil by the
West. This is given the fact that the rationale for ousting Gaddafi in order to enthrone democracy tallies with the immediate opening for exploitation of crude oil by the West through its allies, despite the fact that Libyans were still at war and the level of damages are enormous. There is therefore, the tendency of enthroning stooge of the NATO allies who will sustain the pattern of exploitation and relation of unequal exchange.
The foregoing reveals that there is no doubt that oil is central to the crisis in Libya, both at the international and local dimensions. Locally, the government of Gaddafi perfected its plan to secure its maximum benefit of oil revenue without challenge from within, thus, the government suspended the constitution and paved way for the introduction of obnoxious and self-serving laws (contained in the Green Book) to justify the ideals of the leadership and restrain interests in oil revenue.
The Green Book is made up of 110 pages with 200 words or fewer on each page. It consists of three parts; The Solution of the Problem of Democracy: The Authority of the People (1975); The Solution of the Economic Problem: Socialism (1977); The Social Basis of the Third International Theory (1981). The central theme rejects liberal democracy, free press and capitalism. Its democracy model is based on direct 15
democracy in the form of popular committees (wikipedia.org/wiki/Libyan_Constitution).
The editor of The Guardian (2011, March 1:18) describes the Green
Book as “incoherent and conflicting vision of socialist Libya for self-serving purposes”. Moreover, the contradiction of the creed of the Green Book with the practices of Gaddafi stuns the entire world with his sense of direction as suggested by Abati (2011:51) who avers that the 42 years of Gaddafi indicates the long-time abandonment of the Green Book by the Guide of the Revolution, preferring rather, his idiosyncratic discretion to the stated principles of the revolution. In a way, this projects Gaddafi as enigmatic and unpredictable, something obnoxious to the tenets of democracy, but fails the essential demands of the citizens of the state, vis-à-vis, the respect for their fundamental human rights as it exists in every true democracy elsewhere, namely, the right to vote and be voted for in a free and fair election and the right to hold leaders accountable.
Fundamental human right is one of the major principles of democracy which guarantees the rights and liberties of citizens as well as restrains the tendency for absolute power in a leader. The test-case of Gaddafi, as in most parts of post-colonial oil-based states, justifies the potency for abuse of these rights due to unrestrained power. In the opinion of Mulligan (2011:1) “even if next leader arise from a democratic movement, at some point, he is likely to consider political oppression as a survival strategy that helps to hold back all his competitors”. This is particularly true in a rentier state like Libya. The 16 tendency for aggression, intimidation and suppression of rights of citizens is a manifestation of the low level of the development of the forces of production and dependence in foreign goods and expatriate for the production of the major material means of sustenance of the post-colonial oil-based stateless state of
Libya, which unfortunately are converted by the leaders since it is the major or only means of livelihood in the state (Charkow, 2011, and Ake, 1981:1-3).
Furthermore, the National Intelligence Council (2008:8) asserts that
“Both oil and aid provides external rents that ruling elites fund the state apparatus of repression and patronage that sustains venal, unpopular governments. Both sever the bonds of accountability between rulers and ruled and feed the monster of African politics: corrupt, lawless personal rule.
On the other hand, the justice system in Libya leaves much to be desired due to the nature and structure of the judicial arm of government as a puppet answering to the beckons of the leadership in the state. It is observed with regards to the courts in Libya that
With the acceptance of the primary Islamic law, the dual religious-sector court structure was no longer necessary. In 1973, the religious judicial system of qadi courts was abolished. The secular court system was retained to administer justice, but its jurisdiction now included religious matters. Secular jurisprudence had to conform to sharia (www.mongabay.com/ history/libya/libya-court_structure.html).
In 1987, the court hierarchy is composed of the summary court
(sometimes referred to as partial courts), courts of first instance, appeal courts and the Supreme Court (www.mongabay.com/history/libya/libya- court_structure.html). These courts are known not to follow any publicly laid- 17 down rules of modern courts, but function in line with the sharia law or the dictates of the Revolutionary Command Council and its leader (Sijil, 2011a).
As such the right to humane forms of punishment is truncated since the unconventional law is super-ordinated to the conventional law.
However, by 2005, a new trend in democratization emerged in Libya allowing slight opening for improved right to fair hearing. Due to the demands of the international community in the wake of reconciliation of Libya to the world, the state abolished the Revolutionary People’s Courts in 2005 used to try political prisoners (Africa Policy Institute, 2011:12). The courts were used to try political prisoners and its abolition is adjudged as the proof of democratic practice in Libya by Gaddafi, irrespective of the fact that he instituted it to suppress political opponents and only removed it conditionally, apparently because it does not pose immediate threat to his regime.
From another point of view, the civil society organizations are only allowed existence on the condition of conformity with the revolutionary ideals and are subsumed into the General Peoples Congress where their relevance as champions of the fundamental human rights are silenced. Wikipedia reports that
In the area of civil society organizations, the establishment of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is allowed. However, because they are required to conform to the goals of the revolution, their numbers are small in comparison with those in neighbouring countries. Trade unions do not exist, but numerous professional associations are integrated along with the General Peoples’ Congress (www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Libya). 18
The point of departure here is that the civil society organizations only serve as humanitarian groups without right to express their opinion on the issues of human rights abuse in the state. Consequently, they are allowed existence in acquiescence to the dictates of the regime. A quintessence to this fact is the alleged case of the infection of 426 Libyan children with HIV-tainted blood in 1999, the rash judgment and condemnation to death of the health workers involved on May 6, 2004, who were only saved by the early intervention of the European Union (www.en.m.wikipedia.org/Human_rights_ in_Libya).
Commenting on the economic right of well-being of the Libyans,
Obayuwana (2005:11) quotes Gaddafi as maintaining that a servant and a prisoner are comrades in chains. Therefore, there should be no room for wage worker in any society”. The abolition of wage work is predicated on the concept of collective ownership of the means of production and the design to eliminate any potential growth of individual economic power that could pose threat to the regime. In this regard, he further opines that:
One can never tell whether the citizenry is satisfied with Gaddafi’s brand of socialism even with the food that is almost freely put on their table and the fact that every adult owns a house of his own and that healthcare and education are taken for granted.
This idea is made manifest in the confused and ignorant state of most
Libyans with regard to their economic and social standing comparative to the rest of the oil-reach economies, especially in the Arab world. Hence, while 19
Gaddafi and his sons and friends enjoy the benefits of the oil revenue, 60% of
Libyans remain poor and subsist on less than $2 a day (The Guardian Editor,
2011:18).
The above position is affirmed by the low level poverty index of Libya in terms of absolute and relative poverty comparative to neighbouring states, highest human development index in North Africa as well as best healthcare delivery in the area (www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libya). Despite these positive indexes, the fact is that low population and high GDP confuse the reality of the condition of the people. Beyond this however, the problem of
Libyans with regards to political and economic rights goes beyond daily livelihood, but cuts across the desire for self fulfillment and actualization by expression of the fundamental rights to vote and be voted for into leadership positions as well as to hold leaders accountable.
Elective Principles and Patterns of Political Recruitment into Leadership
Positions in Libya between 1969 and 2011
The Libyan state seems to adopt disguised pattern of elective principles.
This is because the government provides an uncompetitive outlet for political expression in the form of the General Peoples Congress. The Libyan state practices socialist and direct democracy under Gaddafi, which is controlled in an undemocratic manner by the leader with the election of secretaries from the
Jamahiriya sector (Abati, 2001). 20
The structure of Gaddafi’s Jamahiriya government originates in April
1973, described by Joffe and Paoletti (2010) as “stateless state, driven by direct popular democracy, which emerged, distilled, as it were, from the broader principles of Nasirist Arab nationalism in which the revolution had been born.”
The creation of the General People’s Congress is predicated on the discontent of the members of the Revolutionary Command Council who demands for more opening and participation by members of the public, not necessarily for their genuine interest in the public, but on their fear of the excessive powers of
Gaddafi and his likelihood to be corrupted absolutely. As a result of the challenges by members of the Revolutionary Council to the leader, the General
Peoples Congress was introduced in 1975 in other to weaken the powers of the
Council, while at the same time allow for the direct exercise of powers, relatively though, by the people (www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libya).
The Revolutionary Sector has permanent membership while the
Jamahiriya Sector involving the national General Peoples Congress (legislature) whose membership is composed of 2700 secretaries were elected in an open- ballot system of electoral college from the 22 regional Shabiyat Committees
(composed of Secretaries – representatives of the Shabiyat Council) at the regional congress level. The Shabiyat secretaries were elected from each of the
1,500 local/urban Wards Committees (Secretaries – representatives of Ward
Council) at the Basic People’s Congress. The Wards Committees’ Secretaries are the only directly elected officers by the members of each ward. 21
The legislative bodies (Congresses) are represented by corresponding executive bodies (Committees) consisting of secretaries of local/urban ward
Basic People’s Committees, regional Shabiyat People’s Committees and the national General People’s Committee. Every four years, the members of the
Basic People’s Congresses elect their own secretaries. The leadership of the local Basic People’s Congress represents the local congress at the regional
Shabiyat People’s Congress which also elects its secretaries, and in turn represents the regional congress at the national General People’s Congress level.
The members of the General People’s Congress elect the members of the
General People’s Committee (Secretaries) at their annual meeting
(www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libya). The real powers of government rest on the Revolutionary Command Council while the Secretaries of the General
People’s Committee serve as administrative officers. Moreso, each of the sectors has its Council/Congress and Committees as executive and legislative bodies, respectively, thus forming a dual parliamentary system.
Although the secretaries are designated as ministers (with little or no portfolios), they take instruction from the leadership of the Revolutionary
Council. This is evidenced by Joffe and Paoletti (2010:3) that “Libya’s governance purports to be based on direct popular democracy, yet Libyans are ultimately conditioned by the coercive techniques of the Revolutionary
Command Council, whose tenure is permanent based on their involvement in the revolution of 1969. In fact, the closeness or easy assess to Gaddafi, in terms 22 of relations, friends, tribal leaders and allies, confers higher authority to the individual(s) above that of the national secretaries.
According to the Editor of The Guardian (2011, March 1) Gaddafi built his rule on a cult of personality and a network of family and tribal alliances particularly in his hometown Sirte, as well as on the Revolutionary Command
Council (legislature). This is antithetical to the tenets of modern liberal elective principle in the elements of democracy where popular participation, periodic election as well as competitive, free and fair election are the demands.
For example, elections into the General People’s Committee involves direct voting by show of hands or a division into ‘yea’ or ‘nay’ camps with electorate comprising all Libyan citizens eighteen years of age or older in good legal political standing (www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cabinet_of_Libya). The overt show of hands impedes on the rights to a convinced voting pattern on the electorate who changes choice of vote on basis of fear for voting an opponent of the regime (given the level of surveillance) or out of sheer conformity with majority or friends.
In this regard, Campbell (2011) rightly observes that because of the level of repression in the police state of Gaddafi, the levels of political organization by the Libyan working class were underdeveloped. Based on the foregoing, the regime neutralized elective principles into the national executive and legislative arms by allowing localized elections that do not transit representatives as national political office holders, but in practice as merely administrative 23 officers. Again, these officials must conform to the idea of the Green Book and the whims of the leader in administrative offices. Bearing in mind that those chosen are selected on sentiments of alliance and relationship with Gaddafi, all forms of opposition is silenced through the network of formal and informal security agents (Joffe and Paoletti, 2010:3, and Obayuwana and Obinor, 2011).
In the view of National Intelligence Council (2008:9)
The fundamental purpose of neo-patrimonial, prebendal governments is not to produce public goods… rather, it is to produce private goods for those who hold or have access to political power, with the tendency for prolonged tenure in power of a single ruler.
A peculiar trend of recycling and rotating positions is common among sit- tight leaders simply to remain in the corridors of power. This lends credence to their application of all possible means in the recruitment of supporters and suppression of opponents in the state. Thus the pattern of political recruitment is based on the whims of the leader. Joffe and Paoletti (2010:16) put succinctly that
Gaddafi’s decisions are mediated through contact and discussion with formal and informal advisers, even if they are his ultimate responsibility. The General People’s Committee forms a kind of temporary elite in that their membership to the core advisory group depends entirely on the Colonel’s interests in the projects and policies they espouse. Once his personal interests and convictions shift, they cease to be members of the core, yet always available to be reintegrated should the Libyan leader switch back towards the highest and lowest of policy makers.
Hence, the choice of members of the ruling class is predicated on the policy fluctuation trends of Gaddafi. The ability of the individual to have 24 access to the leader as well as to convince him on his ability and unflinching support provides him with the edge over other informal competitors. However, the decision as to who is recruited or who is dropped from the leadership position remains the responsibility of Gaddafi.
Status of Political Parties and Constitutional Opposition between 1969 and
2011
The hallmark of the failure of democracy under Gaddafi’s regime manifests in the suppression of all forms of opposition, particularly in recent times. Statutorily, political parties in the state were banned since 1952 due to the electoral crisis of the period, but also as a result of their nature to pose threat to the perpetuity in power of the regime. Obayuwana (2005:11) sums up the operation of the party system and political recruitment in Libya that “the party system”, according to Gaddafi in his Green Book, “aborts democracy, because to make a party, you split society.”
The desire for the regime to create a cohesive political order is described by Martin Asser, a writer for the BBC as a bitter irony which unfortunately suppresses the rights of Libyans opposed to the original idea of upholding direct democracy professed in the thesis of the doctrine. This idea is complemented by the Africa Policy Institute (2011:4) that given the very nature of the state under Gaddafi, in which there has been no space for political parties, opposition movements, or genuine civil society organizations, the push for reforms could only have come from within the upper echelons of the regime, [although this is 25 hard to come by]. Thus the party system is abolished by the 1972 Prohibition of Political Parties Act Number 71 (www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libya).
The statutory impingement on the existence of political parties and constitutional opposition only creates room for illegal opposition groups who apply subtle means in agitating for the various demands of the citizens of the state so as not to offend the ideas of the leader. Although the General Peoples’
Congress provides a forum for representation, the actual function is administrative and making of project recommendations to the Revolutionary
Council (www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cabinet_of_Libya). In view of the foregoing, the fundamental human rights relating to the right to vote in a meaningful, fair, competitive elections, and to hold governing officials accountable is not only abused, but completely denied of the Libyans.
Africa Policy Institute (2011:12) avers that the calls for political reforms have generally been far less forthcoming, since any kind of decentralization would automatically entail a loss of control that could threaten the very nature of the regime. It is the recognition of the fact that urged the leader to eliminate any source of threat including guaranteeing lifetime leadership in the state.
Commenting on tenure of leadership in Libya, the editor of The Guardian
(2011:18) states that Gaddafi espoused an incoherent vision of a socialist Libya in line with perpetuating himself in power. This idea is further highlighted in the analysis of Adeyemi (2006:6) and Bankole (2011:6) that Gaddafi propagates the expungement of the tenure of leadership in Africa as a basis of sustainable 26 development, [even if it goes against the wills of the people]. There is little wonder then why the leadership in Libya suspended the constitution of 1951 and in its place, introduced the Green Book. Since the political party system is made illegal and unacceptable for the emergence of leadership in Libya, opposition to the ideals of the leaders is crushed vehemently.
In the view of Sijill (2011a) while Gaddafi denies the claim of holding political prisoners, evidences in human rights organizations reports indicate that some political prisoners are actually in the custody of government for belonging to ‘illegal’ organizations (the Islamic Liberation Party and the Muslim
Brotherhood). Moreover, the attempt to indulge in protests by students and professionals result to extra-judicial killing through public hanging of students, shooting of demonstrators, arrests, and torture. This is evidenced in the April
1984 killing of students demonstrating at Al Fateh University and the great number of professionals and students arrested, tortured and even killed by the government (www.mongabay.com/history/libya_student_opposition.html).
