"OH, YOU USE 098, YOU MUST BE FROM HERCEGOVINA?" COMMUNICATING IDENTITY IN EVERYDAY CONSUMER RITUALS IN CROATIA Katherine Sredl, University ofIllinois, Urbana-Champaign
During my preliminary dissertation culturally foreign occupying force, which created a fieldwork in Zagreb and Split, Croatia, in 2002- sense of Croatian unity, or at least distanced it 2003, I found the debate over Croatian identity from many internal divisions. After Yugoslavia, played out in symbolic consumption very the transformation of political structures redirects interesting. I chose consumption because it is an the construction of Croatian identity and its everyday act in which people actively create and "other." This research asks how these questions of communicate identity to themselves and to others identity are addressed in everyday life. (Douglas and Isherwood 1973). Often, they For many Croatians from Hercegovina, communicate membership to social groups as well secession from SFRY was a chance to reinstate the as status (Solomon 1999). I thought that these historical, "thousand year old dream of the would be important issues since the post-Yugoslav Croatian state," as well as an ethnically identity, as it was explained to me, is about homogenous Croatian state. For people in Zagreb, negotiating new identities in a changing political it was a chance to leave the balkanization that climate. I noticed differences in style between came with the influx of peasants into Zagreb, their Hercegovci and other people from Zagreb, and I rise in political power, and their "backwards'' sought understanding, from a local point of view, culture and political processes of Yugoslavia. of what this might mean. Informants from Zagreb They could return to their European cultural and generally organized legitimate Croatians as political identity. With the victory of Franjo culturally European, and non-Croatians as Tudjman, who aligned himself with the culturally "Balkan." Hercegovina Croats at home and abroad, the Post-socialism offers an opportunity to historic view of Croatian rights prevailed. Many study the social process in which national identity people from Hercegovina migrated to Zagreb; their is negotiated. The Yugoslav state attempted to village networks took control of political and create a homogenous Yugoslav national identity, cultural life, displacing Zagreb natives and for example. by glorifYing Yugoslav shared diminishing their hopes that postsocialism would peasant heritage (Banac 1999). Political and legitimate their political and cultural views. For cultural history of the Republics, and even within example, Tudjman's argument for annexing the Republics, trumped efforts to present a Hercegovina was that this was not annexation of common peasant heritage at the Yugoslav level. the territory of a neighboring state. but re Critical discussion of the state did not create, establishment of Croatia's historic borders across the Republics, a sense of unity through (Hockenos 2003: 17-80; Tanner 1997: 275-289). protest as might be expected in other movements: Tudjman censored media criticism of his strategy rock musicians and their audiences understood the (Udovicki and Ridgeway 1997: 267-280). This music as expressing protest from the views of discourse directed identity into the historical and Bosnia (New Primitivism), or Slovenia (Laibach) ethnic argument for Croatian statehood and created but rarely a unified, Yugoslav protest identity the '·other" as those internal groups who opposed (Ramet 1999: 126-150). it. Zagreb natives became the political and cultural "other" in their city, just as migration and political Yugoslav project, nevertheless, did create transformation were bringing in migrants from a common "other" within Croatia. The question of Hercegovina. How was this tension negotiated in why Croatia had a right to statehood and what the daily life? borders would be, and who would be excluded, remained rather unsatisfactorily answered for Once, at the beginning of the research many Croatians at the start of the first Yugoslavia project, as I was searching for a hook to hang these (Banac 1983). After 1945. Tito favored a new observations of contested cultural "Croatianness" narrative of unity in which all ethnicities in the symbolic consumption realm, I happened to contributed to the anti-fascist to suggest ethnic tell a friend that my phone number was assimilation. There was also no formal national 098462843. He responded by saying, oh, you are reconciliation in Croatia after World War II for the HDZ, which I took also to mean that I am a (Ramet 1999). Many Croatians, however, Hercegovci (I'm not; my family is from Zagreb experienced Yugoslavia as a politically and and Slavonia). I decided to research why 098 Vol. 23, No.2 Fall 2005. Page: 90 l J. could be a symbol of cultural and inside/outside but your mobile number so they would not know" Croatian identity. (Vera Zagreb advertiser 30). The newcomers used their mobile number from Cronet which came to Croatia Telecom (HT), which had been a be known as a "balkan" brand because of its state-held company, completed the privatization connection to HT and the privatization deal, who process in 1999. Under the