INTEGRATION DILEMMAS and the Institutionalization of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Chien-peng Chung

Beijing will back the Shanghai FTER the fall of the Soviet Union in late 1991, the APeople’s Republic of China (PRC), the Russia Cooperation Organization Federation, and four of the new post-Soviet states in Central Asia—, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, as long as it furthers China’s and Uzbekistan—had to establish new relationships. interests in Central Asia and (The fifth Central Asian state, Turkmenistan, follows a foreign policy of neutrality and has refrained from will support institutionalization joining international alliances.) During the subsequent fifteen years, the primary concerns of these countries efforts that foster regional have progressively shifted from demarcating boundar- integration and security. ies, to promoting border security, establishing regional confidence-building measures, and combating what regional policymakers have termed the “three evils” of terrorism, religious extremism, and secessionism. To ad- dress these trans-national issues and challenges, Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan decided to create a regional multi-lateral forum that came to be known as the Shanghai Five because the first meeting of the heads of the member states took place in the Chi- nese city of Shanghai on April 26, 1996. In June 2001, with the admission of Uzbekistan, the Shanghai Five was more formally named the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In recent years the SCO has added CHIEN-PENG CHUNG is assistant professor of politics at Lingnan Uni- versity, Hong Kong. He is the author of Domestic Politics, International to its core focus of fighting the three evils by advancing Bargaining, and China’s Territorial Disputes (Routledge, 2004). cooperation to prevent all forms of cross-border smug-

Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 53, no. 5, September/October 2006, pp. 3–14. © 2006 M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved. ISSN 1075–8216 / 2006 $9.50 + 0.00. DOI 10.2753/PPC1075-8216530501 Chung China and the SCO 3 From left: President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov, Russian president , Kazakhstan’s president , China’s president Hu Jintao, and Kyrgyzstan’s president Kurmanbek Bakiyev, unveil a plaque marking the planting of a tree to commemorate the fifth anniversary of their previous SCO meeting in Shanghai, during a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, June 14, 2006. (AP Photo/ Sergei Guneyev/ ITAR-TASS, Presidential Press Service )

gling and by promoting trade, investment, and economic involvement in constructing and institutionalizing development among member states. multi-lateral regimes reflects not only an aspiration to Apart from the SCO, international politics in the last shape the rules of the game for regional cooperation,3 decade has also witnessed the institutionalization of but also an increasing level of comfort in subscribing several regional multi-lateral regimes in East Asia in to norms of predictable and interdependent behavior which China plays a major role, such as the six-party among states.4 Increased involvement also advances talks on denuclearizing North Korea, the cooperative China’s national interests and projects its influence by forum involving the Association of Southeast Asian raising its positive profile and dispelling concerns and Nations with China, Japan, and South Korea (ASEAN misgivings about its growing economic and military + 3), and the narrower dialogue mechanism between power.5 the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and China As part of Beijing’s official “Good Neighbor Policy,” (ASEAN + China). A multi-lateral regime is a set of China is making active and skillful use of the SCO mutual expectations, rules and regulations, organiza- to accelerate regional integration and cooperation tional plans, efforts, and commitments that has been with neighboring states in post-communist Eurasia. accepted by a group of states with shared interests,1 for PRC officials regularly attend SCO summit meetings, the purpose of removing causes of conflict, promoting ministerial gatherings, and working conferences. This cooperation, establishing standard patterns of behavior, increasing international engagement is the result of a and reducing transaction and research costs.2 China’s foreign policy consensus among China’s leaders and

