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The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare

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The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare The Myth of Air Power Daryl G. Press in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War On February 24, 1991, U.S. groundtroops, supportedby British, French, andArab forces, moved 1 north from Saudi Arabia to liberate Kuwait and destroy the Iraqi military. Four days later the job was apparently done: The Kuwaiti ºag once again ºew over Kuwait City, andwhat remainedof the Iraqi military was in full retreat. Astonishingly, only sixty-three Americans were killedin a groundoperation 2 that most analysts expectedwouldcause thousandsof U.S. casualties. How did the coalition’s ground forces destroy the Iraqi army so quickly and with so few coalition casualties? Does the Persian Gulf War heralda future of U.S. mili - tary dominance and low-cost U.S. military operations? What are the lessons from the ªghting for U.S. foreign policy? The conventional wisdom among historians, military analysts, and foreign policy decisionmakers is that air power neutralized the Iraqi military before 3 the groundwar began. This interpretation of the Gulf War has important im- Daryl G. Press is Assistant Professor in the Government Department and a Research Fellow at the Rockefeller Center at Dartmouth College. He is also an Associate of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. The author would like to thank Stephen Biddle, Stephen Brooks, Daniel Byman, Eliot Cohen, Eu- gene Gholz, David Kang, Thomas Keaney, Jennifer Lind, Thomas Mahnken, Michael Mastanduno, Karl Mueller, Kenneth Pollack, Barry Posen, Joshua Spero, Allan Stam, andWilliam Wohlforth for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. Previous versions of this article were presented at the Dartmouth Seminar on International Politics, the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, the StanfordUniversity Center for International Security andCooperation, the Columbia Univer - sity Institute of War andPeace Studies,andthe New York Military Affairs Symposium. 1. Thirty-six countries joinedthe coalition against Iraq, but the groundoffensive can be fairly char - acterizedas a U.S. operation with British support. The coalition’s groundforce comprisednine and two-thirds U.S. divisions, two-thirds of a British division (two brigades), and two-thirds of a French division (two brigades), along with several less-capable Arab divisions. Only the U.S. and British forces were given important roles in the offensive. 2. The number of U.S. soldiersandmarines killedduringthe groundwar is from Stephen T. Hosmer, Psychological Effects of U.S. Air Operations in Four Wars, 1941–1991 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1996), p. 155. This number excludesthe twenty-eight Americans killedby a Scudmissile that hit a barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, during the ground war. For an account of prewar es- timates of U.S. casualties, see Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Transformation of American Air Power (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 2. 3. For the most prominent analyses that support this view, see Eliot A. Cohen, Director, Gulf War Air Power Survey (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Ofªce [GPO], 1993), 5 vols. (herein- after citedas GWAPS), plus Summary Report. See speciªcally GWAPS Summary Report, pp. 116–117; International Security, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Fall 2001), pp. 5–44 © 2001 by the PresidentandFellows of HarvardCollege andthe Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 5 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/016228801753191123 by guest on 24 September 2021 International Security 26:2 6 plications for U.S. foreign policy andfor U.S. military procurement strategies. For U.S. foreign policy, the Gulf War seems to show—andthe 1999 Kosovo conºict appears to conªrm—that air power is now so lethal, andAmerican air power so dominant, that the United States can win nearly cost-free military victories against its foes. For U.S. military procurement debates, the lessons are equally clear: The UnitedStates shouldsigniªcantly alter its military procure - ment priorities to favor air power over groundforces; in the future, decisive 4 battles will be won from the air. U.S. conªdence in air power is soaring, but the conventional wisdom about its decisiveness in the Gulf War has never been rigorously tested. It is undeni- able that for six weeks—during the period now known as the air campaign— coalition aircraft droppedtons of bombs andmissiles on Iraqi targets. It is also undeniable that Iraq’s ground forces were totally ineffective against the coali- tion’s groundforces. But those facts donot prove that the bombing caused Iraqi ineffectiveness. The questions that must be answeredare: Why were the Iraqi groundforces so incapable duringthe groundwar? Were they neutral- GWAPS, Vol. 2, Pt. 2, p. 107; James A. Winnefeld, Preston Niblack, and Dana J. Johnson, A League of Airmen: U.S. Air