William Riker
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Duncan Black on Lewis Carroll a MATHEMATICAL APPROACH to PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
A MATHEMATICAL APPROACH TO PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION: Duncan Black on Lewis Carroll A MATHEMATICAL APPROACH TO PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION: Duncan Black on Lewis Carroll edited by lain McLean (Official Fellow in Politics, Nuffield College, Oxford) Alistair McMillan (Research Officer, Nuffield College, Oxford) and Burt L. Monroe (Assistant Professor of Political Science, Indiana University) l1li... Springer Science+Business" Media, LLC Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A C.P.1. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN 978-94-010-3735-8 ISBN 978-94-007-0824-2 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-0824-2 Copyright @ 1996 by Springer Science+Business Media New York Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1996 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1996 AlI rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, mechanical, photo-copying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 101 Philip Drive, Assinippi Park, NorwelI, Massachusetts 02061. Printed an acid-free paper. v Contents Editors' Preface vii Introduction IX l. What is the Theory of Voting? ix 2. Duncan Black and the Study of Theoretical Politics xiii 3. The Duncan Black Archive at the University of Glasgow xiv 4. Black's Struggles for Recognition xvi 5. Black and Lewis Carroll XIX 6. Carroll's Principles ofParliamentary Representation xxi 7. The Making of This Book xxviii References for the Introduction xxxi Part 1. The Life and Logic of Lewis Carroll 1 1.1. -
Social Cleavages, Political Institutions and Party Systems: Putting Preferences Back Into the Fundamental Equation of Politics A
SOCIAL CLEAVAGES, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND PARTY SYSTEMS: PUTTING PREFERENCES BACK INTO THE FUNDAMENTAL EQUATION OF POLITICS A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Heather M. Stoll December 2004 c Copyright by Heather M. Stoll 2005 All Rights Reserved ii I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. David D. Laitin, Principal Adviser I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Beatriz Magaloni-Kerpel I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Morris P. Fiorina Approved for the University Committee on Graduate Studies. iii iv Abstract Do the fundamental conflicts in democracies vary? If so, how does this variance affect the party system? And what determines which conflicts are salient where and when? This dis- sertation explores these questions in an attempt to revitalize debate about the neglected (if not denigrated) part of the fundamental equation of politics: preferences. While the com- parative politics literature on political institutions such as electoral systems has exploded in the last two decades, the same cannot be said for the variable that has been called social cleavages, political cleavages, ideological dimensions, and—most generally—preferences. -
Economics 5403: Public Choice: an Introduction to the Political
ECON 5403 F – Topics in the Theory of Public Economics (Political Economy) August 6, 2014. Stanley L. Winer Canada Research Chair Professor in Public Policy. Email: stanley.winer@carleton .ca Tel: 520-2600 x2630. Office Hours: TBA, River Bldg. 5140 Course Objectives: This term ECON 5403 will offer an introduction to the study of political economy, with emphasis on the political economy of public finance. In this course, microeconomics, public economics and analytical political theory are combined in the search for a more comprehensive vision of the economic and political forces underlying the structure and evolution of the public sector and the consequences of political institutions for the allocation and distribution of resources. Topics covered include selected aspects of public goods and externalities, the free-rider problem and collective action, the operation of collective choice mechanisms such as pure majority rule, the relationship between the institutions of representative democracy and economic welfare, the modelling of political competition, special interest politics, time consistency, electoral competitiveness, the efficiency of democracy, and other issues. Some attention is paid to the historical evolution of ideas. In addition to foundational issues and the methods used to study them, we will also look carefully at some recent research papers. Course Requirements: There will be take-home questions to answer at two points over the term (worth 50% of your mark in total), and a project (worth 50%). Due date for the project will be one week after the last class. Sets of questions will be handed out periodically that (in part) review material considered in class. -
RHETORIC and HERESTHETIC in the MISSISSIPPI FREEDOM PARTY CONTROVERSY at the 1964 DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION a Thesis by ADRIA BATTA
RHETORIC AND HERESTHETIC IN THE MISSISSIPPI FREEDOM PARTY CONTROVERSY AT THE 1964 DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION A Thesis by ADRIA BATTAGLIA Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS August 2005 Major Subject: Speech Communication RHETORIC AND HERESTHETIC IN THE MISSISSIPPI FREEDOM PARTY CONTROVERSY AT THE 1964 DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION A Thesis by ADRIA BATTAGLIA Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Approved by: Chair of Committee, James Arnt Aune Committee Members, Kurt Ritter Jennifer R. Mercieca Sarah Gatson August 2005 Major Subject: Speech Communication iii ABSTRACT Rhetoric and Heresthetic in the Mississippi Freedom Party Controversy at the 1964 Democratic Convention. (August 2005) Adria Battaglia, B.A., Texas A&M University; M.A., Texas A&M University Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. James Arnt Aune This thesis shows the development and shifts in rhetorical form as strategies evolve to meet heresthetic demands. This thesis explores the rhetorical crisis that emerged between the Democratic Party and the Mississippi Freedom Party at the 1964 Democratic Convention. Specifically, the focus is on the rhetorical discourse presented by the members of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, Fannie Lou Hamer in particular, at the Credentials Committee two days before the onset of the actual Convention. It is the rhetorical interplay in the specific context of the Committee, the subsequent political bargaining behind the scenes during the next four days of the Convention, and the emerging and evolving constraints as a result of this bargaining that illuminate the symbolic power and limitations behind a rhetoric aimed at redefining race in the nation’s social and political consciousness. -
New Institutional Economics: from Early Intuitions to a New Paradigm?
