The Construction of Chinese Muslim Identities in Transnational Spaces

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Yuting Wang American University of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates [email protected]

Abstract

Since the beginning of the reform and opening up in China nearly four decades ago, China’s Muslim minorities have restored connections with the global Muslim ummah (community) through religious pilgrimages, business activities, and educational and cultural exchanges. Whether attracted by better economic prospects or for religious purposes, an increasing number of Chinese Muslims have found ways out of China, taking sojourns or eventually settling down in diverse locations across the globe. Draw- ing on the author’s field research in China, the United States, and the United Arab Emirates, combined with a review of key studies on Chinese Muslims in Southeast Asia, this paper traces the shape of Chinese Muslim transnational networks and ex- amines the construction of “Chinese Muslim” identity in the diaspora. By locating the study of contemporary Chinese Muslims within the broader scholarship on transnational religion, this paper deepens our understanding of the impact of globalization on ethnoreligious minorities.

Keywords

Chinese Muslims – transnational migration – diasporic identity – transnational Islam – globalization

The Construction of Chinese Muslim Identities 157

跨国空间里的华人穆斯林身份建构

摘要

改革开放近四十年以来，中国的穆斯林少数民族通过宗教朝觐，商业活动，以及教育文化交流与世界各地的穆斯林社区恢复了联络。不论是基于经济考虑或宗教目的，越来越多的中国穆斯林离开中国到海外各地暂居或者定居。使用作者在中国，美国，阿联酋的田野资料，并结合其他学者对东南亚华人穆斯林的研究，本文勾勒出华人穆斯林跨国网络的轮廓，并考察移民社区中“华人穆斯林”身份的构建。将当代华人穆斯林置于跨国宗教的研究领域之中，本文将加深我们对全球化进程中少数宗教族群的认知。

关键词

华人穆斯林，跨国移民，流散身份，跨国伊斯兰，全球化

Introduction

Chinese Muslims, or more precisely, Chinese-speaking Muslims, have in many ways become a transnational phenomenon in recent decades. More than simply the result of cross-border population movement, the growing visibility of Chinese Muslim communities in Western academia1 and public discourses2 is also the byproduct of the escalating conflict between Islam and the West and the deeply rooted sectarian tensions within the Muslim ummah (community). The legitimacy of the very existence of Chinese Muslims is, on the one hand, threatened by the the invasion of modern and postmodern cultural influences

1 A rich and growing body of literature on Chinese Muslims and Islam in China has developed since the topic was first introduced to Western academia through the work of Jesuit mission- aries in the early twentieth century. James Frankel (2011) provided a review of key publications in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Recent conferences and workshops held in the uk (International Conference on Ethnographies of Islam in China, held at the soas, University of London, in March 2017), the uae (Workshop on Islam in China and Chinese Muslims, held at the American University of Sharjah in January 2018), and Hong Kong (Inter- national Conference on Islam in the China Seas, held at the Chinese University of Hong Kong in March 2018) suggest that the field remains relevant in different areas of academic research. 2 Major media outlets in the West, for example Foreign Affairs and the New York Times, frequently report on the affairs of Muslim minorities in China.

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158 Wang that confront those desiring to preserve an ancient tradition, and on the other hand celebrated as a sign of the universality of Islam and of the possibility of cross-cultural dialogues and cooperation. Therefore, the vitality of Chinese Muslims in transnational spaces presents a fascinating case study for both theologians (e.g., Abd-Allah 2004, 2006) and academics. Recently, there has been a renewed scholarly interest in the growing ties between Chinese Muslims in mainland China and the diasporic communities in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and beyond (Ho 2010, 2013; Wang 2016; Cieciura 2018 [in this issue]). A complex Chinese Muslim transnational network, as shown in these studies, links closely knit communities in remote corners of Northwest China to individuals scattered in large metropolises from the Middle East to North America, and is sustained by powerful social media. The historical ties between China and Southeast Asia and the prevailing Islamic culture in the region make it attractive to potential Chinese Muslim migrants. The Middle East and North Africa is another desirable destination, for both religious and economic reasons. A constant flow of Chinese Muslims has traveled to countries like Tunisia, Syria, Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, either through official channels or by private means, in order to study in some of the most reputable religious universities or madrasas in the Islamic world. Some of these students, who initially aspired to become imams after completing their studies, took advantage of the growing appetite for Chinese products in the region to build their own trading companies. The rapid economic growth in the Arabian Gulf countries over the last two decades has also drawn a large number of Chinese Muslims, especially from the less developed region of Northwest China. The global North remains an ideal destination for Chinese migrants, including a stream of Chinese Muslims with strong academic credentials and rich professional experience. Nevertheless, the implications of the increasing cross- border mobility of Chinese Muslims and of the expanding Chinese Muslim transnational networks, both tangible and virtual, on the identities of Chinese Muslims have not been adequately addressed in the existing scholarship. Stud- ies of Chinese Muslim migrants remain outside the mainstream scholarship on Muslim immigrants and on the Chinese diaspora. This paper seeks to bridge these fields by examining the divergent approaches to being and becoming “Chinese Muslims” within a multilayered and expansive Chinese Muslim transnational network. Drawing on my field research in China, the United States, and the United Arab Emirates, combined with a review of key studies on Chinese Muslims in Southeast Asia, this paper traces the shape of the Chinese Muslim transnational network and the construction of a “Chinese Muslim” identity in varied contexts. To deepen our understanding of the impact of globalization on ethnoreligious minorities and align the study of Chinese Muslims more

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The Construction of Chinese Muslim Identities 159 closely with the agenda of mainstream scholarship, this paper begins by locating the study of contemporary Chinese Muslims within the broad scholarship on transnational religion, specifically transnational Islam.3 It proposes that Chinese Islam, although a local development, is increasingly a transnational religious phenomenon. The identity of contemporary Chinese Muslims is a product of transnational migration and exchanges. It is neither static nor uni- form, but arises from individually conceived ideas responding to a sense of homelessness and anomie that combine to form a strategy to aid the search for a “third space” (Fischer 2004) and a new home in a fragmented world. The role of Islam in this process is important, but not always essential; indeed, the very concept of “Chinese Muslims” reveals the complex relationship between culture and religion.