Consequent upon the above, prisoners are detained for long periods without trials as demands by the law for the respect of the fundamental human rights to fair hearing. This impinges on the principles and practices of democracy in the state, and is further aggravated by the twists in the role of the legal institution responsible for bequeathing justice to the people.
27
Gap in the Literature
Mulligan (2011) concentrates analysis on the oil wealth of Libya and leadership expropriation of the revenue while suppressing the masses. He however, failed to examine the economic structures and political institutions of the state which aid such corrupt practices and political alienation of the masses.
Obayuwana and Obinor (2011) focus explanation on dictatorial and suppressive nature of leadership in Libya but fail to adopt any specific theory. Joffe and
Paoletti (2010) explicate the role of oil revenue is creating prebendalism and clientelism while serving the rent for acquiring arms for suppression of opposition within and outside Libya, but they did not adopt the Political
Economy theory for the analysis. Morss (2011) deliberates on human rights abuses in Libya, but did not examine the role of the political institutions alongside. The central theme of their studies rests on oil-based rentierism which serves for prebendalism, clientelism and suppressive security surveillance.
These theses converges socio-political and economic rights denials as basis of human rights abuse in Libya. However, their studies fail to apply the Political
Economy theory in the analysis of the state and political economy of democratization in Libya with specific reference to the political and economic structures provided by the government for the enforcement of the fundamental human rights in the state. They also did not analyze the subordinated pattern of political recruitment based on elective principles as it exists in the state as well as the improving tolerance of opposition groups which gave rise to the popular 28 protests of 16 th February, 2011, the rebellion and ouster of Gaddafi in
September, 2011 culminating to his gruesome death on 20 th October, 2011 and capture of Sirte (the last stronghold), as well as the end of the war/declaration of liberation of Libya on 23 rd October, 2011. The above gaps are intended to be filled by the study using the Political Economy Theory and in adducing evidence to these effects. These gaps when filled, will contribute immensely to the development of the theory in this area of study.
1.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The theory adopted for the study is the Marxian Political Economy theory propounded by Karl Marx, but expanded in the ‘Contribution to the
Critique of Political Economy’ in 1844 by Friedrich Engels. The central thesis of the theory is the dynamic character of social reality, inter-relatedness of different levels of structure and, the primacy of material condition and its dialectics in determining how a society produces, distributes and exchanges goods and services as well as the social relations arising from the productive process (Ake, 1981, and Igwe, 2005).
Sabine and Thorson (1973:692-693) points out that Marx’s dialectical materialism led to a class structure in a society where the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are in constant struggle within the capitalist historical stage. It is this struggle between the leadership and the masses in Libya that culminates to the creation of impeding political and economic structures for the dominance of the people by the government. The resistance by the people also reflects the class 29 struggle in the thesis of the political economy theory which results to the current crisis and forceful change of the regime. The crisis in Libya is not only a reflection of demand for regime change, but also for right of popular participation and to that effect, economic improvement of the average citizen.
The thesis is also reflected in the argument of Ake (1981:3) that political positions are the basis of resource allocation in the state. This sums up the general idea of the theory and its relevance in the analysis of the problem of study.
Furthermore, Ake (1981:1-2) further explains the primacy of material condition as the substructure of social existence of man which determines his superstructure. The economic alienation of the lower class in Libya tends to drive them to fight against the existing structures which ought to protect his rights and liberties, but unfortunately subverts it due to the dysfunction of the structures as designed by the upper class. This, he argues is because those that are economically privileged tend to fair better in all other aspects of life; politics, education, culture, etc. They are also interested in preserving the existing social order that favours them. Hence, there is the tendency of not having an acceptable democratic polity, since the economically privileged are also politically advantaged; thus having the economic and political rewards in the state to themselves, leading to an endless struggle between the classes
(Mulligan, 2011 and Africa Policy Institute, 2008:3). 30
Moreover, the theory had the advantage of providing insight into the dynamics of the social world, developmental perspective, a comprehensive view of society as well as treating problems concretely rather than abstractly
(Ake, 1981:3). Therefore, the framework for the application of the theory is in consideration of the character of a post-colonial state which comprises rent- seeking and self-serving leadership, the political economy and social relations of production of the state which is oil and socialism as well as their (post- colonial, oil-based economy and socialism) convergence which lead to the human rights issues in Libya; the restriction of political recruitment and suppression of all forms of opposition.
Correlating this theory with the problem of study, Huntington (1993:11) identifies four, sometimes overlapping geo-cultural categories as obstacles to democratization as follows:
1. Home-grown Marxist-Leninist regimes, eg. Soviet Union, etc.
2. Sub-Saharan African countries, with military regimes, one-party systems,
or their combinations.
3. Islamic countries stretching from Morocco to Indonesia.
4. East Asian countries, from Burma through Southeast Asia to China and
North Korea, having communist systems, military regime, personal
dictatorships, etc.
He further explained that these instances are summed-up in terms of political, cultural and economic obstacles to democratization. In the context of 31
Libya, it appeared all the factors are converged and visible such that all traits to hindering democracy manifests in all facets of life of citizens in the state.
1.6 HYPOTHESES
This study is based on the following hypotheses:
H1: The government of Libya tends to relegate political and economic structures for the enforcement of the fundamental human rights of citizens between 1969 and 2011.
H2: Libya political recruitment into the legislature and executive based on periodic election between 1969 and 2011 tend to be undermined by the Libyan government.
H3: The Libyan political structure tends to militate against the development of political parties and constitutional opposition between 1969 and 2011.
The political and economic structures to be examined include those relevant for the enforcement of the fundamental human rights. On the part of the political structures such structures considered are the legislature, the executive, the court, the civil society organizations, and the political parties and electoral system. On the other part, the economic structures examined include private sector comprising indigenous enterprises and foreign investments
(MNCs), labour unions, occupational mobility and reward, as well as social security and human capital development in the state. Moreover, the study examines the nature of recruitment into the executive and legislative structures as well as the disposition of the political parties and constitutional opposition for the period of study. This will be done in the light of the framework of
Marxian Political Economy.
32
1.7 METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION
The data used for the study was collected through the use of qualitative method by development of the logical data framework (empirical indicators).
The qualitative method in political studies is traditional with value-ridden concepts. Igwe (2005:367) describes qualitative method as relating to aspects of enquiry that are more philosophical and argumentative. Although it deals with facts like the quantitative method, however, it adopts a logical instead of empirical facts, as such is concerned with the value-laden, subjective, and theoretical variables. The aspects of qualitative data utilized for the study include field studies and the development and application of logical data framework in the extraction of evidence from the documentary studies.
Documents used for the field survey include field studies of human rights
(records) by international human rights agencies like the United Nations Human
Rights Commission, Sijil, Amnesty International, as well as health and economic reports of World Health Organization, etc. Other materials used for data collection include mass communications record in forms of newspapers,
Internet sources as well as scholarly textbooks.
Furthermore, the application of the logical data framework is based on collection of argumentative and logical evidence relating broadly to democracy
(with emphasis on the fundamental human rights), but particularly on economic and socio-political rights which are right to life, right to dignity of human person, right to fair hearing, right to freedom of expression and the press, and 33 the right to peaceful assembly and association. Consequent upon the above, data collection is based on empirical indicators of abuse of right to life which include extra-judicial killing and empirical indicators of abuse of right to dignity of human person which include unlawful arrests, torture, unlawful detention and coerced labour, lack of choice/alternative jobs, and unequal socio-economic relations. Similarly, empirical indicators of abuse of right to fair hearing include, lengthy detention without legal proceeding, jungle or predetermined judgment and inability to appeal judgment. Also the empirical indicators of abuse of right to freedom of expression and the press include, unlawful restriction in media ownership and control, restraint in competitive free and fair election, and the empirical indicators of abuse of right to peaceful assembly and association include, unlawful restriction on formation and membership of socio- political association, trade union and political parties (in opposition) as well as restrictive electoral system and popular participation.
According to Selltiz, Jahoda, Deutsch, and Cook, (1977:200)
Direct observation of behaviour is, of course, not the only method by which the scientist can obtain data; interviews and questionnaires, projective techniques, and available records can be substituted for the scientist’s own observation.
They further opine that mass communication documents provide a bridge in the gap of the past and present history of any society and provide the data, free of bias of the investigator, necessary for research (Seltiz et al, 1977:330).
Hence, the reliance, mainly on the secondary source of data in no means limits the validity and reliability of the findings of the study since they are relevant in 34 adducing evidence to the areas of need in the study using the logical data framework.
Moreover, the data collected was analyzed using qualitative descriptive technique (or qualitative content analysis technique). Descriptive analysis otherwise called content analysis involves the reading and/or listening to the content of a body of communication and then summarizes and interprets what is there (Burnham, Gilland, Grant, and Layton-Henry, 2004:236). The use of qualitative content analysis is due the large quantity of data from available records, from which the systematic and objective selection of relevant logical data was made for the study.
In addition, Asika (2009:118) avers that qualitative descriptive analysis is used to verbally summarize the information generated in the research. For example, the preference for use of verbal analysis and interpretation of a report in a table rather than presenting the table in the study constitutes qualitative descriptive analysis. This must be done in an orderly, coherent and comprehensive manner so as to serve the purpose of presenting the table.
However, tables were employed to illustrate instances and thus enhance evidence needed for the study. The technique is not the exclusive method of data analysis, but is adequate for the interpretation, analysis and prediction of phenomena especially for social phenomena as in the case of the study.
Furthermore, research design for the study involves the logical structure of the research enquiry aimed at identifying variables and their relationships to 35 one another. It sets the strategy for obtaining answers to the problem of study by describing the hypotheses to be tested, listing the research questions and specifying the evidence needed to provide convincing test for the research hypothesis and the data needed to answer the research questions (Asika,
2009:27 and Burnham et al, 2004:30 and 33).
The research design adopted is observation method (Burnham et al,
2004:31 and Selltiz et al, 1977:200). The study adopts a logical application of the theory by observing empirical evidence relating to the major concepts of the study and on the research questions. This is on the ground that the government of Libya tend to militate the provision of political and economic structures
(independent variables already specified in the hypotheses) for the enforcement of the fundamental human rights between 1969 and 2011, that the government disposes to restrain political recruitment into the legislature and executive on periodic election between 1969 and 2011 and that the Libyan political structure tends to impede the development of political parties and constitutional opposition between 1969 and 2011. The theory will also apply the empirical evidence of the fundamental human rights (dependent variables already specified in the method of data collection) to test the relationship and interaction of the variables.
36
CHAPTER TWO
2.0 NATURE OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURES IN
LIBYA BETWEEN 1969 AND 2011.
This section of the study evaluates with evidences, the political and economic structures put in place by the government of Libya for the enforcement of the fundamental human rights in the state. Some of the political institutions necessary for a (liberal) democratic state include the legislature, the court, the political party and civil society organizations/interest groups.
However, basic concepts in the study were clarified to enhance comprehension of the study.
2.1 THE STATE AND DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN
LIBYA
The Libyan State
The name Libya originally derives from the ‘Libu’ tribesmen. The name was resuscitated in 1903 by the Italian geographer Frederico Minutilli who used it in his work “Bibliografia della Libia” and was adopted by the Italian government in its “Regio Decreto di Annessione” (Royal Decree of
Annexation) on November 5, 1911 (www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libya).
Historically, the area of Libya was considered separate provinces (or states) with Tripolitania in the northwest, Barka (Cyrenaica) in the east, and
Fezzan in the southwest. These three ethnic groups are the major ethnic groups apart from the popularized tribe of Sirte, which is the local tribe of Gaddafi. At 37 independence on 24 th December, 1951, the three major ethnic groups were united in a federation with republican government; monarchical leadership and unicameral legislature under King Idris whose regime spanned from 1951 -
1969. Wikipedia sums up that
Libya is in the north-African continent classified within the Arab world, with land area of 1,759,541 km 2 of which about 90% is desert. It was colonized by Italy between 1911 and 1947, and by United Kingdom and France under United Nations Trusteeship up until 1951 when it gained independence with the name as the United Libyan Kingdom headed by King Idris. It is the 17 th highest oil producer in the world with reserve estimated at 10 th largest of any country (www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libya).
Geographically, Libya has the fourth largest land area in Africa and seventeenth in the world with about 90% desert covering the land area (WHO,
2007:10). It is bordered by Mediterranean Sea to the north, Egypt at the east,
Sudan at the south east, Chad and Niger at the south, and Algeria and Tunisia at the west. After independence, Libya was divided into three governorates
(muhafazat) and in 1963 into ten governorates. The governorates were legally abolished in February 1975 and nine Control Bureaus were setup to deal directly with the nine areas: education, health, housing, social services, labour, agricultural services, communications, financial services and economy. In 1983
Libya was split into forty-six districts (baladiyat), then in 1987 into twenty-five.
In 1995, Libya was divided into thirteen districts (shabiyah) and in 1998 into twenty-six districts. These were later divided into thirty-two districts and further rearranged into twenty-two districts in 2007. The population estimate of 38
Libya as at 2010 stood at 6,420,000 with 98% Muslims. The following table indicates the districts and land areas in Libya, each with its 2006 population estimate distribution as at the time of the last division in the state
(www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libya).
Table 1: Districts, population distribution (2006 estimate) and land
areas in Libya after the division in 2007.
S/No District Population Land Area (2006) (km 2) 1 Al Batnan 159,536 83,860 2 Darnah 163,351 19,630 3 Al Jabal al Akhdar 206,180 7,800 4 Al Marj 185,845 10,000 5 Benghazi 670,797 43,535 6 Al Wahat 177,047 _ 7 Al Kufrah 50,104 483,510 8 Sirte (Surt) 141,378 77,660 9 Murzuq 78,621 349,790 10 Sabha 134,162 15,330 11 Wadi Al Hayaa 76,858 31,890 12 Misrata 550,938 _ 13 Al Murgub 432,202 _ 14 Tarabulus 1,065,405 _ 15 Al Jfara 453,198 1,940 16 Az Zawiya 290,993 2,890 17 An Nuqat al Khams 287,662 5,250 18 Al Jabal al Gharbi 304,159 _ 19 Nahut 93,224 _ 39
20 Ghat 23,518 72,700 21 Al Jufrah 52,342 117,410 22 Wadi Al Shatii 78,532 97,160 (Source: www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libya).
The state under the regime of Gaddafi suspended inter alia , the existing constitution and introduced government under the Revolutionary Sector comprising the Revolutionary Command Council and its Committee. It later introduced the Jamahiriya Sector in 1975 also comprising General Peoples’
Congress and its Committee with the Green Book as a revolutionary guide. The book is authored by the Brotherly Guide and Leader of the Revolution
(Gaddafi) in 1975 in Arabic with the English version following in 1976.
The structure of government in Libya appears in complex forms, with dual parliamentary/cabinet structures. For example, there are two branches of government in the Great Socialist People’s Libya Arab Jamahiriya comprising the Revolutionary Sector with the Revolutionary leader as Gaddafi (the de facto leader with honorific title of Brotherly Guide of the Revolution), and the
Revolutionary Committee (cabinet) and the 12-person Revolutionary Command
Council (parliament), who were not elected, with nearly permanent tenure due to involvement in the revolution of 1969.
In 1975 however, the Jamahiriya Sector was introduced in order to curtail the excessive powers of the Council in general, and that of Gaddafi in particular who poses threat to the other members. The parliamentary Jamahiriya Sector involves the national General Peoples Congress/Committee 40
(legislature/cabinet), the 22 regional Shabiyat Congress/Committee
(legislature/cabinet), and the 1,500 local/urban wards Basic People’s Congress
(legislature/cabinet), each comprising all Libyans from 18 years and above.
