Cutting THE

BvCOMBINED JOINT OPERATIONSw FROM THEW SEA CENTREa OF EXCELLENCE e

2013 CJOS Published Works 2012

Supporting L.I.F.E. Apr 2013 A Warfighting Concept for A Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HADR) initiative, Littoral Sea Control Operations the L.I.F.E. (Logistics, Information, Force protection, This concept provides NATO maritime and joint commanders Expertise) concept provides a structured approach to improve an operational level doctrine for joint maritime warfighting in coordination between military and humanitarian organizations the littorals against a hybrid threat pursuing an anti-access/area during HADR operations. This concept provides the various denial strategy, while operating at strategic distance from the humanitarian partners with a better understanding of the level European continent. The concept scope is broad and focused of support they can expect from military units in the four on the doctrinal aspects of littoral sea control operations, while key L.I.F.E. domains. It also provides commanders with a providing an overview of the other elements of the Doctrine, structured approach to HADR operations and the basic tools to Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, plan and conduct their mission. CJOS COE has approached Facilities, and Interoperability (DOTMLPFI) format. numerous international agencies and incorporated their comments into this updated version to reflect the importance Alternate Command & Control of internationally recognized protocols and guidelines in natural and Staff Organization for Amphibious Operations and industrial disasters as well as complex emergencies. A white paper by CJOS COE, requested by the Royal Netherlands Navy, develops a concept reflecting contemporary A Framework for Enhanced International Maritime discussions within the amphibious community and proposes a Security Cooperation and Awareness leaner, smaller, and integrated C2 structure to better respond CJOS COE produced this White Paper based on a series of to the current operating environment. This concept provides Maritime Security Conferences, research and experience in an innovative C2 model which optimizes manpower while maritime security concept development. The White Paper maintaining capabilities. outlines and identifies the need for central governance and standards in order to coordinate efforts among various national/international organizations to establish an international framework for maritime security cooperation.

2 Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence NATO Guidance for Developing Autonomous Vessel Protections Maritime Unmanned Systems (MUS) Capability Detachments (AVPD) The guidance aims to inform the capability development of This white paper provides information to gain a common Maritime Unmanned Systems (MUS), broadening beyond that understanding of the requirements of AVPDs in order to currently being exploited by UAV into Unmanned Underwater safeguard shipping through waters where piracy maybe Vehicles (UUV) and Underwater Surface Vehicles (USV). It encountered. covers likely attributes and tasks for MUS, and discusses some Allied Interoperability Handbook V2 of the challenges in developing these capabilities. The Allied Interoperability Handbook was firstly published An Introduction to Joint Operations in 2010 and was created to provide guidance and advice on and from the Sea regarding the integration of Allied, or Coalition units into CJOS COE produced this “easy-to-read” handbook that US Navy sponsored exercises. The objective was to reduce highlights the significance and the possibilities of operating interoperability problems. In 2012 CJOS COE updated on and from the sea in support of joint and multinational the Handbook to produce Version Two. The new version operations. This expeditionary, sea-based capability provides updated the Lessons Learned Data Base, the preparedness joint force commanders the ability to initiate and conduct checklists, and added the Interoperability Metrics tool. The operations throughout the spectrum of force and is scalable enhanced checklists and the IM Tool provide a self measure from the deployment of a single ship to an entire fleet, of interoperability to permit units to reduce the common depending on the size and type of the operation. challenges before beginning operations.

Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence 3 Cutting THE Bv w Wa e 2013

DIRECTOR’S MESSAGE Collaboration is a virtue at Multi-National NATO Centre for Maritime Experiment – 7, 37 Research and Experimentation 39 Maritime Domain Message from the Director “Our role is to be a catalyst for CDR Patrick J. Cummings, USA-N VADM Michelle Howard 5 scientific work among the CJOS COE Project Officer for MNE-7 Director, Combined Joint Operations nations.” Combined Joint Operations from the Sea From the Sea Centre of Excellence Edward Lundquist Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE) Centre for Maritime Research and Norfolk, VA, USA Message from the Experimentation (CMRE) 7 Deputy Director La Spezia, Italy “Mental Models and their CDRE Stephen Chick Influence on the Concept Deputy Director, Combined Joint Operations 41 Development Process” From the Sea Centre of Excellence Exercise and experimentation CDR Linda M. Spangler – USA-N CJOS COE A View from the Reserves: Norfolk, VA, USA 9 CAPT Gordon Broz, USA-N CJOS COE’s Support to US Combined Joint Operations from the Sea 14 Joint forces Staff College’s BOLD ALLIGATOR 2012 Centre of Excellence Reserve Component Exercise Purple Solace Review Norfolk, Va, USA Commander Helmut Zimmermann, 36 CDR Pedro Fonseca, PRT-N DEU-N Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Section Head Strategy & Policy Analysis Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE) BUILDING MARITIME EXPERTISE Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Norfolk, VA, USA Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE) Norfolk, VA, USA MARSEC COE COMMUNICATION AND CYBER SECURITY CDR Sumer Kayser, TUR-N Alligator Conference 2012 29 Maritime Security Centre of Excellence (AC12) – Lisbon, Portugal 3 to (MARSEC COE) 25 5 October 2012 Aksaz Naval Base, Marmaris/Mugla, Enhancing Maritime Turkey Major Andrew Cross, GBR-RM Situational Awareness: Air Strike Force NATO (STKFORNATO) 16 And Space Power NMIOTC: The Credible NATO Lisbon/Oeiras, Portugal In Counter-Piracy MIO Expert Operations 22 High Level Decision Support Commodore Adrianos Poulos, in Maritime Interdiction Commander Roberto Petruzzi, ITA - N Joint Air Power Competence Centre HEL-N, Commandant 31 Operations: Complex NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational (JAPCC) Training Centre (NMIOTC) Experiments, Intelligent Kalkar, Germany Souda Bay Naval Base, Chania, Greece Reachback & Computational Supply Networks Alternative C2 Structure For Maritime Heinrich Buch, Senior Advisor The Commander Amphibious COMTESSA, Universität der Bundeswehr, Expeditionary Power: 26 Task Force And Commander 11 München, Germany Tailored, Scalable, Capability.... Prof. Dr. Alex Bordetsky, Professor, Landing Force from the sea CENETIX, Naval Postgraduate School, LCOL Gary Yuzichuk, CAN-A Col Jose Torres, Monterey, CA, USA Combined Joint Operations from the Sea ESP-Infanteria De Marina Goran Mihelcic, Fakultät für Informatik, Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE) Strike Force NATO (STRIKFORNATO) Universität der Bundeswehr, München, Norfolk, VA, USA Lisbon/Oeiras, Portugal Germany Prof. Dr. Stefan Pickl, Fakultät fur Informatik, Universität der Bundeswehr, München, Germany Venera Pjetraj, COMTESSA, Universität der Bundeswehr, München, Germany

3 Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence Common Littoral Sea 33 Design Standards, 35 Control Concepts Interoperability CDR Mark Coffman, USA-N and Data Fusion Combined Joint Operations from the Karna Bryan, Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE) NATO Science and Technology Norfolk, VA, USA Organization (STO) Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation (CMRE) La Spezia, Italy MARITIME SECURITY

JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS 2012 Maritime Security 20 Conference Review CDR Patrick J. Cummings, USN-N Allied/Coalition-USN MSC Project Officer Interoperability Combined Joint Operations from the 19 Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE) CDR Themistoklis Papadimitriou, Norfolk, VA, USA HEL-N CENTRES OF EXCELLENCE Combined Joint Operations from the FACT SHEET Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE) The Sad State of 49 Norfolk, VA, USA 43 Maritime Blindness Mr. Tim Dunne, MA, CD, APR 2012-2013 Prospective Halifax, CAN 50 Programme of Work 27 Operations in Confined and CAPT Peter Crain, CAN-N Shallow Waters Maritime Security CAPT Alberto Maffeis, ITA-N CDR Dierk Hansen, DEU-N Conference (MSC) Series CJOS COE CDR Volker Bruns, DEU-N 46 Report Norfolk, VA, USA Centre of Excellence Confined CDR Mahmut Karagoz, TUR-N and Shallow Water Combined Joint Operations from the Kiel, Germany Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE) CJOS COE DIRECTORY Norfolk, VA, USA 54

Publisher Note Cutting the Bow Wave is an annual Managing Editor: Assistant Editor: publication by Combined Joint Opera- CAPT Peter Crain LCDR Karl Rubis, NR CJOS COE tions from the Sea Centre of Excellence, [email protected] [email protected] United States Fleet Forces Command, Asst Managing Editor: Assistant Editor: Building NH-1S, Norfolk, Virginia. For CDR Patrick “Tater” Nash CDR P. J. Cummings copies and information, mail request to: [email protected] [email protected] CJOS COE Assistant Editor: Publication/Editing: ICO Bow Wave Editor CAPT Joseph Dipaola, Teagle and Little, Inc. 1562 Mitscher Ave Ste 250 NR CJOS COE Greg Jordan Norfolk, Va 23511. [email protected] Fil Mutschler

Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence 4 DIRECTOR’S MESSAGE

Message from the Director

Vice Admiral Michelle J. Howard, USA-N Director, Combined Joint Operations From the Sea Centre of Excellence

The Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE), now in its seventh year of operation, continues to serve the needs of the maritime community by providing maritime operations expertise and maritime security advice on a global scale. It has been a busy year, with several works being published on topics ranging from Joint Sea Basing to Maritime Unmanned Systems to Littoral Sea Control. The highlight of 2012 was the Maritime Security Conference held in June. This event played host to over 250 attendees representing military, business and international organizations from around the globe. Since assuming duties as Deputy Commander, United States Fleet Forces Command and Director of CJOS COE in August 2012, I have been reminded of the important work and perspectives that a talented and motivated group of international officers can bring to the maritime community. Building on the successes achieved by my predecessor, Vice Admiral David Preparing our nations and their navies Buss, U.S. Fleet Forces Command continues to address these challenges will require to work closely with the CJOS COE team to the combined and collective efforts of improve interoperability with our NATO and NATO members and our allies. international partners though joint exercises and integration opportunities. We are in the midst of a changing global maritime environment that includes emerging cyber and energy threats as well as traditional and developing maritime security issues. Against this background, global partners are operating under constrained defense budgets due to the ongoing stagnant economic climate. Preparing our nations and their navies to address these challenges will require the combined and collective efforts of NATO members and our allies. Going forward, I expect CJOS COE to continue to play a key leadership role within the maritime community and provide solution-oriented ideas that address our shared concerns. n

Vice-Admiral David H. Buss served as the Director of the CJOS COE from September 2011 until August 2012. Under his leadership, CJOS COE produced the Humanitarian Assistance Guidance: Navy Supports L.I.F.E, a handbook on Joint Sea Basing that later transitioned into a draft NATO concept and a White paper on global maritime security information sharing. His vision was instrumental in moving CJOS COE to the forefront of the maritime community. VADM Buss is now Commander, Naval Air Forces and Commander, Naval Air Force, U.S Pacific Fleet. We here at CJOS wish him well in his new appointment and thank him for his dedication and leadership. Fair winds and following seas!

5 Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence CJOS Mission CJOS Vision Working in conjunction with the Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces To become the pre-eminent source Command Staff, CJOS COE will provide a focus for the sponsoring of innovative specialist advice and nations and NATO in improving allied ability to conduct combined recognized expertise on all multinational joint operations from the sea in order to ensure that current and aspects of combined joint operations emerging global security challenges can be successfully solved. from the sea in support of the sponsoring nations, NATO, and other allies.

Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence 6 DEPUTY DIRECTOR’S MESSAGE

Message from the Deputy Director Commodore S. J. Chick CBE, GBR-N Deputy Director, Combined Joint Operations From the Sea Centre of Excellence

s I sit and watch the effects of the in 2025 is either in service today or under that we must identify options for our political current global economic downturn construction — our challenge is to use it masters that achieves the required end state A on nations, and in particular their more flexibly and more effectively — it is the in a cost effective, agile, collaborative and military, it is very evident that we must mitigate classic ways ends and means equation with environmentally friendly way. some of the impact through innovation and the political appetite for the ends unlikely to Whilst CJOS COE’s main effort in recent collaboration. The following articles I trust reduce. Not one to rest on laurels, we must years has, rightly, been Maritime Security, I will demonstrate that both are present. As do better and grasp every opportunity. As we believe it is now time to place more emphasis the majority of equipment that we will have look ahead, post Afghanistan I am convinced on the other three tasks identified in the Allied Maritime Strategy. The Joint Sea Base is well placed to meet much of the activity demanded The benefit gained by being embedded with the USN and by these tasks, but it needs us to challenge the collocated with NATO ACT is very evident, as is the warm norm, to recognize that the maritime area of interest does not stop at the high water mark; relationships established with fellow Centres of Excellence and the debate should not be about ownership, but other organizations — several of whom have contributed to about adapting the sea base to accommodate this publication. joint assets, that together deliver joint effects. Maritime Security still features strongly in

U.S. Marines with the Maritime Raid Force, 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) conduct a simu- lated casualty evacuation during a visit, board, search and seizure training exercise with Sailors assigned to the amphibious transport dock ship USS New Orleans (LPD 18) Oct. 1, 2011, in the Pacific Ocean. New Orleans and the 11th MEU conducted pre-deployment work-ups as part of the Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Dominique Pineiro/Released)

7 Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence our programme of work, although it has been wave who wish to be more involved please do decided to take an operational pause with the not hesitate to contact CJOS COE. annual conference, as we gather our thoughts and allow momentum to gather on what has Who We Are and How We already been established. Scoping work is Accomplish Our Mission: underway on the implications of cyber warfare to Maritime Security, which I suspect will have In May 2006, the Combined Joint read across to other elements of our work. Operations from the Sea, Centre of Excellence As only a small team of 25, ably supported (CJOS COE) was established to provide a by a USN Reserve unit, collaboration is focal point for Joint Maritime Expeditionary fundamental to the CJOS COE. A network Operations expertise for allied nations. of parties interested in the maritime brings a Headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia, CJOS breadth of experience and intellect, and ensures COE is comprised of representatives from our products are wholesome, understanding 13 nations and is the only NATO accredited cultural, commercial and regional viewpoints. It Centre of Excellence within the United States. is also essential to one of CJOS COE’s enduring We are one of 18 NATO accredited COEs How We Are Tasked: mandates of interoperability; in maritime worldwide, representing a collective wealth of Shortfalls in current maritime operations, where the coalition is one of the international naval experience and expertise. capabilities/procedures are identified willing, we need to ensure that our concepts CJOS COE draws on the knowledge and by ACT and NATO, who then request and doctrine accommodate as many factors as capabilities of U.S. Fleet Forces Command CJOS COE’s support as reflected possible, and that we train accordingly — it headquarters, as well as neighboring U.S. in our Annual Programme of Work is not just about connectivity. The benefit commands to promote common “best (POW), approved by the CJOS gained by being embedded with the USN and practices” within the Alliance, and to aid COE’s Steering Committee. CJOS collocated with NATO ACT is very evident, as NATO’s transformational goals with respect to COE’s POW 2012 contained a wide is the warm relationships established with fellow maritime-based joint operations. We cooperate spectrum of proposals with strong Centres of Excellence and other organizations closely with Allied Command Transformation focus on interoperability of global — several of whom have contributed to this (ACT), other NATO maritime COEs, NATO allies, maritime security initiatives, publication. There is though, undoubtedly Joint Force Commands, and various national and working to deliver coherent a need to reach out further, to develop more commands. Our value is achieved by shortening operational Concept of Operations robust relationships with sponsoring nations NATO decision cycles between the COE staff (CONOPS). Our aim is to become and maritime commands, draw in academia and and individual Sponsoring Nations’ key experts a pre-eminent source of innovative develop links outside of the traditional NATO by setting up focal points of contact within military advice on combined joint region. For those readers of Cutting the Bow these nations. n operations from the sea. We continue to raise our profile by collaborating with high profile, leading edge institutions, publishing high quality, well researched products, and validating them through experimentation and exercise. This is made possible through our close relationship with U.S. Fleet Forces Command which provides the appropriate validation opportunities, thus making maximum benefit of our unique position embedded in their command structure. We continue to work with non-military entities to leverage existing knowledge and expertise to share best practices on maritime issues to further enhance global maritime security.

Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence 8 A VIEW FROM THE RESerVES

A View From The Reserves CAPT Gordon Broz, USA-N Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence Reserve Component Norfolk, Va, USA

Seamless Support – was assumed that the interval between activa- members and were no longer hampered by ge- CJOS US Navy Reserve tion and a “shooting war” would permit ad- ography or time. Naval Reserve CJOS COE provides seam- equate time for the mobilization process and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Op- less, fully integrated direct support dedicated acclimation to active duty for personnel and eration Enduring Freedom (OEF) presented to the CJOS COE mission. Currently led by units. For decades this was the accepted role new opportunities and challenges for the US Captain Gordon Broz, the unit consists of 4 of the US Navy Reserve with World War II Navy Reserve. Since 9/11, Navy Reserve per- Enlisted and 16 Officer personnel. As a part serving as a real world example. sonnel combined with other reserve service of US Fleet Forces Command, Naval Reserve The end of the Cold War, budget pres- branches have represented over fifty percent CJOS COE operates with US and NATO sures, and asymmetrical threats required a of all deployed personnel in the combat the- active duty counterparts as a model of inte- change in the structure and use of Navy Re- ater of operations. Without ties to specific gration, blurring the imaginary line between serve resources. Hardware units with their hardware units, it is not uncommon for in-

The Navy Reserve CJOS COE Unit is a model for Active Reserve Integration (ARI). The unit offers a unique combination of military and civilian experience. For a unit that is designed to develop global maritime strategy, there are many benefits. Among the Naval Reserve CJOS COE unit members are attorneys, sales executives, contractors, entrepreneurs, and project managers representing Department of Defense, manufacturing, telecommunications, health care, and other sectors of the economy. active and reserve sailors, working jointly side- large budgets for training and maintenance, dividual reserve sailors to fill designated roles by-side on Programmes of Work, conferences, along with their support and command com- in either OIF or OEF. Former Naval Reserve and joint exercises. ponents, had to be transformed. US Reserve CJOS COE Reserve Commanding Officer The United States Navy Reserve, previ- forces were evaluated and restructured on the Captain Jamie Pierce (currently deployed as ously, was structured to augment active duty basis of their ability to support and integrate the Afghanistan Air Force Liaison Officer) is forces to defeat Cold War adversaries. Reserve with existing active-duty components. The an example of this type of support. In the units were designed to operate independently only hardware units that remained in the new structure, his civilian and past military and were usually built around platforms and order of battle were those that maintained experience was identified and he was subse- hardware connections. Reserve squadrons a specific mission specialty not performed quently mobilized to support a specific senior and ships were wholly manned with Navy in the active force, such as small boat / lit- role for OEF. In a period of less than 7 weeks, Reservists. Cross connect with the active toral operations or helicopter special opera- he went from civilian / drilling reservist to de- force occurred at the Echelon level with few tions support. Active Reserve Integration ployed active duty in Afghanistan. This level opportunities for active-duty reserve integra- (ARI) was the label for how the Navy Re- of responsiveness was not possible before ARI. tion. Conventional wisdom held that in time serve would operate in the 21st century. Ad- Thousands of Individual Augumentees (IAs) of increasing tension and hostility, US Navy ditionally, new technologies permitted flexible have provided substantive support for both Reserve hardware units would be activated. It drilling and information sharing between unit OEF and OIF over the last decade.