4 Problems of Post-Communism September/October 2006 international affairs experts, achieved at the end of the SCO Institutionalization twentieth century, that for China to have a peaceful en- vironment conducive to its domestic political stability The SCO and its predecessor, the Shanghai Five, were and economic development, it needs to be more proac- the first multi-lateral security organizations largely initi- tive in shaping its neighborhood. China’s leaders have ated and promoted by China. Beijing’s primary goal for given multi-lateral cooperation a prominent place in the the SCO is to gain the cooperation of the Central Asian country’s national security doctrine, which envisages governments in reducing the threat of Muslim Uighur the development of a virtuous cycle of mutual security separatism in Xinjiang province. On June 15, 2001, through cooperative means. when the SCO was founded in Shanghai, the leaders Institutionalization matters for the study of a of the member states signed the Shanghai Convention regional multi-lateral organization like the SCO Against Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism, which because it provides a starting point from which to clearly defined the cardinal purpose of the organiza- examine policy issues and processes, helps identify tion. The subsequent SCO Charter contains twenty-six the roles, interests, and norms of the actors involved, articles that delineate the purposes, principles, structure, assists with understanding how these actors together and operational rules of the organization.9 The heads of determine the shape and speed of regional integration, the SCO states adopted the charter at a meeting in St. and allows for speculation on the future of the institu- Petersburg in June 2002. According to Article 16 of the tion.6 The degree of institutionalization of a regional charter, SCO members will make decisions by consen- multi-lateral organization is more or less collectively sus, abstention notwithstanding, except for decisions determined by an upward index of objectives outlined regarding the suspension or expulsion of members from and achieved, established norms, procedures, or writ- the organization, which will be made by “consensus mi- ten sets of rules, the size of its physical structures and nus [the] one vote of the member state concerned.”10 permanent staff, the number of committees created, The supreme decision-making body of the SCO is the including the regularity and level of the meetings, Council of Heads of States. Consisting of the presidents and overall organizational longevity.7 It is difficult of the member states, the council holds annual sessions, to address the issue of age, since the SCO and its makes decisions, and issues instructions on all important Shanghai Five precursor were only created within the matters pertaining to the organization. Moving down last ten years. However, China’s enthusiasm for help- one level, the Council of Heads of Government has ing to establish, develop, and structure this regional brought the prime ministers of member states together multi-lateral organization is obvious. The expansion for regular annual meetings since September 2001. This of the Shanghai Five into the SCO and the ongoing group discusses multi-lateral cooperation strategies and consolidation of the SCO make it apparent that the organizational priorities. It also approves the budget for regional process has been progressively institutional- the following year. Lower down, mechanisms exist for ized (see Tables 1, 2, and 3). annual meetings of ministers of foreign affairs, economy, Aside from assessing the level of institutionalization transport, culture, defense, and law enforcement, heads of the SCO, this article also aims to refute the popular of disaster-relief agencies, and general prosecutors. notion that China has a preference for institutionalizing Regular SCO functions are coordinated by a Council of multi-lateral economic forums but not security ones. National Coordinators of SCO member states that meets This is clearly not the case with the SCO, whose primary at least three times a year. Joint working groups may also focus was, and to a large extent still is, to address the be created under the supervision of senior officials in difficulties faced by Russia, China, and the states of Cen- the relevant ministries of member states to tackle issues tral Asia in confronting traditional and non-traditional of common concern. security threats, and combating domestic disturbances The SCO has two permanent bodies: the SCO Sec- and trans-national crime. China considers its involve- retariat and the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure.11 ment in the SCO to be a “key point” in its foreign policy.8 Located in Beijing, the secretariat consists of thirty With the support—or at least acquiescence—of Russia, staff delegated by the member countries in proportion China played a leading role in constructing and insti- to their financial contribution to the SCO budget. The tutionalizing the Shanghai Five, subsequently has done secretariat works closely with the Council of National the same with the SCO, and seems to have a desire to Coordinators in preparing draft documents, making continue in this capacity. suggestions, implementing resolutions, and exercis-

Chung China and the SCO 5 Table 1 Institutionalization of Shanghai Five vs. Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Meetings and Organs

Shanghai Five, 1996–2000 Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2001–

Type/level of meeting held Location and date of meeting

Summit Shanghai, April 26, 1996 Shanghai, June 14–15, 2001 Head of state Moscow, April 24, 1997 St. Petersburg, June 7, 2002 Almaty, July 3, 1998 Moscow, May 28–29, 2003 Bishkek, August 24–26, 1999 Tashkent, June 17, 2004 Dushanbe, July 5, 2000 Astana, July 5, 2005 Shanghai, June 15–16, 2006 Heads of government/ Almaty, September 13–14, 2001 prime ministers Beijing, September 23, 2003 Bishkek, September 23, 2004 Moscow, October 26, 2005 Ministerial level Ministers of foreign affairs July 4, 2000 January 7, 2002 April 28, 2001 April 26, 2002 September 5, 2002 October 23, 2003 April 29, 2003 January 15, 2004 April 23, 2004 February 25, 2005 Ministers of defense March 28, 2000 November 20, 2002 September 10, 2003 Ministers of culture April 11–12, 2002 July 2005 April 27–28, 2006 Ministers of economy and trade May 28–29, 2002 September 5–6, 2003 Ministers of transport November 20, 2002 September 10, 2003 Parliamentary speakers May 30, 2006

Committee/agency/department level Heads of law-enforcement bodies and November 1999 October 10–11, 2001 security services (Bishkek group) May 23, 2002 Departments of emergencies April 29–30, 2002 Prosecutors general October 30, 2002 September 3–4, 2003 Council of National Coordinators 16 meetings by June 2006 Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure October 31, 2003 Council May 1, 2004 March 30, 2005 September 2005 March 29, 2006

