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“Mathew Carey‟S Learning Experience: Commerce, Manufacturing, and the Panic of 1819”

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“Mathew Carey‟S Learning Experience: Commerce, Manufacturing, and the Panic of 1819” 1 “Mathew Carey‟s Learning Experience: Commerce, Manufacturing, and the Panic of 1819” Cathy Matson University of Delaware A Paper Submitted to “Ireland, America, and the Worlds of Mathew Carey” Co-Sponsored by: The McNeil Center for Early American Studies The Program in Early American Economy and Society The Library Company of Philadelphia, The University of Pennsylvania Libraries Philadelphia, PA October 27-29, 2011 *Please do not cite without permission of the author 2 The Frustrations of Having an Economic Vision When Mathew Carey arrived in Philadelphia in 1784 he was already convinced that North Americans could achieve the post-Revolutionary economic prosperity that they anticipated only by breaking their continuing dependence on English commerce and credit. He must have been heartened to see regular appeals that year in the Pennsylvania Gazette for “good policy” that would “multiply our currently modest productions and stomp out the luxuries of foreign parts.” Like so many Philadelphians who were getting busy with post-war recovery, “projecting new arteries of commerce and raising up new producing establishments,” Carey believed that the post- Revolutionary decade was a most auspicious moment to establish national self-sufficiency. So he wasted little time cultivating friendships with some of the mid-Atlantic region‟s foremost nationalists who shared his perspective on America‟s future, most notably Tench Coxe. New friends also helped Carey initiate a succession of printing businesses, which became a constant vehicle for spreading nationalist ideas in the years to come. In his early printing efforts, the Pennsylvania Evening Herald (Jan. 1785 to 1787), the Columbian Magazine (Oct. to Dec. 1786), and the somewhat more successful literary and editorial magazine, The American Museum (January 1787 to Dec. 1792), Carey established the core ideas of a political economy to which he adhered – with elaborations over time -- for “the next thirty years.”1 1 “An Act to Encourage and Protect Manufactures of This State,” Pennsylvania Gazette, Oct. 5, 1785; “At a Town Meeting,” ibid., June 22, 1785; Carey, Essays on Political Economy, or the Most Certain Means of Promoting the Wealth, Power, Resources and Happiness of Nations (Philadelphia: H. C. Carey & I. Lea, 1822), Preface, p.vii, for “thirty years;” Carey, Auto-Biographical Sketches. In a Series of Letters Addressed to a Friend. (Philadelphia, 1829), v, where Carey claimed that his early writings coincided with the American System associated with Henry Clay and that the Amer System was his “life long pursuit.” The Essays on Political Economy was Carey’s compilation of some previously written tracts, including his most important writings during the Panic; it was, however, “a dismal failure financially,” according to Kenneth Rowe, Mathew Carey: A Study in American Economic Development (JHU Press: Baltimore, 1933), 85. The American Museum attracted positive recognition from Washington, Hamilton, and other nationalists; 3 For Carey, the bedrock of a viable political economy was protectionism, a wall of discriminatory tariffs designed to limit foreign imports and encourage production of those goods in North America. The prosperity that Americans yearned for in the new republic, argued Carey, would be impossible to achieve so long as they foolishly experimented with “unrestricted commerce” following the Revolution. In addition, he insisted that merchants had been lulled into believing the old channels of commerce in Britain would continue to sustain them long into the future, with “pernicious” results. By the end of 1784 gluts of overpriced goods were being “disgorged on our shores” by British merchants, specie flew from American port cities to pay for a portion of these “unnecessary and luxurious” commodities, and unwary citizens were falling heavily into debt to foreign merchants. Americans lacked, Carey consistently argued, an adequate “protecting power;” high discriminatory tariffs – which would keep British commercial competition at bay -- were essential in a young country that was scrambling to establish international commercial credibility and raise enough capital to make more of its own necessities. Once foreign goods flowed less copiously into the “infant country,” Americans would aspire energetically to meet their own growing domestic demand with new manufactures; in the Tench Coxe was a regular contributor. For Carey’s early efforts in printing, see his Autobiography , p.490, where he acknowledges a gift of “four one hundred dollar notes of the Bank of North America” from Lafayette to get Carey started; also, pp. 491, 60-6, and p.65, where Carey writes of his “intense