University of Pittsburgh

West-Russism, Litvinism, and Aleksandr Lukashenko’s Hybrid Nationalist Rhetoric

Marika Olijar

Dr. Jan Musekamp

HIST 1046

Revised 7 November 2020

Olijar 1

West-Russism, Litvinism, and Aleksandr Lukashenko’s Hybrid Nationalist Rhetoric

Historically, Belarus is an ethnically and religiously diverse territory. Western Belarusian lands were predominantly Catholic for centuries, under the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and eventually the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth, while the predominantly Orthodox East was influenced by the Russian Empire (Rudling 32). Accordingly, the Belarusian national movement finds its roots in two diverging philosophies: Litvinism and West-Russism. The Litvin—or

Krajowość—philosophy argued that “all local ethnic groups … should cooperate in the interest of the region” (Rudling 45; Wilson 61). West-Russism argued that Catholic influences strictly coincided with a Polish identity: one that Belarusians should shirk (Wilson 61). Thus, this ideology highlights the Russian-Orthodox influence on the Belarusian nation. Both of these philosophies framed ideologically divergent and fragmented nationalist movements in Belarus, which influence the current state of Belarusian nationalist rhetoric today. This divergence is demonstrated through the political tactics of Belarus’ authoritarian president, Aleksandr

Lukashenko, as he synthesizes both of the diametrically opposed philosophies of Belarusian nationalism to form his own hybrid version. In this paper, I argue that Litvinism and West-

Russism heavily influence President Aleksandr Lukashenko’s nationalist rhetoric, as he creates a unique rendition of Belarusian nationalism by adopting elements of both movements. I will first discuss how the two diverging nationalist philosophies formed. In the second part, I focus on the

Belarusian nationalist movements of the early 20th century. In the third section, I analyze the competing Polish and Russian influences in the context of standardizing the Belarusian vernacular for each nationalist movement respectively. In the fourth part, I examine how the diverging Belarusian nationalist discourse in the Interwar and World War II era contributed to the formation of a short-lived Belarusian state. Finally, I evaluate how World War II victory and

Olijar 2 the two nationalist philosophies of the 19th century comprise President Aleksandr Lukashenko’s current nationalist rhetoric.

The Confessional Origins of Litvinism and West-Russism

As a nation largely influenced by Polish and Russian culture, these factions primed the development of Litvinism and West-Russism and their respective movements. In the Polish-

Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Belarusian language was labeled a dialect of Polish; however, by the mid 1800s, Russian scholars argued that the Belarusian language and culture was an offshoot of Russian, due to Belarusian speakers’ predominantly Orthodox affiliations (Rudling 33). This became the origin of West-Russism: an idea that a distinct Belarusian identity did not exist— though liberal adherents believed an ethnicity to exist, but with no right to national development—, and instead, Belarusians were simply Polonized Russians with an Orthodox identity tracing back to Kievan Rus’ (Silitsky and Zaprudnik 308; Rudling 34).

Despite denying the existence of a distinct Belarusian identity, West-Russism served as a response to Polish-Lithuanian nation building and cultural influences: the Polish elite heavily influenced what is now West Belarusian territory via the Uniate—or Greco-Catholic—Church

(Rudling 34). The Union of Lublin in 1569 marked the beginning of the Polish-Lithuanian

Commonwealth, which was characterized by institutional administrative and religious influence

(Wilson 46). Polish administrative influence was further expanded in the Commonwealth with the Union of Brest in 1596 creating the Uniate Church: a move meant to Polonize, religiously- speaking, the nobility and undermine Orthodox influence (Silitsky and Zaprudnik li). Next,

Polish was made the official language in 1697, promoting allegiance to the Polish-Lithuanian

Commonwealth (Silitsky and Zaprudnik li). The Uniate Church continued to expand, but mostly

Olijar 3 for institutional reasons: all non-Catholic churches were banned in 1717 by the Polish-Lithuanian