(Continued)

6 Problems of Post-Communism September/October 2006 Table 1 (Continued) Shanghai Five, 1996–2000 Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2001–

Type/level of meeting held Location and date of meeting

Permanent staff Secretariat, Beijing, China Headed by secretary-general 3 deputy secretaries 1 assistant secretary 30 staff members Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, Headed by executive director Tashkent, Uzbekistan Permanent representatives

Source: Shanghai Cooperation Organization Web site (www.sectsco.org); news reports.

ing budgetary supervision for the organization. The in the founding charter and to settle disputes between Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) is located in member states. Tashkent, Uzbekistan, and its personnel are responsible for collecting and sharing intelligence on suspected terrorist groups operating in SCO member states. The Rapid Growth Benefits Beijing secretariat was inaugurated on January 15, 2004, and In only three years the SCO has achieved a high degree the first meeting of the RATS Executive Committee of institutionalization. There are three major reasons for was held on October 31, 2003. The combined 2005–6 this rapid development. budgets for both the secretariat and RATS is $3.2 mil- lion, with $1.95 million earmarked for the secretariat, Shanghai Five Legacy. The process of institutional- and $1.25 million to RATS. China and Russia each ization was already under way within the predecessor pay 24 percent of the budget, Kazakhstan 21 percent, of the SCO, the Shanghai Five forum. The Shanghai Uzbekistan 15 percent, Kyrgyzstan 10 percent, and Five mechanism for boundary demarcations and con- Tajikistan 6 percent.12 fidence-building among the heads of state of China, The Council of Heads of State appoints both the exec- Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan was utive secretary of the SCO and the director of the RATS established at the first summit in Shanghai on April 26, Executive Committee, each for a term of three years. 1996. Exactly one year later, the heads of the five countries The first SCO secretary-general was China’s Zhang held a second meeting in Moscow, where they signed an Deguang, and the first director of RATS is Viacheslav Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces along Kasymov from Uzbekistan. Members rotate according to China’s borders with Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyz- the alphabetical order of their country’s Russian names stan. At the third summit in Almaty, Kazakhstan, on July 3, to serve three-year terms. The secretary is assisted by 1998, discussions expanded into non-border issues, such three deputies in charge of political-security, economic- as cooperation against the common threats of terrorism, humanitarian, and administrative-legal-budget affairs, religious fundamentalism, and separatism. At the fourth and an assistant secretary in charge of external and summit, in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on August 24, 1999, the media relations. The SCO Heads of State meeting in group agreed to institute regular meetings among officials 2004 established a Council of Permanent Representa- of various government departments of the member-states. tives from member states to exercise direct supervision In November 1999, the heads of law enforcement agencies over RATS.13 Given the increasing interactions among in the Shanghai Five countries met for the first time. The the SCO states and the many areas of shared issues, first meeting of defense ministers of the group was held perhaps the next step in institutionalizing the organiza- in Astana, Kazakhstan, in March 2000.14 The first meeting tion will be to set up a tribunal of representatives from of the group’s foreign ministers was held on July 5, 2000, member states to interpret the provisions laid down just before the fifth summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. The

Chung China and the SCO 7 Table 2 Summits of SCO Heads of State

Location and date Participants Accomplishments

Shanghai, June 14–15, Jiang Zemin, PRC Signed Declaration on Establishment of SCO; signed 2001 Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan Shanghai Convention Against Terrorism, Separatism, and Askar Akayev, Kyrgyzstan Extremism Imomali Rakhmonov, Tajikistan Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan Vladimir Putin, Russia St. Petersburg, June 7, Jiang Zemin, PRC Signed Charter of SCO; agreed on regional anti-terrorist 2002 Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan structure Askar Akayev, Kyrgyzstan Imomali Rakhmonov, Tajikistan Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan Vladimir Putin, Russia

Moscow, May 28–29, Hu Jintao, PRC Agreed on SCO flag and emblem, formation of secretari- 2003 Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan at, administration of budget, and designation of executive Askar Akayev, Kyrgyzstan secretary; discussed economic cooperation within SCO Imomali Rakhmonov, Tajikistan Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan Vladimir Putin, Russia

Tashkent, Uzbekistan Hu Jintao, PRC Signed Agreement on Combating Trafficking of Illegal June 17, 2004 Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances; approved Askar Akayev, Kyrgyzstan observer status for Mongolia Imomali Rakhmonov, Tajikistan Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan Vladimir Putin, Russia Astana, Kazakhstan, Hu Jintao, PRC Issued declaration on eviction of U.S. military forces in July 5, 2005 Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan Central Asia; approved observer status for Iran, Paki- Kurmanbek Bakiyev, Kyrgyzstan stan, and India Imomali Rakhmonov, Tajikistan Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan Vladimir Putin, Russia