9 Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence The Navy Reserve CJOS COE Unit is a ing of the CJOS COE annual publication of COE for a specific extended time frame. model for Active Reserve Integration (ARI). “Cutting The Bow Wave”. Alignment throughout the Chain of The unit offers a unique combination of The fundamental structural change in Command is critical to successful employment military and civilian experience. For a unit the management and operation of the US of US Navy Reserve resources. The CJOS that is designed to develop global maritime Navy Reserve aligns effectively with the mis- COE team excels at recognizing the strategy, there are many benefits. Among the sion of CJOS COE. US Navy Reservists are capabilities of the Reserve team. By treating Naval Reserve CJOS COE unit members are dedicated to their commitment to military the Reserve Unit as an extension of the active attorneys, sales executives, contractors, entre- service while managing family and civilian duty component, the line between active and preneurs, and project managers representing work responsibilities. Often separated by geo- reserve is effectively blurred as intended in Department of Defense, manufacturing, tele- graphic distance from their parent command, the shift to Active Reserve Integration (ARI). communications, health care, and other sec- today’s reserve member relies on technol- The Navy Reserve CJOS COE Unit will strive tors of the economy. These civilian roles and ogy to maintain a connection with the unit. to enhance the quality of output from CJOS experiences enhance the diversity of input, Long term projects with definitive deadlines, COE by supporting projects where their and augment their warfare specialties provid- clear expectations, which can be completed experience and availability are best utilized to ed to CJOS COE. The Reserve unit is struc- remotely, are well suited for the services that accomplish the mission. n tured to support each Programme of Work. US Navy Reservists can render. Some mem- Additionally, Reserve members participate in bers of the reserve CJOS COE Unit have also For more information about the US Naval exercises and author point papers to provide participated with their active-duty counter- Reserve, please visit www.navyreserve.com. For direct support to the CJOS COE mission. parts for longer periods of active duty when information specifically about the CJOS COE Behind the scenes, the reserve unit was instru- necessary. These Active Duty for Training Naval Reserve component, visit www.cjoscoe.org/ mental in orchestrating logistical components (ADT) and Active Duty for Special Work cjosnrco.html or CAPT Broz may be contacted at of the Maritime Security Conference in 2012 (ADSW) intervals permit individual reserv- [email protected]. and critical to the development and publish- ists to focus on an activity or project for CJOS

Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence 10 BUILDING MARITIME EXPERTISE

Col Jose Torres, ESP-Infanteria De Marina Strike Force NATO (STRIKFORNATO) Lisbon/Oeiras, Portugal Maritime Expeditionary Power Tailored, Scalable, Capability....from the sea

TRIKFORNATO, Naval Striking and Historical Overview Easter Mediterranean, including the Adriatic, Support Forces NATO (SFN) is NA- SFN was created in 1952 when Com- Ionian, Aegean and Black Seas. A primary task S TO’s premier Maritime Battlestaff and mander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Eu- of SFS naval units in all out war would be to the Alliance’s primary link for integrating US rope (CINCSOUTH) ordered the establish- participate in the SACEUR counter-offensive Maritime Forces into NATO operations. ment of a new command titled, Commander, by launching deep conventional air attacks or Managed by a Memorandum of Under- Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern close air support missions in conjunction with standing comprising of 11 Nations, SFN is a Europe (COMSTRIKFORSOUTH – origi- any amphibious operations, serving as a major rapidly deployable, Maritime Headquarters that provides scalable command and control across the full spectrum of Alliance fundamen- Within an evolving strategic context, STRIKFORNATO remains tal security tasks. It is also the natural link to ready to deploy rapidly with optimized capabilities to plan, bring US Navy & Marine assets into NATO command, and control maritime operations across the full chain of command. spectrum of Alliance missions and act as a joint commander for Its logo is a shield with the Trident and maritime / expeditionary operations for small joint operations. the NATO Star. The blue section in the shield represents the sea as we deliver military effects from the sea on the land, the green part of the nal title of SFN). The Commander was also advisor to AFSOUTH and SHAPE in the area shield. The gauntlet represents our strength and the Commander of the U.S. SIXTH FLEET, of Nuclear Strike Planning in response to the the trident stands for the three forms of SFN’s a dual assignment that continues to this day. Soviet naval build-up in the Mediterranean. Power Projection ashore: Cruise Missiles, Am- The SRIKFORSOUTH (SFS) area of respon- In 1970s and 1980s, SFS assured the read- phibious Operations and Aircraft Carrier Op- sibility encompassed the entire Mediterranean iness of NATO’s maritime power projection erations. theatre, from the Straits of Gibraltar to the forces in the Southern Region, to include land

(Above) USS Mount Whitney (LCC/JCC 20) leads a formation of ships from 12 different countries through the Baltic Sea June 8, 2009, during the exercise Baltic Operations (BALTOPS) 2009. BALTOPS is an annual exercise hosted by the United States and is intended to improve interoperability with partner nations by conducting realistic training at sea. (DoD photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Michael Rumbach, U.S. Navy/Released)

11 Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence missions, by planning and conducting large- scale NATO amphibious exercises. In the 1990s, SFS was directly responsible for developing and refining the Multinational Amphibious Task Force (MNATF) concept. These TF were high readiness, multi-purpose forces, which were task organized and support- ed by several nations. Also, SFS contributed to AFSOUTH operations in Kosovo by providing planning support and liaison officers. In 1998 Staff personnel established the Kosovo Verification Coordination Centre in the former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedo- nia. During Operation ALLIED FORCE, the first high intensity air campaign conducted by NATO, COMSTRIKFORSOUTH assumed command of NATO Carrier Forces. In 1999, following the reorganization of the NATO Command Structure, SFS moved from the Command Structure to the NATO Force Structure. CINCSOUTH refined SFS operational focus and named it the Regional Re- action Force, acting in response to moves within NATO towards the creation of High Readiness, Rapidly Deployable forces capable of operating beyond the immediate boundaries of NATO. From 1999 to 2004 SFS participated in NATO training, exercises and planning activities, but its status in NATO was still unclear.

Changing the focus: from STRIKFORSOUTH to STRIKFORNATO On 01 July 2004, after the US, as lead na- tion, declared SFS a NATO force, the title was changed to STRIKFORNATO (SFN), and its responsibility was broadened to cover the entire NATO Area of Responsibility. Consequently on 17 August 2004, SFN moved from Allied Joint Force Command Naples Operational Control to Supreme Allied U.S. Navy members of the visit, board, search and seizure team from guided-missile destroyer USS Forrest Command Europe Operational Control. The Sherman (DDG 98) return to the ship June 11, 2009, after participating in a boarding training exercise member nations USA (lead nation), Germany, during Baltic Operations 2009 in the Baltic Sea. (U.S. Navy photo/Released) Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Turkey and UK accepted SFN as a NATO Expanded Task From January to July 2008 in the ISAF the JTF Commander for the US-hosted multi- Force (ETF), and it was certified as a 3-star XI rotation, SHAPE directed SFN to act as a lateral Exercise BALTOPS. In Feb 2011, SFN Maritime Component Command (at ETF nucleus of the ISAF SHQ Staff. served at the 2-star Coalition Maritime Com- level) after the execution of Exercise ALLIED From January to July 2009, and after ponent Commander for the USS GEORGE ACTION-05. The SFN MOU was opened to successfully completing certification Exercise H. W. BUSH Carrier Strike Group Joint Task other NATO nations and two members, France STEADFAST JUNCTURE 08 in November Force Exercise. and Poland, elected to join SFN, 2008, SFN served as the 2-star NATO Re- At the onset of the Libya crisis, SFN On 1 August 2006 - SACEUR, General sponse Force MCC for NRF 12. In 2010, SFN provided planning support to JFC Naples as James L. Jones, declared SFN at Full Opera- served as the Higher Control for Exercises BAL- they developed draft OPLANS in prepara- tional Capability (FOC). TIC HOST and EMERALD MOVE and as tion for the possibility of a NATO-led opera-

Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence 12 tion in Libya. SFN personnel, under national Alliance Fundamental Security Tasks, including tory with little or no host nation support and to authorities, also augmented the JTF and the maritime Expanded Task Force operations and sustain those operations for extended periods. US-led JFMCC staff for Operation ODYSSEY maritime-heavy small joint operations within This requires forces that are fully deployable, DAWN. These responsibilities included posi- the Euro-Atlantic region or at strategic reach. including the means by which they are de- tions as Deputy Commander JFMCC, Liaison SFN assists in the enhancement of Alli- ployed, sustainable and interoperable and the Officers to France and the UK, and targeting ance and Partner nations’ maritime capabilities means to deploy them. It also requires a fully and intelligence experts. and joint interoperability through training and coordinated and, where appropriate, multina- Throughout the NATO Libya operation, cooperative action. tional approach to logistic support, avoiding up to sixty percent of the SFN staff fulfilled SFN will contribute effectively to the de- dependence on local resources. key appointments in Combined Joint Task terrence of aggression against Alliance members The New Strategic Concept, from Lisbon Force Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR, and if deterrence fails, contribute towards the summit 2010 highlighted the need to sustain until its successful termination by NATO setting of conditions for a favourable outcome concurrent major joint operations and sev- Secretary General on 31 October 2011. SFN of the crisis. eral smaller operations for collective defence provided the bulk of the Current Operations Battle Watch Captains, maritime and air watch officers, formed and led the 1-star Ground SFN will contribute effectively to the deterrence of Effects Cell (GEC) to provide the Commander aggression against Alliance members and if deterrence fails, and staff with ground situational awareness, contribute towards the setting of conditions for a favourable staffed national intelligence cells, the Joint Synchronisation and Execution Cell and outcome of the crisis. provided the Deputy Directors for Targeting, GEC, Support, and Operations as well as Core Roles and crisis response, including at strategic dis- the POLAD and the Deputy Commander tance, identifying the requirement to further To accomplish this mission, SFN will re- Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR. develop doctrine and military capabilities for main ready to serve as: In November, the reconstituted SFN staff expeditionary operations, including counter- 1. A deployable Joint Force Maritime successfully executed Exercise STEADFAST insurgency, stabilization and reconstruction Component Command at Expanded JUNCTURE as the 2-star MCC, to become operations. Task Force Level for Article V and accredited for NRF duties in 2012 and suc- In the last Chicago Summit, May 2012, non-Article V operations. cessfully served as the JTF Commander for the NATO agreed to ensure that the Alliance 2. A deployable and scalable Joint Force US-hosted multilateral Exercise BALTOPS 12 continues to have the capabilities needed to Maritime Component Command at between 31 May and 16 June 2012. perform the essential core tasks to which they Sub-Expanded Task Force level. As a part of the NATO Command Struc- have committed in the Strategic Concept. To 3. A deployable Joint Task Force Com- ture Reform, SFN relocated its Headquarters that end, NATO endorsed the Defence Pack- mand for Maritime / Expeditionary from Naples, Italy to Lisbon, Portugal in sum- age for the Chicago Summit, outlining a vi- Joint Operations. mer 2012. Portugal joined SFN as its 11th sion and a clear way forward towards the goal member and Host Nation. SFN became fully SFN will be ready also to carry out the of NATO Forces 2020. A new structure will operational in Lisbon as of 01 August 2012. Support Roles by providing: support this endeavour and as a part of the 1. Training Support: Supporting Al- establishment of the new force structure, SFN Vision & Mission lied Command Operations and Allied changed its homeport from Naples to Lisbon. Within an evolving strategic context, Command Transformation integra- In meeting these objectives and to STRIKFORNATO remains ready to deploy tion objectives for partner and other achieve the NATO declared level of ambi- rapidly with optimized capabilities to plan, com- nations‘ staff and forces. tion, SFN can provide a fully deployable, high mand, and control maritime operations across 2. Subject Matter Expert Support: readiness Maritime Expeditionary Headquar- the full spectrum of Alliance missions and act as Supporting Supreme Allied ters capable of commanding operations across a joint commander for maritime/expeditionary Commander Europe and Supreme the full spectrum of the Alliance security tasks, operations for small joint operations. Allied Commander Transformation by from a CJTF MCC role to a Joint Task Force SFN will develop, sustain and advance a educating, supporting, and providing Commander for a small joint operation in a mature relationship with US Navy and Marine expertise to NATO headquarters staffs maritime expeditionary environment. Corps to ensure its ability to integrate US mari- and operations. This is what STRIKFORNATO stands time forces into Alliance operations. for after 60 years of high value service rendered The impact of NATO transformation n The SFN mission is to provide a rapidly to NATO. deployable joint but predominantly maritime In Riga 2006, NATO identified the need headquarters to plan, command, and control to conduct and support multinational joint You may view the STRIKFORNATO web maritime operations across the full spectrum of expeditionary operations far from home terri- page at www.sfn.nato.int

13 Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence EXERCISE AND EXPERIMENtATION

CJOS COE’s Support to US Joint forces Staff College’s Exercise Purple Solace

Commander Helmut Zimmermann, DEU-N \Section Head Strategy & Policy Analysis Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE) Norfolk, VA, USA

Introduction and recognized expertise on the multinational One component of CJOS COE’s Pro- aspects of Combined Joint Operations from gramme of Work (POW) is a commitment to the Sea. providing up to three international staff of- ficers to participate in Exercise Purple Solace US Joint Forces Staff College’s Mission Joint Forces Staff College, as a compo- Prior to the start of the Purple Solace exercise, students are nent of the US National Defense University acquainted with applying concepts relating to international (NDU), is a military institution for educating humanitarian response mechanisms and to constraints in national security professionals involved in the assessing US government response to a crisis. planning and execution of joint operations. The JFSC programme educates staff officers (US and international) in the planning and (PS), a three day training exercise at US Joint execution of joint, multinational, and inter- Forces Staff College (JFSC, Norfolk, VA), to agency operations and instills a commitment support the joint and combined operational to joint, multinational, and interagency team- planning curriculum. Participation in all Pur- work, attitudes, and perspectives. ple Solace exercises conducted at JFSC is in The exercise format for Purple Solace keeping with the CJOS COE mission of be- is specifically designed to place emphasis coming a source of innovative specialist advice on military planning interaction with other

Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence 14 U.S. Government agencies such as the State SUPPORTS L.I.F.E. (http://cjoscoe.org/ma- that arose during the exercise; and, Department and USAID, as well as the na- jorwork.html). the requirements for, and authorities tional, international, and intergovernmental involved in, a U.S. governmental re- elements. The exercise emphasizes the interac- Objectives and Achievements sponse to a natural disaster. tion, coordination and consensus building re- Prior to the start of the Purple Solace ex- CJOS COE Participation quired to execute a mission and is less focused ercise, students are acquainted with applying on the actual planning product or deliverable. concepts relating to international humanitar- Participation in this exercise provides the ian response mechanisms and to constraints in unique opportunity to interact with many US The Purple Solace Exercise assessing US government response to a crisis. Armed Forces Staff Officers of all branches and Purple Solace is a three day, faculty guided After the panel discussion, the audience breaks from numerous commands to provide them planning exercise which reinforces the initial into groups where students learn how to cat- an overview of a comprehensive approach to steps necessary to derive a mission statement egorize the contribution of U.S military and coalition-building and civil-military planning. and a Commander’s intent (end state) and a non-U.S. military capabilities during a crisis. The students realize that the military is only limited Concept of Operations in response to a Additionally, they are tasked with designing one actor among several key partnerships with series of natural disasters. For the exercise, CJOS a comprehensive approach to a disaster in a civilian actors that have experience and skills COE representatives join a notional USEAST- foreign nation using Crisis Action Planning in areas such as institution building, develop- COM Headquarters with the mission to com- (CAP). As a result, they are able to explain the ment, governance, judiciary and policing. Prior to the start of the Purple Solace exercise, students are acquainted with applying concepts relating to international humanitarian response mechanisms and to constraints in assessing US government response to a crisis. mence planning efforts in response to a rapidly processes and complexities of an international CJOS COE’s participation in Purple Sol- developing humanitarian crisis in West Africa. response to a natural disaster. Participants also ace reinforces CJOS COE’s continuing work The governments of Cameroon, Gabon and learn to synthesize key elements of strategic on HA/DR. Student and staff attentions are Equatorial Guinea have notionally appealed to communications during a crisis. The semi- channeled to injecting “international” experi- the UN, US and other willing countries to assist nar work culminates in assessing the depth ence on Policy-Military related issues when in conducting search and rescue missions and of knowledge of a paired group by receiving a forging a coalition plan and thereby exchang- to relieve human suffering. The augmenting briefing on a mock deliverable. These seminar ing international views concerning experienc- staff officers, representing the coalition forces cross-briefings demonstrate the following: es in HA/DR mission planning. This serves pledged by their respective countries, ensure to promote the level of cooperation and make their forces are properly included in the op- • the selection of the most appropriate an international contribution to a US-led op- erational plans within the caveats identified by approach; eration more valuable. each country. Additionally, they provide coun- • the defense of the group’s devised op- Joint Forces Staff College students be- sel on forging a coalition in a multinational and erational design/approach; come more aware of coalition capabilities and intergovernmental environment. • an evaluation of the contributions of are exposed to interests beyond those of the One of CJOS COE’s international staff coalition members, categorization of US. Students seek a comprehensive, coalition officers participates in the panel discussion participant contributions; and interagency perspective capitalizing on representing the “kick-off” for a Purple Solace • an assessment of the deployment and the increased legitimacy and capabilities avail- exercise. The goal of the panel discussion is to employment timelines; able through multinational and interagency understand the roles of key US Government • an explanation of how U.S. and co- efforts and teamwork. CJOS COE’s support interagency participants in the Foreign Hu- alition military assets would be inte- to Purple Solace provides a high level opportu- manitarian Assistance (FHA) process as well as grated; nity to broaden CJOS COE staff’s professional the roles of key international partners, agen- • the defense of proposed command, development related to planning an HA/DR cies, and non-governmental institutions in the control and coordination concepts; and operation. FHA process. The CJOS COE task is to instill • explanation of: the roles and capa- the experiences in a natural disaster relief op- bilities of international governmental CDR Zimmermann is the Strategy and Poli- eration from a non-US point of view and to organizations (IGOs) and non-gov- cy Analysis Section Head at CJOS COE. He may deliver a short brief on one of its major Pro- ernmental organizations (NGOs); be contacted at [email protected]. View the gramme of Work items: “HADR (Humani- the unique processes and complexi- CJOS COE HA/DR guidance “L.I.F.E. at www. tarian Assistance / Disaster Relief) – NAVY ties of international disaster response cjoscoe.org

15 Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence COMMUNICATIONS AND CYBER SECURItY

Enhancing Maritime Situational Awareness: Air And Space Power In Counter-Piracy Operations

Commander Roberto Petruzzi, ITA - N Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC) Kalkar, Germany

Introduction reach and global impact. It is commonly rec- be controlled. In 2011, Major General Buster ognized that a comprehensive approach is re- Howes, Operational Commander of EUNAV- The creation and preservation of Mari- quired to obtain a real and decisive answer to FOR, stated: “If you wanted to have a one-hour time Security (MS) is crucial for the Alliance. defeat piracy. This multi-dimensional method, response time in that huge stretch of ocean, you In addition to ensuring a secure and safe mari- already in place, is intended to bring together would need 83 helicopter-equipped destroyers time environment, it upholds the principle of coherent and effective military, foreign affairs, or frigates.” Due to the costs involved and the freedom of navigation and the protection of the humanitarian aid and economic development current state of the world economy, it is very Allies’ and global maritime security interests. policy strands. While initiatives by internation- unlikely that such force would be generated to An essential condition in achieving MS is al organizations’ continue ashore for increased fight piracy off the HoA. Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA). MSA governance and capacity building, a simulta- For these circumstances, continuous or is the enabling capability which delivers the neous and correlated military action at sea is semi-continuous wide-area surveillance is neces- required Information Superiority in the mari- needed. sary to locate potential pirate safe havens, since time environment to achieve a common under- Increased patrols and proactive efforts by early detection of impending attacks increases standing of the maritime situation in order to warships (together with improved self-protec- the likelihood that avoidance, suppression or increase effectiveness in the planning and con- tion measures by mariners) have drastically re- pre-emptive measures will succeed. A wide area duct of operations. In simple words, the better duced the number of piracy incidents, but have surveillance system would require specific tools one’s MSA, the more effectively one can detect, not stopped piracy. Warships offer much to the for detection, identification and tracking. Pi- evaluate and counter maritime and maritime- CP effort. Their inherent flexibility, endurance rate skiffs are not easy to detect in the open sea based threats. and reach, are key components of a true end- and at long range (especially for surface sensors) to-end CP capability. Their effect, however, since they are mainly small wooden craft with a Somali Piracy as a case study is highly influenced by different factors. These low radar signature. Identification is also quite The clearest example of the importance of include the vast area of CP operations and the challenging. Pirate mother ships and skiffs are this capability is provided by Counter-Piracy intrinsic characteristics of the ‘enemy’. common sailing vessels in the CP area and due (CP) operations off the Horn of Africa (HoA). It is quite clear that the area in which to lack of clear combatant indicators, it is not Somali piracy is a local problem with regional pirates currently operate is simply too vast to immediately possible to distinguish them from

Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence 16 COMMUNICATIONS AND CYBER SECURItY

ployment of a composite ‘system of systems’, legitimate fishing, or transport vessels. Finally, in which all components provide different or pirate craft remain at sea in remote regions for SPACE ASSETS common capabilities and are necessarily com- a long time; hence tracking of a suspect pirate plementary to each other for the accomplish- vessel requires sensor coverage for extended HALE UAVs ment of the ISR mission and the enhancement periods. of MSA. Moreover, this CONOPS provides the advantage of reducing the patrol burden on Why Air & Space Power warships, allowing them to pre-position to ar- in CP operations? AWACS/MPAs eas of interest, which improves deterrence and Despite significant commitment to the CP increases the probability of successful intercept mission, surface assets do not entirely match of Pirate Action Groups (PAGs). the requirements dictated by the operational MPAs This CONOPS places Space assets, High environment. Even if one takes account of the Altitude Long Endurance Unmanned Aerial many contributions from coalition task forces TUAVs Vehicles (HALE UAVs) and Airborne Warning (NATO, European Union, Combined Mari- and Control System (AWACS) high-to-medi- time Force) and national task forces (e.g. China, um orbit, Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPAs) and Iran, India), the scale of the CP task remains Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (TUAV) in daunting. a medium-to-low orbit, with warships on pa- An alternate and effective way for the im- PAG trol carrying organic helicopters either in flight provement of MSA is to implement Air and or on alert. Assets are then able to mutually Space (A&S) Power in coordination with sur- support one another in a series of cross-cueing, face assets in CP operations. Figure: Multi-layered ISR CONOPS for A&S which typically flows from high to low. The air environment is contiguous and assets in CP operations Space-based and air-based Automatic overlays the land and maritime environments, Identification System (AIS) information can and air, land and sea all are enveloped by space. the ubiquity of air platforms could generate de- be collected to provide the basis of a real time, A&S Power is therefore uniquely pervasive and terrence and discourage acts of piracy. high resolution picture of cooperating maritime offers the prospect of free access to any point A&S Power could provide the necessary shipping. This basic picture can be further en- on or above the Earth, with the opportunity Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance hanced for military use by the employment of to observe and decisively influence operations (ISR) capability to discriminate the ‘abnormal sensors embarked on both manned and un- in other environments. In the CP scenario, the behaviors’ at sea. The synergistic use of A&S manned air assets, providing raw contact data military use of air and space would provide a assets could substantially contribute to the of non-cooperating vessels to command nodes, perspective over the whole CP region, ensuring building of the Recognized Maritime Picture both ashore and at sea. the necessary wide-area surveillance capability. (RMP), which would increase MSA, providing Comparing AIS information with data The intrinsic elevation, persistency and pene- alerts for mariners as well as timely and tacti- from other sensors (Synthetic Aperture Ra- tration characteristics of A&S Power would also cally valuable information to Commanders at dar, maritime radar, optical, infrared, etc.) greatly enhance the capability to detect, identify sea. This would ultimately increase the speed allows the detection of potential irregularities and track suspected pirates, even if operating in of response for merchant vessels (e.g. alter and discrimination of ‘abnormal behaviors’. remote areas and outside the range of surface course and change speed, initiate protective/ NATO AWACS and modern MPAs are key (shore-based or sea-based) sensors. Moreover, defensive measures, request assistance) and im- enablers in this role and can merge commer- prove the employment of warships (e.g. escort cial AIS data with their own organic picture of vulnerable vessels, shadowing pirate vessels, on board to give a complete ‘contact’ plot all MSA is the enabling interception of Pirate Action Groups, disrup- vessels at sea in specifically designated regions. capability which delivers tion of attacks). Digital LINK networks can disseminate the information, providing a common operating the required Information A&S ISR Concept of Operations in CP picture to CP units. HALE UAVs will offer Superiority in the maritime a similar capability in addition to the advan- environment to achieve a To deliver actionable intelligence via A&S Power in CP, a multi-layered ISR Concept of tages of a much extended endurance and high common understanding Operations (CONOPS) should be adopted resolution imagery capability. of the maritime situation (see figure). At this point, an additional layer is re- in order to increase This CONOPS requires a ‘sensor oriented quired to provide target identification and approach’. Given the assumption that combin- track correlation. The deployment of MPAs or effectiveness in the planning TUAVs (eventually equipped with Full Motion and conduct of operations. ing sensors reveals a more complete picture, it implies the synergistic and orchestrated em- Video) ensures the collection of further infor-

17 Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence of A&S assets would be quite challenging. A substantial A&S Power contribution in the maritime environment for the enhancement of MSA would clearly require the presence of an Air Component Commander (ACC) support- ing the Maritime Component Commander (MCC). Given that the military action mainly occurs at sea and the potentially extensive em- ployment of air assets, stronger ACC-MCC li- aison relationships should be established prior to the execution of this CONOPS. Additionally, complex multinational and multidimensional scenarios (as in CP) would involve additional levels of liaison in order to guarantee coordination of forces belonging to different nations/coalitions. Integrated naval and air communication systems and a tailored network should also be implemented to fos- U.S. Navy Intelligence Specialist 1st Class Carlos E. Cruz monitors automatic identification systems aboard ter information sharing by enabling ‘synapsis’ the aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) while in the Arabian Sea Sept. 28, 2011. George among forces for the construction of the neces- H.W. Bush was deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility on its first operational deployment sary operational picture for Commanders of dif- conducting maritime security operations and support missions as part of operations Enduring Freedom and ferent Components in the NATO Force and for New Dawn. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman K. Cecelia Engrums/Released) Commanders of different nations/coalitions. These factors, together with unity of ef- mation with higher spatial and temporal resolu- Conclusion fort and the synergistic employment of assets, tion and possibly the identification of a piracy would at last elevate Air-Maritime operational The multi-layered ISR CONOPS envi- threat. In this way, the ‘detect-identify-track and tactical relationships from the level of de- sioned for CP could be used as a template for cycle’ is significantly reduced as relevant data confliction/coordination to that of integration. the employment of A&S assets against other is passed up the Command and Control chain. It is not the case of structural integration of as- threats to MS, namely smuggling, drugs and Commanders can then evaluate the threat and sets and manpower, rather the coherent com- weapons trade, human trafficking and sea- have the option to issue alerts to merchant ves- bination of capabilities that ensure mission ac- based IED (Improvised Explosive Device). sels or initiate shadowing or interdiction with complishment. n However, the organizational and technical re- surface assets. quirements deriving from the application of The Joint Air Power Competence Centre Helicopters are not included in the the described concept and the employment web page is located at www.japcc.de/ CONOPS because they are to be considered part of a warship weapon system. However, organic capabilities of rotary wing assets such as speed of response and unique sensors can pro- vide high quality surveillance products, iden- tification of pirates vessels detected by other means (air-based, sea-based or shore-based) and intelligence collection on pirate bases and ports. They also provide a crucial link in the informa- tion chain, from intelligence cueing (AWACS/ HALE UAV/MPA), target identification and shadowing (MPA/TUAV), to ‘end-game’ ac- tivities.

Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence 18 JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS

Allied/Coalition-USN Interoperability

CDR Themistoklis Papadimitriou, HEL-N Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE) Norfolk, VA, USA

ombined and Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Training/Tactics/Procedure challenges are as divergent Excellence has issued the second edition of the Allied as the references and procedures themselves (U.S. vs. Al- C Interoperability Handbook. The scope of the Handbook lied vs. Multinational doctrine). This causes increased plan- includes interoperability problems that arise when allied/co- ning burden on multinational forces because OPORDs and alition and US Naval forces are participating in joint opera- OPTASKs cannot be shared with coalition forces. Releasabil- tions. These problems are mainly due to differences in culture, ity restrictions or inadequate means of transmission impedes doctrine and planning. the execution of coalition operations. The recent coalition experience during Libyan operations While coalition operations have been successful, as well as Joint US- Coalition exercises have highlighted the the time taken to integrate forces can be lengthy. Greater difference between U.S. and coalition operating procedures. emphasis on closing the gap among these challenges is The U.S. Navy primarily employs national doctrine, publi- needed to become a more effective participant in sup- cations, networks, and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures port of cooperative maritime security. For these rea- (TTPs). These elements are the product of an advanced tech- sons, CJOS COE promotes the use of the CJOS COE nological and doctrinal supported infrastructure. NATO/co- Allied Interoperability Handbook. It is offered as a source alition navies primarily employ NATO doctrine, publications, of reference for interoperability lessons learned and remedial networks, and TTPs but exploit their national tools only when actions. required. CJOS COE recently has begun work on the 3rd Edition When the US Navy operates with NATO and coalition so that the Handbook will become more generic in nature. navies, friction arises as a result of these interoperability chal- Broadening the scope and the utility of the Handbook may lenges. Many of these challenges are linguistic and cultural but shorten the path that leads to interoperability and make the also include dissimilar terminology, training, and mindset. Handbook exploitable in different areas where US and coali- Coupled with information releasability challenges, it can be- tion/allied forces operate. The upcoming 3rd Edition updates come difficult to effectively integrate forces. Communication will make it more useful from a logistical side by incorporat- Information Systems (CIS) challenges such as non-compatible ing logistic annexes for different operating areas like the east C4I networks require combined forces to use ad hoc networks (North Atlantic) and west (North Pacific) coasts of the US and outside of standard NATO and US systems for information the Gulf of Mexico. n sharing (e.g., CENTRIX vs. NSWAN). The current practice of dissemination of plans and orders via VTC, SIPRNET, and CDR Papadimitriou is Maritime Operations Section Head chat, which are often not backed up by messages to coalition at CJOS COE in Norfolk, Va. For further information, he may forces, can lead to units missing important orders issued from be contacted at [email protected]. The Allied Interoperabil- commanders. ity Handbook is available for download at www.cjoscoe.org.

19 19 Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence Maritime Security

CDR P. J. Cummings, USA-N MSC Project Officer 2012 Maritime Security Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE) Conference Review Norfolk, VA, USA

ilitary and civilian leaders in the mari- time community of interest from 29 M countries met in Halifax, Nova Scotia this past June for the 5th annual Maritime Se- curity Conference, jointly-hosted by the Com- bined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE) and the Centre of Ex- cellence for Operations in Confined and Shal- low Waters (COE CSW). As NATO-accredit- ed Centres of Excellence (COE), the aim was to contribute to maritime security by identify- ing cooperative strategies for future maritime security engagement. Building on the success of previous conferences, the specific objectives were to (a) enhance national maritime security governance through comprehensive, whole- of-government approaches; (b) enhance inter- regional maritime security governance by devel- oping the way ahead for international maritime inter-state commerce that is transported by sea, seen to have the greatest effect. And although security cooperation and awareness; (c) im- and the fact that two thirds of the world’s popu- collaboration is increasing with its demonstrat- prove maritime security capabilities through lation lives within 400 kilometers of the coast, ed success, it is still not the international norm. effective, interoperable and affordable support the events at sea directly and often dramatically Efforts often spanned broad sectors of gov- infrastructure for maritime security efforts; and impact the populations ashore. What is signifi- ernment, but responsibility was usually solely (d) identify future maritime security challenges cant is that the ocean is at once freely open to shouldered by a nation’s navy or coast guard. and the way ahead to address them. anyone with a boat, and at the same time very Other conclusions were that adoption of new While planning for the 2012 conference, difficult and challenging to remain on it for technology was critical in matching the grow- CJOS COE and COE CSW collaborated with any length of time. Movement across oceans is ing challenges and that these challenges would Dalhousie University in Halifax on an academic relatively slow and requires large operational in- continue to evolve as the threats reacted to pre- critique of the four previous years of concept vestment; yet maritime transport of commerce viously secured maritime security successes. development, which refined the conclusions is several orders of magnitude cheaper than any With these issues and objectives estab- and set the scene for the 2012 conference in ground or air method of transportation. It re- lished, the distinguished speakers engaged a Halifax. A total of 33 distinguished speakers, mains the world’s transport method of choice thoroughly active audience of over 220 attend- all of them leaders in military, civilian govern- for large volume movement across any signifi- ees from 29 countries and six continents. The ment, and commercial industries, were chosen cant distance. A nation’s navy can maintain real intellectual work came during the panel to critically address the topics from a broad unchecked maritime supremacy across massive discussions, which followed the plenary presen- spectrum of experience and insight. swaths of the sea, yet a few fiberglass boats car- tations. Chaired and staffed by a distinguished rying several men with rifles can divert hun- group including admirals and scientists, Rus- Conference Objectives dreds of millions of dollars in commerce while sian representatives to the UN and Turkish The topics on page 21 were selected to raising the overall cost of business by fifty times Fleet Commanders, think tank founders and form the basis of the conference, based on the that across the industry. In short, the maritime military authors of maritime security doctrine, conclusions of previous work by CJOS COE domain is simple and open, yet at the same these smaller venues created a focus of academ- and COE CSW, as well as other independent time it is complex and challenging. ic rigor and an open crucible of contention, sources. The idea that was taken into the con- The research of CJOS COE, COE CSW, which made for an exciting and productive re- ference was that maritime security is inherently and others concluded that current investment finement of concepts and objectives. As Com- a global issue, given the current economic inter- into maritime security was creating a positive ef- modore Steve Chick, Deputy Director CJOS dependence of most nations. In consideration fect but left room for improvement. Collabora- COE stated, “The insight and engagement of the overwhelming percentage of the world’s tion in maritime security between nations was provided by this unique arsenal of maritime

Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence 20 security expertise really formed a constructive and maintaining political will & popular 2. Maritime security and access to the domain friction that, in the end, sharpened the confer- support; can best be assured by maritime security ence’s proceedings, considerably.” 5. Non-NATO and Non-military stakehold- regimes (MSR). MSRs should build on ers (e.g. NGO, IGO, non-allied govern- multi-stakeholder approaches involving all Based on the presentations and the sub- ments) need to be engaged in developing relevant state, international, non-state and sequent debates, the conclusions of the confer- maritime security solutions. corporate partners. There is no “one-size- ence’s panel chairmen were presented on the fits-all” in designing MSRs/local ownership final day, in plenary. Within the scope of the Improved Maritime and stakeholder directed construct are keys conference’s objectives, the conclusions are as Security Capabilities for regime success; and follows: 1. Three important spheres of influence on 3. MSRs should provide scalable engagement maritime security are (a) maritime situ- capabilities for (a) law enforcement at sea, National Maritime ational awareness, (b) maritime security (b) deep-sea operations, and (c) inter-do- Security Governance operations (enforcement), and (c) political main concepts of operations. These should 1. Without adequate national arrangements, will / leadership focus on protecting critical maritime infra- the foundation does not exist for adequate 2. Comprehensive maritime situational aware- structure as well as offshore and deep-sea regional/international arrangements; ness starts with national integrated efforts installations and services 2. Technology is not the main issue in mari- time domain awareness. The national National Inter-Regional Improved Future guidance and operational culture regarding Maritime Security Maritime Security Maritime Security Maritime Security the classification and sharing of informa- Governance Capabilities tion is a larger impediment. Investment • Nations are Basis for • Cooperation • Information Sharing • Varing Challenges focus should not be in equipment but in as World Rapidly Maritime Security Required Among • Threat Analysis the human element – understanding, gov- States Changes ernance, training; • Comprehensive • Risk Assessment Approach is • Mutually Beneficial • Identify Main Drivers 3. No two countries or regions are the same. Necessary Their culture and institutions are forma- • Develops Trust • Broad Perspective tive and influential. It is imperative to allow multiple approaches to maritime security layered with a federation of national systems More than just concept papers and aca- solutions, i.e. top-down/federal mandate in a standardized paradigm, all of which is demic commentary, the conference’s proceed- vs. grass-roots/coalition of the willing, etc; purposed towards information sharing be- ings have reached a maturity and a momentum 4. Maritime domain awareness and surveil- tween nations and regions; requiring segue to real-world actions. Best de- lance capacity can be international, but 3. Key issues and concerns are (a) willing- scribed as a culminating event, this five year se- the response capacity may need to be very ness to share data between entities, (b) ries of conferences successfully wrought mature clearly national. coordination of responsibilities inside and concepts and practical applications for compre- between governments and regions, (c) hensive solutions to the maritime security chal- Inter-regional Maritime common architectures and requirements, lenges stressing the global maritime commons. Security Governance (d) and most importantly, data policy, i.e. From the impact to future planning, strategic 1. Any framework or roadmap will have to “need-to-know” vs. “need-to-share” guidance and operational execution, these con- accommodate a variety of national models. 4. There is ample room for incorporating cepts dovetail perfectly with NATO’s Strategic Levels of capabilities vary among states but commercial interests collaboratively in the Forces Initiative. the key is to create opportunities; surveillance areas of maritime situational Over the next year, CJOS, in co-operation 2. Maritime security must exist at two levels. awareness. with other maritime stakeholders, will incor- The most successful international coopera- porate these proceedings into the development Future Maritime Security Challenges tion is founded on a high degree of nation- of the Implementation Concept for Maritime al co‐ordination; 1. Future issues and concerns are (a) cyber Security Operations. 3. An international body should have a role vulnerability makes control of operation in facilitating the creation and adoption of domains more difficult, (b) the rise of hy- CDR Cummings is a Staff Officer at CJOS standard operating procedures (SOPs) de- brid actors who excel at concealment in COE in Norfolk, Va. For further information, veloped by engaged states; clutter, (c) Anti-access/area denial situa- to obtain a copy of the MSC 2012 Proceedings 4. Information sharing, capacity building tions fuelled by sovereignty claims to con- or provide comments, he may be contacted at and trust are key components of coopera- trol strategic SLOCs and (d) cultural dif- [email protected]. For additional informa- tive security arrangements, as are common ferences in accepting risk and using force tion on CJOS COE, you may visit our website at communication strategies for developing against adversaries will increasingly matter; www.cjoscoe.org.

21 Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence BUILDING MARITIME EXPERTISE

NMIOTC: the credible NATO MIO expert Commodore Adrianos Poulos, HEL-N, Commandant NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre (NMIOTC) Souda Bay Naval Base, Chania, Greece

he mission of the NATO Maritime In- tion to provide experts globally capable of ef- Maritime Strategy has been agreed to by all terdiction Operations Training Centre is ficiently tackling the challenge of maritime se- NATO nations; it is the foundation from T to conduct the combined training neces- curity. Through cooperation and contributions which the four core pillars are driving the sary for NATO forces to better execute surface, from other international organizations and whole concept of operational and tactical di- sub-surface, aerial surveillance, and special op- academia, NMIOTC is honored to be a proud mensions in the maritime environment. These erations activities in support of Maritime Inter- member of the global maritime expert field and core pillars are: diction Operations. The Commandant’s vision is maintaining a reputation as a Centre that can • Deterrence and Collective Defense is to enhance Maritime Security through Mari- deliver basic concepts through advanced train- • Crisis Management time Interdiction Operations (MIO) Training ing and, most importantly, providing students • Cooperative Security and remain the recognized expert in the field trained to NATO standards. In order to pur- • Maritime Security of MIO. sue this goal, it is of the utmost importance to MIO supports each of the above men- understand the strategic significance of MIO tioned core values as follows: within the concept of the Alliance Maritime • Deterrence and Collective Defense: MIO relations to NATO’s Strategy. MIO is not something old fashioned MIO contributes actively to deterrence Strategic Concept but combined with MSA, is a critical enabler and collective defense in support of op- NMIOTC has stood in the NATO com- to achieve the Alliance’s Maritime Strategy. In erations in the maritime, land and air munity for the last three and a half years deliv- any maritime operation, there is always a link environment, by supporting rapid and ering training and transformation concepts to to a MIO operation founded in MSA and an decisive force actions. help support the countering of illegal activity information exchange strategy. • Crisis Management: Crisis response within the maritime domain. More specifi- NATO’s Strategic Concept is the funda- actions often include embargo opera- cally, NMIOTC has trained more than 3000 mental basis from which all maritime strategic tions amongst others as defined in ATP students in MIO on a practical and theoretical tasks originate at the political level. One level 71 Maritime Interdiction Operations. basis. We believe this is a significant contribu- below and still on the strategic level, Alliance • Cooperative Security: In the theme of

(Above) Sergeant Richard Klein with the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit’s Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) assault force stresses the importance of keeping your elbows in while firing to a paratrooper from the 1st Paratrooper Battalion, Hellenic Army, in Malkme, Crete, Greece, Nov. 15, 2010. The MIO assault force went through a one-week course at the NATO Maritime Interception Operations Training Center in tactics to board a suspect vessel. (Official USMC Photo by Master Sgt. Christopher Matt/ Released)

Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence 22 BUILDING MARITIME EXPERTISE

contributing to partner capacity build- The training provided at NMIOTC con- boarding team finally goes on board and discov- ing by improving their capabilities to sists of exercises and transformational activities ers that the ship is under the control of pirates. address security threats and to operate as depicted in the flow chart below. This operation then becomes an opposed board- effectively, NMIOTC is actively con- As it can be seen from the below flow ing operation. The same situation can happen tributing to training and exercises. chart, the training and exercises for boarding during a small skiff / mother ship investigation, • Maritime Security: MIO is closely re- operations can be generally divided into two: where the suspect crew on board the small skiff lated to, and supports directly, all Mari- compliant and opposed. During compliant or the mothership is pretending that they are time Security Operations. Finally, we should stress the fact that counter piracy operations entail all core values In any maritime operation, there is always a link to a MIO of the Alliance Maritime Strategy from deter- operation founded in MSA and an information exchange strategy. rence and NATO’s current collective defense through to maritime security operations under the freedom of navigation MSO task. MIO boarding operations, the boarding team fishermen, but in reality there are strong indica- will need to check papers and search compart- tions that they may be pirates. NMIOTC’s Activities ments for suspicious or illegal cargo and report In supporting transformation, NMIOTC NMIOTC is a NATO Education and back to the MIO Commander, all the while is conducting extensive experimentation, con- Training Facility with a mission to train com- taking safety of personnel into consideration. cept development; and modeling and simula- mand teams, boarding teams, naval units and This requires a basic knowledge of the maritime tion activities with Allied Command Transfor- individual personnel in Maritime Interdic- terror threat such as WMD / CBRN/ CIED / mation, Naval Postgraduate School, Lawrence tion Operations. The NMIOTC vision is to Hybrid or any other possible threats, as well as Livermore National Laboratory, US European remain the Alliance’s credible MIO expert, layout, cargo and procedures onboard any type Command, Combined Joint Operations from enhancing the effectiveness of Alliance’s Mari- of merchant vessel. the Sea Centre of Excellence, US Central Com- time Strategy in all possible ways. Currently, Before a boarding operation commences, mand and other organizations / academia. This NMIOTC’s area of expertise spans all activities no one can estimate if a compliant boarding op- will allow NMIOTC to validate the outcomes that can occur during an interdiction mission, eration will revert to an opposed boarding op- and enhance future boarding. starting from safety of personnel to execution eration (force on force). Consider the following Last but not least, all the above procedures of the entire interdiction mission. In other example: a ship that has been taken by pirates are being improved through our efforts in con- words, NMIOTC provides training such that a without the knowledge of external authorities. cept development and the Lessons Learned boarding team is able to face any threat related During the hail and query procedure, the mas- procedures. We are cooperating with Allied to their own security and addresses any aspect ter of the vessel replies to all queries, but under Command Transformation, Joint Analysis connected to their ship and mission. the pressure of the pirates as if all was well. The and Lessons Learned Centre, Standing NATO