The leaders of each congress (form a cabinet/secretaries) and represent the members at the higher level for renewable 4-year tenure ad infinitum
(www.en.m.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Libya).
Economically, the Libyan state is an oil producing state which was discovered in 1958 with crude oil constituting about 95% of export earnings,
75% of government receipts, and over 50% of the gross domestic product. It is estimated to have the 10 th largest proven oil reserve in the world and the 17th highest petroleum production (WHO, 2007:10). Here lies the soul of Libya in formation of sub and super structures as well as the social relations of production emanating from the process. Despite the large expanse of the desert region totaling about 90% of land area, Libya is able to create agricultural produce up to 25% of its local consumption needs through underground irrigation and is involved in petrochemical industrial activities to a lesser extent
(www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agriculture_in_Libya).
On the other hand, basic concepts for this aspect of the study include democracy, democratic principles and fundamental human rights. These are related with the institutions in the state as they concern the enforcement of the fundamental human rights in Libya. Appadorai (2001) identifies the essentials of a state to include a definite territory, population, government and sovereignty 41 which derives from the people, and the state’s responsibility for the protection of the rights and liberties of the people. The rights and liberties of the people are contained in the principles of democracy. The popular phrase of Abraham
Lincoln about democracy as the government of the people, for the people and by the people reflects the importance of democracy and sovereignty built on the people.
According to Schmitter (1993:40) democracy is defined as
A system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and co-operation of their elected representatives.
This idea is also complemented by Sodaro (2008:171) who describes democracy in this manner:
The essential idea of democracy is that the people have the right to determine who governs them. In most cases they elect the principal governing officials and hold them accountable for their actions. Democracies also impose legal limits on the government’s authority by guaranteeing certain rights and freedoms to their citizens.
Similarly, Sodaro (2008) further identifies the basic elements or principles of democracy depicted as the Greek temple to include popular sovereignty, rights and liberties, economic well-being, rule of law, and democratic values. The central theme of the above conceptions of democracy is the existence of institutions of governance put in place by the people through election and which is accountable to the people. 42
Arguing in support of the above idea, Arend (1999:1) identifies some of the institutions relevant for the enforcement for the fundamental human rights in democratic societies to include the legislature (and constitution), the court, the civil society organizations, the political parties, among others. Mere existence of these political institutions is on its own not enough to ensure democratic practices and the enforcement of the fundamental human rights in a state.
Rather, they are dependent on other alternative supports for adequate functioning of liberal democratic principles in the system.
Furthermore, Sodaro (2008:223–233) lists the supportive elements for democracy to function such as elites committed to democracy, state institutions, national unity, national wealth, private enterprises, a middle class, support of the disadvantaged for democracy, citizens participation, civil society and a democratic political culture, education and freedom of information, and a favourable international environment. However, among the ideas and principles of democracy, the focal point of the study lies on the rights and liberties, otherwise called the fundamental human rights, especially as it relates to the state in Libya.
Writing on the anomaly of the fundamental human rights abuse, Cranston
(1967:52) cited in Eke (2010:34) opines that it is
Something of which no one may be deprived without a great affront to justice. There are certain deeds which should never be done, certain freedoms which should never be invaded, something which are supremely sacred.
43
Freedom, rights and liberties of the people are considered God-given and inalienable rights of persons, especially right to life, right to the ownership of properties and right to movement from place to place. Tinkering with any of the rights and liberties constitutes abuse to natural laws and justice. This is the rationale for the establishment of state institutions which will assist the government in the protection of the rights of the people. The rights and liberties of the people are also protected through education and orientation (Ifesinachi and Tarabinah, 2009:26). Since the awareness and proper information of the masses will enable them demand for their rights.
The primacy of rights and liberties is better appreciated in the United
States declaration of independence on July 4, 1776 and the Constitution which codified the Bill of Rights and Liberties in 1791 declaring that
We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created equal, and that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, and that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness (Sodaro, 2008:181).
The universal declaration of human rights by the United Nations also form a major principle of the organization which member-states are expected to ratify, codify and respect. Some of the rights and liberties are indicated below.
Some Liberal Democratic Rights and Liberties
1. The right to life and the security of one’s person and property against
government interference without probable cause of illegal activity.
2. Freedom of conscience, thought, and expression (including freedom of
the press). 44
3. Freedom of religion.
4. The right to vote in meaningful, fair, competitive elections and to hold
governing officials accountable.
5. The right to assemble and organize peacefully for political purposes.
6. Freedom of movement, that is, the right to travel freely within and
outside the country’s borders and to live where one chooses.
7. The right to equal treatment under the law and to the due process of
law, including the right to a fair trial and humane forms of
punishment.
8. The right to own and alienate (i.e. buy and sell) private property and to
engage in private business activity.
9. The right to publicly funded education (Sodaro, 2008:183).
2.2 CHARACTER OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN LIBYA FROM
1951–1969 AND 1969–2011.
The character of the political institutions in Libya is predominantly that of acquiescence to the autocratic disposition of the regime. This emanates from the clientele, prebendal and patronage system of the leadership. Relating the above to the issue of the study, Gaddafi’s regime appeared to have effectively applied the coercive and subversive measures on the institutions of government in the infringement of the fundamental human rights of citizens in the state.
Based on the foregoing, the study examines with evidences, the features of the political institutions regarding the enforcement of the fundamental human rights 45 in Libya. The political institutions include the parliament/legal framework as well as the court.
Republican Parliamentary System and Legal Framework in Libya between
1951 and 1969
Prior to the regime of Gaddafi between 1951 and 1969, the Libyan political system is parliamentary system with monarchical head of state under
King Idris al-Sennusi. The form of government coupled with Islamic religious dictates in sharia allows the concentration of enormous power under the leadership. Although massive power was concentrated on the leadership of
King Idris, the 1951 Constitution of Libya provides for the fundamental human rights of citizens common to European and North American nation states. The first National Assembly was elected under the rule of the 1951 Independence
Constitution with then political parties (latter banned in 1952 due to the electoral crisis). The state has a unicameral legislature headed by Mohamed
Abulas’ad El-Alem as the President of the National Assembly, with two Vice
Presidents of the National Assembly Omar Faiek Shennib and Abu Baker
Ahmed Abu Baker (www.en.m.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Libya).
Some of the rights include Equal Rights set-out in Article 11 of the
Constitution. This aims at ensuring that all citizens are equal before the law and receives equal treatment and opportunities in public situations. Although Islam was declared the official religion in Article 5, the Constitution formally acknowledged the respect for other religions, noting in Article 21 that “there 46 shall be respect for other religions and freedom of conscience”, even though this is hardly the case since the conventional law is subordinated to sharia law. It further provides for equality before the law as well as equal civil and political rights, equal opportunities, and an equal responsibility for public duties and obligations without distinction of religion, belief, race, language, wealth, kinship or political or social opinions. Similarly, Article 13 of the Constitution provides that “there shall be no forced labour, except on emergency”. It also provides in Article 34 that “works shall be entitled to fair remuneration”
(www.en.m.wikipedia.org /wiki/Libya).
Nature of dual Parliament and Legal Instrument in Libya between 1969 and 2011
The regime of Colonel Gaddafi instituted the Revolutionary Sector and the Jamahiriya Sector in a dual parliamentary system as already described in literature review. The study has also noted that the Revolutionary Command
Council is composed of the military officers engaged in the revolutionary coup with permanent seat. These take the decisions for the functioning of the government while the people’s sector functions as administrative officers.
Sequel to this fact, it has been emphasized earlier that the character of the political institutions in Libya is predominantly that of acquiescence to the autocratic disposition of the regime (and the Revolutionary Command Council).
This emanates from the clientele, prebendal and patronage system of the leadership. The study now turns to the examination of the roles of the 47
Jamahiriya Sector (comprising the national General Peoples
Congress/Committee) and elites in the state in checkmating the powers of the
Revolutionary Command Council/Committee with regards to instituting democratic laws that protect the rights and liberties of citizens in Libya.
The functions of the General Peoples Committee is purely administrative such as implementation of laws, preparation of proposals, monitoring and supervision of local and regional committees, institutions and public companies, adoption of curriculum, etc (www.en.m.wikipedia.org /wiki/Cabinet_of_Libya).
Although the members of the General Peoples’ Congress (comprising 2,700 representatives) elect their leaders (General Peoples’ Committee), they are subject to confirmation by the leadership of the Revolutionary Committee which also assign them functions as administrative officers. The Secretary-
General of the General Peoples’ Committee and his deputy are designated as the nominal head of state and deputy head of state (Prime minister and Deputy
Prime Minister) respectively, while the other 25 secretaries (ministers) head the
25 secretariats (ministries) each as administrative officers under their leaders
(www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Peoples’_Congress_Libya). The real powers of government rest on the Revolutionary leadership who compose and alternate the position of the head of state while the General-Secretary, Deputy
General Secretary and Secretaries of the General People’s Committee, who are supposed to be the actual executive officers as head of government and deputy 48 head of government, respectively, now serve as administrative officers – the puppets of the regime.
Joffe and Paoletti (2010:3) indicate that “Libya’s governance purports to be based on direct popular democracy, yet Libyans are ultimately conditioned by the coercive techniques of the Revolutionary Command Council. In fact, the closeness or easy assess to Gaddafi (relations, friends, tribal leaders and allies), confers higher authority to the individual(s) above that of the national secretaries. Hence, the Jamahiriya sector is rendered weak and ineffective in challenging the undemocratic dictates of the Revolutionary Command and could not replace them due to their permanent membership.
Several literature are instructive of the use of patronage in separating leadership from the people so as to perpetuate in power even while abusing the fundamental human rights of the people to vote and be voted for in a meaningful, competitive, free and fair election. Thus, the Africa Policy Institute
(2011:16-17) observes that
The Gaddafi regime has always relied heavily on patronage as a means of securing loyalty. It has distributed cars, money, positions, and other perks in return for allegiance, creating vast patronage networks that have underpinned the regime since it came to power in 1969. This extensive use of patronage has created an environment whereby public office is generally considered as a means of siphoning money off from the state and where corruption is a way of life. Thus, Libya was ranked 126 th out of 180 countries as among the bottom-point corrupt nations by the Transparency International in 2008.
Libya’s corruption index is a manifestation of the level of political alienation of the people, and bearing in mind the economic determinism thesis 49 of the theory of the study, the leadership could only sustain itself in power by settling some tribal leaders and elites in the society while applying suppression and intimidation on the ordinary citizens. Africa Policy Institute (2011:15) also evidences this when it asserts that
The main impediment to reform regularly cited by commentators and Libyans alike is the presence of an ‘old guard’ who are opposing the shift to modernity. Many of these are members of the feared Revolutionary Committees movement some of who are Ahmed Ibrahim – former Deputy General Secretary of the General Peoples’ Congress; Nasser al- Mabrouk – former Public Security Secretary; and Mehdi Emberish – former Culture Secretary, etc
However, quest for political reforms has been initiated by Saif al-Islam
(Gaddafi’s son) who constituted a committee comprising academics and experts from his reformist current around 2007, to draw up a draft National Charter which proposed the establishment of a Social Leaderships Council that would sit at the apex of the country, but Gaddafi has refused to adopt the document presumably tinkering with essentials of his regime structure. This led him to declare on August 20, 2007 that
there are four red lines in Libya that cannot be crossed. These are Islam and the application of sharia law, the security and stability of Libya, national unity and Muammar Gaddafi (Africa Policy Institute, 2011:14-16).
To this extent, the Libyan political structure in terms of the executive and legislative organs of government remained personalized tools of oppression under the regime of Gaddafi. Therefore, they remained in acquiescence to the whims of the leadership who concatenate patronage and suppression through the 50 existing structures in holding-off potential competitors, thereby denying the people their socio-political rights to a competitive, free and fair election as well as holding leaders accountable.
Nature and Structure of the Justice System in Libya between 1969 and
2011
Influence of Islam and Revolutionary Command Council on Courts in Libya
Libya is a religious state with Islam as the official state religion. This is because 98% of the people are Muslims which lay credence to the adoption of state religion. To this effect, the state from inception adopted sharia law in its legal system as indicated in article 5 of the 1951 Constitution under the regime of King Idris. The sharia system during the period 1951 – 1969 was subordinated to the secular legal system in the state. This creates a dual-legal court structure, so as to allow the exercise of the fundamental human rights of the people while at the same time allowing for the expression of their religious dictum within the state (www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libya).
However, the regime of Gaddafi suspended the existing laws with a modified restructuring of sharia law in administrative and cultural revolutions on the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad in 1973. The pattern of the legal system indicates that
With the acceptance of the primary Islamic law, the dual religious-sector court structure was no longer necessary. In November, 1973, the religious judicial system of qadi courts was abolished. The secular court system was retained, but its jurisdiction now included religious matters. Secular 51
jurisprudence had to conform to sharia (www.mongabay.com/ history/libya/libya-court_structure.html).
Thus, the secular aspect of the legal system was joined with the sharia law with the latter super-ordinating the former. The implication here is that secular model of legal administration was adopted in applying sharia law; simply put, it is the advancement of the system of sharia law, which is known not to conform to any secular law pertaining to democratic principles and particularly to the enshrinement and enforcement of the fundamental human rights of citizens.
Libya Courts Structure and the Revolutionary Court
Judicial structure in Libya as at 1987 comprises four levels namely,
Summary Courts (sometimes referred to as Partial Courts), Courts of First
Instance, Appeal Courts, and the Supreme Court. Each of the Courts functions in line with the designs of the sharia law in the state (www.mongabay.com/ history/libya/libya-court_structure.html).
The Summary Courts were located in most small towns. Each consisted of a single judge who heard cases involving misdemeanors, disputes amounting to Libyan dinar (LD) 100. Most decisions are final, but in cases where the dispute involved more than LD20 the decision could be appealed.
The primary court was the Court of First Instance. One Court of First
Instance was located in each area that formerly constituted a governorate
(district) before its abolition in 1975. The Courts of First Instance heard appeals from Summary Courts and had original jurisdiction over all matters in which 52 amount of more than LD100 were involved. A panel of three judges, ruling by majority decision, heard civil, criminal, and commercial cases and applied sharia to personal or religious matters.
The three Courts of Appeal sat at Tripoli, Benghazi, and Sabha. A three- judge panel, again ruling by majority decision, served in each court and heard appeals from the courts of first instance. Original jurisdiction applied to cases involving felonies and high crimes. Sharia judges were assigned to the regular courts of appeals to specialize in sharia appellate cases.
The Supreme Court was located in Tripoli and comprises five chambers: civil and commercial, criminal, administrative, constitutional, and sharia. A five-judge panel sat in each chamber, the majority establishing decision. The court was the final appellate body for cases emanating from lower courts
(www.mongabay.com/ history/libya/libya-court_structure.html).
Notwithstanding the above, the Revolutionary Peoples’ Court forms the informal apex of the justice system in Libya until its abolition in 2005. The court was used to try political prisoners and opposition members (Africa Policy
Institute, 2011:12). The indication of the dominance of the Revolutionary court over the Libyan justice system is evidenced in the records of human rights organizations. In this vein, Sijil (2011a) observes that
the Revolutionary Court unilaterally takes-over cases from the other courts, has no room for appeal and adopts no defined form of legal system, except that it is based on sharia and decision of the leadership in the state.
53
Similarly, a wikipedia analysis quotes US Department of States on its annual human rights report for 2007 that the Judiciary is controlled by the government and there is no right to a fair public trial
(www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libya). Further evidence to this effect is the
HIV trial in Libya in which six foreign health workers (five Bulgarian nurses and one Palestinian doctor) were accused of deliberately infecting 426 children with HIV-tainted blood in a hospital in 1999. On May 6, 2004, a Libyan court sentenced the workers to death. They were eventually freed in 2007, following
European diplomatic mobilization and Revolutionary Council’s resolution in the spirit of reconciliation with the west (en.m.wikipedia.org/Human_rights_in_
Libya).
