Is an Status Quo Power? Morten Larsen Nonboe phd-studerende, Institut for Statskundskab, Aarhus Universitet, email: [email protected].

Russian foreign policy in the increasingly impor- 10, Zyśk 2009: 106, Trenin 2010: 10-12, Indzhiyev 2010: tant Arctic region refl ects an ambiguous combi- 117-118). Specifi cally, the approach stresses that Russia nation of assertiveness and cooperation in accor- bases its claims in the ice-covered on the dance with international law. Against this back- UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)1 and ground, the existing literature on the Arctic tends has abrogated the Soviet sector principle according to to polarise around revisionist and status quo in- which the unilaterally claimed a triangu- lar sector between the Soviet Union’s North-eastern and terpretations of Russian foreign policy in the re- North-western borders and the in 1926 (In- gion. Based on case studies this article provides dzhiyev 2010: 16-20, Kazmin 2010: 15). Th e approach support for a modifi ed version of the status quo also highlights Russia’s participation in the ‘Arctic Five’ interpretation which incorporates insights from cooperation with the other Arctic coastal states (Canada, the revisionist interpretation. Denmark, Norway, and the United States). Th e ‘Arctic Five’ cooperation is based on the UNCLOS and was 1. Russia and the Arctic formally launched at the Ilulissat Summit in May 2008 Th e existing literature on Russian foreign policy in the when the ‘Arctic Five’ signed the Ilulissat Declaration and Arctic is divided into two competing camps. One ap- committed themselves to an ‘orderly settlement of any proach emphasises assertive Russian actions like the Rus- possible overlapping claims’ based on the existing legal sian fl ag planting on the seabed beneath the North Pole framework in the Arctic (Ilulissat Declaration 2008). For in 2007 and downplays Russia’s adherence to the legal these reasons, a Russian observer has posited that Rus- framework in the Arctic region whose economic poten- sia’s Arctic policy aims to maintain ‘the status quo in the tial is increasingly highlighted by the eff ects of global Arctic waters which exists from the Soviet period’ until warming (Borgerson 2008: 65-74, Petersen 2008: 47, Russia achieves UN recognition of its claims (Golotiuk Baev 2010: 25-26). Ominously, it has been suggested that 2008: 3). Russia is merely ‘paying lip service to international law’ Th e divergent interpretations make it relevant to and appears to believe that ‘credible displays of power study Russian foreign policy in the Arctic in further de- will settle confl icting territorial claims’ in the Arctic (Co- tail. Drawing on the distinction between the ideal types hen, Szaszdi & Dolbow 2008: 1). Russia’s actions in the of revisionist and status quo powers in international rela- Arctic have in fact even been linked to a looming ‘New tions, the existing literature can be synthesised into revi- Cold War’ between Russia and the West (Lucas 2009: sionist and status quo interpretations. Th e realist premise 186-187). underlying the distinction between revisionist and status Another approach, by contrast, is inclined to dismiss quo powers suggests that all policies seek to either in- assertive Russian actions like the fl ag planting or the crease or keep power. Accordingly, a state whose foreign resumption of Soviet-era strategic bomber fl ight patrols policy aims at acquiring more power conducts a revision- over the Arctic Ocean and underlines Russia’s adherence ist foreign policy, while a state whose foreign policy aims to the existing legal framework in the Arctic (Rowe 2009: at maintaining the distribution of power pursues a policy 26 TIDSSKRIFTET POLITIK IS RUSSIA AN ARCTIC STATUS QUO POWER?

