Pramtnavrttika and Prananaviniscaya (I)
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Pramtnavrttika and Prananaviniscaya (I) Isshi Yamada Dharmakirti, the preeminent logician of later Indian Buddhism,wrote the Pramanavarttika in the form of a critical commentary to the Pramanasamuccaya., of Dignaga.The Varttika was so voluminousand difficult that Dharmakirti found it necessary to write the Pramanaviscaya summarizing its logical thought. In the- Viniscayahe quoted the important karikas from the Varttika and clarified their logical meaningsin the following lines. The subtle differences between the karikas of these two books testify to the developmentof Dharmakirti's thoughts. In the- following I limit my examinationof the karikas of these two books to the Praty- aksa chapter, which is the third of four chapters of the Varttika and the first of- three chapters of the Viniscaya. The Pratyaksa chapter of Viniscaya consists of 51 karikas with the commentary (1) ygasthe author himself, and 34 karikas of them are quoted directly 'or indirectly(2) rom the Pratyaksa chapter of Varttika which consists of 541 karikas. Among these quoted karikas in the Viniscaya 20 karikas are quoted from the Vijnaptima- trata-cinta in the Pratyaksa chapter of Varttika, where Dharmakirti mentions the fundamental theory of knowledge of Buddhst Logic using 222 karikas from No. 320 to 541. Therefore we can reach such a conclusion that Dharmakirti stands on the same epistemologicallogic based on Vijnanavada philosophy, which is (1) To my regret, I must omit my detailed comparison and examination of these 34 karikas here. It will be shown in the other magazine. So I show only their numbers in the third chapter of Varttika (ed. by R. Sankrtyayana, JBORS Vol. XXIV pt. 1-2, Patna 1938). 247, 245, 251, 270, 277, 278, 279, 282, 283, 285, 305, 306, 307 308, 327, 330, 331, 332, 351,. 352, 353, 354,355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360,361, 362, 363, 365, 366, 367. (2) The Pratyaksa chapter of Varttika consists of 541 karikas, but Karika No. 342 and 511 cannot be seen in the Tibetan translation (The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition, Vol. 130, No. 5709, trans. by Subhutisrisanti and Dge-bahi-blo-gros of the Old Nyaya. Ed. by D. T. Suzuki, Tokyo-Kyoto 1957). So it seems to me that these two karikas were probably inserted by unknown follower of Dhar- makirti. -736- (43) Pramanavarttika and Pramanaviniscava (I) (I. Yamada) the basis of his logical theory, both in the Varttika and Viniscaya. In the Vijn.apti- matrata-cinta Dharmakirti denies all of the objects of cognition, adopting the -Svasamvedana Theory of Vijnana as his fundamental principle of the epistemological logic. The object of cognition appears only when the transcendental self (vijnana) appears as a perceptible object (grehyakara) of Vijnana and a perceptible subject (grahakakara) of Vijnana grasps the perceptible object of Vijnana. Thus, according to such a logical Iorm of noema and noesis, every cognition in our usual experience -is realized as the introspection of Vijnana. Therefore he says: "In such an object of perception that is different from the perceptible object of Vijnana, both object and subject modes are hard to be accomplished. As the intellect, not having object and subject modes, appears by reason of illusory cogni- tions," "Illuded with the divers forms of perception, percept and percipient; so when -the intellect has posited a diversity, as inthe example of the differences of the cognition of a hair and the like," "Th en it is not to be doubted that it is characterized as percept and percipient. And then there is no other introspection (except that the perceptible subject of Vijnana grasps the perceptible object of Vijnana), so it is natural that the intro- (3) pective awareness (svasamvit) is the result of cognition (phala)." In the Viniscaya Dharmakirti states his clear opinion regarding the so-called logical theory of Pratyaksa which is somewhat different from that of the Varttika. These passages, which show us a more advanced theory of sense-perception of Dharmakirti, are similar to that in the Nyayabindu as in the following: "Right kno wledge (samyagjnana) is twofold, perception (pratyaksa) and infer- ence (anumana). Because we never meet with any contradiction in reaching the efficient object (arthakriya), when we act after we have examined the object by (4) hese two right knowledges." "The object of cognition is twofold, direct (pratyaksa=svalaksana) and indirect (3) Varttika, III 330-2. cp. Viniscaya (The Tibetan Tripitaka, Vol. 130, No. 5710, trans. by Gshan-la-phan-pa-bzarn-po etc. and Blo-ldan-ses-rab of the New Nyaya), Bstan-hgyur Gtan-tshigs rig-pa Ce 262 a 7-262b 3. cp. Madhava's Sarvadarsana- samgraha, II 213-6. 