New Institutional Economics: From Early Intuitions to a New Paradigm? By Claude Ménard and Mary M. Shirley1 This version: September 23, 2011 1 Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne at the University of Paris –Pantheon Sorbonne (Ménard) and Ronald Coase Institute (Ménard and Shirley). Both participated actively to the foundation and are past presidents of the International Society for New Institutional Economics. We are grateful to Alexandra and Lee Benham, Douglass C. North, Oliver E. Williamson, participants in the ISNIE conference in Stirling (2010), the Charles Gide Conference in Paris (2010), and seminars at the University of Paris (Pantheon-Sorbonne) and at George Mason University for their helpful comments on previous versions of this paper. 2 New Institutional Economics: From Early Intuitions to a New Paradigm? Abstract NIE is a success story by many measures: four Nobel laureates in under 20 years, increasing penetration of mainstream journals, and significant impacts on major policy debates. This success is remarkable for a field that took shape as recently as the 1970’s around some relatively vague intuitions. It is even more so when we consider that it was divided from birth into distinct schools of thought. This paper reviews the history of NIE including the creation of an international society (ISNIE), documents the sometimes bumpy road to its current successes, and elucidates the challenges ahead. Will NIE be quietly absorbed by mainstream theory, or will it radically transform neoclassical economics into a new paradigm that includes institutions? I. Introduction New Institutional Economics (NIE) is a success story by many measures. To mention a few: four Nobel laureates in under 20 years; significant impacts on major policy debates ranging from anti-trust law to development aid; increasing penetration of mainstream journals; and a large and growing body of adherents, applied research, and relevant datasets. -
Page 1 the Heresthetic of Local Government Amalgamation
The Heresthetic of Local Government Amalgamation: The Saliency of Dimension The study of heresthetic is a quest to explain how potential political losers might become winners. Local Government amalgamation is invariably a controversial and hotly contested political decision. It thus represents the ideal context to locate a pedagogical discussion regarding how control of dimensions can lead to political success. Specifically, we examine two common dimensions through which amalgamation debate is prosecuted: efficiency (optimizing the ratio of inputs to outputs) and scale (which can be defined according to a number of parameters but which is instead generally discussed in terms of it’s asserted attributes such as capacity to deliver major infrastructure and integrated strategic planning, improved quality of leadership, and enhanced regional advocacy) from the perspective of the heresthetic value to proponents of amalgamation. Moreover, we discuss how revised conceptions of the Principle of Dominance and Principle of Dispersion can guide the heresthetician in the struggle to win hearts and minds during political contest. We conclude that timing and careful control of dimensions can marginalize empirical contest and neutralise some ‘identity’ heresthetic foils and thus contribute significantly to successful prosecution of the case for local government amalgamation. Joseph Drew, Takahiro Endo, Masayoshi Noguchi Page 1 Introduction Heresthetic is the art of exploiting latent attitudes of an audience in such a way that potential losers might become winners (Riker, 1986). It differs fundamentally from rhetoric which is ‘the faculty of defining in any given case the available means of persuasion’ (Aristotle, 2012, p. 8). That is, the heresthetician manipulates along existing tastes and preferences – often by re-casting the debate in terms of alternate salient dimensions – rather than trying to change tastes and preferences. -
The Structure of Heresthetical Power
The Structure of Heresthetical Power Scott Moser¤ John W. Pattyy Elizabeth Maggie Pennz July 5, 2008 Abstract This paper considers manipulation of collective choice – in such environments, a potential alternative is powerful only to the degree that its introduction can affect the collective decision. Using the Banks set (Banks [1985]), we present and characterize alternatives that can, and those that can not, affect sophisticated collective decision making. Along with offering two substantive findings about political manipulation and a link between our results and Riker’s concept of heresthetic, we define a new tournament solution concept that refines the Banks set, which we refer to as the heres- thetically stable set. ¤Research Fellow, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, Email: scott.moser@nuffield.ox.ac.uk. yAssistant Professor, Department of Government & Institute for Quantitative Social Science, Harvard University, Email: [email protected]. zAssistant Professor, Department of Government & Institute for Quantitative Social Science, Harvard University, Email: [email protected]. 