of the status quo (Morgenthau 1973: 40-41). In opera- of “the fi rst night” (...) the North Pole belongs to Rus- tionalisable terms, a state’s attitude towards the rules of sia’ (Moskovskiy komsomolets 2007). Th e fl ag planting an international system distinguishes revisionist from consequently sparked sharp reactions from the other Arc- status quo powers. From this perspective, a revisionist tic coastal states. For instance, then Canadian foreign power is discernable from a status quo power by its com- minister Peter MacKay was quoted saying that ‘this isn’t pliance with the existing international institutions and the 15th century (…) you can’t go around the world and the framework of international law (Gilpin 1981: 34-36, just plant fl ags and say “we’re claiming this territory”’ Johnston 2003: 8-12). Given the importance of the UN- (Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 2007). Against CLOS in an Arctic context, adherence to the UNCLOS this background, the fl ag planting could be seen as a therefore constitutes an important indicator of whether revisionist attempt to challenge ‘the rules of the game’ Russia is best classifi ed as a revisionist power challenging in the Arctic based on the UNCLOS. Nonetheless, clas- the provisions of the UNCLOS or a status quo power sifi cation of the fl ag planting as a revisionist challenge adhering to the existing legal framework. of the UNCLOS would seem to depend on the certain Th e present paper aims to test the competing inter- conditions. Given the operationalisation of a revisionist pretations through case studies of the Russian fl ag plant- power as a power challenging the existing legal frame- ing in 2007 and the Ilulissat Summit in 2008 which can work based on the UNCLOS, it seems possible to de- be treated as ‘crucial cases’ given their centrality to the duce the following minimum conditions. First, the fl ag competing interpretations (Eckstein 1975: 113-123, Ger- planting expedition would have to refl ect continuity with ring 2007: 115-122). Th e possibility of testing hypotheses Russia’s previous foreign policy in the Arctic. Second, the using single case studies is disputed for various reasons fl ag planting would need to have had an international di- and case studies entail obvious limitations with respect to rection to assert Russia’s claims vis-à-vis the other Arctic external validity (King, Verba & Keohane 1994: 209-211, coastal states. Th ird, high-level decision-makers in Russia George, Bennett 2005: 220-222). Th e ‘crucial’ case stud- would need to have welcomed the fl ag planting. What ies can, however, be seen as a ‘plausibility probes’ which follows explores the extent to which the three conditions attempt to determine whether the potential validity of the are satisfi ed. competing interpretations may reasonably be considered great enough to warrant further inquiry (Eckstein 1975: 2.1 Policy continuity 108-109). Th e case studies, accordingly, seek to explore Th e origins of Arktika 2007 are somewhat obscure. Rus- the validity of the two competing perspectives on Russian sia has previously organised similar expeditions known as foreign policy in the Arctic and do not attempt to give Arktika 2000 and Arktika 2005 in order to collect scienti- a full account of Russia’s Arctic policy which is beyond fi c data and prove Russia’s claims within the UNCLOS the scope of the paper. Conducting the case studies, the framework (Indzhiyev 2010: 37, ITAR-TASS 2005). Th e paper primarily relies on offi cial statements from the Rus- continuity between Arktika 2007 and Russia’s previous sian government and news coverage of the selected cases. foreign policy in the Arctic region has also been stressed by the Russian member of the UN Commission on the 2. Th e Russian Flag Planting on the North Pole Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), Yury Kazmin. Seabed According to Kazmin, ‘the political signifi cance of [the In the summer of 2007, Russia performed the fi rst ever fl ag planting] can be hardly overestimated’ since the fl ag manned descent to the seabed beneath the North Pole. planting ‘confi rmed that Russia has not abandoned its Th e descent took place as a part of the expedition Ark- claim to the continental shelf and the resources of the tika 2007 which was conducted by the Russian research seabed up to the North Pole (...) and that she shall never vessel Akademik Fyodorov with the help of the revise the limit once