Commonwealth (Wilson 46). Orthodox education, rites, and traditions were stifled by these provisions, and many Orthodox churches were promptly closed or abandoned (Wilson 46). Even the Uniate Church had to prove its loyalty to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and its communion with the Catholic Church: a clandestine operation within the Sejm pushed for abolition of the Uniate Church in 1717, and the response of the Uniate Church was the Zamość

Synod (Wilson 53). The Zamość Synod further Latinized the Uniate Church and Polonized its clergy—especially with respect to replacing its higher ranking members with ethnic Poles

(Wilson 53). They instituted more Roman Catholic practices, like the Latin alphabet, catechism, and removing iconostases in churches (Wilson 53). For West Russianists, Uniatism, especially after the Zamość Synod, served as an excellent example of the “Polish scheme” against Russian hegemony (Silitski and Zaprudnik 308).

West Russianists concerned themselves with how to sever ties with the Polish-Lithuanian

Commonwealth via ethnic terminology. Belarusians, Poles, and Lithuanians had been referring to themselves as Litvins—as a regional marker—in the Commonwealth, so West Russianists increased the use of the term Belorussian to emphasize their view of the language being a dialect of Russian in the mid-nineteenth century (Rudling 33; Wilson 71). Being a Litvin meant you were or once were a member of the Commonwealth–and not necessarily ethnically Polish–, while being Belarussian tethered you to a Russian identity. Polish-Russian tensions were evident through comprehensive policies imposed by the Russian Empire, characterized by enforced

Russian language instruction in schools and the requirement for Russian to be used as the official language in courts and in the administrative sphere (Porter-Szücs 26). The Russian Empire exiled

Polish-Lithuanian nobility to remote parts of the empire, with the Jamontt family, for example,

Olijar 4 being sent beyond the Urals (Michalska-Bracha 17). The Empire also expelled Jesuits from its territory, as 1820 marked their expulsion from Polatsk (Wilson 67-68). With growing animosity between the Russian partition of Poland and the Imperial administration, 1831 marked a period of physical clashes known in Polish historiography as the November Uprising (Snyder 25;

Kamusella 46-47), after which anti-Polish policies followed. Thus, these policies were subtextually anti-Belarusian and this uprising is even referred to as paustan’ne in modern

Belarusian historiography (Kamusella 46-47). In 1839, Vilna University, a bastion of Polish-

Lithuanian education, was closed and moved to Kyiv University and supplemented with a

Russian-language curriculum, while the Belarusian language was prohibited from being written or printed using Latin letters (Vakar 69; Snyder 43). Another blow to Polish nationalists was the

Russian Empire’s abolition of the Uniate Church in 1839, and its absorption into the Orthodox

Church (Snyder 45). Thus, Belarusians were incredibly affected by the Russian Empire’s crackdown in lands once part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, as following the January

Uprising of 1863, the Tsar made Russian the single official language for educational instruction and administrative purposes (Kamusella 46, 52).

The opposing philosophy of West-Russism is the Litvin philosophy: a “territory-based, superethnic… ideology… based upon the historical legacy of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and…. its legacy” (Rudling 45). This legacy implied ties to Catholicism and an opposition to

Orthodoxy and Russification, and it was fitting that the philosophy appealed to Catholic Poles and Belarusians alike (Rudling 45). Litvins did not dispute a Belarusian identity, and even supported the newspaper Nasha Niva, which was instrumental in establishing what it meant to be a Belarusian (Rudling 45). Both West-Russism and Litvinism were responses to a ‘Catholic-

Olijar 5

Polish’ and ‘Orthodox-Russian’ takeover respectively, fostering disunity in later nationalist movements.