Observers: Nambaryn Enhbayar, President of Mongolia Mohammad Reza Aref, First Vice President of Iran Shaukat Aziz, Prime Minister of Pakistan Natwar Singh, External Affairs Minister of India

Dushanbe summit mooted the idea of establishing a member states. Although the Shanghai Five/SCO is not Shanghai Five Council of National Coordinators to fos- a military alliance directed against any external parties,16 ter regularized coordination for organizational support, leaders in both China and Russia have been united in a which was eventually realized under the SCO. This set strategic partnership since 1996 against what they see as of cabinet-level meetings was annualized and institu- U.S. “hegemonism” and “unipolarity,” and they aim to tionalized when the Shanghai Five became the SCO in maintain their joint sphere of influence in Central Asia. The 2001 with the addition of Uzbekistan. After the SCO was Dushanbe Declaration, issued at the closing ceremony of founded, member states quickly set about planning a flag the fifth summit of Shanghai Five leaders on July 5, 2000, and emblem, permanent secretariat, regional anti-terror- confirmed the right of each state to choose its own path ist structure, and budget for the organization.15 of political, economic, and public policy development, condemned intervention into the internal affairs of other Shared Interests. The operating principles of the SCO states under the pretext of “humanitarian intervention” are reinforced by the shared norms and interests of its and “human rights protection,” and supported efforts by

8 Problems of Post-Communism September/October 2006 Table 3 Summits of SCO Prime Ministers

Location and date Participants Accomplishments

Almaty, Kazakhstan, Zhu Rongji, PRC Signed memorandum on basic goals and directions on September 13–14, 2001 Kasymzhomart Tokayev, Kazakhstan trade and economic cooperation Kurmanbek Bakiyev, Kyrgyzstan Mikhail Kasyanov, Russia Akil Aikilov, Tajikistan Utkir Sultanov, Uzbekistan Beijing, September 23, Wen Jiabao, PRC Ratified heads of states’ agreements on structure and 2003 Daniyal Akhmetov, Kazakhstan staff of SCO bodies; approved SCO budget for 2004 Nikolai Tanayev, Kyrgyzstan Mikhail Kasyanov, Russia Akil Aikilov, Tajikistan Utkir Sultanov, Uzbekistan Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, Wen Jiabao, PRC Approved “Action Plan” on economic, technical-sci- September 23, 2004 Daniyal Akhmetov, Kazakhstan entific, and humanitarian cooperation; applied for Nikolai Tanayev, Kyrgyzstan observer status at UN General Assembly; approved Mikhail Fradkov, Russia SCO budget for 2005 Akil Aikilov, Tajikistan Shavdat Mirziaev, Uzbekistan Moscow, October 26, Wen Jiabao, PRC Issued instructions to execute Action Plan, with prior- 2005 Daniyal Akhmetov, Kazakhstan ity on energy, transport, telecommunications, science, Felix Kulov, Kyrgyzstan technology, agriculture, and customs regulation; agreed Mikhail Fradkov, Russia on structure and principles of SCO Development Akil Aikilov, Tajikistan Fund, and inter-bank cooperation; established SCO- Utkir Sultanov, deputy PM, Uzbekistan Afghanistan contact group; approved SCO budget for 2006 Observers: Tsakhiagin Elbegdorj, prime minister of Mongolia Parviz Davudi, first vice president of Iran Shaukat Aziz, prime minister of Pakistan Natwar Singh, external affairs minister of India member states to protect the independence, sovereignty, Cooperation among governments against terrorism, territorial integrity, and social stability of member states.17 religious fundamentalism, and separatism has remained This declaration, more than any other document, defines the focus of the SCO. However, poverty is a major source the norms of the Shanghai Five forum, and its content has of instability in Central Asia and Xinjiang province. been repeated in various forms at subsequent SCO summit Therefore, beginning with the 2003 summit in Moscow, meetings. The Central Asian countries had others motives the SCO has expanded to embrace economic coopera- for banding together, including gaining international atten- tion in the form of encouraging trade, investment, and tion and recognition, and securing support to help fight local infrastructure development among member countries Islamist terrorist groups such as the Islamic Movement of and cracking down on the trafficking of illicit arms, Uzbekistan and Hizb-ut-Tahrir. They also hoped that the ammunition, explosives, and particularly narcotics from Chinese market could help reduce their trade dependence Afghanistan.18 To further SCO cooperation and institu- on Russia. The leaders of these countries believed that these tionalization, leaders at the fourth SCO annual summit aims could be achieved in part by working with China, first on June 17, 2004, in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, signed an in the Shanghai Five and subsequently in the SCO. Even Agreement on Cooperation in Combating Illegal Turn- after the overthrow of President Askar Akayev in March over of Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances and the 2005, the new leadership of Kyrgyzstan saw enough value Precursors Thereof to tighten customs regimes around in the SCO that it did not contemplate withdrawing from Afghanistan, improve anti-drug-smuggling efforts, and the organization. develop and implement relief programs for poppy farm-