Particularly important is the confirmation of Saif al-Islam that Islam and the application of sharia law are two of the four red lines (major obstacles) to democratization in Libya (Africa Policy Institute, 2011:16). In this regard, the legal system in Libya was designed to suit the structure of suppression of opposition in Libya through Islam, sharia law and its administration as well as idiosyncrasy of Gaddafi’s Revolutionary Court.
Nature of the Civil Society Organizations in Libya from 1969 to 2011
Civil Society Organizations consist of those non-governmental groups whose major aim is the improvement of the standard and quality of living of the people through rendering of services. Civil Society Organizations in Libya were compelled to conform to the tenets of the revolution. The conditionalities 54 made them to either stay in complete obedience without any form of opposition or to leave the state. This is expressed in a Wikipedia analysis that
In the area of civil society organizations, the establishment of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is allowed. However, because they are required to conform to the goals of the revolution, their numbers are small in comparison with those in neighbouring states (www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Libya).
The groups are also allowed to send representatives to the General
Peoples’ Congress who are expected to make suggestions, but not to oppose or criticize ideas raised in the process of the governance. Given this scenario, the number of non-governmental organizations in Libya is smaller compared to those in neighbouring states since some of these aims to promote the fundamental human rights of the people with respect to social, cultural, political and economic rights.
WHO (2007:4) avers that given the nature of the state under Gaddafi, in which there has been no genuine civil society organizations, the push for reform could only have come from within the upper echelons of the regime.
Unfortunately, the elites who benefit from the regime either on patronage or clientelism as members of the ruling class prefer to maintain the status quo ante which favours them. Therefore, the Civil Society Organizations in the state were impeded by statutory and bureaucratic bottlenecks for their establishment and functioning and were as such unable to press for the improvement of the fundamental human rights conditions of the people. 55
2.3 STRUCTURE OF ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS IN LIBYA
BETWEEN 1969 AND 2011.
As a socialist state, there is predominance of state enterprises over private enterprises; hence the state is the leading investor in Libya. The discovery of oil and natural gas reserves in the country in 1959 led to the transformation of
Libya’s economy from a poor economy to (then) Africa’s richest. The World
Bank defines Libya as an “Upper Middle Income Economy”, along with only seven other African countries. In the early 1980s, Libya was one of the wealthiest countries in the world, its GDP per capita (in purchasing power parity
- PPP) was higher than that of developed countries such as Italy, Singapore,
South Korea, Spain and New Zealand. However, the isolation of the state from the rest of the western world coupled with corruption of the leadership led to the high poverty incidence in the area. Although Libya enjoys low level of both absolute and relative poverty compared to its neighbours, unemployment status is the highest in the region at 21% according to the latest census figures (2010)
(www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libya). The following table will provide clearer picture of economic indicators of Libya
Table 2: Economic Indicators in Libya as at 2010
S/No Details Indicator 1 GDP (2010) $96.1 billion 2 GDP growth (2010) 10.6% 3 GDP per capita (2010) $14,884 4 Inflation (2005) Less than 1% 56
5 Population below poverty line (2006) 76% 6 Labour force (2005 including unemployed) 1.6 million 7 Rate of unemployment (2009) 10% 8 Labour force by occupation: - Agriculture 17% - Industry 23% - Services and Government 60% (Source: Extracts from www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Libya)
The Libyan economy depends primarily upon revenues from the oil sector, this constitute practically all export earnings and about one-quarter of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) which totals $96.1 billion in 2010. Similarly,
GDP growth rate of Libya is estimated at 10.6% with an inflation of less than
1% for the same period (2010). Poverty indicator as at 2006 shows that population below poverty line is 76% of total population. Unfortunately the mismanagement of resources in the state has reduced the position of Libyans such that while the per capita income dwindles to about $14,884 that of the other developed states listed above rose to about $40,000 in 2010 IMF estimate
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/list_of_countries_by_GDP_(PPP)_per_capita).
In a bid to improve the economic status of Libya through economic reforms, the General Peoples’ Congress has passed several pieces of legislation to help stimulate the economy and boost the private sector, including removing currency controls and improving taxation laws. Moreover, a new economic reform plan called the Libyan Economic Development Board was also launched in 2007 to lead initiatives that address Libya’s critical economic priorities, such 57 as promoting small and medium-sized enterprises, improving the competitive position, developing human capacity and promoting public-private dialogue and partnerships (Mulligan, 2011).
However, Africa Policy Institute (2011:7) reveals that
A number of economic reforms have been implemented…, many of them initiated by Ghanem during his time as General Secretary. In June 2003, for example… the Central Bank unified the dual exchange system …and the state also accepted the IMF’s structural reforms which led to the earmarking of 360 companies for privatization and the final transfer of 40 state- owned companies, though considered dead already.
The ownership, control and reward system of the public enterprises is determined by the ruling political class which applies favouritism and nepotism in the allocation of rewards to the citizenry. These shall be examined under the arrangements of private sector which comprises indigenous enterprises, and foreign investments (MNCs), labour union and labour mobility as well as social security and human capital development in Libya.
Private Sector in Libya
State and Indigenous Enterprises in Libya
Low level of agitation for political reforms in Libya arises partly due to the suppression by the leadership, but also as a result of underdeveloped economic conditions for individual citizens. At the inception of the regime, the state coercively forbids wage work as indicated by Obayuwana (2005:10-11) that
58
Gaddafi in the second part of the Green book presents Socialism as the solution to the Economic Problem. Since he maintains that a servant and a prisoner are comrades in chains, then there shall be no room for wage worker in any society.
However, this restriction gave way to a number of internal demands in the challenging agricultural sector with only about 2% arable land. Similarly, the growing pressure and demands for reconciliation with the international community after about twenty decades of isolation from the west following the
Lockerbie bombing of December, 21 1988 as well as the need to grow the economy led to increasing economic reforms in the early 2000s. The level of state enterprises ownership in the state surpasses all other private sector investments in the state as indicated below.
List of state enterprises in Libya
1. Airlines: i. Air Libya ii. Air One Nine iii. Alajnihah Airways iv. Buraq Air v. Ghadames Air Transport vi. Libyan Airlines vii. Libyan Arab Air Cargo viii. Tobruk Air Transport and Cargo 2. Business Services Companies: i. Alraied Group of Companies ii. Arab Falcon Co. Ltd iii. Al-Mateen Co. - FMCG Distribution iv. Al Fakhera. Co - Catering Services v. Phoenicia Group vi. SOC Libya, Your Platform to Libya, SOC Libya, is a London- based company exclusively covering the Libyan market, it identify, help and support companies entering Libya. Its services include before and after market entry, due diligence, consultancy and advice, market research, finding the right partners, opening 59
branches, rep offices, commercial development, visas, accommodation etc. vii. CGB Law Firm - www.cgblibya.com 3. Education: i. Alsafwa World Libya 4. Energy: i. Libyan General Electric Company Ltd (GECOL) 5. Manufacturing Industries: i. S&A Arab Falcon Co. Ltd ii. Libyan Iron & Steel Company 6. Oil and Gas: i Abha Oil & Gas Services ii. Boma Safety & Security Company iii. PETROLIBYA Oilfield Services iv. PETROLIBYA Environmental Services v. Arab Falcon Co. Ltd vi. Delta Oil Services vii. Ordano Oil Services viii. Brega Marketing Company ix. Challenger LTD x. National Oil Corporation xi. Tamoil 7. Telecommunication Companies: i. Libya Phone Company ii. LITC iii. General Post Telecommunication and Information Technology Company of Libya (GPTITC): Established in 2005 by the General People's Committee (GPC). Encompasses Libyana, Al-Madar, Libya for Telecommunication and Technology, and General Post and GPTC. iv. Alwadi Communications Co., Ltd a. Information Technology: i. MISBAR Altaqnia for intelligent and security systems ii. IT Managed Services iii. Al Shamel for ICT iv. Al Malak Information Technology v. Libya Online
60 b. Travel and Tours: i. Temehu Tourism Services: specialist Libyan tour operator providing Libyan visa on arrival, Libya tours, and private and group itineraries to any destination in Libya. c. Internet Service Providers: i. Libya Telecom & Technology d. Mobile Phone Companies: i. Libyana ii. Phone Libya iii. Aljeel Aljadeed iv. Al-Madar: ("Orbit") (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_companies_of_Libya) Among the about 100 privatized enterprises, 20% is fully owned by foreign investors, while the rest benefits Gaddafi and his sons and allies in the ruling class (www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libya). Charkow (2011) and
Campbell (2011) argue that the form of personalized rule of Gaddafi and his family meant that the spoils of the state did not trickle down to the masses of 6.7 million Libyans. This is further corroborated and evidenced by Africa Policy
Institute (2011:3) which asserts that
The Libyan political economy of oil (is) largely owned by foreign firms and clan/family-based networks… in which the Gaddafi family is reputed to hold a massive wealth, including the $70 billion Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) controlled by Gaddafi’s sons.
Apart from the dominance in the oil sector, there is also visible dominance, nepotism and favouritism in the allocation of resources in the telecommunications industry as indicated by Africa Policy Institute (2011:8) which avers that
61
Gaddafi’s son, Mohamed is the chair of Libya’s General Post and Telecommunications Company, with the fixed, mobile, satellite, and Internet communications held by state-owned enterprises… and the fact that the whole sector is ultimately controlled by one of Gaddafi’s sons places question marks over the extent to which the reforms manifest.
The Gaddafi network of clientele also sustains the pattern of leadership personalization so as to be prebendal in allocation of state position and resources mutually exclusive of the masses, but to the benefit of the ruling class and the allies of the leadership and his family. As a proof to this testimony, the
African Policy Institute (2011:15) indicates that
In 2005, Ahmed Ibrahim (strong supporter of Gaddafi) and his cohorts blocked plans to privatize the marine transportation company (now reportedly owned by Gaddafi’s son Hannibal).
As in the case of political alienation from political structures, the masses were also allowed expression of entrepreneurship in difficult and restricted areas of economic endeavour. This petit-leeway economic reform for the masses amounts to expressing well-being in a sub-human form in order not to create a middle class or economically powerful class that could threaten the existence of the regime. The Africa Policy Institute (2011:8) further affirms that
It is also true that there has been a growth in private sector activity, as evidenced by the mushrooming of private shops, hotels, Internet cafes, and restaurants, as well as a growing real estate market, which hardly constitute a national privatization scheme. To earn ten, twenty or thirty dinars a day means nothing more than the fact that you managed to continue living. This lack of a real private sector has major implications for the country’s bid to reform its public sector with about 800,000 employees. 62
The rationale for the restraint in economic endeavours is made evident since the government does not want a real-time private sector that drives the economy, particularly in the hands of potential opposition groups. The African
Policy Institute (2011:18) already quoted extensively further cites a Libya academic Professor Zahi Mogherbi as commenting that the main problem in the reform process in Libya lies on the absence of clear political will towards economic reform. The General People’s Committee is taking decisions that allow individuals and groups to trade, to undertake contracts, and other private economic activity. Yet at same time, the Secretariat of the General People’s
Congress has issues a directive that places restrictions on (private) traders and contractors preventing them from standing for tassayid (being elected to public positions, ie from being involved in politics).
On the other hand, although agriculture is the second-largest sector in the economy, Libya depends on imports for three-quarters of its food consumption.
This is because climatic conditions and poor arable land limits farm production to 25% of food demands, which is further worsened by population growth and low income. The area suitable for cultivation approximates 22,000km 2 of the
1,760,000km 2 land area of the state and 2,390km 2 is dedicated to irrigated agriculture. Under 2% of the land is arable and about 4% is suitable for grazing livestock. Most agricultural activity in the state relies on irrigation like the Al
Khufrah Oasis which depends on underground water sources. The major agricultural water sources remain the Great Manmade River (GMMR). Since 63
1962 agriculture has received much attention through optimum use of available lands and agricultural wage policies. In 1981, the Libyan Agricultural Bank provided agricultural credit totaling almost 10,000 loans averaging nearly
LD1500 each. This explains why many Libyans (nearly 20% of the labour force in 1984) remained in the agricultural sector. By 1997, about 17% of the labour force worked in agricultural sector. Fishery sub-sector also faces challenges due to unsuitable fishing waters (the continental shelf in the
Mediterranean) is not rich in plankton needed to sustain fishing. This is aggravated by underdeveloped fishing technology and lack of investment in the area (www.en.m.wiwkipedia.org/wiki/Agriculture_in_Libya).
Despite the level of encouragement in the sector, it is bedeviled by twisted loan facility. This is a clear case of prebendalism and character of post- colonial state, where public resources are allocated such that loans meant for agriculturists end up in the hands of non-agriculturists who are allies and relations of the ruling class in Libya. In this respect, Africa Policy Institute
(2011:18) notes that
Many people have complained that one needed to know the right people within the system to be granted such loans and that those who had such connections had accessed multiple loans under different names. As a result, those that have been able to expand and to really profit out of private businesses have tended to be linked in some way to high-ranking figures within the regime.
This structural separation of economic reward system from the masses by the leaders led to the situation whereby the already widened gap between the 64 haves and the have-nots grew worse since privatization deprived lots of people the near certainty of basic needs. Unfortunately, their consequent dependence on loan-driven petit private enterprises is dashed by subversion of the funds.
Africa Policy Institute (2011:17) puts rightly that as prices have continued to rise, especially in recent years, given the fact that Libya imports almost all of its consumable goods, Libyans have complained of the growing gap between rich and poor as those linked to the regime have seized the lucrative business opportunities that have opened up as Libya has rejoined the international community. Hence, the average Libyan is economically disempowered by the regime in private enterprises establishment.
Foreign Investments (MNCs) in Libya
Multinational Corporations in Libya comprise mostly of oil and gas services industry. This is as a result of the technicality and expertise required for the labour in the extractive industry as well as the area of interest by foreign investors. From 1972 when oil revenue increased markedly, the regime of
Gaddafi nationalized (with compensation) 51% ownership in subsidiaries of foreign petroleum firms operating in the country. The remaining subsidiaries within the state oil and gas business were completely nationalized by the regime
(www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0859275.html).
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Charkow (2011) observes that
One of the great failures of the Gaddafi regime is that after 40 years, they have almost failed to diversify the Libyan economy. The economy today is almost totally dependent on the export of oil and gas. Most Libyan families are connected to the state because those are the only jobs available.
The idea is complemented by National Intelligence Council (2008:8) and supported by Campbell (2011) who opine that the form of personalized rule of
Gaddafi and his family meant that the spoils of the state did not trickle down to the masses while he and his children recycled the wealth to western arms manufacturers and financial interests even when the standard of living of the people remained very low. In this vein, the Africa Policy Institute (2011:3) rightly observes that the Libyan political economy of oil largely owned by foreign firms and clan/family-based networks, relied on expatriates and migrant labour from the rest of Africa, Asia and even Eastern Europe. Libya attracted 1-
2 million workers from Sub-Saharan Africa and some 30,000 Chinese workers.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, foreign investors in Libya, particularly in oil and gas industry are not spared the complex conditioning measure of
Gaddafi. Joffe and Paoletti (2010:21) quotes Sicker (1987:112-120) who observes that the relations of Libya with United States during the period of isolation steadily declined as the latter increasingly overtly opposed the former.
This covered a range of issue over the Gulf of Sirte closure to international shipping, over support for the government in Grenada, over its attempts to influence American policy and most particularly over its open state terrorism. 66
Consequently, Joffe and Paoletti (2010:23) further note that due to the radicalism of Libya, the Reagan administration had imposed unilateral sanctions on the export of Libyan oil to the United States, on the operations of American oil companies in Libya, and on the supply of all except humanitarian goods to
Libya.