4) Viniscaya, ibid. 251 a 1 f. cp. NB, I su. 1-3, 15 and Dharmottara's NBT. -735- Pramanavarttika and Pramanaviniscaya (I) (I. Yamada) (44) (5) paroksa=samanyalaksana)." "Perception (pratyaksa) means here neither construction (kalpanapod) ha) nor illusion (abhra ta)." "Knowledge that is not affected by an illusion produced by eye-blindness, rapid (7) motion, travelling on board a ship, sickness or other causes, is -Pratyaksa." "If yo u ask what the construction (kalpana) is, we would answer that it has a verbal designation, that the constructed knowledge implies a distinct cognition of a mental reflex which is capable of (yogya) coalescing with a verbal expression, (8) and that the knowledge without such an illusion is Pratyaksa." in the Nyayabindu, however, Dharmakirti does not make mention of the Svasam- vedana Theory of Vijnana that is the fundamental principle of the theory of know- ledge in the Varttika and Viniscaya. There he explains his theory of knowledge admitting the outer reality only in one moment (ksana) of a thing as a particular character (svalaksana), an efficient point of thing (arthakriyakaritva) and an ulti- mate existence (paramarthasat), which can be communicated to us only by Praty- aksa and which is completely different from the universal character (samanyalaksa- na), the object of Anumana. In this point he adopts Sautrantikavada philosophy rather than Vijnanavada philosophy. Dharmakirti is a Vijnanavadin in his Varttika and Viniscaya, as he called himself an adherent of Vijnanavada in his Santanantarasiddhi, for he maintains the cognizability of Vijnana alone; but he is a Sautrantikavadin in his Nyayabindu, ass the author of Nyayabindutika-tippani pointed out that the Nyayabindu had been written from the Sautrantika point of view, for he admits the outer reality as an incognizable foundation of our knowledge. Therefore he can be naturally called a (9) Sautrantika-Vi jnanavadin. It cannot be persisted, however, that Dharmakirti never made use of any Sautrantikavada in his Varttika and Viniscaya, for he used the theory of instantaneous being (ksanikavada) in these books. "If it be asked, how can there be a percept in the past? They (Sautrantikas) know that the percept has perceptibility, and it is ascribable to the fact that its (5) ibid. 251 a 3 f. cp. NB, I su. 13, 16-7 and NBT. (6) ibid. 252 b 3. cp. NB, I su. 4. (7) ibid. 252 b 3-4. cp. NB, I su. 6. (8) ibid. 252 b 4. cp. NB, I su. 5. (9) cp. Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, Vol. I, Leningrad, 1932, p. 114, 163, 529. -734- (45) Pramanavarttika and Pramanaviniscaya (I) (I. Yamada) (10) proper cognition has an ability to raise the form of knowledge." Madhava, a famous scholar of Vedanta philosophy in the 14 th century, quoted many karikas from Dharmakirti when he introduced Buddhist philosophy in the (11) second chapter of his Sarvadarsanasamgraha. These karikas were quoted to cite the authority of both Sautrantikavada and Vijnanavada philosophy by Madhava, and most of them were those karikas which Dharmakirti had used both in the Varttika and Viniscaya. From this we can see such two facts that scholars of Indian phi- losophy in general including Madhava comprehended the thought of Dharmakirti as a harmony of Sautrantikavada and Vijnanavada philosophy, and that Madhava's understanding of Dharmakirti is authentic for he quoted those important karikas which Dharmakirti himself thought of the essence of his epistemological and logical theory. I will show the list of karikas which Madhava quoted from Dharmakirti, limitting them to the Pratyaksa theory. (10) Varttika, III 247, and Viniscaya, ibid. 256 b 3-4. This karika is quoted in Vacaspatimisra's Nyayavarttika-tatparyatika, p. 15, 2-3, and Madhava's SDS, II 245-6. (11) SDS ed. with an commentary by M. V. S. Abhyarikar, Government Oriental Series Class A, No. 4, pub. by the Bhandarkar Oriental Institute, Poona, 1924 (Ist ed.); 1951 (2nd ed.). -733-.