Chung China and the SCO 9 ers in Afghanistan.19 Since then, the focus of the group SCO countries, citing the end of large-scale operations has broadened to include taking joint measures to halt against terrorism in Afghanistan.26 Accordingly, the organized international crime, illegal immigration, and Uzbek government gave the United States 180 days mercenary activities.20 from July 29, 2005, to cease operations at the Karshi- At the 2004 summit, members of the organization Khanabad air base, and this was completed by the end decided to establish five specialized working groups of November.27 in the areas of commerce, customs, quality inspection, investment promotion, and transportation.21 According Spread Chinese Influence. As the SCO is an obvious to Secretary-General Zhang, the SCO has initiated 120 tool for enhancing Chinese power and influence in projects related to customs cooperation, cross-border Central Asia, Beijing has every incentive to push for transportation, harmonization of laws and regulations, the institutionalization of the organization. Since 1996, energy, and railway construction.22 The organization has when Jiang Zemin became the first PRC head of state also declared the goal of realizing the free flow of goods, to visit Central Asia, either the president or the prime services, capital, and technology within a time frame minister of China has visited the region at least once of twenty years, starting in 2005.23 As part of its insti- each year.28 Further reflecting China’s influential role tutionalization efforts, the SCO later created a team of in the SCO, a permanent secretariat building entirely observers to monitor presidential and other elections in funded by the PRC was erected in Beijing in late 2003, member states. To provide further structure to the SCO, and the PRC maintains the largest number of staff the heads of government, meeting in October 2005 in members at the secretariat.29 Zhang Deguang, a former Moscow, signed agreements to establish a mechanism to Chinese ambassador to Russia, became the first SCO provide quick reaction and mutual aid to member states secretary-general. for disaster relief and other emergencies. They created Former PRC foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan has de- an SCO Development Fund, a sort of investment bank scribed the SCO as “the first international organization for joint projects, in 2006.24 They also established an that set counter-terrorism as its target.”30 His statement SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group composed of SCO reflects Beijing’s view of the SCO as a mechanism of secretariat staff and senior diplomats from Afghan em- multi-national cooperation to fight terrorism. China’s bassies in SCO states. In December 2005 the SCO was main goals are to stabilize Central Asia, which is turn- given observer status as a caucus at the United Nations ing out to be a potentially important source of oil and General Assembly. In May 2006 an inaugural meeting gas for its growing economy, and to get the support of of parliamentary speakers of SCO states convened in the region’s governments in its fight against the Uighur Moscow.25 separatists, specifically to deny them cross-border fund- The climate of the July 2005 SCO summit in Ka- ing, equipment, or sanctuary. To avoid being sidelined zakhstan’s capital city, Astana, was heavily influenced by the post-9/11 U.S. military presence in Central Asia, by Western and U.S. criticisms of Islam Karimov, the Beijing pushed hard and successfully at the 2002 St. Uzbek president, for violently suppressing the popular Petersburg summit for the establishment of an SCO re- uprising in Andijan, a city in eastern Uzbekistan, in May gional anti-terrorist center.31 At that meeting, China also 2005. The uprising spread fear and suspicion through- managed to persuade the group to take a stand against the out Central Asia that the United States was engaging in deployment of theater-missile defense (TMD) systems, covert operations to subvert or overthrow the incumbent for a U.S. missile shield would make China’s relatively regimes in the region. In the aftermath of the September small nuclear deterrent force obsolete. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, two SCO These Chinese moves, together with the joint Chi- states, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, provided air base fa- nese-Kyrgyz military exercise in October 2002 and the cilities for use by the U.S. military in connection with its SCO anti-terrorist exercise along the Chinese-Kazakh actions against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which border in August 2003, have effectively turned the group Washington had accused of harboring the masterminds into a quasi-military bloc. The combined SCO exercise of the 9/11 attacks. Reflecting the anti-U.S. feelings of involved 1,300 officers and soldiers from member-states many SCO member states, the joint declaration at the in anti-terrorist maneuvers. The troops used live am- end of the Astana meeting called for a timetable for the munition and practiced deploying helicopters, tanks, withdrawal of U.S.-led forces in Afghanistan and for a armored vehicles, and infantry troops in the region.32 deadline to terminate the use of temporary facilities in A joint command center staffed by SCO senior mili-