Complaint Coorperative

Boarding Self (Training-Exercises) Protection Opposed Force On Force (& Non-Cooperative) Counter Piracy Mothership – Small Skiff Investigation

NMIOTC & ACT’s CBRN Experiment MIO Experimentation Joint NPS - LLNL WMD in MIO Experiment JCBPO Experimentation

Modeling & Serious Games (Borders Ahoy) Simulation Tactical MIO Simulator (OOS, OUP and ATATLANTA) Boarding Validation (Transformation) Lessons Cooperation with JALLC - CJOS-SNMGs Learned

Concept ATP 71 (MIO) Development EXTAC789, 792 Counter Piracy

23 Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence 23 trategic Co TO S ncep NA t Alliance Maritime Strategy

Deterrence & Crisis Cooperative Maritime Colelctive Management Security Security Defense

Counter Piracy Contribute to MIO Contribution Interdiction Partner’s Maritime Security Support to Deterrence Operations Capacity Building Capacity Building MSA Uphold Freedom of Navigation Support Embargo Outreach Martime Full Range of MIO & Counter Law Enforcement Terrorism

CRITICAL Protect Critical Fight Figure 1 — NMIOTC’s strategic Infrastructure Proliferation ENABLERS of WMD perspective on how Maritime Interdiction Operations and Maritime Situational Awareness are critical enablers to implement the full range of tasks stemming from Alliance Maritime Strategy. MIO MSA

CRITICAL ENABLERS TO IMPLEMENT FULL RANGE OF TASKS STEMMING FROM ALLIANCE MARITIME STRATEGY

Maritime Group and other naval units, includ- aligned to NATO standards and policy. In the NMIOTC credibility in the field and the foun- ing personnel participating in real operations in near future, and as the security threats con- dation upon which to strive for even better re- order to share their valuable knowledge and bet- tinue to change in the maritime environment, sults. Following Socrates’ words: “Happiness is ter prepare for upcoming operations. NMIOTC will continue to prove its worthi- stemming, not from money, but from produc- ness and capability to tackle the current issue tivity,” we are committed to continuing our best Epilogue of maritime security. Of course, all the abili- efforts even in an era of severe global austerity. n In conclusion, NMIOTC is proud to be ties that we encompass can only be performed a leader in the field of Maritime Interdiction through strong cooperation with other interna- For further information, visit the NMIOTC Operations as a subject matter expert capable tional organizations and academia. web site at www.nmiotc.gr/#home_en.htm or of delivering effective, efficient and affordable Our distinguished clients, including US contact them at www.nmiotc.gr/#contact/con- training in addition to transformative solutions Coast Guard and European Special Forces, give tact_form_en.php

Commodore’s Bio Besides his naval education, Commodore Adrianos Poulos has received a master’s degree in Operations Research from Naval Postgraduate School in Commodore Adrianos Poulos, GRC N graduated from the Hellenic Monterey California and he holds a B.S. from the Economic University of Navy Naval Academy in July 1981 and was appointed as Navigation Of- Athens. Additionally, he has attended a number of educational programs in ficer and XO to various types of ships. He had the honour to Command, military colleges, such as the Hellenic Naval Staff and Command College, the Fast Patrol Boat HS KAVALOUDIS (P-25 – Missile Patrol Boat) and the Hellenic Naval War College and the Hellenic National Defense College. the “S – Kortenaer” type Frigate, HS AIGAION (F-460). Commodore’s Commodore’s awards include the Cross of the Order of Honor, the main appointments include, Operations Officer in the Frigates Com- Cross of the Order of Phoenix, the Medal of Military Merit B’ Class, the mand, Staff Officer to the Hellenic Navy General Staff / A1 directorate as Navy Force Formation Command Medal C’ Class and the Staff Officer well as Commandant to the Patrol Boats flotilla. His NATO experience Service Commendation Medal B’ Class. includes a two year assignment to the NATO / PfP cell in Mons, Belgium He is married to Constantina Stratigou, who is an English Teacher and also a two year tour as DCOS for STRFORNATO in Naples. Since in Primary Schools and he has three children, two daughters and one son. April 2011 Commodore Adrianos Poulos is the NMIOTC Commandant.

Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence 24 EXERCISE AND EXPERIMENtATION

Alligator Conference 2012 (AC12) – Lisbon, Portugal 3 to 5 October 2012

Major Andrew Cross, GBR-RM Strike Force NATO (STKFORNATO) Lisbon/Oeiras, Portugal

he annual Alligator Conference, spon- sored by Naval Striking and Support TForces NATO HQ (STRIKFOR- NATO), took place near Oeiras, Portugal 3 through 5 Oct 12. Attending the event were 49 delegates representing 37 NATO Head- quarters, Organisations and aligned Partner Nations. Key note speakers included Major General Ed Davies, Commandant General UK Royal Marines and Rear Admiral Ann Phillips, Commander US Expeditionary The broader ‘Vision’ of Alligator is to provide Strike Group Two. outreach opportunities to those Nations with The aim of the conference was to pro- developing maritime and amphibious capabilities, vide a credible platform for attending organ- or ambitions that may otherwise not have been a isations to inform others on national capa- suitable forum in which to interact. bility developments and debate experiences from recent operational and exercise activity. AC12 focused on operational Lessons Identified and Learned and opportunities to partake in future exercises such as BOLD from the primarily land centric operations in Iraq and Af- ALLIGATOR and BALTOPS exercise series. Furthermore, it ghanistan in the last decade with a transferable benefit to provided STRIKFORNATO with an opportunity to explain the littoral domain and from the air and maritime domains its ongoing work in respect to development of the Joint during Op UNIFIED Headquarters and Maritime Expeditionary Command and PROTECTOR. In ad- Control concept on behalf of SHAPE. dition, Alligator’s intent Building upon the progress of AC12, STRIKFOR- was to then pass collec- NATO intended to broaden its primary littoral focus to the tive observations directly full spectrum of the future maritime enterprise and invited to the membership of the NATO Standardisation Author- delegations to the STRIKFORNATO Maritime Conference ity Amphibious Operations Working Group (AOWG), Alli- 2013 (currently scheduled for 28-29 May. In support of this ance Centres of Excellence (COE) and Nations as a catalyst intent, the targeted audience will grow to include delegations to further develop amphibious doctrines and capabilities. from Air, Land and Civil communities; in order to discuss The broader ‘Vision’ of Alligator is to provide outreach op- maritime issues affecting the future community of the inter- portunities to those Nations with developing maritime and ested. n amphibious capabilities, or ambitions that may otherwise not have been a suitable forum in which to interact. More details will be published on the STRIKFORNATO Key topics discussed this year included: updates on webpage in due course: http://www.sfn.nato.int/operations/alliga- the future of NATO Command Transformation processes; tor.aspx specifically Project MARCOM, the European Amphibious Point of contact within STRIKFORNATO: Major Andy Initiative, advancements in the area of the Sea-basing concept, Cross UK Royal Marines: [email protected]

25 Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence COMMUNICATIONS AND CYBER SECURItY

Alternative C2 Structure For The Commander Amphibious Task Force And Commander Landing Force

LCOL Gary Yuzichuk, CAN-A Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE) Norfolk, VA, USA

mphibious Operations involve and in- to require transfer of command, CJOS COE tegrate a simultaneous action on the received a request from the Royal Netherlands A land, maritime and air environments Navy to develop an alternative Command and and are conducted at a tactical level but with Control (C2) structure. The project aimed at an important impact at the operational and supplementing the current allied doctrine for strategic level. For this reason, amphibious op- amphibious operations, ATP 8 (B), Vol I, caters erations are among the most complex of opera- for an effective comand and control relation- tions and are probably the area of joint warfare ship while carrying out less ambitious, smaller which requires a clear chain of command and scale, amphibious operations. a strong relationship between the Commander Included in the CJOS COE Programme of the Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and of Work (POW) 2012, the final product was the Commander of the Landing Force (CLF). published and distributed last January after Possibly one of the more crucial aspects that a thorough revision by, amongst others, the amphibious operations must overcome is the Royal Netherlands Maritime Warfare Centre challenges related to the transition of forces as well as the U.S. Navy Expeditionary Strike from the sea to the land in a non-permissive Group 2 (ESG-2). environment. The Alternate Command & Control In reaction to the realities of shrinking Relationship and Staff Organisation for Am- defense budgets across most of the NATO phibious Operations document emphasised geous location. It also leverages the advance- countries, amphibious forces have begun to that the proposed command and control struc- ments of modern technology to conduct non- adapt their doctrine to suit smaller scale opera- ture fosters a greater integration of the amphib- contiguous operations while reducing resources tions, such as raids and minor incursions. This ious elements of the Amphibious Task Force and manpower requirements. n posture, while reflective of the current operat- by regrouping functions and operating from a ing environment, decreases the ability for, and common command centre. Although the au- LCOL Yuzichuk is a staff officer at CJOS perceived need to conduct, large scale, opposed thorities are clearly delineated, the concept pro- COE in Norfolk, Va. For further information, he amphibious landings. vides the sought after flexibility and mobility can be contacted at [email protected]. The Based on this change in operations and the enabling the Commander of the Landing Force Alternative CATF/CLF paper may be download- fact that current littoral operations are unlikely to exercise command from the most advanta- ed at www.cjoscoe.org

Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence 26 JOINTMariti ANDme SecurityCOMBINED | GlobalOPERATIONS Situation Prospective CDR Dierk Hansen, DEU-N Operations in Confined CDR Volker Bruns, DEU-N Centre of Excellence Confined and Shallow Water and Shallow Waters Kiel, Germany

pproximately seventy percent of the NATO’s COEs unique. A ship underway on its route from Sin- earth’s surface is covered with water Confined waters include narrow waters gapore to Bremerhaven will pass the blacked A and almost eighty percent of the world’s limited by geographical constraints and naviga- ringed choke points and blue marked confined population lives within 500 km of the coastline. tional restrictions (e.g. dense traffic in the ap- areas on the map. They are critical points along Additionally, ninety percent of international proaches of choke points or along sea lines of sea lines of communication requiring protec- commerce is carried by sea. The confluence of communications). This definition allows for a tion to ensure safe flow of commodities. Their the seas and their legal, economic, technologi- broad interpretation. During the 2012 Mari- relative vicinity to the shore and shipping pre- cal, organizational, and governmental spheres time Security Conference in Halifax, the Dep- dictability enable threat factors to interfere with of influence occurs in confined and shallow wa- uty Commander MarCom Naples went so far ships and form theaters of operations. Nation ters (CSW). Depending on the international, as to include the Mediterranean Sea as confined states might also use legal claims to deny sea national, regional and local orientation of stake- waters. Shallow waters include a depth up to borne transportation. The effect of those fac- holders acting there, confined and shallow wa- 200m. For discussion purposes, this reference tors varies from hampering the flow of goods ters are priority areas of responsibility between to loss of ships and personnel. The economic the coast with its maritime infrastructure, the impact of these threats influence areas beyond high seas and inland. operational areas. Generating a sufficient level of aware- ness for solution-influencing factors in Current Operations CSW operations requires a well-struc- Few maritime operations today re- tured and sufficiently detailed analysis. To semble the tactics developed during the conduct such analyses, well-founded mari- Cold War. The objective during the Cold War time expertise in maritime safety and security was defense of the territorial integrity by mili- in CSW is necessary. tary forces or alliances. Today the focus is on the Due to decades of experience as a “coastal Figure 1 - This map depicts the main traffic lines protection of economic sovereignty by law and navy”, the German Navy identified these glob- and shipping density. The most frequented routes resolution enforcement. These operations are ally valid aspects and early in the 21st century, are shown in red. primarily the responsibility of military organi- decided to establish a “Centre of Excellence for zations. However, non-military organizations point serves as a point of demarcation rather Operations in Confined and Shallow Waters” like FRONTEX (Frontières extérieures for “ex- than including deeper areas of the sea. (COE CSW) in Kiel. The COE CSW, hosted ternal borders”, legally: European Agency for the by the German Navy and accredited by NATO Shipping routes and Chokepoints Management of Operational Cooperation at the in 2009, unites expertise from seven nations. A External Borders of the Member States of the Modern Container ships such as the portfolio of projects (Programme of Work) is European Union) are an example of the cooper- EMMA MEARSK are able to carry up to updated semi-annually through a vote of an In- ation by national non-military authorities. Cur- 14,770 TEU, (twenty foot equivalent, a small ternational Steering Committee (SC). Revisions rent operations like Atalanta, Active Endeavour, standard container). With the average load of are made in accordance with NATO and partici- Ocean Shield, UNIFIL, Frontex and others fo- 12 tons per TEU it equals the freight load of pating nations’ priorities. The primary objective cus on CSW; however, blue water considerations 177,000 tons aboard one ship. The fuel con- of the COE CSW is to produce timely results continue to be disproportionally weighted. sumption for the distance of approximately and reduce duplicative efforts without lengthy Prospective operations will require new 8,700 nm from Singapore to Bremerhaven, processes. NATO’s common ambition to devel- types of operational planning and execution Germany, is approximately 10 gallons per 1 ton op existing capabilities to meet the requirements and will be driven by several factors. of 21st century’s SMART DEFENCE strategy load. Based on a price of heavy fuel oil at $180 /ton, the shipping cost of freight is $6.50 per in an optimized and complementary approach Drivers and Trends ton. Compared to a theoretical transport by resulted in COEs establishing themselves as rel- for Prospective Operations evant international knowledge networks. The truck we would end up with $460/ton. Given capability of the COEs to act as a link between geographic limitations, cost effectiveness, and Growing urbanization will increase the military and civilian agencies, corporations, quantity, sea transport is significantly more ef- demand for sea borne trade as well as the need universities, and research / trial facilities, make ficient than Intra-Continental shipping. for exploitation of new off shore resources.

27 Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence Harbors and ports will drastically grow in size Center of Gravity ment and rapid response are often financial to serve larger ships requiring additional force All stake holders must be aware of the trade-offs in terms of both material and person- protection and protection of nearby industry meaning and need of the awareness of their nel. Technology may serve as a force multiplier and support sites. area of responsibility. The ability to concentrate and reduce the need for human involvement. As wind and other energy technologies ex- the effort on a particular location inside the op- Flexibility is also a parameter. By its na- ploit offshore capabilities, the demand for infra- erational area on short notice could be critical. ture, CSW requirements change rapidly and structure protection will simultaneously increase. This could range from sea presence by patrol- must be adapted to current conditions on short The information technology revolution will ling to interdiction or engagement on short no- notice. Designing units to cover potential re- also place demands on CSW support. The use tice. Unmanned systems can alleviate the pres- quirements with rapid deployment capability is of the internet and social media is ubiquitous. sure on resources. It is possible to make use of cost prohibitive. Modularity and use of avail- Custom software solutions are of no longer the intra-force organic long range assets (e.g. rocket able use of theater assets is the key to flexibility. norm with the emphasis on open source software propelled carrier systems) or unmanned sys- and platforms. Global communication networks tems which can drop airborne assets equipped COE CSW — Fields of Work provide a vital link for these systems. Protection with sensors to identify contacts of interest to Access to Competence of undersea communication lines will also be a deter them as necessity dictates. Area Assess Safety Operations will be chal- serious consideration for CSW planners. lenged by the number of theaters and the ca- Sustainability pability of assets. The implementation of Un- Prospective Objectives and Priorities Sea endurance of assets in use has to be manned (Autonomous) Systems in operations • Protect critical infrastructure, including adapted to the threat. Anti-piracy operations is critical to maritime situational awareness. It sea borne (platforms, ships), territorial on the Somali coast serve as an example. So- includes static and territorial systems as well as (power plants, harbor facilities), and natu- mali pirates quickly altered their tactics once fully integrated shipboard systems to process in- ral resources, they recognized that merchant ships were alter- formation and reduces workload. Improved the • Ensure unfettered access to the maritime ing their routes away from hostile coastal areas. effectiveness of unmanned rapid carriers is an domain and the freedom of the seas in the Pirates broadened their operational radius by ongoing need. Off-shore platforms such as sup- defined area. employing a mother ship as the basis for their port and Command and Control sites will en- center for gravity. Countering the threat could hance sustainability and improve effectiveness. Area Access Safety Operations require the use of supply ships or mobile plat- Due to the character of confined and shal- low waters, Area Assess Safety Operations re- Area Access Safety Operations are char- forms /artificial islands offering supply, recov- ery, and maintenance capabilities. quire the willingness, reliability and a common acterized by regionally limited operations in interest of all contributors to give valid infor- a defined area which have a specific objective Effectiveness mation and requires dependency on other play- in order to serve a specific purpose. Area Ac- ers, who may follow other priorities without cess Safety Operations are unlimited in dura- It is not reasonable to expect member na- any preannouncement. Together with other tion and must be executed with limited assets. tions to purchase new ship types to address the entities in a so-called Community of Maritime These operations are typically executed in special needs of Area Access Safety Operations. Interest, the COE CSW is currently work- CSW, so their complexity and number of pos- Available assets will not significantly change ing on aspects of the aforementioned topics. sible theaters could exceed current capability. from the current force structure designed for COE CSW is committed to the development classic blue water warfare. The variety of threats of strategic to tactical requirements for the im- Challenges and opponents’ capabilities require the possibil- provement of experimental tactics and tactical The first factor is the Assets to Area ratio ity for a scalable engagement and an increase of documentation. Implementation of aspects of (the challenge to operate with a limited amount the identification and engagement capabilities the Maritime Security Operations Concept of assets in a defined area). Bringing to bear the optimized for the environment and task. resulting from the Maritime Security Confer- right force at the right time in the right place This could be done by ship borne and ences jointly planned by COE CSW and CJOS is an ongoing concern. Available entities must non surface solutions. Floating buoys equipped COE is a prime example. also be able to operate for an extended period with sensors could be used like oceanographic The 2013 Program of Work estimate of of time in theater. Sustainability will remain a probes as unmanned single intelligence devices. COE CSW covers projects ranging from tacti- critical, resource-dependent determinant for Autonomous underwater gliders could provide cal to strategic level in this sphere which gener- the successful conduct of operations. Effec- surveillance over wide areas. ally will meet – amongst other – NATO- and tiveness will be determined by the availability multinational initiatives such as the Multina- Efficiency of suitable sensor and communication equip- tional Capability Development Campaign ment for the respective type of operation, while Economic capability is the most limiting (MCDC) 2013/2014. n efficiency will be reflected by the maximized factor in today’s operations. The capital inten- potential of the combination of human and sive cost for assets and ongoing maintenance View the COE CSW Programme of Work at material factors. restricts plans regardless of ambition. Sustain- www.coecsw.org

Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence 28 BUILDING MARITIME EXPERTISE

MARSEC COE

CDR Sumer Kayser, TUR-N Maritime Security Centre of Excellence (MARSEC COE) Aksaz Naval Base, Marmaris/Mugla, Turkey

eventy percent of the world is covered by balized economies. It is apparent over the last However, maritime forces have been oceans. Since the dawn of mankind, we decade that the risks affecting maritime secu- tasked to tackle some of the maritime secu- S have used the oceans as a means to trans- rity can be categorized into four areas. These rity challenges along with their traditional port our products. And since mankind has four risks are maritime terrorism; proliferation roles, but maritime security tasks are getting used the oceans, he has also found ways to use of WMD; organized crime and illegal immi- more and more significant. Not only navies the oceans illegally. The maritime dimensions gration on the sea; and, piracy and armed rob- but also other maritime security stakeholders1 of resources, energy, trade, transportation, bery. In view of these issues, there is a need realize that they need to be better prepared for environment and tourism make it a natural to clarify the mechanism/legal framework ap- this new role. assumption that maritime security should oc- plicable to the efforts in countering such risks. One of the challenges within maritime cupy a very important position in the world Although there is the United Nations SCR’s security coordination and cooperation is that culture varies by country as well as between different national agencies. Also, there is a Maritime forces have been tasked to tackle some of the maritime vast difference in the capabilities of the dif- security challenges along with their traditional roles, but ferent nations/ regions of the word. Maritime maritime security tasks are getting more and more significant. security requires both multinational-inter- Not only navies but also other maritime security stakeholders agency cooperation and the necessary legal framework. A solution is not possible using realize that they need to be better prepared for this new role. only military forces. However, it is achiev- able through civilian involvement, awareness and engagement. The Shared Awareness and agenda. As the global economy gets smaller, outlining the ways and means to cope with Deconfliction (SHADE) meetings in Manama/ countries are gathering to find solutions to these problems, each nation first resorts to its Bahrain are the best example for multinational- maritime security. At the Maritime Security own national laws and policies. In this respect, interagency cooperation on maritime security. COE, we have found that a whole-of-govern- most nations have national crisis management Within this spirit, maritime security challenges ment approach is the best solution towards structures that would be activated immediate- to be addressed require a sustainable, multina- ensuring maritime security. ly in case of a maritime related terrorist attack. tional, cross–functional-interagency approach. Since ninety percent of goods are trans- These structures typically include inter-agency Multinational Maritime Security Centre of ported via the seas, maritime security plays a representation, although levels of decision- Excellence (MARSEC COE) is ready to help critical role in today’s interdependent and glo- making differ from country to country. provide this environment.

