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The Role of Ali Moertopo in President Soeharto's

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The Role of Ali Moertopo in President Soeharto's International Baccalaureate Extended Essay President Soeharto’s Dictatorship Rule: Could Soeharto have consolidated his power over Indonesia between 1966-1978 without Ali Moertopo? Student Name: Sabrina Hartono Candidate Number: School Name: Jakarta Intercultural School Date of IB Exams: May 2017 Category: History Advisor Name: Mr. Matthew Foster Word Count: 3993 words TABLE OF CONTENTS 1: Abstract 4 2: Background Context 5 3: Ali Moertopo’s Personality 7 4: Key events 8 4.1: Borneo Confrontation 1963-1966 8 4.2: MPRS Session 1968 10 4.3: General Elections 1971 12 4.4: Malari Incident 1974 13 4.5: General Elections 1977-1978 16 5: Other factors 18 5.1: Soeharto’s personality 18 5.2: Importance of Golkar 20 5.3: Benny Moerdani 22 5.4: Economic Revival Plans 23 Concluding Remarks 25 Works Cited 27 Bibliography 29 2 1: Abstract Ali Moertopo was notoriously known as Soeharto’s right-hand man during his rise to becoming the President of the Republic of Indonesia. Moertopo and Soeharto’s relationship Gerakan 30 dates back to at least a decade before the 30 September 1965 movement (​ September ​). To a great extent, Moertopo proved to be a key element in Soeharto’s political maneuvering up the ranks, finally gaining spotlight during the clash against the communists. However, as Soeharto began transitioning into the mainstream political arena, how important was Moertopo’s role in the process? Was Ali Moertopo just as indispensable during Soharto’s consolidation as he was during Soeharto’s rise? The question then arises: ​could Soeharto have consolidated his power over Indonesia between 1966-1978 without Ali Moertopo? In analyzing this question, we need to consider three overarching aspects: key events involving Moertopo between 1966-1978, Moertopo’s individual personality, and the significance of events between 1966-1978 outside of Moertopo’s involvement. The underlying question to consider is thus: in which cases were Moertopo dispensable and to what extent were his contributions exclusive to himself? Holistically, Moertopo’s knowledge, position and connections were not mutually exclusive to himself. Moertopo’s involvement in the Malari incident 1974 appeared to be the single event that showcased Moertopo’s indispensability; there were other individuals who could have just as easily assumed Moertopo’s roles in the other events. Conclusively, Ali Moertopo’s role in Soeharto’s consolidation of power owed to his traits of being ruthless and cunning. Moertopo was only able to facilitate Soeharto’s consolidation of power due to his position and connections with other individuals. If not Moertopo, another one of Soeharto’s cronies could have easily assumed the role of being Soeharto’s right-hand man and—albeit through different means—achieved similar results in consolidating Soeharto’s rule. 3 2: Background Context th The failed coup attempt of 30​ September 1965 (also known as the G30S event) served as the spark for General Soeharto’s rise to power. On the surface, it appeared that Soeharto himself seized the moment and rose to be the people’s champion by denouncing the communists and winning the hearts of the people. But behind the scenes, preparations were made a few steps ahead to pave the way for Soeharto to rise into such position. At that time, Ali Moertopo was th a key army general in the 4​ Command Military Territory Diponegoro army unit that then-Colonel Soeharto was also stationed. At that time, the Army headquarters considered Colonel Bambang Supeno for the Commander role of the Diponegoro army unit. However, Moertopo, together with Head General Yoga Sugama, lobbied support for Soeharto’s nomination, forcing the headquarters to accept Soeharto as the new Commander. Supersemar Ali Moertopo also played a key role in orchestrating the 11 March 1966 ​ document, via collaboration with General Panggabean and the CIA (Wardaya, 341), the official document that bestowed complete executive rights to General Soeharto as Acting President. Following a series of political maneuvers, General Soeharto was finally installed as the second president of Indonesia on 27 March 1968, a position he would eventually hold until 1998. During his 32-year dictatorial reign over Indonesia, Soeharto has always portrayed himself as the infallible father of the nation, yet he remains a figure shrouded in mystery. Soeharto’s rise to power has long been attributed to the failures of his predecessor and the swift seizing of opportunities. However, would opportunity have come to him without the involvement of his right-hand man, Ali Moertopo? Ali Moertopo’s role in Soeharto’s rise 4 was definitely a significant one, but did he continue to be important for Soeharto to consolidate his power since his installation as Acting President in 1966 to the second round of presidential elections in 1978? Soeharto’s dictatorial regime has inflicted a lasting mark in Indonesian history, hence, this question would provide a deeper insight on the dark period of Indonesia. As an Indonesian born just after Soeharto stepped down from presidency, I am part of the generation who remains oblivious to the experience under Soeharto’s rule, despite hearing so much about him. The curiosity to understand my nation’s history compels me to research on Soeharto and the consolidation of his power. 