University of Pittsburgh West-Russism, Litvinism, and Aleksandr Lukashenko’s Hybrid Nationalist Rhetoric Marika Olijar Dr. Jan Musekamp HIST 1046 Revised 7 November 2020 Olijar 1 West-Russism, Litvinism, and Aleksandr Lukashenko’s Hybrid Nationalist Rhetoric Historically, Belarus is an ethnically and religiously diverse territory. Western Belarusian lands were predominantly Catholic for centuries, under the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and eventually the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth, while the predominantly Orthodox East was influenced by the Russian Empire (Rudling 32). Accordingly, the Belarusian national movement finds its roots in two diverging philosophies: Litvinism and West-Russism. The Litvin—or Krajowość—philosophy argued that “all local ethnic groups … should cooperate in the interest of the region” (Rudling 45; Wilson 61). West-Russism argued that Catholic influences strictly coincided with a Polish identity: one that Belarusians should shirk (Wilson 61). Thus, this ideology highlights the Russian-Orthodox influence on the Belarusian nation. Both of these philosophies framed ideologically divergent and fragmented nationalist movements in Belarus, which influence the current state of Belarusian nationalist rhetoric today. This divergence is demonstrated through the political tactics of Belarus’ authoritarian president, Aleksandr Lukashenko, as he synthesizes both of the diametrically opposed philosophies of Belarusian nationalism to form his own hybrid version. In this paper, I argue that Litvinism and West- Russism heavily influence President Aleksandr Lukashenko’s nationalist rhetoric, as he creates a unique rendition of Belarusian nationalism by adopting elements of both movements. I will first discuss how the two diverging nationalist philosophies formed. In the second part, I focus on the Belarusian nationalist movements of the early 20th century. In the third section, I analyze the competing Polish and Russian influences in the context of standardizing the Belarusian vernacular for each nationalist movement respectively. In the fourth part, I examine how the diverging Belarusian nationalist discourse in the Interwar and World War II era contributed to the formation of a short-lived Belarusian state. Finally, I evaluate how World War II victory and Olijar 2 the two nationalist philosophies of the 19th century comprise President Aleksandr Lukashenko’s current nationalist rhetoric. The Confessional Origins of Litvinism and West-Russism As a nation largely influenced by Polish and Russian culture, these factions primed the development of Litvinism and West-Russism and their respective movements. In the Polish- Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Belarusian language was labeled a dialect of Polish; however, by the mid 1800s, Russian scholars argued that the Belarusian language and culture was an offshoot of Russian, due to Belarusian speakers’ predominantly Orthodox affiliations (Rudling 33). This became the origin of West-Russism: an idea that a distinct Belarusian identity did not exist— though liberal adherents believed an ethnicity to exist, but with no right to national development—, and instead, Belarusians were simply Polonized Russians with an Orthodox identity tracing back to Kievan Rus’ (Silitsky and Zaprudnik 308; Rudling 34). Despite denying the existence of a distinct Belarusian identity, West-Russism served as a response to Polish-Lithuanian nation building and cultural influences: the Polish elite heavily influenced what is now West Belarusian territory via the Uniate—or Greco-Catholic—Church (Rudling 34). The Union of Lublin in 1569 marked the beginning of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which was characterized by institutional administrative and religious influence (Wilson 46). Polish administrative influence was further expanded in the Commonwealth with the Union of Brest in 1596 creating the Uniate Church: a move meant to Polonize, religiously- speaking, the nobility and undermine Orthodox influence (Silitsky and Zaprudnik li). Next, Polish was made the official language in 1697, promoting allegiance to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Silitsky and Zaprudnik li). The Uniate Church continued to expand, but mostly Olijar 3 for institutional reasons: all non-Catholic churches were banned in 1717 by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Wilson 46). Orthodox education, rites, and traditions were stifled by these provisions, and many Orthodox churches were promptly closed or abandoned (Wilson 46). Even the Uniate Church had to prove its loyalty to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and its communion with the Catholic Church: a clandestine operation within the Sejm pushed for abolition of the Uniate Church in 1717, and the response of the Uniate Church