Chinese Islam: The Dialectic between Local and Global

Spanning some fourteen hundred years, the history of Islam in China has been greatly shaped by continuous negotiations over spatial boundaries between Muslim minorities and non-Muslim majorities, and by the relationship between local context and global forces. Islam, a monotheistic faith that arose in the Arabian Peninsula, is widely believed to have first arrived in China during the second half of the seventh century with Arab and Persian caravaneers and voyagers. Some of these pioneers settled down in coastal cities such as Guangzhou, Quanzhou, and Changzhou, while others put down roots in the capital city of Chang’an (former name of Xi’an). By the eighth century, Muslim communities had been established in major urban areas (Israeli 2002:291–294). The Chinese imperial court welcomed the arrival of the “foreign guests” (fanke 蕃客), granting extraterritorial privileges within their residential areas, which were known as fanfang 蕃坊 (foreigners’ corners). The emperors ordered the building of mosques for their Muslim guests, some of which still stand today in Guangzhou and Xi’an.4 In the following millennia, these “foreign guests” weathered a turbulent history in the Middle Kingdom and eventually put down roots in a largely Confu- cian society despite their distinctive beliefs and lifestyles. Islam evidently went through a process of Sinicization as it struggled to survive in the midst of an

3 For discussions of transnational Islam and global Islam, see Bowen 2004; Roy 2004; Cesari 2009; Leonard 2009. 4 The Huaisheng Mosque (怀圣寺) in Guangzhou is believed to be one of the oldest mosques ever built in China. The grand mosque in Xi’an was built in the fourteenth century.

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160 Wang overwhelmingly polytheistic majority. Throughout a long period characterized by interwoven intervals of peaceful coexistence and violent confrontations, a unique Chinese Islamic culture centered on the concept of qingzhen 清真 emerged.5 Not only have Chinese Muslims developed distinctive rituals of their own, Chinese Muslim intellectuals have also made important progress in reconciling two seemingly incompatible civilizations—Confucianism and Islam—by linking Chinese mythology to the theology of Islam and reinterpret- ing Islamic concepts using Confucian vocabulary (Murata and Chittick 2000; Murata, Chittick, and Tu 2009; Petersen 2017). The development of a distinctively Chinese Islam can be understood as the result of the cyclical processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. Originated in the social and cultural context of the Arabian Peninsula, Islam’s cultural forms became separated from its birthplace as it reached the Far East through the settlement of Muslim traders, merchants, soldiers, and intellectuals in imperial China—a process of deterritorialization (Inda and Rosaldo 2002:11). To cope with the separation and the loss of natural habitat, itinerant Islamic cultural forms from Arabia and Central Asia cling to selected elements in the local culture to reconstitute and eventually recreate context-based time- space meanings (Inda and Rosaldo 2002:12)—the reterritorialization of Islam in China. The unique architectural forms of Chinese mosques; the creolization of Chinese, Arabic, and Farsi that forms a distinctive colloquial language, jing- tangyu 经堂语; and various vernacular religious rituals are all strong evidence suggesting that the process of reterritorialization has clearly taken place. Thus, Chinese Islam is the very product of transnational flows that began during the archaic stage of globalization. The peculiar social, cultural, and political dynamics in Chinese society that are reflected in the complex identity matrix of Chinese Muslims and that constitute the “Chinese Muslim” identity are sensitive to the contexts within which individuals operate. Concerned with the growing influence of overseas religious organizations on domestic religious activities, the Chinese government has tightened its control over religious affairs in recent years.6 Steps have been taken to promote patriotism and nationalism among religious minorities through educational and religious organizations. The militarization in

5 Translated as “pure and true,” the term qingzhen symbolizes two important aspects of Mus- lim identity in Chinese society. Qing, meaning “pure” or “clean,” represents the significance of “ritual cleanliness and moral conduct” in Islam; zhen, interpreted as “true” or “authentic,” points to the very question of the legitimacy and authenticity of Islam as a way of life in a predominantly Confucian society (Gladney [1991] 1996:13). 6 For a discussion of China’s recent tightening of control over religion, see Yang 2018:1–4.

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The Construction of Chinese Muslim Identities 161

Xinjiang to curb the looming threat of terrorism and separatism has drawn criticism from the global Muslim ummah and human rights activists (Chung 2018). Further, the prevalent Islamophobia in Chinese society (Luwei and Yang 2018) and China’s foreign policies in the Middle East (Ehteshami and Horesh 2018) lead many to question the implications of China’s rise for the Muslim world. The identity of Chinese Muslims is thus susceptible to these ongoing events both inside and outside their localities. Although the Chinese- speaking Hui people are largely portrayed as China’s “good” Muslims (Wang 2013a), it has become increasingly challenging for individuals to claim both identities at the same time. The dilemma facing Chinese Muslims is not unique. Scholars from a wide range of fields have carefully examined the impact of globalization on religion and the phenomenon of transnational religion (e.g., Levitt 2001; Ebaugh and Chafetz 2002; Csordas 2009). The meeting of a projected hegemonic form of global religion and locally rooted variations frequently results in tension and conflict in individual identities. This is especially true for religious minorities living on the periphery. Although their hybrid cultural repertoires have enabled them to survive between multiple worlds, such hybridity can also ren- der them homeless. As these individuals negotiate with multiple forces that simultaneously push them down and pull them up in the ebb and flow of globalization, they develop different ways to address the demands of living in an interdependent and interconnected global space where diverse cultures and worldviews frequently clash. As one of the three monotheistic Abrahamic traditions, Islam is seen as in- trinsically universal. Since its inception, Islam has called for people to turn away from local deities to worship an omnipresent God—a genuinely universal vision that is evident both in the Qur’an and in religious practices, particularly through the ritual pilgrimage of the Hajj, where people of all colors and shapes pray together as equals. Although Islam has inevitably developed distinctive territorial characteristics, throughout the millennia waves of regional and transnational migrations have helped to diffuse Islam to the far- thest corners of the world, triggering an unceasing process of localization and hybridization. The confluence of population movement, transnational religious movements, the institutionalization of Islamic organizations, and “the diasporic forms of consciousness, identity, and culture creation” produces the diverse transnational forms of Islam (Bowen 2004). Consequently, identity construction among Muslim minorities in the diaspora is strongly shaped by these transnational dimensions. Given the reemerging importance of place in the discourses of globalization today (Tilley 2006; Christopherson, Garretsen, and Martin 2008), the study

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162 Wang of Chinese Muslims thus requires more place-based analyses embedded in a study of multidirectional flows in transnational spaces driven by highly mobile Chinese Muslim individuals from diverse backgrounds, global Islamic movements, and Muslim social networks (e.g., conferences, research institutions, and Islamic organizations). In the following pages, I will consider both local contexts and global forces while engaging with the experiences of diasporic Chinese Muslims in multiple locations to show that the identities of contemporary Chinese Muslims are not merely inherited, but produced and consoli- dated through individual encounters in transnational spaces. The conversion of Han and other ethnic minority Chinese to Islam,7 especially in the diaspora,8 broadens the scope of “Chinese Muslims” to include those who do not neces- sarily consider themselves Hui.