1 1 Introduction William Riker defined heresthetic as the art of political strategy. In The Art of Political Ma- nipulation, he describes three aspects of heresthetic: (1) agenda control, (2) strategic voting, and (3) manipulations of dimensions.1 The first two of these aspects – particularly strate- gic/sophisticated voting are well understood – in particular, the results of Farquhar- son [1969], McKelvey and Niemi [1978], Shepsle and Weingast [1984], and Banks [1985] (among others) have provided us with an impressive level of understanding about the strategic incentives of both voters and agenda-setters in situations in which the set of alternatives to be voted upon is predetermined. -
Political Research Quarterly
Political Research Quarterly http://prq.sagepub.com/ Trying to Get What You Want : Heresthetical Maneuvering and U.S. Supreme Court Decision Making Ryan C. Black, Rachel A. Schutte and Timothy R. Johnson Political Research Quarterly published online 22 March 2013 DOI: 10.1177/1065912913482757 The online version of this article can be found at: http://prq.sagepub.com/content/early/2013/03/22/1065912913482757 Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com On behalf of: The University of Utah Western Political Science Association Additional services and information for Political Research Quarterly can be found at: Email Alerts: http://prq.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Subscriptions: http://prq.sagepub.com/subscriptions Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav >> OnlineFirst Version of Record - Mar 22, 2013 What is This? Downloaded from prq.sagepub.com at Serials Records, University of Minnesota Libraries on April 9, 2013 PRQXXX10.1177/1065912913482757Political Research QuarterlyBlack et al. 482757research-article2013 Article Political Research Quarterly XX(X) 1 –12 Trying to Get What You Want: © 2013 University of Utah Reprints and permissions: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Heresthetical Maneuvering and U.S. DOI: 10.1177/1065912913482757 Supreme Court Decision Making prq.sagepub.com Ryan C. Black1, Rachel A. Schutte1, and Timothy R. Johnson2 Abstract Riker famously theorized that political actors faced with suboptimal outcomes might be able to garner a more desirable one by adding issues to the agenda. To date, limited support for Riker’s theory of heresthetics exists, primarily consisting of case studies and anecdotal evidence. We offer a systematic analysis of heresthetical maneuvers in the context of Supreme Court decision making. -
Spatial Model of Voting: Citizens with Inconsistent, Persuadable and Endogenous Policy Preferences
Spatial model of voting: Citizens with inconsistent, persuadable and endogenous policy preferences Lukas Frederik St¨otzer Mannheim, 2014 Spatial model of voting: Citizens with inconsistent, persuadable and endogenous policy preferences Lukas Frederik St¨otzer Inaugural dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Social Sciences in the Graduate School of Economic and Social Sciences at the University of Mannheim written by Lukas Frederik Stotzer¨ Mannheim, Dezember, 2014 Dean: Prof. Dr. Michael Diehl First Examiner: Prof. Thomas Gschwend, Ph.D. Second Examiner: Prof. Daniel Stegmuller,¨ Ph.D. Third Examiner: Prof. Eric Dickson, Ph.D. Date of oral examination: 19 March 2015 Summary Electoral democracies are built on the idea of representation. The electorate selects politicians to represent their interests in the law-making process. Given that citizens hold meaningful preferences about political outcomes, this electoral linkage is supposed to ensure that implemented policies are in line with the public’s will. In political science, spatial voting theories model this connection between citizens’ opinions about policies and their electoral decisions. But what if ordinary voters are not equipped with policy views that easily permit them to select matching candidates: does this distort the simple model of representative democracy? I argue that the electoral linkage between voters and candidates is affected if voters do not reflect the assumptions made about their policy preferences in spatial voting theories. Spatial voting theory builds on a rational choice framework in which policy preferences are assumed to be well-defined, fixed and exogenous. For decades, be- havioral theorists have questioned the usefulness of this oversimplified depiction in attempting to understand and explain the democratic process. -
Become a Political Issue in Indian Politics?