was the Zamość Synod (Wilson 53). The Zamość Synod further Latinized the Uniate Church and Polonized its clergy—especially with respect to replacing its higher ranking members with ethnic Poles (Wilson 53). They instituted more Roman Catholic practices, like the Latin alphabet, catechism, and removing iconostases in churches (Wilson 53). For West Russianists, Uniatism, especially after the Zamość Synod, served as an excellent example of the “Polish scheme” against Russian hegemony (Silitski and Zaprudnik 308). West Russianists concerned themselves with how to sever ties with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth via ethnic terminology. Belarusians, Poles, and Lithuanians had been referring to themselves as Litvins—as a regional marker—in the Commonwealth, so West Russianists increased the use of the term Belorussian to emphasize their view of the language being a dialect of Russian in the mid-nineteenth century (Rudling 33; Wilson 71). Being a Litvin meant you were or once were a member of the Commonwealth–and not necessarily ethnically Polish–, while being Belarussian tethered you to a Russian identity. Polish-Russian tensions were evident through comprehensive policies imposed by the Russian Empire, characterized by enforced Russian language instruction in schools and the requirement for Russian to be used as the official language in courts and in the administrative sphere (Porter-Szücs 26). The Russian Empire exiled Polish-Lithuanian nobility to remote parts of the empire, with the Jamontt family, for example, Olijar 4 being sent beyond the Urals (Michalska-Bracha 17). The Empire also expelled Jesuits from its territory, as 1820 marked their expulsion from Polatsk (Wilson 67-68). With growing animosity between the Russian partition of Poland and the Imperial administration, 1831 marked a period of physical clashes known in Polish historiography as the November Uprising (Snyder 25; Kamusella 46-47), after which anti-Polish policies followed. Thus, these policies were subtextually anti-Belarusian and this uprising is even referred to as paustan’ne in modern Belarusian historiography (Kamusella 46-47). In 1839, Vilna University, a bastion of Polish- Lithuanian education, was closed and moved to Kyiv University and supplemented with a Russian-language curriculum, while the Belarusian language was prohibited from being written or printed using Latin letters (Vakar 69; Snyder 43). Another blow to Polish nationalists was the Russian Empire’s abolition of the Uniate Church in 1839, and its absorption into the Orthodox Church (Snyder 45). Thus, Belarusians were incredibly affected by the Russian Empire’s crackdown in lands once part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, as following the January Uprising of 1863, the Tsar made Russian the single official language for educational instruction and administrative purposes (Kamusella 46, 52). The opposing philosophy of West-Russism is the Litvin philosophy: a “territory-based, superethnic… ideology… based upon the historical legacy of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and…. its legacy” (Rudling 45). This legacy implied ties to Catholicism and an opposition to Orthodoxy and Russification, and it was fitting that the philosophy appealed to Catholic Poles and Belarusians alike (Rudling 45). Litvins did not dispute a Belarusian identity, and even supported the newspaper Nasha Niva, which was instrumental in establishing what it meant to be a Belarusian (Rudling 45). Both West-Russism and Litvinism were responses to a ‘Catholic- Olijar 5 Polish’ and ‘Orthodox-Russian’ takeover respectively, fostering disunity in later nationalist movements. The Early 20th Century: Belarusian Literature and the National Movement 1905 marked the first emergence of an organized Belarusian nationalist movement, as an opportunity arose after Japan’s triumph over the Russian Empire in the Russo-Japanese War (Lubachko 8). Nicholas II’s political concessions, necessitated by the Russian Revolution of 1905, permitted education in one’s native language and freedom of religious practice for non- Russians in the empire (Porter-Szücs 50-51). For example, following the Revolution of 1905, the Russian Empire lifted the Belarusian language prohibition, allowing for future publications in Belarusian (Silitski and Zaprudnik 258). The nationalist movement was left-leaning ideologically (Rudling 65). Belarusian workers rallied for higher wages and more rights, fostering a Belarusian unified identity via peasant socialism (Lubachko 8). In 1902, the Belarussian Socialist Hramada—or Union—was established, and Belarusian-language newspapers like Nasha Niva began being published in 1906 (Lubachko 9). A national awakening was seen as a means of fostering increased rights for Belarusian peasants, and the Nasha Niva newspaper editors made sure to announce that publishing