However, Western interest in Libya’s oil led to the efforts by some leaders in 1999 of its reconciliation with the rest of the world. In this respect,
Joffe and Paoletti (2010:25) put succinctly that
Britain’s attempt, under Prime Minister Tony Blair in 1999 to reconcile Libya to the world is to demonstrate its ability and role in EU, to secure energy supply, and to have access to commercial opportunities in the oil sector. This is generally seen as the most attractive prospect for oil and gas production worldwide since Libya supplies 2% of crude oil to the world, and in the refurbishment of the Libya’s decaying infrastructure to aid the trend.
Western interest in the Libyan oil is due to its desire to sustain the metropolitan industries and at the same time sustain the regime of Gaddafi even when it is not doing enough to democratize. To this effect, the Africa Policy
Institute (2011:12) notes that Libya have found itself under pressure both from the international community and from inside the country to be seen to be doing something on the level of political reform. Although this push has been limited on the part of both the United States and Europe not only because of Libya’s vast energy reserves, but also because the EU in particular is anxious for Libya to co-operate in stemming migration flows across the Mediterranean. 67
The need of Libyan crude oil by the West is further evidenced by
Campbell (2011) who avers that
With the knowledge of the vast oil resources of Libya, western states competed to gain contracts to exploit this wealth. In order to be at this table of looting, the George W. Bush administration worked hard to regularize relations with Libya, using all its diplomatic clout to take Libya out of the list of countries sponsoring state terrorism.
Perhaps the most important partner for Libya in foreign policy, outside the United States and Britain, is the European Union. After all, European states, chief among them Germany, Italy, and Switzerland, have an acute interest in
Libya’s energy export. On the fulfillment of conditionalities by Gaddafi through indirect acknowledgment of responsibility and surrender of the two
Lockerbie bombers in 1999, the US, EU and the UN removed sanctions against
Libya in 2003 with American oil companies returning to work in the country
(Joffe and Paoletti (2010:25). This explains the ability of Saif al-Islam, to initiate humanitarian and human rights course, including the securement of freedom for Abdelbasset al-Meghrahi (the Lockerbie bomber) from UK (Africa
Policy Institute, 2011:5).
As part of the conditions for reconciling Libya to the west, the multinational oil companies returned to Libya while privatization programmes commenced in earnest. A Wikipedia analysis notes that Libya has begun some market-oriented reforms. Initial steps have included applying for membership of the World Trade Organization, reducing subsidies, and announcing plans for privatization. Authorities have privatized more than 100 government owned 68 companies since 2003 in industries including oil refining, tourism, and real estate, of which 29 are 100% foreign owned. The non-oil manufacturing and construction sectors, which accounted for about 20% of GDP, have expanded from processing mostly agricultural products to include the production of petrochemicals, iron, steel and aluminum (www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Libya).
The willing and hurried manner of reconciliation of Libya with the west propelled the unrepentant and indefatigable character of Gaddafi to manifest.
Africa Policy Institute (2011:9-10) assert that
Between March 2004 and January 2005 state reforms of the National Oil Corporations (NOC) brought back foreign oil companies including that of the US. In January 2008, Colonel Gaddafi threatened to nationalize oil company assets forcing the foreign energy firms to renegotiate contracts agreed under the EPSA IV rounds, demanding that they reduce their production shares significantly. Eni SpA, Occidental Petroleum Corporation, Repsol YPF, Petro-Canada and Total have been forced to half their production shares in return for contract extensions.
The regime further compelled the recruitment of about 90% latter reduced to 75% of Libyans in the workforce of any multinational company including having a Libyan as a member of the Executive Board. The constant interference and undue regulation of the foreign oil companies explains the rationale for
West’s aversion of the regime and the quest to see the end of Gaddafi’s leadership. Hence, the connection between oil interests of the West coincides with the democratization struggle by the Coalition of Opposition Movement in
Libya. 69
List of Private Oil Companies and Manufacturing Industries in Libya
Some of the oil companies in Libya include Oasis group of US companies at Ras as-Sidr west of Mersa Brega, Amerada Hess, Conoco, and Mobil. Others include Gelsenberg, BP, Bunker Hunt, Agip, Marathon, Exxon, Amoseas, Shell, and Texaco. The list also includes Eni SpA, Occidental Petroleum Corporation,
Repsol YPF, Petro-Canada and Total California Asiatic, Atlantic Richfield, Elf
Aquitaine, OMV AG (of Austria), and Lasmo.
Private manufacturing industries in the state include Kobe Steel of Japan,
Korf Engineering of Germany, Voest Alpine of Austria, Friedrich Krupp of
Germany, Hyundai Engineering and Construction Company of South Korea as contractor for (electricity) power station construction, Sezai Turkes Feyzi of
Turkey and Orascom Construction Industries of Egypt as contractor for steel supply (http://books.google.com.ng/books?id=P315Mw3S9EC&pg=PA795).
Labour Union and Labour Mobility in Libya
The state is the greatest employer of labour in Libya to the tune of 70% of the total labour force of about 1.6 million as at 2005. However, the privatization policies of the government within the same period exacerbated the already difficult unemployment situation. Unfortunately, the existing labour has no rights to make demands for better working conditions. This is as a result of the fact that paid work is mostly banned and the labour union in the state is integrated and compelled to acquiesce to the tenets of Gaddafi’s Jamahiriya socialism. Wikipedia observes that: 70
Trade Unions do not exist, but numerous professional associations are integrated into the state structure as a third pillar, along with the People’s Congresses and Committees. These associations do not have the right to strike (www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libya).
It is already evidenced in the study that the political economy of the state is that of crude oil and that many Libyan are connected to it since it is the only jobs available. Consequent upon the above the ordinary Libyan resorts to a mere obedience to the rule and in engaging in agriculture which is the only possible option for enterpreneural expression. In a bid to suppress any form of opposition that may crop up from the system, the regime set up security surveillance strategy as reflected in the Wikipedia that Gaddafi set-up an extensive surveillance system in which 10 to 20 percent of Libyans works in surveillance for the Revolutionary Committees. The surveillance takes place in government, in factories and the education sectors [thereby bequeathing fears on the people] (www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libya).
The restriction of the labour union from making demands from the leadership coupled with the surveillance system in check of resistance and opposition of leadership demands put the people in constant fear.
Consequently, the right of the people to well-being and to the dignity of human person is denied of the people.
Social Security and Human Capital Development in Libya
On the average, the government of Gaddafi adequately provides the basic needs of the people of Libya. In this regard, Obayuwana (2005:11) admits that 71 one can never tell whether the citizenry is satisfied with Gaddafi’s brand of socialism even with the fact that every adult owns a house of his own and that healthcare and education are taken for granted. Similarly, Wikipedia affirms that high oil revenues and a small population give Libya one of the highest GDP per capita in Africa and has allowed the Libyan state to provide an extensive level of social security particularly in the fields of housing and education.
Libya has the highest Human Development Index in Africa and the fourth highest GDP (PPP) per capita in Africa as at 2009. Unfortunately, corruption and mismanagement of resources led to the increase in unemployment rate from
10% in 2009 to 21% in 2010 making the state the highest in unemployment rate in the region.
Basic education in Libya is free for all citizens, and compulsory to secondary level. Children between the ages of 6 and 15 attend primary school and then attend secondary school for three additional years (15 to 18 years old).
According to figures reported for the year 2000, approximately 766,807 students attended primary school and had 97,334 teachers; approximately
717,000 students were enrolled in secondary, technical, and vocational schools; and about 287,172 students were enrolled in Libya’s universities. Libya’s population includes 1.7 million students of which over 270,000 studies at the tertiary level. The literacy rate is the highest in North Africa and over 80% of the population can read and write. Since 1975, the number of universities has grown from two to nine and after their introduction in 1980, the number of 72 higher technical and vocational institutes currently stands at 84 with 12 public universities (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Education_in_Libya).
Literacy level in the early 1980s shows 50% and 60% in the ratio of 70% for men and 30% for women. However, by 2001, the United Nations
Development Programme’s Human Development Report estimates that the adult literacy rate climbed to about 80.8% or 91.3% for males and 69.3% for females. According to the 2004 US government estimates, 82% of the total adult population (age 15 and older) is literate, or 92% of males and 72% of females (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Education_in_Libya).
Libya’s higher education is mostly financed by the public budget, although a small number of private institutions have been given accreditation lately. The provision of these basic needs is due to the enormous wealth in which the GDP amounts to about $9.6 billion comparative to the low population of about 6.4 million people as at 2010 (www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libya).
List of Higher Institutions in Libya
1. 7th October University, Misrata, Libya
2. Academy of Graduate Studies, Tripoli, Libya
3. Al Fateh University of Medical Sciences, Tripoli, Libya, established
1957 and expanded in 1986
4. Al Jabal Gharbi University, Gherian, Libya
5. Al-Asmariya University of Islamic Sciences, Zliten, Libya
6. Al-Tahadi University 73
7. Altahdi University
8. Garyounis University
9. Omar Al-Mukhtar University
10. Sebha University
11. Al Arab Medical University, established 1984
12. Higher Institute of Computer Technology also known as the College
of Computer Technology (Tripoli) and
13. Higher Institute of Electronics (Tripoli).
(Source: http://www.directoryofeducation.net/colleges/worldwide/libya/ and
http://universities.roro44.com/en/libya/)
Libya’s human development index, particularly in education stands in antithesis of the idea that higher education level helps to create awareness of the fundamental human rights of citizens and the ability to demand for its respect and enforcement (Ifesinachi and Tarabinah, 2009:26). This is as a result of the security-tight surveillance and high level of suppression of opposition in the state, even against the academia.
Therefore, even though social security and welfare of the people are reasonably provided to the extent of sustenance, the government denies the people the chances of higher standard of living. Consequently, the hypothesis which holds that the government of Libya did not provide political and economic structures for the enforcement of the fundamental human rights between 1969 and 2011 is upheld as correct. 74
CHAPTER THREE
3.0 PATTERNS OF POLITICAL RECRUITMENT IN LIBYA FROM
1969 – 2011
Elective principles and contractual appointments form the principal basis of political recruitment in a democratic society. This was the situation that produced the leadership of King Idris and the members of the National
Assembly. The major indices of political recruitment during the regime of King
Idris are periodic election, political appointment and contractual arrangements based on rule of law as specified in the 1951 constitution. However, these patterns of political recruitment shifted to idiosyncratic appointment and later a combination of quasi elective principles as well as political and contractual appointment. The following table demonstrates the pattern of democratic replacement of leadership before the ouster of King Idris.
Table 3: List of Heads of Government in Libya between 1951 and 1969
S/No Duration Name Designation 1 29 Mar 1951–19 Feb 1954 Mahmud al-Muntsair Prime Minister 2 19 Feb 1954–12 Apr 1954 Muhammad Sakizli Prime Minister 3 12 Apr 1954–26 May 1957 Mustafa Benttalim Prime Minister 4 26 May 1957–17 Oct 1960 Abdul Majid Kubar Prime Minister 5 17 Oct 1960–19 Mar 1963 Muhammad O. Said Prime Minister 6 19 Mar 1963–20 Jan 1964 Mohieddin Fikini Prime Minister 7 20 Jan 1964–20 Mar 1965 Mahmud al-Muntasir Prime Minister 8 20 Mar 1965–2 Jul 1967 Hussein Maziq Prime Minister 9 2 Jul 1967–25 Oct 1967 Abdul Qadir al-Badri Prime Minister 75
10 25 Oct 1967–4 Sep 1968 Abdul H. al-Bakkoush Prime Minister 11 4 Sep 1968–31 Aug 1969 Wanis al-Qaddafi Prime Minister Source: www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_heads_of_government_of_Libya
The above listed officers were recruited based on elective principles with defined constitutional regimen. This creates room for political rights enforcement of all Libyans during the period, bearing in mind the equal rights law enshrined in the 1951 Constitution. However, the system could not be sustained owing to the exit of the regime in 1969 and the sequel introduction of obnoxious laws by the Gaddafi regime.
3.1 POLITICAL APPOINTMENT FROM 1969 – 1975
The regime of Gaddafi being a military rule (de facto ), base political recruitment and sustenance on personal choice. Although Gaddafi actually holds no official position in the state after his exit as the General Secretary of the General Peoples’ Committee in 1979, he practically controls all other patterns of political recruitment into national leadership in the state. The persons so appointed only serve as tools for patronage and clientelism.
National Intelligence Council (2008:8) posits that post-colonial state of
Libya combines clientele, neo-patrimonial and prebendal system in service to personal patrons and not to laws and institutions; and that such funds are used as personal slush fund to maintain political dominance, acquire political offices for clients, jobs, licenses, contracts, vehicles, bribes and other access to illicit rent so as to sustain unconditional support in return.
76
3.2 ELECTIVE PRINCIPLES FROM 1975 – 2011
The introduction of the General Peoples’ Congress and Committee in
1975 aims to subvert attention from direct position of Gaddafi as de jure leader and the consequent de facto background leadership of the regime. Hence, the electoral system in the state adopts four-year infinite tenure, absence of political parties, and open balloting system (involving hand-raising), which goes contrary to the tenets of democratic principles. Beyond this however, the leadership use coercive mechanism and surveillance system in dictating choice of contestants.
The choice of whoever emerges into the General Peoples’ Committee is finally ratified by the Revolutionary Command Council which is the apex decision making body in the state (www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libya, and Joffe and
Paoletti, 2010:3). The table below indicates the pattern of political recruitment under the regime of Gaddafi. The regime tinker with choice, pattern, responsibility and designation of nominal leadership at will as indicated in the table below.
Table 4: List of Heads of Government in Libya between 1969 and 2011
S/No Duration Name Designation 1 8 Sep 1969–16 Jan 1970 Mahmud al-Maghribi Prime Minister 2 16 Jan 1970–16 Jul 1972 Muammar al-Gaddafi Prime Minister 3 16 Jul 1972–2 Mar 1977 Abdessalam Jalloud Prime Minister 4 2 Mar 1977–2 Mar 1979 Abdul Ati al-Obeidi Gen Secretary 5 2 Mar 1979–16 Feb 1984 Jadallah Azzuz al-Talhi Gen Secretary 6 16 Feb 1984–3 Mar 1986 Muhammad Rajab Gen Secretary 77
7 3 Mar 1986–1 Mar 1987 Jadallah Azzuz al-Talhi Gen Secretary 8 1 Mar 1987–7 Oct 1990 Umar M. al-Muntasir Gen Secretary 9 7 Oct 1990–29 Jan 1994 Abuzed Omar Dorda Gen Secretary 10 29 Jan 1994–29 Dec 1997 Abdul Majid al-Qa’ud Gen Secretary 11 29 Dec 1997–1 Mar 2000 Muhammad al-Mangoush Gen Secretary 12 1 Mar 2000–14 Jun 2003 Imbarek Shamekh Gen Secretary 13 14 Jun 2003–5 Mar 2006 Shukri Ghanem Gen Secretary 14 5 Mar 2006–5 Mar 2011 Baghdadi Mahmudi Gen Secretary Source: www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_heads_of_government_of_Libya
Some of these officers as well as other allies are recycled or transferred to other positions in a reshuffle that maintains the dominance of the same class of leaders. These form the executive heads in the state as indicated in the table below.