10 Problems of Post-Communism September/October 2006 Shanghai Cooperation Organization guests, from left to right, Iran’s president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Pakistan’s president Pervez Musharraf, and Afghanistan’s president Hamid Karzai during pose for a group picture at the Shanghai International Convention Center in China, June 15, 2006. (AP Photo/Elizabeth Dalziel, Pool) tary officers was set up for the exercise, allowing the to include economic cooperation.35 The Chinese presi- individual armed forces to share intelligence, launch dent made a strong push for an early focus on building joint actions, and gain familiarity with one another’s rail and highway infrastructure throughout Eurasia.36 command, control, and coordination structures.33 When At the 2004 SCO summit, China offered $900 million China and Russia held their first joint military exercise in credit at preferential rates to the other five members in August 2005, only observers from other SCO member of the SCO.37 China signed an energy agreement with states were allowed to watch. To bolster its influence Uzbekistan worth $600 million when President Karimov among the clan-based authoritarian regimes of Central visited Beijing only days after suppressing the Andijan Asia, Beijing excused President Karimov’s harsh sup- uprising.38 During his visit Karimov earned praise from pression of the Andijan protests in May 2005, with SCO the Chinese and a commitment to block any international Secretary Zhang calling the disturbance “a terror attack investigation of the Andijan events.39 Before the 2005 carried out by armed religious extremists.”34 SCO summit at Astana, President of China Hu Jintao At its 2003 annual meeting in Moscow, the SCO, separately forged a strategic partnership with President reflecting China’s goals of building comprehensive of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev , pledging to sup- strategic partnerships and cementing its burgeoning eco- port his country’s entry into the World Trade Organiza- nomic role and influence in Central Asia, expanded its tion (WTO) in exchange for a commitment to counter concerns from a primary emphasis on counterterrorism attempts by Xinjiang’s Islamic rebels to find sanctuary

Chung China and the SCO 11 in Kazakhstan.40 Beijing would like the Kazakh leader Tokyo. To make sure that any discussion of the region’s to guarantee the fulfillment of mutually agreed upon oil future will not come at the expense of Japanese interests, and gas contracts through the $700 million, 600-mile Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi initiated a meeting pipeline that the Chinese government is constructing with her Central Asian counterparts in Astana in August across Kazakhstan to Xinjiang.41 Hu also said that China 2004 to carry out as-yet unspecified joint programs would set aside a special development fund of about to promote regional integration and development, in $10 million for training 1,500 people from other SCO what is known as the Central Asia Plus Japan Dialog.45 countries within the next three years, chiefly in the ar- Tokyo’s decision to create an exclusive organization eas of economic, scientific-technical, and humanitarian linking Japan and the countries of Central Asia confirms cooperation.42 its desire to have its own presence in the region. When Russia suggested admitting India as an SCO observer, China agreed, but only if Pakistan and Iran New Delhi. Although India is now an observer member were also admitted as observers at the same time.43 All of the SCO, it is an emerging regional power. As India three states were duly made observer members of the prepares for future increases in its oil and gas demands, SCO at the 2005 summit, joining Mongolia, which had it may become a keen competitor of China for influence been granted observer status the year before. Given and hydrocarbons in Central Asia. India could try to Iran’s animosity toward the United States and its desire involve the SCO in the race for energy resources to operate a nuclear program, a closer relationship be- tween China, Russia, and Iran in a regional multi-lateral institution may prove to be a major obstacle to U.S. Presenting a United Front policy in the Central Asian region. Indeed, the SCO in- In order to limit further U.S. or Japanese attempts to woo vited President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran to attend the former Soviet Central Asian republics away from the sixth SCO Heads of State summit on June 15, 2006, them and to assert their influence in the region, both in Shanghai. The agenda of this summit was to appraise Beijing and Moscow are likely to continue their efforts and consolidate the structure and achievements of the to strengthen the SCO, and even to transform the regional SCO and launch an SCO Business Council to encourage multi-lateral institution into a power bloc. Washington’s private investment in member states.44 abrupt cancellation of aid to Uzbekistan in 2005 because of its human rights record, combined with widespread re- Challenges to Cohesion and gional suspicion of American involvement in the overthrow of Kyrgyzstan president Akayev and the Andijan riots, Consolidation seems to have made Central Asian governments believe Beijing will consider the SCO to be a success story that sticking with China and Russia will better ensure the so long as it furthers the interests, norms, and influ- longevity of their regimes. They appreciate that Beijing and ence of China in Central Asia. Powerful countries Moscow have designed the SCO to preserve the status quo outside Central Eurasia pose the main challenges to and, unlike the United States or other Western countries, the SCO’s organizational cohesion and institutional have refrained from stipulating any market or democratic consolidation. reforms. Although Russia and the four Central Asian SCO states—but not China—are members of both the Central Washington. The United States has approached its Asian Cooperation Organization and the Collective Se- relations with the Central Asian countries on bilateral curity Treaty Organization, they have not pushed these terms, and Washington did not treat the SCO states as organizations at the expense of the SCO, in order not to members of a bloc when it negotiated for military bases offend China’s interests in Central Asia, harm their own in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, requested over-flight interests with China, or divide the SCO. permission from Tajikistan, and conducted military ex- ercises with the armed forces of the three states within the rubric of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Structure Brings Security (NATO) Partnership for Peace program. This strategy Based on the analysis presented in this article, three is designed to weaken the SCO by steering each target tentative conclusions may be drawn from the study country’s foreign and military policies toward individual of the institutionalization process of the SCO. First, arrangements reached with Washington. the Shanghai Five forum became progressively more