Encountering Chinese Muslims in Transnational Spaces

I began my research on Chinese Muslims at the end of 2006 as part of a project investigating the relationship between faith and trust in China’s emerging market economy.9 On my first research trip to China, I visited Beijing, Zhengzhou, and Guangzhou and conducted more than sixty in-depth interviews with Chi- nese Muslim businesspeople in different trades, seeking to understand how ethnoreligious minorities reconcile the conflicting demands of religion and business in China’s emerging market economy (Wang and Yang 2010, 2011). In subsequent years I continued my research on Chinese Muslims in Yiwu to find out the opportunities and challenges of living in the world’s largest small-commodity wholesale market (Wang 2015). My current project involves a five-year ethnography on Chinese expatriates in Dubai from 2011 to 2016. I observed the rapid growth of Chinese Muslim business networks, religious organizations, educational initiatives, cultural events, and social networks in the city and beyond. I was particularly interested in the new role Chinese Mus- lims play as middlemen in cultural exchanges between China and the United

7 There has been a growing interest in the diffusion of Islam among ethnic minority groups that are not traditionally associated with Islam, such as the Tibetan 藏, Dai 傣, and Mongo- lian 蒙 peoples. For a discussion of Tibetan Muslims, see Wang and Yang 2015. For a discussion of Dai Muslims, see Ma 2013. 8 For a discussion of early Chinese conversion to Islam in Indonesia, see Taylor 2005. 9 Publications from this project include Gao and Yang 2010; Wang and Yang 2011; Tong and Yang 2016.

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The Construction of Chinese Muslim Identities 163

Arab Emirates. Between September 2016 and May 2017, I had an opportunity to study Chinese Muslim immigrants in North America, particularly those who live in the San Francisco Bay area (Yu 2017) and Southern California. I conducted twenty interviews with first- and second-generation Chinese Muslim immigrants to examine the connotations of “Chinese Muslim” and how this identity shapes the day-to-day lives of immigrants. Migration is central in the history of Islam and Muslims. The movement of people over the millennia across the vast terrain stretching from West Asia to the Middle Kingdom defines the ethos of Chinese Muslims, who are the products of the cross-fertilization of diverse cultures. Chinese Islam grew out of the encounters between the monotheistic faith brought by immigrants and the highly eclectic traditions in the host society. To Chinese Muslim minorities, migration is not simply a choice; it is often a survival strategy. The process of moving and resettling transcends boundaries and enriches spiritual experiences. The territoriality of China’s Muslim minorities became increasingly dis- cernible toward the end of the Qing dynasty. By the early twentieth century, a substantial number of Hui people, concentrated in the northwestern provinces of Qinghai, Ningxia, Gansu, and Yunnan, had produced a distinctive Chinese Muslim cultural landscape. Urban Muslim enclaves were clearly identifiable in cities like Beijing, Huhehot, Xi’an, Zhengzhou, Kaifeng, Nanjing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. The Chinese Civil War between the Kuomintang Party and the Communists produced the first major wave of Chinese Muslim emigrants in the twentieth century. Anticipating the defeat of the Kuomintang and unsure about the attitudes of the Communist Party toward religious minorities, tens of thousands of Muslims fled the mainland. Many went to Taiwan, while others sought refuge in Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore. Among this wave of migrants were many Hui elites, including affluent businesspeople, entrepreneurs, Islamic scholars, and officials in the Kuomintang government. They brought Islam to their new homes, built mosques, and formed Hui communities in the diaspora. Some actively participated in local politics and had a long-lasting impact through their writings and social activism (Cieciura 2018 [in this issue]). The prominent Hui warlords of Northwest China were also forced into exile. Ma Hongkui and his close family members eventually settled down in Southern California, following a fallout with Chiang Kai-Shek shortly after arriving in Taiwan. Ma Bufang and his associates made a pilgrimage to the kingdom of Saudi Arabia before taking up temporary residence in Cairo. They eventually returned to Saudi Arabia after Egypt established a diplomatic relationship with the People’s Republic of China in 1957. Ma Bufang was appointed by Chiang Kai-Shek as the ambassador to Saudi Arabia and served in that role until his death in 1975. Ma Hongkui, however, died as an insignificant Chinese

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164 Wang immigrant in Los Angeles.10 Communications between the diasporic Chinese Muslims and those left in the mainland remained scarce until the period of reform and opening up began in the early 1980s. The implementation of the hukou policy11 following the founding of the People’s Republic effectively strengthened government controls over population movement. Although the Chinese constitution guarantees religious free- dom, the penetration of Party branch committees in large work units (danwei 单位) and residential neighborhoods shook the social structure of urban Mus- lim enclaves. The unwavering political campaigns in the first three decades after the founding of the prc, up to the end of the Cultural Revolution, severely curtailed the rights of religious minorities. As a result, the second wave of Chi- nese Muslim migration did not occur until the advent of economic reform, the loosening up of the hukou policy, and the rehabilitation of places of worship. It began with rural Muslim residents moving to nearby cities or provincial capitals. Then a stream of brave migrants headed to the booming manufacture centers on the southeast coast. Unlike the Han migrants, Muslim minorities found working at large factories less appealing due to dietary restrictions and, for some, religious obligations. Instead, Hui and Uyghur people started small businesses. They set up Northwest-style food stands or restaurants catering to the growing appetite for diverse foods in the metropolises. Uyghur street ven- dors and kebab sellers became a familiar sight in urban centers across eastern China. The mushrooming halal restaurants in the Pearl River Delta suggest that the expansion of the Chinese Islamic cultural landscape is the result of domestic migration. Chain migration was a pronounced feature in this wave of migration. For example, following the opening of one Qinghai restaurant by a Salar family on the outskirts of Beijing, countless Qinghai restaurants were founded, all of which were operated by Salar Muslims from Xunhua Autono- mous County in Qinghai Province.12 The traditional Hui urban enclaves also served as the entrepôt for new immigrants. These halal restaurants and ethnic businesses became transmitters of information and points of gathering on Fridays, on the occasion of religious festivals, and during the holy month of Ramadan. These business networks would later grow into important platforms that allowed Islamic scholars and Chinese Muslim intellectuals and artists to