Table 5: List of Heads of State in Libya between 1969 and 2011
S/No Duration Name Designation 1 2 Mar 1977–2 Mar 1979 Muammar Gaddafi Gen Secretary 2 2 Mar 1979–7 Jan 1981 Abdul Ati al-Obeidi Gen Secretary 3 7 Jan 1981–2 Feb 1984 Muhammad Rajab Gen Secretary 4 15 Feb 1984–7 Oct 1990 Mifta al-Usta Umar Gen Secretary 5 7 Oct 1990–18 Nov 1992 Abdul Razzaq as-Sawsa Gen Secretary 6 18 Nov 1992–3 Mar 2008 Muhammad az-Zamati Gen Secretary 7 3 Mar 2008–5 Mar 2009 Mifta M. Kebe Gen Secretary 8 5 Mar 2009–26 Jan 2010 Imbarek Shamekh Gen Secretary 9 26 Jan 2010–5 Mar 2011 Mohammed al-Zwai Gen Secretary Source: www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_heads_of_state_of_Libya 78
Some of the officers recycled include Muammar Gaddafi as Head of
Government (Prime Minister) 1970–1972 and as Head of State (General
Secretary) 1977–1979; Abdul Ati al-Obeidi as Head of State (General
Secretary) 1979–1981 and as Head of Government (General Secretary) 1977–
1979 (in mentoring and parallel leadership with Gaddafi at the same time);
Muhammad Rajab 1981–1984 as Head of State (General Secretary) and as Head of Government (General Secretary) 1984–1986; Jadallah Azzuz al-Talhi as
Head of Government (Secretary General) 1979–1984 and 1986–1987; Imbarek
Shamekh as Head of Government (Secretary General) 2000–2003 and as Head of State (Secretary General) 2009 – 2010. The clique of leadership mostly from the Revolutionary Command Council maintains a recycling pattern to ensure the sustenance of the prebendal system in the state.
In 1975 however, the Jamahiriya Sector was introduced in order to curtail the excessive powers of the Council in general, and that of Gaddafi in particular who poses threat to the other members. The parliamentary Jamahiriya Sector involves the national General Peoples Congress/Committee, the 22 district
Shabiyat Congress/Committee, and the 1,500 local/urban wards Basic People’s
Congress, each comprising all Libyans from 18 years and above. The leaders of each congress (form a cabinet/secretaries) and represent the members at the higher level for renewable 4-year tenure ad infinitum (www.en.m.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Libya). 79
The above pattern of recruitment and control is further confirmed by
Joffe and Paoletti (2010:16) who opine that
Gaddafi’s decisions are mediated through contact and discussion with formal and informal advisers, even if they are his ultimate responsibility. The General Peoples’ Committee forms a kind of temporary elite in that their membership to the core advisory group depends entirely on the Colonel’s interests in the project and policies they espouse. Once his personal interests and convictions shift, they cease to be members of the core, yet always available to be reintegrated, should the Libyan leader switch back toward the highest and lowest of policy makers.
Surprisingly too, the allies in the leadership subjugation of Libya are predominantly tribal leaders and/or tribesmen and loyalists of Gaddafi from
Sirte (Charkow, 2011). These groups from the north-west sustain the subordination of the entire Libya in general and Benghazi at the north-east in particular. This is despite the fact that north-eastern Libya including Benghazi produces most of the oil in the state. The fact that opposition parties are not allowed and that leadership is not changed by the people but by the
Revolutionary Command Council attests to the inadequacy in the system, hence laying credence to the dominance of a set of persons in the leadership of the state.
In this vein Obayuwana (2005:10) avers that the party system in
Gaddafi’s argument aborts democracy because to make a party, you split society. In the spirit of creating unity among the people, the regime suppressed their political aspiration. This is further affirmed by Saif al-Islam that among the four red lines that cannot be crossed in Libya is national unity and 80
Muammar Gaddafi. Again, a Libya academic Professor Zahi Mogherbi acknowledged that the Secretariat of the General People’s Congress has issues a directive that places restrictions on (private) traders and contractors preventing them from standing for tassayid, that is being elected to public positions or involved in politics (Africa Policy Institute, 2011:16 and 18).
As the state suppresses political aspirations of the ordinary citizens so as to hold them off from the rewards of statecraft, the leadership apply patronage in appeasing the rest of the tribal leaders in the society as indicated by the
Africa Policy Institute (2011:16-17) that
The Gaddafi regime has always relied heavily on patronage as a means of securing loyalty. It has distributed cars, money, positions and other perks in return for allegiance, creating vast patronage networks that have underpinned the regime since it came to power in 1969.
This gave the political office-holders ample opportunity to disregard the yearnings of the people while satiating their quests of leadership and self- service. The consequence of this is that
This extensive use of patronage has created an environment whereby public office is generally considered as a means of siphoning money off from the state and where corruption is a way of life. Thus, Libya was ranked 126 th out of 180 countries as among the bottom-point corrupt nations by the Transparency International in 2008 (http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/ International_rankings_of_Libya).
The corrupt level of the leadership in Libya is affirmed in the economic indicators which reveal that under the regime of Gaddafi the situation worsened incrementally. While the ordinary Libyan complain of the wider growing gap 81 between the rich and the poor, particularly under the economic reform regimen, the leadership recycle the oil wealth of the state in procurement of arms used for the suppression of insurgency and opposition especially manifest from the
February 16, 2011 protest and revolution (Bokor, 2011b, Campbell, 2011,
National Intelligence Council, 2008:8, and Africa Policy Institute, 2011:2-3).
Evidence regarding political alienation of the people had been demonstrated elaborately in the evidence of human rights records (Sijil, 2011a).
This affirms that the holding-off of Libyans from the rewards of the state in economic and political spheres in a strategy of prebendalism, and is as such the indicator that the fundamental human rights of the people with regards to right to vote and be voted for and to hold elected officials accountable are denied the citizens.
Moreover the National Intelligence Council (2008:9) opines that the fundamental purpose of neopatrimonial, prebendal governments is not to produce public goods, rather it is to produce private goods for those who hold or have access to political power with the tendency for prolonged tenure in power of a single ruler. This also confirms the thesis of the Political Economy theory that political positions form the basis of allocation of reward system in a state and that those who hold political positions also control economic rewards which benefit them and which they struggle to sustain (Ake, 1981:3). Consequently, allocation of resources in the state favour the ruling class as well as their 82 relations and friends more than any other Libyan (Africa Policy Institute,
2011:8)
3.3 POLITICAL RECRUITMENT UNDER THE NATIONAL
TRANSITIONAL COUNCIL (NTC)
Currently however, political recruitment under the National Transitional
Council (NTC) is based on political appointment of officers representing the interests of the citizens of Libya from among the coalition of Anti-Gaddafi forces. This Council has been recognized by the international community, including the United Nations Organization. The present status of political recruitment in Libya is based on the protest of February 16, 2011 and the subsequent war that culminated to the exit of Gaddafi on September, 2011. The implication is that the political landscape of Libya has been shuffled to transplant the regime of Gaddafi to the leadership of the National Transitional
Council led by Mustafa Abdul Jalil, as the Chairman while the Transitional
National Council Interim Prime Minister is Mahmoud Jebril.
The National Transitional Council hands over the mantle of leadership to a Transitional Interim Government by November, 2011 since the war ended on
20 th October, 2011 alongside the death of Gaddafi on the same day, thus marking the liberation of Libya on 23 rd October, 2011. The Interim
Government is expected to handover to a constitutional and democratically elected government by June, 2012. The following table indicates the members of the National Transitional Council from March 5, 2011 to November, 2011. 83
Table 6: List of Leadership of the National Transitional Council from 5
March, 2011 to November, 2011.
S/No Name Designation 1 Mustafa Abdul Jalil Chairman, NTC 2 Abdul Hafiz Ghoga Vice Chairman, NTC 3 Mahmoud Jebril Chairman, and Head of Foreign Relations and Internal Affairs of the Executive Board (Crisis Committee) 4 Ali Al-Issamni Vice Chairman, Executive Board 5 Ahmed Hussein Al-Darrat Internal Affairs and Local Government 6 Mahmoud Shamman Media 7 Naji Barackat Health 8 Mohammed Al Gumati Justice and Human Right 9 Hania Al-Gumati Social Welfare 10 Abdullah Shamia Economics 11 Ali Al-Tarhuni Finance and Oil 12 Anwar Al-Faytoun Transport and Communications 13 Abulgassim Nimir Environment 14 Atia Lawgoli Culture and Community 15 Abdulsalam Al-Shikhy Religious Affairs and Endowments 16 Ahmed Al-Jehani Reconstruction and Infrastructure 17 Suliman El-Sadhi Education (Source: www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Transitional_Council)
The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Transitional National Council are assisted by a 33-member group some of who defected from the regime of
Gaddafi to the TNC led leadership. At the point in time, the TNC leadership is tasked with various responsibilities as contained in the declaration of the 84 founding of the Transitional National Council. The aims and objectives of the
Council include:
1. To supervise the Military Council in the achievement of freedom, and
ensure the safety of the national territory and citizens of Libya.
2. Support the efforts of local councils to work for the restoration of
normal civilian life.
3. Facilitate the election of a constituent assembly to draft a new
constitution for the country, and to be put to a popular referendum.
4. Form a transitional government to pave the holding of free elections.
5. Guide the conduct of foreign policy and the regulations with other
countries and international and regional organizations, and the
representation of the Libyan people (www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/
National_Transitional_Council).
It is worthy of note that the stated aims of the Council form the bedrock of democratic institution in Libya, which will create the basis for democratization process in the state. However, the challenge rests on the ability of the emergent democratic state of Libya to sustain a democratic character given the feature of a post-colonial oil-based economy with Islam as official religion, enthronement of sharia law, and the reactionary tendency of the NTC leadership and their successors. Secondly, the fact that the current democratization process is acquired through violence of Coalition of Opposition
Forces in Libya with the support of NATO poses great threat to its potency of 85 not erupting similar violence, resistance and possible breakups in the nearest future.
In view of the foregoing, the hypothesis which says that the Libyan government did not base political recruitment into the legislature and executive on periodic election between 1969 and 2011 is justified and supported with evidence.
86
CHAPTER FOUR
4.0 POLITICAL PARTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL OPPOSITION
IN LIBYA FROM 1969 – 2011
This aspect of the study demonstrates the existence of political parties and constitutional oppositions before the regime of Gaddafi as well as the disposition of the groups during the regime. Similarly, the study evaluates the rationale behind the increasing quest for democratization in Libya as well as the status of the struggle that led to the ouster of Gaddafi and the current freedom of
Libya for democratic institution and democratization process.
4.1 POLITICAL PARTIES IN LIBYA FROM 1951 – 1952
Prior to the regime of Colonel Gaddafi, the 1951 constitution provided a political arrangement for the existence of political parties including constitutional opposition groups. The political parties of the period are listed below.
List of Political Parties in Libya between 1951 and 1952
1. Arab Socialist Union (Libya)
2. Democratic Party (Libya)
3. Libyan National Democratic Front
4. Libyan National Movement
5. Muslim Association of the Lictor
6. National Front for the Salvation of Libya
(Source: http://en/wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Political_parties_in_Libya) 87
As a result of electoral crisis of 1952, the political party system was abolished while contestants stand as independent candidates for subsequent elections under the regime of King Idris.
4.2 DISPOSITION OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND OPPOSITION
GROUPS IN LIBYA FROM 1969 – 2011
The regime of Gaddafi in 1969 sustained the suspension of the entire structure of political party arrangement as political parties were banned by the
1972 Prohibition of Party Politics Act Number 71
(www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libya). This is due to the quest to perpetuate in leadership leading to the demand by Gaddafi for the expungement of tenures of leaders as basis of sustainable development in Africa (Adeyemi, 2006:6), but also to expropriate the rewards of the oil revenue of the state in a prebendal and patronage system (Mulligan, 2011).
Consequent upon the foregoing, opposition groups operate in a salience informal and illegal condition. This is particularly so given the level of security surveillance aimed at identifying and suppressing any form of opposition by the regime. In this vein and in order to instill fear and deter opposition, the regime of Gaddafi not only considered surveillance and public execution as strategy, but also utilized the state institutions as reflected in the Wikipedia that
88
Gaddafi set-up an extensive surveillance system in which 10 to 20 percent of Libyans works in surveillance for the Revolutionary Committees. The surveillance takes place in government, in factories and the education sectors. Gaddafi executed dissidents publicly and the executions were often rebroadcast on state television channels. Gaddafi employed his network of diplomats and recruits to assassinate dozens of critical refugees around the world. Amnesty International listed at least 25 assassinations between 1980 and 1987. Hundreds of Libyans also lost their lives in the war against Tanzania, when Gaddafi tried to save his friend Idi Amin (www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libya).
The setup for the suppression of opposition is further evidenced in the fact that the regime supports radical leadership elsewhere as in the case of Idi
Amin of Uganda whose autocratic regime echoes all over the world. Beyond this, the regime also attests to the involvement in the suppression of opposition within the system and quest for exterior suppression of dissidents elsewhere.
Consequently, Libya has chronically employed terrorism and revolutionary groups as primary instruments of fulfilling its international ambitions. The main targets of terrorist activity have been Libyan dissidents living abroad and prominent political figures of moderate Arab and African countries.
Gaddafi has openly declared that the revolution has destroyed those who oppose it inside the country and now it must pursue the rest abroad. A concerted drive to assassinate anti-Gaddafi exiles resulted to the murder of eleven Libyan dissidents in 1980 and 1981. Further attacks were sponsored by Libya in 1985, plots were allegedly uncovered against President Habre of Chad in 1984 and President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire in 1985… (www.mongabay.com/history/libya/libya-international- terrorism-and-support-for-insurgent-groups.html).
In the light of the findings, it was evident that there are impeding economic and political factors to the enforcement of the fundamental human 89 rights of the people. This is as a result of the fact that civil society organizations, political parties and electoral body do not exist in Libya. These, according to Gaddafi, are sources of divisions of the members of the society.
Therefore, any person or groups who organize or oppose the regime of
Gaddafi are treated as criminals. Sijill (2011a) argues that the existence of political prisoners in Libya is denied categorically and repeatedly in public statements by Col. Gaddafi and other Libyan officials. Gaddafi also claims that
Libyan prison houses only drug traffickers and other common criminals.
Clarifying the issue above in the official report of the Reporters San
Frontiers, the study notes that:
…many Libyans have suffered for decades as political prisoners, and many have died in prison under torture and deteriorating health conditions… Libyan prisons house many educated and established professionals, whose rights are violated without charge, or through sham trials and arbitrary judgments (Sijill, 2011a).
Similarly, the US Department of State’s annual human rights report for
2007 reports that Libya’s authoritative regime continued to have a poor record in the area of human rights. Some of the numerous and serious abuses on the part of the government include poor prison conditions, arbitrary arrest and prisoners held for many years without charge or trial. The judiciary is controlled by the government (despite the abolition of the Revolutionary Court in 2005) and there is no right to fair public trial. Libyans do not have the right to change their government. Freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, and religion are restricted (www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libya). 90
The table below will provide strong proof to attest to the evidence of human rights abuse in terms of arrests, torture and extra-judicial killing of political prisoners.
Table 7: Political prisoners and detainees in Libya.