The Early 20th Century: Belarusian Literature and the National Movement

1905 marked the first emergence of an organized Belarusian nationalist movement, as an opportunity arose after Japan’s triumph over the Russian Empire in the Russo-Japanese War

(Lubachko 8). Nicholas II’s political concessions, necessitated by the Russian Revolution of

1905, permitted education in one’s native language and freedom of religious practice for non-

Russians in the empire (Porter-Szücs 50-51). For example, following the Revolution of 1905, the

Russian Empire lifted the Belarusian language prohibition, allowing for future publications in

Belarusian (Silitski and Zaprudnik 258). The nationalist movement was left-leaning ideologically

(Rudling 65). Belarusian workers rallied for higher wages and more rights, fostering a Belarusian unified identity via peasant socialism (Lubachko 8). In 1902, the Belarussian Socialist

Hramada—or Union—was established, and Belarusian-language newspapers like Nasha Niva began being published in 1906 (Lubachko 9). A national awakening was seen as a means of fostering increased rights for Belarusian peasants, and the Nasha Niva newspaper editors made sure to announce that publishing in Belarusian was a conscious choice to divorce the nation from its peasant associations: “[Belarusian] is not dead, but spoken by some ten million dark, oppressed and humiliated people. The quicker our people can read what we publish, the less the language will appear as the language of muzhyki” (Rudling 53-54). The nationalist benefits of printing in Belarusian reflected the ideas of Benedict Anderson, a historian and political scientist, as increased literacy stemmed from using the vernacular, and it meant the establishment of a mass-readership that soon felt as if they were members of a distinct community: a Belarusian

Olijar 6 imagined community (Anderson, 44). The Belarussian Socialist Hramada began meeting officially to discuss cultural autonomy for Belarusians, but not for Belarusian statehood (Rudling

52). Grievances addressed by the Tsarist administration via agricultural reforms supported the blooming of the Belarusian middle class, facilitating the organization of student groups, theaters, literary circles (Vakar 88). Belarusian literature and writings were published in Nasha Niva by notable writers like Janko Kupala and Jakob Kolas, employing rhetoric that pushed for

Belarusian cultural autonomy (Lubachko 9-10). For example, Janko Kupala’s poem, “A khto tam idze” written circa 19051, demonstrates an emerging Belarusian nationalist rhetoric:

A khto tam idze, a khto tam idze Who goes there, who goes there, U ahromnistaĭ takoĭ hramadze? In such a large group? - Belarusy. - The Belarusians. A shto i͡ any ni͡ asuts′ na khudykh pli͡ achakh, What are they carrying on their thin shoulders, Na rukakh u kryvi, na nahakh u laptsi͡ akh? On bloody hands, feet, and bast shoes? - Svai͡ u kryŭdu. - Their grievance A kudy z͡ h ni͡ asuts′ hėtu kryŭdu ŭsi͡ u, Where are they carrying all their grievance A kudy z͡ h ni͡ asuts′ napakaz svai͡ u? Where are they carrying it to display? - Na svet tsėly. - To the whole world. A khto hėta ikh, ne adzin mil′i͡ on, And who has taught them, not just a million, Kryŭdu nests′ naŭchyŭ, razbudziŭ ikh son? to carry their pain, and has awakened them from a dream? - Bi͡ ada, hora. - Misfortune, suffering. A chaho z͡ h, chaho zakhatselas′ im, Why, why did they want [this], Pahardz͡ hanym vek, im, sli͡ apym, hlukhim? Despised for centuries, blind and deaf? - Li͡ udz′mi zvatstsa. - To be called people. A khto tam idze, a khto tam idze Who goes there, who goes there U ahromnistaĭ takoĭ hramadze? In such a large group? - Belarusy. - The Belarusians. The presence of symbols of nationalist victimology, “On bloody hands, feet, and bast shoes” and “despised for centuries”; great suffering, “carrying their grievance”; and of a nationalist awakening, “has awakened them from a dream”; demonstrates Belarusian nationalism in the frameworks of Belarusian-language poetry. This symbolism adheres to the naturalist approach detailed by Umut Özkırımlı, a political scientist, as the poem contains the theme of a

“nation’s perpetual struggle for self-realization” vis-a-vis references to the age-old struggle to be recognized as a nation (Özkırımlı 67). However, despite peasant socialism contributing to a

1 Translated by Marika Olijar, Edited by Olga Klimova, PhD. University of Pittsburgh

Olijar 7 booming Belarusian literary scene and cultural awakening, the Belarusian language was far from standardized, making it difficult to mobilize.