10 For a detailed account of the Ma family warlords of Gansu, see Lipman 1984. See also Allès, Cherif-Chebbi, and Halfon 2001. 11 Hukou 户口 is a household registration system in mainland China. 12 This information derives from interviews with Salar businesspeople in Beijing and Guangzhou in 2006.

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The Construction of Chinese Muslim Identities 165 disseminate knowledge and provide much-needed cultural activities for migrants coping with the disorienting urban life. The third wave of migration began after 2000 and continues today. This phase of movement is marked by its transnational and multidirectional characteristics. Instead of settling down in one place, more and more individuals began to travel frequently between two or more locations often situated in more than one country. These flows of population are driven by the central government’s agenda to deepen economic reforms, to revive trade along the ancient Silk Road, to develop the vast Northwest region, and most recently to deepen China’s connectivity with the rest of the world through the Belt and Road Initiative. More importantly, in the last two decades, the movement of people no longer follows the southeastward path of the second wave of migration. Ningxia Autonomous Region made a timely decision to bank on its unique Muslim cultural capital in order to attract collaborators, investors, con- sumers, and tourists from the rest of China and the growing markets in Muslim countries (Ho 2013). The first China-Arab Trade and Commerce Summit took place in 2009 in Yinchuan, the capital of Ningxia Autonomous Region. The event was so successful that the Yinchuan government renamed it the China- Arab Expo and built a permanent site where the convention is held every two years to promote economic, social, and cultural exchanges between China and the Arab countries, and to facilitate the flow of capital and people. These contacts have encouraged Muslim minorities to seek opportunities in the Middle East and North Africa. There is now a significant presence of Chinese Muslims—Hui, Uyghur, Han converts, and others—among the Chi- nese expatriates in oil-rich Gulf cities, especially in Dubai, a prominent global city in the region (Wang 2016). Moreover, in the last two decades, a growing number of Chinese Muslim businesspeople have expanded their businesses to Eurasia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. The Belt and Road Initiative has further enabled greater participation of Chinese Muslim businesspeople, professionals, students, artists, and intellectuals in various exchange activities in transnational spaces. During the same period, students and professionals from Muslim backgrounds trickled into Western countries in search of further education and better employment opportunities. These individuals are widely dispersed, yet they are often connected through relatives, friends, alumni networks, and provincial associations of all sorts. These existing social networks, strengthened by social media, provide convenient platforms for exchanges of information, which in turn cultivate a sense of belonging and strengthen group solidarity. Friendships and romantic relationships formed in virtual space often extend into real life, connecting distant Chinese Muslim communities on different continents.

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166 Wang

The increasing flow of China’s Muslim minorities into Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa, as well as other popular destinations in North America, have significantly expanded the migratory networks and introduced the phenomenon of Chinese Islam to people who have little knowledge about China, let alone Chinese Muslims. Although the Turkic-speaking Uyghurs gen- erally exist outside this network, the boundaries are not all that clear and are contingent on the background of each person. Individuals of different minzu 民族 (ethnicities or nationalities), varied socioeconomic backgrounds, professions, and religiosity connected via the migratory networks represent “Chinese Islam” in different ways. Their interpretations of Chineseness and Muslimness are also divergent. Contacts with non-Chinese Muslims and exposure to different Islamic schools of thought as the result of migration both pose challenges and provide opportunities for China’s Muslim minorities to rethink their heritage and identity as they navigate transnational spaces.

Reclaiming Chinese Identity in Southeast Asia

Countries around the South China Sea have a long and complex history with China through tribute and trade. As a result, Southeast Asia now hosts about 80 percent of the entire Chinese diaspora. Ethnic Chinese, numbering some- where between 40 and 50 million, have made important contributions to the economic, social, and political development of the region and have played indispensable roles in cultivating and maintaining ties with China (Dongen and Liu 2017). Despite the concentration of about 240 million Muslims in South- east Asia, mainly Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei, Chinese Muslims have not received much attention in studies of the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia until recently. The presence of Chinese Muslims in Indonesia today is mostly due to religious conversion, rather than the emigration of Hui people from China. The ethnic Chinese Muslims number between 30,000–50,000, less than 2 percent of the Chinese in Indonesia and a tiny minority in the nation’s Muslim population. Until the end of the 1990s, or the end of the New Order era (1966–1998), it was widely believed that ethnic Chinese who converted to Islam would lose their “Chineseness” (Hew 2014a). The radical reorganization of day-to-day rou- tines and the practice of intermarriage—two conspicuous results of religious conversion—would lead to the assimilation of ethnic Chinese into various local ethnic majorities that comprise the ethnically and culturally diverse Indo- nesian society. These assumptions, however, have been challenged in the post–New Or- der period: a growing number of Chinese Muslims have been engaging in the