S/No Name Details Reporting Organization 1 Abdullah Ali al- Journalist detained since 1973 with Reporters San Sanussi al- no charge or trial. Detained longer Frontiers Darrat, than any other journalist anywhere in the world. Investigations have failed to locate his whereabouts or obtain any information on his state of health. 2 Al-Ajili Five prisoners arrested in April Muhammad al- 1973, charged with membership in Azhari, Ali an illegal organization (Islamic Muhammad al- Liberation Party), and hostility to Akrami, Ali authorities. Faced lengthy legal Muhammad al- proceedings, including in-camera Qajij, Salih trial before the People’s Court, Omar Al-Qasbi, sentenced in February, 1977 for the Muhammad al- duration of 5-15 years. They have Sadiq al- no right to appeal to a higher court, Tarhouni but judgment is subject to review by the Revolutionary Command Council which increased all sentences to life terms. All five prisoners are believed to be held in Abu Salim Prison in Tripoli. 3 Mohamed Detained incommunicado for more UN Human Bashir al- than three years until April 1992 Rights Megreisi when allowed a visit by his wife. Committee Then detained again incommunicado and in a secret location
4 Ahmad Abd al- Arrested in similar circumstances UNHCHR, Qadir al-Thulthi, for alleged possession of weapons, Report of Yusuf Hassan sabotage and membership of an Working 91
al-Huwayl, illegal organization. Denied family Group on Najm al-Din visits between 1988 and 1991. Arbitrary Muhammad al- Charged in the Revolutionary court Detention Naquzi in February, 1987 with postponed trials and inconclusive case 5 Sheikh Yusuf Imam of al-Sharquiya mosque at Muhammad al-Fateh University. Arrested 10 Hussein January, 1989 for unknown reasons and locked at unknown prison. Alleged to be 1 of 392 political prisoners detained between January 1980 and April 1990, suspected of being active political opponents or supporters of the opposition, particularly religious groups. 6 Rashid Abdul Law graduate detained since UN High Hamid al-Urfia February, 1982. Reportedly Commission on arrested with 20 others on Human Rights, suspicion of founding an Islamist and Amnesty opposition group. All those International’s arrested with him were released 2000 Report following a general amnesty in 1988, but he remained in Abu Salim prison in Tripoli. (Source: www.sijill.tripod.com/prison/ of 03/07/2011)
Despite the attempt in the study to correlate educational empowerment to the enforcement of fundamental human rights, the opposite was the case in
Libya such that despite highest human development index in Africa as at 2010 estimates, its human rights records fall short of expectations (Ifesinachi and
Tarabinah, 2009:26, and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/list_of_countries_by_
GDP_(PPP)_per_capita). The regime also extended its human rights abuse to academic professionals and students as is evidenced in the following table.
92
Table 8: Academic professionals and some students detained in June and July 1998 for sympathy and/or support of the Libyan Islamic Group. S/N Name Profession 1 Farhat El-Houni Laboratory Technician, Faculty of Engineering 2 Hamed Naser El-Werfall MSc, Mathematics 3 Tareg Ahmed Bou Zeriba MSc, Computer Science 4 Salah Omah Al-Shamekh MSc, Zoology 5 Abdel-Barie Al-A’Rousi PhD, Corrosion Engineering 6 Abdel-l’a Tief Karmous PhD, Agricultural Engineering 7 Rajad El-Jaroushi PhD, Civil Engineering 8 Sulaiman Ali Khatroush PhD, Head of Civil Engineering Department 9 Abdullah Ahmed I’zedien PhD, Nuclear Engineering 10 Salem Abuhanak PhD, Head of Chemistry Department 11 Ames Hason Gwaidhi Student, Faculty of Medicine 12 Nazar Kraikesh Student, Faculty of Medicine 13 Khalid El-Jazwie Student, Faculty of Medicine 14 Hammad Beltaieb Student, Faculty of Engineering 15 Khalid El-Hashmie Medical Doctor 16 Abdel-Rahman Abdel- Medical Doctor Majeed El-Daiban 17 Jamal El-Majrie Doctor of Veterinary Medicine 18 Abdel-Jawad Mohamed MSc, Computer Science Shatwan 19 Ali-El Sadeg El-Houni MSc, Electrical Engineering 20 Khalid El-Hashrie El- Engineering Zaroug 21 Fawzie Wanies El-Ghadhafi Electrical Engineering 22 Adel Saleh El-Werfalli Agricultural Engineering 23 Ahmed Jaballah El- Agricultural Engineering Meghrabie 24 Kamal El-Wesh Aviation Ground Engineering 25 Faisal Mohamed El-Safi Flight Engineering 26 Fawzie Bu-Katif Communications Engineering 27 Ahmed Dasougi Computer Science/Engineering 28 Sala El-Zaroug El-Saa’Itie Civil Engineering 29 Elsa El-Zwaie Civil Engineering 30 Khalid Mohamed Shoua’leb Engineering 31 Mohammad Faraj Al-Qallal Graduate of Institute of Administrative Science Reported by the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and Amnesty International’s 2000 Report and derived from (Source: www.sijill.tripod.com/prison) 93
Not only are the victims arrested and detained, they are also tortured in the most inhuman ways for the extraction of information also used to incriminate them. These are done in a bid to suppress the opposition as well as to forestall such future occurrence. Amnesty International in its 2000 Report
(cited in Sijil, 2011a) notes that
Special Rapporteur advised the government that he had received information on methods of torture and other forms of ill-treatment reportedly applied against detainees during interrogation to extract confessions, which in turn are used to incriminate them. Methods include beating, including falaqa, ie. beating on the soles of the feet, hanging by the wrists from a ceiling or high window, or being suspended from a pole inserted between the knees and elbows, electric shocks, etc, in an underground interrogation room (www.sijill.tripod.com/ prison).
The above indicators of human rights abuse in socio-economic and political deprivations are pointers to the inhuman treatment of the citizens by the government using the security agencies of the state. However, this is not only the case as the following table also contains some of the victims of torture in the Libyan prisons including some that died as a result of the torture.
Table 9: Victims who are tortured and/or died as a result of the torture
and medical neglect
S/N Name Details 1 Mohammad Ali al- Detained since 1989 without charge or trial. Bakoush Died in Abu Salim Prison in August, 1999, reportedly as a result of poor conditions of detention. 2 Mohammad al- Reportedly held without charge or trial since Fourtiya 1989. Died at the end of 1994 or early in 1995 in Abu Salim Prison. Believed to have been 94
suffering from high blood pressure and diabetes, for which he had not been receiving adequate medical care in prison.
3 Al-Haddar Ben-Hayal Detained without charge or trial since 1989 and was said to have been suffering from paralysis in prison. Died in 1994 allegedly because of lack of adequate medical care. 4 Noouri Shalfit Reportedly held without charge or trial since 1989. Allegedly died in prison in 1993 or 1994, said to have been tortured repeatedly during first months of detention in Abu Salim Prison, and frequently denied food. 5 Tawfiq ‘Awadh Jaber Was said to have died in prison in 1994. He had al-Hariri reportedly been suffering from heart problems. Following an alleged unfair trial, he was said to have been sentenced to life imprisonment by a court in Benghazi in 1991 and to have been imprisoned in al-Kuwayfiya. 6 Jamal al-Arbi Reportedly arrested in Tripoli in 1989, allegedly died in custody in 1992. 7 Ahmad al-Amari Reportedly died in custody in 1992 8 Gasmalla Osman Reportedly died in custody in the summer of Hamad Sharah 1996 as a result of medical neglect. Suffering from ill-health and under-treatment in Tripoli Central Hospital when he was reportedly arrested by the security forces and taken to al- ‘Ataba prison in Tripoli. Later taken to al-Kufra camp near the Sudan border where he died. Contained in the Amnesty International’s 2000 Report and derived from (Source: www.sijill.tripod.com/prison/ of 03/07/2011) The human rights abuse and suppression of opposition groups that also include academic professionals culminate to a situation whereby a regular pattern is exhibited in the abuse of the fundamental rights of the people by the regime. Corroborating the fact in a rather ridiculous tradition by Gaddafi, Sijil
(2011b) observes that 95
Under Gaddafi, the month of April has seen some of the worst abuses of human rights in Libyan history. Starting with arrests of suspected political party members in 1973, and sections of military officers in 1975, the madness of the Gaddafi regime culminated into reserving April for persecution of Libyan students and other dissidents, inside and outside Libya.
Evidently, the situation creates delirious quest for quenching the blood- thirsty regime that is disguised under the operation of sharia law and the idiosyncratic Revolutionary Command Council’s unguided decisions. The following table will elucidate more vividly on the fact attesting to this aspect of the fundamental human rights abuse within and outside Libya.
Table 10: Victims of April persecution within and outside Libya (in the April tradition of human rights abuse) S/N Name Details 1 Omar A. Dabboub, and Teachers, arrested 7 April, 1977 in Benghazi. Mohammed bin Saudi Executed by public hanging for participation in January 1976 students’ demonstration. Gaddafi presided over the execution personally. 2 Mahmoud A. Nafi Attorney and business man, Assassinated in his office in London. Two Libyans tried for the crime and sentenced to life in prison. 3 Mahmoud Banoun Engineer, arrested in early April 1980 in Tripoli. Died a few days later as a result of torture and his body delivered to family in sealed box. 4 Abdul Jalil al-Arif Business man, assassinated in April 1980 in Rome as a victim of Gaddafi’s campaigns of ‘physical liquidation’ of opponents abroad. 5 Abdul Latif al- Business man, relative of Major Omar al- Muntassir Meheshi, assassinated in April 1980. 6 Mohammed M. Journalist and announcer at BBC, Arabic section. Ramadan Assassinated by Gaddafi operatives outside Regent Park mosque. Libyan regime refused him burial in Libya and returned the body to be buried in London. Two Libyans were tried for the crime and in September 1980, sentenced to life in prison. 7 Naji bu Hawiya Khlyif, Students, arrested in April 1982 by Gaddafi 96
and Ahmed I. Makhluf security, and died under torture in August 1982 in Benghazi. 8 Mohammed M.Hfaf Student, arrested and imprisoned in April 1973 in Tripoli. Accused of membership in Islamic Liberation Party. Ten years later on 7 April, 1983, executed by hanging in College of Engineering, Tripoli.
9 Abdallah A. Al- Student, arrested on 16 April, 1973, charged with Mesallati membership in Islamic Liberation Party and sentenced to prison. Retried by Revolutionary Courts, sentenced to death and executed in Tripoli Central Prison. 10 Abdul Aziz al- Student, arrested in April 1983 in Tripoli, on Ghorably suspicion of membership in political party. Died in January 1984 as a result of torture and lack of medical care. 11 Rasheed M. Ka’bar Student, arrested in November, 1980 following unrest at the College of Engineering. Accused of being follower of Sheikh Bishti (mosque leader tortured and killed by A. Zadma and Revolutionary Committees). Sentenced to death by Revolutionary Committees, and executed at the College of Pharmacy, Tripoli where University students were forced to watch the execution. 12 Hafed al-Madani Student, arrested in November, 1980 following unrest at College of Engineering. Executed on 16 April, 1984 by public hanging at the College of Agriculture, Tripoli. 13 Mustafa R. An-Nawairy Student, elected President of Students Union for the academic year 1975-1976. Elected Secretary of Benghazi chapter of Students Union. Expelled from Benghazi University and arrested in 1976. Arrested again in 1980 and sentenced to death and executed by the Revolutionary Committees in front of University students and staff. 14 Hassan A. al-Kurdi Arrested among hundreds in spring 1973. In June, accused with nine others of membership in Islamic Liberation Party and of writing articles opposing the regime. On 7 December, 1973, the Revolutionary Council issued resolution to stop the courts and release the accused. Rearrested on 97
the same day and held without trial until February 1977. Sentenced to 15 years in prison, days later, the sentence was increased to life imprisonment. Executed in prison without trial in April, 1984. 15 Ahmed Rafeeq al- Business man, assassinated on 3 April, 1985 in Barani his office at Cyprus.
16 Jibril A. ad-Dinali Former Police Officer and member of NFSL, shot by Gaddafi agents in Bonn, Germany. (source: www.sijill.tripod.com/victims/ of 05/07/2011)
These conditions of high human rights abuse by the Gaddafi regime creates the lay credence to the basis of the isolation of Libya from the rest of the world, especially from Europe and US, but also from international communities including the United Nations and European Union. In fact, on March 31, 1992, the UN Security Council in a resolution sanction Libya and the continued defiance led to further sanctions by the UN against Libya in November 1993.
Unfortunately, the dire need of Libyan oil by the West culminated to the hurried attempt for reconciliation with the advanced economies and international organizations (www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libya).
Furthermore, the popular case and trial of six foreign health workers (five
Bulgarian nurses and one Palestinian doctor) are indicators of the pattern of unfair trial by the regime. The health workers were accused of deliberately infecting 426 children with HIV-tainted blood in a hospital in 1999. On May 6,
2004, a Libyan court sentenced the workers to death. They were eventually freed in 2007, following European diplomatic mobilization. On another note,
Amnesty International discovered human rights abuses and called for an 98 independent inquiry into deaths that occurred in Abu Salim maximum security prison in the 1996 riot in which Human Rights Watch believes that 1,270 prisoners were killed (www.en.m.wikipedia.org/Human_rights_in_Libya).
4.3 SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS AS GROUND
FOR REVOLUTION IN LIBYA
In 1999, less than a decade after the sanctions were put in place, Libya began to make dramatic policy changes in regard to the Western world, including turning over the Lockerbie suspects for trial. This diplomatic breakthrough followed years of negotiation, including a visit by then UN
Secretary General Kofi Anan to Libya in December 1998, and personal appeals by Nelson Mandela. Similarly, following the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, Gaddafi decided to abandon his weapons of mass destruction programme and pay almost 3 billion US dollars in compensation to the families whose members are victims of the Pan Am Flight 103 and the UTA Flight 772 bombings (www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libya).
Mulligan (2011) opines that Libya’s political and economic landscape has changed slowly, but surely in recent years. The halting five-year rapprochement began in 2003 when the United Nations ended its embargo and Libya’s leader
Muammar Gaddafi renounced terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. This was followed by the restoration of US-Libyan diplomatic relations in 2009 for the first time in about 30 years. Signs of political and economic opening became more noticeable in areas concerning human capital and legal rights. 99
Given the above scenario, the regime was forced into a petit repentance by threats of possible violent resistance from within and outside the state resulting to the wake of reconciliation efforts of Libya and the west by Britain.
Consequently, Lahlou (2010) opines that Gaddafi’s decision in 2003 for the first time to privatize the oil industry and other sectors marks another sign of openness to the outside world. The slight economic reform is a catalyst for both economic strategic reform and possible political reform. The need for political reforms also emanate from Gaddafi’s threat in 2005 to nationalize the foreign oil companies that returned for operation after 2003 privatization, as this is a pointer to insincere reconciliation effort, but as a basis for buying-time in preparation for further onslaught. Despite this, Mulligan (2011) avers that these promising initiatives, coupled with the change in rhetoric among the ruling elite in recent years, make Libya a potential candidate for liberalization through economic reform which can pave the way for political reform in the long-term.
The above further elucidate on the thesis of the theory of Political
Economy that economic power (substructure) is a basis of political rights and power (superstructure) agitation. In this vein, the economic reforms which benefit the family members and allies of Gaddafi were seen as economic disempowerment of Libyans and led to the quests by the citizens for securing their own interests. African Policy Institute (2011:14) holds that
100
The advent of the reformist project has certainly heralded a freer, more open atmosphere and Libyans were able to criticize the organs of government in an unprecedented manner through media established by Saif al-Islam. The areas of criticism include complain about services, corruption and the government more widely, without specific mention of Gaddafi, his family, or the upper echelons. This has also led to regular outbreaks of small-scale localized unrest over socio-economic issues since they are unlikely to threaten the hegemonic rule.
The prelude of Tunisia’s revolt followed by Egypt revolution sparked-up the outbreaks of revolution in Libya. In little or no time, the protests became sources of potency for ousting the regime through the support of NATO (given the misgivings against the regime). Moreso, the government of Libya allowed the Human Rights Watch for the first time, to come and make verification of human rights situation in Libya. Discoveries to this effect (as already indicated above) are rather shocking for a government that claims to be practicing true democracy. As much as these claims are denied, the indications in the recent violent crackdown of protesters are testimonies to the truthfulness of the reports.
Moreover, freedom of the press is restricted and Libya is rated as the most censored country in the Middle East and North Africa according to the Freedom of the Press Index (http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_rankings_of_
Libya).
4.4 2011 REVOLUTIONARY WAR IN LIBYA AND END OF
GADDAFI’S REGIME.
