Trotsky on the Tanaka Memorial June 1941

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Trotsky on the Tanaka Memorial June 1941 1 FOURTH INTERNATIONAL VOLUME 2 JUNE 1941 NUMBER 5 The “Tanaka Memorial” By LEON TROTSKY The famous “Tanaka Memorial” was a though certain of the authenticity of the citic dates for certain of the events. Although document submitted to the Japanese em- “Tanaka Memorial,” have remained silent his memory was excellent, he was never peror in 1927 by Baron Tanaka, the premier while Japan has continued to deny its au- satisfied, in anything he wrote, until he of Japan. This document outlined in de- thenticity. Washington and London, engaged secured documentary verification. The edi- tailed steps a program of Japanese imper- in “appeasing” Japan — i.e., preparing for tors have not been able to supplement Trot- ialist expansion, beginning with establish- the most propitious moment for war in the sky’s own tentative dates with further veri- ment of Japanese control in Manchuria and Pacific — have discouraged publication of fication. leading eventually to dominatiori of all material on the “Tanaka Memorial.” The In an article published in Libert~, Janu- China, Indonesia, the South Sea Islands, Soviet press likewise remains silent. ary 27, 1940, Comrade Trotsky predicted the Maritime Provinces of USSR and, even- In the following article Leon Trotsky has that a forthcoming Kremlin-Japan Pact tually, India and the whole Pacific basin. told for the first time the story of how “would constitute a symmetric supplement Baron Tanaka even visualized ultimate Ja- the “Tanaka Memorial” was secured by to the pact between Moscow and Berlin.” panese control of Europe. the Soviet intelligence service from the Such a pact was actually signed on April When the document came to light, its au- archives of the Japanese government. Com- 13, 1941. The Kremlin would scarcely thenticity was denied in Japan. But begin- rade Trotsky had not quite finished this vouch for the authenticity of the “Tanaka ning in 1931 with the invasion of Man- article when he was assassinated by Stalin’s Memorial” today, for then it would be hard churia, Japan proceeded alongprecisely the GPU. put to justify to the world working class lines laid down in the “Tanaka Memorial.” The article was written for publication the signing of the pact with Japan in the Yet the chancelleries of all the great im- for the general public. Comrade Trotsky midst of China’s struggle against Japanese perialist powers, and the Kremlin too, al- was still attempting to establish more spe- imperialism.—THE EDITORS. ● The American press has up to now consideredthe “Tan- occupy themselveswith forgeries but devote their energies to aka Memorial” a dubious document. other pursuits. To be sure, there was no scarcity of forgeries OrIApril 23, 1940,Rear Admiral Taussig referred to the during the last war and the ensuing post-war years. Suf6ce it “Tanaka Memorial” in his extremely interesting report to the to recall the notorious Sisson documents on the Soviet Re- Senate Committee on Naval Affairs. Rear Admiral Taussig public. As a general rule-and I know of no exceptions— was disavowedby his own department. It is not my intention documentsof this type are extremely crude.‘They tend to re- to enter into this controversy. I believe that Rear Admiral veal the psychologyof the forgers themselvesor of the circles Taussig had his own reasons for speaking, and the Navy De- for whom they are intended rather than the psychology of partment had its own reasons for disavowinghis views.Quite those individuals or groups in whose name the forgeries are possiblythe disavowaldid not come as a surprise to the Rear committed. If such documentsmeet with credibility, it is only Admiral. But, I repeat, this does not concern me. So far as I because of lack of familiarity with the milieu from which am able to judge, Rear Admiral Taussig is a qualified expert they reportedly emanate. The Soviet Government consistedof on the morals, tasks and politics of the Far East. He does not individuals completely unknown to world public opinion. doubt the authenticity of the “Tanaka Memorial.” The New Small wonder that it was possibleto ascribe to them any goal York Times, however, in reporting this sessionof the Senate or aim whatsoever, and depict these things in any kind of Committeeon Naval Affairs, found it necessary to remind its language. readers once again that the “Japanese have always insisted It is otherwise with the Imperial Government of Japan. that the so-called‘Tanaka Memorial’was a Chineseforgery.” It constitutes an ancient and traditional milieu. Whoever has Thus even today, some sixteen years after the publication of carefully followed the evolution of Japanese politics cannot the “Memorial,” it still remains a suspect and controversial fail to acknowledgethat the document, with its cynical real- document. ism and icy fanaticism of the ruling caste, originates in this The “Tanaka Memorial” is not a forgery. A careful anal- milieu. The document is credible. The text is valid. The con- ysis of its contents and text in and of itself