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The Construction of Chinese Muslim Identities 167 public display of their “Chineseness” as Indonesia continues to show greater political openness to Chinese culture. In his carefully executed ethnography of Chinese Muslims in Indonesia, Hew Wai Weng (2017) documented the various dimensions of “Chineseness” as exhibited by ethnic Chinese Muslims in Indo- nesia. China’s prospering economy and growing influence in the region after the end of the Cold War, the changing political atmosphere within Indonesia, and the internal restructuring of Indonesian Islam are among the most important factors that made the coexistence of “Chineseness” and “Muslimness” possible among Chinese Muslims in Indonesia. Hew (2014b) provided a detailed account of the Cheng Hoo Mosque established in Surabaya in 2002. Incorporating the contours of the ancient Ox Street Mosque located in the heart of Beijing with an interior design featuring Indo- nesian representations of Islam, the Surabaya Cheng Hoo Mosque “declare[s] that Islam and Chineseness can coexist harmoniously in the country” (Hew 2014b:630). Hew went on to argue that the construction of a Chinese-style mosque reflects “a process both of consumption and self-production” and “the interplay of transnational imagining and local negotiation” (2014b:630). Cheng Hoo Mosque is a statement made by ethnic Chinese Muslims in Indonesia to legitimize their existence. Backed by the fourteen-hundred-year history of Is- lam in China and the resilience of the Hui people, Chinese Muslims in Indone- sia can now introduce themselves as followers of an authentic tradition that is even older than Indonesian Islam. Compared to the small Chinese population in Indonesia (less than 1.2 percent of the total population), the Chinese community in Malaysia is the nation’s second largest ethnic group, making up 23.4 percent of the total population.13 Like their counterparts in Indonesia, the experiences of Chinese Muslims in Malaysia are similarly influenced by the fluctuating relationships between China and Malaysia, China’s growing influence in the South China Sea, and global Islamic movements. Due to the close association between Malay ethnicity and Islam, Chinese converts are also expected to erase their Chinese ethnicity in order to claim Muslim identity (Ma 2011). In addition, studies have found that Chinese Muslim migrants—the Hui people—from mainland China are pushed by social and political forces to assimilate into either the non-Muslim Chinese community or the non-Chinese Muslim community (Ma 2010). With the rise of China and the shifting attitudes toward cultural diversity within Muslim communities, however, there is a growing desire among ethnic Chi- nese Muslims to preserve their Chinese identity alongside their Muslim identity. This is especially true among recent Chinese Muslim immigrants from

13 Source: Department of Statistics of Malaysia, 2016.

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168 Wang mainland China (Chow and Ma 2016). The practice of adopting Arabic sur- names and first names upon embracing Islam now meets mounting resistance (Malay Mail 2015). Chinese Muslims also display and reproduce their ethnic identity by celebrating Chinese festivals, such as the Chinese New Year, the Moon Cake festival, and the Dragon Boat festival. The experiences of Chinese Muslims in Malaysia and Indonesia as documented in these studies show that claiming Chinese identity helps to weaken the strong linkage between local majority groups—various ethnic groups in Indonesia and the Malay in Malaysia—and Islam. The public discourse on the issue of cultural diversity in Islam, informed by the ongoing debate among Islamic scholars and theologians on the concepts of pluralism and multiculturalism in Islam (Said and Sharify-Funk 2003), have clearly shaped the per- ception of Chinese cultural practices among Chinese Muslims in the diaspora. Through building Chinese-style mosques, resisting the assimilative force, and engaging in global exchanges of religious knowledge, Islam in Southeast Asia has transcended its ethnic and local boundaries to become universal and global, lending legitimacy to a diasporic Chinese Muslim identity.

Being a Double Minority in the United States

The passage of the us Immigration Act of 1965 has led to a significant increase in immigrants from non-European countries. In the subsequent years, the first wave of Chinese Muslims arrived from Taiwan and many of them settled in California, given the historical connections between the East Asian Pacific region and the American West Coast. In the 1970s and 1980s, America’s Muslim community encountered Chinese Muslims on university campuses through the networks of the Muslim Student Association. At that time, the small number of international students of Hui descent almost all hailed from Taiwan and Southeast Asia, whereas most Chinese Muslim immigrants in America today arrived from mainland China after 2000. Many of these international students are in the fields of engineering and computer science. They often find employment in large it companies, such as Google, Facebook, and Apple, which has led to the geographic concentration of Chinese Muslims on the West Coast, especially in the San Francisco Bay area. There are also businesspeople who obtained green cards or citizenship through investment and individuals who obtained permanent residence or citizenship through political asylum. De- spite this diversity, Chinese Muslim immigrants in the United States are gener- ally voluntary immigrants with strong educational credentials and skills that are in great demand on the job market. They are widely scattered across the

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The Construction of Chinese Muslim Identities 169 continental us and Hawaii (Wang 2013b) and concentrated in California. The earliest migrant families have now reached the third generation. But most Chinese Muslim Americans today are first-generation immigrants whose pri- ority is to put down roots in the United States. Most of the first-generation immigrants from Taiwan in the 1970s are members of well-to-do Hui families who were able to leave mainland China in 1949. Some of them are descendants of prominent Hui scholars, businesspeople, and government officials. Fawzia, one of my interlocutors in Phoenix, Arizona, is widely known within the circle of Chinese Muslims as the daughter-in-law of the renowned Hui scholar Tong Daozhang, who was jailed during Lee Kuan Yew’s clampdown on media in Singapore in 1971 (Casady 1975). Fawzia herself is a descendant of one of the most affluent Hui households during the Republican era in Nanjing—the Mai family—which made its fortune in the shipping business. Born in Taiwan, Fawzia spent her childhood in Europe and the Middle East with her itinerant diplomat father. She attended schools in Saudi Arabia, France, Taiwan, Jordan, and the uk and worked as a psychiatrist and journalist in Jordan and Saudi Arabia. After getting married, she migrated to Phoenix, where she homeschooled her seven children. A hijabi, a mother, a well-educated professional, a multilingual educator, a former director of the Arizona office of cair (Council on American-Islamic Relations), and a teacher at a Chinese after-school academy, Fawzia possesses a wide range of identities that make her an extraordinary individual. The two-hour phone interview was conducted in Mandarin Chinese with just a few English and Arabic words inserted. Fawzia shared her life story.

My sister and I went to kindergarten in France. I still remember that we used to be surrounded by other [French] kids who made fun of our eyes and noses . . .

I went to the University of Jordan to study medicine. . . . It was the only university in the country at that time. Our professors used to teach in Arabic. I was the first Chinese who graduated with a degree in medicine . . .

I didn’t used to cover my hair, only when [I was] praying. During that time, in Jordan, only the less educated covered their hair, the more educated didn’t. When students in the medical school started covering their hair, I also began wearing longer and longer clothes and started buying headscarves. After making Hajj, I decided to put on the hijab and I’ve been wearing it ever since. It came naturally and my daughters are covered

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too. I didn’t really feel any strong reaction [after I put on the hijab] from others. I’m used to [being different].

After 9/11 . . . I became director of cair’s office in Arizona. . . . I did many interviews with the press to talk about Islam and the struggle of American Muslims. In some ways, I became the face of Muslims in Phoenix.