29 Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence MARSEC COE seminars and papers; MARSEC COE officially opened on 12 • Educate leaders/specialists and help over- November 2012 with a ribbon-cutting cere- come “sea blindness” of maritime security mony at the Southern Task Group Command related issues; Headquarters in Marmaris, Turkey. The pre- • Contribute to maritime security capacity siding officer was Vice Admiral Atilla KEZEK, building; Commander of Turkish Naval Southern Sea • Promote interoperability, standardization Area Command. The opening of MARSEC and best practices in the context of mari- COE commenced with a two-week Maritime time security; Security and Counter Piracy course organized • Analyze maritime security activities to MARSEC COE has a busy 2013 planned, by the new Centre of Excellence and Turk- identify lessons and to identify best prac- offering many courses and workshops. Please ish Partnership for Peace Training Center. tices; and, contact us to inquire about participation in any Thirty two participants from 18 countries • Test and validate concept through experi- of these events. n participated in this first event (Albania, Alge- mentation. For further information visit our web site: ria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Estonia, Our mission is to support UN, NATO, www.dgmm.tsk.tr Ireland, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Partner Countries and maritime security stake- Contact [email protected] for Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Tunisa, holders by providing subject matter expertise in a comprehensive approach for all levels and further information about the MARSEC COE. Turkey, United Arab Emirates). Concurrently, a Maritime Security Workshop was held from aspects of maritime security. 1. Government (Navy, Coast Guard, Custom, Harbour Au- 14th to 16th of November 2012. Fifteen in- Our vision is to become a centre producing thorities and related Government agencies), Private Sector proactive strategies related to maritime security (Private Maritime Security Companies-PMSC, Privately ternational academics gave presentations on Contracted Armed Security Personnel-PCASP, Recognized maritime security to the participants. Follow- as an internationally efficient and effective Security Organizations-RSO) and Maritime Industry (ship- ing the workshop, MARSEC COE hosted the academic institution. ping lines, R&D etc.) and Academics. NCAGS Units participating ‘‘Exercise Dynam- ic Master’’ from 20-29 November 2012. This is an NCAGS Counter-Piracy Exercise (CPX) designed to exercise Naval Cooperation and MARSEC COE 2013 Training/Courses/Workshops Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS) and Allied Worldwide Navigational Information System Vessel Protection Detachment Training...... 1-12 April 2013 (AWNIS) personnel in accordance with proce- Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Course...... 17-21 June 2013 dures in a multinational environment. MARSEC COE objectives are to: International Ship & Port Security (ISPS) Course...... 8-12 July 2013 • Establish a maritime security community Maritime Security Operations Staff Officer Course...... 9-20 September 2013 of interest via extensive networking; • Assist in concept and doctrine development Maritime Security Workshop-İstanbul...... 7-9 October 2013 for various aspects of maritime security; Maritime Security & Counter Piracy Course...... 18-29 November 2013 • Distribute in-depth expert knowledge through training, exercises, conferences,

Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence 30 EXERCISE AND EXPERIMENtATION

High Level Decision Support in Maritime Interdiction Operations Complex Experiments, Intelligent Reachback & Computational Supply Networks

Heinrich Buch, Senior Advisor COMTESSA, Universität der Bundeswehr, München, Germany Prof. Dr. Alex Bordetsky, Professor, CENETIX, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA Goran Mihelcic, Fakultät für Informatik, Universität der Bundeswehr, München, Germany Prof. Dr. Stefan Pickl, Fakultät fur Informatik, Universität der Bundeswehr, München, Germany Venera Pjetraj, COMTESSA, Universität der Bundeswehr, München, Germany

omplexity is a natural component of the Maritime Interdiction Operations identification and globalization process: Traffic systems, (MIO) and CENETIX tracking in the C critical infrastructure protection, net- “The question is, if it is hard to detect this maritime domain. work topologies, energy resource management special maritime traffic, how can we improve our The international and so forth are all characterized by complex awareness of what is going on? How do we know if community, led behavior and economic interdependencies. a suspicious vessel is in the area? And when there is by NATO, Swe- Operations Research (OR) is one of the key in- one, what does the boarding team do?” den, Germany struments to model, simulate and analyze such — Dr. Alex Bordetsky (COMTESSA), systems and questions concerning safety and Denmark, Greece security. Gaining optimal solutions, suitable These are central questions focusing on and Singapore, heuristics, and efficient procedures for these ap- the work of the MIO experiment series as well are also participating in MIO experiments de- plications are some of the main solutions which as the participation of COMTESSA within the signed to efficiently manage maritime traffic. were developed at COMTESSA, University of Centre of Excellence for Operations in Con- Maritime interdiction operations research and the Bundeswehr Munich (COMTESSA is part fined and Shallow Waters (COE CSW). Fur- experiments conducted since 2002 are showing of the Centre for Network Experimentation thermore, CENETIX and COMTESSA intend promise in the development of intelligent tools and Innovation (CENETIX) which is directed to increase the cooperation with the CMRE at to better identify, tag, track and monitor com- by Prof. Dr. Alexander Bordetsky from Na- La Spezia. CENETIX is engaged in Sensor Al- plex (reach back) processes. Annual NPS-led val Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey). location and Complex Harbor Protection. Dr. exercises and experiments are therefore provid- COMTESSA focuses on awareness, analysis, Alex Bordetsky leads a team of NPS research- ing a test bed for new detection and communi- control, and optimization of complex systems. ers working with their counterparts in the US cations technologies and search tactics, as well Research is also conducted on IT-supported Joint Special Operations Command, the US as interagency and international communica- process optimization as well as service-orientat- Navy, Homeland Security, and Department tions to support specialized maritime interdic- ed, reach-back convention. of Energy to determine the fundamentals of tion operations.

31 Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence SUPPLY CHAIN CONTROL TOWER - Self-forming adaptive networks and services In order to analyze such complex adap- tive systems on a platform; agent-based model- ing and simulation is necessary. Agent-based modeling and simulation are an approach for modeling real world complex systems of an adaptive nature, such as an adaptive supply chain network. They enable design of each ac- tor’s supply chain network individually, based on their own decision rules. Moreover, it allows the simulation of the aggregate behavior of these heterogeneous organizations. In this way A ScanEagle unmanned aerial vehicle launches from the flight deck of the dock landing ship USS emergent, non-linear behavior can be captured. Comstock (LSD 45) in the Persian Gulf May 17, 2011. Comstock is supporting maritime security To adapt as flexibly as possible to unexpected operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility. (U.S. changes, information along a supply chain net- Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Joseph M. Buliavac/Released) work has to be visible. Achieving visibility in a supply chain network continues to remain a problem. To overcome this difficulty, a supply Complex Computational simulation and unconventional networking chain control tower which could be embedded in Supply Networks capabilities being advanced through the MIO the global reach-back concept of the future via a program. COMTESSA is developing a special “Complex experiment series and high-level special service-orientated approach. The whole information system known as IRIS (Integrat- decision support are the heart of CENETIX and initiative, once completed, will enable analysts ed Reach-Back Information System).” COMTESSA.” Dr. Stefan Pickl to put together a more complete and integrated Such a holistic decision support pro- The heart of the effort is a network that operational picture. An integrated MIO net- cedure supports the flexible coordination enables partners to collaborate and share data work is vital for providing instant expert service between multiple disciplines and respon- that they can relay, in real time, directly to first orientated reach-back. Our aim is the creation sibilities (within the creation of OR cells responders and patrol crews in a position to in- of a robust SOA in an agile complex environ- and CD&E processes) to create an optimal terdict. International law and enhanced moni- ment like Maritime Interdiction Operations. n operational picture. Therefore OR/M&S is toring capabilities have made it easier to track central to the area of IT-supported process LITERATURE: Program Promotes Im- larger vessels and, in many cases, identify any optimization as well as issues regarding de- proved Small-Craft Surveillance, By Donna Miles critical materials in their cargo. COMTESSA is cision and game theory/ strategic planning, American Forces Press Service, MONTEREY, Ca- engaged in the area of understanding complex particularly with a view to the background of lif., Sept. 21, 2011 supply networks, especially in the area of cargo international military experiments and ser- Zhang, J., Xu, J. & Liu, Y., 2009. Complex transportation and surveillance. vice-orientated “reach-back”-concepts. IRIS adaptive supply chain network: The state of the focuses on the development of a technical art. Chinese Control and Decision Conference, IRIS-Integrated Reachback platform that seeks to support the effective (1), pp.5643-5647. Information System and efficient application and integration of “Improving maritime awareness requires soft and hard OR techniques within a dis- Prof. Dr. Pickl may be contacted through the an elaborate system of sensors, unmanned tributed decision environment like the MIO Universität der Bundeswehr web page at www. systems, screening portals, modeling and experiment series. unibw.de/startseite/index_en.html

Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence 32 COMMUNICATIONS AND CYBER SECURItY

ecuring the maritime environment relies Common on many factors such as interagency co- S ordination, international cooperation, and organized response. The ability to identify Design Standards, threats far away from where they may strike helps to reduce vulnerability by reducing the necessity to respond to threats on short times- Interoperability cales. Situational awareness on its own cannot guarantee a secure maritime environment, but and Data Fusion it is a key enabler to building the knowledge required to recognize threats and respond to them efficiently. As the quantity of data in- Karna Bryan, creases from scarce to abundant, operators are NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO) Centre for Maritime no longer able to manage and fully utilize all Research and Experimentation (CMRE) available information in order to make the La Spezia, Italy connections required to sufficiently identify threats in advance. The employment of in- novative tools and automated techniques are a vital component of information superiority. A complex global supply chain and com- plicated maritime governance are two other contributing factors to situational awareness. The amount of commercial and recreational maritime traffic is massive and this traffic often operates on a global scale, with no one entity having all critical pieces of information. Additionally, no single nation has a mandate to govern the Global Maritime Commons, yet all nations have a common interest in protect- ing the environment and securing the right of free passage. Collaboration is essential for the common interest, and it follows that some level of shared situational awareness is essential for effective collaboration. While data sharing is fundamental to increased situational aware- ness and is frequently discussed, an area yet to receive significant attention is how data which is shared will be effectively utilized. This must be done collaboratively, without each agency or nation operating in isolation. Data fusion is the process of combining data from multiple sensors and other forms of knowledge to create the most complete and accurate understanding of objects in the en- vironment as possible. With increasing sen- sor coverage, new platforms, and better infor- mation sharing, the technical requirement to quickly synthesize this information into a use-

33 Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence is to develop a standardization within data fusion engines which enable partners entities to better utilize data collaboratively. Key to this collaboration is the use of an open frame- work as an expandable base where additions and modifications to the collective knowledge and know-how can be made by participating organizations when appropriate. Even with- out explicit contributions from partners, the CoMSSoFT framework could be used simply as a means of standardization in data fusion engines. A secondary objective is to create a highly modular environment to facilitate more efficient development and the ability to quickly tune and adapt algorithms to new data sources and environments. The current trend is to replace monolith- ic implementations of software and command ful and precise picture is a clearly identifiable and control systems with open architecture, challenge. The ability to correlate between Data fusion is the process service-oriented implementations. These more high-level, context-based knowledge and low- of combining data from modern systems are an important enabler in ef- fectively using all available data. The next step level information about location in space and multiple sensors and other time is also a prerequisite to building a picture beyond the sharing of data will be the sharing of intent. forms of knowledge to create of algorithms, or “services” in a software engi- From a technical point of view, data fu- the most complete and neering paradigm. The benefits of such service- sion has multiple definitions and a wide va- accurate understanding of oriented architectures are notable, allowing for riety of algorithms can be employed. Data objects in the environment rapid integration of new data sources and the fusion can be as simple as overlaying infor- as possible. rapid prototyping of new services. As these sys- mation and re-aligning data to match time tems are becoming more effective at managing stamps. For location data, target tracking al- the sharing of data, the next step will be the in- gorithms are often used to optimally correlate sion engines are generally used as a black box sertion of modular components which provide multiple data sources over space and time. where data is fed in and supplied back, with content and added value services to the data. To These range from simple rule-based measures no knowledge of what happens inside the box. achieve collective Maritime Situational Aware- defining “close” to sophisticated mathematical Often, significant investment has gone into ness (MSA), data on its own is of little value, formulations which account for motion mod- the development of these algorithms, and the unless its meaning can be collectively under- els and interactions between multiple targets. challenges of “algorithm sharing” may be even stood. Enabling and enforcing interoperability It is widely agreed that there is no “holy grail”, more difficult than data sharing. in the design of these components will allow or single algorithm which is best for all situa- With the aim of enabling interoperability greater contributions by a larger spectrum of tions; however the best model for a particular between tools which can reason on maritime industry partners which can allow nations, or- situation will depend on the sensor mix, target data, the NATO Science and Technology Orga- ganizations, and agencies to better exploit the characteristics, and other factors. nization (STO) Centre for Maritime Research information available to them. n Interoperability between data fusion en- and Experimentation (CMRE) is working on gines would enable nations to not only share an interoperability platform which allows vari- The NATO Science and Technology Orga- data but also the tools to manipulate data. The ous national programs and industry partners nization (STO) Centre for Maritime Research effort to define a framework for this interoper- to share a common framework for processing and Experimentation (CMRE) web page is ability is non-trivial and undertaking such an data. The framework is called the “Collabora- www.cmre.nato.int initiative is less interesting for a single nation, tive Multi-Sensor/Source Fusion and Tracking” Ms. Bryan may be contacted for further in- agency, or industry partner. Existing data fu- (CoMSSoFT) tool, and the primary objective formation and follow up at [email protected]

Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence 34 JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS

Littoral Sea Control Concepts

CDR Mark Coffman, USA-N Ultimately, the goal for Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE) NATO should be to use the Norfolk, VA, USA collective expertise of the various centres of excellence to establish a sound doctrine for joint operations in the JOS COE has recently completed work geographical features and the human terrain that littoral environment and to on the final draft of an“A Warfighting may impose limitations on his actions. Under- issue the doctrine in a formal C Concept for Littoral Sea Control”. This standing the battlespace requires both academic NATO publication. concept was developed with help from repre- expertise about the region in question and oper- sentatives from the Centre of Excellence for ating experience. It also requires persistent intel- Operations in Confined and Shallow Waters ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), or formal wargame simulations that stress the (CSW COE), UK Maritime Warfare Centre both before, during, and after any conflict. complexities of operating in the littoral envi- (UK MWC), the Netherlands Navy Maritime Persistent ISR requires access to the bat- ronment against a hybrid maritime threat. Les- Warfare Centre (NLD MWC), NATO Naval tlespace. Access is assured through the attain- sons learned from these exercises can be further Mine Warfare Centre of Excellence (NMW ment of a measure of air superiority and sea con- integrated into the doctrine established thus far. COE), and the US Naval Warfare Develop- trol, which also enables maritime manoeuver. Future NATO operations will likely be ment Command (NWDC). The concept will This access in turn, allows for the application of conducted from within the maritime environ- provide NATO maritime and joint command- local airborne and seaborne ISR platforms, per- ment. These operations may not be confined ers an operational level doctrine for joint mari- mits strike operations ashore and afloat, and en- to the waters around the European land mass time warfighting in the littorals against a hybrid ables effective employment of information oper- as NATO security concerns expand across the threat pursuing an anti-access/area denial strat- ations; vital to success in a littoral environment. globe. Ultimately, the goal for NATO should egy, while operating at strategic distance from Force protection, always a critical require- be to use the collective expertise of the vari- the European continent. The concept scope is ment, is particularly important in the littoral ous centres of excellence to establish a sound broad and focused on the doctrinal aspects of environment, given the overlap of various con- doctrine for joint operations in the littoral en- littoral sea control operations, while providing ventional and asymmetric threats found within vironment and to issue the doctrine in a formal an overview of the other elements of the Doc- the confines of coastal waters. These threats can NATO publication. This approach will provide trine, Organization, Training, Material, Leader- range from high-tech capabilities such as cyber NATO a baseline from which to conduct train- ship, Personnel, Facilities, and Interoperability attacks, and ballistic or defense cruise missiles ing for future operations, which may include (DOTMLPFI) format. to low-tech fast inshore attack craft (FIAC) and crisis management operations in littoral waters In the course of the concept’s development, naval mines. Utilizing sea-based command and at strategic distance. n several doctrinal pillars for littoral sea control op- control can mitigate the threat to shore based erations emerged, which were based on historical headquarters and facilitate operations in a GPS CDR Coffman is a Staff Officer at NWDC analysis and wargaming. These pillars are inter- or satellite denied environment. in Norfolk, Va. The CJOS COE Warfighting related. First, a commander must understand The next step in further developing the Concept for Littoral Sea Control Concepts can be the littoral battlespace in which he fights. This concept described above is to seek opportuni- found at www.cjoscoe.org/published_docs.html. understanding includes not only the enemy’s or- ties to validate the doctrine. These opportuni- Comments are welcome and should be sent to usff. der of battle and anticipated strategy, but also the ties may exist within future planned exercises [email protected]

35 Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence BOLD ALLIGATOR: EXERCISE AND EXPERIMENtATION 2012 Review CDR Pedro Fonseca, PRT-N Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE) Norfolk, VA, USA

n the spring of 2012, along the coast of Amphibious Task Force\Commander Landing both reports as well. Lack of early coordination Virginia and North Carolina, military forces Force staffs on board USS WASP, embedded and follow through hampered US and coalition I from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, with the Riverine Group and underway on forces by causing confusion and communication Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, board FS MISTRAL. problems. Lack of LNOs aboard FS Mistral, use Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States From the U.S. perspective, Exercise BA12 of 2 different time zones, pre-exercise knowledge conducted BOLD ALLIGATOR 2012 (BA12). was the largest Navy and Marine Corps am- base of amphibious operations on staffs within As part of an annual series of exercises, BOLD phibious exercise conducted in the last ten various operations’ centers were identified as ALLIGATOR was a large-scale, multi-national, years. Due to sustained combat operations in causatives for difficulties in operability. amphibious exercise designed to maintain and Iraq and Afghanistan, the Marines have been Both reports recommended similar follon further the allied littoral expertise. more focused on land operations. The previ- on actions. There should be early engagement by The US and France made the largest force ous live exercise executed at the Expeditionary all partners in order to reveal differences and de- contribution. The U.S. employed the USS Strike Group and Marine Expeditionary Bri- ficiencies as a key component to success. Facili- WASP, USS KEARSARGE, and USS SAN AN- gade level was conducted in 2001 on the US tation interoperability and information sharing TONIO to embark the Expeditionary Strike East Coast. The BOLD ALLIGATOR series is issues required all involved to address the iden- Group and Marine Expeditionary Brigade. aimed at revitalizing and reinforcing the Navy tified issues early enough in order to develop a USS ENTERPRISE and her escort combatants and Marine Corps traditional roles as “fighters solution. This includes: acknowledging and con- supported the exercise, as well as units from the from the sea”. figuring a common operation system; addressing 1st Riverine Group, US Coast Guard and five The BOLD ALLIGATOR series actually Foreign Disclosure issues prior to exercise com- auxiliary ships from Military Sealift Command. started in late 2007 following publication of “A mencement; all partners should participate in France provided the amphibious assault ship FS Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapow- pre-exercise education for a knowledge baseline; MISTRAL with embarked Commander Am- er”, with a unified U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine exercise standards for time zones and terminol- phibious Task Force staff, amphibious landing Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard strategy. In order ogy; and lastly, provide engagement and liaise to battalion and embarked helicopter air wing. to implement this strategy, Sailors and Marines smooth the difficult areas. Additionally, a Dutch boat detachment, a Ca- identified the specific requirements and train- Overall, BA12 was an excellent oppor- nadian Army Company and a Royal Marines ing objectives through workshops, symposiums tunity to strengthen the proficiency of the Company each took an active part in the train- and academic training sessions. Navy\Marine Corps team’s amphibious capa- ing. U.S. Marines have recently fought side-by- This exercise, unrelated to any current bilities and enhance partnership with coalition side with these allies in Iraq and Afghanistan; geo-political situation, involved fictional coun- maritime forces. Realistic exercises, such as the this exercise provided another opportunity for tries and opposing forces to provide realistic BOLD ALLIGATOR series, are essential to these coalition forces to refine and strengthen scenarios that an amphibious task force may be maintain US and coalition military forces in their combat skills, this time from a sea-based expected to successfully encounter. The train- persistent combat readiness, able to act world- environment. As expected, this generated some ing was based on a continuum of scenarios that wide at sea and ashore. The important lessons important lessons learned, discussed in the lat- develop critical experience and skills that the identified from BOLD ALLIGATOR 2012 ter part of this article. Navy\Marine Corps team is likely to leverage were interoperability and information sharing. The Combined Joint Operations from the in the near and distant future. By addressing these matters early in the exercise Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE) played Communication in a multinational ex- planning process, it will better allow command an important role in BA12 by capturing “Les- ercise amongst all partners is a requirement and control communications and operations sons Learned” from a “Coalition Interoper- in order to be effective. Early in the planning throughout a combined task force. For the fu- ability” perspective. Additionally, CJOS COE process of BOLD ALLIGATOR 2012, Cenrix ture, and in an effort to minimize resources and played a key role in facilitating the communi- was identified as the favored system to allow operating funds, CJOS COE is now focused on cation and integration of coalition forces via information sharing/communications between BOLD ALLIGATOR 2013 as a synthetic exer- liaison officers. Lastly, BA12 was an excellent all partnering nations; however, it was not cise in April/early May 2013. n opportunity to collect data to support our Pro- used from “cradle to grave” for planning and gramme of Work items including: Amphibious execution causing discontinuity in sea, air, and CDR Fonseca is a Staff Officer at CJOS COE Force Operations, Littoral Warfare, Joint Sea- land coordination. Secondly, not all key plan- in Norfolk, Va. He may be contacted at usff.cjos. Based Operations, Interoperability, Humani- ning documents such as OPTASKs for ASW, [email protected]. BOLD ALLIGATOR 13 contin- tarian Aid\Disaster Relief and Information Ex- ASUW, and AAW were released to coalition ues to build on BA12 and the previous exercises. change. To accomplish this, CJOS COE staff partners due to classification problems. BOLD ALLIGATOR 13 is scheduled 22 Apr-02 officers were deployed with the Commander Interoperability was noted as a hindrance in May 2013.

Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence 36 MBUILDINGaritime MARITIME Security EXPERTISE| Global Situation

Collaboration is a virtue at NATO Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation “Our role is to be a catalyst for scientific work among the nations.”

Edward Lundquist Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation (CMRE) La Spezia, Italy

ATO’s premier undersea research center is broaden- around the world to take advantage of exciting discoveries, ing its horizons. Although now 50 years old with inventions and knowledge. N a legacy for discovery and innovation in support of To investigate underwater acoustics, the Centre has the warfighters; the Centre for Maritime Research and Experi- world’s quietest research vessel, the R/V Alliance, designed mentation in La Spezia, Italy, takes a vibrant and enthu- for underwater acoustic research for the benefit of NATO siastic approach to finding and trying new concepts and and member nations. “We invite researchers to see how we technologies. can collaborate on oceanographic and maritime research In July 2012, the NATO Undersea Research Laborato- that is best conducted aboard a highly capable and quiet, ry became CMRE. “We welcome this opportunity to apply dedicated research platform,” according to Tielbuerger. our knowledge and capabilities to the entire maritime do- CMRE also operates the smaller 94-foot coastal re- main,” says Director Dr. Dirk Tielbuerger. “This will better search vessel Leonardo. Like Alliance, CRV Leonardo is built reflect our contributions to meet the needs of the 28-nation for quiet operation to enable acoustic research. alliance, and to take full advantage of science and technol- Known for its work in anti-submarine warfare, today the Centre is creating new approaches to maritime security and harbor protection for NATO’s Emerging Security Chal- The Centre invites visiting scholars lenges Division Defense Against Terrorism program. and interns from a broad spectrum of Powerful modeling and simulation tools allow scenari- academia, government agencies, and os to be examined that could not be accomplished in the re- industry to join in the research and al-world. Gaming technology is used to improve advanced interoperability and watch stander capabilities in maritime bring fresh insights and ideas. security situations. “We’re studying how to protect military forces, seaborne shipments, and critical civilian infrastruc- ture in ports and harbors during times of high threat alert,” ogy and expertise. Our Science & Technology (S&T) focus says CMRE scientist Ron Kessel. is to develop and then demonstrate how new concepts and One widely used tool today is the internationally ad- equipment perform in the operational maritime environ- opted Automatic Identification System (AIS), which requires ment.” every vessel larger than 300 tons to transmit identification CMRE is a world-class laboratory with a highly quali- and sailing information. CMRE has been investigating fied international staff of scientists, along with technicians ways effectively use this data for maritime domain aware- and engineering support to fabricate and conduct experi- ness. “Situational awareness is sort of an all-encompassing ments. The Centre invites visiting scholars and interns sort of task to know more about the maritime environment from a broad spectrum of academia, government agencies, than we know right now,” says Dr. Karna Bryan, a CMRE and industry to join in the research and bring fresh insights research scientist. “A lot of our global awareness is based and ideas. Just as important, the Centre has been, and con- on AIS.” Bryan, a mathematician, is an operations analyst tinues to be, a fulcrum for leveraging the work of partners developing tactical decision aids for various warfare func-

37 Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence tions. Better understanding AIS data can point out po- form—which have life cycles of several tens of years— to tential problems, through identification of traffic pattern capabilities. New platforms are built to support multiple anomolies. missions with a variety of capabilities. You basically plug “Maritime anomaly detection requires an efficient in the ones that you need for this mission.” representation and consistent knowledge of vessel behavior. That has motivated Potter and his associates to look Automatic Identification System (AIS) data provides ship’s at unmanned underwater vehicles. “They’re smaller and state, vector, and identity information to automatically de- cheaper than ships. In the past you explored the undersea rive knowledge of maritime traffic in an unsupervised way,” environment by towing a long sensor aperture from a big states Bryan “With AIS, more and more data becomes avail- ship, we now have new intelligent-adaptive ways of gather- able, and people are not able to process it all. In fact, right ing and responding to environmental information. As the now, I think there is more data unmanned vehicles mature than people can use. We’ve and becoming autono- gone from not enough dots on mous, the new challenge the screen to too many dots on has shifted toward their the screen. We’re developing intelligent behavior.” ComSoft, which is Collabora- “It is our role to be tive Multi-Sensor Source Fu- a catalyst for work among sion and Tracking Tool, which the nations; a place where is a computationally intensive the nations can send sci- solution to automatically learn entists and collaborate at maritime motion patterns us- sea to achieve the mission ing unsupervised algorithms of NATO,” says Chief Sci- to analyze the AIS data flow entist Ed Gough. “Even so it is suitable for historic or when nations have an S&T real time analysis.” In look- capability themselves, they ing for anomalies, it becomes can gain a great deal from less of an issue of what a par- collaboration.” ticular vessel is doing, but Since the end of the rather whether there are ves- Cold War, NATO has been sels that are not doing what proactive in reaching out to they should be expected to do. other nations in an attempt “Surveillance remains a chal- to promote its mission of lenge because certain vessels peace, cooperation and in- that you’re interested in are teroperability. CRME em- not necessarily easy to track,” bodies the ability to work says Bryan. together to form coalitions The Centre is also experi- to establish an environ- menting with autonomous ment of security. unmanned systems to conduct “At CMRE, we are undersea surveillance and in- proud of our past,” says tervention to sense, compre- Tielbuerger. “But we are hend, predict, communicate, focused on the future.” plan, make decisions and take appropriate actions to achieve Contact the Centre for Mar- mission goals. According to CMRE research scientist Dr. itime Research and Experimentation about research partner- John Potter, “Naval operations have been traditionally ships, visiting researcher opportunities and internships: performed by a relative small number of large, expensive SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY platforms dealing with well-defined threats to which those ORGANIZATION CENTRE FOR MARITIME platforms could be designed to address.” “That’s chang- RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTATION ing,” he says. “The threats are now much more diverse, Viale San Bartolomeo, 400 – 19126 La Spezia – Italy changing rapidly, and so we require a more adaptable, Tel: +39 0187 5271 - Fax: +39 0187 527 700 - E- flexible response. That’s changed the focus from the plat- Mail: [email protected]

Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence 38 EXERCISE AND EXPERIMENtATION Multi-National Experiment – 7 Maritime Domain

CDR P. J. Cummings, USA-N CJOS COE Project Officer for MNE-7 Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE) Norfolk, VA, USA

Introduction Operations in Confined and Shallow Waters this insight, MNE-7 evolved the concept into Throughout 2011 and 2012, a group of (COE CSW) worked to design an improved a maritime security Enterprise, centered on the 17 NATO and partner nations collaborated in ability to build and enhance “maritime secu- idea of a global network of maritime security a comprehensive concept development and ex- rity regimes” (MSR). An MSR is a group of regimes. perimentation (CD&E) effort to address “Ac- states acting together under a framework aimed The concept of this Enterprise is not cess to the Global Commons”. Since 2001, towards improving collectively, security in the merely the sharing of maritime situational the United States has spearheaded these multi- maritime domain. CJOS COE had previously awareness, but neither is it a supra-national en- national efforts in a series of limited objective written a white paper titled “A Framework for tity governing authority over the oceans. The experiments. The aim of these experiments is to Enhanced International Maritime Security Enterprise is an active, voluntary, collaboration apply academic and analytical rigor to concepts Cooperation and Awareness”, which informed of nations and the MSRs that they form. This and operations that involve military forces. This the initial foundation for the maritime domain active collaboration carries significant potential latest campaign (MNE-7) sought to improve concept. The subsequent campaign consisted in securing the resource that makes the world coalition capabilities to ensure access to and of five workshops and two limited objective economy possible, i.e. the global maritime com- freedom of action within the Global Commons experiments. The concept writers and profes- mons. Two principles inherent to its success are domains (Maritime, Space and Cyberspace). sional analysts developed case studies and que- (a) the building of confidence and trust among The specific problem statement was: “Nations and organizations require concepts and capabilities for anticipating, deterring, pre- This active collaboration carries significant potential in securing venting, protecting against and responding to a the resource that makes the world economy possible, i.e. the disruption or a denial of access to the global com- global maritime commons. mons domains (maritime, space and cyber) and for ensuring freedom of action within them, while ried subject matter experts from the military participants and (b) the establishment of mu- taking into account their interrelationships.” and civilian ranks. Their work culminated in tual stakeholder benefit. Concomitant with The framework for the campaign con- an innovative concept titled “Maritime Security these principles are complementary functions sisted of four outcomes, each dedicated to the Regime Concept” and an implementation plan of Enterprise support to MSRs. They are: (1) three aforementioned domains with the fourth titled “Enterprise Proposal and MSR Manual.” the net-enabled collaboration of the MSRs, (2) dedicated to the linkage between them, or the This concept and its accompanying manual a repository of proven best practices and MSR “inter-domain”. consolidated the lessons from current maritime procedures, (3) the enhancement of the “assess- • Outcome 1, Maritime Domain, co-led security regimes with the goal of fostering and ment” aspect of situational awareness and (4) an by United States and Germany facilitating mutual support among them. The advocacy function that collaborates, mentors • Outcome 2, Space Domain, co-led by latter is where the Maritime Domain objective and builds capacity within the Enterprise. Canada and NATO ACT of MNE-7 achieved the greatest impact. • Outcome 3, Cyber Domain, led by Increased Situational Awareness United Kingdom The Big Idea At first glance, networking the MSRs for • Outcome 4, Inter-Domain Understand- increased situational awareness and operational ing, led by France In the early phases of the case studies, con- current with initial conceptual work, the prob- cueing provides an obvious potential for more The Combined Joint Operations from lem of situational awareness horizons started effective response efforts. A clear example of the Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE) to emerge. The challenges faced by a MSR this networking at the regional level was the lent its expertise and efforts to the concept ex- inevitably originate or reach beyond the MSR’s Italian Navy’s work to found a network of perimentation within Outcome 1 - Maritime geographic and operational limits. A global ap- federated surveillance systems, which has now Domain. Co-led by the U.S. and Germany; proach to regional problems is then necessary become the Trans-Regional Maritime Network CJOS COE, the 17 nations; and the COE for to overcome this inherent disadvantage. With (T-RMN). The T-RMN began as an idea with

39 Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence roots in NATO, EU and national initiatives to has historically lost one billion dollars annually Sovereignty Concerns Addressed network maritime situational awareness. It has to unlicensed and unregulated illegal fishing. As MNE-7 developed and codified the subsequently expanded to network the mari- The regional GDP per capita is under $2,400 Enterprise concept, it was initially not with- time operations centers of the wider Mediter- making this a viscerally acute loss. Throughout out detractors. Throughout the concept de- ranean community. This includes five North the previous decades, bi-lateral engagement in velopment, the various subject matter experts African navies of the Maghreb plus the inte- maritime capacity building throughout Africa and some concept writers raised concerns with gration of Brazil and Singapore through their (Russia, U.S., et al) involved providing opera- creating a global maritime governing body or own national systems (SISTRAM and OASIS). tional assets (i.e. boats) and some basic train- contributing to the loss of national sovereign- With this increased situational awareness fa- ing. This resulted in little to no increase in any ty at sea. These concerns are understandable cilitated by open collaboration, maritime assets maritime security capacity of any form for any and, perhaps even valid. However, the sur- are coordinated in identified areas and warning length of time. In contrast, the APS mentor- render of any governing authority is expressly indications are dramatically improved. As one ship has facilitated the rapid improvement of counter to the prescription of the Enterprise’s might predict, the T-RMN partners have com- African states’ capability and capacity in fisher- concept. To be of any value, the MSR En- pounded their operational effects simply by ies protection. This sustained success has cre- terprise must be the collaborative network of sharing data and analysis. This improvement ated an immediate benefit at both the govern- regional MSRs. Any authority that the MSRs also shows potential for further operational ex- ment level and within the coastal population. have is a product of the sovereign authorities pansion as their network matures and grows in Concurrently, there is a growing, mutual confi- that support them. In short, the Enterprise scope and effectiveness. dence among the participating navies. serves the MSRs who make up its voluntary network of contributors, who in turn serve Mentorship MSR Formation the nations that fund and support their own While the tactical and operational im- In this same vein, the Enterprise becomes regional actions. The power of the Enterprise provement with this expanded situational a key enabler to the formation of new MSRs is not in the usurping of sovereignty, but in awareness is self-evident, the Enterprise can and the sustained improvement of existing re- supporting it. provide much more to allied MSRs in mutual gimes. For example, the International Mari- benefit and strategic advantage. A strategic ad- time Organization (IMO) and the Regional Conclusion vantage of the Enterprise is the ability to link Co-operation Agreement on Combating Piracy Herein lies the strength of the MSR En- MSRs facing an emerging problem in their re- and Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) terprise. The momentum of confidence and gion with other MSRs who have an established were instrumental in supporting the emerging trust created from successful and voluntary expertise in addressing that challenge. This MSR in the Gulf of Aden and western Indian collaboration establishes mutual benefit and an mentor function reduces the required time to Ocean, that results from the Djibouti Code of increased operational agility in a complex en- learn and adapt to issues, possibly eliminating Conduct (Djibouti Code). The IMO hosted vironment. Sustaining the engagement in this the mistakes of a solitary effort. This transforms the initial conference for the Djibouti code, Enterprise offers an even greater potential than the MSRs into more agile and responsive en- where the draft MOU was developed. IMO the immediate gains. It reinforces the mutual gines of change, i.e. it mitigates the need to re- then linked the Djibouti Code representatives benefit and institutionalizes the norm of a se- invent solutions to previously solved problems. with ReCAAP, who provided a proven MSR cure maritime domain. The result is a steady, We see this with the multi-national effort of construct that meets both operational and po- global improvement in stable and continued mentorship that the U.S. and its partners from litical requirements. ReCAAP and IMO con- access to the maritime commons and freedom Europe, Canada, Australia, and South America tinued their involvement with a joint training of legal action within it. This maritime secu- have provided to the emerging nations of Af- program for the Djibouti Code’s Information rity is ultimately a critical foundation for the rica, through the African Partnership Station Sharing Centres and a set of agreements that world’s economy. It is this dual approach of a (APS). One highlight of APS’s success is its pave the way for complete operational link-up global Enterprise, combined with individual impact on the nascent Maritime Organization in ReCAAP’s and the Djibouti Code’s anti- improvement efforts, that promises to ensure of West and Central Africa (MOWCA) work- piracy efforts. In this instance, the roadmap to future security in the maritime global com- ing to form an MSR on the continent’s west concrete results already existed, with ready part- mons. Within the maritime realm, MNE-7’s coast. APS brings navies with developed mari- ners to facilitate an efficient operational transi- concept and accompanying manual offer an time safety and security into a recurring contact tion. This is not to state that the formation of adaptable and effective construct for sustained with African participants. As these developing an MSR is now a simple matter requiring little global maritime security. n navies mature in capacity and capability, they in effort. Yet, the involvement of another MSR turn, take on more of the planning and training dramatically improves the efficiency and effec- CDR Cummings is a Staff Officer at CJOS roles of the engagements. This persistent and tiveness of the formation process. When com- COE in Norfolk, Va. For further information tailored interaction creates an enduring fast- pared to what would otherwise be the necessity or provide comments, you may contact usff.cjos. track to a much higher level of success and re- to form a MSR independently from scratch, [email protected]. For additional information on turn on the African investment. For one of sev- the transformational impact of this Enterprise CJOS COE, you may visit our website at www. eral specific examples, the continent of Africa is difficult to refute. cjoscoe.org.

Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence 40 EXERCISE AND EXPERIMENtATION

“Mental Models and their

Influence on the Concept CDR Linda M. Spangler – USA-N CJOS COE Development Process” Norfolk, VA, USA

Introduction One day while reviewing the Allied Com- mand Transformation’s Concept, Development and Experimentation (CD&E) Handbook1, I came across the statement that the output of the CD&E process is a concept. Reading fur- ther, one discovers that a concept is “a notion or statement of an idea, expressing how some- thing might be done or accomplished, that may lead to an accepted procedure”. This definition of a concept is refined within the handbook to state a concept is a “solution-oriented transfor- mational idea that addresses a capability”. The crux of both of these definitions is a concept is an idea. So, how are ideas formed? No, I am not a neuroscientist with the intention of explaining the inner workings of the brain. I Figure 1 am; however, a Staff Officer positioned within a diverse international organization tasked with models is considered a basic characteristic of Figure 1 is a simple illustration of the concept development. The purpose of this ar- the human cognitive system4. mental model constructed by each individual’s ticle is to explain how ideas are formed as men- For example, if I were to say “I rode my interpretation of the word “bike” where cogni- tal models, the dangers and pitfalls of mental bike to work this morning”. My Dutch col- tive factors influenced their model. The cogni- models, and their influence on the concept de- league, knowing I enjoy exercise, might pre- tive factors listed in figure 1 are just a few. They velopment process. sume, since it is a sunny day and in his nation are by no means exhaustive nor does the figure there are more bicycles than people, that I imply that both individuals used the same cog- What is a Mental Model? pedaled my way to work. On the other hand, nitive factors to reach the end result and they The definition of “Mental Model” depends my Italian Supervisor, a motorcycle enthusiast, didn’t necessarily use the factors I have repre- on the discipline and context in which one finds knows that my family owns a motorcycle and sented. Building on the definition presented of a mental model, the following are a few key char- There are various applications that facilitate bringing mental acteristics of mental models5: models into the open and supporting collaboration. • Mental models include what a person thinks is true, not necessarily what is actu- these words. The contemporary originator of a motorcycle is extremely helpful to utilize the ally true. the mental model concept was Kenneth Craik, High Occupancy Vehicle lanes, lanes that en- • Mental models are similar in structure to a psychologist, who in 1943 stated that mental able one to possibly avoid the dense Hampton the thing or concept they represent. models are “small scale models of reality2” or Roads traffic. Considering the above, he might • Mental models are simpler than the thing more simply stated “individual mental repre- think of a motorcycle instead. Whether a bicy- or concept they represent. sentations of the external world influenced by cle or a motorcycle is imagined, each individual These characteristics are important when cognitive factors3”. The ability to form mental built their own mental model. evaluating the dangers and pitfalls of mental

41 Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence models as well as assessing their influence on recommended by the CD&E Handbook. One come up with new ideas or concepts. It is these the concept development process. reason these actions are beneficial to the process new concepts that ultimately contribute to NA- is that concept development is a collaborative TO’s transformational goals. Errors in mental Dangers and Pitfalls of Mental Models effort providing a measure of insurance guard- models are inevitable but if personnel and orga- Recognizing some of the dangers and pit- ing against the mental model pitfalls previously nizations acknowledge the importance of these falls or limitations of mental models enables cited. There are various applications that fa- models or even the existence of mental mod- organizations to establish mechanisms to re- cilitate bringing mental models into the open els, they can position themselves to reduce the duce the limitations that mental models can and supporting collaboration. A contemporary limitations of mental models by establishing sometimes inject. The following are a couple term for one form of this is “Mindmapping”. processes that harness each individual’s creativ- of mental model limitations6: A more formal definition is “A mind map uses ity, leading to new ideas and concepts. I leave 1) Just like the first mental model character- visual thinking to create an organized display of you with one final quote from Mr. Johnson, the istic listed above states, mental models are the plan, problem, or project—a diagram that author previously quoted, who likens ideas to not always reality. This can be dangerous mirrors the way our brain naturally processes neurons in the brain, “A single neuron firing when ignored because unrealistic models information7”. Mindmapping tools range from alone produces nothing. It is when thousands can lead to false conclusions. basic office tools that most Staff Officers cur- of neurons fire in sync that an idea is born”. n 2) Similar to the above, mental models are not always articulated; therefore, assump- tions remain unchallenged. Mental mod- “A mental model changes with time and even during the flow els are only as accurate as the information of a single conversation. The human mind assembles a few upon which they are based. realtionships to fit the context of a discussion. As the subject shifts 3) Mental models can be mental traps. Men- so does the model. Each participant in a conversation employs tal models are built to assist in the devel- opment of ideas; however, failure to con- a different mental model to interpret the subject. Fundamental tinue learning or process new experiences assumptions differ but are never brought into the open.” can sometimes create mental models that — Jay Forrester, inventor of magnetic-core memory storage. become barriers to new ideas. The cog- nitive factors become frozen producing stale models which must be discarded. As rently have access to on their desktop to an as- CDR Linda Spangler is a Supply Corps Of- Heidi Klum would say on Project Runway sortment of freeware and commercial software ficer in the United States Navy assigned to the “One day you are in and the next day you available online. Some example applications Maritime Operations Branch at CJOS COE. She are out!” include FreeMind, Mindjet, Gliffy, Mind42, is the project lead for a new CJOS COE project and TheBrain. in 2013 supporting ACT in the development of a Influence on the Concept Finally, building on guarding against roadmap to execute NATO’s Modeling and Simu- Development Process mental model pitfalls and using collaborative lation vision and objectives. This project is sched- As previously mentioned in the definition applications, usually in concept development uled to kick-off in May of 2013. You may view the of mental models, the formation of a mental two ideas are better than one. I cannot attempt CJOS COE web page at www.cjoscoe.org to explain this any better than, Mr. Steven model is a basic characteristic of the human 1. Allied Command Transformation, Concept Develop- cognitive system. Therefore, mental models are Johnson, author of “Where Good Ideas Come ment and Experimentation Handbook, January 2013. essential to the concept development process. From: The Natural History of Innovation”, 2. Craik, K. (1943). The Nature of Explanation. Cam- The CD&E Handbook states that in concept who argues that “although we tend to think bridge: Cambridge University Press, p61. development, one must “approach the task that good ideas emerge from our own mental 3. Cognitive factors are something immaterial (as a circum- with an open mind prepared to alter course in prowess; our environment provides an equally stance or influence) that contributes to producing a result. light of knowledge gained”. Personnel engaged crucial influence. If we isolate ourselves from www.thefreedictionary.com. the intellectual influence of others then good in concept development must continually learn 4. Jonassen, David. (2005). Model Building for Concep- 8 and stay abreast of new information in order to ideas will rarely develop ”. Communicating tual Change. Interactive Learning Environments Vol 13, constantly reevaluate their mental model. The our mental models to others allows our ideas Taylor and Francis Group, p19. best new ideas are said to develop by gradually to evolve as well as endure a form of testing 5. McDaniel, Scott. http://boxesandarrows.com/whats- adding bits of complexity to older ideas. through the validation of our assumptions. your-idea-of-a-mental-model/. Another example of the influence of men- 6. http://www.createadvantage.com, 28 Feb 2013. tal models in the concept development process Conclusion 7. http://www.mindjet.com, 3 March 2013. is during the detailed phase of the concept Personnel involved in the concept devel- development process. Throughout this phase, 8. Johnson, Steven. Where Good Ideas Come From: The opment process must recognize the need to Natural History of Innovation. Riverhead Books, 2010. the production of a series of drafts, soliciting continually change their mental models and http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=mind- comments, and brainstorming are all highly perceptions of reality, in order to effectively reviews-where-good-ideas-come-from.

Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence 42 Maritime Security

The Sad State of Maritime Blindness

Mr. Tim Dunne MA, CD, APR Halifax, CAN

he consuming public, and by extension Freedom of the seas is guaranteed by the tude of women and children, there are many their governments, are generally oblivi- United Nations Convention on the Law of the unscrupulous predators who take advantage of T ous to the degree to which they depend Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982, which comprises, the disadvantaged for personal profit. Accord- on the oceans as a major transportation su- inter alia, freedom of navigation, overflight, ing to the United Nations Office on Drugs and perhighway, a source of food and energy and fishing and freedom of scientific research. Crime (UNODC), while maritime smuggling strategic resource. Consumers and manufac- This constitutes de facto authorization for of migrants is a small proportion of the total turers are unconcerned that 90 per cent of the nations to exercise these freedoms, to use the number of migrants smuggled worldwide, it world’s trade is conducted by the international ocean commons for commerce, trade, fishing, accounts for the highest number of deaths shipping industry. The oceanic transportation transportation and recreation. But navies, coast among smuggled migrants. industry has transformed the industrialized guards and law enforcement agencies that en- UNODC notes that an estimated 1,000 world into a “just-in-time” manufacturing force these provisions, do so invisibly. Only oc- lose their lives each year. The International zone, in which “our warehouses now float,” as casionally and with the cooperation of the me- Catholic Migration Commission puts the Canada’s Rear-Admiral David Gardam, com- dia can the public learn of our reliance on the number higher, reporting that 2,000 people mander of the Royal Canadian Navy’s Atlantic world’s oceans. The Interagency Round Table lost their lives in the first months of 2011, Fleet, observed. of International Shipping Associations cautions including 61 people who died of dehydration The public’s blasé expectation that what that with any significant disruption to mari- and starvation on board a boat in the Mediter- we want will be available when we want it with- time commerce, “Half the world would starve ranean Sea. out being mindful of how it arrives at the table, and the other half would freeze.” Energy security store shelf or the assembly shop floor has been What are the issues that consumers, man- loosely called maritime blindness. It also de- ufacturers and governments are missing? Maritime oil drilling operations and bulk scribes the lack of awareness about strategic and Canadian public policy analyst Tim Lynch carriers that carry petrochemical resources to security issues associated with international use enumerates a series of hot buttons that emanate user nations need to be protected to ensure that of the ocean commons. from our growing reliance on maritime trade they arrive and not suffer any mishap along About one million mariners are employed and commerce: the way. Another aspect of energy security is in 50,000 merchant ships registered in more Nigeria’s experience, losing $7 billion to oil Human smuggling and trafficking than 150 nations. New Zealand’s Vero Marine theft from maritime drilling platforms. And Insurance estimates that between five and six With illegal profits from US $7 to 12 bil- recently there was another threat emanating million sea containers are in transit at any lion per year from human smuggling and traf- from Iran, saying if it had to, it could block the given time. ficking and $32 billion from the sexual servi- flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz — a

43 Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence waterway that borders that country and con- gions under dispute. Portions of the Arctic are Two terrorists believed to be responsible nects to the Persian Gulf and channels almost being subjected to claims by the United States, for the bombing of the USS Cole mastermind- 20 percent of the world’s oil. Russia, Norway, Denmark and Canada; and, ed the 7 October 2002 bombing of the French In January 2012, Britain’s Royal Institute we are facing the possibility of conflict over the supertanker Limburg. The bombing came the of International Affairs issued a briefing paper, claims to the small island archipelago which Ja- day before the first anniversary of the U.S.-led Maritime Choke Points and the Global Energy pan calls Senkaku and China calls Diaoyu. war against the Taliban and the al-Qaeda terror System, in which it warned that “the global Included in the many other territorial network in Afghanistan. energy system is vulnerable to disruption at claims with a maritime association that could The 27 February 2004 bombing of Su- key maritime choke points such as the Straits spark conflict are: Mauritius and Seychelles perFerry 14 off the Philippine coast destroyed of Malacca, Bab Al-Mandab, the Suez Canal, claim to the Chagos Islands; Spain and Mo- the ship and killed 116 people, including 15 the Turkish Straits and the Strait of Hormuz.” rocco both claim Perejil Island, which led to an children. Two years later, Philippine authori- The international community, it warned, armed incident between the two countries in ties arrested three suspected Moro Islamic Lib- must establish and maintain legal and political 2002; and Somalia and Yemen claim the So- eration Front (MILF) members attempting to measures to ensure the security of these choke cotran Archipelago. carry improvised bombs aboard SuperFerry 3, points and that this “ultimately rests . . . on the docked in Parang town in Maguindanao. willingness and capacity of interested members Maritime terrorism And added to this list are: of the international community to enforce it if Terrorism has a maritime component with necessary.” Drug smuggling a legacy that goes back to October 7, 1985, when four Palestinian Liberation Front mem- A United Nations report estimated the Port security bers hijacked the cruise ship Achille Lauro off global illegal drug trade at US$321.6 billion Eighty per cent of global trade passes the Egyptian coast. Singling out 69-year old re- in 2003, against a global GDP of US$36 tril- through the world’s 4,000 ports, making them tired American businessman Leon Klinghoffer, lion. Since the 1980s, maritime traffickers of the potential targets for illegal activity and ter- they shot him and threw his body overboard. cocaine, who transport over 80 percent of the rorism. An article in the respected journal, The cocaine for the United States market, have been Royal Navy Commodore Steve Chick Economist (11 October 2002) disclosed that an remarkably and successfully innovative at evad- explained to this writer, “When you see the Egyptian, suspected of being an al-Qaeda ter- ing detection. The private aircraft of the 1980s significant volume of trade, you see some of rorist, was discovered hiding in a sea container were replaced by “go-fast” boats in late 1990s these container vessels, gas carriers and car car- in the Italian port of Gioia Tauro. Had he not that could carry approximately 2,000 kilograms riers that are plying their way backwards and been discovered, his voyage would have taken of cocaine. High speed fiberglass boats traveling forwards between our countries, it is very easy him to Halifax, NS. up to 130 kilometres per hour were faster than the vessels of enforcement authorities. At about $25,000, the boats were cheaper and more eas- The public’s blasé expectation that what we want will be ily disposed than airplanes. available when we want it without being mindful of how it arrives at the table, store shelf or the assembly shop floor has been loosely called maritime blindness. to conceal something. That’s why we need ro- bust port security facilities and cargo loaded in a more secure manner.” Cmdre Chick’s remarks were made prior to NATO’s Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE) and the Centre of Excellence for Operations in Confined and Shallow Waters (COE CSW) Maritime Security Conference held in Halifax, Nova Scotia last June. The highly respected magazine, The Economist, warned in 2002 that any container aboard any carrier ship could deliver “an instru- ment of death.”

Territorial claims Despite the general belief that all land has been allocated to the various nations since the Treaty of Westphalia, there are hundreds of re-

Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence 44 receive can be expected to be increasingly hos- tions and its maritime choke points — straits tile and laws regarding illegal residents more of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok — increas- hardened. ingly critical gateways for energy, manufactured goods and produce between the Indian Ocean Maritime piracy and the South China Sea. Events off the Somali coast have raised The Strait of Hormuz is another narrow the profile of piracy and attracted the world’s entranceway, with the United Arab Republic’s attention. But the problem isn’t exclusively So- peninsula jutting between the Iranian head- mali. There have been reports of piracy in the lands. This makes the strait particularly vul- Caribbean as well. Dr. Manoj Gupta, a retired nerable to political polemics between Iran and A boarding team from the Royal Thai Navy’s Indian Navy submarine commander with 22 customers for the oil leaving the Persian Gulf. HTMS Similan investigates a skiff suspected of years of naval service and currently a member of Post-modern hyper-globalization has ele- being involved in an attempted pirate attack on the Australian Defence Science and Technology vated the Indian Ocean from being merely a se- Liberian-flagged merchant vessel MV Hellespont Organisation, recognizes piracy as a major con- ries of shipping arteries to an important centre Protector in the Gulf of Aden Oct. 28, 2010. cern. He warns that Somalia-based piracy has for the flow of materials and the development Hellespont Protector evaded the skiff. (Combined grown from its birthplace in the littoral waters of investment relationships among the Pacific Maritime Forces photo/Released) off Haradeere to the waters of the United Arab Rim nations as well as the north Atlantic Rim. Republic to the north, northern Mozambique Illegal migration to the south and eastward to India’s Gujarat Communicating maritime blindness The arrival in Vancouver of 76 Sri Lankan peninsula. In effect, consumer and corporate sectors Tamil men aboard The Ocean Lady in October In 2011, while there were 160 incidents of are as oblivious to the maritime sector as they 2009 underscored the extent to which impover- piracy off the Somali coast, there were 13 in the are to the automotive sector and the agricul- ished people will go to improve their lives, and South China Sea, 33 in Benin, 37 in the Gulf tural sectors, until they are made aware of the the extent to which unscrupulous people will of Aden, 46 in Indonesia 16 in Malaysia and 39 importance of those commodities by principals exploit them for profit. There are estimates of in the Red Sea, totalling eleven more than were within those communities, or by the absence between five million and fifteen million illegal in Somali waters. of the very commodities they want and need. residents in the United States; illegal migrants By virtue of their blue-water operational New Trade Customers have landed on both of Canada’s coasts, and the jurisdictions, navies have always been away potential to land illegal migrants in Canada’s In a speech at the East-West Center, from the public eye and distant from the public warming north is increasing. Washington, D.C., Michael Wesley, former consciousness, earning the moniker “Silent Ser- There are at least 50,000 illegal workers Executive Director of Australia’s Lowy Institute vice”. The Center for International Maritime estimated to be in Australia, but a 2010 Austra- for International Policy, explained that while Security (CIMSEC), a non-profit, non-parti- lian Government report suggested it could be the east Asia’s trade with North America grew san think tank, describes U.S. efforts to address as many as 100,000. Thousands of illegal Afri- by 3¼ times between 1998 and 2008, its trade this “blindspot” in the public knowledge of the can migrants make the trek across the Mediter- with south east, south and West Asia grew by importance of the global ocean commons, by conducting a series of Fleet Weeks across the country to educate Americans, by “bringing ex- In 2011, while there were 160 incidents of piracy off the Somali posure to the sea services even in those corners coast, there were 13 in the South China Sea, 33 in Benin, 37 in of the country far from a sea.” the Gulf of Aden, 46 in Indonesia 16 in Malaysia and 39 in the The 16th century Dutch Renaissance humanist, Desiderius Erasmus opined, “Con- Red Sea, totalling eleven more than were in Somali waters. cealed talent brings no reputation.” The world’s “Silent Services” need to develop and imple- ranean Ocean to Italy. However, the target of 6¼ times over the same. This pan-Asian trend ment programs to educate their citizens about choice for illegal migration is the United States, is accelerating: while Indo-Pacific trade grew by the importance of the seas as marine super- viewed worldwide as the most desirable destina- 240% in the 1990s, it grew by 280% in the highways, and the roles and missions of their tion for people seeking to improve their circum- decades that followed. navies and coast guards in protecting the inter- stances. The growth of industry in India and ests of their nations on the ocean commons and Catherine Dauvergne of the University China is creating increased competition and ac- in littoral waters. n of British Columbia’s Faculty of Law sets the celerating price wars for resources, witnessed by worldwide number of ‘illegals’ at a minimum the sharp increases at the gas pump. Tim Dunne is a retired Canadian military of 20 million. As the financial and employ- The new industrial and manufacturing officer and is currently a Nova Scotia-based mili- ment situations continue to worsen for many models have created new oceanic trade corri- tary affairs writer and analyst. He can be con- of migrants’ target nations, the receptions they dors making the Indian Ocean, with its 33 na- tacted for comment at [email protected].

45 Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence Maritime SecuritY

ombined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE) has C organized an annual Maritime Security Conferences since 2008 with the objective of improving international maritime security co- operation and awareness. Since MSC 2011, the Centre of Excellence for Operations in Confined and Shallow Waters (COE CSW) has joined with CJOS COE as a co-organizer. In uniting our forces to organize the last two conferences, it has set an example for other or- ganizations in the endeavor to address global maritime challenges in a cooperative manner. The world’s prosperity in today’s intercon- nected economic system is dependent on safe sea lines of communications and maritime se- curity (MS) is providing the means to that end. Today’s maritime environment is experiencing a wide range of national, regional and global challenges which require both a collective ap- proach and collective effort to address. Mari- time security is a requirement for the smooth functioning of the global economy and this factor should provide the impetus to bring in- ternational players together in cooperation, ir- Maritime Security respective of geographic locations and political positions. Global partnership and cooperation have Conference (MSC) always been the backbone of the Maritime Se- curity Conference. Over the years, maritime security has been discussed and explored from a Series Report variety of perspectives. The focus was on infor- mation sharing in 2008, improving collective CDR Mahmut Karagoz, TUR-N capabilities in 2009, building a comprehensive Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence (CJOS COE) approach in 2010, creating a strategic frame- Norfolk, VA, USA work in 2011, and identifying and developing cooperative strategies to address future chal- lenges in 2012. The overarching goal for the Maritime Se- curity Conferences was to enhance global mari- time security by focusing on how to implement cooperative and capable security measures around the world. A frame work for interna- tional maritime security cooperation, as was discussed extensively during the MSCs, would help achieve this end by setting policies and standards that promote an integrated approach to information sharing and international coop- eration. Maritime security issues and responsi- bilities are distributed among different agen- cies within the governments, a collaborative and coordinated effort among various agencies and authorities is essential in order to quickly respond to maritime threats and mitigate

Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence 46 Maritime Security

risks. Therefore, a wide representation was the the years, this goal has been achieved, and we eration occurs when there are common inter- goal for participation at the conferences. Par- can now talk about a common understand- ests. If maritime actors have common interests ticipants ranged from strategic level political/ ing of maritime security and its fundamentals. that are served by cooperation, then there will military leaders to the operational mid-level This is a very important achievement – we be a significant motivation to work together. decision making/decision support personnel cannot meet challenges and solve problems in The maritime security challenges on an organi- of global maritime stakeholders, including not the absence of common understanding of all zational or national level can be extrapolated to only NATO or military representatives but also aspects of maritime security. MSC discussion regional/international maritime security where civilians, government representatives, interna- topics revolved around three mutually depen- they are joined by additional concerns such as tional organizations, academia and commercial dent main pillars. The three pillars are: mari- language and cultural differences; national ten- partners with a very good geographic represen- time security cooperation, maritime situational sions and conflicts; suspicion; lack of common tation of the world. awareness/information sharing and maritime doctrine; leadership; interoperability challeng- Choice of conference venue was also an security governance. The first pillar is the most es; and, varied technology levels. enabler to achieve the Maritime Security Con- inclusive, and the other two pillars could be in- Collaboration, coordination and coop- ference objectives. The conferences were not cluded in this category, although it is helpful at eration on a regional level offer unique oppor- held in one location but rather the location some stages to discuss each separately. Other tunities and challenges. There are even more was changed from year to year. Selecting dif- aspects of maritime security discussed over the challenges to implement and maintain one ferent locations in Europe and North America years are Maritime Security Operations, future overarching international body to deal with undoubtedly enhanced the exposure to a wider threat environment, technical capabilities, ISR, maritime security. If there is one overarching professional and academic audience. climate change, management of natural re- body, it is likely to be not only distant geo- A number of deliverables were produced sources, protection of marine environment and graphically but also unaware of the dynamics after MSC series. These products include: a cyber security. particular to each region. These challenges will CJOS COE White Paper, the MSC 2011 Pro- Achieving maritime security globally is an complicate the process of coordination and ceedings, the MSC 2012 Proceedings and the enormous task and no one state has this capa- make the organization either insensitive to, or MSC Series Analysis. bility in itself. The only alternative is to build unaware of, local concerns, potentially creating The CJOS COE White Paper “A Frame- a global network of maritime security coopera- resentment that it is not addressing problems work for Enhanced International Maritime Se- tion, whereby all states have a role and respon- as well as regional actors who understand the curity Cooperation and Awareness” identified sibility in securing the maritime domain against area might. Decision-making processes will the need for central governance and standards the broad challenges that exist today, from the work more efficiently among countries that in order to coordinate regional efforts among national up to the international level. These have common challenges, concerns, connected various existing international organizations. synchronized efforts among the different enti- by the realities of their geography – i.e. com- This coordination of effort would help to estab- ties and nations are the key to the success of mon interests. lish an international framework for maritime maritime security. The basic form of cooperation is informa- security cooperation. The CJOS White Paper Inter-agency cooperation is one of the tion sharing. A problem with information shar- has been central to the MSC series and was ana- fundamental elements of MS. The civilian and ing is that information is often closely guarded lyzed and discussed between MSC 2011 and military counterparts that have separate mari- by the agencies that collect it. States tend to 2012 by the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies time security responsibilities allocated by law over-classify and over-protect information; in- (CFPS) at Dalhousie University at a dedicated should work very closely and in harmony with formation should be classified to the minimum workshop. one another. Information must flow seamlessly level required so that more of it can be shared. among civilian, constabulary and military secu- Institutional and cultural change will be neces- MSC Discussions and Key Issues rity networks. sary to bring about greater cooperation among Given the alarming proliferation and Political will is the driving force to increase all maritime security entities and build the core adaptability of criminal and piracy activities, cooperation at all levels, within and across ju- of maritime security cooperation. Information the importance of keeping the Sea Lines of risdictions. Without support from the politi- sharing will be more likely, widespread and effi- Communication open and safe is becoming cal leadership, cooperation will be limited to a cient if there is a certain level of trust and trans- more and more important for the nations that low level, and activities that do occur will fail to parency among the stakeholders. These are are connected with the vital requirements of bring all the stakeholders together and will not critical challenges because broad information global economy. Disruptions in any part of the orchestrate maritime security efforts. Political sharing may make some countries/agencies global system will ultimately affect all nations. leadership is even more critical to achieve inter- uncomfortable. It may be viewed as reducing Therefore, establishing better maritime security national (bilateral, multilateral, regional, inter- their sovereign rights and/or jeopardizing their cooperation now is a critical step to preserving regional) engagement. security. maritime security and stability in the future. International maritime security coopera- The limits and definition of the role of The MSC series began with the aim to tion should unite regional initiatives. We must navies to provide maritime security are still create awareness about maritime security. Over recognize that regional and inter-regional coop- not clear and vary from state to state, but the