Power in the Gulf War (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1994), pp. 5, 285, 287; Thomas A. Keaney, “The Linkage of Air andGroundPower in the Future of Conºict,” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), p. 147; Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conºict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995), p. 474; Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (Boston: Houghton Mifºin, 1993), p. 495; Hosmer, Psycho- logical Effects of U.S. Air Operations; Robert A. Pape, “The Limits of Precision-Guided Air Power,” Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Winter 1997/1998), pp. 93–114; Robert A. Pape, “The Air Force Strikes Back: A Reply to Barry Watts andJohn Warden,” Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Winter 1997/1998), pp. 191–214; Aharon Levran, Israeli Strategy after Desert Storm: Lessons of the Second Gulf War (London: Frank Cass, 1997), p. 29. The only academic studies that place substantial emphasis on the importance of the ground campaign are Stephen Biddle, “Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conºict,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 139–179; Stephen Biddle, “The Gulf War Debate Redux,” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 163–174; and my response to Biddle’s article in Daryl G. Press, “Lessons from GroundCombat in the Gulf: The Impact of Training andTechnology,” ibid.,pp. 137–146. Several U.S. Army-sponsoredaccounts place emphasis on the groundcampaign. See, for example, Robert H. Scales, Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1997); Frank N. Schubert andTheresa L. Kraus, eds., The Whirlwind War: The United States Army in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, 1995); andRichard M. Swain, “Lucky War”: Third Army in Desert Storm (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Com- mandandGeneral Staff College Press, 1997). 4. This position appears to be guiding the current review of U.S. defense policy mandated by U.S. Secretary of Defense DonaldRumsfeld.See Thomas E. Ricks, “RumsfeldOutlines Pentagon Over - haul,” Washington Post, March 23, 2001, p. 1; Tom Bowman, “Pentagon Faces Transformation,” Bal- timore Sun, March 13, 2001, p. 1A; Greg Jaffe, “Pentagon Lists Potential Cuts in About 30 Weapons Programs,” Wall Street Journal, March 26, 2001, p. A3; andMortimer B. Zuckerman, “Rethinking the Next War,” U.S. News and World Report, March 5, 2001, p. 64. Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/016228801753191123 by guest on 24 September 2021 The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War 7 izedby the air campaign? Or were they simply outmatchedby vastly superior 5 U.S. andBritish groundforces? To test the proposition that air power neutralizedthe Iraqi groundforces, I divide the argument into ªve different versions:6 (1) air power preventedthe Iraqis from maneuvering, which is critical in desert combat; (2) air power dis- ruptedIraqi command,control, communications, andintelligence (C 3I); (3) air power severedIraqi supply lines; (4) air power attritedthe Iraqi forces too heavily for them to ªght effectively; and(5) air power broke Iraqi morale. Each version makes predictions about the conduct of the Iraqi ground forces during the groundoperation. In this article I use detailedevidencefrom the ground campaign to test these ªve explanations. The evidence from the ground campaign shows that the conventional wis- dom about the Gulf War is wrong. Although air power played an important role in the coalition’s victory, its role has been exaggeratedandmisunderstood. I make two primary arguments about air power during the Gulf War. First, air power was not decisive; it did not neutralize the Iraqi ground forces. At the endof the air campaign, Iraqi groundforces couldstill maneuver, andthey still hadthe C 3I, supplies, numbers, andmorale to ªght. Second, the six-week air campaign did not play a necessary, enabling role that madethe groundwar “easy” for U.S. forces. Hadthere been no air cam- paign, U.S. andBritish fatalities in the groundwar wouldprobably have been slightly higher. But evidence strongly suggests that with or without the air campaign, the coalition’s groundattack wouldhave ledto a rout of historic proportions. In sum, air power contributedto the coalition’s effort, but the air campaign was neither sufªcient nor necessary for the very one-sided victory. If air power did not neutralize the Iraqi army, why were the Iraqi ground forces totally ineffective during the ground campaign? The answer is that they were simply overmatchedby the U.S. andBritish groundforces. In 1991 the Iraqis ªelded a military that was mediocre even by third world standards, and during the Gulf War they were facing the most powerful military forces in the worldon terrain ideallysuitedto U.S. andBritish military strengths. Further - more, Iraq’s timing was terrible; Iraq invaded Kuwait just after the Reagan mil- 5. An obvious thirdpossibility is that a combination of air bombardmentandthe coalition’s supe - riority on the groundneutralizedthe Iraqi groundforces.
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