Although Fawzia was raised in many different places around the world and mostly outside Chinese society, her identity is strongly defined by her Hui heritage. Her marriage was arranged with the help of family members and relatives who are well connected to a transnational Hui social network. In fact, Fawzia told me that since there were so few Hui families overseas, her parents began making contacts when she was about fifteen or sixteen years old, although she eventually got married at the age of twenty-six. Both the Arabic language and Islam are indispensable elements in Fawzia’s identity. Although Fawzia’s father only started learning about Islam while working in Saudi Arabia, Fawzia was socialized in Arab Muslim societies from an early age. Her donning of the hijab, an important indicator of her religiosity, was an act in accordance with the growing conservatism in the Arab world in the 1980s. The term “Chinese Muslim” in its Chinese translation (华人穆斯林) was never used during our conversation. Fawzia referred to herself and her family as Huihui or Hui throughout the entire interview. She used the English term “Chinese Muslim” only once when talking about her life in the us. Neverthe- less, in her identity matrix, there is room for Chineseness, which is constructed through other people’s perceptions of her based on her physical features, her origin, and her choice of language in her daily interactions with the people around her. The Chinese heritage she claims is embedded in her extended family’s long history in mainland China, Southeast Asia, and Taiwan. Like other Chinese in the diaspora, she attaches great value to education. The roles she plays in Islamic organizations and Chinese American educational institutions suggest that it is possible to be a Chinese and a Muslim simultaneously. Fawzia’s children, the second-generation immigrants, all learned to speak Chinese, Arabic, and English. They also received an Islamic education since childhood. Her daughters wear the hijab and take pride in their religious affili- ation. One of her daughters is a qualified teacher of Mandarin. Another daughter is married to a Hui from the mainland and now lives in Nanjing. Two of her sons ran an online Islamic educational platform for a period of time. As travel and communication have become easier with technological advancements, Fawzia’s family is now well connected to Chinese Muslim communities in California, Nanjing, Taiwan, and many other places around the world, which contributes to the maintenance of their ethnoreligious identity.

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Although other interlocutors’ stories are not as legendary, their experiences, just like those of Fawzia, are similarly shaped by the tensions between mainland China and Taiwan, and the global politics that have aggravated the conflict between Islam and the West. Chinese Muslims in the San Francisco Bay area gather frequently. These gatherings are usually held on long week- ends during public holidays, especially when the dates coincide with Chinese festivals, such as the Mid-Autumn festival and the Chinese New Year. During Ramadan and the Eid holiday, on the other hand, many Chinese Muslim families celebrate with other immigrant Muslims in the Bay area. Such an arrange- ment provides space for the reproduction of both religious identity and ethnic identity, especially for the American-born children. The Chinese Muslim immigrants from mainland China whom I interviewed said that they rediscovered “Chinese Muslim” identity as the result of migration. Most of them came to the United States to pursue postgraduate studies. They had little knowledge about Islam since they were all educated in public schools in China, where religion is regarded as a primordial relic or as super- stition. The vibrant religious activities in the United States provide them with an opportunity to see religion in a different light. The Muslim international students they meet on campuses and their Muslim colleagues in workplaces introduce them to local immigrant Muslim communities. Some Chinese Mus- lim immigrants from mainland China began attending Friday Jummah prayers, learning how to perform salat, and observing Ramadan. Those who are less religious are also becoming more interested in Islam and their Muslim identity. Nevertheless, as Chinese living in the United States, it is inevitable that Chinese Muslims also share similar concerns as non-Muslim Chinese. They prioritize job security, financial stability, and their children’s education. Mrs. Ma, a forty-year-old well-paid professional working in an insurance company, confessed that although she supported the Democratic Party because it was more friendly to Muslims, she was frustrated by the increasing taxes levied on high-income households like hers. She talked about her children’s future and felt that Asian Americans were punished for their outstanding academic achievement by the college admission process. She worried that the increasing competition would reduce her children’s opportunity to go to the best universities in the United States. The family adheres to Muslim dietary restrictions carefully and often discusses topics related to Islam at home. However, instead of finding an Arabic tutor or Islamic teacher, Mrs. Ma enrolled her children in after-school programs to study Mandarin Chinese, musical instruments, and martial arts, among other extracurricular activities, just like other non-Muslim Chinese. Many of my interlocutors echoed these concerns. The prejudice and discrimination in American society against Asian Americans accentuates the Chinese identity of these Chinese Muslim immigrants.

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The formation of Chinese Muslim organizations further strengthens the identity of Chinese Muslims. Founded in 2005 by a group of international students linked by various alumni networks, the Chinese Muslim Youth Associa- tion in North America (cmyana, 北美华人穆斯林青年联谊会) provides a platform for information exchange and mutual help for Chinese Muslims living in North America, especially the first-generation immigrants. Members also frequently engage in discussions of topics related to religious knowledge and social problems facing Muslim minorities. With the emergence of social media apps in subsequent years, Facebook and WeChat have gradually replaced this platform. However, the social network built by cmyana continues to grow, affirming group solidarity and creating a sense of belonging. It is, therefore, through their interactions with other Chinese Muslims, non-Chinese Muslim immigrants from all over the world, and the American mainstream that Chi- nese American Muslims learn to cope with the challenges of being a double minority in American society.