guidance of was using it, and how they were using it. "HDZ Hercegovci emigres in Germany, who were tied to was ruled by Hercegovci and they were unliked President Tudjman' s government, Deutsche but they were really rich and they were on [HT Telecom (DT) purchased a controlling share in mobile]" (Vera). HT. Moreover, the state included a moratorium on accepting bids from other fixed-line providers in In 2000, the symbolic field changed. The the privatization terms. For most informants, the Croatian government accepted the bid of Austria's privatization of HT represented the pillaging of the Vodafone to enter the Croatian market. VIPme and Croatian state's rich resources. They saw the HT its 091 prefix offered consumers an alternative to infrastructure as theirs; during SFRY they paid to the symbolic associations ofCronet and 098. build state telecom. They anticipated privatization "VIPme [Vodafone] came on market and the would bring them a return on their investment. people didn't like HT so they went to VIP" (Vera). They also anticipated that it would end the state With the introduction of 091, purgers (Zagreb socialist monopoly style of services. Instead, they natives) were able to communicate their identity. understood that Hercegovci emigres close to the Just as the 48 prefix on Zagreb land lines stood in Tudjman's party, the Croatian Democratic for connections and/or money, 098 and 09I were Community, (HDZ) and foreign interests (DT) understood as signifying cultural identity: 098 profited at their expense. A small group of elites stood in for "Balkan" and 091 for European. With controlled the telecom, creating a situation that did the changes in technology, consumers had applied not seem too different from state socialism. An old meanings to new symbols. They were informant commented, "The war and that period organizing post-socialist changes to national when the, uh, HDZ was in the government and all identity- the end of the Yugoslav cultural identity of privatization, and all that happened with it was project and the start of the Croatian project- along horrible" (Silva Zagreb 32). As a consequence, HT historic lines of creating a national cohesion, and was unpopular with most Croatians. I recall a who has the right to belong. friend from Dalmatia commenting, "I don't care if Hercegovci, ethnic Croatians from Slobodan Milosevic owns the next service fixed Hercegovina, were powerful iN Tudjman's line company in Croatia, I hate HT and I am administration (1990-1999), and in Croatian switching when the moratorium is over" (Marie economics, and many migrated to Zagreb from Sinj 30). Hercegovina or emigre communities abroad after At the end of 1999, HT introduced the 1991. Many informants from Zagreb questioned first mobile phone subscription service in Croatia the legitimacy Hercegovci power with the under the brand Cronet. Cronet was expensive, and argument that they were not culturally Croatia. In most subscribers were Hercegovci. Mobile phone general, this meant they did not speak Croatian service was a way to communicate membership in and their culture was foreign -they spoke a dialect Croatia's new political and economic elite. In the different from Zagreb and they were not civilized eyes of other Croatians, it also communicated and not European as purgers see themselves, i.e. "balkanness" because of the way many people Hercegovci culture was "Balkan". Hercegovci, used their phones. In Zagreb, fixed line prefixes who came from a mountainous borderland with are related to neighborhoods, so telling an Bosnia, viewed themselves as "true Croatians" by acquaintance that your phone number is 4826 032 their historical resistance to the Ottomans and is a way to communicate your status of having an Eastern Orthodox political, cultural, and economic apartment in the center. meaning you have deep influence. This looked like historical fanaticism to local connections and/or money. The Cronet phone purgers. and as other scholars (Ramet 1999: 166) number prefix, 098, however, communicated have noted, like Croatians in !stria, who wanted financial status. It also circumvented and added nothing to do with this type of"Croatianness". The uncertainty to the previously mentioned status in and out groups were all united on one thing, networks of place and connections. "You would defining Croatian culture and history against the tell someone where you lived, and you would lie East. about it and say you lived somewhere better. .. Also you would not give your home phone number