outlined’ (Kazmin 2010: 27). Th e Rossiya. On 2 August 2007, the deep-submergence vehi- continuity between Arktika 2007 and Russia’s previous cles -1 and MIR-2 submerged from the Akademik foreign policy in the Arctic is, nonetheless, far from per- Fyodorov in the morning and reached the North Pole sea- fect. In fact, the idea of performing a manned descent bed around noon. MIR-1 and MIR-2 collected a number to the seabed of the North Pole appears to have been of specimens from the seabed, but most famously the conceived already in 1997 among a group of internatio- MIR-1 also placed a large Russian titanium fl ag on the nal explorers led by the Australian Mike McDowell. Th e North Pole seabed (McDowell, Batson 2007: 11-13). Af- original idea was to conduct the endeavour as a passenger- ter the descent, the leader of the expedition, the presi- funded expedition using the Russian MIR deep-submer- dential advisor Artur Chilingarov, forcefully commented gence vehicles, but it proved diffi cult to fi nd enough pas- that ‘there is the law of the sea and there is the right2 sengers willing to pay for the project. For that reason, the MORTEN LARSEN NONBOE TEMA 27

plan did not develop further until the Swedish-German ing member and head of the International businessman Frederik Paulsen joined the project in 2005 Aff airs Committee in the Russian Federation Council, and agreed to ‘funding a signifi cant proportion of the Mikhail Margelov, publicly welcomed the capsule with costs’ in return for a place in one of the MIR submersi- the United Russia banner as ‘an excellent PR move by his bles (McDowell, Batson 2007: 8). Still, the organisers had party colleagues’ (Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press diffi culties securing and the expedition did 2007). Th e domestic direction of Arktika 2007 is also not get underway until the prominent Russian polar ex- indicated by the fact that assertive Arctic endeavours have plorer and presidential Arctic representative, Artur Chi- resonance among the Russian public according to opin- lingarov, took over the organisation of the logistics and ion polls. More than 70 percent of the respondents in one used his clout ‘to fund the remaining cost of mounting poll, for example, had an ‘encouraging attitude’ towards the expedition’ (McDowell, Batson 2007: 9). With the Arktika 2007, while 90 percent had no doubts as to the assistance of Chilingarov, who is also a deputy speaker legitimacy of a Russian claim to the North Pole (ITAR- of the Russian representing the dominant TASS 2007a). Th e references to United Russia suggest a United Russia party, the expedition was authorised by domestic purpose which is diffi cult to combine with the the Russian government and approved by the Maritime second condition of an international direction to assert Board under the Russian government. Formally, Arktika Russia’s claims vis-à-vis the other Arctic coastal states. 2007 was organised by the Institute of Oceanography under the Russian Academy of Sciences. Th e Institute 2.3 High-level reactions of Oceanography, in turn, delegated the task of carrying Arktika 2007 might have developed outside the tradi- out the expedition to the non-commercial Russian Polar tional channels of Russian foreign policy in the Arctic, Research Foundation which is established by the Rus- but the Russian authorities quickly embraced the project sian Association of Polar Explorers headed by Chilinga- once the descent to the North Pole seabed was success- rov. Interestingly, though, offi cials from the Institute of fully carried out (Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press Oceanography are reported to have refused to comment 2007). Th en President Putin, for example, personally on the fi nancial sources of the expedition (Current Digest phoned the participants shortly after the descent to con- of the Post-Soviet Press 2007, ITAR-TASS 2007d, ITAR- gratulate them (ITAR-TASS 2007c, ITAR-TASS 2007b). TASS 2007c). All told, the unclear level of government Th e praise from President Putin was seconded by similar involvement in the organisation and funding of Arktika statements from other prominent Russian offi cials like 2007 suggests that the fi rst condition of policy continuity the speaker of the State Duma and leading member of is not satisfi ed. United Russia, (ITAR-TASS 2007e). Even the Russian Patriarch at the time, Aleksiy II, welcomed 2.2 Policy Direction the descent, commenting