The New Middleman Minority in the United Arab Emirates

For centuries, the Arabian Peninsula has been the real or imagined homeland of Chinese Muslims. The United Arab Emirates (uae), a tiny country located on the east coast of the peninsula, has become another popular destination for Chinese Muslim migrants. Many were attracted to the emirate by its booming economy. The dominant Islamic culture in the region offers another incentive for Muslim minorities. Unlike Southeast Asia, where there is a long history of Chinese immigration and an influential Chinese diasporic community, the uae is home to a highly diverse population, which is comprised of about 11 percent natives and 89 percent foreigners, mostly from the South Asian subcontinent (uae Government 2018). Unlike the United States, the uae does not offer immigrants a path to naturalization. Both low-skilled workers and well-trained professionals are is- sued temporary residence permits under the sponsorship of their employers. Length of stay is contingent upon employment. Life is transitory in this country. Although some foreigners have lived in the uae for more than two generations, there is a strong sense of “permanent impermanence” (Ali 2010). China and the uae did not establish diplomatic relations until 1984. A small stream of Chinese businesspeople trickled into Dubai in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The second wave of Chinese entrepreneurs arrived after 2000, supported by China’s massive manufacturing industry and the need for Chinese

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The Construction of Chinese Muslim Identities 173 companies to “go out”14 and engage with the promising Middle Eastern and African markets. The 2009 economic crisis did not slow down the inflow of Chinese. In fact, Chinese migration to Dubai accelerated during the years after the Arab Spring, producing the third wave of Chinese influx. Economic exchanges between China and the uae have been fruitful as the Chinese government seeks to protect its investment in the region and secure its energy supplies in the Middle East. China is also keen on promoting deeper mutual understandings through social and cultural exchanges, which are essential to China’s long-term strategic goals in the region. As a result, the Chinese population in the city has increased by more than a hundredfold since the 1990s from some 2,000 to more than 270,000.15 China has become the uae’s biggest trade partner and a significant source of tourists. As a religious minority living in the midst of non-Muslim majorities, Chi- nese Muslims have traditionally engaged in ethnic entrepreneurship.16 On the one hand, they operate ethnic businesses out of ethnoreligious enclaves, sus- taining an enclave economy. On the other hand, they also play the role of a middleman minority, enabled by unique skills that give them an advantage in certain niche markets. As Dubai ascends to become the most promising global city in the Middle East and the status of Chinese Muslims shifts from religious minority in China to religious majority in Dubai, a new niche market emerges, in which the dual identity of Chinese Muslims allows them to become brokers, mediators, and in a way cultural ambassadors between China and the uae. To improve Dubai’s ranking on the global city index,17 Dubai’s ruling elites are keen on creating an open and tolerant social space, which is key to the growth of a knowledge-based economy essential for Dubai’s future. In the last decade, Dubai has constructed world-class infrastructure and simplified bureaucratic procedures to attract global event organizers. Dubai’s Islamic roots and cosmopolitan outlook provide the perfect stage for events to promote cross-cultural dialogues, especially in the post-9/11 era. The Arab Spring had a mixed impact on Dubai. Its economy boomed as the rest of the Middle

14 For more on China’s “going out” policy, see Salidjanova 2011. 15 This estimate was obtained from the Chinese Consulate General in Dubai. However, given the high level of population mobility, it is difficult to obtain accurate figures for the city’s Chinese population. 16 For detailed discussions on ethnic entrepreneurship, see Zhou 2004. 17 Dubai was ranked no. 28 on ATKearney’s Global Cities index in 2016 (https://www .atkearney.com/documents/20152/436064/Global+Cities+2016.pdf/934b2d25–89fa-00d2 -ee9a-b053b92b5230).

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East crumbled into chaos. The influence of extremism also forces Dubai to de- fend its position as a moderate Muslim society. Although academic research and public events are closely scrutinized, cultural economy has flourished with the opening of a number of art galleries, creative spaces, and entertainment venues. There is a growing emphasis on cultural exchanges, drawing the center of attention away from sensitive issues. Chinese Muslims in the uae—Hui, Han converts, and Uyghurs—have played an increasingly important role in promoting mutual understanding between China and the uae and dialogues between the Islamic and Chinese civilizations. These individuals come from a wide range of backgrounds. Some are officially appointed clerics, some are successful entrepreneurs, and others are artists, teachers, doctors, and intellectuals. Over the years they have sponsored, organized, and participated in a wide range of public events to educate Chinese people about Islamic culture, and to introduce Chinese culture to the broader Muslim community. With their help, the renowned Chinese Islamic calligrapher, Mi Guangjiang, held several exhibitions in Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Sharjah that showcase the perfect union of Chinese and Arab aestheticism. In June 2016, Zhenghe International Peace Foundation, a us-based non-profit organization, held its second annual Zhenghe International Peace Conference in Dubai. Chinese Muslims have also played an active role in interfaith dialogues sponsored by the uae Ministry of Culture and local Dawah organizations to promote dialogue between Islam and Confucianism. The organizer of a well- attended monthly lecture series on topics that are of interest to the Chinese expatriate community is in fact a Han Muslim convert who received his doc- torate from a prestigious university in the United States. These activities have gone beyond the traditional territory of Chinese Mus- lim businesses, such as halal restaurants and halal food production. As the volume of trade between China and the uae multiplies, the need for mean- ingful cultural exchanges between the two countries gains urgency. The dual identity of Chinese Muslims, broadly defined, is a unique source of cultural capital in this new field. Through their active involvement in these events, Chinese Muslims adopt the role of a middleman minority (Blalock 1967:79– 84; Bonaich 1973). In history and at present, middleman minorities—Jewish Americans, Italian Americans, Chinese Americans, Chinese in southeast Asia, Korean Americans, and many others—have been able to achieve exceptional success in their respective niche markets and accumulate considerable wealth; yet, they continue to face discrimination in the host society, both from the dominant majority above them and the subordinate minority below (Alba and Nee 2009). Different from the typical middleman minorities, who gravi- tate toward certain niche markets and professions due to discrimination and