The human rights abuse of Libya government came to public limelight in the wake of the February 16, 2011 revolution. In May, 2010, Libya was elected 101 by the UN General Assembly to a three-year term on the UN’s Human Rights
Council. This was in a bid to bring it closer to human rights knowledge, and respect for the rights of its citizens. It was however, suspended from the Human
Right Council in March 2011 as a result of spotlight in February, 2011 of government’s violent response to pro-democracy protesters, which killed hundreds of demonstrators at the early stage.
Abati (2011:51) concludes that the recent revolt, which culminated to war in Libya is
A referendum on the Gaddafi government of 42 years of personalization of power that has seen the people suffering, while Gaddafi and his children prospered. 42 years which the Green Book of the Revolution had long been abandoned by the Guide of the Revolution.
Moreover, Bankole (2011:6) sums-up that under this atmosphere of autocratic leadership, innocent people at the slightest resistance to oppressive rulers are brutally tortured, imprisoned, jailed and even killed. The tyrants called leaders, humiliated their citizens and grossly abused their fundamental human rights. The current crisis in Libya has resulted to the death of an estimated 5000 people as at March, 2011 while hospitals and morgues are filled with wounded and dead persons, yet the regime remains defiant to give up power (The Guardian editor, 2011:8), and by September 5, 2011, the CNN reports that about 50,000 people have died as a result of the war in Libya. Even with the current warrant of arrest on Gaddafi for war crimes, crimes against 102 humanity and gross abuse of human rights by the International Court of Justice,
Gaddafi remained bent on clinching to power to death.
This is evidenced in the analysis of Obayuwana and Obinor (2011:64) that
Gaddafi, vowed to fight on and die a martyr, calling on his supporters to take back the streets from protesters, demanding his ouster, shouting and pounding his fist in a furious speech on state television.
The continued repression of pro-democracy movements in Libya, which took cue from the rebellion in Tunisia and Egypt led to the March 18 UN
Security Council Resolution 1973 creating a Libyan no-fly zone
(www.trust.org/alertnet/crisis-centre/crisis/Libya-turmoil). This is followed by the bombardment which was the largest against an Arab country since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, carried out by the NATO allies, namely United States, Britain,
France, Italy, Canada, Qatar, among others.
The regime has already deployed hundreds of tanks to fight the Libyan people to the bitter end, initially offering $400 per person to shoot fellow
Libyans (The Guardian Editor, March 1, 2011:18). The use of tanks and mercenaries in shelling civilians by Gaddafi forces led to the degrading of the state arms, with adverse consequences to the fighting groups. The leadership has also been accused of using mercenaries in the suppression of opposition.
Africa Policy Institute (2011:4) mentions that
103
The claim that the Gaddafi government is using mercenaries reportedly hired mainly from Sub-Saharan Africa (and the former Yugoslavia) has drawn attention to the African Union’s Convention on the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa. Media reports have claimed that Gaddafi’s loyalists have recruited Nigerian, Ukrainian, Serbian and Ghanaian mercenaries, paying them a colossal $2,500 per day
The resistance to the suppression is remarkable as evidenced by Africa
Policy Institute (2011:3) that the struggle in Libya is celebrated as part of popular pro-democracy revolutions sweeping North Africa, which is people- based and not elite-driven or linked to political parties. The cue for the struggle is taken from the North African uprisings initiated by the icon Mohamed
Bouaziz, the vendor whose self-immolation on 17 December 2010 was eulogized as the ultimate protest against the indignity and repression in the low end informal sector of Tunisian political economy and ignites the wave of revolt across North Africa involving Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. With the fight over as at 23 rd October, 2011 the TNC is expected to enthrone a democratic dispensation that will ensure a democratization process in Libya.
4.5 LIST OF WANTED FIGURES FOR THE CRIMES AND 2011
WAR IN LIBYA
Interpol on 4 March 2011 issued a security alert concerning the "possible movement of dangerous individuals and assets" based on United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1970, which imposed a travel ban and asset freeze.
The warning lists Gaddafi himself and 15 key members of his regime: 104
1. Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi: Responsibility for ordering
repression of demonstrations, human rights abuses.
2. Dr. Baghdadi Mahmudi: Head of the Liaison Office of the Revolutionary
Committees. Revolutionary Committees involved in violence against
demonstrators.
3. Abuzed Omar Dorda: Director, External Security Organization. Regime
loyalist. Head of external intelligence agency.
4. Major General Abu-Bakr Yunis Jabr: Defense Minister. Overall
responsibility for actions of armed forces.
5. Aisha Muammar Gaddafi: Daughter of Muammar Gaddafi. Closeness of
association with regime.
6. Hannibal Muammar Gaddafi: Son of Muammar Gaddafi. Closeness of
association with regime.
7. Mutassim Gaddafi: National Security Adviser. Son of Muammar Gaddafi.
Closeness of association with regime
8. Saadi Gaddafi: Commander Special Forces. Son of Muammar Gaddafi.
Closeness of association with regime. Command of military units
involved in repression of demonstrations.
9. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi: Director, Gaddafi Foundation. Son of Muammar
Gaddafi. Closeness of association with regime. Inflammatory public
statements encouraging violence against demonstrators. 105
10. Abdulqader Yusef Dibri: Head of Muammar Gaddafi's personal security.
Responsibility for regime security. History of directing violence against
dissidents.
11. Matuq Mohammed Matuq: Secretary for Utilities. Senior member of
regime. Involvement with Revolutionary Committees. Past history of
involvement in suppression of dissents and violence.
12. Sayyid Mohammed Qadhaf Al-dam: Cousin of Muammar Gaddafi. In the
1980s, Sayyid was involved in the dissident assassination campaign and
allegedly responsible for several deaths in Europe. He is also thought to
have been involved in arms procurement.
13. Khamis Gaddafi: Son of Muammar Gaddafi. Closeness of association
with regime. Command of military units involved in repression of
demonstrations.
14. Mohammed Gaddafi: Son of Muammar Gaddafi. Closeness of association
with regime.
15. Saif al-Arab Gaddafi: Son of Muammar Gaddafi. Closeness of
association with regime.
16. Colonel Abdullah Senussi: Director Military Intelligence. Military
Intelligence involvement in suppression of demonstrations. Past history
includes suspicion of involvement in Abu Selim prison massacre.
Convicted in absentia for bombing of UTA flight. Brother-in-law of
Muammar Gaddafi. 106
The NTC has been in negotiations with Algeria and Niger, neighboring countries to which members of the regime and defecting military commanders have fled, attempting to secure the arrest and extradition of Saadi Gaddafi and others. Of these officials, Abdulqader Mohammed Al-Baghdadi and Abu Zayd
Umar Dsorda were arrested, while Saif al-Arab Gaddafi was killed by a NATO air strike during the war and Khamis Gaddafi was claimed by the NTC to have been confirmed dead as well (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Libya#
Wanted_figures).
4.6 TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL COUNCIL FIGHTERS (TNCF)
The Transition National Council/Government in Libya has since been recognized by some states as the official representatives of the people of Libya.
These are made up of the former anti-Gaddafi forces who latter formed coalition members in the struggle under the TNC. They were described as the
Transitional National Council Fighters for a democratic Libya. Some of the groups include
1. National Transitional Council
2. National Liberation Army
3. National Front for the Salvation of Libya
4. Free Libyan Air Force
5. Libyan Youth Movement,
6. Libyan Constitutional Union
7. Committee for Libyan National Action in Europe 107
8. Libyan Freedom and Democracy Campaign
9. National Conference for the Libyan Opposition
10. Libyan League for Human Rights
11. Libyan Tmazight Congress (www.en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-
Gaddafi_forces).
Similarly, the leadership in Libya is expected to conduct a democratic election by April 2012, which will institute a Constitutional Government by
2013. Some of the political parties already established to this effect include
Democratic Party of Libya, New Libya Party and Libyan Socialist Movement
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Libya#Political_parties_and_election).
To this end, the hypothesis which proposes that the government of Libya did not support the development of political parties and constitutional opposition between 1969 and 2011 is upheld given the quantum of evidence to this effect.
108
CHAPTER FIVE
5.0 SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
This part of the study is used to make summary of the findings as well as conclusion and recommendations based on the study discoveries. Thus far, the study fulfills the objectives initially set as the task of the study. The aim of the study include to evaluate the government’s provision of political and economic structures for the enforcement of the fundamental human rights of citizens in
Libya from 1969 to 2011, to analyze the basis and nature of political recruitment into the legislature and executive through electoral process for the period of study, and to adduce evidence with regards to the support and development of political parties and constitutional opposition between 1969 and
2011.
The evidence justifying the fact that the hypotheses relate to the research questions in the study are summed below. The study discovered in response to research question one that the government of Libya tilts towards impeding on the economic rights and empowerment of the citizens by restraining entrepreneurial drives as well as wage work. In the same vein, the government used the institutions of the state in coercing the citizens and thus subverts rights protection. Similarly, the findings from research question two reveals that the government militates against competitive election into public offices in executive and legislature. This is done by use of open balloting, use of security surveillance and no party system. There is also the problem of permanent 109 leadership of the Revolutionary Command Council which is the ultimate decision making body in the state. Moreover, the government base political appointment on clientelism, prebendalism and patronage of tribal leaders as basis of buying support and perpetuating in power. Finally, the discoveries in response to research question three revealed that the government did not allow the development of constitutional oppositions, but rather suppressed them, using violent forms as is visible in the recent crackdown of protesters. The government is also involved in arrests, torture, detention and killing of dissents at home and abroad.
5.1 SUMMARY
The study is concerned with the State and political economy of democratization in Libya, with focus on the respect for the socio-economic and political rights of the people. Democratization entails a process of institutionalizing democratic practices and principles in a state. This connotes the level of adoption and enforcement of socio-economic and political rights and liberties of the people in such manner as to allow popular participation, self actualization and respect for the wills of the citizens expressed freely.
Democratization in Libya is encumbered by the political economy of oil expropriation by Gaddafi family and allies in a prebendal, patrimonial, patronage and clientele relationship, which excludes the rest of Libyans.
The study discovered that oil is at the heart of the human rights abuse in
Libya. The perpetuation of the leadership in power with no opportunity for 110 political recruitment from the ordinary citizens polarized the economic rewards accruing from oil in the state from the people. This is because political office in
Libya is the major source of economic reward, hence, the restrictive strategies put in place to deter opposition. The Libyan government not only ignores democratic principles, but ultimately abuses the fundamental human rights of citizens.
Exclusionary leadership of the Gaddafi regime spanning from 1969 –
2011 ousted the democratic regime of King Idris. It combines the suppression of all forms of opposition and extra-legal measures as well as draconian laws which impede the fundamental rights of the people of Libya in self-service. It is this scenario that gave rise to the February 16, 2011 protest-turned war that also ousted the regime of Gaddafi in September, 2011. The study reveals that
Gaddafi’s regime using the Green Book, Revolutionary Command Council, sharia law, security surveillance, and the institutions of the state, suppresses the people of Libya as is made manifest in recent times.
Initial suppression of the regime gradually gave way to external and local pressures first for economic reforms and latter public expressions that culminated to the recent uprisings for democratic regime. Although several factors encouraged the revolutionary movement from onset such as opposition movement (especially by the Muslim Brotherhood), Saif al-Islam’s human rights organization (the Gaddafi Foundation), economic reforms (with leeway for political reforms), uprisings in Tunisia, among others; the principal agent of 111 the revolution in Libya is citizens-driven quest for democratic change of old regime order. The old order entails the creation of outlet for expression of socio-economic and political rights (petty entrepreneurship and quasi-election) in a subordinated form contrasted to the dominance of ruling elites. As a result of the foregoing, the government basis recruitment on clientelism and patronage instead of democratic elections. Similarly, it entrenches perpetuity of the regime by neutralizing elective principles, thus leaving no space for socio- economic and political competition and challenge of leadership in the state.
Using the Political Economy theory, the study reveals with a gamut of evidence that the state militates the provision of political and economic structures for the enforcement of the fundamental human rights of the people.
Again, it shows that patterns of political recruitment disenfranchises ordinary
Libyans from leadership positions, who rather face undue suppressions and compelled to merely exist amidst abundance of wealth in the state which ostensibly benefits Gaddafi and his family and allies. This justifies the need for violent method of acquiring democracy in the state, and more importantly, to institutionalize and advance it for the betterment of all Libyans.
However, the war by the NTC (government) forces as a process of democracy acquisition portends dangers of unsustainability due to the violent manner of its obtainance. Moreso, the tendency for a new regime to persevere in democratic principles without reverting to the old order is precarious given the antecedence of the tools of undemocratic practices such as sharia law, 112 corrupt-ridden elites and existing factionalization blended by West’s oil interests.
5.2 CONCLUSION
This study is based on the analysis of the state and political economy of democratization in Libya with emphasis on the government’s provision of political and economic structures for the enforcement of the fundamental human rights of the people, the function of elective principles for political recruitment of executive and legislative members, as well as the support and development of constitutional opposition for the period of the study. The study adopts the
Political Economy theory in investigating the hypotheses that the government tends to militate against the provision of political and economic structures for the enforcement of the fundamental human rights of Libyans. It also revealed that the government tend to restrain political recruitment and suppresses the opposition rather than develop them.
5.3 IMPLICATION OF FINDINGS
In line with the research questions and hypotheses, the study makes bold to conclude that from the findings and evidence, there are inadequate economic and political structures for the enforcement of the fundamental human rights of
Libyans, but for the alienation of the people of Libya. Secondly, that the pattern of political recruitment in Libya is based on patrimony, prebendalism, clientelism and patronage rather than democratic election. Finally, that the political structures in the state fail to support the development of constitutional 113 opposition and political parties, but rather suppresses them legally and violently.
Consequent upon the above, there is urgent need to salvage the initiating factors for the undemocratic practices and the resultant rebellion without which the polity may remain unstable.
5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS
The Libyan leader – Gaddafi, has actually over-stayed his welcome. He ought to know that gallant bow-out is better than arrogant and stubborn clinch to power. Unfortunately, the disgraceful ouster and warrant of arrest on him are testimonies to the regimes mis-governance and human rights abuse. The study therefore, recommends as follows:
1. Adequate supervision of the NTC forces by the United Nations so as
to forestall further extra-judicial killings still going on in Libya,
particularly against blacks.
2. The return of the Constitution of 1951 and the election of a
Constituent assembly for its amendment to reflect current trends and
wishes of the people of Libya.
3. The institution of a democratically elected government in a free, fair,
transparent and generally acceptable manner in Libya within the
shortest possible time to enable good governance and restoration of
peace, order and development of the state 114
4. The application of the justice system to arrest and try all those
involved in the death and abuses of the people of Libya in view of the
revolution.
5. The government of Libya should control the arms in the hands of the
liberation fighters to forestall future violence. It should also stop the
ongoing killings against perceived supporters of the past regime of
Gaddafi.
6. Finally, the government should speedily work towards reconstructing
and stabilizing the system so as to salvage the basis of the last revolt.
5.5 PROGNOSIS
The government of Gaddafi inevitably faced violent ouster due to the resilience of the people in enthroning democracy in Libya. However, the various opposition groups are likely to see themselves as competitors and may resort to use of violence given the proliferation of arms used to oust Gaddafi.
Beyond this, there is the tendency that NATO will back and enthrone a puppet regime to enable them benefit from the crude oil rewards in the state. This is likely to deter the full realization of the basis of the revolution of February,
2011 since funds will be applied for repairs, compensation of supporters and victims of the revolution, among others. Thus, speedy development of the social infrastructures, reduction of poverty and creation of employment in the medium term will be unrealizable. If this trend persists for long, there is the tendency for a reinvention of the revolution against the current government. 115
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