that Arktika 2007 was a historic According to Chilingarov, the most important result of event which had ‘enhanced Russia’s prestige’ (Kolodkin, Arktika 2007 was that ‘we showed that the Arctic is ours, Glandin 2007: 15). As another sign of high-level sup- the Russian Arctic (…) the Arctic has always been Rus- port, Chilingarov was invited for a private meeting at sian and will always be Russian’ (Moskovskiy komsomo- the presidential residence upon his return to Russia and lets 2007). Chilingarov’s words could suggest that the was told that the expedition members had ‘accomplished fl ag planting had an international direction and aimed a great deed for our state’ (Moscow News 2008). In Jan- to challenge the other Arctic coastal states. Chilingarov’s uary 2008, the high-level support was reiterated when statements concerning the purpose of the expedition are, President Putin signed a decree awarding the title Hero however, not entirely consistent. In another interview, of the Russian Federation to the crew members of the Chilingarov has simply called Arktika 2007 ‘a geographic MIR-1 ‘for the courage and heroism they showed under expedition’ whose main goal was the descent to the North extreme conditions and the successfully conducted opera- Pole seabed (Moskovskiye novosti 2007). Moreover, Ark- tion’ (ITAR-TASS 2008a). tika 2007 incorporated a number of symbols relating to Th e enthusiastic offi cial response to Arktika 2007 the dominant United Russia party which seem superfl u- notwithstanding, however, high-level Russian offi cials ous outside a Russian context. Apart from Chilingarov, have also been cautious not to link the fl ag planting to United Russia was represented by another State Duma Russia’s claims in the Arctic. At the meeting with Chilin- member, Vladimir Gruzdev, who was also onboard the garov at the presidential residence, for instance, Presi- MIR-1 when the Russian fl ag was placed on the North dent Putin explicitly stressed that the results obtained by Pole seabed. Th e MIR-1 also left a time capsule on the Arktika 2007 should become the basis of Russia’s stand seabed which contained a United Russia banner. Th e lead- during future discussions with the other Arctic coastal 28 TIDSSKRIFTET POLITIK IS RUSSIA AN ARCTIC STATUS QUO POWER?

states. In the words of President Putin, ‘the fact that the in well with the status quo interpretation. Even so, clas- ranges are the continuation of the Russian shelf should sifi cation of Russia as a status quo power on the basis be discussed with scientists (…) we should prove it at of the Ilulissat Summit would also seem to depend on international organisations’ (ITAR-TASS 2008a). Shortly certain basic conditions. Given the operationalisation of after awarding the Hero of the Russian Federation titles a status quo power as a power adhering to the existing to the MIR-1 crew members, President Putin also made legal framework based on the UNCLOS, the follow- it clear that Russia is collecting evidence in the Arctic ing minimum conditions can be deduced. First, a sta- precisely because Russia wants to ensure ‘an open and tus quo interpretation would depend on evidence of a objective dialogue’ and that Russia will continue its work positive Russian engagement before the summit. Second, ‘within the framework of existing international proce- the fi ndings would have to reveal a constructive Russian dures’ (Shaverdov 2008: 110). Similarly, the fl ag planting behaviour during the summit. Th ird, Russia would need has been downplayed by the Russian Foreign Minister, to have communicated its participation domestically and Sergey Lavrov, who has compared the fl ag planting to internationally following the summit. the American fl ag on the Moon and argued that Arktika 2007 was part of ‘the extensive work that is based on the 3.1 Pre-summit Engagement Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (Kolodkin, Glandin Th e Ilulissat Summit was convened ‘at the invitation of 2007: 15). During the Ilulissat Summit in May 2008, the Danish Minister for Foreign Aff airs and the Premier Foreign Minister Lavrov made the same point, explicitly of ’ (Ilulissat Declaration 2008). Th e summit denying that the fl ag planting signals a Russian claim emerged as a continuation of an informal brain-storming to the North Pole. In Foreign Minister Lavrov’s words, session among the ‘Arctic Five’ which Norway hosted Russia does not ‘and cannot have any claims to that ter- in