China and the Institutionalization of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Chien-Peng Chung
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INTEGRATION DILEMMAS China and the Institutionalization of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Chien-peng Chung Beijing will back the Shanghai FTER the fall of the Soviet Union in late 1991, the APeople’s Republic of China (PRC), the Russia Cooperation Organization Federation, and four of the new post-Soviet states in Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, as long as it furthers China’s and Uzbekistan—had to establish new relationships. interests in Central Asia and (The fifth Central Asian state, Turkmenistan, follows a foreign policy of neutrality and has refrained from will support institutionalization joining international alliances.) During the subsequent fifteen years, the primary concerns of these countries efforts that foster regional have progressively shifted from demarcating boundar- integration and security. ies, to promoting border security, establishing regional confidence-building measures, and combating what regional policymakers have termed the “three evils” of terrorism, religious extremism, and secessionism. To ad- dress these trans-national issues and challenges, Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan decided to create a regional multi-lateral forum that came to be known as the Shanghai Five because the first meeting of the heads of the member states took place in the Chi- nese city of Shanghai on April 26, 1996. In June 2001, with the admission of Uzbekistan, the Shanghai Five was more formally named the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In recent years the SCO has added CHIEN-PENG CHUNG is assistant professor of politics at Lingnan Uni- versity, Hong Kong. He is the author of Domestic Politics, International to its core focus of fighting the three evils by advancing Bargaining, and China’s Territorial Disputes (Routledge, 2004). cooperation to prevent all forms of cross-border smug- Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 53, no. 5, September/October 2006, pp. 3–14. © 2006 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved. ISSN 1075–8216 / 2006 $9.50 + 0.00. DOI 10.2753/PPC1075-8216530501 Chung China and the SCO 3 From left: President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov, Russian president Vladimir Putin, Kazakhstan’s president Nursultan Nazarbayev, China’s president Hu Jintao, and Kyrgyzstan’s president Kurmanbek Bakiyev, unveil a plaque marking the planting of a tree to commemorate the fifth anniversary of their previous SCO meeting in Shanghai, during a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, June 14, 2006. (AP Photo/ Sergei Guneyev/ ITAR-TASS, Presidential Press Service ) gling and by promoting trade, investment, and economic involvement in constructing and institutionalizing development among member states. multi-lateral regimes reflects not only an aspiration to Apart from the SCO, international politics in the last shape the rules of the game for regional cooperation,3 decade has also witnessed the institutionalization of but also an increasing level of comfort in subscribing several regional multi-lateral regimes in East Asia in to norms of predictable and interdependent behavior which China plays a major role, such as the six-party among states.4 Increased involvement also advances talks on denuclearizing North Korea, the cooperative China’s national interests and projects its influence by forum involving the Association of Southeast Asian raising its positive profile and dispelling concerns and Nations with China, Japan, and South Korea (ASEAN misgivings about its growing economic and military + 3), and the narrower dialogue mechanism between power.5 the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and China As part of Beijing’s official “Good Neighbor Policy,” (ASEAN + China). A multi-lateral regime is a set of China is making active and skillful use of the SCO mutual expectations, rules and regulations, organiza- to accelerate regional integration and cooperation tional plans, efforts, and commitments that has been with neighboring states in post-communist Eurasia. accepted by a group of states with shared interests,1 for PRC officials regularly attend SCO summit meetings, the purpose of removing causes of conflict, promoting ministerial gatherings, and working conferences. This cooperation, establishing standard patterns of behavior, increasing international engagement is the result of a and reducing transaction and research costs.2 China’s foreign policy consensus among China’s leaders and 4 Problems of Post-Communism September/October 2006 international affairs experts, achieved at the end of the SCO Institutionalization twentieth century, that for China to have a peaceful en- vironment conducive to its domestic political stability The SCO and its predecessor, the Shanghai Five, were and economic development, it needs to be more proac- the first multi-lateral security organizations largely initi- tive in shaping its neighborhood. China’s leaders have ated and promoted by China. Beijing’s primary goal for given multi-lateral cooperation a prominent place in the the SCO is to gain the cooperation of the Central Asian country’s national security doctrine, which envisages governments in reducing the threat of Muslim Uighur the development of a virtuous cycle of mutual security separatism in Xinjiang province. On June 15, 2001, through cooperative means. when the SCO was founded in Shanghai, the leaders Institutionalization matters for the study of a of the member states signed the Shanghai Convention regional multi-lateral organization like the SCO Against Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism, which because it provides a starting point from which to clearly defined the cardinal purpose of the organiza- examine policy issues and processes, helps identify tion. The subsequent SCO Charter contains twenty-six the roles, interests, and norms of the actors involved, articles that delineate the purposes, principles, structure, assists with understanding how these actors together and operational rules of the organization.9 The heads of determine the shape and speed of regional integration, the SCO states adopted the charter at a meeting in St. and allows for speculation on the future of the institu- Petersburg in June 2002. According to Article 16 of the tion.6 The degree of institutionalization of a regional charter, SCO members will make decisions by consen- multi-lateral organization is more or less collectively sus, abstention notwithstanding, except for decisions determined by an upward index of objectives outlined regarding the suspension or expulsion of members from and achieved, established norms, procedures, or writ- the organization, which will be made by “consensus mi- ten sets of rules, the size of its physical structures and nus [the] one vote of the member state concerned.”10 permanent staff, the number of committees created, The supreme decision-making body of the SCO is the including the regularity and level of the meetings, Council of Heads of States. Consisting of the presidents and overall organizational longevity.7 It is difficult of the member states, the council holds annual sessions, to address the issue of age, since the SCO and its makes decisions, and issues instructions on all important Shanghai Five precursor were only created within the matters pertaining to the organization. Moving down last ten years. However, China’s enthusiasm for help- one level, the Council of Heads of Government has ing to establish, develop, and structure this regional brought the prime ministers of member states together multi-lateral organization is obvious. The expansion for regular annual meetings since September 2001. This of the Shanghai Five into the SCO and the ongoing group discusses multi-lateral cooperation strategies and consolidation of the SCO make it apparent that the organizational priorities. It also approves the budget for regional process has been progressively institutional- the following year. Lower down, mechanisms exist for ized (see Tables 1, 2, and 3). annual meetings of ministers of foreign affairs, economy, Aside from assessing the level of institutionalization transport, culture, defense, and law enforcement, heads of the SCO, this article also aims to refute the popular of disaster-relief agencies, and general prosecutors. notion that China has a preference for institutionalizing Regular SCO functions are coordinated by a Council of multi-lateral economic forums but not security ones. National Coordinators of SCO member states that meets This is clearly not the case with the SCO, whose primary at least three times a year. Joint working groups may also focus was, and to a large extent still is, to address the be created under the supervision of senior officials in difficulties faced by Russia, China, and the states of Cen- the relevant ministries of member states to tackle issues tral Asia in confronting traditional and non-traditional of common concern. security threats, and combating domestic disturbances The SCO has two permanent bodies: the SCO Sec- and trans-national crime. China considers its involve- retariat and the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure.11 ment in the SCO to be a “key point” in its foreign policy.8 Located in Beijing, the secretariat consists of thirty With the support—or at least acquiescence—of Russia, staff delegated by the member countries in proportion China played a leading role in constructing and insti- to their financial contribution to the SCO budget. The tutionalizing the Shanghai Five, subsequently has done secretariat works closely with the Council of National the same with the SCO, and seems to have a desire to Coordinators in preparing