The Political Salience of the Belarusian Vernacular

The competition between Polish and Russian influences and its interaction with the emergence of modern nationalism is exemplified in the characterization of the Belarusian vernacular. Polish elites had begun collecting Belarusian—or, as they often stated, Polonized

‘White Ruthenian’—folklore, transliterating it using the Latin script and Polish orthography, introducing peasant culture to Polish nobles (Vakar 75-76). Russian scholars, on the other hand, saw the Belarusian language as a system of atypical Russian-language pronunciations (Vakar

78). The standardization of the Belarusian vernacular exacerbated the competition between

Polish and Russian influences from the Belarusian nationalist movement’s inception to later periods. The oldest version of the Belarusian standardized vernacular is known as Tarashkevitsa, developed by Branislaw Tarashkevich in 1918, basing the standardization on dialects of the

South-west (Wilson 124). Numerous Belarusian-language materials of different dialects had been published prior to the language’s standardization, an example being the Eneida Navyvarat, published circa 1820 in the Smolensk dialect: a play on the 1798 Ukrainian-language version by

Ivan Kotlyarevsky (“Eneida Navyvarat”). The second Belarusian vernacular standardization emerged in the Soviet period in the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR), which I will expand upon in the next section.

The Interwar and World War II Periods

Diverging Belarusian nationalist discourse and activity in the Interwar and World War II periods established a foundation for modern Belarusian nationalism and even the establishment

Olijar 8 of a short-lived Belarusian state. World War I had made a battlefield out of the western Russian

Empire and Tsarist policy reverted to expanding Russification and deporting ethnic minorities such as Germans, Hungarians, and Austrians (Rudling 67). Mass misinformation campaigns were executed in the form of sermons by Orthodox and Catholic clergymen, facilitating anti-

German sentiment by asserting that German soldiers had committed violent crimes like rape

(Rudling 68). Rumors of German criminal acts stimulated a Belarusian and Russian exodus from

Western Belarus, resulting in Polonization of the remaining Belarusian Catholics (Rudling 72).

Belarusian lands were experiencing yet another cultural polarization vis-à-vis Polish and Russian influences. When the Germans had conquered a large section of Imperial Russian borderlands in

1915, named the Ober Ost, they strategized to aid the construction of a Belarusian national identity via promotion of the Belarusian language and culture in order to weaken Polish influences, as they feared the emergence of a strong Polish state, whom they believed complicated the security of their dominion (Rudling 73).

In the Eastern Belarusian lands, the February Revolution of 1917 had awakened further socialist ideological leanings in the Belarusian population (Lubachko 12-13). Vladimir Lenin’s nationalist rhetoric in 1903 centered on “free national self-determination” for nations that were victims of Great Russian chauvinism (Lubachko 12), which had resulted from “tsarist-imposed statelessness, backwardness and culturelessness” (Slezkine 423). After the October Revolution,

Eastern Belarusian lands fell under Soviet control, with elections revealing the population’s support for Bolshevism (Rudling 75). However, Belarusian nationalists did not favor the

Bolshevik takeover and called for Belarusian statehood after forming the All-Belarusian

Congress, which was met with a Bolshevik crackdown (Rudling 76). The All-Belarusian

Congress was forcibly converted into an underground organization (Wilson 94). 1918 marked

Olijar 9 the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, in which Eastern Belarusian lands were given to

Germany, allowing for the reunification of Western and Eastern Belarusian lands under German rule (Wilson 94). Before German troops arrived in East Belarus, the All-Belarusian Congress convened and established a Provisional Government in Minsk (Vakar 101). The Provisional

Government in Minsk learned of the Vilna resolution: where a newly formed Belarusian Rada in

Vilna, led by Anton Lutskevich, sought Western—German—support for the reestablishment of a