12 Problems of Post-Communism September/October 2006 institutionalized as it expanded to become the SCO, al- nium,” in China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy, ed. Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, though it is likely to remain an inter-governmental rather 2005), p. 188. than supra-national organization that will involve little 6. Elizabeth Bomberg, Laura Cram, and David Martin, “The EU’s Insti- surrender of state sovereignty. Second, the proposition tutions,” in The European Union: How Does It Work?, ed. Elizabeth Bomberg and Alexander Stubb (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 64. that China has a preference for institutionalizing multi- 7. Michael E. Smith, Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institu- lateral economic forums but not security arrangements tionalization of Cooperation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 38–46; Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Society (New is not borne out, for China’s enthusiasm toward crafting, Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 12–22. sustaining, and deepening this largely security-oriented 8. Fu Ying, “China and ASEAN in a New Era,” China: An International regional multi-lateral institution has only grown. Third, Journal 1, no. 2 (September 2003): 310–11. the only way that the SCO could break up is if Russia 9. Wang, “China’s Multilateral Diplomacy in the New Millennium,” p. 182. and a majority of its Central Asian neighbors perceive 10. See the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Web site (www.sectsco. that it is no longer in their best interests to stay in the or- org), for all the operational details described in this article. ganization. Of course, the SCO would collapse if China 11. “Russian Diplomat Appointed Deputy CEO of Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” RIA-News Agency, in BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union were to decide to withdraw from it, but the likelihood of (January 15, 2004): 1. that happening is rather low, since the SCO continues to 12. Telephone interview with Du Wei, assistant secretary of the Shanghai strongly reflect the norms, serve the interests, and spread Cooperation Organization (February 27, 2006). 13. “Declaration by the Heads of Member-States of the Shanghai Co- the influence of Chinese foreign policy in Eurasia. operation Organization,” Xinhua (July 5, 2005). The SCO successfully weathered the potentially grave 14. Andrei Kiriilov, “Chi Haotian Hails Shanghai Five Military Coopera- threat to regional stability posed by the unconstitutional tion,” Itar-Tass (April 3, 2001): 1. 15. Alexander Lukin, “Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Problems and regime change in Kyrgyzstan, one of its constituent states. Prospects,” International Affairs (Moscow) 50, no. 3 (2004): 34. The “Tulip Revolution” in March 2005 was instigated by 16. Xu Tao, “Lun Shanghai hezuo zuzhi de jizhihua” (On the Institution- people publicly and loudly critical of President Akayev’s alization of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization), International Politics (Beijing), no. 10 (2003): 1. land-transfer agreement with Beijing in 2001, but in her first 17. Itar-Tass (July 5, 2000). meeting with Chinese leaders, then acting Kyrgyz foreign 18. Hua Yujie, “Shanghai hexuo zuzhi: dique anquan yu jingji jinbu” minister Roza Otunbayeva assured them that the country’s (Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Regional Security and Economic new leadership was committed to preserving friendly rela- Progress), International Politics (China), no. 4 (2005): 90–91. 19. “Declaration by the Heads of Member-States of the Shanghai Coopera- tions with China and remaining in the SCO.46 tion Organization (Astana, July 5, 2005),” posted by the School of Hawaiian, The continued existence of the Shanghai Cooperation Asian, and Pacific Studies, University of Hawaii at Manoa (http://russia.shaps. hawaii.edu/fp/russia/2005/20050705_sco_07.html). Organization is not due simply to its members’ fear of 20. “SCO Pledges to Deal with New Security Challenges,” China Daily displeasing China by withdrawing from it, nor even to (July 6, 2005). the shared norms and interests of the member states. 21. “China Offers 900 Million US Dollars in Credit Loans to SCO Rather, its organizational endurance is attributable to the Members,” Xinhua (June 18, 2004). 22. “SCO Summit Starts to Push for Closer Regional Cooperation,” high level of institutionalization accepted by the member People’s Daily (English ed.) (July 5, 2005). states, a structure that wraps them in an ever-thickening 23. Ibid. web of regular engagement and multiplying issues. 24. “Premier Wen Leaves for Home After SCO Meeting in Moscow,” Xinhua (October 27, 2005). 25. “Joint Communiqué of 2006 SCO Summit (full text),” Chinese gov- Notes ernment official Web portal (www.gov.cn/misc/2005-06/15/content_311296. 1. John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on Inter- htm). national Institutionalization (New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 56. 26. Hu Qihua, “SCO Summit Flexes Anti-Terror Muscles,” China Daily (August 8, 2005). 2. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 27. Jim Garamone, “Uzbeks Ask U.S. to Leave Karshi-Khanabad,” pp. 79–95. Agence France-Presse (August 1, 2005). 28. Zhu Tingchang, “Lun Zhongguo mulin zhengce and lilun yu shijian” 3. Kuik Cheng-Chwee, “Multilateralism in China’s ASEAN Policy: Its (On the Theory and Practice of China’s Neighborly Policy), Zhongguo waijiao Evolution, Characteristics, and Aspiration,” Contemporary Southeast Asia (Chinese Foreign Affairs), no. 8 (August 2001): 18. 27, no. 1 (2005): 119. 29. Telephone interview with Du Wei. 4. This point was made by Alastair Ian Johnston in his chapter “So- cialization in International Institutions: The ASEAN Way and International 30. Andrew Scobell, “Terrorism in Chinese Foreign Policy,” in China Relations Theory,” in International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, Rising, p. 312. ed. G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia 31. “Jiang Zemin Calls for Regional Anti-Terrorism Mechanism Between University Press, 2003), pp. 107–62. Johnston was describing China’s SCO,” Xinhua (January 7, 2001). willingness to be “socialized” into certain norms adopted by member states 32. Gong Xiling and Du Xianzhou, “Coalition 2003: Real Bullet Exer- of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), but the parallel is close enough to cise,” People’s Liberation Daily (August 13, 2003). be applied here. 33. “Five-State Army Drill Targets Terrorism,” China Daily (August 5. Wang Jianwei, “China’s Multilateral Diplomacy in the New Millen- 7, 2005).