47 Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence curity challenges. Multi-stakeholder rity arrangements offers the greatest promise to involvement – including political ac- achieving an international level of cooperation. tors, governmental departments, legal There is already sufficient structure for co- institutions, law enforcement agencies, operation; it is time for action. The best way academics, international organizations is to start with simple, basic information ex- and non-governmental organizations change as the first step. Based on the success of – are crucial for success. this experience, it will evolve to broader coop- Maritime security engagement eration. Taking small steps will help to develop should be guided by a long-term par- trust. In some cases, it may be very difficult to ticipative strategy that will help to ac- build trust among certain partners but, even so, tivate political and public attention. cooperation on small matters will establish the The overall strategy needs to consider practice of working together. There remains organizational, national and regional much to be done to achieve the desired level of differences to reduce cultural barriers. international cooperation for maritime security There are numerous successful operations, but small steps are a start. regional bodies conducting maritime Maritime security initiatives need to create efficient inter-agency cooperation as maritime security requires multi-stakeholder engage- MSC Themes ment including all relevant state, international, non-state and corporate partners. They have to • MSC 2008: “Structuring a Global work in concert with each other. Maritime Information Sharing It may be unrealistic to expect one inter- Environment.” national authority to act as an executor of the • MSC 2009: “Delivering Maritime common goal of secured maritime security on Security in Global Partnership: all oceans. However, such a global body is re- capabilities that navies offer, especially for blue Improving Collective Capabilities.” quired as a facilitator for developing guidelines water security operations, remain irreplaceable. and a collaborative environment for all parties Some people would argue that maritime secu- • MSC 2010: “Delivering Maritime involved. The question – “Who should coor- rity is not one of the traditional warfare roles for Security in Global Partnership: dinate and lead international maritime security which navies are trained and equipped. On the A Comprehensive Approach for cooperation: Is it an existing organization like other hand; however, maritime security tasks Mutual Benefit.” UN/IMO, or a new body formed by a group of have been carried out by navies for centuries, likeminded states, or a confederation of all the • MSC 2011: “Delivering Maritime and around the world the maritime security op- regional initiatives?” - will certainly be a central Security and Safety in Global erational practices of navies are highly similar focus of our upcoming work. Partnership: Creating a Strategic – although not standardized. Framework for Maritime Security Commercial companies have different MSC Way Ahead Cooperation.” concerns, with a focus on profit. To them, mar- The Maritime Security Conference series itime security is not their biggest concern. On • MSC 2012: “Delivering Maritime created significant maritime security aware- the contrary, increased maritime security ap- Security in Global Partnership: ness and identified the need to work together plications such as International Ship and Port Identify Cooperative Strategies for improved maritime security. The solution Security are considered a threat to business and For Future Maritime Security to maritime security challenges requires global profitability. How can commercial interests, Engagement.” participation, and our conferences have always ownership and crewing of vessels be balanced aimed at achieving this goal. The Maritime Se- with effective maritime security response and curity Conference series has inspired and led to law enforcement? security initiatives. They all display at least new initiatives for international maritime secu- the possibility to be a model for a global mari- rity cooperation. n MSC Findings time security network and cooperation. Sepa- No country can tackle the maritime secu- rate solutions have to be brought in line with CDR Mahmut Karagoz is a staff officer at rity challenges alone. Therefore, a more effective a common goal. The responsibility starts at CJOS COE in Norfolk, Va. For further infor- network of global MS cooperation needs to be the national level with a vision to interact with mation on this subject, he may be contacted at instituted, synchronized and operationalized. regional and international MS actors. A bot- [email protected]. The full MSC report is We must remember that military power tom-up approach starting at the national level, available at http://www.maritimesecurityconfer- alone will not be able to address maritime se- followed by the linkage to sub-regional secu- ence.org/

Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence 48 CENTRES OF EXCELLENCE FACT SHEET n A COE is a nationally or multi-nationally • Civil Military Cooperation • Military Medicine sponsored entity, which offers recognised (CIMIC / NLD) — (MILMED / HUN) — expertise and experience to the benefit www.cimic-coe.org www.coemed.hu/coemed/index.php of the Alliance, especially in support of transformation. • Cold Weather Operations • Human Intelligence COE (CWO / NOR) — (HUMINT / ROU) — www. n A COE is not part of the NATO http://mil.no/education-training/ natohcoe.org/en/home/ command structure, but forms part of coe-cwo/Pages/coe-cwo.aspx the wider framework supporting NATO • Counter – Improvised Explosive Command Authority. • Joint Chemical, Biological, Devices COE (C-IED / ESP) — Radiological & Nuclear Defence www.coec-ied.es/ n COEs support transformation through COE (JCBRN / CZE) — Education and Training; Analysis of http://jcbrncoe.cz/joomla • Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operations and Lessons Learned; Concept COE (EOD / SVK) — Development and Experimentation; and, • Air Operations Analysis and https://www.eodcoe.org Doctrine Development and Standards. Simulation Centre (CASPOA / FRA) — www.caspoa.org/ • Modeling and Simulation n There are 18 NATO accredited COEs: COE (M&S / ITA) — • Command & Control COE (C2 / TO BE PROMULGATED • Joint Air Power Competence Centre NLD) — http://c2coe.org/ (JAPCC / DEU) — • Energy Security COE www.japcc.de • Cooperative Cyber Defense (ENCOE / LIT) — COE (CCD / EST) — http://enseccoe.org/ • Defence Against Terrorism (DAT / www.ccdcoe.org/ TUR) — www.coedat.nato.int (All web sites are unclassified) • Operations in Confined and Shallow • Naval Mine Warfare Waters COE (CSW / DEU) — n The NATO point of contact for COEs is (NMW / BEL) — www.coecsw.org/ ACT’s Transformation Network Branch - www.eguermin.org/coe/coe.asp https://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/TNB • Military Engineering COE • Combined Joint Operations from (MILENG / DEU) — http:// the Sea (CJOS / USA) — milengcoe.org/Pages/default.aspx www.cjoscoe.org

49 Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence 2012 ANNUAL REPORT

CAPT Peter Crain, CAN-N 2012-2013 Programme CAPT Alberto Maffeis, ITA-N CJOS COE of Work Norfolk, VA, USA

JOS activities are guided by a pro- in Confined and Shallow Waters. This confer- gramme of work approved by the spon- ence, the fifth in a series of conferences, high- C soring nations based upon the requests lighted building greater collaboration and co- received by NATO, the CJOS member coun- operation amongst international and regional tries, and other entities. CJOS, as an organiza- maritime security organizations. The MSC tion outside the NATO Command Structure, series fostered considerable awareness of Mari- is open to requests for support by any organiza- time Security (MS) issues and led the way to tion and, requests received will be considered new initiatives for international maritime secu- for inclusion in the programme of work based rity cooperation. To capitalize on the success of upon their alignment to CJOS interests and the MSC series, the decision was taken to fore- those of the sponsoring nations and NATO. go a conference in 2013 in favor of a series of The 2012-13 CJOS Programme of Work is workshops dedicated to advancing the NATO summarized below. Maritime Security agenda. CJOS COE and COE CSW will examine the status of ongoing Programme of Work MS projects with an announcement expected Throughout 2012, CJOS COE continued in early summer 2013 as to the location and Royal Netherlands marines and sailors attached to build upon its knowledge of joint maritime focus for MSC 2014. Continuing into 2013, to the U.S. Navy Riverine Squadron (RIVRON) operations and demonstrate this knowledge CJOS COE plans to support Allied Command 1 prepare to begin a hot extraction drill Feb. 7, through active participation in exercises and the Transformation in the development and refine- 2012, at Camp Lejeune, N.C., during Bold Al- publication of several concepts. The year began ment of several overarching Maritime Strategy ligator 2012. Bold Alligator is a joint and mul- with several of CJOS COE staff participating and Security concepts and a NATO Joint Sea tinational amphibious assault exercise involving in the BOLD ALLIGATOR exercise series. Based Operations concept, further maintain- several foreign militaries and the U.S. Navy and CJOS COE staff provided a keen focus on In- ing CJOS COE’s reputation as the “go to” Marine Corps, designed to execute brigade-sized teroperability and Lessons Identified. The year centre for international maritime expertise. In amphibious assaults against low-to-medium land progressed with CJOS COE publishing several addition, new for 2013, is CJOS COE’s par- and maritime threats to improve amphibious core documents, some of which are detailed in this ticipation in the NATO Reaction Force 2014 competencies. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Commu- edition of “Cutting the Bow Wave”. In June certification process, the review of the NATO nication Specialist 1st Class Lynn Friant/Released) 2012, CJOS co-hosted its annual Maritime Se- Maritime Evaluation Checklist, and the devel- curity Conference (MSC) in Halifax, Canada opment of a Riverine Operations concept. We with the Centre of Excellence for Operations are sure these projects will continue to meet the

Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence 50 2012 ANNUAL REPORT

expectations of our sponsoring nations as well contribute to NATO’s transformation goals.

Maritime Strategy During 2013, CJOS COE will be engaged in three major projects related to NATO Mari- time Strategy. First, the command will be re- viewing the Conceptual Framework for Allied Operations (CFAO) to provide recommenda- tions that link ongoing and emerging Maritime Domain concepts with the Allied Maritime Strategy and NATO Strategic Concept. Sup- porting the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in developing the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) from the Maritime perspective with the overall objective to maintain the Alli- ance’s relevance post-ISAF is another important piece of work this year. Lastly, CJOS is taking part in the NATO Strategic Foresight Initiative (SFI) focused on the future security environ- ment to set the strategic context by both estab- lishing a shared perspective of the long-term future and then developing a concept for how NATO could operate in the future.

Maritime Security CJOS COE is supporting Allied Com- mand Operations and Allied Command Transformation in the development of “Im- plementation Concept for Maritime Security Operations-ICMSO”; that will enable NATO to implement the NATO MSO concept. CJOS COE will lend its expertise to the implemen- tation of MSA in MSO and a refresh of the NATO MSA concept.

Maritime Cyber Review/Maritime Information Dominance There are increased operational com- plexities and multiple maritime stakeholders involved within the Maritime domain, which makes the existing environments particularly vulnerable to cyber attacks, which could result in severe maritime service disruptions. We are conducting a literature review of the current state of Maritime Cyber strategies, policies, and concepts to determine if Maritime Cyber related issues are being adequately ad- dressed. The research concentrates on identify- ing cyber arena gaps that need to be addressed with new and future concepts, as a common prospective, but also from the civilian and in- dustry side.

51 Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence CJOS COE will continue to support any result- ing follow-on work of this concept. One of the first outcomes of the concept is ACT’s proposal to include elements of the NJSBO concept in the upcoming Multinational Capability Devel- opment Campaign (MCDC) 2013-2014.

Analysis and Lessons Learned Modeling and Simulation (M&S) is an invaluable tool to enabling NATO’s transfor- mation goals such as those articulated in Smart Defence and the Connected Forces Initiative. The benefits of M&S apply to numerous ar- eas such as concept development, training, defence planning, and support to operations. Recognizing the need to further implement NATO’s M&S vision, ACT worked with Nations and other NATO agencies to develop a customer and supplier business model to better allow NATO to exploit the potential benefits of M&S. In order to better understand the needs of potential M&S customers, ACT requested the support of the Centres of Excellence in developing the customer side of the business model. CJOS COE, as a potential customer of Throughout the calendar year, CJOS M&S, understands that modeling and simula- COE will continue to investigate Maritime tion is important to adding analytic rigor to Cyber, especially on the area of Cyber Secu- the concept development process and accepted rity impacts on Maritime Security (MSA and this task for 2013. The kick-off meeting for MSO) and also the interrelationships among this project is a NATO M&S Customer Forum Cyber Security, Maritime Security, and Energy to be held in May in Rome, Italy. This meet- Security. ing will be held in conjunction with ITEC, an annual forum for representatives from the Operations on and from the Sea military, industry and academia to connect and CJOS COE was requested by the French share knowledge with the international train- Maritime Force Headquarters (FRMARFOR ing, education and simulation sectors. HQ) to develop a concept for Riverine op- CJOS COE supports the formal lessons CJOS COE supports the learned process primarily through active partic- erations, to include brown and green water as formal lessons learned well as special boat operations by revising cur- ipation in the BOLD ALLIGATOR amphibi- rent international doctrine and examining best ous exercise series, as well as other exercises on process primarily through practices. After collating a substantial quan- a smaller scale. This directly feeds our work active participation in tity of doctrinal and tactical publications, the on interoperability, especially with regard to the BOLD ALLIGATOR Expeditionary Operations section is conduct- European NATO countries joining and operat- amphibious exercise series, ing an analysis of the relevant documentation ing in U.S.-led exercises and operations. This as well as other exercises on also touches several other CJOS programme and developing the concept’s framework. The a smaller scale. concept is expected to be delivered by 31 De- of work issues, such as NATO Joint Sea Based cember 2013. Operations, Multinational Capability Develop- The development of the NATO Joint Sea ment Campaign, and, inter alia, Amphibious Basing Operations (NJSBO) concept was initi- Operations Working Group. ated by CJOS COE and resulted in a formal Interoperability task in April 2012 from NATO International Military Staff to ACT to develop a NATO Joint The CJOS COE has been working on Seabasing concept. The concept is now in its fi- improving Interoperability among Coalition nal stage of being approved by NATO Nations. Navies and US Navy since 2010 through two

Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence 52 2012 ANNUAL REPORT

main paths. The first path is through the use uled US OPTASK to be reviewed & devel- Centers of Excellence, and civil Standardization of the Allied Interoperability Handbook de- oped is OPTASK Mine Warfare while the rest Developing Organizations. veloped in 2010 by CJOS COE to reveal pos- of OPTASKS will follow. sible interoperability challenges and concerns Certification and Evaluation among Coalition Navies and the U.S Navy. Working Groups CJOS lends its expertise to the NATO The analysis of the amount of gathered Within the framework of the NATO Force Structure by assisting, upon request, data has shown 5 major areas of further atten- Standardization Agency (NSA), CJOS COE, in the evaluation and certification of various tion in order to increase the levels of Interoper- since 2007, holds the Chair of the Maritime force entities. In 2012-13, CJOS will provide ability: Operations Working Group (MAROPSWG) support to the Maritime Evaluation Group • Command and Control (C2): Mili- which, in turn, is established by the Military and the Certification of JFC Brunssum. tary cultural differences have an ad- Committee Maritime Standardization Board CJOS will support Allied Command verse impact on interoperability across (MCMSB) to develop standardization and to Operations in the NATO Response Force the C2 spectrum. Documents convey- improve interoperability with the final goal of 2014 (NRF14) Evaluation & Certification ing specific directives and details perti- making NATO maritime forces more effec- process. CJOS staff officers will bring mari- nent to operations must be distributed tive. The 2013 meeting of the MAROPSWG time expertise and additional capacity to assist well in advance to allow time for in was held in Copenhagen, Denmark from 23- in evaluating JFC Brunssum during Exercise depth review and understanding of the 31 January 2013 and over 110 delegates from STEADFAST JAZZ 13 (SFJ 13),scheduled content. NATO, Partner and Contact Nations, as well to take place November 1-9, 2013 in Latvia. • Communications: Effort should be as NATO Commands and COEs, participated The activities leading to Exercise SFJ 13 in- invested to ensure communications in this year’s very successful meeting. Next clude several preparation seminars and exer- plans are a result of early collaboration, MAROPSWG will take place in Taranto, Italy cise planning activities in Brunssum. This detailed planning, and early dissemi- tentatively from 22-30 January 2014. work is consistent with the CJOS mandate to nation. Special attention to the avail- The Maritime Multi-National Informa- support NATO forces’ Education & Training ability of voice and internet networks tion Systems Interoperability (M2I2) Board is as responsibility shifts from Allied Command on both sides is needed to ensure a an operationally focused working group con- for Operations to Allied Command for Trans- good level of flow of information. sisting of representatives from coalition na- formation. • Common terminology, references, tions to enable the provision of critical Com- The Maritime Evaluation (MAREVAL) and procedures: NATO publications mand and Control systems for operations and group is in the process of updating Allied should be used as much as possible to exercises. The M2I2 has been established to Command for Operations Forces Standards provide common references. develop and supervise the implementation of (AFS) Volume 4 - Maritime Standards and • Dissemination of Orders/ Informa- mutually agreed operational and technical so- Volume 8 – Evaluation Manual. Over the tion Sharing: The distribution and lutions for the efficient and secure operation calendar year, CJOS, working as part of the handling of formal orders require co- of all CENTRIXS enclaves, Communities of MAREVAL team, will participate in the revi- alition agreement on method of deliv- Interest (COI), and other networks that are sion of the maritime standards to reflect new ery. The mindset of “inadvertent re- deemed a priority. CJOS holds the position of and updated references. The team will also lease of information” should change to Permanent Secretary of Operations and Train- develop new evaluation checklists to include “failure to share required information”. ing working Group, one of three Sub working quality control checks as part of the Evalua- • Execution: Watch Officer training groups in the M2I2 Board. tion Manual review. This work is scheduled on coalition operations, and access to Since 2004, CJOS COE, as an emerging for completion and publication of the new publications could be improved. Ex- authority in the field of Operations from the standards by the end of 2013. ecution of different tasks or function Sea, has participated in the Amphibious Oper-

or exercises could also improve with ations Working Group (AMPHIBOPSWG). Conclusion the use of common TTPS. This annual meeting is hosted by NATO’s The second path to improved interoper- Standardization Agency and addresses NATO CJOS COE has a very active 2013 ability is through the cooperation with the US standardization issues from an amphibious planned with a Programme of Work that spans Navy aiming at developing releasable US Navy view point. The focus is standardizing Am- the four pillars of transformation: Education documents conveying specific directives and phibious Doctrine; Techniques and Training and Training; Analysis and Lessons-learned; details pertinent to operations (OPTASKs). Methods; Equipment for use in Amphibious Concept Development and Experimentation; These documents will increase integration of Operations; Communications; Operational and, Doctrine Development and Standards. Coalition ships into US Navy forces by de- Intelligence; and, Command and Control re- creasing significantly the releasability prob- lationships to enhance NATO Forces effective- To view CJOS COE’s Programme of Work; lems. To date, there is a releasable working ness and interoperability. The AMPHIBOP- seek additional information; or to request CJOS draft of OPTASK Antisubmarine Warfare & SWG is attended by NATO nations, Strategic COE support, please contact us at usff.cjos.coe@ OPTASK Communications. The next sched- and Operational Commands, Partner Nations, navy.mil

53 Cutting THE Bow Wave | Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Centre of Excellence CJOS COE DIRECTORY

RANK/NAME/CTR-BRANCH POSITION/MAJOR PROJECTS TELEPHONE # 757-443-9850-EXT DSN 646-9850-EXT STAFF HEADQUARTERS VADM Michelle Howard, USA-N Director 5201 CDRE Stephen Chick, GBR-N Deputy Director 2465 CDR Richard Panko, USA-N Fiscal Officer 2457 LT Kelley Slaughter, USA-N Flag Aide 2452 LT Colette LaCompte, USA-N Directorate Coordinator 2611 YNC (EXW/AW) Shonka Houston, USA-N Administrative Assistant 2453 IT1 (IDW/SW/AW) Ana Eskharia, USA-N IT Support 2467

TRANSFORMATION OPERATIONS BRANCH

CAPT Alberto Maffeis, ITA-N Transformation Operations Branch Head 2449 CDR Fabrice Berthelot, FRA-N Expeditionary Operations Section Head 2446 CDR Pedro Fonseca, PRT-N EO SO 2444 LCOL Bas van Rijswijk, NLD-M EO SO 2443 (CDR Gerrit Wiegman, NLD-N; arriving July 2013) LCOL Gary Yuzichuk, CAN-A EO SO 2445 CDR Themis Papadimitriou, HEL-N Maritime Operations Section Head 2448 CDR Linda Spangler, USA-N MO SO 2441 LT Michael Roberts, USA-N EO SO 2454 WO2 Trevor Austin, GBR-RM MO SO 2960

STRATEGIC PLANNING AND POLICY BRANCH CAPT Peter Crain, CAN-N Strategic Plans and Policy Branch Head 2450 CDR Helmut Zimmermann, DEU-N Strategy and Policy Analysis Section Head 2440 (CDR Steinar Torset, NOR-N; arriving Aug 2013) CDR Mahmut Karagoz, TUR-N SPA SO 2466 (LCDR Aytac Yavux, TUR-N; arriving Aug 2013 CDR Patrick (PJ) Cummings, USA-N SPA S 2462 CDR Ove Nyaas, NOR-N SPA SO 2464 CDR Carlos CouceMontenegro, ESP-N SPA SO 2442 CDR Ricky McIver, USA-N Strategic Communication and Knowledge 2461 Management Section Head CDR Patrick (Tater) Nash, USA-N SCKM SO 2463 CDR Lucian Grigorescu, ROU-N SCKM SO 2451

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