Lithuanian-Belarussian state (Vakar 102; Snyder 81). Delegations met from the Vilna-based and

Minsk-based Radas, and established an independent Belarusian state—the BNR—on March 25,

1918 (Rudling 82). This unity of the Radas was brief, as it quickly factionalized ideologically, fragmenting the nationalist movement into socialist-revolutionary, socialist-democratic, and socialist-federalist, and prompting the rejection of BNR legitimacy by Western powers (Rudling

85). The abdication of German Emperor Wilhelm II on November 9, 1918 prompted the

Bolshevik usurpation of the BNR, the exile of the BNR Rada, and the establishment of the Soviet

Socialist Republic of Belarus (SSRB) (Rudling 93, 96-97). The Soviet Central administration tasked the SSRB with creating a Socialist Republic that unified it with Lithuania—LitBel— forming a buffer between the newly reconstituted Poland—the Second Polish Republic—and the

Bolsheviks (Rudling 98). However, LitBel’s creation was met with Polish armed resistance, and by 1919, LitBel lands were captured by Poland (Rudling 101). By 1920, the Belarusian nationalist movement had become so fragmented along pro-Polish and pro-Bolshevik fault lines that Belarusians were excluded from peace negotiations (Vakar 113). At this point, there was a

Soviet Belarusian government in Minsk, a Belarusian National government in Warsaw, and a

Belarusian National government in Lithuania (Vakar 113). The Treaty of Riga was signed in

1921, with Belarusian lands being split between Poland and the Soviet Union (Snyder 65). The

Olijar 10

Belarusians living in Poland encountered a brief period of Belarusification (Vakar 125).

However, with a change in Polish nationality policies, Belarusian schools were closed and

Belarusian nationalists were jailed (Snyder 65).

Meanwhile in East Belarus, the Belarussian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR) was created, with a policy of Belarusification and national development intimately paired with

Socialism and indigenization of Communist party members (Rudling 125, 159). The BSSR underwent Belarusification and a period of national development in the 1920s, with Belarusian becoming the language of instruction in “an Academy of Sciences, a State University, an

Institute of Belarusian Culture, a Belarusian State Library, and four thousand Belarusian schools” (Snyder 65). At the height of Belarusification, Narkamawka, a 1933 Soviet- standardized Belarusian, was promoted by the state (Wilson 124). Based on dialects of the

North-west and South-east, and its primary goal was to make Belarusian language closer to

Russian (Wilson 124). Later in history, Belarusian’s Polish and Russian borrowings remained a politically salient issue: the problem was not necessarily that Belarusian was similar to Polish, but that it was not close enough to the Soviet lingua franca.

The Belarusification policy waned in 1927, as Josef Stalin’s nationalist policy began to transform, rehabilitating the Russian language and eliminating indigenization (Rudling 275,

299). According to Yuri Slezkine, a historian, promoting use of native tongues worked to indoctrinate the population and set them against their bourgeois populations, but “the need to speed up the study of marxism-leninism,” prompted the adoption of Russian as the lingua franca

(Slezkine 418, 437). This linguistic shift in the 1930s marked a transition to Russian chauvinism

(Slezkine 423-424, 448). For example, Branislau Tarashkevich, after spending four years in a

Polish prison for being active in the Communist party in West Belarus, was executed in 1938 in

Olijar 11

Soviet Belarussia due to his affiliation with translating and writing Belarusian nationalist texts

(Snyder 66).