testifiesadequately tents gain credencebecausethey speak for themselves. to this. Moreover, the author of these lines is in possessionof Japan is today the weakest link in the imperialist chain. facts which verify completely and incontrovertibly the au- Her financial and military superstructure rests on a founda- thenticity of the “Tanaka Memorial.” tion of semi-feudal agrarian barbarism. Periodical explosions within the Japanese army are only a reflection of the intoler- Its InternalValidity able tension of social contradictions in the country. The re- A genius in the fabrication of forgeries would have been gime as a wholemaintains itself only through the dynamics of required to execute so complex a forgery with such penetra- military seizures. The programmatic basis for these seizures tion into the objective situation and the political psychology is supplied by the “Tanaka Memorial.” of Japan’s ruling circles. However, geniusesdo not as a rule As I recall it, the “Memorial” is based on the testament . Page 132 FOURTH INTERNATIONAL June 1941 0 of Emperor Meiji. This testament itself is of course a myth. Chinese Revolution was a question of the future. It is hardly But Japanese awzression is interlaced with traditionalism. astonishing that the Soviet Intelligence Service in both its Whil~ &-eatinga-~igantic fleet of the most modern type, the branche%that which fulfilled military assignmentsand that Japanese imperialistsprefer to base their activities on ancient of the GPU—wereunder orders to watch carefully every Jap- national traditions. Just as priests put their pronouncements anese move in diplomatic as well as military fields. and desires into the mouths of deities, so the Japanese im- The Military Intelligence Service was under a two-foId perialists palm off their very modern plans and combinations jurisdiction: subject on the one hand to the War Department as the will of the august progenitorsof the reigning Emperor. and on the other to the GPU. The Foreign Department of the Similarly Tanaka covered up the imperialist aspirations of GPU was headed by an old Bolshevik,Trilisser, who was later the ruling cliques by reference to a non-existingtestament of removed and apparently liquidated along with many others. an Emperor. The Military Intelligencewas headed by Berzin, an old Let- The document did not leap full-blown from Baron Tan- tish Bolshevik. 1 was not closely acquainted with the organ- aka’s brow. It constitutes a generalization of the plans form- ization of our agency in Japan, being little interested in the ulated by the Army and Navy leaders and, in a certain sense, technicalaspectsof the matter. 1handed this over to my aides, a reconciliation and a theoretical summation of these plans. first Sklyansky, later Unschlicht and, to a certain extent, It is to be assumed that many variants preceded the final Rosenholtz. Permit me to recall that Sklyansky. one of the draft; and that many discussionswere held in intimate, “non- otitstandingand most meritoriousorganizersof the Red Army, official” and hence all the more influential circles. The task was drowned in 1924or 1925in America while taking a boat was to affix the seal of imperial will upon these aspirations ride on a lake. Unschlicht disappeared, and was evidently of the Army and Navy circles. The old Emperor’s physical liquidated. Rosenholtz was shot by verdict of the court. and mental condition was such that his signature could not Questions relating to the Intelligence Service were thus prove authoritative for the initiated. That is why the imper- brought to my attention only in exceptional cases involving ialist conspirators waited for the enthronement of Emperor issues of great military or political importance. This is pre- Hirohito before presenting for his signature the document, cisely what happenedon the occasionto which 1 have referred. which from all indications had received its final formulation under General Tanaka’s direction. EarlySovietAdvantagesin IntelligenceWork Why I Can Verify ItsAuthenticity The successesof which the Soviet Foreign Intelligence However, apart from these general considerations, the could already boast at that time were by no means accidental. writer of these lines is able to vouch for the following facts. The party had at its disposalnot a few peoplewho had passed The “Tanaka Memorial” was first photographed in Tokio in through a serious conspiratorial school and who were well the Ministry of Naval Affairs and brought to Moscowas an acquainted with all the methods and subterfugesof the police undevelopedfilm. I was perhaps the very first person to be- and counter-espionage.They brought into their work an in- come acquainted with the document in English and Russian ternational experience, many of them having been emigres translations of the Japanese text. in various lands and possessinga broad politicaloutlook. They *** had personal friends in many countries. Nor was there any At that time relations with Japan were extremely alarm- lack of self-sacrificingsupport on the part of the revolutionary ing for Soviet foreign policy.
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