penury” during these early years. The Autobiography was first published in a series of thirteen installments as letters to The New-England Magazine, dated July 1833 through December 1834, which is the source I used. It is also published, along with other materials, as Cary, Autobiography (Brooklyn: Research Classics, 1942). See also, James Green, “Mathew Carey: Publisher and Patriot” (The Library Company of Philadelphia: Philadelphia, 1985), 5-7, 25-26; and Rowe, Mathew Carey, chap 1. For nationalists’ thinking during the 1780s and 1790s, some of which was compatible with Carey’s views, see Drew McCoy, The Elusive Republic, (Chapel Hill, 1980), 139-165; Cathy D. Matson and Peter S. Onuf, A Union of Interests: Political and Economic Thought in Revolutionary America (Lawrence, Kansas, 1990), chaps 2-3; Matson, “American Political Economy in the Constitutional Decade,” in The U.S. Constitution: The First 200 Years, ed. R. C. Simmons and A. E. Dick Howard (Manchester, UK, 1989), 16-35; Matson, “The Revolution, the Constitution, and the New Nation,” in Stanley Engerman and Robert Gallman, eds., Cambridge Economic History of the U.S., vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA, 1996), 363-401; and Matson, “Capitalizing Hope,” in Paul Gilje, ed., Wages of Independence: Capitalism in the Early Republic, (Chicago, 1997), 117-136. 4 meantime, manufacturers needed the “interposing [of] the powerful aegis of governmental protection in favour of that important portion of the national industry devoted to convert the rude produce of the earth into such shapes and forms as are demanded by the necessities, the comfort, or the luxury of mankind.” As early as the mid-1780s – and continuing through the 1820s -- Carey believed high discriminatory tariffs were the single most important means to break dependence on British commerce and create inviting conditions for manufacturing.2 Many nationalists concurred. George Logan, Tench Coxe, and William Barton, for example, assured readers of the American Museum that protectionism along America‟s coastline would establish the basis for the free flow of business within America. James Madison, from a more southern vantage, believed that the same combination of discrimination against foreign goods and close attention to petty manufacturing in America would secure a “natural harmony of interests” across all regions. Protectionism also figured prominently in early manufacturing societies in Philadelphia – Carey being a founding member of many of them – including the short- lived Society for the Encouragement of Manufactures and Useful Arts in 1787-1788, and the Pennsylvania Society for the Encouragement of Manufactures and the Useful Arts in the early 1790s.3 2 Carey, Essays on Political Economy, “Preface,” p.i; Carey, Auto Biographical Sketches. Letter III, p.16-17; Letter IV, p.21-26. Carey also believed there were too many importing merchants and too few manufacturing entrepreneurs; see Auto Biographical Sketches, Introduction, p.xiv; Letter II, p.10-11. For overviews of tariffs as policy and intellectual argument, see, e.g., Jacob E. Cooke, Tench Coxe and the Early Republic (Chapel Hill, NC, 1978); Philip R. Schmidt, Hezekiah Niles and American Economic Nationalism (New York, 1982); Maurice G. Baxter, Henry Clay and the American System (Lexington, KY, 1995); and Nicholas Onuf and Peter Onuf, Nations, Markets, and War: Modern History and the American Civil War (Charlottesville, 2006). 3 For example, Tench Coxe, “Statements . in Reply to the Assertions and Predictions of Lord Sheffield” (1791), and “Sketches of the Subject of American Manufactures” (1787), in Coxe, A View of the United States of America (Philadelphia, 1794), 111-285, 34-56; William Barton, The True Interest of the United States, and Particularly of Pennsylvania, (Philadelphia, 1786) p.11; Barton, “On the propriety of investing Congress with the power to regulate the trade of the United States,” American Museum 1 (Jan 1787), 13-17; idem, “To the Printers of the Museum,” American Museum 7 (June 1790), 285-292; [George Logan], “A Farmer,” “Five Letters addressed to the 5 Although Carey‟s appeals for high discriminatory tariffs and more manufactures resembled planks in the Federalists‟ platform, his advocacy of a small producers‟ manufacturing republic veered sharply away from plans such as the Report on Manufactures that Hamilton put before Congress in 1791. Carey also developed some doubts about the practices of the First Bank of the United States (although he supported the Bank in principle). He was convinced that liberal lending from local and state banks to the country‟s ambitious entrepreneurs was an essential ingredient in a healthy political economy, and he insisted that such local lending needed the guiding regulations of the national Bank to act as a watchdog over the smaller banks that might be tempted to put their money into circulation
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