Why Has “Development” Become a Political Issue in Indian Politics? Aseema Sinha Wagener Chair of South Asian Politics Claremont McKenna College Most observers of India have an implicit model of how Indians vote.1 They assume that voters in India act on their primary identities, such as caste or community, and that parties seek votes based on group identities—called vote banks—that can be collated into majorities and coalitions. K.C. Suri articu- lates the logic of this dominant model: 189 People of this country vote more on the basis of emotional issues or primordial loyalties, such as caste, religion, language or region and less on the basis of policies. The victory or defeat of a party depends on how a party or leaders marshal support by appealing to these sentiments or forge coalitions of groups and parties based on these feelings. People of India, unlike in the West, do not think and act as classes, and they vote for the party or leader they think their own, regardless of its or his policies.2 Scholarship on India has accumulated strong evidence that elections are per- meated by caste, language, religion, and identity politics.3 The prominence of parties such as the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Aseema Sinha is the Wagener Chair of South Asian Politics at Claremont McKenna College. She previ- ously taught at University of Wisconsin-Madison and was a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C. Her research interests relate to the political economy of India, India-China comparisons, international organizations, and the rise of India as an emerging power. -
Download Accepted Manuscript Versionadobe
This is an accepted manuscript version of an article published by Taylor and Francis. http://journalauthors.tandf.co.uk/preparation/copyright.asp How Losers Can Turn into Winners in Disputatious Public Policy: A Heuristic for Prospective Herestheticians ABSTRACT The study of heresthetic is a quest to explain how potential political losers might become winners. Local Government amalgamation is invariably a controversial and hotly contested political decision. It thus represents the ideal context to locate a pedagogical discussion regarding how clever herestheticians might act to bring about unlikely political success. Specifically, we extend the heresthetic literature by drawing attention to the costs (opportunity, contingency and legacy costs) inherent to various strategies, the need to carefully evaluate the heresthetic potential of different dimensions according to which amalgamations might be argued, and the importance of ensuring that the rhetorical seasoning is appropriate. This leads us to propose a heuristic that we argue has the potential to turn losers into winners on the vexed matter of local government amalgamations. We conclude by considering the implications of our heuristic for both prospective herestheticians in other public policy areas and for the wider heresthetic research agenda. Keywords: heresthetic, Local Government amalgamation, dimensions, costs Page 1 Heresthetic is the art of exploiting latent attitudes of an audience in such a way that potential losers might become winners (Riker 1986). It differs fundamentally from rhetoric which is ‘the faculty of defining in any given case the available means of persuasion’ (Aristotle 2012, 8). That is, the heresthetician manipulates along existing tastes and preferences – often by re-casting the debate in terms of alternate salient dimensions – rather than trying to change tastes and preferences. -
Power, Politics & Persuasion in Foreign Policy Decision
WHO ADVISES? POWER, POLITICS & PERSUASION IN FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Brent A. Strathman, B.A., M.A. ***** The Ohio State University 2005 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Associate Professor Donald Sylvan, Adviser Professor Richard K. Herrmann ___________________________ Professor Kathleen McGraw Adviser Graduate Program in Political Science ABSTRACT In a complex foreign policy system, involving myriad bureaucracies, advisors, and political entrepreneurs, who advises? What advice is heeded, and which advisor is followed? While most scholars tacitly acknowledge the importance of advisors in international relations, few attempt to answer the question of how advisors impact the decision making process, and the limits to successful advising. Importantly, the question of ‘who advises?’ is often crucial in explaining war and peace, since advisors often impact leader opinions and dictate the course of foreign policy. My dissertation blends insights from psychology and foreign policy to create a comprehensive framework describing foreign policy advising. In my framework, advisors compete against each other in a ‘marketplace of ideas.’ Successful advisors are those who draw from four bases of power (access, expertise, experience, and rhetoric) to posit salient appeals. However, these appeals are constrained by leader dispositions (such as militant assertiveness and political knowledge) and the strategic situation (the foreign policy problem a decision maker faces). I construct a set of hypotheses that combines bases of power, leader predispositions, strategic situation, and advisory technique to predict when advisors matter. I use experiments and comparative case studies to empirically explore these hypotheses.