In 1939, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact led to the reunification of Belarus, incorporated into the BSSR (Lubachko 141). The political reunification—as questionable election results suggested—was followed by World War II destruction. Much of the BSSR was occupied and subject to terror by the Nazis (Lubachko 152). While numerous Belarusians collaborated with

Nazi-powers, joining SS ranks, and even forming a collaborationist rada with aims for an independent Belarusian state—The Belarusian Central Council—, many also joined the Soviet partisans (Lubachko 154, 162). The makeup of Soviet Belarus changed tremendously, starting in

1944, as Stalin initiated population exchanges to mitigate national questions between Poland,

Soviet Lithuania, and Soviet Belorussia (Snyder 183). With a certain degree of ethnic consolidation, the transmission of mass culture and nationality was possible for each Soviet republic (Snyder 186). With this post-World War II atmosphere, constructing a new national myth–one that celebrated the Belarusian national resistance and partisans–was the next step in solidifying Belarus’ identity as a Soviet republic (Wilson 114). BelarusFilm, dubbed

PartisanFilm, released war epic after war epic, recounting heroic partisan stories and downplaying World War II Nazi collaboration and Soviet aggression toward its population

(Wilson 115). The discovery of the Kurapaty graves, which became evidence to the Belarusian population of Stalin’s terror in the late 1930s, became a topic of Soviet and post-Soviet denial

(Wilson 115). What was Belarus without its anti-fascist, Soviet legacy?

Post-Soviet Belarus Under Aleksandr Lukashenko

Olijar 12

The victory of the Soviets in World War Two—or the Great Patriotic War as it is referred to in much of post-Soviet East Europe—is frequently cited by President Aleksandr Lukashenko, who has served as President of Belarus since 1994, following its independence in 1991. In

Lukashenko’s 2020 New Year’s Speech, he stated that in the upcoming year, Belarus would be celebrating the 75th anniversary of “the victory of the Soviet nation over Nazism”2

(“Pozdravlenie Aleksandra”). Note that he mentioned the Soviet nation instead of referencing the state: Lukashenko pandered to the Soviet legacy of victory, and solidified an association of

Belarusians’ with a ‘Soviet nation’. However, Lukashenko did not only praise the Soviets; he also cited the “blossoming of our young, independent state,”3 and referenced the Belarusian nation using Janko Kupala’s poem representing the awakening of the Belarusian nation: “In the history of the Belarusian nation, for which not only once has it had to fight for the right ‘to be called people.’4 And 2020 is no exception.”5 In an interview with Ukrainian Media6, Aleksandr

Lukashenko emphasized that “we have no borders,”7 aside from administrative ones, between

Russia and Belarus: he stressed economic, social, and cultural ties between the two countries.

Paired with his support of the Soviet legacy in Belarus, his friendly relations with Russia echoed

West-Russism. Additionally, Lukashenko even proposed uniting with Russia–based on an agreement made in 1999– as recently as 2019, with hopes of creating a shared government and parliament (I͡ Evropeǐs′ka Pravda). He also presented “the image of Belarus as monolithically

Orthodox,” omitting the multiconfessional identities I have defined earlier in this paper (Wilson

2 “pobedy velikogo sovetskogo naroda nad nat͡ sizmom” (“Pozdravlenie Aleksandra”) 3 “prot͡ svetanii͡ a nashego molodogo nezavisimogo gosudarstva” (“Pozdravlenie Aleksandra”) 4 See Janko Kupala’s poem, “A khto tam idze” (“Pozdravlenie Aleksandra”) 5 “V istorii belorusskogo naroda, kotoromu ne raz prikhodilosʹ borotʹsi͡ a za pravo "li͡ udʹmi zvatʹsi͡ a". I 2020-ĭ ne budet iskli͡ ucheniem.” (“Pozdravlenie Aleksandra”) 6 “vstrecha s vedushchimi ukrainskimi SMI” (“Aleksandr Lukashenko Ob Ukraine”) 7 u nas net granit͡ s (“Aleksandr Lukashenko Ob Ukraine”)

Olijar 13

131). For example, in a 2012 ceremony with Patriarch Kirill of Moscow, Lukashenko said,

“...Orthodoxy is that fundamental stone laid in the foundation in our spirituality and our nation”8

(“Lukashenko: pozi͡tsii”).

Besides constructing a unified religious identity that is closely associated with West-

Russism, he also has taken action against state symbols that resemble the Polish-Lithuanian past.