Chung China and the SCO 13 34. Goh Sui Noi, “Security Summit Will Also Discuss Economic Ties,” 42. “Hu: SCO Future Hinges on Action,” Xinhua (July 6, 2005). Straits Times (Singapore), (July 5, 2005). 43. “Shanghai hezuo zuzhi—weiyiwu Meiguo shili jieru de guoji zuzhi” 35. David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia,” International Security 29, (Shanghai Cooperation Organization—the Only International Organization no. 3 (winter 2004/5): 74. Without the Intrusion of United States Power) (June 15, 2005) (www.sina. 36. “Hu Jintao’s Speech at the SCO Moscow Summit,” People’s Daily com.cn). (May 30, 2003). 44. “Joint Communiqué of 2006 SCO Summit (full text).” 37. “China Offers 900 Million US Dollars in Credit Loans to SCO 45. S. Frederick Starr, “A Strong Japanese Initiative in Central Asia,” Members,” Xinhua (June 18, 2004). Central Asia-Caucasus Institute: Analysis (October 20, 2004). 38. Ariel Cohen, “Uzbekistan: A Policy Proving Ground for Washington,” 46. Zamir Chargynov, “Revolution, Repression and Re-election in 2005: Eurasian Insight (May 31, 2005) (www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/ China’s Response to Political Developments in Central Asia,” China and articles/eav053105a.shtml, accessed October 7, 2005). Eurasian Quarterly 4, no. 1 (2006): 32. 39. Zamir Chargynov, “Revolution, Repression, and Re-election in 2005: China’s Response to Political Developments in Central Asia,” China and Eurasian Quarterly 4, no. 1 (2006): 33. 40. Goh, “Security Summit Will Also Discuss Economic Ties.” To order reprints, call 1-800-352-2210; 41. “Oil Pipeline to Link Kazakhs to Energy-Hungry China,” Central outside the United States, call 717-632-3535. Asia-Caucasus Institute: Analysis (September 22, 2004).

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