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The Construction of Chinese Muslim Identities 175 limited opportunities in mainstream society, the Chinese Muslims in the uae are simultaneously minority—being Chinese—and majority—being Muslim. They continue to combat prejudice and stereotypes, both from their Chinese compatriots and Muslim brothers and sisters, due to their in-between-ness (Wang 2016). Nevertheless, the growing cultural industry in Dubai, an event city and an entertainment city, attaches more prestige to the new niche— cultural exchanges between China and the Islamic world. Activities that fall into this territory are unlikely to generate much wealth, but they are effective in improving China-uae relations, which may then translate into tangible business deals between the two partners. Dr. Ma, a Hui businessman who served as the first director of the Confucius Institute in Dubai, contends, “Everything will become easier, if both sides understand each other and accept each other. Cultural exchange is the key to open up people’s minds and genuinely accept each other” (personal interview, 2016). The new middleman role of Chinese Muslims in strengthening China–uae relations through their work as policy/legal consultants, business brokers, phi- lanthropists, and informal cultural ambassadors helps to improve the overall experiences of the Chinese Muslim community in the uae, which is con- ditioned by their relationship with the overseas Chinese authorities—the Chinese Consulate General in Dubai and in turn their relationship with government agencies back in China. Being recognized by overseas Chinese authorities as good citizens is an intangible but valuable asset, especially useful since the uae does not provide permanent residence or paths to naturalization. Since Ramadan 2010, it has become a tradition for the Chinese Consulate General to host an iftar for Chinese Muslim families—Hui, Uyghur, and others—during the holy month of Islam. The consul general, representatives of major provincial and regional trade associations, and Emirati partners gather together with Chinese Muslims to celebrate the contributions of Chinese Muslims to the economic, social, and cultural exchanges between China and the uae. Chinese Muslims see the uae as a safe haven where they are not only able to practice Islam freely, but also have more opportunities to achieve financial stability and gain social influence. In my research, I found that their accentu- ated religious identity does not cancel out the presence of Chinese-ness. Even the second generations are more likely to maintain stronger ties with China. Under the influence of the Belt and Road Initiative, the uae is also commit- ted to developing closer and stronger ties with China—an emerging economic and political power in the ever-changing world system. The shifting economic currents empower Chinese Muslims to play a bigger role in the future collabo- rations between the two countries and consequently reinforce their dual identity as Chinese Muslims (Wang 2016).

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Conclusion: Constructing Chinese Muslim Identities in Transnational Spaces

The phenomenon of Chinese Muslims, or Chinese-speaking Muslims, has been produced and sustained by constant transregional flows of people, ideas, and organization structures throughout the millennium. It is rooted in the monotheistic tradition of Islam and flourishes in the social and cultural context of Chinese society. The intrinsic norms and values of these two dimensions—both evolving as the result of transnational flows—have shaped Chinese Muslims’ sense of belonging and group boundaries. Contemporary Chinese Muslims—both those who inherited their religious and cultural traditions from their ancestors and the more recent converts from a variety of backgrounds—are embedded in increasingly interconnected and interdependent transnational networks. Their identities reflect the interactions between local conditions and global forces. The identities of Chinese Muslims grew out of the need to survive in a largely Confucian society. The formation of this hybrid identity attests the resilience of Islam, as well as the flexibility of Chinese civilization. Despite persecution and the pressure to assimilate, Chinese Muslims emerged as one of the five key ethnic groups instrumental in the nation-building project during the Republi- can era. The close connections between Islam and Hui ethnicity also enabled Chinese Muslims to resist the force of secularization under communist rule. The trend of religious revival in China since the 1980s has generated a growing interest in Islamic heritage among China’s Muslim minorities, especially the younger generations who came of age during the reform era. Such an interest is largely driven by haphazard economic growth and the spiritual crisis that followed the collapse of the traditional value system and the suppression of religion in mainland China (Yang 2012). Urban renewal projects and housing system reform broke down historic Hui enclaves and redistributed Hui families to different parts of their cities. Nevertheless, the increasing flow of Chinese Muslims from rural villages to urban areas and from Northwest to Southeast China, driven by the force of urbanization and economic liberalization, has produced new forms of Muslim communities and extended the Islamic cultural landscape (Zhou and Ma 2004; Liang 2006). In these processes, divergent understandings of the phenomenon of Chinese Islam emerged. The debates within Chinese Muslim communities and academia further produced greater awareness of the complex relationships between ethnicity and religion. The experiences of Chinese Muslims are not only shaped by these local conditions. With the significant expansion of Chinese Muslim transnational networks in the last four decades, a community that is bound by a shared faith and

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The Construction of Chinese Muslim Identities 177 collective memory has been exposed to the ebb and flow of global political, economic, social, and cultural currents. The shock wave of the 9/11 events bred rampant Islamophobia across the globe. Anti-terrorist rhetoric has had a long- lasting impact on transnational Chinese Muslim communities, pushing them into a “third space” (Fischer 2004) due to their dual identity. Scattered in the diaspora, Chinese Muslims are often a double minority who are pressured to give up at least one dimension of their dual identity in order to fit in. The experiences of Chinese Muslims in the United States as examined in this paper show that, at least for the first and second generations, the category of “Chinese Mus- lim” remains salient, despite variations in individual piety. Some place more emphasis on the “Muslim” dimension of their identity, while being encouraged to preserve their Chinese identity. This is largely due to the democratic polity in the United States and the strong influence of pluralism and multiculturalism in public discourse. Some find the “Chinese” dimension more relevant in their day-to-day lives. In a liberal state, such as California, Chinese Muslim migrants feel less pressure to conform. Thus, they are more likely to freely reconstruct their own versions of being Chinese Muslims in the diaspora. The rise of China, on the other hand, entails both opportunities and challenges for Chinese Muslims. The growing nationalism, patriotism, and Han- chauvinism inside China are clearly felt in the diaspora. At the same time, there is also heightened suspicion and mistrust regarding China’s potential political influence in the world system. Studies on Chinese Muslims in Southeast Asia show that ethnic Chinese Muslims creatively exhibit the Chinese characteristics of their religious space to proclaim their affinity with the Chinese Islamic cultural heritage, which then provides legitimacy for their existence in South- east Asia’s ethnoreligious landscape. In the uae, Chinese Muslim identity is a valuable source of cultural capital in a new niche market that has emerged as the result of the growing economic ties between China and the Arabian Gulf and the broader Middle East. Other local contexts, such as the immigrant policies in the uae and the active promotion of multiculturalism in Dubai, an emerging global city, have also contributed to the resilience of Chinese Muslim identity. Certainly, the expansion of the transnational network of Chinese Muslims can also be attributed to the rapid growth of social media in the last decade, the growing public interest in the state of religion in China, and the increasing presence of Chinese Muslims in education, cultural industry, and academia. In this paper, I have drawn on my fieldwork in China, the United States, and the United Arab Emirates, combined with a survey of key studies of Southeast Asia, to delineate the shape of transnational Chinese Muslim networks and examine the divergent patterns of identity construction among Chinese Muslims

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178 Wang in the diaspora. In future studies, it would be useful to delve deeper into the growing presence of diasporic Chinese Muslims in academia, cultural industry, and mass media to gain a fuller understanding of their role in driving the transnational flow of ideas—a subject that is more abstract and hard to capture, but nevertheless essential for future generations of Chinese Muslims as they face multiple challenges from secularism, a shifting world order, and a capricious global economy.

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