In September 1991, the Belarusian Supreme Soviet, after being tasked with generating state symbols for the newly independent Belarus, confirmed that the state symbols would be the white-red-white flag and the pahonia coat of arms, (Klaskovij, “Lukashenko Rastoptal”). The pahonia coat of arms was sourced from the historical coat of arms of the Grand Duchy of

Lithuania, used by nobles in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and was adopted as the

Belarusian Democratic Republic’s official emblem in 1918 (Rudling 129). However, this was reversed in 1995 by Lukashenko, following a referendum, as he declared the flag and its corresponding coat of arms to be nationalist and “unregistered symbols”9 meriting prison time if it were to be displayed (Klaskovij, “Lukashenko Rastoptal”; Snyder 279). Most memorable is

“his bodyguard [removing] the Belarusian colors from the presidential compound, [tearing] the flag into pieces, and [giving] them away as souvenirs” (Snyder 279). Lukashenko’s main argument against this symbolic flag is that he claimed it to be fascist, as Nazi collaborators–the

Byelorussian Central Council–used the symbol in World War II (Wilson 109-110). Pål Kolstø, a scholar of nationalism and history, stressed that national symbols such as flags, coats of arms, and national anthems were essential to the nation-building process and that “audiovisual aids” help one learn a national identity, fomenting patriotism to the nation (Kolstø 676). Since the

8 “...a Pravoslavie – ėto tot fundamentalʹnyĭ kamenʹ zalozhennyĭ v osnovu v nasheĭ dukhovnosti i nashego naroda” (“Lukashenko: pozit͡ sii”) 9 “nezarehistrirovannui͡ u simvoliku” (Klaskovij, “Lukashenko Rastoptal”)

Olijar 14 pahonia and corresponding flag was widely used in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and is also considered controversial by those concerned with portraying a Soviet anti-fascist legacy of

Belarus, Lukashenko squelched the remaining Litvin influences in Belarus by banning these nationalist symbols.

However, Lukashenko did not completely reject the Litvin philosophy. In his interview with Ukrainian media, Lukashenko mentioned the significance of his birth in Eastern Belarus: he expected the Polish population not to vote for him, but in contrast they supported him in his first presidential election–despite Polish diaspora protests against his campaign (“Aleksandr

Lukashenko Ob Ukraine”). This comment implies that Lukashenko values incorporating

Belarus’ Polish population into his support-base, contrasting with West-Russism. Along more ambiguous lines, in 2014, Lukashenko called the Crimean Annexation a “‘bad precedent,’ but acknowledged that the region is now a ‘de facto’ part of Russia” (Rfe/rl).

Litvinism and West-Russism both developed as reactions to Polish and Russian religious and cultural influences on Belarusian lands, and characterized two very different approaches to understanding the Belarusian nation. These diverging philosophies of the 20th century influenced the Belarusian literary movement and the Belarusian nationalist movements of the 20th century, contributing to a divided discourse in the Interwar and World War II periods. Despite this ideological disunity across history, Aleksandr Lukashenko uses this divergence to his advantage in the political arena today. Lukashenko most closely aligns himself with West-Russism, but ultimately applies elements of the Litvin philosophy, forming his own eclectic concept of a

Belarusian nation within the framework of the fragmented nationalist movements that persisted throughout Belarusian history. He approaches nationalism with his own hybrid rhetoric, neither adhering completely to Litvinism or to West-Russism. Instead, he favors the glorious

Olijar 15 achievements of the Belarusian nation both preceding and following the war victory of the Soviet period. Since the beginning of anti-Lukashenko protests in May 2020, Lukashenko has accused the opposition of being “Western ‘puppets’” (BBC, “Belarus: Hundreds More Arrested”). The opposition’s use of the pahonia flag as an anti-Lukashenko symbol illustrates a movement diametrically opposed to West-Russism. Thus, Lukasenko’s occasional appeal to Litvinism may dwindle as protests continue. Will Lukashenko’s hybrid rhetoric remain, or will West-Russism decidedly prevail?

Olijar 16

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