Oslo in October 2007 and the invitations for the Il- ritory (…) there is the UN Convention on the Law of ulissat Summit were issued only after informal consul- the Sea and a mechanism of its fulfi lment, which also tations with Norway (Petersen 2008: 56). Russia, by concerns the issue of the continental shelf’ (ITAR-TASS contrast, was not directly involved in the preparations 2008b). Th e third condition is consequently only par- for the Ilulissat Summit, but has by and large supported tially fulfi lled since the enthusiastic high-level reactions the launch of ‘Arctic Five’ cooperation. In Oslo, for in- are accompanied by reassurances of Russia’s adherence stance, Russia’s representatives noted the applicability of to the UNCLOS. an extensive international legal framework to the Arctic Overall, the case study of the Russian fl ag planting Ocean including the UNCLOS and emphasised Rus- challenges the explanatory power of the revisionist inter- sia’s commitment to continued cooperation in the Arctic pretation. Nonetheless, the disharmony between Chilin- (Norwegian Foreign Ministry 2007). Russia also acted in garov’s forceful rhetoric and the offi cial policy line advo- a cooperative way during the preparations for the Ilulis- cated by the presidential administration and the foreign sat Summit. In January 2008, for example, the Danish ministry suggests that the revisionist interpretation can- government presented the participating states with a dis- not be rejected entirely. For that reason, the second case cussion paper which noted the adequacy of the existing study delves into the Ilulissat Summit in 2008 to test the legal framework. Russia accepted the discussion paper status quo interpretation in further detail. and was particularly satisfi ed with an explicit reference to the UNCLOS (Petersen 2008: 59-61). Russia’s coop- 3. Th e Ilulissat Summit eration during the initial preparations for the Ilulissat In May 2008, the fi ve Arctic coastal states gathered in Summit was followed by a highly proactive engagement the Greenlandic town of Ilulissat to discuss the future immediately before the summit. Notably, the Russian of the Arctic region. Th e two-day conference offi cially Foreign Minister Lavrov visited Copenhagen on his way known as the Arctic Ocean Conference took place on to Greenland (Rossiyskaya gazeta 2008). According to 27-29 May 2008 and resulted in the Ilulissat Declara- a Russian newspaper, Foreign Minister Lavrov aimed to tion which was widely seen as defusing the Arctic con- reassure his Danish colleague of Russia’s cooperative at- fl ict potential. Explicitly mentioning the UNCLOS, the titude in advance, downplaying Russia’s assertive moves Ilulissat Declaration notes that ‘an extensive international in the Arctic and emphasising the importance of the UN- legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean’ and that the CLOS (Vremia novostey 2008). On the whole, the evi- ‘Arctic Five’ remain ‘committed to this legal framework dence relating to Russia’s pre-summit engagement would and to the orderly settlement of any possible overlapping therefore seem to fulfi l the first condition. claims’ (Ilulissat Declaration 2008). Against this back- ground, Russia’s participation at the Ilulissat Summit fi ts MORTEN LARSEN NONBOE TEMA 29

3.2 Behaviour during the Summit Foreign Minister Lavrov made it clear that Russia did Th e actual negotiations of the Ilulissat Summit took place not share ‘alarmist prognoses’ of a future ‘battle for the on 28 May 2008. Th e fi rst half of the day was devoted Arctic’ (Lavrov 2008b). Instead, he explicitly stressed the to less disputed matters like the eff ects of climate change importance of the UNCLOS and concluded by noting and issues pertaining to indigenous peoples in the Arctic. how the Arctic is becoming ‘our common home’, echo- Afterwards, the controversial issue of Arctic sovereignty ing Gorbachev’s vision of a ‘common European home’ was discussed during the second half of the day (Rossiy- (Lavrov 2008b). skaya gazeta 2008). Th e level of diplomatic representa- Russia’s focus on the Arctic coastal states and the ex- tion constitutes an instructive starting point when ex- isting legal framework based on the UNCLOS is clearly amining Russia’s behaviour during the summit. Russia refl ected in the fi nal wording of the Ilulissat Declaration. has historically been very conscious about parity in the Th e declaration repeatedly refers to ‘the fi