5 3: Ali Moertopo’s Personality Having begun his military career starting when he was a teenager, Ali Moertopo adept in the art of strategizing clandestine operations and gathering intelligence. He is notorious for being a cunning and manipulative operator who engages in behind-the-scenes deals. (Conboy, 151) Moertopo largely used indirect methods to execute his operations. (Cahyono, 7) Moertopo was ruthless when dealing with his opponents and he was not afraid to play dirty, for example by blackmailing, threatening with a gun or even tampering with documents. His trademark tactic is intimidating his opponents into submission. (​Knapp​, 87) Ali Moertopo is also known for his “can-do” attitude, (Wanandi, 68) a trait that definitely served Soeharto well in executing orders. His crass nature was also reflected in his lack of decorum, often speaking out of turn. But perhaps it is his boldness, coupled with a very rational brain and raw honesty, which earned him Soeharto’s trust as his right-hand man. Above all, Soeharto’s biggest asset in Moertopo has to be Moertopo’s unfailing loyalty towards people he respects. Fortunately for Soeharto, Moertopo respected him very early on their encounter and continued to do so as the years passed. 6 4: Key events 4.1: Borneo Confrontation 1963-1966 One of the first few things Ali Moertopo did after Soeharto was crowned Acting President was to swiftly, and quietly, end the “Confrontation” policy with Malaysia in 1966. Previously in 1963, Indonesia entered a violent conflict with the newly formed country of Malaysia, consisting of Malaya, Sarawak and Sabah (Singapore). During that time, President Soekarno saw the formation as a neo-colonialist effort by the British to corner Indonesia, and thus sent armed troops to encircle Malaysia on the Borneo border. Unfortunately, the battle was fought in jungle terrain, which forced the Indonesian forces to move largely on foot. As the war raged on, the British intervened on the side of Malaysia, causing heavier damage to the Indonesian Army. It is worth noting that the initial Indonesian forces comprised largely of local volunteers trained by the Indonesian Army, which meant that civilians were being sent into the battlegrounds, which have yet to prove any significant success by 1964. Mid-1965 saw tensions between the Indonesian Armed Forces and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) became more heated, especially approaching the days of G30S. General Yani, head of the Army command, was concerned about the growing incidents of PKI members infiltrating the Indonesian Armed Forces—especially the Air Force and Marines—and their insistence to Soekarno for allowing the establishment of a people’s army. (Wanandi, 67) Since most of the Indonesian army’s resources have been channeled towards the Confrontation effort, General Yani and Soeharto were worried of their defenses against the PKI, should conflict arise. 7 Additionally, the significance of ending Confrontation was because Soeharto believed that to successfully negotiate for financial aid from Western powers, he would need to prove that Indonesia was a cooperative player on the international platform. (Elson, 147) Ali Moertopo volunteered to see the end of Confrontation with Malaysia due to his Malaysian contact: Des Alwi, an Indonesian who was a close associate to Tun Abdul Razak, then Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia. Moertopo himself headed the meeting with Tan Stri Ghazali Shafie, then permanent secretary of Malaysia’s foreign office, in mid-July 1965. (Wanandi, 69) At first glance, it could be said that Moertopo was crucial for establishing a contact point in Malaysia, Des Alwi. However, Moertopo was not the only one who knew Des Alwi. Their first meeting occurred in 1960 when Moertopo was a chief of staff of the battalion led by General Yoga Sugama. Yoga’s troop was sent to fight the rebellion group Des Alwi was part of; instead, Yoga and Moertopo ended up befriending their enemies. (Wanandi, 68) Bearing this in mind, this means that Yoga was also acquainted with Des Alwi, and that Moertopo’s friendship with him was not exclusive. Thus, if not Moertopo, Sugama could have contacted Des Alwi and carried out a similar arrangement to end Confrontation. 8 4.2: MPRS Session 1968 Probably one of the most defining moments of Soeharto’s transition period were the days leading up to the 1968 People’s Consultative Assembly (MPRS) session. The MPRS was the most legitimate channel through which Soeharto would be recognized as the true leader of Indonesia. Should the MPRS authorize Soeharto’s leadership, his rule would be further strengthened because currently, Soeharto’s power originated from the Supersemar, which was a presidential decree that could be revoked at any time.
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