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It seemed to me that people in Croatia, ethnic identity is a complex process everywhere, especially Zagreb, understood Hercegovci as especially in Croatia, a borderland, where most consuming more conspicuously than other groups. informants are ethnically mixed. Focusing on Women and men Hercegovci are associated with ethnic identity makes very few people a legitimate BMW cars and the mafia. An informant Croatian. For people from Zagreb, focusing on commented, "'Young girls driving BMW at the cultural identity ensures their power. For university, things like that, that's usually the Hercegovci, historical identity makes sense mafia" (Jagoda, 35 Zagreb). While the BMW is because it points to a distinct period in which they usually a sign of status and stability in the US, in were part of a Croatian nation. Croatia, it is a sign of power related to corruption. I believe my findings support scholarly My friends pointed to Hercegovci cafes and notions ofOrientalisms and nestling Orientalisms commented on them as places that the mafia (Bakic-Hayden and Hayden, Todorova 1997). frequents. One friend from Zagreb calls them Taking the question out of Serb/Croat context kotsku glavi, square heads, because, she says, that pointed to me the importance of defining is how they look. Respondents describe "Croatian-ness" and how these are related to ideas Hercegovci as lacking taste, extremely patriotic, of the state's legitimacy. Moreover, most and behaving as a mafia- a closed society, helping informants disclosed that one parent or only its own, with ethically questionable business grandparent was from another former Yugoslav and political behavior. This tension between Republic, but they identified themselves as Hercegovci and purgers in a post-Yugoslav Croatian. I felt that this informed an open climate of negotiating identity was the theme of a discussion of the problems of definitions of play I saw, "staje smijesno, banda lopovska" ethnicity, because most people cannot claim to be "what's so funny, you band of thieves". ethnically "pure" Croatians. Also, the country's An important aspect of the stories of regions share different cultural and historical informants from Zagreb is that they react to the influences. It felt as if the country was in a period changing social structure by re-defining their of negotiating who. if anyone was a Croatian. I status position on cultural grounds of westernness. recall an advertiser commenting, "'We can't use One respondent from Zagreb, who's parents are comedy in our ads, making fun of ourselves, from Zagreb and Ljubljana (Slovenia), described because it is too sensitive still. We don't know the newcomers' pursuit of status goods, "'how do who we are to make fun of ourselves" (Luka, they earn their money as they think only about Zagreb 30). I think the question of national how much money they have ... it's totally a identity is first to be dealt with between Croatians. cultural shock for let's say us [people from Once that is handled. dealing with ethnic Zagreb] who were not taught that way ... people minorities can be perceived as non-threatening to who come now from that part of Croatia Croatian identity. [Hercegovina] ... the values are totally, I mean, wrong and they did not stand on healthy teet so References Cited you can feel it on the street" (Marija 29 Zagreb). Sanae. Ivo, 1984, The National Question in Creating a homogenous Croatian Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics. ethnicity in Croatia is a difficult project, since Ithaca: Cornell University Press. most informants refer to Italian, Hungarian, or Banac, Ivo, 1999, "Foreward", in Sabrina Petra Montenegrin grandparents. The literature tends to Ramet, ed. Balkan Babel, Balkan Babel: center on the question of the civil and cultural The disintegration of Yugoslavia from the rights that the Croatian state ensures for ethnic death ofTito to the war for Kosovo. minorities (i.e. Serbs living in Croatia). Certainly, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, xv-xix. minority rights are an important issue for European states with particular political challenges Bakic-Hayden. Milica and Robert M. Hayden, for post-socialist states emerging from 1992, ''Orientalist Variations on the authoritarian national ideology. In my research, Theme "Balkans": Symbolic Geography however, I felt that for most informants, the first in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics", national project was a cohesive Croatian ethnic, Slavic Review, 51 (1), 1-15. historic, political, and cultural identity. One reason, I believe, is that the Yugoslav political climate did not allow for a negotiation of this question. I also believe that another issue is that
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« Burn This House: The Making and Unmaking of Yugoslavia. Jasminka Udovicki and James Ridgeway, eds., 1997, Durham: Duke University Press. Douglas, Mary and Baron Isherwood, 1979, The World of Goods: Towards and Anthropology of Consumption. New York: Basic Books. Gross, M irjana. 1981, "On the Integration of the Croatian Nation: a case study in nation building", East European Quarterly, XV, 2 (June), 209-225. Hockenos, Paul, 2003, Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Ramet, Sabrina Petra, 1999, Balkan Babel: The disintegration ofYugoslavia from the death ofTito to the war for Kosovo. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Solomon, Michael R., 1999, "The Value of Status and the Status of Value," 63-82. in Morris B. Hollbrook, (ed.) Consumer Value: a framework for analysis and research,. London: Routledge. Tanner, Marcus, 1997, Croatia: a Nation Forged in War. New Haven: Yale University Press. Todorova, Maria, 1997, Imagining the Balkans. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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