ve coastal states’ level of diplomatic representation in general and parity and their special status in the Arctic and makes a clear with the United States in particular. Russia’s particular distinction between the coastal states and ‘other inter- emphasis on the relationship with the United States is ested parties’ (Ilulissat Declaration 2008). Moreover, in clearly refl ected by the fact that Foreign Minister Lav- keeping with the Russian position, the Ilulissat Declara- rov held bilateral talks with the US Deputy Secretary of tion emphasises the existing framework of international State, John Negroponte, on the sidelines of the summit law and explicitly mentions the UNCLOS (Ilulissat Dec- (Russian Foreign Ministry 2008a). For these reasons, it laration 2008). Th e level of Russian representation and is worth noting that Russia like Denmark and Norway the congruence between Russia’s offi cial position and the was represented by its foreign minister, whereas Canada fi nal wording of the Ilulissat Declaration would seem to was represented by the Canadian Minister for Natural satisfy the second condition of a constructive Russian Resources and the United States was represented at the behaviour during the summit. level of Deputy Secretary of State. While the absence of the Canadian Foreign Minister refl ected his resignation 3.3 Communication on the eve of the summit, the lower level of American rep- Immediately after the summit, Foreign Minister Lavrov resentation appears to have been a conscious choice. Rus- spoke at a joint press conference with the other partici- sian observers, in any case, note that the representative of pants. At the conference, Foreign Minister Lavrov called the United States was a less infl uential fi gure and the rep- the results of the summit ‘substantial and useful’ and resentation by a ‘secondary fi gure’ is seen as an indication added that the summit ‘showed that we have common that the United States did not attach great importance interests’ (Lavrov 2008a). Notably, the Ilulissat Declara- to the summit (Kommersant 2008, Usviatsov 2009: 4). tion was said to refl ect the resolve of all the participants to Th e presence of Foreign Minister Lavrov at the summit solve all potential problems ‘on the basis of international despite the level of American representation suggests a law’ (Lavrov 2008a). constructive Russian behaviour insofar as Russia could Th e day after the summit, the Russian Foreign Min- have sent one of Russia’s eight Deputy Foreign Minis- istry issued a short press release on the results of the Arc- ters of whom one is primarily responsible for multilateral tic Ocean Conference. Th e press release mentioned the diplomacy and climate change related issues (Russian intent of expanding cooperation among the Arctic states Foreign Ministry 2010). In that way, Russia could have and the commitment to legal solutions of any disputes given the impression of complying with the framework of (Russian Foreign Ministry 2008b). Th e press release was international law and maintained diplomatic parity with also published in English and French versions which were the United States simultaneously. clearly addressed at an international audience. On the Th e congruence between Russia’s offi cial position at contrary, it has not been possible to identify evidence of the summit and the wording of the Ilulissat Declaration similar domestic communication apart from the Russian also indicates a constructive Russian behaviour. Th e min- version of the press release. Likewise, few domestic ac- utes of the negotiations are not publicly accessible, but the tors seem to have commented on Russia’s participation Russian position is refl ected by a speech which Foreign at the summit. Minister Lavrov gave at the summit. In the speech, For- Again, however, the presidential representative Artur eign Minister Lavrov emphasised the common interests Chilingarov stands out. After the summit, Chilingarov uniting the Arctic coastal states and avoided reference publicly refuted Foreign Minister Lavrov’s remarks that to extra-regional actors like Finland, , and Swe- Russia has no claims to the North Pole, saying that For- den which are also members of the Arctic Council, but eign Minister Lavrov ‘speaks as a diplomat’ (Kommersant do no border directly on the Arctic Ocean. Specifi cally, 2008). Chilingarov stated that Russia did not need to 30 TIDSSKRIFTET POLITIK IS RUSSIA AN ARCTIC STATUS QUO POWER?

negotiate further but should simply continue working to- is not a unitary actor. Th e forceful rhetoric from Chilin- wards proving its claims. Moreover, Chilingarov warned garov demonstrates the existence of more assertive views against waiting until other countries arrive at the North on the Arctic which the Russian leadership sometimes Pole and urged that Russia should summon strength and seems to accommodate. Remarkably, even Chilingarov ‘do everything to see that Russia grows through the addi- has recently moved to emphasise Russia’s adherence to tion of the North Pole’ (Kommersant 2008). Th e attempt the UNCLOS following the commotion in connection to downplay the importance of the Ilulissat Summit is with the fl ag planting (Moscow News 2008, ITAR-TASS diffi cult to overlook considering Chilingarov’s close links 2010b). Chilingarov is, however, not the only proponent with the presidential administration and United Russia. of an assertive Russian stance in the Arctic. Notably, Th e scarce and rather ambiguous communication of the the commander in chief of the Russian navy, Admiral Ilulissat Summit therefore provides little support for the Vladimir Vysotskiy, has warned that while there is pres- status quo interpretation and suggests that internal dis- ently peace and stability in the Arctic a power-based re- harmony remains a feature of Russian foreign policy in vision up to the point of armed intervention cannot be the Arctic. excluded in the future (Usviatsov 2009: 3). Noting an in- Overall, though, the case study of Russia’s participa- crease in the military activities of the NATO members in tion at the Ilulissat Summit provides signifi cant support the Arctic, the secretary of the Russian Security Council for a status quo interpretation of Russian foreign policy and former director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), in the Arctic. , has similarly urged that Russia should ‘take action now’ to prevent NATO members from driv- 4. Conclusion ing Russia away from the Arctic (Zyśk 2009: 118). Status quo and revisionist interpretations both capture A modifi ed version of the status quo interpretation important elements of Russian foreign policy in the Arc- incorporating revisionist insights would therefore sug- tic. On the one hand, in keeping with the status quo gest that Russia is an Arctic status quo power seeking interpretation, the case studies show that the UNCLOS international cooperation despite some domestic support enjoys considerable support within the presidential ad- for an assertive stance which can explain the existence of ministration and the Russian foreign ministry which revisionist interpretations. favour international cooperation in the Arctic. Recent events provide additional support for a status quo in- terpretation of Russian foreign policy in the Arctic. 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hcheniye glia SMI: Ob uchastii Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii S.V. Notes Lavrova v konferentsii pribrezhnykh arkticheskikh gosudarstv, Ilulissat, 1. Th e UNCLOS specifi es the conditions under which coastal states Grenlandiya, 28 maya 2008 goda/Press release: On the participation of can claim an outer continental shelf beyond a 200-nautical-mile Russia’s Foreign Minister S.V. Lavrov at the conference of Arctic coastal exclusive economic zone which is automatically stipulated in the states, Ilulissat, Greenland, 28 May 2008). Available: http://www. UNCLOS (Colson 2003: 92-94, Kunoy 2007: 465-470). Russia mid.ru/Brp_4.nsf/arh/157B406B6D52F1FFC3257458002E0D0F? ratifi ed the UNCLOS in 1997 and became the fi rst state to submit OpenDocument [2010, 10 October]. a claim within the UNCLOS framework for an outer continental Shaverdov, A 2008, „Арктика: лед и пламень (Arktika: lied i pla- shelf in the Arctic to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Con- men’/Th e Arctic: ice and fl ame)“,Военный дипломат (Voenny diplo- tinental Shelf (CLCS) in 2001. Th e CLCS rejected Russia’s initial mat/ Military Diplomat), vol. 2, pp. 110-119. claim because of inadequate scientifi c evidence, but Russia has been Trenin, D 2010, „Th e Arctic: A Front for Cooperation Not Confl ict“ gathering more data ever since in order to submit a new claim in in Th e Arctic: A View from Moscow, eds. D. Trenin & P.K. Baev, 2013 or 2014 (Kazmin 2010: 27-28). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Moscow. 2. Th e word ’pravo’ both means ’law’ and ‘right’ in Russian. Usviatsov, B 2009, „Кого согреет Арктика (Kogo sogreyet Arktika/ Who will be warmed by the Arctic)“, На страже Заполярья (Na strazhe Zapoliarya/ Guarding the Arctic), vol. 36. Vremia novostey 2008, На айсберги не претендуем (Na aysbergi ne pretenduyem/We lay no claims to the icebergs). Zyśk, K 2009, „Russia and the High North: Security and Defence Per- spectives“ in SG Holtsmark & BA Brooke (eds), Security prospects in the High North: geostrategic thaw or freeze, NATO Defence College, Research Division, Rome, pp. 102-129.